@pairling/runtime-darwin-x64 0.1.0 → 0.2.0

package/python/lib/python3.12/site-packages/pip/_internal/network/session.py

@@ -0,0 +1,537 @@
+"""PipSession and supporting code, containing all pip-specific
+network request configuration and behavior.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import email.utils
+import functools
+import io
+import ipaddress
+import json
+import logging
+import mimetypes
+import os
+import platform
+import shutil
+import subprocess
+import sys
+import urllib.parse
+import warnings
+from collections.abc import Generator, Mapping, Sequence
+from typing import (
+    TYPE_CHECKING,
+    Any,
+    Optional,
+    Union,
+)
+
+from pip._vendor import requests, urllib3
+from pip._vendor.cachecontrol import CacheControlAdapter as _BaseCacheControlAdapter
+from pip._vendor.requests.adapters import DEFAULT_POOLBLOCK, BaseAdapter
+from pip._vendor.requests.adapters import HTTPAdapter as _BaseHTTPAdapter
+from pip._vendor.requests.models import PreparedRequest, Response
+from pip._vendor.requests.structures import CaseInsensitiveDict
+from pip._vendor.urllib3.connectionpool import ConnectionPool
+from pip._vendor.urllib3.exceptions import InsecureRequestWarning
+
+from pip import __version__
+from pip._internal.metadata import get_default_environment
+from pip._internal.models.link import Link
+from pip._internal.network.auth import MultiDomainBasicAuth
+from pip._internal.network.cache import SafeFileCache
+
+# Import ssl from compat so the initial import occurs in only one place.
+from pip._internal.utils.compat import has_tls
+from pip._internal.utils.glibc import libc_ver
+from pip._internal.utils.misc import build_url_from_netloc, parse_netloc
+from pip._internal.utils.urls import url_to_path
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from ssl import SSLContext
+
+    from pip._vendor.urllib3 import ProxyManager
+    from pip._vendor.urllib3.poolmanager import PoolManager
+
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+SecureOrigin = tuple[str, str, Optional[Union[int, str]]]
+
+
+# Ignore warning raised when using --trusted-host.
+warnings.filterwarnings("ignore", category=InsecureRequestWarning)
+
+
+SECURE_ORIGINS: list[SecureOrigin] = [
+    # protocol, hostname, port
+    # Taken from Chrome's list of secure origins (See: http://bit.ly/1qrySKC)
+    ("https", "*", "*"),
+    ("*", "localhost", "*"),
+    ("*", "127.0.0.0/8", "*"),
+    ("*", "::1/128", "*"),
+    ("file", "*", None),
+    # ssh is always secure.
+    ("ssh", "*", "*"),
+]
+
+
+# These are environment variables present when running under various
+# CI systems.  For each variable, some CI systems that use the variable
+# are indicated.  The collection was chosen so that for each of a number
+# of popular systems, at least one of the environment variables is used.
+# This list is used to provide some indication of and lower bound for
+# CI traffic to PyPI.  Thus, it is okay if the list is not comprehensive.
+# For more background, see: https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/5499
+CI_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES = (
+    # Azure Pipelines
+    "BUILD_BUILDID",
+    # Jenkins
+    "BUILD_ID",
+    # AppVeyor, CircleCI, Codeship, Gitlab CI, Shippable, Travis CI
+    "CI",
+    # Explicit environment variable.
+    "PIP_IS_CI",
+)
+
+
+def looks_like_ci() -> bool:
+    """
+    Return whether it looks like pip is running under CI.
+    """
+    # We don't use the method of checking for a tty (e.g. using isatty())
+    # because some CI systems mimic a tty (e.g. Travis CI).  Thus that
+    # method doesn't provide definitive information in either direction.
+    return any(name in os.environ for name in CI_ENVIRONMENT_VARIABLES)
+
+
+@functools.lru_cache(maxsize=1)
+def user_agent() -> str:
+    """
+    Return a string representing the user agent.
