@parmana/crypto 0.0.0-stage → 0.1.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/LICENSE +202 -0
- package/NOTICE +8 -0
- package/README.md +16 -2
- package/dist/.tsbuildinfo +1 -0
- package/dist/ApprovalArtifactCrypto.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/ApprovalArtifactCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ApprovalArtifactCrypto.js +54 -0
- package/dist/ApprovalArtifactCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ArtifactSigner.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/ArtifactSigner.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ArtifactSigner.js +29 -0
- package/dist/ArtifactSigner.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AuditEventCrypto.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/AuditEventCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AuditEventCrypto.js +57 -0
- package/dist/AuditEventCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationSigner.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationSigner.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationSigner.js +103 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationSigner.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationVerifier.d.ts +53 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationVerifier.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationVerifier.js +66 -0
- package/dist/AuthorizationVerifier.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CallerAuditChainVerifier.d.ts +62 -0
- package/dist/CallerAuditChainVerifier.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CallerAuditChainVerifier.js +97 -0
- package/dist/CallerAuditChainVerifier.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CanonicalSerializer.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/CanonicalSerializer.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CanonicalSerializer.js +78 -0
- package/dist/CanonicalSerializer.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBootstrap.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBootstrap.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBootstrap.js +70 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBootstrap.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBuilder.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBuilder.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBuilder.js +42 -0
- package/dist/CryptoBuilder.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutableContentHasher.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/ExecutableContentHasher.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutableContentHasher.js +25 -0
- package/dist/ExecutableContentHasher.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainCrypto.d.ts +78 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainCrypto.js +165 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainHasher.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainHasher.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainHasher.js +13 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionChainHasher.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.js +29 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCrypto.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCrypto.js +47 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionIntentCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.d.ts +89 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.js +106 -0
- package/dist/ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/HybridSignatureProvider.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/HybridSignatureProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/HybridSignatureProvider.js +90 -0
- package/dist/HybridSignatureProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyBootstrap.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/KeyBootstrap.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyBootstrap.js +37 -0
- package/dist/KeyBootstrap.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyExpiry.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/KeyExpiry.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyExpiry.js +66 -0
- package/dist/KeyExpiry.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyPair.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/KeyPair.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyPair.js +37 -0
- package/dist/KeyPair.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyProvider.d.ts +98 -0
- package/dist/KeyProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyProvider.js +57 -0
- package/dist/KeyProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyStore.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/KeyStore.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/KeyStore.js +2 -0
- package/dist/KeyStore.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/OfflineVerifier.d.ts +74 -0
- package/dist/OfflineVerifier.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/OfflineVerifier.js +263 -0
- package/dist/OfflineVerifier.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeCrypto.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeCrypto.js +79 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeStepUpAuthorizationCrypto.d.ts +55 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeStepUpAuthorizationCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeStepUpAuthorizationCrypto.js +107 -0
- package/dist/PolicyChangeStepUpAuthorizationCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptCrypto.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptCrypto.js +84 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptHasher.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptHasher.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptHasher.js +13 -0
- package/dist/ReceiptHasher.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/RefusalCrypto.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/RefusalCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/RefusalCrypto.js +73 -0
- package/dist/RefusalCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/SignatureCommitment.d.ts +33 -0
- package/dist/SignatureCommitment.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/SignatureCommitment.js +42 -0
- package/dist/SignatureCommitment.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/SignatureVerifier.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/SignatureVerifier.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/SignatureVerifier.js +25 -0
- package/dist/SignatureVerifier.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/Signer.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/Signer.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/Signer.js +2 -0
- package/dist/Signer.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/SignerBootstrap.d.ts +37 -0
- package/dist/SignerBootstrap.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/SignerBootstrap.js +52 -0
- package/dist/SignerBootstrap.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/TrustRecordHasher.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/TrustRecordHasher.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/TrustRecordHasher.js +23 -0
- package/dist/TrustRecordHasher.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/VerificationCrypto.d.ts +132 -0
- package/dist/VerificationCrypto.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/VerificationCrypto.js +229 -0
- package/dist/VerificationCrypto.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/errors/CryptoError.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/errors/CryptoError.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/errors/CryptoError.js +18 -0
- package/dist/errors/CryptoError.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/index.js +73 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/models/HybridCryptoProvider.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/models/HybridCryptoProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/models/HybridCryptoProvider.js +2 -0
- package/dist/models/HybridCryptoProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/CryptoProvider.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/providers/CryptoProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/CryptoProvider.js +2 -0
- package/dist/providers/CryptoProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashProvider.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashProvider.js +2 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashRegistry.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashRegistry.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashRegistry.js +18 -0
- package/dist/providers/HashRegistry.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/ProviderFactory.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/providers/ProviderFactory.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/ProviderFactory.js +13 -0
- package/dist/providers/ProviderFactory.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureProvider.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureProvider.js +2 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureRegistry.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureRegistry.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureRegistry.js +18 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignatureRegistry.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignerKeyProviderAdapter.d.ts +50 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignerKeyProviderAdapter.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignerKeyProviderAdapter.js +66 -0
- package/dist/providers/SignerKeyProviderAdapter.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/hash/SHA256HashProvider.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/providers/hash/SHA256HashProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/hash/SHA256HashProvider.js +12 -0
- package/dist/providers/hash/SHA256HashProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/key/FileKeyProvider.d.ts +85 -0
- package/dist/providers/key/FileKeyProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/key/FileKeyProvider.js +163 -0
- package/dist/providers/key/FileKeyProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Dilithium3SignatureProvider.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Dilithium3SignatureProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Dilithium3SignatureProvider.js +33 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Dilithium3SignatureProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Ed25519SignatureProvider.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Ed25519SignatureProvider.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Ed25519SignatureProvider.js +40 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/Ed25519SignatureProvider.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/assertKeyType.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/assertKeyType.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/assertKeyType.js +19 -0
- package/dist/providers/signature/assertKeyType.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/KmsSigner.d.ts +71 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/KmsSigner.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/KmsSigner.js +270 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/KmsSigner.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/LocalFileSigner.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/LocalFileSigner.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/LocalFileSigner.js +38 -0
- package/dist/providers/signer/LocalFileSigner.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/support/MlDsaSupport.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/support/MlDsaSupport.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/support/MlDsaSupport.js +23 -0
- package/dist/support/MlDsaSupport.js.map +1 -0
- package/package.json +45 -4
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import { CryptoBootstrap } from "./CryptoBootstrap.js";
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import { TrustRecordHasher } from "./TrustRecordHasher.js";
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import { ExecutionChainHasher } from "./ExecutionChainHasher.js";
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import { ArtifactSigner } from "./ArtifactSigner.js";
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import { SignatureVerifier } from "./SignatureVerifier.js";
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import { SignerBootstrap } from "./SignerBootstrap.js";
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import { DEFAULT_KEY_ID } from "./KeyProvider.js";
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/**
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* Execution Chain cryptographic operations.
