@oxyhq/core 6.0.0 → 7.1.0

package/dist/esm/HttpService.js

@@ -1020,7 +1020,7 @@ export class HttpService {
  * `clearCacheByPrefix` sweeps and `clearCacheEntry` base-key matching.
  * The `clearCacheEntry` callsites all pass fixed, dataless logical keys
  * (`GET:/users/<id>`, `GET:/session/user/<sessionId>`,
- * `GET:/fedcm/me/authorized-apps`), so this readable suffix can never be
+ * `GET:/auth/grants`), so this readable suffix can never be
  * ambiguous with a serialized request body.
  */
 HttpService.CACHE_IDENTITY_DELIM = ' id=';

package/dist/esm/index.js

@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@ import './crypto/polyfill.js';
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 export { OxyServices, OxyAuthenticationError, OxyAuthenticationTimeoutError } from './OxyServices.js';
 export { OXY_CLOUD_URL, oxyClient } from './OxyServices.js';
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Authentication
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 export { ServiceCredentialMismatchError } from './mixins/OxyServices.auth.js';
 export { OxyAppDataIdentifierError } from './mixins/OxyServices.appData.js';
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -117,14 +120,18 @@ export { buildAccountsArray, createQuickAccount, getAccountDisplayName, getAccou
 // Registrable-domain + central-IdP-apex helpers.
 //
 // The client SSO-bounce / silent-iframe / FedCM machinery was removed in the
-// device-first cutover. These three symbols survive because the api SSO surface
-// and the IdP (both lista B, gated on the ecosystem bump) still import them:
-// `registrableApex` (eTLD+1), `CENTRAL_IDP_APEX`, and the `SSO_CALLBACK_PATH`
-// constant. `@oxyhq/core/server` re-exports `registrableApex` + `SSO_CALLBACK_PATH`
-// for the api; the IdP imports all three from here.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-export { registrableApex } from './utils/fapiAutoDetect.js';
-export { CENTRAL_AUTH_URL, CENTRAL_IDP_APEX } from './utils/authWebUrl.js';
+// device-first cutover (wave 2, ecosystem-wide bump complete). `registrableApex`
+// (eTLD+1) and `CENTRAL_IDP_APEX` are still genuinely used: `registrableApex`
+// via the `@oxyhq/core/server` re-export consumed by
+// `packages/api/src/utils/sameSite.ts` for same-site origin checks, and
+// `CENTRAL_IDP_APEX` by `server/cors.ts`'s `createOxyCors` (auto-allows
+// `*.oxy.so`). `SSO_CALLBACK_PATH` has no remaining importer outside this
+// module as of wave 2 — kept exported for now rather than removed here (an
+// export deletion is a logic change, out of scope for a comment sweep); flag
+// for a follow-up dead-export cleanup pass.
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+export { registrableApex } from './utils/registrableApex.js';
+export { CENTRAL_IDP_APEX } from './utils/authWebUrl.js';
 export { SSO_CALLBACK_PATH } from './utils/ssoBounce.js';
 export { runColdBoot } from './utils/coldBoot.js';
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
@@ -139,6 +146,17 @@ export { SessionClient } from './session/SessionClient.js';
 export { createSessionClientHost } from './session/sessionClientHost.js';
 export { createSessionClient } from './session/createSessionClient.js';
 export { deviceStateToClientSessions, activeSessionIdOf, activeUserOf, accountIdsOf, } from './session/projectSessionState.js';
+// Unified account-list projection (THE single source of truth for the account
+// chooser: device sign-ins ∪ account graph, deduped by accountId). Pure +
+// I/O-free — the caller hydrates profiles via `getUsersByIds`. Shared by
+// `@oxyhq/services`, `@oxyhq/auth`, and auth.oxy.so so the list can't diverge.
+export { projectSwitchableAccounts, switchableAccountIds, } from './session/accountProjection.js';
+// Headless controller for the unified account dialog. Framework-agnostic
+// state machine + subscribe/getSnapshot store (bind via `useSyncExternalStore`)
+// — no password/2FA logic (that lives at the IdP; `openPasswordAtOxyAuth` only
+// hands off). Reuses `SessionClient.switchAccount` / `oxyServices.switchToAccount`
+// for the uniform switch and the existing device-flow methods for sign-in.
+export { AccountDialogController, createAccountDialogController, } from './session/accountDialogController.js';
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // Device-first session machinery (auth centralization, wave 1) — additive.
 // Persisted auth-state store, the unified refresh handler + scheduler, the

