@oxyhq/services 14.1.0 → 16.0.0

package/src/ui/utils/activeAuthuser.ts

@@ -1,142 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Web-only helpers around the retired `oxy_rt_${authuser}` multi-slot
- * refresh-cookie scheme, PLUS the (unrelated, still load-bearing) deliberate
- * sign-out / SSO-bounce gates.
- *
- * NOTE (session-sync cutover, Task 5): the device account SET is now
- * server-authoritative via `SessionClient` (`@oxyhq/core`) — nothing in
- * `@oxyhq/services` writes the persisted active-`authuser`-slot key anymore
- * (`writeActiveAuthuser`/`clearActiveAuthuser` were deleted; their only
- * callers were the deleted `establishDeviceRefreshSlot` sign-in registration
- * and the deleted `switchToAccount`/`switchSession` slot bookkeeping).
- * {@link readActiveAuthuser} is KEPT purely as an OPTIONAL restore hint:
- * `OxyContext`'s `restoreStoredSession` cold-boot step reads it only to
- * backfill `clientSession.authuser` for the active session when a legacy value
- * happens to be present. It NO LONGER gates whether restore is attempted — the
- * old guard that also required this marker made every web reload with a lapsed
- * local bearer bail before any network validation (P0), and was replaced by a
- * "bail only when there is nothing to restore" guard plus a valid-session
- * election. Since nothing writes the key anymore, the backfill is dormant on
- * fresh installs; it stays for legacy installs and costs nothing.
- *
- * Native (React Native) has no equivalent of these device-local cookies
- * and uses bearer-protected session ids directly, so these helpers no-op
- * outside the browser.
- */
-
-import {
-  ssoAttemptedKey,
-  ssoNoSessionKey,
-  ssoGuardKey,
-  ssoStateKey,
-  ssoDestKey,
-  ssoSignedOutKey,
-  silentRestoreSuppressed,
-} from '@oxyhq/core';
-
-const ACTIVE_AUTHUSER_KEY = 'oxy_active_authuser';
-
-function hasLocalStorage(): boolean {
-  return typeof window !== 'undefined' && typeof window.localStorage !== 'undefined';
-}
-
-function getSessionStorage(): Storage | null {
-  if (typeof window === 'undefined') return null;
-  try {
-    return window.sessionStorage ?? null;
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Read the persisted active `authuser` slot index.
- *
- * Returns `null` on native, on a corrupted value, or when nothing has been
- * persisted yet (first visit). Callers treat `null` as "no preference" and
- * fall back to deterministic selection (lowest authuser).
- */
-export function readActiveAuthuser(): number | null {
-  if (!hasLocalStorage()) {
-    return null;
-  }
-  try {
-    const raw = window.localStorage.getItem(ACTIVE_AUTHUSER_KEY);
-    if (raw === null) return null;
-    const parsed = Number.parseInt(raw, 10);
-    if (!Number.isFinite(parsed) || parsed < 0) return null;
-    return parsed;
-  } catch {
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Mark this origin as DELIBERATELY signed out (durable `localStorage`, via the
- * core {@link ssoSignedOutKey}). Called ONLY on EXPLICIT full sign-out so that
- * the next cold boot does NOT silently re-mint a session from a still-live IdP
- * session (the per-apex `/auth/silent` iframe cold-boot step). Cleared by any
- * deliberate sign-in (see {@link clearSignedOut}). No-ops on native / storage
- * failure (best-effort).
- */
-export function markSignedOut(): void {
-  if (!hasLocalStorage()) return;
-  try {
-    window.localStorage.setItem(ssoSignedOutKey(window.location.origin), '1');
-  } catch {
-    // Best-effort; swallow QuotaExceededError / SecurityError (private mode).
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Clear the durable deliberately-signed-out flag. Called on ANY deliberate
- * sign-in (password, account switch, device claim) so a real sign-in
- * fully re-enables automatic silent restore — there is no "stuck signed out"
- * state. No-ops on native / storage failure.
- */
-export function clearSignedOut(): void {
-  if (!hasLocalStorage()) return;
-  try {
-    window.localStorage.removeItem(ssoSignedOutKey(window.location.origin));
-  } catch {
-    // Best-effort.
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Whether AUTOMATIC silent restore is suppressed for the current origin because
- * the user deliberately signed out. Reads the durable flag through the core
- * {@link silentRestoreSuppressed} predicate. Returns `false` off-web and on any
- * storage failure (fail safe toward normal restore). Used to gate the
- * `silent-iframe` cold-boot step.
- */
-export function isSilentRestoreSuppressed(): boolean {
-  // Unlike its try/catch-wrapped siblings this reads `window.location.origin`
-  // directly, so guard it: an RN polyfill can expose `localStorage` without a
-  // `location`, which would throw here. Fail safe toward normal restore.
-  if (!hasLocalStorage() || typeof window.location === 'undefined') return false;
-  return silentRestoreSuppressed(window.localStorage, window.location.origin);
-}
-
-/**
- * Clear all per-origin SSO bounce sessionStorage keys. Called ONLY on EXPLICIT
- * user sign-out (logout / logoutAll) — never on a cold-boot failure path — so a
- * fresh deliberate sign-in can re-probe the central IdP. Clearing on cold-boot
- * failure would reintroduce the redirect loop.
- *
- * No-ops on native and on any storage failure (best-effort).
- */
-export function clearSsoBounceState(): void {
-  const storage = getSessionStorage();
-  if (!storage) return;
-  try {
-    const origin = window.location.origin;
-    storage.removeItem(ssoAttemptedKey(origin));
-    storage.removeItem(ssoNoSessionKey(origin));
-    storage.removeItem(ssoGuardKey(origin));
-    storage.removeItem(ssoStateKey(origin));
-    storage.removeItem(ssoDestKey(origin));
-  } catch {
-    // Best-effort; swallow SecurityError (e.g. Safari private mode).
-  }
-}