+    """
+    data: dict[str, Any] = {
+        "installer": {"name": "pip", "version": __version__},
+        "python": platform.python_version(),
+        "implementation": {
+            "name": platform.python_implementation(),
+        },
+    }
+
+    if data["implementation"]["name"] == "CPython":
+        data["implementation"]["version"] = platform.python_version()
+    elif data["implementation"]["name"] == "PyPy":
+        pypy_version_info = sys.pypy_version_info  # type: ignore
+        if pypy_version_info.releaselevel == "final":
+            pypy_version_info = pypy_version_info[:3]
+        data["implementation"]["version"] = ".".join(
+            [str(x) for x in pypy_version_info]
+        )
+    elif data["implementation"]["name"] == "Jython":
+        # Complete Guess
+        data["implementation"]["version"] = platform.python_version()
+    elif data["implementation"]["name"] == "IronPython":
+        # Complete Guess
+        data["implementation"]["version"] = platform.python_version()
+
+    if sys.platform.startswith("linux"):
+        from pip._vendor import distro
+
+        linux_distribution = distro.name(), distro.version(), distro.codename()
+        distro_infos: dict[str, Any] = dict(
+            filter(
+                lambda x: x[1],
+                zip(["name", "version", "id"], linux_distribution),
+            )
+        )
+        libc = dict(
+            filter(
+                lambda x: x[1],
+                zip(["lib", "version"], libc_ver()),
+            )
+        )
+        if libc:
+            distro_infos["libc"] = libc
+        if distro_infos:
+            data["distro"] = distro_infos
+
+    if sys.platform.startswith("darwin") and platform.mac_ver()[0]:
+        data["distro"] = {"name": "macOS", "version": platform.mac_ver()[0]}
+
+    if platform.system():
+        data.setdefault("system", {})["name"] = platform.system()
+
+    if platform.release():
+        data.setdefault("system", {})["release"] = platform.release()
+
+    if platform.machine():
+        data["cpu"] = platform.machine()
+
+    if has_tls():
+        import _ssl as ssl
+
+        data["openssl_version"] = ssl.OPENSSL_VERSION
+
+    setuptools_dist = get_default_environment().get_distribution("setuptools")
+    if setuptools_dist is not None:
+        data["setuptools_version"] = str(setuptools_dist.version)
+
+    if shutil.which("rustc") is not None:
+        # If for any reason `rustc --version` fails, silently ignore it
+        try:
+            rustc_output = subprocess.check_output(
+                ["rustc", "--version"], stderr=subprocess.STDOUT, timeout=0.5
+            )
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+        else:
+            if rustc_output.startswith(b"rustc "):
+                # The format of `rustc --version` is:
+                # `b'rustc 1.52.1 (9bc8c42bb 2021-05-09)\n'`
+                # We extract just the middle (1.52.1) part
+                data["rustc_version"] = rustc_output.split(b" ")[1].decode()
+
+    # Use None rather than False so as not to give the impression that
+    # pip knows it is not being run under CI.  Rather, it is a null or
+    # inconclusive result.  Also, we include some value rather than no
+    # value to make it easier to know that the check has been run.
+    data["ci"] = True if looks_like_ci() else None
+
+    user_data = os.environ.get("PIP_USER_AGENT_USER_DATA")
+    if user_data is not None:
+        data["user_data"] = user_data
+
+    return "{data[installer][name]}/{data[installer][version]} {json}".format(
+        data=data,
+        json=json.dumps(data, separators=(",", ":"), sort_keys=True),
+    )
+
+
+class LocalFSAdapter(BaseAdapter):
+    def send(
+        self,
+        request: PreparedRequest,
+        stream: bool = False,
+        timeout: float | tuple[float, float] | tuple[float, None] | None = None,
+        verify: bool | str = True,
+        cert: bytes | str | tuple[bytes | str, bytes | str] | None = None,
+        proxies: Mapping[str, str] | None = None,
+    ) -> Response:
+        assert request.url is not None
+        pathname = url_to_path(request.url)
+
+        resp = Response()
+        resp.status_code = 200
+        resp.url = request.url
+
+        try:
+            stats = os.stat(pathname)
+        except OSError as exc:
+            # format the exception raised as a io.BytesIO object,
+            # to return a better error message:
+            resp.status_code = 404
+            resp.reason = type(exc).__name__
+            resp.raw = io.BytesIO(f"{resp.reason}: {exc}".encode())
+        else:
+            modified = email.utils.formatdate(stats.st_mtime, usegmt=True)
+            content_type = mimetypes.guess_type(pathname)[0] or "text/plain"
+            resp.headers = CaseInsensitiveDict(
+                {
+                    "Content-Type": content_type,
+                    "Content-Length": str(stats.st_size),
+                    "Last-Modified": modified,
+                }
+            )
+
+            resp.raw = open(pathname, "rb")
+            resp.close = resp.raw.close  # type: ignore[method-assign]
+
+        return resp
+
+    def close(self) -> None:
+        pass
+
+
+class _SSLContextAdapterMixin:
+    """Mixin to add the ``ssl_context`` constructor argument to HTTP adapters.
