@paretools/shared 0.8.0 → 0.8.2

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -5,5 +5,6 @@ export { assertNoFlagInjection, assertAllowedCommand } from "./validation.js";
 export { INPUT_LIMITS } from "./limits.js";
 export { sanitizeErrorOutput } from "./sanitize.js";
 export { shouldRegisterTool } from "./tool-filter.js";
+export { assertAllowedByPolicy, assertAllowedRoot, assertNoPathQualifiedCommand, } from "./policy.js";
 export type { ToolOutput } from "./types.js";
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map

package/dist/index.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC9E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACtD,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,KAAK,SAAS,EAAE,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC9E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EACL,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,4BAA4B,GAC7B,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACrB,YAAY,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC"}

package/dist/index.js

@@ -5,4 +5,5 @@ export { assertNoFlagInjection, assertAllowedCommand } from "./validation.js";
 export { INPUT_LIMITS } from "./limits.js";
 export { sanitizeErrorOutput } from "./sanitize.js";
 export { shouldRegisterTool } from "./tool-filter.js";
+export { assertAllowedByPolicy, assertAllowedRoot, assertNoPathQualifiedCommand, } from "./policy.js";
 //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map

package/dist/index.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,EAAmC,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC9E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"index.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,iBAAiB,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5E,OAAO,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,YAAY,EAAmC,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACjF,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EAAE,qBAAqB,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,MAAM,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAC9E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC3C,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AACpD,OAAO,EAAE,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AACtD,OAAO,EACL,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,4BAA4B,GAC7B,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC"}

package/dist/policy.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+/**
+ * Security policy controls — opt-in hardening via environment variables.
+ *
+ * All controls follow the same global/per-server precedence pattern as
+ * tool filtering (see tool-filter.ts):
+ *
+ *   1. `PARE_{SETTING}` — global, applies to all servers.
+ *   2. `PARE_{SERVER}_{SETTING}` — per-server override.
+ *   3. No env var → permissive (default, no restriction).
+ *
+ * Global takes precedence over per-server when both are set.
+ *
+ * ## Available Controls
+ *
+ * ### PARE_ALLOWED_COMMANDS / PARE_{SERVER}_ALLOWED_COMMANDS
+ * Comma-separated list of allowed command names.
+ * When set, only listed commands may be executed.
+ * Example: `PARE_PROCESS_ALLOWED_COMMANDS=node,python,make`
+ * Example: `PARE_ALLOWED_COMMANDS=node,python,git,npm` (all servers)
+ *
+ * ### PARE_ALLOWED_ROOTS / PARE_{SERVER}_ALLOWED_ROOTS
+ * Comma-separated list of allowed root directories.
+ * When set, all path/cwd parameters must be under one of these roots.
+ * Example: `PARE_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/home/user/projects,/tmp/builds`
+ * Example: `PARE_PROCESS_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/home/user/safe-dir`
+ *
+ * ### PARE_BUILD_STRICT_PATH
+ * When set to "true", the build server rejects path-qualified commands
+ * (e.g., `/tmp/evil/npm`) and only allows bare command names resolved via PATH.
+ */
+/**
+ * Asserts that a command is allowed by the ALLOWED_COMMANDS policy.
+ * No-op when the policy is not configured (permissive default).
+ *
+ * @param command - The command to check (e.g., "node", "python").
+ * @param serverName - Server identifier for per-server overrides (e.g., "process").
+ * @throws Error if the command is not in the allowlist.
+ */
+export declare function assertAllowedByPolicy(command: string, serverName: string): void;
+/**
+ * Asserts that a working directory path is under one of the allowed roots.
+ * No-op when the policy is not configured (permissive default).
+ *
+ * @param targetPath - The path/cwd to validate.
+ * @param serverName - Server identifier for per-server overrides (e.g., "process").
+ * @throws Error if the path is outside all allowed roots.
+ */
+export declare function assertAllowedRoot(targetPath: string, serverName: string): void;
+/**
+ * Asserts that a command does not contain path separators (strict path mode).
+ * Used by build server when PARE_BUILD_STRICT_PATH=true.
+ *
+ * @param command - The command to check.
+ * @throws Error if the command contains `/` or `\`.
+ */
+export declare function assertNoPathQualifiedCommand(command: string): void;
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy.d.ts.map

package/dist/policy.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"policy.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/policy.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AA+BH;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAmB/E;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,wBAAgB,iBAAiB,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAoB9E;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,wBAAgB,4BAA4B,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CASlE"}