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*
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* Signs a hash chain over the Executions belonging to one
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* business_transaction_id, reusing the same ArtifactSigner /
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* FileKeyProvider / DEFAULT_KEY_ID stack as every other signed
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* artifact (ReceiptCrypto, VerificationCrypto, PolicyChangeCrypto) --
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* not a third key to manage.
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*
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* A plain SHA-256 hash stored alongside the content it hashes gives no
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* protection against an actor who already has UPDATE rights on the
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* executions row (they can recompute a fresh valid hash over tampered
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* content in the same statement). Signing each chainHash with
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* Parmana's private key closes that: an actor with DB write access but
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* not the private key cannot forge a replacement chain link.
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*/
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export class ExecutionChainCrypto {
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crypto = CryptoBootstrap.create();
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signerPromise = SignerBootstrap.create();
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chainHasher = new ExecutionChainHasher(new TrustRecordHasher(this.crypto));
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signer = new ArtifactSigner(this.crypto);
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verifier = new SignatureVerifier(this.crypto);
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/**
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* Creates the canonical immutable view of one Execution chain
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* link used for hashing and signing. Deliberately excludes
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* chainHash/chainSignature themselves -- the same discipline
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* VerificationCrypto.canonicalRecord already applies to
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* trustRecordHash/signature -- so the signed content never
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* includes its own signature.
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*
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* previousChainHash IS included: it is the chain-linking element,
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* and must be covered by the signature so an attacker cannot
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* re-point this link at a different predecessor without
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* invalidating chainSignature.
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*/
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canonicalChainEntry(execution, previousChainHash) {
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return {
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executionId: execution.executionId,
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businessTransactionId: execution.businessTransactionId,
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decision: execution.decision,
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status: execution.status,
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mode: execution.mode,
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startedAt: execution.startedAt,
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completedAt: execution.completedAt ?? null,
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evidence: execution.evidence ?? null,
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metadata: execution.metadata ?? null,
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previousChainHash,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Computes (chainHash, chainSignature) for one Execution given its
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* fixed previousChainHash -- the chain predecessor's chainHash, or
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* null for the first Execution in a business transaction's chain.
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*/
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async chain(execution, previousChainHash) {
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const entry = this.canonicalChainEntry(execution, previousChainHash);
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const chainHash = await this.chainHasher.hash(entry);
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const keyId = DEFAULT_KEY_ID;
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const signer = await this.signerPromise;
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const value = await this.signer.signWithSigner(entry, keyId, signer);
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const chainSignature = {
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algorithm: this.crypto.signature.algorithm,
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keyId,
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value,
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signedAt: new Date(),
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};
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return {
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previousChainHash,
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chainHash,
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chainSignature,
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};
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}
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/**
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* Verifies one Execution's own chainHash and chainSignature against
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* its recomputed canonical content. Does not check chain linkage --
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* see verifyChain() for that.
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*/
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async verifyEntry(execution) {
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if (execution.chainHash === undefined ||
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execution.chainSignature === undefined) {
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return false;
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}
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const previousChainHash = execution.previousChainHash ?? null;
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const entry = this.canonicalChainEntry(execution, previousChainHash);
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const expectedHash = await this.chainHasher.hash(entry);
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if (expectedHash !== execution.chainHash) {
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return false;
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}
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const signer = await this.signerPromise;
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const publicKey = await signer.getPublicKey(execution.chainSignature.keyId);
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return this.verifier.verify(entry, execution.chainSignature.value, publicKey);
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}
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/**
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* Walks Executions in their already-established (created_at, seq)
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* append order and verifies both per-entry authenticity and
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* previousChainHash linkage to the prior entry's chainHash.
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*
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* An Execution with no chain fields at all is treated as
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* unprotected legacy data -- neither verified nor required to
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* link -- so historical rows and pre-feature test fixtures don't
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* fail verification.
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*/
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async verifyChain(executions) {
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let previous;
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let chainStarted = false;
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for (const execution of executions) {
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const isChained = execution.chainHash !== undefined &&
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execution.chainSignature !== undefined;
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//
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// chain() always writes chainHash and chainSignature together,
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// so an Execution carrying only some chain fields was altered:
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// removing chainSignature must not turn an edited Execution into
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// "unprotected legacy data" that is skipped. Likewise, once the
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// chain has started, a later Execution without chain fields is a
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// break, not legacy data: legacy Executions predate chaining.