package/dist/esm/mixins/OxyServices.accounts.js

@@ -49,24 +49,18 @@ export function OxyServicesAccountsMixin(Base) {
          * target, directly or inherited — else 403; 404 if missing/archived; 403 if
          * the target is a personal account), then mints a REAL session for the
          * target account and returns it in the canonical login / `claimSessionByToken`
-         * shape (`{ sessionId, deviceId, expiresAt, accessToken, user, authuser }`).
+         * shape (`{ sessionId, deviceId, expiresAt, accessToken, user }`).
          *
          * Unlike the removed `X-Acting-As` delegation header, the returned session
          * IS the new identity: this plants `accessToken` as the active token —
          * exactly like `claimSessionByToken` / `verifyChallenge` — so every
          * subsequent request authenticates as the target account.
          *
-         * Joining the device multi-account set (so the switch survives a reload and
-         * propagates cross-domain via `/auth/refresh-all`) requires a SECOND call, to
-         * `POST /auth/session`, made here after the token is planted. The switch route
-         * lives at `/accounts/*`, OUTSIDE the `oxy_rt_<authuser>` cookie's `Path=/auth`
-         * scope, so the server never sees the device's existing slots from it and
-         * would clobber slot 0 (destroying the operator's own session). `/auth/session`
-         * runs where those cookies ARE visible, so the server allocates a NEW slot that
-         * coexists with the operator's and returns its `authuser`. This step is
-         * web-only (native multi-account uses stored sessions, not cookies) and
-         * best-effort — a failure leaves the in-session switch intact; the switched
-         * account simply won't survive a reload until the cookie is next established.
+         * A single call is all that's needed: the server registers the switched
+         * session into the operator's `DeviceSession` set directly, inheriting the
+         * operator's central `deviceId` so the switch survives a reload and syncs
+         * cross-domain via the same device-first session model as a normal login —
+         * there is no separate client-side cookie/slot step to make it stick.
          *
          * After planting, the SDK's identity-scoped GET cache is fully cleared so
          * every cached read re-fetches as the new account. (The consuming
@@ -76,7 +70,7 @@ export function OxyServicesAccountsMixin(Base) {
          * same-user silent refreshes, so the sweep here is explicit.)
          *
          * @param accountId - The target account's Mongo `_id`.
-         * @returns The minted session (planted) plus the device `authuser` slot.
+         * @returns The minted session, already planted as the active session.
          */
         async switchToAccount(accountId) {
             try {

package/dist/esm/mixins/index.js

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@
  */
 import { OxyServicesBase } from '../OxyServices.base.js';
 import { OxyServicesAuthMixin } from './OxyServices.auth.js';
-import { OxyServicesAuthorizedAppsMixin } from './OxyServices.authorizedApps.js';
 import { OxyServicesUserMixin } from './OxyServices.user.js';
 import { OxyServicesIdentityMixin } from './OxyServices.identity.js';
 import { OxyServicesPrivacyMixin } from './OxyServices.privacy.js';
@@ -43,10 +42,6 @@ import { OxyServicesDeviceBootMixin } from './OxyServices.deviceBoot.js';
 const MIXIN_PIPELINE = [
     // Base authentication
     OxyServicesAuthMixin,
-    // Legacy FedCM "Connected apps" management (list/revoke authorized RP grants).
-    // The FedCM sign-in surface was removed in the device-first cutover; only
-    // this management pair survives until the AppGrant migration.
-    OxyServicesAuthorizedAppsMixin,
     // User management (requires auth)
     OxyServicesUserMixin,
     // Self-sovereign identity (DID, signed records, auth-method ↔ VM mapping)

package/dist/esm/server/index.js

@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ export { verifySecret } from './verifySecret.js';
 // SOURCE OF TRUTH shared with the IdP worker and the client FAPI auto-detect.
 // Pure host handling (no browser deps), so it is safe on the server subpath and
 // lets `@oxyhq/api` derive `auth.<apex>` without duplicating PSL logic.
-export { registrableApex } from '../utils/fapiAutoDetect.js';
+export { registrableApex } from '../utils/registrableApex.js';
 // The single RP callback path the IdP redirects back to. A pure wire-contract
 // constant (no browser deps at module top level), re-used server-side so the
 // `/sso/establish-token` `return_to` cannot drift from what `/sso/establish`