package/dist/policy.js

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+/**
+ * Security policy controls — opt-in hardening via environment variables.
+ *
+ * All controls follow the same global/per-server precedence pattern as
+ * tool filtering (see tool-filter.ts):
+ *
+ *   1. `PARE_{SETTING}` — global, applies to all servers.
+ *   2. `PARE_{SERVER}_{SETTING}` — per-server override.
+ *   3. No env var → permissive (default, no restriction).
+ *
+ * Global takes precedence over per-server when both are set.
+ *
+ * ## Available Controls
+ *
+ * ### PARE_ALLOWED_COMMANDS / PARE_{SERVER}_ALLOWED_COMMANDS
+ * Comma-separated list of allowed command names.
+ * When set, only listed commands may be executed.
+ * Example: `PARE_PROCESS_ALLOWED_COMMANDS=node,python,make`
+ * Example: `PARE_ALLOWED_COMMANDS=node,python,git,npm` (all servers)
+ *
+ * ### PARE_ALLOWED_ROOTS / PARE_{SERVER}_ALLOWED_ROOTS
+ * Comma-separated list of allowed root directories.
+ * When set, all path/cwd parameters must be under one of these roots.
+ * Example: `PARE_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/home/user/projects,/tmp/builds`
+ * Example: `PARE_PROCESS_ALLOWED_ROOTS=/home/user/safe-dir`
+ *
+ * ### PARE_BUILD_STRICT_PATH
+ * When set to "true", the build server rejects path-qualified commands
+ * (e.g., `/tmp/evil/npm`) and only allows bare command names resolved via PATH.
+ */
+import { resolve, normalize } from "node:path";
+/**
+ * Reads a policy env var with global/per-server precedence.
+ * Global (`PARE_{setting}`) wins over per-server (`PARE_{SERVER}_{setting}`).
+ * Returns undefined when neither is set (no restriction).
+ */
+function readPolicyVar(serverName, setting) {
+    const global = process.env[`PARE_${setting}`];
+    if (global !== undefined)
+        return global;
+    const envKey = `PARE_${serverName.toUpperCase().replace(/-/g, "_")}_${setting}`;
+    return process.env[envKey];
+}
+/**
+ * Parses a comma-separated env var value into a trimmed Set.
+ * Returns undefined if the raw value is undefined or empty.
+ */
+function parseList(raw) {
+    if (raw === undefined || raw.trim() === "")
+        return undefined;
+    return new Set(raw
+        .split(",")
+        .map((s) => s.trim())
+        .filter(Boolean));
+}
+/**
+ * Asserts that a command is allowed by the ALLOWED_COMMANDS policy.
+ * No-op when the policy is not configured (permissive default).
+ *
+ * @param command - The command to check (e.g., "node", "python").
+ * @param serverName - Server identifier for per-server overrides (e.g., "process").
+ * @throws Error if the command is not in the allowlist.
+ */
+export function assertAllowedByPolicy(command, serverName) {
+    const raw = readPolicyVar(serverName, "ALLOWED_COMMANDS");
+    const allowed = parseList(raw);
+    if (!allowed)
+        return; // No policy — everything allowed
+    // Extract basename for comparison (handle paths like /usr/bin/node)
+    const base = command
+        .replace(/\\/g, "/")
+        .split("/")
+        .pop()
+        ?.replace(/\.(cmd|exe|bat|sh)$/i, "") ?? "";
+    if (!allowed.has(base) && !allowed.has(command)) {
+        throw new Error(`Command "${command}" is not allowed by ALLOWED_COMMANDS policy. ` +
+            `Allowed: ${[...allowed].sort().join(", ")}`);
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Asserts that a working directory path is under one of the allowed roots.
+ * No-op when the policy is not configured (permissive default).
+ *
+ * @param targetPath - The path/cwd to validate.
+ * @param serverName - Server identifier for per-server overrides (e.g., "process").
+ * @throws Error if the path is outside all allowed roots.
+ */
+export function assertAllowedRoot(targetPath, serverName) {
+    const raw = readPolicyVar(serverName, "ALLOWED_ROOTS");
+    const roots = parseList(raw);
+    if (!roots)
+        return; // No policy — all paths allowed
+    const normalizedTarget = normalize(resolve(targetPath));
+    for (const root of roots) {
+        const normalizedRoot = normalize(resolve(root));
+        if (normalizedTarget === normalizedRoot ||
+            normalizedTarget.startsWith(normalizedRoot + (process.platform === "win32" ? "\\" : "/"))) {
+            return; // Path is under an allowed root
+        }
+    }
+    throw new Error(`Path "${targetPath}" is outside allowed roots. ` + `Allowed roots: ${[...roots].join(", ")}`);
+}
+/**
+ * Asserts that a command does not contain path separators (strict path mode).
+ * Used by build server when PARE_BUILD_STRICT_PATH=true.
+ *
+ * @param command - The command to check.
+ * @throws Error if the command contains `/` or `\`.
+ */
+export function assertNoPathQualifiedCommand(command) {
+    if (process.env.PARE_BUILD_STRICT_PATH === "true") {
+        if (command.includes("/") || command.includes("\\")) {
+            throw new Error(`Path-qualified commands are not allowed when PARE_BUILD_STRICT_PATH is enabled. ` +
+                `Use a bare command name (e.g., "npm" not "${command}") that resolves via PATH.`);
+        }
+    }
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=policy.js.map