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//
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const hasAnyChainField = execution.chainHash !== undefined ||
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execution.chainSignature !== undefined ||
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(execution.previousChainHash ?? null) !== null;
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if (!isChained && hasAnyChainField) {
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return {
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valid: false,
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brokenAt: execution.executionId,
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reason: "Execution carries only some chain fields; chainHash and chainSignature are always written together.",
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};
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}
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if (!isChained && chainStarted) {
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return {
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valid: false,
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brokenAt: execution.executionId,
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reason: "Execution has no chain fields but follows a chained execution.",
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};
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}
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if (isChained) {
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chainStarted = true;
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const entryValid = await this.verifyEntry(execution);
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if (!entryValid) {
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return {
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valid: false,
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brokenAt: execution.executionId,
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reason: "chainHash or chainSignature does not match recomputed content.",
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};
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}
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const expectedPrevious = previous?.chainHash ?? null;
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if ((execution.previousChainHash ?? null) !== expectedPrevious) {
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return {
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|
+
valid: false,
|
|
155
|
+
brokenAt: execution.executionId,
|
|
156
|
+
reason: "previousChainHash does not reference the prior execution's chainHash.",
|
|
157
|
+
};
|
|
158
|
+
}
|
|
159
|
+
}
|
|
160
|
+
previous = execution;
|
|
161
|
+
}
|
|
162
|
+
return { valid: true };
|
|
163
|
+
}
|
|
164
|
+
}
|
|
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|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionChainCrypto.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionChainCrypto.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionChainCrypto.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,2BAA2B,CAAC;AACjE,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAoBlD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,oBAAoB;IACd,MAAM,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAElC,aAAa,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAEzC,WAAW,GAAG,IAAI,oBAAoB,CACrD,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CACnC,CAAC;IAEe,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAEzC,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAE/D;;;;;;;;;;;;OAYG;IACK,mBAAmB,CACzB,SAAoB,EACpB,iBAAgC;QAEhC,OAAO;YACL,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW;YAElC,qBAAqB,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,qBAAqB;YAEtD,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ;YAE5B,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM;YAExB,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI;YAEpB,SAAS,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS;YAE9B,WAAW,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW,IAAI,IAAI;YAE1C,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI;YAEpC,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,QAAQ,IAAI,IAAI;YAEpC,iBAAiB;SAClB,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED;;;;OAIG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CACT,SAAoB,EACpB,iBAAgC;QAEhC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QAErE,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAErD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,cAAc,CAAC;QAE7B,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC;QAExC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAErE,MAAM,cAAc,GAAc;YAChC,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS;YAE1C,KAAK;YAEL,KAAK;YAEL,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE;SACrB,CAAC;QAEF,OAAO;YACL,iBAAiB;YACjB,SAAS;YACT,cAAc;SACf,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED;;;;OAIG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAoB;QACpC,IACE,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS;YACjC,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,SAAS,EACtC,CAAC;YACD,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;QACf,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;QAE9D,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,iBAAiB,CAAC,CAAC;QAErE,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAExD,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACzC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;QACf,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC;QAExC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAE5E,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CACzB,KAAK,EACL,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,KAAK,EAC9B,SAAS,CACV,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED;;;;;;;;;OASG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,WAAW,CACf,UAAgC;QAEhC,IAAI,QAA+B,CAAC;QACpC,IAAI,YAAY,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;QAEzB,KAAK,MAAM,SAAS,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;YACnC,MAAM,SAAS,GACb,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS;gBACjC,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,SAAS,CAAC;YAEzC,EAAE;YACF,+DAA+D;YAC/D,+DAA+D;YAC/D,iEAAiE;YACjE,gEAAgE;YAChE,iEAAiE;YACjE,8DAA8D;YAC9D,EAAE;YACF,MAAM,gBAAgB,GACpB,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS,KAAK,SAAS;gBACjC,SAAS,CAAC,cAAc,KAAK,SAAS;gBACtC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,IAAI,CAAC;YAEjD,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnC,OAAO;oBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;oBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW;oBAC/B,MAAM,EACJ,qGAAqG;iBACxG,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;YAED,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC/B,OAAO;oBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;oBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW;oBAC/B,MAAM,EACJ,gEAAgE;iBACnE,CAAC;YACJ,CAAC;YAED,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;gBACd,YAAY,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;gBAEpB,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;gBAErD,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBAChB,OAAO;wBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;wBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW;wBAC/B,MAAM,EACJ,gEAAgE;qBACnE,CAAC;gBACJ,CAAC;gBAED,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;gBAErD,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,iBAAiB,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,gBAAgB,EAAE,CAAC;oBAC/D,OAAO;wBACL,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK;wBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,WAAW;wBAC/B,MAAM,EACJ,uEAAuE;qBAC1E,CAAC;gBACJ,CAAC;YACH,CAAC;YAED,QAAQ,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;QACvB,CAAC;QAED,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IACzB,CAAC;CACF"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { TrustRecordHasher } from "./TrustRecordHasher.js";
|
|
2
|
+
/**
|
|
3
|
+
* Execution Chain Hasher.
|
|
4
|
+
*/
|
|
5
|
+
export declare class ExecutionChainHasher {
|
|
6
|
+
private readonly hasher;
|
|
7
|
+
constructor(hasher: TrustRecordHasher);
|
|
8
|
+
hash(chainEntry: unknown): Promise<string>;
|
|
9
|
+
}
|
|
10
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionChainHasher.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionChainHasher.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionChainHasher.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAE3D;;GAEG;AACH,qBAAa,oBAAoB;IACnB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;IAAnC,YAA6B,MAAM,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAI;IAEpD,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAE/C;CACF"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* Execution Chain Hasher.
