@pablo2410/core-server 0.10.8 → 0.11.0

package/dist/auth.d.ts

@@ -31,6 +31,12 @@ interface PortalUser {
     siteId?: number;
     /** Profile picture as a data URL, or null when the user has none (portal#518). */
     avatarUrl?: string | null;
+    /**
+     * True for a read-only account (the live check's login, ops#246): the Portal
+     * says so in this payload and every app refuses its writes. Absent or false
+     * for everyone else.
+     */
+    readOnly?: boolean;
 }
 /** Environment variables required by the auth SDK. */
 interface AuthEnv {
@@ -57,6 +63,8 @@ interface BaseUser {
     role: string;
     enterpriseId: number | null;
     portalUserId: number | null;
+    /** Set (true) only for a read-only account; see PortalUser.readOnly. */
+    readOnly?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Minimal upsert payload for creating/updating users.
@@ -196,4 +204,5 @@ interface SubdomainAuth<TUser extends BaseUser = BaseUser> {
 
 declare function createSubdomainAuth<TUser extends BaseUser = BaseUser>(config: SubdomainAuthConfig<TUser>): SubdomainAuth<TUser>;
 
-export { type AuthEnv, type BaseUser, type DbAdapter, type PortalUser, type RoleMapper, type SessionPayload, type SubdomainAuth, type SubdomainAuthConfig, type UpsertUserPayload, createSubdomainAuth };
+export { createSubdomainAuth };
+export type { AuthEnv, BaseUser, DbAdapter, PortalUser, RoleMapper, SessionPayload, SubdomainAuth, SubdomainAuthConfig, UpsertUserPayload };

package/dist/auth.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import {
   createSubdomainAuth
-} from "./chunk-BUMJYZRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-RSIH3FKC.js";
 export {
   createSubdomainAuth
 };

package/dist/{chunk-BUMJYZRS.js → chunk-RSIH3FKC.js}

@@ -168,6 +168,7 @@ function createSubdomainAuth(config) {
   async function verifySession(cookieValue) {
     return (await verifyCookie(cookieValue))?.session ?? null;
   }
+  const knownReadOnly = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   async function getPortalUser(openId) {
     try {
       const client = await getPortalClientAsync();
@@ -175,6 +176,10 @@ function createSubdomainAuth(config) {
       const { data } = await client.get(
         `/api/service/users/by-openid/${encodeURIComponent(openId)}`
       );
+      if (data) {
+        if (data.readOnly === true) knownReadOnly.add(openId);
+        else knownReadOnly.delete(openId);
+      }
       return data ?? null;
     } catch (err) {
       const status = err?.response?.status;
@@ -223,7 +228,9 @@ function createSubdomainAuth(config) {
         email: null,
         role: "",
         enterpriseId: null,
-        portalUserId: null
+        portalUserId: null,
+        // A known read-only login stays read-only through a Portal outage.
+        ...knownReadOnly.has(openId) ? { readOnly: true } : {}
       };
     }
     const enterpriseId = portalUser.enterpriseId ?? portalUser.companyId ?? null;
@@ -235,7 +242,9 @@ function createSubdomainAuth(config) {
       role: portalUser.role,
       enterpriseId,
       portalUserId: portalUser.id,
-      avatarUrl: portalUser.avatarUrl ?? null
+      avatarUrl: portalUser.avatarUrl ?? null,
+      // Only set for a read-only account (ops#246); the apps refuse its writes.
+      ...portalUser.readOnly === true ? { readOnly: true } : {}
     };
   }
   const sessionCheckCache = /* @__PURE__ */ new Map();
@@ -418,7 +427,9 @@ function createSubdomainAuth(config) {
       openId: user.openId,
       lastSignedIn: signedInAt
     });
-    return user;
+    const portalSays = await getPortalUserCached(user.openId);
+    const readOnly = portalSays ? portalSays.readOnly === true : knownReadOnly.has(user.openId);
+    return readOnly ? { ...user, readOnly: true } : user;
   }
   return {
     verifySession,
@@ -437,4 +448,4 @@ export {
   resolveMarketingOrigin,
   createSubdomainAuth
 };
-//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-BUMJYZRS.js.map
+//# sourceMappingURL=chunk-RSIH3FKC.js.map