package/dist/policy.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"policy.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/policy.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AAE/C;;;;GAIG;AACH,SAAS,aAAa,CAAC,UAAkB,EAAE,OAAe;IACxD,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,QAAQ,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,IAAI,MAAM,KAAK,SAAS;QAAE,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;IAExC,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,QAAQ,UAAU,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;IAChF,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;AAC7B,CAAC;AAED;;;GAGG;AACH,SAAS,SAAS,CAAC,GAAuB;IACxC,IAAI,GAAG,KAAK,SAAS,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE;QAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC;IAC7D,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,CACZ,GAAG;SACA,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;SACV,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;SACpB,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CACnB,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,qBAAqB,CAAC,OAAe,EAAE,UAAkB;IACvE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,kBAAkB,CAAC,CAAC;IAC1D,MAAM,OAAO,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IAC/B,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO;QAAE,OAAO,CAAC,iCAAiC;IAEvD,oEAAoE;IACpE,MAAM,IAAI,GACR,OAAO;SACJ,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC;SACnB,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC;SACV,GAAG,EAAE;QACN,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;IAEhD,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QAChD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,YAAY,OAAO,+CAA+C;YAChE,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAC/C,CAAC;IACJ,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;GAOG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,UAAkB,EAAE,UAAkB;IACtE,MAAM,GAAG,GAAG,aAAa,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,eAAe,CAAC,CAAC;IACvD,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK;QAAE,OAAO,CAAC,gCAAgC;IAEpD,MAAM,gBAAgB,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IAExD,KAAK,MAAM,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;QACzB,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,IACE,gBAAgB,KAAK,cAAc;YACnC,gBAAgB,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,EACzF,CAAC;YACD,OAAO,CAAC,gCAAgC;QAC1C,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;IAED,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,SAAS,UAAU,8BAA8B,GAAG,kBAAkB,CAAC,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAC9F,CAAC;AACJ,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;GAMG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,4BAA4B,CAAC,OAAe;IAC1D,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,sBAAsB,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QAClD,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;YACpD,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CACb,kFAAkF;gBAChF,6CAA6C,OAAO,4BAA4B,CACnF,CAAC;QACJ,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;AACH,CAAC"}

package/dist/runner.d.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@ export interface RunOptions {
      *  and `false` elsewhere. Set to `false` for native executables (e.g., git)
      *  whose args contain characters that cmd.exe would misinterpret (like `<>`). */
     shell?: boolean;
+    /** Maximum combined stdout+stderr buffer size in bytes. Defaults to 10 MB. */
+    maxBuffer?: number;
 }
 /** Result of a command execution, containing the exit code and ANSI-stripped stdout/stderr. */
 export interface RunResult {
@@ -40,11 +42,14 @@ export interface RunResult {
 export declare function escapeCmdArg(arg: string): string;
 /**
  * Executes a command and returns cleaned output with ANSI codes stripped.
- * Uses execFile (not exec) to avoid shell injection. On Windows, shell is
- * enabled so that .cmd/.bat wrappers (like npx) can be executed — args are
- * still passed as an array so they remain properly escaped.
+ * Uses spawn (not exec) to avoid shell injection. The child is spawned in its
+ * own process group (`detached: true` on Unix) so that on timeout we can kill
+ * the entire group — preventing orphaned grandchild processes.
  *
- * Throws on system-level errors (command not found, permission denied).
+ * On Windows, shell is enabled so that .cmd/.bat wrappers (like npx) can be
+ * executed — args are still passed as an array so they remain properly escaped.
+ *
+ * Throws on system-level errors (command not found, permission denied, timeout).
  * Normal non-zero exit codes are returned in the result, not thrown.
  */
 export declare function run(cmd: string, args: string[], opts?: RunOptions): Promise<RunResult>;

