@oxyhq/core 8.1.0 → 9.1.0

package/src/boot/coldBootV2.ts

@@ -7,233 +7,52 @@
  * the app renders with a "Sign in with Oxy" button.
  *
  * Ordered steps (first to yield a session wins):
- *   1. `bootstrap-return` (web) — consume a `#oxy_boot` return fragment from a
- *      just-completed cross-apex hop: strip it, verify state, persist the
- *      deviceToken, exchange the code.
- *   2. `stored-tokens` — the persisted per-origin refresh family: warm-plant a
- *      still-valid access token, else rotate via `/auth/refresh-token`.
- *   3. `shared-key-signin` (native) — re-mint from the shared-keychain identity,
- *      issuing + mirroring a shared deviceToken the first time.
- *   4. `bootstrap-hop` (web) — same-apex: an inline credentialed
- *      `/auth/device/web-session` fetch (no redirect); cross-apex: ONE top-level
- *      navigation to `/auth/device/bootstrap`, guarded once-ever per origin.
- *   5. Signed out.
- *
- * All mutable guard state lives in STORAGE (localStorage `oxy.boot.attempted` +
- * sessionStorage `oxy.boot.state`), never in module scope, so the guard holds
- * under Metro/bundler re-evaluation.
+ *   1. `device-secret-mint` (web + native) — the zero-cookie transport: when the
+ *      origin persisted a `deviceId` + `deviceSecret`, mint a short access token
+ *      with a single bearer-less POST to `/session/device/token` (no cookie, no
+ *      navigation) and rotate the secret in-use.
+ *   2. `shared-key-signin` (native) — re-mint from the shared-keychain identity.
+ *   3. Signed out.
  *
  * ESM-safe (no `require()`); no react/react-native/expo imports.
  */
-import { resolveUserId } from '@oxyhq/contracts';
 import { runColdBoot, type ColdBootOutcome, type ColdBootStep } from '../utils/coldBoot';
-import { isWeb as detectWeb, isNative as detectNative } from '../utils/platform';
+import { isNative as detectNative } from '../utils/platform';
 import { extractErrorStatus } from '../utils/errorUtils';
-import { KeyManager } from '../crypto/keyManager';
 import { logger } from '../utils/loggerUtils';
 import type { OxyServices } from '../OxyServices';
 import type { AuthStateStore, PersistedAuthState } from '../session/authStateStore';
-import { refreshPersistedSession } from '../session/refresh';
-import {
-  consumeDeviceBootReturn,
-  hashHasBootFragment,
-  BOOT_STATE_SESSION_KEY,
-  type DeviceBootSession,
-} from './deviceBootReturn';
-
-/**
- * localStorage flag marking that the cross-apex bootstrap navigation has fired
- * once for this origin. Persistent (not session) so the visible redirect
- * happens AT MOST ONCE EVER per browser+origin — a signed-out user is never
- * bounced again; they sign in explicitly.
- */
-export const BOOT_ATTEMPTED_KEY = 'oxy.boot.attempted';
 
-/**
- * Do not warm-plant a stored access token with less than this remaining — it
- * would need an immediate refresh anyway, so fall through to the rotate path.
- * Matches the refresh lead window.
- */
-const WARM_MIN_REMAINING_MS = 60_000;
+/** The winning session shape a cold-boot step reports. */
+export interface DeviceBootSession {
+  sessionId: string;
+  userId: string;
+  accessToken: string;
+}
 
