@oxyhq/core 13.0.0 → 13.2.0

package/src/server/securityHeaders.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+/**
+ * Shared security headers (Helmet + Content-Security-Policy) for Oxy backends.
+ *
+ * WHY THIS EXISTS
+ * ---------------
+ * A CSP only governs an origin that serves DOCUMENTS; on a JSON API it governs
+ * no browsing context. The Oxy origins that serve HTML through Cloudflare have
+ * so far either hand-written their own policy or shipped none at all, and two
+ * bugs follow from that:
+ *
+ *  1. THE CLOUDFLARE INSIGHTS BEACON IS BLOCKED BY A HAND-WRITTEN POLICY.
+ *     Cloudflare injects `<script src="https://static.cloudflareinsights.com/
+ *     beacon.min.js/...">` into HTML it proxies. No application code loads it,
+ *     so it cannot be allowlisted from the app side any other way, and an
+ *     origin whose policy says `script-src 'self'` logs
+ *     `Loading the script 'https://static.cloudflareinsights.com/beacon.min.js'
+ *     violates the following Content Security Policy directive: "script-src
+ *     'self'"` and collects nothing. The beacon needs BOTH hosts, and they are
+ *     different halves of the same feature: `static.cloudflareinsights.com`
+ *     serves the script (`script-src`), `cloudflareinsights.com` receives the
+ *     measurements (`connect-src`). Allowing only the script leaves the beacon
+ *     loading but unable to report, which looks fixed and is not. Verified in
+ *     production 2026-07-29: `mention.earth` serves HTML behind Cloudflare with
+ *     the beacon injected and `script-src 'self'` — blocked; `oxy.so` had
+ *     already allowlisted the same two hosts in its own static `_headers`,
+ *     independently, which is the divergence this baseline exists to end.
+ *
+ *  2. AN EXPLICIT DIRECTIVE SILENTLY REPLACES HELMET'S DEFAULT.
+ *     Writing `scriptSrc: ['https://example.com']` drops `'self'` — the page's
+ *     own bundle stops loading (or, worse, only some lazily-loaded chunk does,
+ *     so it ships). This helper makes that structurally impossible: callers can
+ *     only ADD sources to the Oxy baseline, never replace a directive, and they
+ *     cannot pass their own `contentSecurityPolicy` through to Helmet at all
+ *     (the option is typed `never`).
+ *
+ * WHAT IT PROVIDES
+ * ----------------
+ * `createOxySecurityHeaders(options)` returns the Helmet middleware with the
+ * Oxy-wide CSP baseline applied, plus per-app extensions merged (and deduped)
+ * into it. Everything Helmet does that is NOT the CSP (HSTS, frameguard,
+ * referrer policy, CORP/COOP, …) is passed straight through, so an app keeps
+ * full control of those.
+ *
+ * `buildOxyCspDirectives(extensions)` is the same resolution as a pure
+ * function, for the Oxy document origins that are NOT Express — a Next.js
+ * `headers()`, a Cloudflare Pages `_headers` generator — so one policy can
+ * cover them without a second implementation.
+ *
+ * SCOPE: mount this on backends that serve HTML. A JSON-only API gains nothing
+ * from a source-list CSP; harden those with the non-CSP headers instead
+ * (`hsts`, `noSniff`, `frameguard`, CORP) rather than adding directives that
+ * apply to no document.
+ *
+ * Node/Express-only: exported solely from `@oxyhq/core/server`.
+ */
+
+import type { RequestHandler } from 'express';
+import helmet, { type HelmetOptions } from 'helmet';
+
+/** CSP keyword for "this origin". Always present in every open baseline directive. */
+const SELF = "'self'";
+
+/** CSP keyword for a fully closed directive. Meaningless alongside any other source. */
+const NONE = "'none'";
+
+/**
+ * Cloudflare Web Analytics. Injected at the edge into proxied HTML — no Oxy app
+ * loads it, and no Oxy app should have to know these hostnames. Both are
+ * required: the script host, and the host the beacon reports to.
+ */
+const CLOUDFLARE_INSIGHTS_SCRIPT_ORIGIN = 'https://static.cloudflareinsights.com';
+const CLOUDFLARE_INSIGHTS_REPORT_ORIGIN = 'https://cloudflareinsights.com';
+
+/**
+ * Oxy platform origins. Every Oxy web origin runs the SDK, which calls the Oxy
+ * API over HTTPS and Socket.IO, and resolves all canonical media through the
+ * Oxy CDN (`getFileDownloadUrl` → `cloud.oxy.so`).
+ */
+const OXY_API_ORIGIN = 'https://api.oxy.so';
+const OXY_API_WEBSOCKET_ORIGIN = 'wss://api.oxy.so';