package/dist/chunk-RSIH3FKC.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/sandbox.ts","../src/auth/createSubdomainAuth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Production and local-sandbox addresses, and how to tell the two apart\n * (#86, part of oplytics-portal#261: no production links inside the sandbox).\n *\n * Same rule as Portal (oplytics-portal#373) and Policy Deployment (PD#329):\n * the sandbox is INFISICAL_ENV=staging; production is INFISICAL_ENV=prod.\n * NODE_ENV is \"production\" in both, so it can't tell them apart. Production\n * addresses are the defaults and never change.\n *\n * The sandbox ports mirror the sandbox compose file (portal 3000, apps\n * 3001-3006, marketing-site 3007) and shared-ui's SANDBOX_LOCALHOST_PORTS.\n */\n\nexport const PRODUCTION_PORTAL_ORIGIN = \"https://portal.oplyticsdigital.net\";\nexport const PRODUCTION_MARKETING_ORIGIN = \"https://oplytics.digital\";\nexport const SANDBOX_PORTAL_ORIGIN = \"http://localhost:3000\";\nexport const SANDBOX_MARKETING_ORIGIN = \"http://localhost:3007\";\n\nconst env = (name: string): string | undefined =>\n  typeof process === \"undefined\" ? undefined : process.env[name];\n\n/** True when this process is the local sandbox (INFISICAL_ENV=staging). */\nexport function isSandboxEnv(\n  infisicalEnv: string | undefined = env(\"INFISICAL_ENV\")\n): boolean {\n  return infisicalEnv === \"staging\";\n}\n\n/**\n * A sandbox app's own address: plain http on localhost or 127.0.0.1, ports\n * 3000-3009 (the rule Portal's cors.ts and returnUrl.ts use).\n */\nexport function isLocalSandboxUrl(url: URL): boolean {\n  return (\n    url.protocol === \"http:\" &&\n    (url.hostname === \"localhost\" || url.hostname === \"127.0.0.1\") &&\n    /^300\\d$/.test(url.port)\n  );\n}\n\n/** The origin of a configured URL, or null if it is unset or not a URL. */\nfunction originOf(value: string | undefined): string | null {\n  const trimmed = value?.trim();\n  if (!trimmed) return null;\n  try {\n    return new URL(trimmed).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The Portal origin the browser talks to in the sandbox: the app's own\n * PORTAL_LOGIN_URL (set by the tunnel variant, e.g.\n * https://sandbox-portal.oplyticsdigital.net), else the local sandbox Portal.\n */\nexport function sandboxPortalOrigin(\n  portalLoginUrl: string | undefined = env(\"PORTAL_LOGIN_URL\")\n): string {\n  return originOf(portalLoginUrl) ?? SANDBOX_PORTAL_ORIGIN;\n}\n\n/**\n * The marketing site's origin, for links Opi cites. As Portal's\n * resolveMarketingOrigin: an explicit MARKETING_ORIGIN wins; otherwise the\n * sandbox's marketing port when running as the sandbox, else production.\n */\nexport function resolveMarketingOrigin(\n  configured: string | undefined = env(\"MARKETING_ORIGIN\"),\n  infisicalEnv: string | undefined = env(\"INFISICAL_ENV\")\n): string {\n  return (\n    originOf(configured) ??\n    (isSandboxEnv(infisicalEnv)\n      ? SANDBOX_MARKETING_ORIGIN\n      : PRODUCTION_MARKETING_ORIGIN)\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * createSubdomainAuth — shared SSO auth factory for Oplytics.digital subdomains.\n *\n * Encapsulates:\n *   - JWT session verification (PORTAL_JWT_SECRET first, fallback to JWT_SECRET)\n *   - Cookie domain handling via COOKIE_DOMAIN env var\n *   - Portal API user enrichment with X-Service-Key header\n *   - Auto-create user from JWT payload if not in local DB\n *   - Enterprise backfill from portal API\n *   - Portal session check: a device signed out in the Portal is refused here\n *     too, cached for 30s, failing open when the Portal can't answer (#77)\n *\n * Based on SQDCP's battle-tested sdk.ts + cookies.ts.\n */\n\nimport type { Request, CookieOptions } from \"express\";\nimport type {\n  BaseUser,\n  PortalUser,\n  SessionPayload,\n  SubdomainAuth,\n  SubdomainAuthConfig,\n} from \"./types\";\nimport { isLocalSandboxUrl, isSandboxEnv } from \"../sandbox\";\n\n// ─── Constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME = \"app_session_id\";\n/** The Portal issues every session cookie for one year (portal#237). */\nconst PORTAL_SESSION_SECONDS = 31_536_000;\n/** Most session check answers kept at once; the oldest is dropped first. */\nconst SESSION_CHECK_CACHE_MAX = 10_000;\n/** Most Portal users cached at once (each can hold a picture); the oldest is dropped first. */\nconst PORTAL_USER_CACHE_MAX = 1_000;\n\n// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst isNonEmptyString = (value: unknown): value is string =>\n  typeof value === \"string\" && value.length > 0;\n\n/**\n * The cookie's issue time in seconds, as the Portal's session check needs it.\n * Cookies from before portal#237 have no iat; every Portal session cookie is\n * issued for one year, so exp minus a year is when it was issued. Never\n * guessed as 0: the Portal would read that as issued before any sign-out\n * cutoff and end a live session.\n */\nfunction issuedAtSeconds(iat: unknown, exp: unknown): number | null {\n  const seconds =\n    typeof iat === \"number\"\n      ? iat\n      : typeof exp === \"number\"\n        ? exp - PORTAL_SESSION_SECONDS\n        : null;\n  if (seconds === null || !Number.isFinite(seconds) || seconds <= 0) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return Math.floor(seconds);\n}\n\n/** A verified cookie: the public payload, plus what the session check needs. */\ninterface VerifiedCookie {\n  session: SessionPayload;\n  /** The Portal session id. Absent on cookies issued before portal#237. */\n  sid?: string;\n  /** Issue time in seconds; null when the cookie has neither iat nor exp. */\n  iat: number | null;\n}\n\n// ─── Factory ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport function createSubdomainAuth<TUser extends BaseUser = BaseUser>(\n  config: SubdomainAuthConfig<TUser>\n): SubdomainAuth<TUser> {\n  const {\n    env,\n    db,\n    // Default to identity (no role translation). Subdomains should adopt the\n    // Portal's canonical roles verbatim; a custom mapper is legacy.\n    mapRole = (role: string) => role,\n    userSource = \"db\",\n    cookieName = DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME,\n    serviceName = \"Subdomain\",\n    portalUserCacheTtlMs = 30_000,\n    sessionCheck = true,\n    sessionCheckCacheTtlMs = 30_000,\n    sessionCheckTimeoutMs = 2_000,\n  } = config;\n\n  const tag = `[${serviceName} Auth]`;\n  // The local sandbox (INFISICAL_ENV=staging) also accepts its own\n  // http://localhost:300x addresses as a returnTo (#86).\n  const sandbox = isSandboxEnv();\n\n  if (userSource === \"db\" && !db) {\n    throw new Error(\n      `${tag} userSource \"db\" requires a db adapter in createSubdomainAuth config`\n    );\n  }\n\n  // Short-TTL cache of Portal users (portal mode), keyed by openId, so we don't\n  // hit the Portal on every request.\n  const portalUserCache = new Map<string, { user: PortalUser; at: number }>();\n\n  // ── Lazy-loaded dependencies (jose, cookie, axios) ──────────────\n  // We use dynamic imports so consumers don't need to install these\n  // as peer deps if they only use other core-server features.\n\n  let _jose: typeof import(\"jose\") | null = null;\n  async function getJose() {\n    if (!_jose) _jose = await import(\"jose\");\n    return _jose;\n  }\n\n  let _cookie: typeof import(\"cookie\") | null = null;\n  async function getCookie() {\n    if (!_cookie) _cookie = await import(\"cookie\");\n    return _cookie;\n  }\n\n  let _axios: typeof import(\"axios\").default | null = null;\n  async function getAxios() {\n    if (!_axios) {\n      const mod = await import(\"axios\");\n      _axios = mod.default;\n    }\n    return _axios;\n  }\n\n  // ── Portal API client ──────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  let portalClient: import(\"axios\").AxiosInstance | null = null;\n\n  async function getPortalClientAsync() {\n    if (portalClient) return portalClient;\n    if (!env.portalApiUrl) return null;\n    const axios = await getAxios();\n    portalClient = axios.create({\n      baseURL: env.portalApiUrl,\n      timeout: 10_000,\n      headers: {\n        \"Content-Type\": \"application/json\",\n        ...(env.portalApiKey ? { \"X-Service-Key\": env.portalApiKey } : {}),\n      },\n    });\n    return portalClient;\n  }\n\n  // ── JWT Secret ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  function getPortalSecret() {\n    const secret = env.portalJwtSecret;\n    if (!secret) throw new Error(\"PORTAL_JWT_SECRET is not configured\");\n    return new TextEncoder().encode(secret);\n  }\n\n  // ── Cookie Helpers ─────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  function getCookieDomain(): string | undefined {\n    return env.cookieDomain || undefined;\n  }\n\n  function isSecureRequest(req: Request): boolean {\n    if (req.protocol === \"https\") return true;\n    const forwardedProto = req.headers[\"x-forwarded-proto\"];\n    if (!forwardedProto) return false;\n    const protoList = Array.isArray(forwardedProto)\n      ? forwardedProto\n      : forwardedProto.split(\",\");\n    return protoList.some(p => p.trim().toLowerCase() === \"https\");\n  }\n\n  function getSessionCookieOptions(\n    req: Request\n  ): Pick<\n    CookieOptions,\n    \"domain\" | \"httpOnly\" | \"path\" | \"sameSite\" | \"secure\"\n  > {\n    const secure = isSecureRequest(req);\n    const domain = getCookieDomain();\n    return {\n      domain,\n      httpOnly: true,\n      path: \"/\",\n      sameSite: \"lax\",\n      secure,\n    };\n  }\n\n  function isValidReturnUrl(url: string): boolean {\n    if (url.startsWith(\"/\") && !url.startsWith(\"//\")) return true;\n    try {\n      const parsed = new URL(url);\n      if (sandbox && isLocalSandboxUrl(parsed)) return true;\n      if (parsed.protocol !== \"https:\") return false;\n      return (\n        parsed.hostname === \"oplyticsdigital.net\" ||\n        parsed.hostname.endsWith(\".oplyticsdigital.net\")\n      );\n    } catch {\n      return false;\n    }\n  }\n\n  // ── Session Verification ───────────────────────────────────────\n\n  /**\n   * Verify session cookie against PORTAL_JWT_SECRET (cross-subdomain SSO).\n   *\n   * Portal is the only issuer of session cookies for subdomains using this\n   * factory — the old Manus OAuth login path (which signed its own cookies\n   * with a local JWT_SECRET) was removed. A cookie that fails portal\n   * verification is invalid, full stop.\n   */\n  async function verifyCookie(\n    cookieValue: string | undefined | null\n  ): Promise<VerifiedCookie | null> {\n    if (!cookieValue) {\n      console.warn(`${tag} Missing session cookie`);\n      return null;\n    }\n\n    const jose = await getJose();\n\n    try {\n      const portalKey = getPortalSecret();\n      const { payload } = await jose.jwtVerify(cookieValue, portalKey, {\n        algorithms: [\"HS256\"],\n      });\n      const { openId, appId, name, email, sid, iat, exp } = payload as Record<\n        string,\n        unknown\n      >;\n      // Identity is openId; the display name is cosmetic. The Portal signs\n      // `name: user.name || \"\"`, so a user with no display name has an empty\n      // one, and must not be locked out for it (#82).\n      if (!isNonEmptyString(openId) || !isNonEmptyString(appId)) {\n        console.warn(`${tag} Portal JWT payload missing required fields`);\n        return null;\n      }\n      return {\n        session: {\n          openId,\n          appId,\n          name: isNonEmptyString(name)\n            ? name\n            : isNonEmptyString(email)\n              ? email\n              : \"\",\n        },\n        ...(isNonEmptyString(sid) ? { sid } : {}),\n        iat: issuedAtSeconds(iat, exp),\n      };\n    } catch (error) {\n      console.warn(\n        `${tag} Session verification failed:`,\n        (error as Error).message\n      );\n      return null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  async function verifySession(\n    cookieValue: string | undefined | null\n  ): Promise<SessionPayload | null> {\n    return (await verifyCookie(cookieValue))?.session ?? null;\n  }\n\n  // ── Portal API ─────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\n  // ops#246: who the Portal last said is read-only. Used only when the Portal\n  // cannot be reached, so a Portal blip never lifts read-only from a login we\n  // already know (the live check). Someone never seen stays fail-open.\n  const knownReadOnly = new Set<string>();\n\n  async function getPortalUser(openId: string): Promise<PortalUser | null> {\n    try {\n      const client = await getPortalClientAsync();\n      if (!client) return null;\n      // The Portal Service API is under /api/service (base URL is the origin,\n      // e.g. https://portal.oplyticsdigital.net). Must include the /api/service\n      // prefix — omitting it 404s and silently strands enterprise resolution.\n      // Deliberately names no company (no X-Enterprise-Id): this is the\n      // sign-in lookup that finds the user's company. The Portal must keep\n      // allowing it with the master key (#91, subdomains#1037).