 /** Why a cold boot ended without a session. */
-export type SignedOutReason =
-  | 'no_session'
-  | 'new_device'
-  | 'state-mismatch'
-  | 'error';
-
-/**
- * The DOM/storage seam. All access is injected so the boot is unit-testable
- * under the jest `node` environment; {@link createBrowserColdBootDom} provides
- * the guarded real-globals implementation used in production.
- */
-export interface ColdBootDom {
-  getHash(): string;
-  stripFragment(): void;
-  getSessionItem(key: string): string | null;
-  setSessionItem(key: string, value: string): void;
-  removeSessionItem(key: string): void;
-  getLocalItem(key: string): string | null;
-  setLocalItem(key: string, value: string): void;
-  getLocationHostname(): string | null;
-  /** Current href WITHOUT its hash fragment (the bootstrap `return_to`). */
-  getReturnToHref(): string | null;
-  navigate(url: string): void;
-  /** A fresh high-entropy CSRF state token. */
-  randomState(): string;
-}
+export type SignedOutReason = 'no_session' | 'error';
 
 export interface RunSessionColdBootOptions {
   oxy: OxyServices;
   store: AuthStateStore;
   /** Platform hints; default derived from `@oxyhq/core`'s platform detection. */
   platform?: { isWeb?: boolean; isNative?: boolean };
-  /**
-   * The RP return URL for the cross-apex hop. Defaults to the current href
-   * (sans fragment) via the DOM seam.
-   */
-  returnTo?: string;
   /** Invoked with the winning session (token already planted). */
   onSession?: (session: DeviceBootSession & { via: string }) => void | Promise<void>;
-  /** Invoked when the boot ended signed out (not while navigating away). */
+  /** Invoked when the boot ended signed out. */
   onSignedOut?: (reason: SignedOutReason) => void | Promise<void>;
   onStepError?: (id: string, error: unknown) => void;
-  /** DOM/storage seam; defaults to the guarded browser implementation. */
-  dom?: ColdBootDom;
-}
-
-/**
- * Generate a 128-bit hex CSRF state token. Prefers Web Crypto
- * (`crypto.getRandomValues`, present in browsers and modern Node); falls back
- * to a time+`Math.random` mix only when no CSPRNG is reachable (this token
- * gates a single-use CSRF echo, not a long-lived secret).
- */
-function generateStateToken(): string {
-  const cryptoObj = (globalThis as { crypto?: Crypto }).crypto;
-  if (cryptoObj?.getRandomValues) {
-    const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);
-    cryptoObj.getRandomValues(bytes);
-    return Array.from(bytes, (b) => b.toString(16).padStart(2, '0')).join('');
-  }
-  return `${Date.now().toString(16)}${Math.random().toString(16).slice(2, 18)}`;
-}
-
-/**
- * The guarded real-globals {@link ColdBootDom}. Every accessor tolerates a
- * missing/throwing global (SSR, sandboxed iframe) by returning a neutral value
- * or no-op, so the boot degrades to signed-out rather than crashing.
- */
-export function createBrowserColdBootDom(): ColdBootDom {
-  const safe = <T>(fn: () => T, fallback: T): T => {
-    try {
-      return fn();
-    } catch {
-      return fallback;
-    }
-  };
-  return {
-    getHash: () => safe(() => (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.hash : ''), ''),
-    stripFragment: () =>
-      safe(() => {
-        if (typeof window !== 'undefined' && window.history?.replaceState) {
-          const { pathname, search } = window.location;
-          window.history.replaceState(null, '', `${pathname}${search}`);
-        }
-      }, undefined),
-    getSessionItem: (key) =>
-      safe(() => (typeof sessionStorage !== 'undefined' ? sessionStorage.getItem(key) : null), null),
-    setSessionItem: (key, value) =>
-      safe(() => {
-        if (typeof sessionStorage !== 'undefined') sessionStorage.setItem(key, value);
-      }, undefined),
-    removeSessionItem: (key) =>
-      safe(() => {
-        if (typeof sessionStorage !== 'undefined') sessionStorage.removeItem(key);
-      }, undefined),
-    getLocalItem: (key) =>
-      safe(() => (typeof localStorage !== 'undefined' ? localStorage.getItem(key) : null), null),
-    setLocalItem: (key, value) =>
-      safe(() => {
-        if (typeof localStorage !== 'undefined') localStorage.setItem(key, value);
-      }, undefined),
-    getLocationHostname: () =>
-      safe(() => (typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location.hostname : null), null),
-    getReturnToHref: () =>
-      safe(() => {
-        if (typeof window === 'undefined') return null;
-        const { origin, pathname, search } = window.location;
-        return `${origin}${pathname}${search}`;
-      }, null),
-    navigate: (url) =>
-      safe(() => {
-        if (typeof window !== 'undefined') window.location.assign(url);
-      }, undefined),
-    randomState: generateStateToken,
-  };
 }
 