package/dist/esm/session/SessionClient.js

@@ -1,6 +1,14 @@
 import { deviceSessionStateSchema, deviceSessionSyncSchema, safeParseContract, } from '@oxyhq/contracts';
 import { logger } from '../utils/loggerUtils.js';
 import { getSocketIO } from './socketLoader.js';
+/**
+ * Same-origin `BroadcastChannel` name for instant, network-free session wake
+ * across tabs of the SAME origin (e.g. two `accounts.oxy.so` tabs). Complements
+ * the cookie-authed device socket, which covers same-apex cross-origin
+ * (`accounts` ↔ `console` ↔ `inbox`, all `*.oxy.so`). Cross-APEX (mention.earth)
+ * is covered by neither and relies on a reload — the documented limitation.
+ */
+const SESSION_BROADCAST_CHANNEL = 'oxy.session';
 export class SessionClient {
     constructor(host, options = {}) {
         this.host = host;
@@ -10,6 +18,12 @@ export class SessionClient {
         this.socket = null;
         this.tokenUnsub = null;
         this.started = false;
+        /** In-flight guard so a burst of pushes triggers at most ONE acquisition. */
+        this.acquiring = false;
+        /** True while the live socket is an anonymous (signed-out) device connection. */
+        this.socketAnonymous = false;
+        /** Same-origin cross-tab wake channel; null on platforms without BroadcastChannel. */
+        this.channel = null;
     }
     getState() {
         return this.state;
@@ -102,14 +116,17 @@ export class SessionClient {
     async switchAccount(accountId) {
         const res = await this.host.makeRequest('POST', '/session/device/switch', { accountId }, { cache: false });
         this.applySync(res);
+        this.postCommitPing();
     }
     async signOut(target) {
         const res = await this.host.makeRequest('POST', '/session/device/signout', target, { cache: false });
         this.applySync(res);
+        this.postCommitPing();
     }
     async addCurrentAccount() {
         const res = await this.host.makeRequest('POST', '/session/device/add', undefined, { cache: false });
         this.applySync(res);
+        this.postCommitPing();
     }
     /**
      * Register the just-signed-in account into the device set AND make it the
@@ -137,19 +154,58 @@ export class SessionClient {
             return;
         this.started = true;
         this.tokenUnsub = this.host.onTokensChanged((token) => {
-            if (token && this.socket && !this.socket.connected) {
+            if (!token)
+                return;
+            // A bearer just landed: an in-flight acquisition (if any) succeeded — clear
+            // the guard so a later sign-out can re-acquire.
+            this.acquiring = false;
+            if (!this.socket)
+                return;
+            if (this.socketAnonymous) {
+                // The live socket was an anonymous (device-room-only) connection. Force a
+                // reconnect so the handshake re-runs authenticated and also joins the
+                // `user:<id>` notification room.
+                this.socketAnonymous = false;
+                this.socket.disconnect();
+                this.socket.connect();
+            }
+            else if (!this.socket.connected) {
                 this.socket.connect();
             }
         });
-        await this.bootstrap();
+        this.openBroadcastChannel();
+        // `bootstrap` (`GET /session/device/state`) is bearer-authenticated: skip it
+        // when signed out (the signed-out socket below still joins the device room to
+        // receive pushes). A bootstrap failure is non-fatal — the socket must still
+        // connect so realtime sync survives a transient state-fetch error.
+        if (this.host.getAccessToken()) {
+            try {
+                await this.bootstrap();
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                logger.warn('[SessionClient] bootstrap during start failed (non-fatal)', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+            }
+        }
         await this.connectSocket();
     }
     stop() {
         this.started = false;
+        this.acquiring = false;
+        this.socketAnonymous = false;
         if (this.tokenUnsub) {
             this.tokenUnsub();
             this.tokenUnsub = null;
         }
+        if (this.channel) {
+            this.channel.onmessage = null;
+            try {
+                this.channel.close();
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                logger.debug('[SessionClient] BroadcastChannel close failed', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+            }
+            this.channel = null;
+        }
         if (this.socket) {
             this.socket.disconnect();
             this.socket = null;
@@ -167,24 +223,139 @@ export class SessionClient {
         if (!this.started)
             return; // stopped while the dynamic import was in flight
         const hasToken = Boolean(this.host.getAccessToken());
+        // Signed-out connect gate: when there is no bearer, only open the socket if
+        // the consumer supplies a device anchor (web cookie → `true`; native token →
+        // string). This lets an idle tab receive its device's `session_state` pushes
+        // and self-acquire when a sibling signs in.
+        let signedOutAuth = false;
+        if (!hasToken && this.options.signedOutSocketAuth) {
+            try {
+                signedOutAuth = await this.options.signedOutSocketAuth();
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                logger.warn('[SessionClient] signedOutSocketAuth failed', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+                signedOutAuth = false;
+            }
+            if (!this.started)
+                return; // stopped while the async gate was in flight
+        }
+        const signedOutConnect = signedOutAuth !== false && signedOutAuth != null;
+        const signedOutDeviceToken = typeof signedOutAuth === 'string' ? signedOutAuth : undefined;