+const OXY_CDN_ORIGIN = 'https://cloud.oxy.so';
+
+/** The CSP directives an Oxy app may extend, in Helmet's camelCase spelling. */
+export type OxyCspDirective =
+  | 'baseUri'
+  | 'connectSrc'
+  | 'defaultSrc'
+  | 'fontSrc'
+  | 'formAction'
+  | 'frameAncestors'
+  | 'frameSrc'
+  | 'imgSrc'
+  | 'manifestSrc'
+  | 'mediaSrc'
+  | 'objectSrc'
+  | 'scriptSrc'
+  | 'scriptSrcAttr'
+  | 'scriptSrcElem'
+  | 'styleSrc'
+  | 'styleSrcElem'
+  | 'workerSrc';
+
+/**
+ * Per-app ADDITIONS to the Oxy baseline, keyed by directive. Values are merged
+ * into the baseline and deduped — they never replace it, so `'self'` (and the
+ * Cloudflare beacon hosts) cannot be lost. Extending a directive the baseline
+ * does not define seeds it with `'self'` first, for the same reason.
+ */
+export type OxyCspExtensions = Partial<Record<OxyCspDirective, readonly string[]>>;
+
+/**
+ * The Oxy-wide CSP baseline. Deliberately the floor every Oxy origin needs, not
+ * a superset of what any one app allows — permissive sources an individual app
+ * wants (`https:` images, `blob:` media, embed hosts, LiveKit) are that app's
+ * extension, so each widening stays visible at its call site.
+ *
+ * `style-src` carries `'unsafe-inline'` because react-native-web injects its
+ * stylesheet as inline `<style>` at runtime; without it every Oxy web app
+ * renders unstyled.
+ */
+export const OXY_CSP_BASELINE: Readonly<Partial<Record<OxyCspDirective, readonly string[]>>> =
+  Object.freeze({
+    defaultSrc: Object.freeze([SELF]),
+    baseUri: Object.freeze([SELF]),
+    formAction: Object.freeze([SELF]),
+    frameAncestors: Object.freeze([NONE]),
+    objectSrc: Object.freeze([NONE]),
+    scriptSrc: Object.freeze([SELF, CLOUDFLARE_INSIGHTS_SCRIPT_ORIGIN]),
+    scriptSrcAttr: Object.freeze([NONE]),
+    styleSrc: Object.freeze([SELF, "'unsafe-inline'"]),
+    imgSrc: Object.freeze([SELF, 'data:', OXY_CDN_ORIGIN]),
+    mediaSrc: Object.freeze([SELF, OXY_CDN_ORIGIN]),
+    fontSrc: Object.freeze([SELF, 'data:']),
+    connectSrc: Object.freeze([
+      SELF,
+      CLOUDFLARE_INSIGHTS_REPORT_ORIGIN,
+      OXY_API_ORIGIN,
+      OXY_API_WEBSOCKET_ORIGIN,
+      OXY_CDN_ORIGIN,
+    ]),
+  });
+
+/** `connectSrc` → `connect-src`. Total over `OxyCspDirective` (all are camelCase ASCII). */
+function toHeaderDirectiveName(directive: OxyCspDirective): string {
+  return directive.replace(/[A-Z]/g, (letter) => `-${letter.toLowerCase()}`);
+}
+
+/**
+ * A source containing `;` or `,` would silently terminate the directive (or the
+ * whole policy) and hand the rest of the string to the browser as new
+ * directives. Helmet rejects these too; we reject them here so the pure builder
+ * is equally safe, and so the failure names the offending directive.
+ */
+function assertValidSource(directive: OxyCspDirective, source: string): void {
+  if (typeof source !== 'string' || source.length === 0) {
+    throw new TypeError(`Oxy CSP: ${toHeaderDirectiveName(directive)} received an empty source.`);
+  }
+  if (source.includes(';') || source.includes(',')) {
+    throw new TypeError(
+      `Oxy CSP: ${toHeaderDirectiveName(directive)} source ${JSON.stringify(source)} may not contain ";" or ",".`,
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/** Order-preserving, first-seen-wins dedupe. */
+function dedupe(sources: readonly string[]): string[] {
+  return [...new Set(sources)];
+}
+
+/**
+ * Resolve the effective CSP directives: the Oxy baseline, with each app
+ * extension merged in and deduped.
+ *
+ * Merge rules:
+ *  - A baseline directive is EXTENDED, never replaced — `'self'` and the
+ *    Cloudflare beacon hosts always survive.
+ *  - A directive absent from the baseline is seeded with `'self'`, so adding
+ *    (say) an embed host to `frame-src` cannot lock the origin out of itself.
+ *  - A directive whose baseline is exactly `'none'` is CLOSED: extending it
+ *    drops the sentinel, because `'none'` alongside any other source is
+ *    meaningless per the CSP spec. This is how an app that must be framable
+ *    opts back in with `frameAncestors: ["'self'"]`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * buildOxyCspDirectives({ frameSrc: ['https://player.vimeo.com'] });
+ * // → { ..., 'frame-src': ["'self'", 'https://player.vimeo.com'], ... }
+ * ```
+ */
+export function buildOxyCspDirectives(extensions: OxyCspExtensions = {}): Record<string, string[]> {