 /**
- * Registrable domain = the last two labels of a host. A deliberately SMALL
- * local helper (the plan forbids coupling the boot to `fapiAutoDetect`/`tldts`).
- * Correct for every Oxy apex (all two-label domains: `oxy.so`, `mention.earth`,
- * `alia.onl`, `homiio.com`); the only imprecision — a multi-part public suffix
- * such as `co.uk` — never arises here because the compared API host is always
- * `api.oxy.so`, so a page under a different registrable domain still classifies
- * as cross-apex.
- */
-function registrableDomain(host: string): string {
-  const labels = host.toLowerCase().split('.').filter(Boolean);
-  return labels.length <= 2 ? labels.join('.') : labels.slice(-2).join('.');
-}
-
-/**
- * Is `host` an IP literal (v4/v6) or a single-label host (`localhost`)? Such
- * hosts have NO registrable domain — the last-two-labels heuristic would
- * mis-group them (`192.168.1.1` and `10.0.1.1` both collapse to `1.1`; IPv6
- * `::1` and `localhost` are single "labels"), so a LAN/dev page could be wrongly
- * classified same-apex as a different LAN API and skip the cross-apex hop.
- */
-function isIpOrSingleLabel(host: string): boolean {
-  if (host.includes(':')) {
-    return true; // IPv6 literal
-  }
-  if (/^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$/.test(host)) {
-    return true; // IPv4 literal
-  }
-  return !host.includes('.'); // single-label (e.g. `localhost`)
-}
-
-/**
- * True when both hosts are same-site / same-apex. For a normal multi-label host
- * pair, that means sharing a registrable domain. For an IP literal or a
- * single-label host (no registrable domain), same-apex requires the two hosts
- * to be EXACTLY equal — never grouped by a spurious trailing-label match.
- */
-export function isSameApex(pageHost: string, apiHost: string): boolean {
-  const a = pageHost.toLowerCase();
-  const b = apiHost.toLowerCase();
-  if (isIpOrSingleLabel(a) || isIpOrSingleLabel(b)) {
-    return a === b;
-  }
-  const ra = registrableDomain(a);
-  const rb = registrableDomain(b);
-  return ra !== '' && ra === rb;
-}
-
-/** Build a `DeviceBootSession` from a persisted state (post-refresh/warm-plant). */
-function sessionFromPersisted(state: PersistedAuthState, accessToken: string): DeviceBootSession {
-  return { sessionId: state.sessionId, userId: state.userId, accessToken };
-}
-
-/**
- * How a `mintFromDeviceSecret` (phase 2c) call failed, distinguished so the cold
- * boot can react per the transport contract:
+ * How a `mintFromDeviceSecret` call failed, distinguished so the cold boot can
+ * react per the transport contract:
  *  - `invalid_secret` — the presented secret no longer matches (another tab/
  *    device rotated it, or theft divergence). Drop it and fall back.
  *  - `no_active_session` — the device is known but has no live session.
- *    Authoritative signed-out; keep the secret, do not fall back to the hop.
- *  - `transient` — network / 5xx. Keep the secret and let the fallback lanes try.
+ *    Authoritative signed-out.
+ *  - `transient` — network / 5xx. Keep the secret; a later attempt can succeed.
  *
  * The mint is bearer-less (`skipAuth`), so `HttpService` surfaces the server's
  * 401 body string (`invalid_device_secret` | `no_active_session`) as the thrown
@@ -256,41 +75,26 @@ function classifyMintFailure(error: unknown): MintFailure {
 