+
+    The additional argument is forwarded directly to the pool manager. This allows us
+    to dynamically decide what SSL store to use at runtime, which is used to implement
+    the optional ``truststore`` backend.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *,
+        ssl_context: SSLContext | None = None,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        self._ssl_context = ssl_context
+        super().__init__(**kwargs)
+
+    def init_poolmanager(
+        self,
+        connections: int,
+        maxsize: int,
+        block: bool = DEFAULT_POOLBLOCK,
+        **pool_kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> PoolManager:
+        if self._ssl_context is not None:
+            pool_kwargs.setdefault("ssl_context", self._ssl_context)
+        return super().init_poolmanager(  # type: ignore[misc, no-any-return]
+            connections=connections,
+            maxsize=maxsize,
+            block=block,
+            **pool_kwargs,
+        )
+
+    def proxy_manager_for(self, proxy: str, **proxy_kwargs: Any) -> ProxyManager:
+        # Proxy manager replaces the pool manager, so inject our SSL
+        # context here too. https://github.com/pypa/pip/issues/13288
+        if self._ssl_context is not None:
+            proxy_kwargs.setdefault("ssl_context", self._ssl_context)
+        return super().proxy_manager_for(proxy, **proxy_kwargs)  # type: ignore[misc, no-any-return]
+
+
+class HTTPAdapter(_SSLContextAdapterMixin, _BaseHTTPAdapter):
+    pass
+
+
+class CacheControlAdapter(_SSLContextAdapterMixin, _BaseCacheControlAdapter):
+    pass
+
+
+class InsecureHTTPAdapter(HTTPAdapter):
+    def cert_verify(
+        self,
+        conn: ConnectionPool,
+        url: str,
+        verify: bool | str,
+        cert: str | tuple[str, str] | None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().cert_verify(conn=conn, url=url, verify=False, cert=cert)
+
+
+class InsecureCacheControlAdapter(CacheControlAdapter):
+    def cert_verify(
+        self,
+        conn: ConnectionPool,
+        url: str,
+        verify: bool | str,
+        cert: str | tuple[str, str] | None,
+    ) -> None:
+        super().cert_verify(conn=conn, url=url, verify=False, cert=cert)
+
+
+class PipSession(requests.Session):
+    timeout: int | None = None
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        *args: Any,
+        retries: int = 0,
+        resume_retries: int = 0,
+        cache: str | None = None,
+        trusted_hosts: Sequence[str] = (),
+        index_urls: list[str] | None = None,
+        ssl_context: SSLContext | None = None,
+        **kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        """
+        :param trusted_hosts: Domains not to emit warnings for when not using
+            HTTPS.
+        """
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+
+        # Namespace the attribute with "pip_" just in case to prevent
+        # possible conflicts with the base class.
+        self.pip_trusted_origins: list[tuple[str, int | None]] = []
+        self.pip_proxy = None
+
+        # Attach our User Agent to the request
+        self.headers["User-Agent"] = user_agent()
+
+        # Pin Accept-Encoding so it doesn't vary with zstd availability (Python
+        # 3.14+ or backports.zstd); a varying value misses the cache for "Vary:
+        # Accept-Encoding" responses shared across interpreters (pypa/pip#13979).
+        self.headers["Accept-Encoding"] = "gzip, deflate"
+
+        # Attach our Authentication handler to the session
+        self.auth: MultiDomainBasicAuth = MultiDomainBasicAuth(index_urls=index_urls)
+
+        # Create our urllib3.Retry instance which will allow us to customize
+        # how we handle retries.