+  const directiveNames = new Set<OxyCspDirective>([
+    ...(Object.keys(OXY_CSP_BASELINE) as OxyCspDirective[]),
+    ...(Object.keys(extensions) as OxyCspDirective[]),
+  ]);
+
+  const resolved: Record<string, string[]> = {};
+
+  for (const directive of directiveNames) {
+    const extras = extensions[directive] ?? [];
+    for (const source of extras) {
+      assertValidSource(directive, source);
+    }
+
+    const baseline = OXY_CSP_BASELINE[directive] ?? [SELF];
+    const isClosed = baseline.length === 1 && baseline[0] === NONE;
+    const merged = isClosed && extras.length > 0 ? extras : [...baseline, ...extras];
+
+    resolved[toHeaderDirectiveName(directive)] = dedupe(merged);
+  }
+
+  // Valueless directive: rewrite stray `http://` subresources to HTTPS rather
+  // than failing them, which matters for federated/user-supplied URLs.
+  resolved['upgrade-insecure-requests'] = [];
+
+  return resolved;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Serialize resolved CSP directives into the single-line header value browsers
+ * and Cloudflare `_headers` expect. Valueless directives (e.g.
+ * `upgrade-insecure-requests`) emit the name alone.
+ */
+export function formatOxyCspPolicy(directives: Record<string, string[]>): string {
+  return Object.entries(directives)
+    .map(([name, sources]) => (sources.length === 0 ? name : `${name} ${sources.join(' ')}`))
+    .join('; ');
+}
+
+export interface OxyPagesHeadersOptions {
+  /** Per-app additions merged into {@link OXY_CSP_BASELINE}. */
+  csp?: OxyCspExtensions;
+  /**
+   * Emit `Strict-Transport-Security` (default `true`). Cloudflare Pages serves
+   * HTTPS only, so static deploys should keep this on.
+   */
+  hsts?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build a Cloudflare Pages `_headers` block for an Oxy HTML origin. Uses the
+ * same CSP resolution as {@link createOxySecurityHeaders} plus the non-CSP
+ * hardening headers Helmet would add on an Express HTML backend.
+ */
+export function buildOxyPagesHeaders(options: OxyPagesHeadersOptions = {}): string {
+  const csp = formatOxyCspPolicy(buildOxyCspDirectives(options.csp));
+  const lines = [
+    '/*',
+    `  Content-Security-Policy: ${csp}`,
+    '  X-Frame-Options: DENY',
+    '  X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff',
+    '  Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin',
+  ];
+  if (options.hsts !== false) {
+    lines.push('  Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload');
+  }
+  lines.push('');
+  return lines.join('\n');
+}
+
+export interface OxySecurityHeadersOptions {
+  /**
+   * Per-app additions to the Oxy CSP baseline. Merged, deduped, never
+   * replacing — see {@link buildOxyCspDirectives}.
+   */
+  csp?: OxyCspExtensions;
+  /**
+   * Everything Helmet does that is not the CSP: `hsts`, `frameguard`,
+   * `referrerPolicy`, `crossOriginResourcePolicy`, … Passed straight through.
+   *
+   * `contentSecurityPolicy` is typed `never` on purpose: the CSP is owned by
+   * this helper so the baseline cannot be replaced (nor the `'self'` guarantee
+   * bypassed) by an app that hands Helmet its own directive block. Extend it
+   * through `csp` instead.
+   */
+  helmet?: HelmetOptions & { contentSecurityPolicy?: never };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build the shared Oxy security-headers middleware: Helmet with the Oxy CSP
+ * baseline plus this app's extensions.
+ *
+ * @example
+ * ```ts
+ * app.use(createOxySecurityHeaders({
+ *   csp: {
+ *     connectSrc: ['https://api.example.com', 'wss://api.example.com'],
+ *     frameSrc: ['https://player.vimeo.com'],
+ *   },
+ *   helmet: { crossOriginResourcePolicy: { policy: 'cross-origin' } },
+ * }));
+ * ```
+ */
+export function createOxySecurityHeaders(options: OxySecurityHeadersOptions = {}): RequestHandler {
+  const { csp, helmet: helmetOptions } = options;
+  const directives = buildOxyCspDirectives(csp);
+
+  return helmet({
+    ...helmetOptions,
+    // `useDefaults: false`: the baseline above is the whole policy, so what the
+    // browser receives is exactly what `buildOxyCspDirectives` returns — no
+    // silent union with Helmet's defaults that tests would never see.
+    contentSecurityPolicy: { useDefaults: false, directives },
+  });
+}