|
|
3
|
+
*/
|
|
4
|
+
export class ExecutionChainHasher {
|
|
5
|
+
hasher;
|
|
6
|
+
constructor(hasher) {
|
|
7
|
+
this.hasher = hasher;
|
|
8
|
+
}
|
|
9
|
+
async hash(chainEntry) {
|
|
10
|
+
return this.hasher.hash(chainEntry);
|
|
11
|
+
}
|
|
12
|
+
}
|
|
13
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionChainHasher.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionChainHasher.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionChainHasher.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,oBAAoB;IACF,MAAM;IAAnC,YAA6B,MAAyB;sBAAzB,MAAM;IAAsB,CAAC;IAE1D,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAmB;QAC5B,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,CAAC;CACF"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { ExecutionIntent } from "@parmana/shared";
|
|
2
|
+
/**
|
|
3
|
+
* The exact projection of an Execution Intent that is hashed and signed
|
|
4
|
+
* (ADR-0012). It excludes `intentHash` and `signature`, which are computed
|
|
5
|
+
* from it.
|
|
6
|
+
*
|
|
7
|
+
* ExecutionIntentCrypto (signing and online verification) and
|
|
8
|
+
* verifyExecutionIntentOffline both use this one function, so the signer and
|
|
9
|
+
* every verifier can never disagree about what was signed. Changing what is
|
|
10
|
+
* included here changes what is signed, and invalidates every existing intent.
|
|
11
|
+
*/
|
|
12
|
+
export declare function canonicalExecutionIntent(intent: ExecutionIntent): {
|
|
13
|
+
intentId: string;
|
|
14
|
+
businessTransactionId: string;
|
|
15
|
+
decisionId: string;
|
|
16
|
+
authorizationId: string;
|
|
17
|
+
policyName: string;
|
|
18
|
+
policyVersion: string;
|
|
19
|
+
policyContentHash: string | undefined;
|
|
20
|
+
signalsHash: string | undefined;
|
|
21
|
+
businessTransactionHash: string;
|
|
22
|
+
action: string;
|
|
23
|
+
target: string;
|
|
24
|
+
submittedBy: string | undefined;
|
|
25
|
+
grantedCapability: string | undefined;
|
|
26
|
+
createdAt: Date;
|
|
27
|
+
};
|
|
28
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAEvD;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe;IAE5D,QAAQ;IAER,qBAAqB;IAErB,UAAU;IAEV,eAAe;IAEf,UAAU;IAEV,aAAa;IAEb,iBAAiB;IAEjB,WAAW;IAEX,uBAAuB;IAEvB,MAAM;IAEN,MAAM;IAEN,WAAW;IAEX,iBAAiB;IAEjB,SAAS;EAEZ"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* The exact projection of an Execution Intent that is hashed and signed
|
|
3
|
+
* (ADR-0012). It excludes `intentHash` and `signature`, which are computed
|
|
4
|
+
* from it.
|
|
5
|
+
*
|
|
6
|
+
* ExecutionIntentCrypto (signing and online verification) and
|
|
7
|
+
* verifyExecutionIntentOffline both use this one function, so the signer and
|
|
8
|
+
* every verifier can never disagree about what was signed. Changing what is
|
|
9
|
+
* included here changes what is signed, and invalidates every existing intent.
|
|
10
|
+
*/
|
|
11
|
+
export function canonicalExecutionIntent(intent) {
|
|
12
|
+
return {
|
|
13
|
+
intentId: intent.intentId,
|
|
14
|
+
businessTransactionId: intent.businessTransactionId,
|
|
15
|
+
decisionId: intent.decisionId,
|
|
16
|
+
authorizationId: intent.authorizationId,
|
|
17
|
+
policyName: intent.policyName,
|
|
18
|
+
policyVersion: intent.policyVersion,
|
|
19
|
+
policyContentHash: intent.policyContentHash,
|
|
20
|
+
signalsHash: intent.signalsHash,
|
|
21
|
+
businessTransactionHash: intent.businessTransactionHash,
|
|
22
|
+
action: intent.action,
|
|
23
|
+
target: intent.target,
|
|
24
|
+
submittedBy: intent.submittedBy,
|
|
25
|
+
grantedCapability: intent.grantedCapability,
|
|
26
|
+
createdAt: intent.createdAt,
|
|
27
|
+
};
|
|
28
|
+
}
|
|
29
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA;;;;;;;;;GASG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAuB;IAC9D,OAAO;QACL,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ;QAEzB,qBAAqB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,qBAAqB;QAEnD,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;QAE7B,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,eAAe;QAEvC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU;QAE7B,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,aAAa;QAEnC,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB;QAE3C,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW;QAE/B,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB;QAEvD,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM;QAErB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM;QAErB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW;QAE/B,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,iBAAiB;QAE3C,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS;KAC5B,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import type { ExecutionIntent, Signature } from "@parmana/shared";
|
|
2
|
+
/**
|
|
3
|
+
* Hashes, signs and verifies an Execution Intent (ADR-0012).
|
|
4
|
+
*
|
|
5
|
+
* Same construction as RefusalCrypto: the signature covers a canonical
|
|
6
|
+
* projection of the intent that excludes `intentHash` and `signature`, it is
|
|
7
|
+
* made with the deployment's signing key (local or AWS KMS), and it verifies
|
|
8
|
+
* against the public key alone, so a third party can check an intent without
|
|
9
|
+
* access to the database.