+        retries = urllib3.Retry(
+            # Set the total number of retries that a particular request can
+            # have.
+            total=retries,
+            # A 503 error from PyPI typically means that the Fastly -> Origin
+            # connection got interrupted in some way. A 503 error in general
+            # is typically considered a transient error so we'll go ahead and
+            # retry it.
+            # A 500 may indicate transient error in Amazon S3
+            # A 502 may be a transient error from a CDN like CloudFlare or CloudFront
+            # A 520 or 527 - may indicate transient error in CloudFlare
+            status_forcelist=[500, 502, 503, 520, 527],
+            # Add a small amount of back off between failed requests in
+            # order to prevent hammering the service.
+            backoff_factor=0.25,
+        )  # type: ignore
+        self.resume_retries = resume_retries
+
+        # Our Insecure HTTPAdapter disables HTTPS validation. It does not
+        # support caching so we'll use it for all http:// URLs.
+        # If caching is disabled, we will also use it for
+        # https:// hosts that we've marked as ignoring
+        # TLS errors for (trusted-hosts).
+        insecure_adapter = InsecureHTTPAdapter(max_retries=retries)
+
+        # We want to _only_ cache responses on securely fetched origins or when
+        # the host is specified as trusted. We do this because
+        # we can't validate the response of an insecurely/untrusted fetched
+        # origin, and we don't want someone to be able to poison the cache and
+        # require manual eviction from the cache to fix it.
+        self._trusted_host_adapter: InsecureCacheControlAdapter | InsecureHTTPAdapter
+        if cache:
+            secure_adapter: _BaseHTTPAdapter = CacheControlAdapter(
+                cache=SafeFileCache(cache),
+                max_retries=retries,
+                ssl_context=ssl_context,
+            )
+            self._trusted_host_adapter = InsecureCacheControlAdapter(
+                cache=SafeFileCache(cache),
+                max_retries=retries,
+            )
+        else:
+            secure_adapter = HTTPAdapter(max_retries=retries, ssl_context=ssl_context)
+            self._trusted_host_adapter = insecure_adapter
+
+        self.mount("https://", secure_adapter)
+        self.mount("http://", insecure_adapter)
+
+        # Enable file:// urls
+        self.mount("file://", LocalFSAdapter())
+
+        for host in trusted_hosts:
+            self.add_trusted_host(host, suppress_logging=True)
+
+    def update_index_urls(self, new_index_urls: list[str]) -> None:
+        """
+        :param new_index_urls: New index urls to update the authentication
+            handler with.
+        """
+        self.auth.index_urls = new_index_urls
+
+    def add_trusted_host(
+        self, host: str, source: str | None = None, suppress_logging: bool = False
+    ) -> None:
+        """
+        :param host: It is okay to provide a host that has previously been
+            added.
+        :param source: An optional source string, for logging where the host
+            string came from.
+        """
+        if not suppress_logging:
+            msg = f"adding trusted host: {host!r}"
+            if source is not None:
+                msg += f" (from {source})"
+            logger.info(msg)
+
+        parsed_host, parsed_port = parse_netloc(host)
+        if parsed_host is None:
+            raise ValueError(f"Trusted host URL must include a host part: {host!r}")
+        if (parsed_host, parsed_port) not in self.pip_trusted_origins:
+            self.pip_trusted_origins.append((parsed_host, parsed_port))
+
+        self.mount(
+            build_url_from_netloc(host, scheme="http") + "/", self._trusted_host_adapter
+        )
+        self.mount(build_url_from_netloc(host) + "/", self._trusted_host_adapter)
+        if not parsed_port:
+            self.mount(
+                build_url_from_netloc(host, scheme="http") + ":",
+                self._trusted_host_adapter,
+            )
+            # Mount wildcard ports for the same host.