package/dist/runner.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"runner.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/runner.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,uGAAuG;AACvG,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7B;;mFAE+E;IAC/E,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;;qFAEiF;IACjF,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACjB;AAED,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAChB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAqChD;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,wBAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CA8EtF"}
+{"version":3,"file":"runner.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/runner.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,uGAAuG;AACvG,MAAM,WAAW,UAAU;IACzB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;IAC7B;;mFAE+E;IAC/E,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf;;qFAEiF;IACjF,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;IAChB,8EAA8E;IAC9E,SAAS,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACpB;AA6BD,+FAA+F;AAC/F,MAAM,WAAW,SAAS;IACxB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACf,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CAChB;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,wBAAgB,YAAY,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAqChD;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,wBAAgB,GAAG,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,CA+ItF"}

package/dist/runner.js

@@ -1,6 +1,36 @@
-import { execFile } from "node:child_process";
+import { spawn, execFile as nodeExecFile } from "node:child_process";
 import { stripAnsi } from "./ansi.js";
 import { sanitizeErrorOutput } from "./sanitize.js";
+/**
+ * Kills an entire process group (Unix) or process tree (Windows).
+ *
+ * On Unix, `spawn({ detached: true })` calls `setsid(2)`, making the child
+ * a process group leader. Sending a signal to `-pid` reaches every process
+ * in that group, including grandchildren.
+ *
+ * On Windows, `taskkill /T /F` walks the native process tree.
+ *
+ * ESRCH (process already exited) is silently ignored.
+ */
+function killProcessGroup(pid) {
+    if (process.platform === "win32") {
+        try {
+            nodeExecFile("taskkill", ["/pid", String(pid), "/T", "/F"]);
+        }
+        catch {
+            /* best-effort */
+        }
+    }
+    else {
+        try {
+            process.kill(-pid, "SIGTERM");
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            if (err.code !== "ESRCH")
+                throw err;
+        }
+    }
+}
 /**
  * Escapes a single argument for safe use with cmd.exe on Windows.
  *
@@ -56,11 +86,14 @@ export function escapeCmdArg(arg) {
 }
 /**
  * Executes a command and returns cleaned output with ANSI codes stripped.
- * Uses execFile (not exec) to avoid shell injection. On Windows, shell is
- * enabled so that .cmd/.bat wrappers (like npx) can be executed — args are
- * still passed as an array so they remain properly escaped.
+ * Uses spawn (not exec) to avoid shell injection. The child is spawned in its
+ * own process group (`detached: true` on Unix) so that on timeout we can kill
+ * the entire group — preventing orphaned grandchild processes.
  *
- * Throws on system-level errors (command not found, permission denied).
+ * On Windows, shell is enabled so that .cmd/.bat wrappers (like npx) can be
+ * executed — args are still passed as an array so they remain properly escaped.
+ *
+ * Throws on system-level errors (command not found, permission denied, timeout).
  * Normal non-zero exit codes are returned in the result, not thrown.
  */
 export function run(cmd, args, opts) {
@@ -73,41 +106,101 @@ export function run(cmd, args, opts) {
         // environment variable expansion and command injection via special chars.
         // See escapeCmdArg() for details on what is escaped and why.
         const safeArgs = useShell && process.platform === "win32" ? args.map(escapeCmdArg) : args;
-        const child = execFile(cmd, safeArgs, {
+        const child = spawn(cmd, safeArgs, {
             cwd: opts?.cwd,
-            timeout: opts?.timeout ?? 60_000,
             env: opts?.env ? { ...process.env, ...opts.env } : undefined,
-            maxBuffer: 10 * 1024 * 1024, // 10 MB
             shell: useShell,
-        }, (error, stdout, stderr) => {
-            if (error) {
-                const errno = error;
-                // Unix: direct ENOENT from execFile (no shell wrapping)
-                if (errno.code === "ENOENT") {
-                    reject(new Error(`Command not found: "${cmd}". Ensure it is installed and available in your PATH.`));
-                    return;
-                }
-                if (errno.code === "EACCES" || errno.code === "EPERM") {
-                    reject(new Error(`Permission denied executing "${cmd}": ${errno.message}`));
-                    return;
-                }
-                // Timeout: execFile killed the child after the configured timeout.
-                // Surface this clearly instead of silently returning exitCode 1.