 /**
  * Run the device-first cold boot. Resolves to the `runColdBoot` outcome and, as
- * a side effect, invokes `onSession` (winning session, token already planted)
- * or `onSignedOut` (no session — unless the boot is navigating away for the
- * cross-apex hop, in which case neither fires).
+ * a side effect, invokes `onSession` (winning session, token already planted) or
+ * `onSignedOut` (no session).
  */
 export async function runSessionColdBoot(
   opts: RunSessionColdBootOptions,
 ): Promise<ColdBootOutcome<DeviceBootSession>> {
   const { oxy, store } = opts;
-  const dom = opts.dom ?? createBrowserColdBootDom();
-  const isWeb = opts.platform?.isWeb ?? detectWeb();
   const isNative = opts.platform?.isNative ?? detectNative();
 
-  // Signed-out reason + navigating flag are boot-local (not module-level), so
-  // they cannot leak across boots or break under bundler re-evaluation.
+  // Boot-local (not module-level) so it cannot leak across boots or break under
+  // bundler re-evaluation.
   let signedOutReason: SignedOutReason = 'no_session';
-  let navigating = false;
-  // Set when the zero-cookie mint reports `no_active_session` (phase 2c): the
-  // device is authoritatively signed out, so the migratory fallback lanes below
-  // (stored-tokens / shared-key / bootstrap-hop) must NOT run — we already know
-  // there is no session and must not bounce a known-signed-out device.
-  let deviceKnownSignedOut = false;
 
   const steps: Array<ColdBootStep<DeviceBootSession>> = [];
 
-  // 0. device-secret-mint (phase 2c) — the zero-cookie fast path. When the
+  // 1. device-secret-mint (web + native) — the zero-cookie fast path. When the
   //    origin persisted a deviceId + deviceSecret, mint a short access token with
-  //    a single bearer-less POST (no cookie, no navigation). FIRST in the chain
-  //    so it wins over the migratory cookie lanes below. Gated OFF while a
-  //    #oxy_boot return fragment is present so `bootstrap-return` still consumes
-  //    + strips it first (a device holding a secret never triggers that hop, so
-  //    this only defers a rare stale/forged fragment). The rest of the chain
-  //    stays as the additive migratory fallback for devices not yet on the secret.
+  //    a single bearer-less POST (no cookie, no navigation).
   steps.push({
     id: 'device-secret-mint',
-    enabled: () => !(isWeb && hashHasBootFragment(dom.getHash())),
     run: async () => {
       const persisted = await store.load();
       if (!persisted?.deviceId || !persisted?.deviceSecret) {
@@ -320,23 +124,21 @@ export async function runSessionColdBoot(
       } catch (error) {
         const failure = classifyMintFailure(error);
         if (failure === 'invalid_secret') {
-          // Stale/diverged secret — drop it so the mint lane stops firing, then
-          // fall through to the migratory refresh/cookie lanes. Setting it
-          // undefined drops the key on the store's JSON serialization, and the
-          // mint guard treats undefined as absent.
+          // Stale/diverged secret — drop it so the mint lane stops firing. On
+          // native the shared-key step below can still recover; on web this ends
+          // signed out. Setting it undefined drops the key on the store's JSON
+          // serialization, and the mint guard treats undefined as absent.
           await store.save({ ...persisted, deviceSecret: undefined });
           return { kind: 'skip' };
         }
         if (failure === 'no_active_session') {
-          // Device known, no live session — authoritative signed-out. KEEP the
-          // secret and stop the chain (do not bounce a known-signed-out device).
-          deviceKnownSignedOut = true;
+          // Device known, no live session — authoritative signed-out.
           signedOutReason = 'no_session';
           return { kind: 'skip' };
         }
-        // Transient (network / 5xx): keep the secret, let the fallback lanes try.
+        // Transient (network / 5xx): keep the secret; a later attempt can succeed.
         logger.debug(
-          'device-secret mint failed (transient) — keeping secret, falling back',
+          'device-secret mint failed (transient) — keeping secret',
           { component: 'coldBootV2', method: 'device-secret-mint' },
           error,
         );
@@ -345,92 +147,15 @@ export async function runSessionColdBoot(
     },
   });
 