+            self.mount(build_url_from_netloc(host) + ":", self._trusted_host_adapter)
+
+    def iter_secure_origins(self) -> Generator[SecureOrigin, None, None]:
+        yield from SECURE_ORIGINS
+        for host, port in self.pip_trusted_origins:
+            yield ("*", host, "*" if port is None else port)
+
+    def is_secure_origin(self, location: Link) -> bool:
+        # Determine if this url used a secure transport mechanism
+        parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(str(location))
+        origin_protocol, origin_host, origin_port = (
+            parsed.scheme,
+            parsed.hostname,
+            parsed.port,
+        )
+
+        # The protocol to use to see if the protocol matches.
+        # Don't count the repository type as part of the protocol: in
+        # cases such as "git+ssh", only use "ssh". (I.e., Only verify against
+        # the last scheme.)
+        origin_protocol = origin_protocol.rsplit("+", 1)[-1]
+
+        # Determine if our origin is a secure origin by looking through our
+        # hardcoded list of secure origins, as well as any additional ones
+        # configured on this PackageFinder instance.
+        for secure_origin in self.iter_secure_origins():
+            secure_protocol, secure_host, secure_port = secure_origin
+            if origin_protocol != secure_protocol and secure_protocol != "*":
+                continue
+
+            try:
+                addr = ipaddress.ip_address(origin_host or "")
+                network = ipaddress.ip_network(secure_host)
+            except ValueError:
+                # We don't have both a valid address or a valid network, so
+                # we'll check this origin against hostnames.
+                if (
+                    origin_host
+                    and origin_host.lower() != secure_host.lower()
+                    and secure_host != "*"
+                ):
+                    continue
+            else:
+                # We have a valid address and network, so see if the address
+                # is contained within the network.
+                if addr not in network:
+                    continue
+
+            # Check to see if the port matches.
+            if (
+                origin_port != secure_port
+                and secure_port != "*"
+                and secure_port is not None
+            ):
+                continue
+
+            # If we've gotten here, then this origin matches the current
+            # secure origin and we should return True
+            return True
+
+        # If we've gotten to this point, then the origin isn't secure and we
+        # will not accept it as a valid location to search. We will however
+        # log a warning that we are ignoring it.
+        logger.warning(
+            "The repository located at %s is not a trusted or secure host and "
+            "is being ignored. If this repository is available via HTTPS we "
+            "recommend you use HTTPS instead, otherwise you may silence "
+            "this warning and allow it anyway with '--trusted-host %s'.",
+            origin_host,
+            origin_host,
+        )
+
+        return False
+
+    def request(self, method: str, url: str, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Response:  # type: ignore[override]
+        # Allow setting a default timeout on a session
+        kwargs.setdefault("timeout", self.timeout)
+        # Allow setting a default proxies on a session
+        kwargs.setdefault("proxies", self.proxies)
+
+        # Dispatch the actual request
+        return super().request(method, url, *args, **kwargs)

package/python/lib/python3.12/site-packages/pip/_internal/network/utils.py

@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+from collections.abc import Generator
+
+from pip._vendor.requests.models import Response
+
+from pip._internal.exceptions import NetworkConnectionError
+
+# The following comments and HTTP headers were originally added by
+# Donald Stufft in git commit 22c562429a61bb77172039e480873fb239dd8c03.
+#
+# We use Accept-Encoding: identity here because requests defaults to
+# accepting compressed responses. This breaks in a variety of ways
+# depending on how the server is configured.
+# - Some servers will notice that the file isn't a compressible file
+#   and will leave the file alone and with an empty Content-Encoding
+# - Some servers will notice that the file is already compressed and
+#   will leave the file alone, adding a Content-Encoding: gzip header
+# - Some servers won't notice anything at all and will take a file
+#   that's already been compressed and compress it again, and set
+#   the Content-Encoding: gzip header
+# By setting this to request only the identity encoding we're hoping
+# to eliminate the third case.  Hopefully there does not exist a server
+# which when given a file will notice it is already compressed and that
+# you're not asking for a compressed file and will then decompress it
+# before sending because if that's the case I don't think it'll ever be
+# possible to make this work.