-                if (error.killed && error.signal) {
-                    reject(new Error(`Command "${cmd}" timed out after ${opts?.timeout ?? 60_000}ms and was killed (${error.signal}).`));
-                    return;
-                }
-                // Windows: cmd.exe masks ENOENT — detect via stderr message
-                const cleanStderr = stripAnsi(stderr);
-                if (cleanStderr.includes("is not recognized")) {
-                    reject(new Error(`Command not found: "${cmd}". Ensure it is installed and available in your PATH.`));
-                    return;
-                }
+            // Unix: creates a new process group via setsid(2) so we can kill the
+            // entire group on timeout (prevents orphaned grandchild processes).
+            // Windows: skip — detached on Windows creates a visible console window,
+            // not a process group. Use taskkill /T /F instead.
+            detached: process.platform !== "win32",
+            windowsHide: true,
+            stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"],
+        });
+        // --- Buffer accumulation (replaces execFile's maxBuffer) ---
+        const maxBuffer = opts?.maxBuffer ?? 10 * 1024 * 1024; // 10 MB
+        const stdoutChunks = [];
+        const stderrChunks = [];
+        let stdoutLen = 0;
+        let stderrLen = 0;
+        let bufferExceeded = false;
+        child.stdout?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+            stdoutLen += chunk.length;
+            if (stdoutLen + stderrLen > maxBuffer && !bufferExceeded) {
+                bufferExceeded = true;
+                killProcessGroup(child.pid);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (!bufferExceeded)
+                stdoutChunks.push(chunk);
+        });
+        child.stderr?.on("data", (chunk) => {
+            stderrLen += chunk.length;
+            if (stdoutLen + stderrLen > maxBuffer && !bufferExceeded) {
+                bufferExceeded = true;
+                killProcessGroup(child.pid);
+                return;
+            }
+            if (!bufferExceeded)
+                stderrChunks.push(chunk);
+        });
+        // --- Timeout handling (replaces execFile's timeout) ---
+        let timedOut = false;
+        let timeoutSignal;
+        const timeoutMs = opts?.timeout ?? 60_000;
+        const timer = setTimeout(() => {
+            timedOut = true;
+            timeoutSignal = "SIGTERM";
+            killProcessGroup(child.pid);
+        }, timeoutMs);
+        // --- Settlement guard (prevents double-resolve from close + error) ---
+        let settled = false;
+        // Handle spawn errors (ENOENT, EACCES on Unix — spawn emits these as
+        // 'error' events, unlike execFile which passes them to the callback).
+        child.on("error", (err) => {
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            if (err.code === "ENOENT") {
+                reject(new Error(`Command not found: "${cmd}". Ensure it is installed and available in your PATH.`));
+                return;
+            }
+            if (err.code === "EACCES" || err.code === "EPERM") {
+                reject(new Error(`Permission denied executing "${cmd}": ${err.message}`));
+                return;
+            }
+            reject(err);
+        });
+        // Resolve on 'close' (not 'exit') — close fires after ALL stdio streams
+        // are flushed, guaranteeing no late data events.
+        child.on("close", (code, signal) => {
+            clearTimeout(timer);
+            if (settled)
+                return;
+            settled = true;
+            const stdout = stripAnsi(Buffer.concat(stdoutChunks).toString("utf-8"));
+            const stderr = sanitizeErrorOutput(stripAnsi(Buffer.concat(stderrChunks).toString("utf-8")));
+            // Timeout: we killed the process group after the configured timeout.
+            if (timedOut) {
+                reject(new Error(`Command "${cmd}" timed out after ${timeoutMs}ms and was killed (${timeoutSignal ?? signal ?? "SIGTERM"}).`));
+                return;
+            }
+            // maxBuffer exceeded
+            if (bufferExceeded) {
+                reject(new Error(`Command "${cmd}" output exceeded maxBuffer (${maxBuffer} bytes) and was killed.`));
+                return;
+            }
+            // Windows: cmd.exe masks ENOENT — detect via stderr message
+            if (code !== 0 && stderr.includes("is not recognized")) {
+                reject(new Error(`Command not found: "${cmd}". Ensure it is installed and available in your PATH.`));
+                return;
             }
             resolve({
-                exitCode: error ? (typeof error.code === "number" ? error.code : 1) : 0,
-                stdout: stripAnsi(stdout),
-                stderr: sanitizeErrorOutput(stripAnsi(stderr)),
+                exitCode: code ?? 1,
+                stdout,
+                stderr,
             });
         });
         // Pipe stdin data if provided, then close the stream so the child