\n      const { data } = await client.get<PortalUser>(\n        `/api/service/users/by-openid/${encodeURIComponent(openId)}`\n      );\n      if (data) {\n        if (data.readOnly === true) knownReadOnly.add(openId);\n        else knownReadOnly.delete(openId);\n      }\n      return data ?? null;\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      const status = (err as any)?.response?.status;\n      if (status === 401) {\n        console.error(\n          `${tag} Portal API key revoked (401) — enrichment disabled`\n        );\n      } else if (status === 404) {\n        // User not found in portal — normal for first-time users\n      } else {\n        console.warn(\n          `${tag} Portal user lookup failed:`,\n          (err as Error).message\n        );\n      }\n      return null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Portal user lookup with a short-TTL cache (portal mode). */\n  async function getPortalUserCached(\n    openId: string\n  ): Promise<PortalUser | null> {\n    if (portalUserCacheTtlMs > 0) {\n      const hit = portalUserCache.get(openId);\n      if (hit && Date.now() - hit.at < portalUserCacheTtlMs) {\n        return hit.user;\n      }\n    }\n    const user = await getPortalUser(openId);\n    if (user && portalUserCacheTtlMs > 0) {\n      // Re-insert so Map order stays oldest-first for eviction.\n      portalUserCache.delete(openId);\n      portalUserCache.set(openId, { user, at: Date.now() });\n      if (portalUserCache.size > PORTAL_USER_CACHE_MAX) {\n        const oldest = portalUserCache.keys().next().value;\n        if (oldest !== undefined) portalUserCache.delete(oldest);\n      }\n    }\n    return user;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Build ctx.user entirely from the Portal record — no local persistence.\n   * The single source of truth. ctx.user.id is the PORTAL user id. Roles and\n   * enterprise come from the Portal verbatim (no mapping).\n   *\n   * On a genuine Portal outage (the by-openid lookup returns null) we keep the\n   * user authenticated using their verified session claims, with role/enterprise\n   * unresolved, rather than throwing. Throwing here would make createContext (in\n   * every subdomain) swallow the error into `user = null`, which the AuthGate\n   * renders as the Sign In screen — i.e. a transient Portal blip would log the\n   * user out. Their session cookie is already valid; keep them in, degraded,\n   * until the Portal recovers. (Enterprise-scoped procedures will 403 during the\n   * outage; client array-guards keep pages from crashing.)\n   */\n  async function resolvePortalUser(\n    openId: string,\n    session: SessionPayload\n  ): Promise<TUser> {\n    const portalUser = await getPortalUserCached(openId);\n\n    if (!portalUser) {\n      console.warn(\n        `${tag} Portal user unavailable for ${openId} — keeping session (role/enterprise unresolved until Portal recovers)`\n      );\n      return {\n        id: 0,\n        openId,\n        name: session.name || null,\n        email: null,\n        role: \"\",\n        enterpriseId: null,\n        portalUserId: null,\n        // A known read-only login stays read-only through a Portal outage.\n        ...(knownReadOnly.has(openId) ? { readOnly: true } : {}),\n      } as unknown as TUser;\n    }\n\n    const enterpriseId =\n      portalUser.enterpriseId ?? portalUser.companyId ?? null;\n    return {\n      id: portalUser.id,\n      openId: portalUser.openId ?? openId,\n      name: portalUser.name || session.name || null,\n      email: portalUser.email ?? null,\n      role: portalUser.role,\n      enterpriseId,\n      portalUserId: portalUser.id,\n      avatarUrl: portalUser.avatarUrl ?? null,\n      // Only set for a read-only account (ops#246); the apps refuse its writes.\n      ...(portalUser.readOnly === true ? { readOnly: true } : {}),\n    } as unknown as TUser;\n  }\n\n  // ── Portal Session Check ───────────────────────────────────────\n  //\n  // Fails open: only an explicit `{ active: false }` from the Portal ends a\n  // session. The check runs on every request to every app, so failing closed\n  // would turn a Portal outage, a slow deploy or a key problem into everyone\n  // being signed out of everything at once (and nobody could sign back in\n  // while the Portal is down). The cost: while the Portal can't answer, a\n  // device signed out after its last answer keeps working here until the\n  // Portal is back. A session the Portal has already called ended stays\n  // ended through an outage.\n\n  // Answers keyed by openId + sid + iat, because the Portal judges all three:\n  // an old copy of a cookie keeps its sid but its earlier iat is cut off.\n  const sessionCheckCache = new Map<string, { active: boolean; at: number }>();\n  const sessionCheckInflight = new Map<string, Promise<boolean>>();\n  const warned = new Set<string>();\n\n  function warnOnce(key: string, message: string) {\n    if (warned.has(key)) return;\n    warned.add(key);\n    console.warn(message);\n  }\n\n  function rememberSessionCheck(key: string, active: boolean) {\n    // Re-insert so Map order stays oldest-first for eviction.\n    sessionCheckCache.delete(key);\n    sessionCheckCache.set(key, { active, at: Date.now() });\n    if (sessionCheckCache.size > SESSION_CHECK_CACHE_MAX) {\n      const oldest = sessionCheckCache.keys().next().value;\n      if (oldest !== undefined) sessionCheckCache.delete(oldest);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One call to POST /api/service/sessions/check. Returns the Portal's\n   * answer, or null when it gave none (unreachable, slow, error, odd reply).\n   * Like the by-openid lookup it names no company: it runs before the user's\n   * company is known, and answers only about the cookie (#91).\n   */\n  async function askPortalSessionActive(body: {\n    openId: string;\n    sid?: string;\n    iat: number;\n  }): Promise<boolean | null> {\n    try {\n      const client = await getPortalClientAsync();\n      if (!client) return null;\n      const { data } = await client.post<{ active?: unknown }>(\n        \"/api/service/sessions/check\",\n        body,\n        {\n          // axios's timeout only covers an idle socket; the signal caps the\n          // whole call, so a Portal that answers slowly can't stall requests.\n          timeout: sessionCheckTimeoutMs,\n          signal: AbortSignal.timeout(sessionCheckTimeoutMs),\n        }\n      );\n      if (typeof data?.active === \"boolean\") return data.active;\n      console.warn(\n        `${tag} Portal session check gave no answer for ${body.openId} — keeping session`\n      );\n      return null;\n    } catch (err: unknown) {\n      const status = (err as any)?.response?.status;\n      if (status === 404) {\n        warnOnce(\n          \"check-404\",\n          `${tag} Portal has no session check yet (404) — sessions signed out in the Portal are not refused until it ships`\n        );\n      } else if (status === 401) {\n        console.error(\n          `${tag} Portal API key refused (401) on session check — keeping session`\n        );\n      } else {\n        console.warn(\n          `${tag} Portal session check failed for ${body.openId} (${status ?? (err as Error).message}) — keeping session`\n        );\n      }\n      return null;\n    }\n  }\n\n  /** Is the session behind this cookie still live in the Portal? */\n  async function isSessionActive(cookie: VerifiedCookie): Promise<boolean> {\n    if (!sessionCheck) return true;\n    if (!env.portalApiUrl) {\n      warnOnce(\n        \"no-portal-url\",\n        `${tag} No Portal API URL — sessions signed out in the Portal are not refused`\n      );\n      return true;\n    }\n    const { openId } = cookie.session;\n    if (cookie.iat === null) {\n      warnOnce(\n        \"no-iat\",\n        `${tag} Session cookie for ${openId} has neither iat nor exp — not checked with the Portal`\n      );\n      return true;\n    }\n\n    const key = JSON.stringify([openId, cookie.sid ?? null, cookie.iat]);\n    const hit = sessionCheckCache.get(key);\n    if (hit && Date.now() - hit.at < sessionCheckCacheTtlMs) return hit.active;\n\n    // Parallel requests from one page load share a single Portal call.\n    let pending = sessionCheckInflight.get(key);\n    if (!pending) {\n      pending = askPortalSessionActive({\n        openId,\n        ...(cookie.sid ? { sid: cookie.sid } : {}),\n        iat: cookie.iat,\n      })\n        .then(answer => {\n          // No answer: keep an earlier \"ended\", otherwise let it through.\n          // Remembered either way, so a down Portal isn't asked every request.\n          const active = answer ?? hit?.active ?? true;\n          rememberSessionCheck(key, active);\n          return active;\n        })\n        .finally(() => sessionCheckInflight.delete(key));\n      sessionCheckInflight.set(key, pending);\n    }\n    return pending;\n  }\n\n  // ── Authenticate Request ───────────────────────────────────────\n\n  async function authenticateRequest(req: Request): Promise<TUser> {\n    const cookie = await getCookie();\n    const cookies = req.headers.cookie\n      ? new Map(Object.entries(cookie.parseCookie(req.headers.cookie)))\n      : new Map<string, string | undefined>();\n\n    const sessionCookie = cookies.get(cookieName);\n    const verified = await verifyCookie(sessionCookie);\n\n    if (!verified) {\n      throw Object.assign(new Error(\"Invalid session cookie\"), {\n        statusCode: 403,\n      });\n    }\n\n    // A device signed out in the Portal is refused here too (#77).\n    if (!(await isSessionActive(verified))) {\n      throw Object.assign(new Error(\"Session ended\"), {\n        statusCode: 403,\n        code: \"SESSION_ENDED\",\n      });\n    }\n\n    const { session } = verified;\n\n    const sessionUserId = session.openId;\n    const signedInAt = new Date();\n\n    // ── Portal mode: single source of truth, no local mirror ────\n    if (userSource === \"portal\") {\n      return await resolvePortalUser(sessionUserId, session);\n    }\n\n    let user = (await db!.getUserByOpenId(sessionUserId)) ?? null;\n\n    // ── Auto-create user from verified JWT ──────────────────────\n    if (!user) {\n      try {\n        // Try portal API first for richer user info\n        const portalUser = await getPortalUser(sessionUserId);\n\n        if (portalUser) {\n          console.log(\n            `${tag} Cross-subdomain SSO: creating user from portal (${portalUser.email || sessionUserId})`\n          );\n          // Portal returns `enterpriseId`; `companyId` is a legacy alias.\n          const portalEnterpriseId =\n            portalUser.enterpriseId ?? portalUser.companyId ?? null;\n          await db!.upsertUser({\n            openId: sessionUserId,\n            name: portalUser.name || session.name || null,\n            email: portalUser.email ?? null,\n            loginMethod: \"portal-sso\",\n            role: mapRole(portalUser.role),\n            lastSignedIn: signedInAt,\n            ...(portalEnterpriseId != null\n              ? {\n                  enterpriseId: portalEnterpriseId,\n                  portalUserId: portalUser.id,\n                }\n              : {}),\n          });\n          user = (await db!.getUserByOpenId(sessionUserId)) ?? null;\n        } else {\n          // Portal unavailable — create from JWT payload\n          console.log(\n            `${tag} Cross-subdomain SSO: creating user from JWT payload (${sessionUserId})`\n          );\n          await db!.upsertUser({\n            openId: sessionUserId,\n            name: session.name || null,\n            loginMethod: \"portal-sso\",\n            lastSignedIn: signedInAt,\n          });\n          user = (await db!.getUserByOpenId(sessionUserId)) ?? null;\n        }\n      } catch (error) {\n        console.error(`${tag} Failed to sync user info:`, error);\n        throw Object.assign(new Error(\"Failed to sync user info\"), {\n          statusCode: 403,\n        });\n      }\n    }\n\n    if (!user) {\n      throw Object.assign(new Error(\"User not found\"), { statusCode: 403 });\n    }\n\n    // ── Enterprise backfill ─────────────────────────────────────\n    if (user.enterpriseId === null) {\n      try {\n        const portalUser = await getPortalUser(user.openId);\n        // Portal returns `enterpriseId`; `companyId` is a legacy alias.\n        const portalEnterpriseId =\n          portalUser?.enterpriseId ?? portalUser?.companyId ?? null;\n        if (portalEnterpriseId != null) {\n          console.log(\n            `${tag} Backfilling enterpriseId=${portalEnterpriseId} for user ${user.id}`\n          );\n          await db!.updateUserFields(user.id, {\n            enterpriseId: portalEnterpriseId,\n            ...(portalUser?.id ? { portalUserId: portalUser.id } : {}),\n          });\n          user = (await db!.getUserByOpenId(user.openId)) ?? user;\n        }\n      } catch (backfillError) {\n        console.warn(\n          `${tag} Failed to backfill enterpriseId for user ${user.id}:`,\n          backfillError\n        );\n        // Non-fatal — user can still proceed\n      }\n    }\n\n    // Touch lastSignedIn\n    await db!.upsertUser({\n      openId: user.openId,\n      lastSignedIn: signedInAt,\n    });\n\n    // A read-only account (ops#246) is marked on the user the apps see. 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package/dist/hierarchy.d.ts