-  // 1. bootstrap-return (web) — consume a #oxy_boot fragment.
-  steps.push({
-    id: 'bootstrap-return',
-    enabled: () => isWeb && hashHasBootFragment(dom.getHash()),
-    run: async () => {
-      const outcome = await consumeDeviceBootReturn({
-        hash: dom.getHash(),
-        stripFragment: () => dom.stripFragment(),
-        readExpectedState: () => dom.getSessionItem(BOOT_STATE_SESSION_KEY),
-        clearExpectedState: () => dom.removeSessionItem(BOOT_STATE_SESSION_KEY),
-        store,
-        exchangeBootCode: (code) => oxy.exchangeBootCode(code),
-        plantAccessToken: (accessToken) => oxy.setTokens(accessToken),
-      });
-      if (outcome.kind === 'session') {
-        return { kind: 'session', session: outcome.session };
-      }
-      if (outcome.kind === 'state-mismatch') {
-        signedOutReason = 'state-mismatch';
-      } else if (outcome.kind === 'no-session') {
-        // `DeviceBootReason` also carries 'session'; a no-session outcome with
-        // that reason (a `session` reason but no code) is still signed out.
-        signedOutReason = outcome.reason === 'new_device' ? 'new_device' : 'no_session';
-      }
-      // Fall through: a stored refresh family (a prior same-origin session) may
-      // still recover below. The once-ever flag blocks a second hop.
-      return { kind: 'skip' };
-    },
-  });
-
-  // 2. stored-tokens — warm-plant or rotate the persisted refresh family.
-  steps.push({
-    id: 'stored-tokens',
-    enabled: () => !deviceKnownSignedOut,
-    run: async () => {
-      const persisted = await store.load();
-      if (!persisted) {
-        return { kind: 'skip' };
-      }
-      // Warm path: a still-valid access token → plant immediately (no network).
-      if (
-        persisted.accessToken &&
-        persisted.expiresAt &&
-        Date.parse(persisted.expiresAt) - Date.now() > WARM_MIN_REMAINING_MS
-      ) {
-        oxy.setTokens(persisted.accessToken);
-        return { kind: 'session', session: sessionFromPersisted(persisted, persisted.accessToken) };
-      }
-      // Rotate path: refreshPersistedSession plants + persists, and clears the
-      // store on a family-revoked error.
-      const token = await refreshPersistedSession({ oxy, store, allowSharedKeyFallback: isNative });
-      if (!token) {
-        return { kind: 'skip' };
-      }
-      const after = await store.load();
-      const base = after ?? persisted;
-      return { kind: 'session', session: sessionFromPersisted(base, token) };
-    },
-  });
-
-  // 3. shared-key-signin (native) — re-mint from the shared identity.
+  // 2. shared-key-signin (native) — re-mint from the shared identity.
   steps.push({
     id: 'shared-key-signin',
-    enabled: () => isNative && !deviceKnownSignedOut,
+    enabled: () => isNative,
     run: async () => {
       const session = await oxy.signInWithSharedIdentity();
       if (!session?.accessToken) {
         return { kind: 'skip' };
       }
-      // First shared-key sign-in on this device: issue + persist + mirror a
-      // shared deviceToken so every native Oxy app joins one DeviceSession.
-      // Best-effort — never fail the sign-in over device-token issuance.
-      try {
-        const existing = await KeyManager.getSharedDeviceToken();
-        if (!existing) {
-          const deviceToken = await oxy.issueNativeDeviceToken();
-          await store.saveDeviceToken(deviceToken);
-          await KeyManager.setSharedDeviceToken(deviceToken);
-        }
-      } catch (error) {
-        logger.debug(
-          'Native deviceToken issuance skipped',
-          { component: 'coldBootV2', method: 'shared-key-signin' },
-          error,
-        );
-      }
       return {
         kind: 'session',
         session: {
@@ -442,83 +167,6 @@ export async function runSessionColdBoot(
     },
   });
 