+HEADERS: dict[str, str] = {"Accept-Encoding": "identity"}
+
+DOWNLOAD_CHUNK_SIZE = 256 * 1024
+
+
+def raise_for_status(resp: Response) -> None:
+    http_error_msg = ""
+    if isinstance(resp.reason, bytes):
+        # We attempt to decode utf-8 first because some servers
+        # choose to localize their reason strings. If the string
+        # isn't utf-8, we fall back to iso-8859-1 for all other
+        # encodings.
+        try:
+            reason = resp.reason.decode("utf-8")
+        except UnicodeDecodeError:
+            reason = resp.reason.decode("iso-8859-1")
+    else:
+        reason = resp.reason
+
+    if 400 <= resp.status_code < 500:
+        http_error_msg = (
+            f"{resp.status_code} Client Error: {reason} for url: {resp.url}"
+        )
+
+    elif 500 <= resp.status_code < 600:
+        http_error_msg = (
+            f"{resp.status_code} Server Error: {reason} for url: {resp.url}"
+        )
+
+    if http_error_msg:
+        raise NetworkConnectionError(http_error_msg, response=resp)
+
+
+def response_chunks(
+    response: Response, chunk_size: int = DOWNLOAD_CHUNK_SIZE
+) -> Generator[bytes, None, None]:
+    """Given a requests Response, provide the data chunks."""
+    try:
+        # Special case for urllib3.
+        for chunk in response.raw.stream(
+            chunk_size,
+            # We use decode_content=False here because we don't
+            # want urllib3 to mess with the raw bytes we get
+            # from the server. If we decompress inside of
+            # urllib3 then we cannot verify the checksum
+            # because the checksum will be of the compressed
+            # file. This breakage will only occur if the
+            # server adds a Content-Encoding header, which
+            # depends on how the server was configured:
+            # - Some servers will notice that the file isn't a
+            #   compressible file and will leave the file alone
+            #   and with an empty Content-Encoding
+            # - Some servers will notice that the file is
+            #   already compressed and will leave the file
+            #   alone and will add a Content-Encoding: gzip
+            #   header
+            # - Some servers won't notice anything at all and
+            #   will take a file that's already been compressed
+            #   and compress it again and set the
+            #   Content-Encoding: gzip header
+            #
+            # By setting this not to decode automatically we
+            # hope to eliminate problems with the second case.
+            decode_content=False,
+        ):
+            yield chunk
+    except AttributeError:
+        # Standard file-like object.
+        while True:
+            chunk = response.raw.read(chunk_size)
+            if not chunk:
+                break
+            yield chunk

package/python/lib/python3.12/site-packages/pip/_internal/network/xmlrpc.py

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+"""xmlrpclib.Transport implementation"""
+
+import logging
+import urllib.parse
+import xmlrpc.client
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING
+
+from pip._internal.exceptions import NetworkConnectionError
+from pip._internal.network.session import PipSession
+from pip._internal.network.utils import raise_for_status
+
+if TYPE_CHECKING:
+    from xmlrpc.client import _HostType, _Marshallable
+
+    from _typeshed import SizedBuffer
+
+logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
+
+
+class PipXmlrpcTransport(xmlrpc.client.Transport):
+    """Provide a `xmlrpclib.Transport` implementation via a `PipSession`
+    object.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self, index_url: str, session: PipSession, use_datetime: bool = False
+    ) -> None:
+        super().__init__(use_datetime)
+        index_parts = urllib.parse.urlparse(index_url)
+        self._scheme = index_parts.scheme
+        self._session = session
+
+    def request(
+        self,
+        host: "_HostType",
+        handler: str,
+        request_body: "SizedBuffer",
+        verbose: bool = False,
+    ) -> tuple["_Marshallable", ...]:
+        assert isinstance(host, str)
+        parts = (self._scheme, host, handler, None, None, None)
+        url = urllib.parse.urlunparse(parts)
+        try:
+            headers = {"Content-Type": "text/xml"}
+            response = self._session.post(
+                url,
+                data=request_body,
+                headers=headers,
+                stream=True,
+            )
+            raise_for_status(response)
+            self.verbose = verbose
+            return self.parse_response(response.raw)
+        except NetworkConnectionError as exc:
+            assert exc.response
+            logger.critical(
+                "HTTP error %s while getting %s",
+                exc.response.status_code,
+                url,
+            )
+            raise