package/dist/runner.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"runner.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/runner.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAC9C,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAwBpD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,GAAW;IACtC,0EAA0E;IAC1E,2EAA2E;IAC3E,yEAAyE;IACzE,uEAAuE;IACvE,sEAAsE;IACtE,uEAAuE;IACvE,yEAAyE;IACzE,uEAAuE;IACvE,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;IAElB,yEAAyE;IACzE,uDAAuD;IACvD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,qEAAqE;QACrE,sEAAsE;QACtE,oEAAoE;QACpE,mEAAmE;QACnE,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACzC,iDAAiD;QACjD,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QACtC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;IACxB,CAAC;IAED,kEAAkE;IAClE,kEAAkE;IAClE,iCAAiC;IACjC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtC,wDAAwD;IACxD,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AACjB,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,GAAW,EAAE,IAAc,EAAE,IAAiB;IAChE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE;QACrC,6EAA6E;QAC7E,6EAA6E;QAC7E,wDAAwD;QACxD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;QAE7D,uEAAuE;QACvE,0EAA0E;QAC1E,6DAA6D;QAC7D,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAE1F,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,QAAQ,CACpB,GAAG,EACH,QAAQ,EACR;YACE,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG;YACd,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM;YAChC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5D,SAAS,EAAE,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,QAAQ;YACrC,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ;SAChB,EACD,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE;YACxB,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;gBACV,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,KAA8B,CAAC;gBAE7C,wDAAwD;gBACxD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;oBAC5B,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,uBAAuB,GAAG,uDAAuD,CAClF,CACF,CAAC;oBACF,OAAO;gBACT,CAAC;gBACD,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;oBACtD,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gCAAgC,GAAG,MAAM,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;oBAC5E,OAAO;gBACT,CAAC;gBAED,mEAAmE;gBACnE,iEAAiE;gBACjE,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;oBACjC,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,YAAY,GAAG,qBAAqB,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,sBAAsB,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,CAClG,CACF,CAAC;oBACF,OAAO;gBACT,CAAC;gBAED,4DAA4D;gBAC5D,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;gBACtC,IAAI,WAAW,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;oBAC9C,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,uBAAuB,GAAG,uDAAuD,CAClF,CACF,CAAC;oBACF,OAAO;gBACT,CAAC;YACH,CAAC;YAED,OAAO,CAAC;gBACN,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;gBACvE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;gBACzB,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAAC;aAC/C,CAAC,CAAC;QACL,CAAC,CACF,CAAC;QAEF,kEAAkE;QAClE,iEAAiE;QACjE,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACxB,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/B,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,CAAC;IACH,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"runner.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/runner.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ,IAAI,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AACrE,OAAO,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,WAAW,CAAC;AACtC,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,eAAe,CAAC;AAmBpD;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,SAAS,gBAAgB,CAAC,GAAW;IACnC,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;QACjC,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,YAAY,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAC9D,CAAC;QAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YACP,iBAAiB;QACnB,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;SAAM,CAAC;QACN,IAAI,CAAC;YACH,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QAChC,CAAC;QAAC,OAAO,GAAY,EAAE,CAAC;YACtB,IAAK,GAA6B,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO;gBAAE,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC;QACjE,CAAC;IACH,CAAC;AACH,CAAC;AASD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,YAAY,CAAC,GAAW;IACtC,0EAA0E;IAC1E,2EAA2E;IAC3E,yEAAyE;IACzE,uEAAuE;IACvE,sEAAsE;IACtE,uEAAuE;IACvE,yEAAyE;IACzE,uEAAuE;IACvE,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,GAAG,CAAC;IAElB,yEAAyE;IACzE,uDAAuD;IACvD,IAAI,QAAQ,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;QACvB,qEAAqE;QACrE,sEAAsE;QACtE,oEAAoE;QACpE,mEAAmE;QACnE,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACzC,iDAAiD;QACjD,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QACtC,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,CAAC;IACxB,CAAC;IAED,kEAAkE;IAClE,kEAAkE;IAClE,iCAAiC;IACjC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACvC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IACtC,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtC,wDAAwD;IACxD,OAAO,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtC,OAAO,OAAO,CAAC;AACjB,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;GAWG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,CAAC,GAAW