package/src/utils/apiUtils.ts

@@ -3,20 +3,46 @@
  */
 
 /**
- * Build URL search parameters from an object
- * @param params Object with parameter key-value pairs
- * @returns URLSearchParams instance
+ * Build a plain query-parameter record from an object, stringifying values and
+ * dropping `undefined`/`null` entries.
+ *
+ * This is the shape `OxyServices.makeRequest` expects for a GET's `params`:
+ * `HttpService` inspects it with `Object.keys(...)` (both to decide whether to
+ * append a query string and to build the request's cache key), and
+ * `Object.keys(new URLSearchParams({ limit: '20' }))` is `[]` — a
+ * `URLSearchParams` exposes its entries through iterator methods, never as own
+ * enumerable properties. Passing one to `makeRequest` therefore silently drops
+ * the whole query string. Always hand `makeRequest` a plain record.
+ *
+ * Generic over the input object rather than taking `Record<string, unknown>`,
+ * because a TypeScript `interface` (`PaginationParams`, `FollowGraphParams`, …)
+ * has no implicit index signature and so is not assignable to that type.
  */
-export function buildSearchParams(params: Record<string, any>): URLSearchParams {
-  const searchParams = new URLSearchParams();
-  
-  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params)) {
+export function buildQueryParams<T extends object>(params: T): Record<string, string> {
+  const query: Record<string, string> = {};
+
+  // Widening the value to `unknown` is always sound; the default overload of
+  // `Object.entries` would otherwise infer `any` here.
+  for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(params) as [string, unknown][]) {
     if (value !== undefined && value !== null) {
-      searchParams.append(key, value.toString());
+      query[key] = String(value);
     }
   }
-  
-  return searchParams;
+
+  return query;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build URL search parameters from an object.
+ *
+ * For building a URL string only — see {@link buildQueryParams} for the shape
+ * `makeRequest` needs.
+ *
+ * @param params Object with parameter key-value pairs
+ * @returns URLSearchParams instance
+ */
+export function buildSearchParams<T extends object>(params: T): URLSearchParams {
+  return new URLSearchParams(buildQueryParams(params));
 }
 
 /**
@@ -25,7 +51,7 @@ export function buildSearchParams(params: Record<string, any>): URLSearchParams
  * @param params Object with parameter key-value pairs
  * @returns Complete URL with search parameters
  */
-export function buildUrl(baseUrl: string, params?: Record<string, any>): string {
+export function buildUrl<T extends object>(baseUrl: string, params?: T): string {
   if (!params) return baseUrl;
   
   const searchParams = buildSearchParams(params);
@@ -43,12 +69,35 @@ export interface PaginationParams {
 }
 
 /**
- * Build pagination search parameters
+ * Ordering for the follow-graph list endpoints (`/users/:id/followers`,
+ * `/users/:id/following`, `/users/:id/mutuals`).
+ *
+ * - `recent` — newest follow edge first (the server default).
+ * - `oldest` — oldest follow edge first.
+ */
+export type FollowGraphSort = 'recent' | 'oldest';
+
+/**
+ * Pagination plus the follow-graph ordering.
+ *
+ * Kept separate from {@link PaginationParams}, which is shared by endpoints
+ * that have no `sort` at all.
+ */
+export interface FollowGraphParams extends PaginationParams {
+  sort?: FollowGraphSort;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build pagination query parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns a plain record — NOT a `URLSearchParams` — because that is the only
+ * shape `makeRequest`/`HttpService` can read. See {@link buildQueryParams}.
+ *
  * @param params Pagination parameters
- * @returns URLSearchParams with pagination
+ * @returns Query record with pagination
  */
-export function buildPaginationParams(params: PaginationParams): URLSearchParams {
-  return buildSearchParams(params);
+export function buildPaginationParams(params: PaginationParams): Record<string, string> {
+  return buildQueryParams(params);
 }
 
 /**