-  // 4. bootstrap-hop (web, terminal) — same-apex inline fetch OR cross-apex nav.
-  steps.push({
-    id: 'bootstrap-hop',
-    enabled: () => isWeb && !deviceKnownSignedOut,
-    run: async () => {
-      const pageHost = dom.getLocationHostname();
-      let apiHost: string | null = null;
-      try {
-        apiHost = new URL(oxy.getBaseURL()).hostname;
-      } catch {
-        apiHost = null;
-      }
-      if (!pageHost || !apiHost) {
-        return { kind: 'skip' };
-      }
-
-      // Same-apex: inline credentialed fetch, no redirect, runs every boot.
-      if (isSameApex(pageHost, apiHost)) {
-        const result = await oxy.requestWebSession();
-        // The rotated deviceToken is on BOTH arms (it is device-level, not
-        // session-level) — persist it before branching on the session.
-        await store.saveDeviceToken(result.deviceToken);
-        if (result.reason === 'session') {
-          const bundle = result.session;
-          const userId = resolveUserId(bundle.user);
-          if (!userId) {
-            return { kind: 'skip' };
-          }
-          const next: PersistedAuthState = {
-            sessionId: bundle.sessionId,
-            refreshToken: bundle.refreshToken,
-            userId,
-            deviceToken: result.deviceToken,
-            accessToken: bundle.accessToken,
-            expiresAt: bundle.expiresAt,
-          };
-          // Phase 2c: the web-session bundle may carry a rotating `deviceSecret`
-          // but NOT a deviceId. Persist the secret and carry any prior deviceId
-          // (from a deviceId-bearing login lane) forward so the mint lane stays
-          // usable — this overwrite must not orphan it.
-          const prior = await store.load();
-          if (prior?.deviceId) {
-            next.deviceId = prior.deviceId;
-          }
-          // Prefer the bundle's secret (the server just rotated onto it); keep the
-          // prior one when the bundle omits it — this lane also runs as the
-          // TRANSIENT-mint fallback, and must not orphan a still-valid secret.
-          const carriedSecret = bundle.deviceSecret ?? prior?.deviceSecret;
-          if (carriedSecret) {
-            next.deviceSecret = carriedSecret;
-          }
-          await store.save(next);
-          oxy.setTokens(bundle.accessToken);
-          return { kind: 'session', session: sessionFromPersisted(next, bundle.accessToken) };
-        }
-        // Known device, signed out.
-        signedOutReason = result.reason;
-        return { kind: 'skip' };
-      }
-
-      // Cross-apex: ONE visible top-level navigation, once-ever per origin.
-      if (dom.getLocalItem(BOOT_ATTEMPTED_KEY)) {
-        return { kind: 'skip' };
-      }
-      const returnTo = opts.returnTo ?? dom.getReturnToHref();
-      if (!returnTo) {
-        return { kind: 'skip' };
-      }
-      const state = dom.randomState();
-      dom.setSessionItem(BOOT_STATE_SESSION_KEY, state);
-      dom.setLocalItem(BOOT_ATTEMPTED_KEY, '1');
-      navigating = true;
-      dom.navigate(oxy.buildBootstrapUrl(returnTo, state));
-      return { kind: 'skip' };
-    },
-  });
-
   const outcome = await runColdBoot<DeviceBootSession>({
     steps,
     onStepError: (id, error) => {
@@ -532,10 +180,6 @@ export async function runSessionColdBoot(
     return outcome;
   }
 