,EAAE,IAAc,EAAE,IAAiB;IAChE,OAAO,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE;QACrC,6EAA6E;QAC7E,6EAA6E;QAC7E,wDAAwD;QACxD,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC;QAE7D,uEAAuE;QACvE,0EAA0E;QAC1E,6DAA6D;QAC7D,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,QAAQ,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;QAE1F,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE;YACjC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG;YACd,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,SAAS;YAC5D,KAAK,EAAE,QAAQ;YACf,qEAAqE;YACrE,oEAAoE;YACpE,wEAAwE;YACxE,mDAAmD;YACnD,QAAQ,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO;YACtC,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI;YACjB,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;SAChC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,8DAA8D;QAC9D,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,SAAS,IAAI,EAAE,GAAG,IAAI,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ;QAC/D,MAAM,YAAY,GAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,MAAM,YAAY,GAAa,EAAE,CAAC;QAClC,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAClB,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QAClB,IAAI,cAAc,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;QAE3B,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,EAAE;YACzC,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YAC1B,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;gBACzD,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;gBACtB,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAI,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC7B,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc;gBAAE,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC,KAAa,EAAE,EAAE;YACzC,SAAS,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;YAC1B,IAAI,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;gBACzD,cAAc,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;gBACtB,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAI,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC7B,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc;gBAAE,YAAY,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;QAChD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,yDAAyD;QACzD,IAAI,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;QACrB,IAAI,aAAiC,CAAC;QACtC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,IAAI,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC;QAC1C,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE;YAC5B,QAAQ,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;YAChB,aAAa,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;YAC1B,gBAAgB,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAI,CAAC,CAAC;QAC/B,CAAC,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,CAAC;QAEd,wEAAwE;QACxE,IAAI,OAAO,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC;QAEpB,qEAAqE;QACrE,sEAAsE;QACtE,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,GAA0B,EAAE,EAAE;YAC/C,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YACpB,IAAI,OAAO;gBAAE,OAAO;YACpB,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;YAEf,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;gBAC1B,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,uBAAuB,GAAG,uDAAuD,CAClF,CACF,CAAC;gBACF,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YACD,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,QAAQ,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC;gBAClD,MAAM,CAAC,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,gCAAgC,GAAG,MAAM,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;gBAC1E,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YAED,MAAM,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;QACd,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,wEAAwE;QACxE,iDAAiD;QACjD,KAAK,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,EAAE;YACjC,YAAY,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YACpB,IAAI,OAAO;gBAAE,OAAO;YACpB,OAAO,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC;YAEf,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YACxE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,mBAAmB,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,YAAY,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;YAE7F,qEAAqE;YACrE,IAAI,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;gBACb,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,YAAY,GAAG,qBAAqB,SAAS,sBAAsB,aAAa,IAAI,MAAM,IAAI,SAAS,IAAI,CAC5G,CACF,CAAC;gBACF,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YAED,qBAAqB;YACrB,IAAI,cAAc,EAAE,CAAC;gBACnB,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,YAAY,GAAG,gCAAgC,SAAS,yBAAyB,CAClF,CACF,CAAC;gBACF,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YAED,4DAA4D;YAC5D,IAAI,IAAI,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC,EAAE,CAAC;gBACvD,MAAM,CACJ,IAAI,KAAK,CACP,uBAAuB,GAAG,uDAAuD,CAClF,CACF,CAAC;gBACF,OAAO;YACT,CAAC;YAED,OAAO,CAAC;gBACN,QAAQ,EAAE,IAAI,IAAI,CAAC;gBACnB,MAAM;gBACN,MAAM;aACP,CAAC,CAAC;QACL,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,kEAAkE;QAClE,iEAAiE;QACjE,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,IAAI,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YACxB,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;YAC/B,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,GAAG,EAAE,CAAC;QACrB,CAAC;IACH,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AACL,CAAC"}