@@ -70,4 +70,5 @@ interface HierarchyService {
 }
 declare function createHierarchyService(config: HierarchyServiceConfig): HierarchyService;
 
-export { type HierarchyService, type HierarchyServiceConfig, createHierarchyService };
+export { createHierarchyService };
+export type { HierarchyService, HierarchyServiceConfig };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -556,4 +556,5 @@ interface SecurityHeadersOptions {
  */
 declare function securityHeaders(opts?: SecurityHeadersOptions): (_req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => void;
 
-export { type AiAvailability, type AiCaller, type AiGate, type AiGateConfig, AiUnavailableError, type AiUnavailableReason, type AssistantMode, type BuildSystemPromptParams, type CallMeta, type ChatMessage, type ChatParams, type ChatResult, type CoreEnv, DEFAULT_COST_RATE, DEFAULT_LLM_MODEL, type FileContent, type GuardRequest, type GuardResult, type ImageContent, type InvokeParams, type InvokeResult, KNOWLEDGE, type KnowledgeItem, LLMBudgetError, type LLMClientOptions, LLMProviderError, type LLMProviderName, type LLMProviderStatus, type Message, type MessageContent, OPLYTICS_VERIFIED_LINKS, type OutputSchema, type ResponseFormat, type RetrieveOptions, type Retriever, type Role, SQDCP_PILLARS, SQDCP_PILLAR_COLORS, SQDCP_PILLAR_LABELS, type SecurityHeadersOptions, type SqdcpPillar, type SupportContext, type SupportEngine, type SupportEngineOptions, type TextContent, type TokenCostRate, type Tool, type ToolChoice, type UsageEvent, buildSystemPrompt, computeCostUsd, createAiGate, createLLMClient, createStaticRetriever, createSupportEngine, estimateMessageTokens, estimateTokens, formatKnowledge, securityHeaders };
+export { AiUnavailableError, DEFAULT_COST_RATE, DEFAULT_LLM_MODEL, KNOWLEDGE, LLMBudgetError, LLMProviderError, OPLYTICS_VERIFIED_LINKS, SQDCP_PILLARS, SQDCP_PILLAR_COLORS, SQDCP_PILLAR_LABELS, buildSystemPrompt, computeCostUsd, createAiGate, createLLMClient, createStaticRetriever, createSupportEngine, estimateMessageTokens, estimateTokens, formatKnowledge, securityHeaders };
+export type { AiAvailability, AiCaller, AiGate, AiGateConfig, AiUnavailableReason, AssistantMode, BuildSystemPromptParams, CallMeta, ChatMessage, ChatParams, ChatResult, CoreEnv, FileContent, GuardRequest, GuardResult, ImageContent, InvokeParams, InvokeResult, KnowledgeItem, LLMClientOptions, LLMProviderName, LLMProviderStatus, Message, MessageContent, OutputSchema, ResponseFormat, RetrieveOptions, Retriever, Role, SecurityHeadersOptions, SqdcpPillar, SupportContext, SupportEngine, SupportEngineOptions, TextContent, TokenCostRate, Tool, ToolChoice, UsageEvent };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import {
   isSandboxEnv,
   resolveMarketingOrigin,
   sandboxPortalOrigin
-} from "./chunk-BUMJYZRS.js";
+} from "./chunk-RSIH3FKC.js";
 import {
   createHierarchyService
 } from "./chunk-NSTH36LS.js";

package/dist/isolation.d.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,15 @@
 import * as _trpc_server from '@trpc/server';
+import { Request, Response, NextFunction } from 'express';
 
 /** The user fields isolation needs. Each app's session user must have these. */
 interface IsolationUser {
     role: string;
     enterpriseId?: number | null;
+    /** True for a read-only account (ops#246): every write from it is refused. */
+    readOnly?: boolean;
 }
+/** What a read-only account is told when it tries to change something. */
+declare const READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG = "This account is read-only: it can look but not change anything.";
 /** The context fields isolation needs. Each app's tRPC context must have these. */
 interface IsolationContext<TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser> {
     user: TUser | null;
@@ -63,24 +68,38 @@ declare function assertEnterpriseOwnership<T extends EnterpriseOwned>(record: T
  * to non-null. Checks run in order: user, then enterprise, then role.
  */
 declare function createIsolationProcedures<TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser>(): {
+    /**
+     * For public procedures and any app tier of its own: no sign-in needed, but
+     * a signed-in read-only account's writes are still refused.
+     */
+    readOnlyGuardedProcedure: _trpc_server.TRPCProcedureBuilder<IsolationContext<TUser>, object, {}, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, false>;
     protectedProcedure: _trpc_server.TRPCProcedureBuilder<IsolationContext<TUser>, object, {
         user: TUser;
     }, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, false>;
     enterpriseProcedure: _trpc_server.TRPCProcedureBuilder<IsolationContext<TUser>, object, {
-        enterpriseId: number;
         user: TUser;
+        enterpriseId: number;
     }, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, false>;
     adminProcedure: _trpc_server.TRPCProcedureBuilder<IsolationContext<TUser>, object, {
         user: TUser;
     }, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, false>;
     enterpriseAdminProcedure: _trpc_server.TRPCProcedureBuilder<IsolationContext<TUser>, object, {
-        enterpriseId: number;
         user: TUser;
+        enterpriseId: number;
     }, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, false>;
     platformAdminProcedure: _trpc_server.TRPCProcedureBuilder<IsolationContext<TUser>, object, {
         user: TUser;
     }, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, _trpc_server.TRPCUnsetMarker, false>;
 };
 type IsolationProcedures<TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser> = ReturnType<typeof createIsolationProcedures<TUser>>;
+/**
+ * Express guard for write routes that are not tRPC (ops#246): a read-only
+ * account gets 403 on every POST, PUT, PATCH and DELETE. `getUser` is the
+ * app's own sign-in lookup (for example `req => auth.authenticateRequest(req)`);
+ * an unauthenticated caller (it throws or returns null) is left to the route.
+ * Mount it before the app's write routes.
+ */
+declare function refuseReadOnlyWritesExpress(getUser: (req: Request) => Promise<IsolationUser | null | undefined>): (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction) => Promise<void | Response<any, Record<string, any>>>;
 