|
|
10
|
+
*/
|
|
11
|
+
export declare class ExecutionIntentCrypto {
|
|
12
|
+
private readonly crypto;
|
|
13
|
+
private readonly signerPromise;
|
|
14
|
+
private readonly hasher;
|
|
15
|
+
private readonly signer;
|
|
16
|
+
private readonly verifier;
|
|
17
|
+
hash(intent: ExecutionIntent): Promise<string>;
|
|
18
|
+
sign(intent: ExecutionIntent): Promise<Signature>;
|
|
19
|
+
verify(intent: ExecutionIntent): Promise<boolean>;
|
|
20
|
+
}
|
|
21
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionIntentCrypto.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionIntentCrypto.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionIntentCrypto.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAUlE;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,qBAAa,qBAAqB;IAChC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAA4B;IAEnD,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,aAAa,CAA4B;IAE1D,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAsC;IAE7D,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CAAmC;IAE1D,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAsC;IAEzD,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAEnD;IAEK,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAoBtD;IAEK,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAgBtD;CACF"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
import { CryptoBootstrap } from "./CryptoBootstrap.js";
|
|
2
|
+
import { canonicalExecutionIntent } from "./ExecutionIntentCanonicalView.js";
|
|
3
|
+
import { TrustRecordHasher } from "./TrustRecordHasher.js";
|
|
4
|
+
import { ArtifactSigner } from "./ArtifactSigner.js";
|
|
5
|
+
import { SignatureVerifier } from "./SignatureVerifier.js";
|
|
6
|
+
import { SignerBootstrap } from "./SignerBootstrap.js";
|
|
7
|
+
import { currentVerificationKeyId } from "./KeyProvider.js";
|
|
8
|
+
/**
|
|
9
|
+
* Hashes, signs and verifies an Execution Intent (ADR-0012).
|
|
10
|
+
*
|
|
11
|
+
* Same construction as RefusalCrypto: the signature covers a canonical
|
|
12
|
+
* projection of the intent that excludes `intentHash` and `signature`, it is
|
|
13
|
+
* made with the deployment's signing key (local or AWS KMS), and it verifies
|
|
14
|
+
* against the public key alone, so a third party can check an intent without
|
|
15
|
+
* access to the database.
|
|
16
|
+
*/
|
|
17
|
+
export class ExecutionIntentCrypto {
|
|
18
|
+
crypto = CryptoBootstrap.create();
|
|
19
|
+
signerPromise = SignerBootstrap.create();
|
|
20
|
+
hasher = new TrustRecordHasher(this.crypto);
|
|
21
|
+
signer = new ArtifactSigner(this.crypto);
|
|
22
|
+
verifier = new SignatureVerifier(this.crypto);
|
|
23
|
+
async hash(intent) {
|
|
24
|
+
return this.hasher.hash(canonicalExecutionIntent(intent));
|
|
25
|
+
}
|
|
26
|
+
async sign(intent) {
|
|
27
|
+
const keyId = currentVerificationKeyId();
|
|
28
|
+
const signer = await this.signerPromise;
|
|
29
|
+
const value = await this.signer.signWithSigner(canonicalExecutionIntent(intent), keyId, signer);
|
|
30
|
+
return {
|
|
31
|
+
algorithm: this.crypto.signature.algorithm,
|
|
32
|
+
keyId,
|
|
33
|
+
value,
|
|
34
|
+
signedAt: new Date(),
|
|
35
|
+
};
|
|
36
|
+
}
|
|
37
|
+
async verify(intent) {
|
|
38
|
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const expectedHash = await this.hash(intent);
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return false;
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}
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const signer = await this.signerPromise;
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const publicKey = await signer.getPublicKey(intent.signature.keyId);
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return this.verifier.verify(canonicalExecutionIntent(intent), intent.signature.value, publicKey);
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{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionIntentCrypto.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionIntentCrypto.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,mCAAmC,CAAC;AAC7E,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,qBAAqB,CAAC;AACrD,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,wBAAwB,CAAC;AAC3D,OAAO,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACvD,OAAO,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAE5D;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,qBAAqB;IACf,MAAM,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAElC,aAAa,GAAG,eAAe,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IAEzC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAE5C,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,cAAc,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAEzC,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,iBAAiB,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAE/D,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAuB;QAChC,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5D,CAAC;IAED,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAuB;QAChC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,wBAAwB,EAAE,CAAC;QAEzC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC;QAExC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,cAAc,CAC5C,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAChC,KAAK,EACL,MAAM,CACP,CAAC;QAEF,OAAO;YACL,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,SAAS;YAE1C,KAAK;YAEL,KAAK;YAEL,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE;SACrB,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;IAED,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAuB;QAClC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;QAE7C,IAAI,YAAY,KAAK,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;YACvC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;QACf,CAAC;QAED,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,CAAC;QAExC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,MAAM,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAEpE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM,CACzB,wBAAwB,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,EAChC,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,EACtB,SAAS,CACV,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;CACF"}
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import type { ExecutionTrustRecord } from "@parmana/shared";
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/**
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* The exact canonical view of an Execution Trust Record that is
|
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* hashed and signed -- extracted out of VerificationCrypto (which
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* still delegates here, unchanged behavior) so there is exactly one
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* implementation of "which fields participate in the signature,"
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* shared by the online verifier (VerificationCrypto, which resolves
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* keys via FileKeyProvider) and the offline verifier
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* (OfflineVerifier.ts, which takes public keys directly and never
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* touches disk, env vars, or the network). Two independent
|
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* reimplementations of this field list would be a correctness risk in
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* their own right -- exactly the kind of drift a third-party verifier
|
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* must never have to guess at.
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*
|
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* PQC audit RED-1 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): before this file
|
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* existed, this mapping lived only as a private method on
|
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* VerificationCrypto, so a third party had no way to reconstruct it
|
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* without reading this repository's source directly. A separately
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* published verifier now ships the same mapping (canonicalExecutionTrustRecord and
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* hybridCanonicalExecutionTrustRecord); keep the two in sync.
|
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*/
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export declare function canonicalExecutionTrustRecord(trustRecord: ExecutionTrustRecord): {
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trustRecordId: string;
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businessTransactionId: string;
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transaction: import("@parmana/shared").BusinessTransaction;
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authorization: import("@parmana/shared").SignedExecutionAuthorization | undefined;
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overrides: readonly import("@parmana/shared").Override[];
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executions: readonly import("@parmana/shared").Execution[];
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createdAt: Date;
|
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};
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/**
|
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* The canonical view signed/verified by the hybrid `signatures`
|
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* array: the same content as canonicalExecutionTrustRecord(), plus
|
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* schemaVersion. Kept separate so the legacy `signature` field's
|
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* signed content -- and therefore its verifiability by pre-hybrid-era
|
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* verifiers, including the published third-party verifier -- never changes.