+        this.socketAnonymous = !hasToken && signedOutConnect;
         const socket = io(this.host.getBaseURL(), {
             transports: ['websocket'],
-            autoConnect: hasToken,
+            // Send the first-party `oxy_device` cookie on the same-site handshake so a
+            // signed-out browser tab can be resolved to its device room server-side.
+            withCredentials: true,
+            autoConnect: hasToken || signedOutConnect,
             auth: (cb) => {
-                cb({ token: this.host.getAccessToken() ?? '' });
+                const token = this.host.getAccessToken() ?? '';
+                // Present the native device token only while signed out (no bearer). Once
+                // a token is held the bearer path wins and the deviceToken is redundant.
+                cb(token || !signedOutDeviceToken ? { token } : { token, deviceToken: signedOutDeviceToken });
             },
         });
         socket.on('session_state', (payload) => {
             const applied = this.applyState(payload);
-            if (applied) {
-                const active = this.state?.activeAccountId ?? null;
-                if (active && active !== this.host.getCurrentAccountId()) {
-                    void this.bootstrap().catch((error) => {
-                        logger.warn('[SessionClient] post-push token fetch failed', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
-                    });
+            if (!applied)
+                return;
+            // Signed-out tab: a session appeared on this device (a sibling signed in).
+            // Acquire it so this tab flips to signed-in; the planted token then
+            // reconnects the socket on the authenticated path.
+            if (!this.host.getAccessToken()) {
+                if ((this.state?.accounts.length ?? 0) > 0) {
+                    this.requestAcquisition();
                 }
+                return;
+            }
+            const active = this.state?.activeAccountId ?? null;
+            if (active && active !== this.host.getCurrentAccountId()) {
+                void this.bootstrap().catch((error) => {
+                    logger.warn('[SessionClient] post-push token fetch failed', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+                });
             }
         });
         this.socket = socket;
     }
+    /**
+     * Run the consumer's session acquisition at most once at a time. A returned
+     * promise gates the next attempt (reset on settle), so a failed acquisition
+     * can retry on the NEXT push while a burst of identical pushes cannot pile up.
+     */
+    requestAcquisition() {
+        if (this.acquiring || !this.options.onSessionAppeared)
+            return;
+        this.acquiring = true;
+        let result;
+        try {
+            result = this.options.onSessionAppeared();
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            this.acquiring = false;
+            logger.error('[SessionClient] onSessionAppeared threw', error);
+            return;
+        }
+        void Promise.resolve(result).catch((error) => {
+            logger.warn('[SessionClient] onSessionAppeared rejected', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+        }).finally(() => {
+            this.acquiring = false;
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * Open the same-origin `BroadcastChannel` (web only). A sibling tab that
+     * commits a session posts a wake ping; on receipt a signed-in tab re-syncs its
+     * device state and a signed-out tab self-acquires — instant + network-free for
+     * the common "two tabs of the same origin" case, with no state (and no tokens)
+     * ever crossing the channel. No-op on native (no BroadcastChannel).
+     */
+    openBroadcastChannel() {
+        if (this.channel)
+            return;
+        const Ctor = globalThis.BroadcastChannel;
+        if (typeof Ctor !== 'function')
+            return; // native RN / SSR — feature absent
+        let channel;
+        try {
+            channel = new Ctor(SESSION_BROADCAST_CHANNEL);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            logger.debug('[SessionClient] BroadcastChannel unavailable', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+            return;
+        }
+        channel.onmessage = (event) => {
+            if (!event || typeof event.data !== 'object' || event.data === null)
+                return;
+            if (event.data.type !== 'commit')
+                return;
+            // BroadcastChannel never echoes to the posting context, so this is a
+            // sibling's commit. Re-sync (signed-in) or acquire (signed-out). Neither
+            // path re-posts, so there is no cross-tab ping loop.
+            if (this.host.getAccessToken()) {
+                void this.bootstrap().catch((error) => {
+                    logger.warn('[SessionClient] broadcast re-sync failed', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+                });
+            }
+            else {
+                this.requestAcquisition();
+            }
+        };
+        this.channel = channel;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Wake same-origin sibling tabs after a locally-initiated session mutation.
+     * Opens the channel lazily: a sign-in registers the account (`addCurrentAccount`
+     * / `switchAccount`) BEFORE `start()` runs, so the ping must not depend on
+     * `start()` having opened the channel first.
+     */
+    postCommitPing() {
+        this.openBroadcastChannel();
+        if (!this.channel)
+            return;
+        try {
+            this.channel.postMessage({ type: 'commit', at: Date.now() });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            logger.debug('[SessionClient] BroadcastChannel post failed', { component: 'SessionClient' }, error);
+        }
+    }
 }