-export { ADMIN_MIN_ROLE, type EnterpriseOwned, type IsolationContext, type IsolationProcedures, type IsolationUser, type OwnershipMessages, assertEnterpriseOwnership, createIsolationProcedures, isAdminRole, requireEnterpriseId, resolveEnterpriseId, scopeToEnterprise };
+export { ADMIN_MIN_ROLE, READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG, assertEnterpriseOwnership, createIsolationProcedures, isAdminRole, refuseReadOnlyWritesExpress, requireEnterpriseId, resolveEnterpriseId, scopeToEnterprise };
+export type { EnterpriseOwned, IsolationContext, IsolationProcedures, IsolationUser, OwnershipMessages };

package/dist/isolation.js

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ import {
   ROLE_HIERARCHY,
   UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG
 } from "@pablo2410/shared-ui/rbac";
+var READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG = "This account is read-only: it can look but not change anything.";
 function isEnterpriseId(value) {
   return typeof value === "number" && Number.isInteger(value) && value > 0;
 }
@@ -82,9 +83,21 @@ function createIsolationProcedures() {
     });
   }
   const requireAdmin = requireRole(ADMIN_MIN_ROLE, NOT_ADMIN_ERR_MSG);
-  const protectedProcedure = t.procedure.use(requireUser);
-  const enterpriseProcedure = t.procedure.use(requireEnterprise);
+  const refuseReadOnlyWrites = t.middleware(({ ctx, type, next }) => {
+    if (type === "mutation" && ctx.user?.readOnly === true) {
+      throw new TRPCError({ code: "FORBIDDEN", message: READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG });
+    }
+    return next();
+  });
+  const baseProcedure = t.procedure.use(refuseReadOnlyWrites);
+  const protectedProcedure = baseProcedure.use(requireUser);
+  const enterpriseProcedure = baseProcedure.use(requireEnterprise);
   return {
+    /**
+     * For public procedures and any app tier of its own: no sign-in needed, but
+     * a signed-in read-only account's writes are still refused.
+     */
+    readOnlyGuardedProcedure: baseProcedure,
     protectedProcedure,
     enterpriseProcedure,
     adminProcedure: protectedProcedure.use(requireAdmin),
@@ -94,11 +107,29 @@ function createIsolationProcedures() {
     )
   };
 }
+function refuseReadOnlyWritesExpress(getUser) {
+  const WRITE = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set(["POST", "PUT", "PATCH", "DELETE"]);
+  return async (req, res, next) => {
+    if (!WRITE.has(String(req.method).toUpperCase())) return next();
+    let user;
+    try {
+      user = await getUser(req);
+    } catch {
+      return next();
+    }
+    if (user?.readOnly === true) {
+      return res.status(403).json({ error: READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG });
+    }
+    return next();
+  };
+}
 export {
   ADMIN_MIN_ROLE,
+  READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG,
   assertEnterpriseOwnership,
   createIsolationProcedures,
   isAdminRole,
+  refuseReadOnlyWritesExpress,
   requireEnterpriseId,
   resolveEnterpriseId,
   scopeToEnterprise