package/src/utils/crossApex.ts

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Cross-apex web detection for sign-in durability gating.
- *
- * On a web Relying Party whose registrable apex differs from the central Oxy
- * Identity Provider apex (`oxy.so`), the ONLY sign-in completion that survives a
- * page reload is the interactive "Continue with Oxy" IdP flow, because it is the
- * only one that establishes a first-party `fedcm_session` cookie at
- * `auth.<apex>` — the anchor the cross-domain cold-boot restore reads on reload.
- *
- * The other sign-in completions the SDK can drive do NOT plant a `fedcm_session`:
- *   - password / public-key sign-in mints a bearer directly against the Oxy API
- *     (its refresh cookie is host-scoped to `api.oxy.so` and `SameSite=Lax`, so
- *     it is unreachable cross-site from the RP), and
- *   - the Commons-app device-flow handoff (cross-device QR / same-device
- *     deep-link) is approved OUTSIDE the browser, so no IdP browser session is
- *     established.
- * On a cross-apex RP each of these leaves the user signed in for the current
- * page only — a reload logs them out. See OxyHQServices AGENTS.md
- * "Auth / Session Contract".
- *
- * Same-apex `*.oxy.so` apps (e.g. `accounts.oxy.so`) are first-party with
- * `api.oxy.so`: their refresh cookie rides same-site requests so reload restore
- * works without `fedcm_session`, and they are therefore NOT gated.
- *
- * Returns `false` off-browser (React Native has no `window.location`) and for
- * hosts without a registrable apex (localhost / raw IP / single-label dev
- * hosts), so native and local development keep every sign-in method.
- */
-
-import { registrableApex, CENTRAL_IDP_APEX } from '@oxyhq/core';
-
-/**
- * Whether the given host is a web RP on a registrable apex other than the
- * central Oxy IdP apex (`oxy.so`). See the module doc for why this gates the
- * non-durable sign-in paths.
- *
- * @param hostname - The host to classify. Defaults to the current
- *   `window.location.hostname`; resolves to `undefined` off-browser (React
- *   Native / SSR), which yields `false`. The explicit parameter mirrors
- *   `autoDetectAuthWebUrl(location?)` and keeps the predicate unit-testable
- *   without manipulating the global `window.location`.
- */
-export function isCrossApexWeb(
-  hostname: string | undefined = typeof window !== 'undefined'
-    ? window.location?.hostname
-    : undefined,
-): boolean {
-  if (!hostname) {
-    return false;
-  }
-  const apex = registrableApex(hostname);
-  return apex !== null && apex !== CENTRAL_IDP_APEX;
-}
-
-/**
- * Thrown when an app attempts a direct (non-IdP) sign-in — password or
- * public-key — on a cross-apex web RP, where such a sign-in would not survive a
- * page reload because no `fedcm_session` is established (see {@link isCrossApexWeb}).
- *
- * Apps on a cross-apex apex must sign in through the interactive
- * "Continue with Oxy" IdP flow (`OxySignInButton` / `showSignInModal()`), which
- * plants the durable session.
- */
-export class CrossApexDirectSignInError extends Error {
-  override readonly name = 'CrossApexDirectSignInError';
-  readonly code = 'CROSS_APEX_DIRECT_SIGN_IN_UNSUPPORTED';
-
-  constructor() {
-    super(
-      'Direct sign-in is unavailable on this domain because the session would ' +
-        'not survive a page reload. Use "Continue with Oxy" to sign in through ' +
-        'the Oxy identity provider.',
-    );
-  }
-}