|
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*/
|
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export declare function hybridCanonicalExecutionTrustRecord(trustRecord: ExecutionTrustRecord, schemaVersion: number): {
|
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trustRecordId: string;
|
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businessTransactionId: string;
|
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transaction: import("@parmana/shared").BusinessTransaction;
|
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authorization: import("@parmana/shared").SignedExecutionAuthorization | undefined;
|
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overrides: readonly import("@parmana/shared").Override[];
|
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executions: readonly import("@parmana/shared").Execution[];
|
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createdAt: Date;
|
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schemaVersion: number;
|
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};
|
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/**
|
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* Schema version of a hybrid envelope that signs the whole record
|
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|
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* (ADR-0016). Version 2 signs only the canonical fields plus schemaVersion.
|
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+
*/
|
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|
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export declare const WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION = 3;
|
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|
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/**
|
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|
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* True when a record created at createdAt is at or after the cutover (ADR-0016,
|
|
55
|
+
* option 2). The instant itself is included. A record whose createdAt does not
|
|
56
|
+
* parse is not treated as after the cutover; its signatures fail on their own.
|
|
57
|
+
*/
|
|
58
|
+
export declare function isAtOrAfterCutover(createdAt: Date | string, hybridRequiredFrom: string | undefined): boolean;
|
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|
+
/**
|
|
60
|
+
* Hybrid schema versions this codebase can sign and verify. Anything else
|
|
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|
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* is rejected rather than canonicalized under a guessed view.
|
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*/
|
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|
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export declare const SUPPORTED_HYBRID_SCHEMA_VERSIONS: readonly [2, 3];
|
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|
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/**
|
|
65
|
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* Selects the canonical view that a hybrid `signatures` array covers for
|
|
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|
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* a given schema version. Version 3 covers the whole record; every other
|
|
67
|
+
* version keeps the version 2 view, so existing records verify unchanged.
|
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|
+
*/
|
|
69
|
+
export declare function hybridSignedCanonicalView(trustRecord: ExecutionTrustRecord, schemaVersion: number): {
|
|
70
|
+
schemaVersion: number;
|
|
71
|
+
};
|
|
72
|
+
/**
|
|
73
|
+
* Top-level fields that a schema version 3 (whole-record) signature does
|
|
74
|
+
* not cover. The signature fields hold the signatures themselves.
|
|
75
|
+
* `verifications` and `receipts` are attached to the stored record after
|
|
76
|
+
* it is signed (ADR-0016); receipts carry their own signature.
|
|
77
|
+
*/
|
|
78
|
+
export declare const WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS: readonly ["signature", "signatures", "schemaVersion", "verifications", "receipts"];
|
|
79
|
+
/**
|
|
80
|
+
* The canonical view signed by a schema version 3 hybrid envelope: every
|
|
81
|
+
* top-level field of the record except WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS, plus
|
|
82
|
+
* the schema version itself. `trustRecordHash` is covered, because it is
|
|
83
|
+
* set before the v3 signature is made. Built with Object.fromEntries, so a
|
|
84
|
+
* field named "__proto__" stays an ordinary covered field.
|
|
85
|
+
*/
|
|
86
|
+
export declare function wholeRecordCanonicalView(trustRecord: ExecutionTrustRecord, schemaVersion: number): {
|
|
87
|
+
schemaVersion: number;
|
|
88
|
+
};
|
|
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|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
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{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAE5D;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,wBAAgB,6BAA6B,CAC3C,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB;IAG/B,aAAa;IAEb,qBAAqB;IAErB,WAAW;IAEX,aAAa;IAEb,SAAS;IAET,UAAU;IAEV,SAAS;EAEZ;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,mCAAmC,CACjD,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB,EACjC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM;;;;;;;;;EAMtB;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,2BAA2B,IAAI,CAAC;AAE7C;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAChC,SAAS,EAAE,IAAI,GAAG,MAAM,EACxB,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,GACrC,OAAO,CAQT;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,gCAAgC,YAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAU,CAAC;AAEhE;;;;GAIG;AACH,wBAAgB,yBAAyB,CACvC,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB,EACjC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM;;EAOtB;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,eAAO,MAAM,4BAA4B,YACvC,WAAW,EACX,YAAY,EACZ,eAAe,EACf,eAAe,EACf,UAAU,CACF,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,wBAAwB,CACtC,WAAW,EAAE,oBAAoB,EACjC,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM;;EAYtB"}
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* The exact canonical view of an Execution Trust Record that is
|
|
3
|
+
* hashed and signed -- extracted out of VerificationCrypto (which
|
|
4
|
+
* still delegates here, unchanged behavior) so there is exactly one
|
|
5
|
+
* implementation of "which fields participate in the signature,"
|
|
6
|
+
* shared by the online verifier (VerificationCrypto, which resolves
|
|
7
|
+
* keys via FileKeyProvider) and the offline verifier
|
|
8
|
+
* (OfflineVerifier.ts, which takes public keys directly and never
|
|
9
|
+
* touches disk, env vars, or the network). Two independent
|
|
10
|
+
* reimplementations of this field list would be a correctness risk in
|
|
11
|
+
* their own right -- exactly the kind of drift a third-party verifier
|
|
12
|
+
* must never have to guess at.
|
|
13
|
+
*
|
|
14
|
+
* PQC audit RED-1 (docs/VERIFICATION-GAPS.md): before this file
|
|
15
|
+
* existed, this mapping lived only as a private method on
|
|
16
|
+
* VerificationCrypto, so a third party had no way to reconstruct it
|
|
17
|
+
* without reading this repository's source directly. A separately
|
|
18
|
+
* published verifier now ships the same mapping (canonicalExecutionTrustRecord and
|
|
19
|
+
* hybridCanonicalExecutionTrustRecord); keep the two in sync.