package/dist/isolation.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/isolation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enterprise Isolation — the one enforced tenant-scoping path for every service.\n *\n * Replaces the per-app copies of `requireEnterprise` / `enterpriseProcedure` and\n * the hand-written `rows.filter(r => r.enterpriseId === id)` and \"does this\n * record belong to the caller?\" checks. Roles and error messages come from\n * `@pablo2410/shared-ui/rbac`, the platform's single role model.\n *\n * Every check fails closed: no user → UNAUTHORIZED; no (valid) enterprise →\n * FORBIDDEN / no rows; an unknown role never passes a role check; a record with\n * no enterpriseId never matches, even against a caller with none.\n *\n * Quick example (each app keeps its own `t`; the procedures are concatenated\n * onto it, so the app's transformer, context and error formatter still apply):\n *\n *   import { createIsolationProcedures } from \"@pablo2410/core-server/isolation\";\n *   const iso = createIsolationProcedures<SessionUser>();\n *   export const enterpriseProcedure = t.procedure.concat(iso.enterpriseProcedure);\n *   // in a resolver: ctx.enterpriseId is a number, ctx.user is non-null\n *   listPlans: enterpriseProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) =>\n *     scopeToEnterprise(await getPlans(), ctx.enterpriseId)),\n */\nimport { initTRPC, TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\nimport {\n  NO_ENTERPRISE_ERR_MSG,\n  NOT_ADMIN_ERR_MSG,\n  NOT_PLATFORM_ADMIN_ERR_MSG,\n  ROLE_HIERARCHY,\n  UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG,\n  type RoleType,\n} from \"@pablo2410/shared-ui/rbac\";\n\n/** The user fields isolation needs. Each app's session user must have these. */\nexport interface IsolationUser {\n  role: string;\n  enterpriseId?: number | null;\n}\n\n/** The context fields isolation needs. Each app's tRPC context must have these. */\nexport interface IsolationContext<TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser> {\n  user: TUser | null;\n}\n\n/** Anything owned by one enterprise (a row from the DB or the Portal API). */\nexport interface EnterpriseOwned {\n  enterpriseId?: number | null;\n}\n\n/** Only positive integers are real enterprise IDs. */\nfunction isEnterpriseId(value: unknown): value is number {\n  return typeof value === \"number\" && Number.isInteger(value) && value > 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `userRole` is a known role at or above `minimumRole`.\n * Unlike a bare indexOf comparison, an unknown role on either side is never\n * treated as meeting the bar.\n */\nfunction meetsMinimumRole(\n  userRole: string | null | undefined,\n  minimumRole: RoleType\n): boolean {\n  const user = ROLE_HIERARCHY.indexOf(userRole as RoleType);\n  const min = ROLE_HIERARCHY.indexOf(minimumRole);\n  return user >= 0 && min >= 0 && user >= min;\n}\n\n/**\n * The fleet's one admin rule: enterprise_admin and above (enterprise_admin,\n * platform_admin). Paul, 5 Oct 2026 (core-server#74). Every admin check in\n * every app uses this; no app sets its own admin threshold, and superuser is\n * not an admin level.\n */\nexport const ADMIN_MIN_ROLE = \"enterprise_admin\" as const satisfies RoleType;\n\n/** True when `role` passes the fleet admin rule (ADMIN_MIN_ROLE and above). */\nexport function isAdminRole(role: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  return meetsMinimumRole(role, ADMIN_MIN_ROLE);\n}\n\n/**\n * The caller's enterprise, or null. Never a default tenant: a missing,\n * zero, negative or non-integer enterpriseId is null.\n */\nexport function resolveEnterpriseId(\n  user: IsolationUser | null | undefined\n): number | null {\n  const id = user?.enterpriseId;\n  return isEnterpriseId(id) ? id : null;\n}\n\n/** Like resolveEnterpriseId, but throws UNAUTHORIZED / FORBIDDEN instead of null. */\nexport function requireEnterpriseId(\n  user: IsolationUser | null | undefined\n): number {\n  if (!user) {\n    throw new TRPCError({ code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\", message: UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG });\n  }\n  const id = resolveEnterpriseId(user);\n  if (id === null) {\n    throw new TRPCError({ code: \"FORBIDDEN\", message: NO_ENTERPRISE_ERR_MSG });\n  }\n  return id;\n}\n\n/**\n * Keep only the rows owned by `enterpriseId`. A null/invalid enterprise gets no\n * rows; a row with no enterpriseId is never included.\n */\nexport function scopeToEnterprise<T extends EnterpriseOwned>(\n  rows: readonly T[],\n  enterpriseId: number | null | undefined\n): T[] {\n  if (!isEnterpriseId(enterpriseId)) return [];\n  return rows.filter(row => row.enterpriseId === enterpriseId);\n}\n\nexport interface OwnershipMessages {\n  /** Message when the record does not exist. Default \"Not found\". */\n  notFound?: string;\n  /** Message when the record belongs to another enterprise. */\n  forbidden?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return `record` if it belongs to `enterpriseId`; otherwise throw.\n * Missing record → NOT_FOUND. Other enterprise, a record with no enterpriseId,\n * or a caller with no enterprise → FORBIDDEN.\n */\nexport function assertEnterpriseOwnership<T extends EnterpriseOwned>(\n  record: T | null | undefined,\n  enterpriseId: number | null | undefined,\n  messages: OwnershipMessages = {}\n): T {\n  if (record === null || record === undefined) {\n    throw new TRPCError({\n      code: \"NOT_FOUND\",\n      message: messages.notFound ?? \"Not found\",\n    });\n  }\n  if (!isEnterpriseId(enterpriseId) || record.enterpriseId !== enterpriseId) {\n    throw new TRPCError({\n      code: \"FORBIDDEN\",\n      message:\n        messages.forbidden ??\n        \"Access denied: this record belongs to another enterprise\",\n    });\n  }\n  return record;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the standard procedures for an app whose session user is `TUser`.\n * Attach each one to the app's own tRPC instance with `t.procedure.concat(...)`.\n *\n * | Procedure                | Auth | Enterprise | Min role                    |\n * |--------------------------|:----:|:----------:|-----------------------------|\n * | protectedProcedure       | Yes  | No         | any                         |\n * | enterpriseProcedure      | Yes  | Yes        | any                         |\n * | adminProcedure           | Yes  | No         | ADMIN_MIN_ROLE (admin gate) |\n * | enterpriseAdminProcedure | Yes  | Yes        | ADMIN_MIN_ROLE (admin gate) |\n * | platformAdminProcedure   | Yes  | No         | platform_admin              |\n *\n * Both admin procedures share one admin gate built from ADMIN_MIN_ROLE.\n * Enterprise procedures add `ctx.enterpriseId: number` and narrow `ctx.user`\n * to non-null. Checks run in order: user, then enterprise, then role.\n */\nexport function createIsolationProcedures<\n  TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser,\n>() {\n  const t = initTRPC.context<IsolationContext<TUser>>().create();\n\n  const requireUser = t.middleware(({ ctx, next }) => {\n    if (!ctx.user) {\n      throw new TRPCError({ code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\", message: UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG });\n    }\n    return next({ ctx: { user: ctx.user } });\n  });\n\n  const requireEnterprise = t.middleware(({ ctx, next }) => {\n    const enterpriseId = requireEnterpriseId(ctx.user);\n    return next({ ctx: { user: ctx.user as TUser, enterpriseId } });\n  });\n\n  function requireRole(minimumRole: RoleType, message: string) {\n    if (!ROLE_HIERARCHY.includes(minimumRole)) {\n      throw new Error(`Unknown role for isolation check: ${minimumRole}`);\n    }\n    return t.middleware(({ ctx, next }) => {\n      if (!ctx.user) {\n        throw new TRPCError({\n          code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n          message: UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG,\n        });\n      }\n      if (!meetsMinimumRole(ctx.user.role, minimumRole)) {\n        throw new TRPCError({ code: \"FORBIDDEN\", message });\n      }\n      return next();\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** The one admin gate (ADMIN_MIN_ROLE). */\n  const requireAdmin = requireRole(ADMIN_MIN_ROLE, NOT_ADMIN_ERR_MSG);\n\n  const protectedProcedure = t.procedure.use(requireUser);\n  const enterpriseProcedure = t.procedure.use(requireEnterprise);\n\n  return {\n    protectedProcedure,\n    enterpriseProcedure,\n    adminProcedure: protectedProcedure.use(requireAdmin),\n    enterpriseAdminProcedure: enterpriseProcedure.use(requireAdmin),\n    platformAdminProcedure: protectedProcedure.use(\n      requireRole(\"platform_admin\", NOT_PLATFORM_ADMIN_ERR_MSG)\n    ),\n  };\n}\n\nexport type IsolationProcedures<TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser> =\n  ReturnType<typeof createIsolationProcedures<TUser>>;\n"],"mappings":";AAsBA,SAAS,UAAU,iBAAiB;AACpC;AAAA,EACE;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,EACA;AAAA,OAEK;AAmBP,SAAS,eAAe,OAAiC;AACvD,SAAO,OAAO,UAAU,YAAY,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,KAAK,QAAQ;AACzE;AAOA,SAAS,iBACP,UACA,aACS;AACT,QAAM,OAAO,eAAe,QAAQ,QAAoB;AACxD,QAAM,MAAM,eAAe,QAAQ,WAAW;AAC9C,SAAO,QAAQ,KAAK,OAAO,KAAK,QAAQ;AAC1C;AAQO,IAAM,iBAAiB;AAGvB,SAAS,YAAY,MAA0C;AACpE,SAAO,iBAAiB,MAAM,cAAc;AAC9C;AAMO,SAAS,oBACd,MACe;AACf,QAAM,KAAK,MAAM;AACjB,SAAO,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI,KAAK;AACnC;AAGO,SAAS,oBACd,MACQ;AACR,MAAI,CAAC,MAAM;AACT,UAAM,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAAA,EACzE;AACA,QAAM,KAAK,oBAAoB,IAAI;AACnC,MAAI,OAAO,MAAM;AACf,UAAM,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,SAAS,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAAA,EAC3E;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAMO,SAAS,kBACd,MACA,cACK;AACL,MAAI,CAAC,eAAe,YAAY,EAAG,QAAO,CAAC;AAC3C,SAAO,KAAK,OAAO,SAAO,IAAI,iBAAiB,YAAY;AAC7D;AAcO,SAAS,0BACd,QACA,cACA,WAA8B,CAAC,GAC5B;AACH,MAAI,WAAW,QAAQ,WAAW,QAAW;AAC3C,UAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,MAClB,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,SAAS,SAAS,YAAY;AAAA,IAChC,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,MAAI,CAAC,eAAe,YAAY,KAAK,OAAO,iBAAiB,cAAc;AACzE,UAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,MAClB,MAAM;AAAA,MACN,SACE,SAAS,aACT;AAAA,IACJ,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AACA,SAAO;AACT;AAkBO,SAAS,4BAEZ;AACF,QAAM,IAAI,SAAS,QAAiC,EAAE,OAAO;AAE7D,QAAM,cAAc,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;AAClD,QAAI,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM;AACb,YAAM,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,gBAAgB,SAAS,iBAAiB,CAAC;AAAA,IACzE;AACA,WAAO,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EACzC,CAAC;AAED,QAAM,oBAAoB,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;AACxD,UAAM,eAAe,oBAAoB,IAAI,IAAI;AACjD,WAAO,KAAK,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,MAAe,aAAa,EAAE,CAAC;AAAA,EAChE,CAAC;AAED,WAAS,YAAY,aAAuB,SAAiB;AAC3D,QAAI,CAAC,eAAe,SAAS,WAAW,GAAG;AACzC,YAAM,IAAI,MAAM,qCAAqC,WAAW,EAAE;AAAA,IACpE;AACA,WAAO,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,KAAK,MAAM;AACrC,UAAI,CAAC,IAAI,MAAM;AACb,cAAM,IAAI,UAAU;AAAA,UAClB,MAAM;AAAA,UACN,SAAS;AAAA,QACX,CAAC;AAAA,MACH;AACA,UAAI,CAAC,iBAAiB,IAAI,KAAK,MAAM,WAAW,GAAG;AACjD,cAAM,IAAI,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,QAAQ,CAAC;AAAA,MACpD;AACA,aAAO,KAAK;AAAA,IACd,CAAC;AAAA,EACH;AAGA,QAAM,eAAe,YAAY,gBAAgB,iBAAiB;AAElE,QAAM,qBAAqB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,WAAW;AACtD,QAAM,sBAAsB,EAAE,UAAU,IAAI,iBAAiB;AAE7D,SAAO;AAAA,IACL;AAAA,IACA;AAAA,IACA,gBAAgB,mBAAmB,IAAI,YAAY;AAAA,IACnD,0BAA0B,oBAAoB,IAAI,YAAY;AAAA,IAC9D,wBAAwB,mBAAmB;AAAA,MACzC,YAAY,kBAAkB,0BAA0B;AAAA,IAC1D;AAAA,EACF;AACF;","names":[]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/isolation.