package/dist/sanitize.d.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * Sanitizes error output by replacing sensitive filesystem paths with
- * home-relative equivalents. This prevents leaking usernames and absolute
- * home directory paths in error messages returned to MCP clients.
+ * Sanitizes error output by replacing sensitive filesystem paths.
  *
- * Replacements:
+ * Default mode (home paths only):
  *   /home/<user>/...  → ~/...
  *   /Users/<user>/... → ~/...
  *   /root/...         → ~/...
  *   C:\Users\<user>\... → ~\...
+ *
+ * Broad mode (PARE_SANITIZE_ALL_PATHS=true):
+ *   Also redacts other absolute paths outside home directories:
+ *   /etc/..., /var/..., /opt/..., C:\Program Files\..., etc.
+ *   These are replaced with <redacted-path>/basename to preserve
+ *   the filename while hiding directory structure.
  */
 export declare function sanitizeErrorOutput(text: string): string;
 //# sourceMappingURL=sanitize.d.ts.map

package/dist/sanitize.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sanitize.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/sanitize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAcxD"}
+{"version":3,"file":"sanitize.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/sanitize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,wBAAgB,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CA6BxD"}

package/dist/sanitize.js

@@ -1,13 +1,17 @@
 /**
- * Sanitizes error output by replacing sensitive filesystem paths with
- * home-relative equivalents. This prevents leaking usernames and absolute
- * home directory paths in error messages returned to MCP clients.
+ * Sanitizes error output by replacing sensitive filesystem paths.
  *
- * Replacements:
+ * Default mode (home paths only):
  *   /home/<user>/...  → ~/...
  *   /Users/<user>/... → ~/...
  *   /root/...         → ~/...
  *   C:\Users\<user>\... → ~\...
+ *
+ * Broad mode (PARE_SANITIZE_ALL_PATHS=true):
+ *   Also redacts other absolute paths outside home directories:
+ *   /etc/..., /var/..., /opt/..., C:\Program Files\..., etc.
+ *   These are replaced with <redacted-path>/basename to preserve
+ *   the filename while hiding directory structure.
  */
 export function sanitizeErrorOutput(text) {
     // Unix: /home/<username>/rest → ~/rest
@@ -18,6 +22,19 @@ export function sanitizeErrorOutput(text) {
     result = result.replace(/\/root\//g, "~/");
     // Windows: C:\Users\<username>\rest → ~\rest (with escaped or literal backslashes)
     result = result.replace(/[A-Z]:\\Users\\[^\\:\s]+\\/gi, "~\\");
+    // Broad mode: redact remaining absolute paths
+    if (process.env.PARE_SANITIZE_ALL_PATHS === "true") {
+        // Unix absolute paths not already handled (e.g., /etc/foo/bar → <redacted>/bar)
+        result = result.replace(/\/(?:etc|var|opt|usr|tmp|srv|snap|nix)\/[^\s:]+/g, (match) => {
+            const basename = match.split("/").pop() ?? "";
+            return `<redacted-path>/${basename}`;
+        });
+        // Windows non-user absolute paths (e.g., C:\Program Files\foo → <redacted>\foo)
+        result = result.replace(/[A-Z]:\\(?!Users\\)[^\s:]+/gi, (match) => {
+            const basename = match.split("\\").pop() ?? "";
+            return `<redacted-path>\\${basename}`;
+        });
+    }
     return result;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=sanitize.js.map

package/dist/sanitize.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"sanitize.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/sanitize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAY;IAC9C,uCAAuC;IACvC,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtD,yCAAyC;IACzC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAErD,4BAA4B;IAC5B,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAE3C,mFAAmF;IACnF,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,8BAA8B,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAE/D,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAChB,CAAC"}
+{"version":3,"file":"sanitize.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/sanitize.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAcG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,mBAAmB,CAAC,IAAY;IAC9C,uCAAuC;IACvC,IAAI,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,oBAAoB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAEtD,yCAAyC;IACzC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAErD,4BAA4B;IAC5B,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC;IAE3C,mFAAmF;IACnF,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,8BAA8B,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;IAE/D,8CAA8C;IAC9C,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,uBAAuB,KAAK,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;QACnD,gFAAgF;QAChF,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,kDAAkD,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE;YACpF,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC9C,OAAO,mBAAmB,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACvC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;QAEH,gFAAgF;QAChF,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,8BAA8B,EAAE,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,EAAE;YAChE,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,KAAK,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAAC,GAAG,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC;YAC/C,OAAO,oBAAoB,QAAQ,EAAE,CAAC;QACxC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;IAED,OAAO,MAAM,CAAC;AAChB,CAAC"}

package/dist/validation.d.ts

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * Validates that a string argument is safe to pass as a positional argument to a CLI tool.
  * Prevents flag injection attacks (e.g., passing "--output=/etc/passwd" as a ref name).
- * See: CVE-2025-68144, CVE-2025-68145
+ * See: [CVE-2025-68144](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68144), [CVE-2025-68145](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68145)
  */
 export declare function assertNoFlagInjection(value: string, paramName: string): void;
 /**

package/dist/validation.js

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 /**
  * Validates that a string argument is safe to pass as a positional argument to a CLI tool.
  * Prevents flag injection attacks (e.g., passing "--output=/etc/passwd" as a ref name).
- * See: CVE-2025-68144, CVE-2025-68145
+ * See: [CVE-2025-68144](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68144), [CVE-2025-68145](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-68145)
  */
 export function assertNoFlagInjection(value, paramName) {
     if (value.trimStart().startsWith("-")) {

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@paretools/shared",
-  "version": "0.8.0",
+  "version": "0.8.2",
   "description": "Shared utilities for Pare MCP servers",
   "license": "MIT",
   "keywords": [