-  // Navigating away for the cross-apex hop: the page is unloading, so do not
-  // flash a signed-out state.
-  if (!navigating) {
-    await opts.onSignedOut?.(signedOutReason);
-  }
+  await opts.onSignedOut?.(signedOutReason);
   return outcome;
 }

package/src/crypto/keyManager.ts

@@ -91,11 +91,6 @@ const STORAGE_KEYS = {
   SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY: 'oxy_shared_identity_public_key',
   SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN: 'oxy_shared_session_token',
   SHARED_SESSION_ID: 'oxy_shared_session_id',
-  // Opaque device-attribution token, shared across all Oxy apps on one device
-  // so they all resolve to a SINGLE server-side DeviceSession (device-first
-  // session model). Add-only: it never carries session state, only attributes
-  // a newly-credentialed session to the shared device set.
-  SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN: 'oxy_shared_device_token',
 } as const;
 
 /**
@@ -648,102 +643,6 @@ export class KeyManager {
     }
   }
 
-  /**
-   * Store the opaque device-attribution token in the SHARED keychain so every
-   * Oxy app on this device reads the SAME token and therefore resolves to one
-   * server-side DeviceSession.
-   *
-   * Mirrors the shared-session storage options exactly (iOS keychain access
-   * group `group.so.oxy.shared`; Android shared secure store). Native-only —
-   * a no-op on web (the shared keychain does not exist there; web persists its
-   * deviceToken in the per-origin {@link AuthStateStore} instead).
-   */
-  static async setSharedDeviceToken(deviceToken: string): Promise<void> {
-    if (isWebPlatform()) {
-      return; // Not supported on web
-    }
-
-    try {
-      const store = await initSecureStore();
-
-      if (isIOS()) {
-        const opts: OxySecureStoreOptions = {
-          keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED,
-          keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-        };
-        await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN, deviceToken, opts);
-      } else if (isAndroid()) {
-        await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN, deviceToken);
-      }
-
-      if (isDev()) {
-        logger.debug('Shared device token stored successfully', { component: 'KeyManager' });
-      }
-    } catch (error) {
-      if (isDev()) {
-        logger.error('Failed to store shared device token', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
-      }
-      throw error;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Read the shared device-attribution token, or `null` when none is set (or
-   * on web). Mirrors {@link getSharedSession}'s keychain-access-group read.
-   */
-  static async getSharedDeviceToken(): Promise<string | null> {
-    if (isWebPlatform()) {
-      return null;
-    }
-
-    try {
-      const store = await initSecureStore();
-
-      if (isIOS()) {
-        const opts: OxySecureStoreOptions = { keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP };
-        return await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN, opts);
-      }
-      if (isAndroid()) {
-        return await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN);
-      }
-      return null;
-    } catch (error) {
-      if (isDev()) {
-        logger.warn('Failed to get shared device token', { component: 'KeyManager' }, error);
-      }
-      return null;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /**
-   * Delete the shared device-attribution token (device signout-all). Best-effort:
-   * a keychain failure is logged, not thrown, so it cannot block a sign-out.
-   */
-  static async clearSharedDeviceToken(): Promise<void> {
-    if (isWebPlatform()) {
-      return;
-    }
-
-    try {
-      const store = await initSecureStore();
-
-      if (isIOS()) {
-        const opts: OxySecureStoreOptions = { keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP };
-        await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN, opts);
-      } else if (isAndroid()) {
-        await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_DEVICE_TOKEN);
-      }
-
-      if (isDev()) {
-        logger.debug('Shared device token cleared successfully', { component: 'KeyManager' });
-      }
-    } catch (error) {
-      if (isDev()) {
-        logger.error('Failed to clear shared device token', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
   // ==================== END SHARED IDENTITY METHODS ====================
 
   /**