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enterprise Isolation — the one enforced tenant-scoping path for every service.\n *\n * Replaces the per-app copies of `requireEnterprise` / `enterpriseProcedure` and\n * the hand-written `rows.filter(r => r.enterpriseId === id)` and \"does this\n * record belong to the caller?\" checks. Roles and error messages come from\n * `@pablo2410/shared-ui/rbac`, the platform's single role model.\n *\n * Every check fails closed: no user → UNAUTHORIZED; no (valid) enterprise →\n * FORBIDDEN / no rows; an unknown role never passes a role check; a record with\n * no enterpriseId never matches, even against a caller with none.\n *\n * Quick example (each app keeps its own `t`; the procedures are concatenated\n * onto it, so the app's transformer, context and error formatter still apply):\n *\n *   import { createIsolationProcedures } from \"@pablo2410/core-server/isolation\";\n *   const iso = createIsolationProcedures<SessionUser>();\n *   export const enterpriseProcedure = t.procedure.concat(iso.enterpriseProcedure);\n *   // in a resolver: ctx.enterpriseId is a number, ctx.user is non-null\n *   listPlans: enterpriseProcedure.query(async ({ ctx }) =>\n *     scopeToEnterprise(await getPlans(), ctx.enterpriseId)),\n */\nimport type { NextFunction, Request, Response } from \"express\";\nimport { initTRPC, TRPCError } from \"@trpc/server\";\nimport {\n  NO_ENTERPRISE_ERR_MSG,\n  NOT_ADMIN_ERR_MSG,\n  NOT_PLATFORM_ADMIN_ERR_MSG,\n  ROLE_HIERARCHY,\n  UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG,\n  type RoleType,\n} from \"@pablo2410/shared-ui/rbac\";\n\n/** The user fields isolation needs. Each app's session user must have these. */\nexport interface IsolationUser {\n  role: string;\n  enterpriseId?: number | null;\n  /** True for a read-only account (ops#246): every write from it is refused. */\n  readOnly?: boolean;\n}\n\n/** What a read-only account is told when it tries to change something. */\nexport const READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG =\n  \"This account is read-only: it can look but not change anything.\";\n\n/** The context fields isolation needs. Each app's tRPC context must have these. */\nexport interface IsolationContext<TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser> {\n  user: TUser | null;\n}\n\n/** Anything owned by one enterprise (a row from the DB or the Portal API). */\nexport interface EnterpriseOwned {\n  enterpriseId?: number | null;\n}\n\n/** Only positive integers are real enterprise IDs. */\nfunction isEnterpriseId(value: unknown): value is number {\n  return typeof value === \"number\" && Number.isInteger(value) && value > 0;\n}\n\n/**\n * True when `userRole` is a known role at or above `minimumRole`.\n * Unlike a bare indexOf comparison, an unknown role on either side is never\n * treated as meeting the bar.\n */\nfunction meetsMinimumRole(\n  userRole: string | null | undefined,\n  minimumRole: RoleType\n): boolean {\n  const user = ROLE_HIERARCHY.indexOf(userRole as RoleType);\n  const min = ROLE_HIERARCHY.indexOf(minimumRole);\n  return user >= 0 && min >= 0 && user >= min;\n}\n\n/**\n * The fleet's one admin rule: enterprise_admin and above (enterprise_admin,\n * platform_admin). Paul, 5 Oct 2026 (core-server#74). Every admin check in\n * every app uses this; no app sets its own admin threshold, and superuser is\n * not an admin level.\n */\nexport const ADMIN_MIN_ROLE = \"enterprise_admin\" as const satisfies RoleType;\n\n/** True when `role` passes the fleet admin rule (ADMIN_MIN_ROLE and above). */\nexport function isAdminRole(role: string | null | undefined): boolean {\n  return meetsMinimumRole(role, ADMIN_MIN_ROLE);\n}\n\n/**\n * The caller's enterprise, or null. Never a default tenant: a missing,\n * zero, negative or non-integer enterpriseId is null.\n */\nexport function resolveEnterpriseId(\n  user: IsolationUser | null | undefined\n): number | null {\n  const id = user?.enterpriseId;\n  return isEnterpriseId(id) ? id : null;\n}\n\n/** Like resolveEnterpriseId, but throws UNAUTHORIZED / FORBIDDEN instead of null. */\nexport function requireEnterpriseId(\n  user: IsolationUser | null | undefined\n): number {\n  if (!user) {\n    throw new TRPCError({ code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\", message: UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG });\n  }\n  const id = resolveEnterpriseId(user);\n  if (id === null) {\n    throw new TRPCError({ code: \"FORBIDDEN\", message: NO_ENTERPRISE_ERR_MSG });\n  }\n  return id;\n}\n\n/**\n * Keep only the rows owned by `enterpriseId`. A null/invalid enterprise gets no\n * rows; a row with no enterpriseId is never included.\n */\nexport function scopeToEnterprise<T extends EnterpriseOwned>(\n  rows: readonly T[],\n  enterpriseId: number | null | undefined\n): T[] {\n  if (!isEnterpriseId(enterpriseId)) return [];\n  return rows.filter(row => row.enterpriseId === enterpriseId);\n}\n\nexport interface OwnershipMessages {\n  /** Message when the record does not exist. Default \"Not found\". */\n  notFound?: string;\n  /** Message when the record belongs to another enterprise. */\n  forbidden?: string;\n}\n\n/**\n * Return `record` if it belongs to `enterpriseId`; otherwise throw.\n * Missing record → NOT_FOUND. Other enterprise, a record with no enterpriseId,\n * or a caller with no enterprise → FORBIDDEN.\n */\nexport function assertEnterpriseOwnership<T extends EnterpriseOwned>(\n  record: T | null | undefined,\n  enterpriseId: number | null | undefined,\n  messages: OwnershipMessages = {}\n): T {\n  if (record === null || record === undefined) {\n    throw new TRPCError({\n      code: \"NOT_FOUND\",\n      message: messages.notFound ?? \"Not found\",\n    });\n  }\n  if (!isEnterpriseId(enterpriseId) || record.enterpriseId !== enterpriseId) {\n    throw new TRPCError({\n      code: \"FORBIDDEN\",\n      message:\n        messages.forbidden ??\n        \"Access denied: this record belongs to another enterprise\",\n    });\n  }\n  return record;\n}\n\n/**\n * Build the standard procedures for an app whose session user is `TUser`.\n * Attach each one to the app's own tRPC instance with `t.procedure.concat(...)`.\n *\n * | Procedure                | Auth | Enterprise | Min role                    |\n * |--------------------------|:----:|:----------:|-----------------------------|\n * | protectedProcedure       | Yes  | No         | any                         |\n * | enterpriseProcedure      | Yes  | Yes        | any                         |\n * | adminProcedure           | Yes  | No         | ADMIN_MIN_ROLE (admin gate) |\n * | enterpriseAdminProcedure | Yes  | Yes        | ADMIN_MIN_ROLE (admin gate) |\n * | platformAdminProcedure   | Yes  | No         | platform_admin              |\n *\n * Both admin procedures share one admin gate built from ADMIN_MIN_ROLE.\n * Enterprise procedures add `ctx.enterpriseId: number` and narrow `ctx.user`\n * to non-null. Checks run in order: user, then enterprise, then role.\n */\nexport function createIsolationProcedures<\n  TUser extends IsolationUser = IsolationUser,\n>() {\n  const t = initTRPC.context<IsolationContext<TUser>>().create();\n\n  const requireUser = t.middleware(({ ctx, next }) => {\n    if (!ctx.user) {\n      throw new TRPCError({ code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\", message: UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG });\n    }\n    return next({ ctx: { user: ctx.user } });\n  });\n\n  const requireEnterprise = t.middleware(({ ctx, next }) => {\n    const enterpriseId = requireEnterpriseId(ctx.user);\n    return next({ ctx: { user: ctx.user as TUser, enterpriseId } });\n  });\n\n  function requireRole(minimumRole: RoleType, message: string) {\n    if (!ROLE_HIERARCHY.includes(minimumRole)) {\n      throw new Error(`Unknown role for isolation check: ${minimumRole}`);\n    }\n    return t.middleware(({ ctx, next }) => {\n      if (!ctx.user) {\n        throw new TRPCError({\n          code: \"UNAUTHORIZED\",\n          message: UNAUTHED_ERR_MSG,\n        });\n      }\n      if (!meetsMinimumRole(ctx.user.role, minimumRole)) {\n        throw new TRPCError({ code: \"FORBIDDEN\", message });\n      }\n      return next();\n    });\n  }\n\n  /** The one admin gate (ADMIN_MIN_ROLE). */\n  const requireAdmin = requireRole(ADMIN_MIN_ROLE, NOT_ADMIN_ERR_MSG);\n\n  // ops#246: the live check's login can look but not change anything. Every\n  // procedure below starts here, so no mutation from a read-only account\n  // reaches a resolver, whatever its role says. Runs before any input is read.\n  const refuseReadOnlyWrites = t.middleware(({ ctx, type, next }) => {\n    if (type === \"mutation\" && ctx.user?.readOnly === true) {\n      throw new TRPCError({ code: \"FORBIDDEN\", message: READ_ONLY_ERR_MSG });\n    }\n    return next();\n  });\n  const baseProcedure = t.procedure.use(refuseReadOnlyWrites);\n\n  const protectedProcedure = baseProcedure.use(requireUser);\n  const enterpriseProcedure = baseProcedure.use(requireEnterprise);\n\n  return {\n    /**\n     * For public procedures and any app tier of its own: no sign-in needed, but\n     * a signed-in read-only account's writes are still refused.\n     */\n    readOnlyGuardedProcedure: baseProcedure,\n    protectedProcedure,\n    enterpriseProcedure,\n    adminProcedure: protectedProcedure.use(requireAdmin),\n    enterpriseAdminProcedure: enterpriseProcedure.use(requireAdmin),\n    platformAdminProcedure: protectedProcedure.use(\n      requireRole(\"platform_admin\", 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package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@pablo2410/core-server",
-  "version": "0.10.8",
+  "version": "0.11.0",
   "description": "Shared server utilities for Oplytics.digital subdomains",
   "type": "module",
   "exports": {
@@ -41,20 +41,20 @@
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "@eslint/js": "^10.0.1",
-    "@pablo2410/shared-ui": "^0.29.1",
+    "@pablo2410/shared-ui": "^0.30.0",
     "@types/express": "^5.0.6",
     "@types/node": "26.6.5",
     "axios": "^1.20.0",
     "cookie": "^2.0.1",
-    "eslint": "^10.12.0",
+    "eslint": "^10.13.0",
     "express": "^5.3.0",
     "globals": "^17.13.0",
     "jose": "^6.2.12",
     "prettier": "^3.9.10",
-    "tsup": "^8.0.0",
+    "tsup": "^9.0.0",
     "typescript": "^5.6.0",
-    "typescript-eslint": "^8.71.2",
-    "vitest": "5.0.4"
+    "typescript-eslint": "^8.72.0",
+    "vitest": "5.0.5"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
     "@pablo2410/shared-ui": ">=0.7.0",