|
|
20
|
+
*/
|
|
21
|
+
export function canonicalExecutionTrustRecord(trustRecord) {
|
|
22
|
+
return {
|
|
23
|
+
trustRecordId: trustRecord.trustRecordId,
|
|
24
|
+
businessTransactionId: trustRecord.businessTransactionId,
|
|
25
|
+
transaction: trustRecord.transaction,
|
|
26
|
+
authorization: trustRecord.authorization,
|
|
27
|
+
overrides: trustRecord.overrides,
|
|
28
|
+
executions: trustRecord.executions,
|
|
29
|
+
createdAt: trustRecord.createdAt,
|
|
30
|
+
};
|
|
31
|
+
}
|
|
32
|
+
/**
|
|
33
|
+
* The canonical view signed/verified by the hybrid `signatures`
|
|
34
|
+
* array: the same content as canonicalExecutionTrustRecord(), plus
|
|
35
|
+
* schemaVersion. Kept separate so the legacy `signature` field's
|
|
36
|
+
* signed content -- and therefore its verifiability by pre-hybrid-era
|
|
37
|
+
* verifiers, including the published third-party verifier -- never changes.
|
|
38
|
+
*/
|
|
39
|
+
export function hybridCanonicalExecutionTrustRecord(trustRecord, schemaVersion) {
|
|
40
|
+
return {
|
|
41
|
+
...canonicalExecutionTrustRecord(trustRecord),
|
|
42
|
+
schemaVersion,
|
|
43
|
+
};
|
|
44
|
+
}
|
|
45
|
+
/**
|
|
46
|
+
* Schema version of a hybrid envelope that signs the whole record
|
|
47
|
+
* (ADR-0016). Version 2 signs only the canonical fields plus schemaVersion.
|
|
48
|
+
*/
|
|
49
|
+
export const WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION = 3;
|
|
50
|
+
/**
|
|
51
|
+
* True when a record created at createdAt is at or after the cutover (ADR-0016,
|
|
52
|
+
* option 2). The instant itself is included. A record whose createdAt does not
|
|
53
|
+
* parse is not treated as after the cutover; its signatures fail on their own.
|
|
54
|
+
*/
|
|
55
|
+
export function isAtOrAfterCutover(createdAt, hybridRequiredFrom) {
|
|
56
|
+
if (hybridRequiredFrom === undefined) {
|
|
57
|
+
return false;
|
|
58
|
+
}
|
|
59
|
+
const created = new Date(createdAt).getTime();
|
|
60
|
+
return !Number.isNaN(created) && created >= Date.parse(hybridRequiredFrom);
|
|
61
|
+
}
|
|
62
|
+
/**
|
|
63
|
+
* Hybrid schema versions this codebase can sign and verify. Anything else
|
|
64
|
+
* is rejected rather than canonicalized under a guessed view.
|
|
65
|
+
*/
|
|
66
|
+
export const SUPPORTED_HYBRID_SCHEMA_VERSIONS = [2, 3];
|
|
67
|
+
/**
|
|
68
|
+
* Selects the canonical view that a hybrid `signatures` array covers for
|
|
69
|
+
* a given schema version. Version 3 covers the whole record; every other
|
|
70
|
+
* version keeps the version 2 view, so existing records verify unchanged.
|
|
71
|
+
*/
|
|
72
|
+
export function hybridSignedCanonicalView(trustRecord, schemaVersion) {
|
|
73
|
+
if (schemaVersion === WHOLE_RECORD_SCHEMA_VERSION) {
|
|
74
|
+
return wholeRecordCanonicalView(trustRecord, schemaVersion);
|
|
75
|
+
}
|
|
76
|
+
return hybridCanonicalExecutionTrustRecord(trustRecord, schemaVersion);
|
|
77
|
+
}
|
|
78
|
+
/**
|
|
79
|
+
* Top-level fields that a schema version 3 (whole-record) signature does
|
|
80
|
+
* not cover. The signature fields hold the signatures themselves.
|
|
81
|
+
* `verifications` and `receipts` are attached to the stored record after
|
|
82
|
+
* it is signed (ADR-0016); receipts carry their own signature.
|
|
83
|
+
*/
|
|
84
|
+
export const WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS = [
|
|
85
|
+
"signature",
|
|
86
|
+
"signatures",
|
|
87
|
+
"schemaVersion",
|
|
88
|
+
"verifications",
|
|
89
|
+
"receipts",
|
|
90
|
+
];
|
|
91
|
+
/**
|
|
92
|
+
* The canonical view signed by a schema version 3 hybrid envelope: every
|
|
93
|
+
* top-level field of the record except WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS, plus
|
|
94
|
+
* the schema version itself. `trustRecordHash` is covered, because it is
|
|
95
|
+
* set before the v3 signature is made. Built with Object.fromEntries, so a
|
|
96
|
+
* field named "__proto__" stays an ordinary covered field.