package/dist/chunk-BUMJYZRS.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/sandbox.ts","../src/auth/createSubdomainAuth.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Production and local-sandbox addresses, and how to tell the two apart\n * (#86, part of oplytics-portal#261: no production links inside the sandbox).\n *\n * Same rule as Portal (oplytics-portal#373) and Policy Deployment (PD#329):\n * the sandbox is INFISICAL_ENV=staging; production is INFISICAL_ENV=prod.\n * NODE_ENV is \"production\" in both, so it can't tell them apart. Production\n * addresses are the defaults and never change.\n *\n * The sandbox ports mirror the sandbox compose file (portal 3000, apps\n * 3001-3006, marketing-site 3007) and shared-ui's SANDBOX_LOCALHOST_PORTS.\n */\n\nexport const PRODUCTION_PORTAL_ORIGIN = \"https://portal.oplyticsdigital.net\";\nexport const PRODUCTION_MARKETING_ORIGIN = \"https://oplytics.digital\";\nexport const SANDBOX_PORTAL_ORIGIN = \"http://localhost:3000\";\nexport const SANDBOX_MARKETING_ORIGIN = \"http://localhost:3007\";\n\nconst env = (name: string): string | undefined =>\n  typeof process === \"undefined\" ? undefined : process.env[name];\n\n/** True when this process is the local sandbox (INFISICAL_ENV=staging). */\nexport function isSandboxEnv(\n  infisicalEnv: string | undefined = env(\"INFISICAL_ENV\")\n): boolean {\n  return infisicalEnv === \"staging\";\n}\n\n/**\n * A sandbox app's own address: plain http on localhost or 127.0.0.1, ports\n * 3000-3009 (the rule Portal's cors.ts and returnUrl.ts use).\n */\nexport function isLocalSandboxUrl(url: URL): boolean {\n  return (\n    url.protocol === \"http:\" &&\n    (url.hostname === \"localhost\" || url.hostname === \"127.0.0.1\") &&\n    /^300\\d$/.test(url.port)\n  );\n}\n\n/** The origin of a configured URL, or null if it is unset or not a URL. */\nfunction originOf(value: string | undefined): string | null {\n  const trimmed = value?.trim();\n  if (!trimmed) return null;\n  try {\n    return new URL(trimmed).origin;\n  } catch {\n    return null;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * The Portal origin the browser talks to in the sandbox: the app's own\n * PORTAL_LOGIN_URL (set by the tunnel variant, e.g.\n * https://sandbox-portal.oplyticsdigital.net), else the local sandbox Portal.\n */\nexport function sandboxPortalOrigin(\n  portalLoginUrl: string | undefined = env(\"PORTAL_LOGIN_URL\")\n): string {\n  return originOf(portalLoginUrl) ?? 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SANDBOX_MARKETING_ORIGIN\n      : PRODUCTION_MARKETING_ORIGIN)\n  );\n}\n","/**\n * createSubdomainAuth — shared SSO auth factory for Oplytics.digital subdomains.\n *\n * Encapsulates:\n *   - JWT session verification (PORTAL_JWT_SECRET first, fallback to JWT_SECRET)\n *   - Cookie domain handling via COOKIE_DOMAIN env var\n *   - Portal API user enrichment with X-Service-Key header\n *   - Auto-create user from JWT payload if not in local DB\n *   - Enterprise backfill from portal API\n *   - Portal session check: a device signed out in the Portal is refused here\n *     too, cached for 30s, failing open when the Portal can't answer (#77)\n *\n * Based on SQDCP's battle-tested sdk.ts + cookies.ts.\n */\n\nimport type { Request, CookieOptions } from \"express\";\nimport type {\n  BaseUser,\n  PortalUser,\n  SessionPayload,\n  SubdomainAuth,\n  SubdomainAuthConfig,\n} from \"./types\";\nimport { isLocalSandboxUrl, isSandboxEnv } from \"../sandbox\";\n\n// ─── Constants ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst DEFAULT_COOKIE_NAME = \"app_session_id\";\n/** The Portal issues every session cookie for one year (portal#237). */\nconst PORTAL_SESSION_SECONDS = 31_536_000;\n/** Most session check answers kept at once; the oldest is dropped first. */\nconst SESSION_CHECK_CACHE_MAX = 10_000;\n/** Most Portal users cached at once (each can hold a picture); the oldest is dropped first. */\nconst PORTAL_USER_CACHE_MAX = 1_000;\n\n// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nconst isNonEmptyString = (value: unknown): value is string =>\n  typeof value === \"string\" && value.length > 0;\n\n/**\n * The cookie's issue time in seconds, as the Portal's session check needs it.\n * Cookies from before portal#237 have no iat; every Portal session cookie is\n * issued for one year, so exp minus a year is when it was issued. Never\n * guessed as 0: the Portal would read that as issued before any sign-out\n * cutoff and end a live session.\n */\nfunction issuedAtSeconds(iat: unknown, exp: unknown): number | null {\n  const seconds =\n    typeof iat === \"number\"\n      ? iat\n      : typeof exp === \"number\"\n        ? exp - PORTAL_SESSION_SECONDS\n        : null;\n  if (seconds === null || !Number.isFinite(seconds) || seconds <= 0) {\n    return null;\n  }\n  return Math.floor(seconds);\n}\n\n/** A verified cookie: the public payload, plus what the session check needs. */\ninterface VerifiedCookie {\n  session: SessionPayload;\n  /** The Portal session id. 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Roles and\n   * enterprise come from the Portal verbatim (no mapping).\n   *\n   * On a genuine Portal outage (the by-openid lookup returns null) we keep the\n   * user authenticated using their verified session claims, with role/enterprise\n   * unresolved, rather than throwing. Throwing here would make createContext (in\n   * every subdomain) swallow the error into `user = null`, which the AuthGate\n   * renders as the Sign In screen — i.e. a transient Portal blip would log the\n   * user out. Their session cookie is already valid; keep them in, degraded,\n   * until the Portal recovers. (Enterprise-scoped procedures will 403 during the\n   * outage; client array-guards keep pages from crashing.)\n   */\n  async function resolvePortalUser(\n    openId: string,\n    session: SessionPayload\n  ): Promise<TUser> {\n    const portalUser = await getPortalUserCached(openId);\n\n    if (!portalUser) {\n      console.warn(\n        `${tag} Portal user unavailable for ${openId} — keeping session (role/enterprise unresolved until Portal recovers)`\n      );\n      return {\n        id: 0,\n        openId,\n        name: session.name || null,\n        email: null,\n        role: \"\",\n        enterpriseId: null,\n        portalUserId: null,\n      } as unknown as TUser;\n    }\n\n    const enterpriseId =\n      portalUser.enterpriseId ?? portalUser.companyId ?? null;\n    return {\n      id: portalUser.id,\n      openId: portalUser.openId ?? openId,\n      name: portalUser.name || session.name || null,\n      email: portalUser.email ?? null,\n      role: portalUser.role,\n      enterpriseId,\n      portalUserId: portalUser.id,\n      avatarUrl: portalUser.avatarUrl ?? null,\n    } as unknown as TUser;\n  }\n\n  // ── Portal Session Check ───────────────────────────────────────\n  //\n  // Fails open: only an explicit `{ active: false }` from the Portal ends a\n  // session. The check runs on every request to every app, so failing closed\n  // would turn a Portal outage, a slow deploy or a key problem into everyone\n  // being signed out of everything at once (and nobody could sign back in\n  // while the Portal is down). The cost: while the Portal can't answer, a\n  // device signed out after its last answer keeps working here until the\n  // Portal is back. A session the Portal has already called ended stays\n  // ended through an outage.\n\n  // Answers keyed by openId + sid + iat, because the Portal judges all three:\n  // an old copy of a cookie keeps its sid but its earlier iat is cut off.\n  const sessionCheckCache = new Map<string, { active: boolean; at: number }>();\n  const sessionCheckInflight = new Map<string, Promise<boolean>>();\n  const warned = new Set<string>();\n\n  function warnOnce(key: string, message: string) {\n    if (warned.has(key)) return;\n    warned.add(key);\n    console.warn(message);\n  }\n\n  function rememberSessionCheck(key: string, active: boolean) {\n    // Re-insert so Map order stays oldest-first for eviction.\n    sessionCheckCache.delete(key);\n    sessionCheckCache.set(key, { active, at: Date.now() });\n    if (sessionCheckCache.size > SESSION_CHECK_CACHE_MAX) {\n      const oldest = sessionCheckCache.keys().next().value;\n      if (oldest !== undefined) sessionCheckCache.delete(oldest);\n    }\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * One call to POST /api/service/sessions/check. 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