|
|
97
|
+
*/
|
|
98
|
+
export function wholeRecordCanonicalView(trustRecord, schemaVersion) {
|
|
99
|
+
const excluded = WHOLE_RECORD_EXCLUDED_FIELDS;
|
|
100
|
+
const covered = Object.entries(trustRecord).filter(([key]) => !excluded.includes(key));
|
|
101
|
+
return {
|
|
102
|
+
...Object.fromEntries(covered),
|
|
103
|
+
schemaVersion,
|
|
104
|
+
};
|
|
105
|
+
}
|
|
106
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.js.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/ExecutionTrustRecordCanonicalView.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAmBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,6BAA6B,CAC3C,WAAiC;IAEjC,OAAO;QACL,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa;QAExC,qBAAqB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,qBAAqB;QAExD,WAAW,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,WAAW;QAEpC,aAAa,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,aAAa;QAExC,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS;QAEhC,UAAU,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,UAAU;QAElC,SAAS,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,SAAS;KACjC,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mCAAmC,CACjD,WAAiC,EACjC,aAAqB;IAErB,OAAO;QACL,GAAG,6BAA6B,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC;QAC7C,aAAa;KACd,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,2BAA2B,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AAE7C;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,kBAAkB,CAChC,SAAwB,EACxB,kBAAsC;IAEtC,IAAI,kBAAkB,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;QACrC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IAE9C,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7E,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,gCAAgC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,CAAU,CAAC;AAEhE;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,yBAAyB,CACvC,WAAiC,EACjC,aAAqB;IAErB,IAAI,aAAa,KAAK,2BAA2B,EAAE,CAAC;QAClD,OAAO,wBAAwB,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9D,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,mCAAmC,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,aAAa,CAAC,CAAC;AACzE,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,4BAA4B,GAAG;IAC1C,WAAW;IACX,YAAY;IACZ,eAAe;IACf,eAAe;IACf,UAAU;CACF,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,wBAAwB,CACtC,WAAiC,EACjC,aAAqB;IAErB,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAsB,4BAA4B,CAAC;IAEjE,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,CAChD,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CACnC,CAAC;IAEF,OAAO;QACL,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC;QAC9B,aAAa;KACd,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC"}
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@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
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1
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+
import type { SignatureEntry } from "@parmana/shared";
|
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2
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+
import { CanonicalSerializer } from "./CanonicalSerializer.js";
|
|
3
|
+
import type { KeyProvider } from "./KeyProvider.js";
|
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4
|
+
import type { HybridCryptoProvider } from "./models/HybridCryptoProvider.js";
|
|
5
|
+
/**
|
|
6
|
+
* Signs and verifies an artifact with two independent signature
|
|
7
|
+
* algorithms at once (Hybrid Signature Support milestone, Phase A):
|
|
8
|
+
* "harvest now, decrypt/forge later" defense for the classical-to-
|
|
9
|
+
* post-quantum transition -- if a future quantum computer breaks the
|
|
10
|
+
* primary (classical) algorithm, the secondary (post-quantum)
|
|
11
|
+
* signature alone still holds, and vice versa if any weakness is ever
|
|
12
|
+
* found in the newer PQ scheme.
|
|
13
|
+
*
|
|
14
|
+
* Not a SignatureProvider implementer: that interface signs/verifies
|
|
15
|
+
* with exactly one key in, one signature out. Hybrid fundamentally
|
|
16
|
+
* needs two keys and produces two independent signatures, so this is
|
|
17
|
+
* a purpose-built composition on top of two SignatureProviders
|
|
18
|
+
* (via HybridCryptoProvider) and a KeyProvider, mirroring how
|
|
19
|
+
* VerificationCrypto/ReceiptCrypto already resolve keys by id rather
|
|
20
|
+
* than requiring callers to pre-fetch raw KeyObjects.
|
|
21
|
+
*/
|
|
22
|
+
export declare class HybridSignatureProvider {
|
|
23
|
+
private readonly crypto;
|
|
24
|
+
private readonly keys;
|
|
25
|
+
private readonly serializer;
|
|
26
|
+
constructor(crypto: HybridCryptoProvider, keys: KeyProvider, serializer?: CanonicalSerializer);
|
|
27
|
+
/**
|
|
28
|
+
* Signs the artifact with both configured algorithms, returning
|
|
29
|
+
* both entries in fixed [primary, secondary] order.
|
|
30
|
+
*/
|
|
31
|
+
sign(artifact: unknown, primaryKeyId: string, secondaryKeyId: string): Promise<readonly SignatureEntry[]>;
|
|
32
|
+
/**
|
|
33
|
+
* Verifies every entry in `signatures`. Fail-closed: requires
|
|
34
|
+
* exactly one entry for the primary algorithm and one for the
|
|
35
|
+
* secondary algorithm -- a missing, extra, duplicated, or
|
|
36
|
+
* mismatched-algorithm entry is a rejection, never a partial pass.
|
|
37
|
+
* Both entries must independently verify against their own
|
|
38
|
+
* algorithm's public key (resolved by the entry's own keyId).
|
|
39
|
+
*
|
|
40
|
+
* Key lookup failures (missing/mismatched key material) are not
|
|
41
|
+
* caught here and propagate as thrown errors, mirroring
|
|
42
|
+
* VerificationCrypto.verifySignature()'s existing precedent: a
|
|
43
|
+
* malformed *signature* is a verification failure (returns false);
|
|
44
|
+
* missing *key infrastructure* is an operational error (throws).
|
|
45
|
+
*/
|
|
46
|
+
verify(artifact: unknown, signatures: readonly SignatureEntry[]): Promise<boolean>;
|
|
47
|
+
}
|
|
48
|
+
//# sourceMappingURL=HybridSignatureProvider.d.ts.map
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"HybridSignatureProvider.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/HybridSignatureProvider.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAGtD,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,0BAA0B,CAAC;AAC/D,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,kCAAkC,CAAC;AAG7E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgBG;AACH,qBAAa,uBAAuB;IAEhC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,MAAM;IACvB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI;IACrB,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,UAAU;IAH7B,YACmB,MAAM,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAC5B,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW,EACjB,UAAU,sBAA4B,EACrD;IAEJ;;;OAGG;IACG,IAAI,CACR,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EACjB,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,EACpB,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,GACrB,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC,CA8BpC;IAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;OAaG;IACG,MAAM,CACV,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,EACjB,UAAU,EAAE,SAAS,cAAc,EAAE,GACpC,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CA6ClB;CACF"}
|