@oxyhq/core 11.0.0 → 12.0.0

package/dist/types/index.d.ts

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * ```ts
  * import { OxyServices, oxyClient } from '@oxyhq/core';
  *
- * const user = await oxyClient.signIn(publicKey);
+ * const user = await oxyClient.getCurrentUser();
  * ```
  *
  * Every export below is NOMINAL — no `export *`, no barrels, no compat shims.
@@ -82,11 +82,12 @@ export { buildAccountsArray, createQuickAccount, getAccountDisplayName, getAccou
 export type { QuickAccount, DisplayNameUserShape } from './utils/accountUtils';
 export { registrableApex } from './utils/registrableApex';
 export { CENTRAL_IDP_APEX } from './utils/authWebUrl';
+export { isOxyRpOrigin } from './utils/webauthnOrigin';
 export { runColdBoot } from './utils/coldBoot';
 export type { ColdBootStep, ColdBootStepResult, ColdBootSession, ColdBootSkip, ColdBootOutcome, RunColdBootOptions, } from './utils/coldBoot';
 export { buildOAuthAuthorizeUrl, computeCodeChallenge, generateOAuthState, generatePkcePair, DEFAULT_OAUTH_SCOPE, OXY_AUTHORIZE_URL, OXY_OAUTH_STATE_STORAGE_KEY, OXY_OAUTH_CODE_VERIFIER_STORAGE_KEY, OXY_SILENT_OAUTH_ATTEMPTED_KEY, OXY_CROSS_ORIGIN_RESTORE_ATTEMPTED_KEY, normalizeOAuthRedirectUri, persistOAuthHandshake, readOAuthHandshake, clearOAuthHandshake, } from './utils/oauthPkce';
 export type { PkcePair, BuildOAuthAuthorizeUrlParams } from './utils/oauthPkce';
-export { buildIdpHubOrigin, buildHubSyncUrl, isIdpHubOrigin, isOfficialWebOrigin, isAllowedDeviceJoinOrigin, normalizeOfficialReturnOrigin, parseHubSyncReturnUrl, } from './utils/officialOrigins';
+export { buildIdpHubOrigin, buildHubSyncUrl, isIdpHubOrigin, isLoopbackOrigin, isOfficialWebOrigin, isAllowedDeviceJoinOrigin, normalizeOfficialReturnOrigin, parseHubSyncReturnUrl, } from './utils/officialOrigins';
 export { syncHubAfterSignIn, redeemHubTicketOnHub, } from './session/hubSync';
 export type { SyncHubAfterSignInOptions } from './session/hubSync';
 export { SessionClient } from './session/SessionClient';

package/dist/types/mixins/OxyServices.auth.d.ts

@@ -451,52 +451,66 @@ export declare function OxyServicesAuthMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBase>(B
             message: string;
         }>;
         /**
-         * Register a new user with email/username and password
-         */
-        signUp(username: string, email: string, password: string, deviceName?: string, deviceFingerprint?: any): Promise<SessionLoginResponse>;
-        /**
-         * Sign in with email or username and password
-         */
-        signIn(identifier: string, password: string, deviceName?: string, deviceFingerprint?: any): Promise<SessionLoginResponse>;
+         * Begin a WebAuthn / passkey REGISTRATION ceremony. Requests the
+         * `PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions` the browser's `navigator.credentials
+         * .create()` (or `@simplewebauthn/browser`'s `startRegistration`) needs.
+         *
+         * With a bearer token planted this links a passkey to the signed-in account
+         * (`username` ignored); without one it is a prospective signup and `username`
+         * is the desired handle. The returned options are OPAQUE — Oxy does not own
+         * their shape (the browser / `@simplewebauthn` does), so they pass through
+         * as `unknown` for the caller to hand straight to the ceremony.
+         */
+        webauthnRegisterOptions(username?: string): Promise<unknown>;
+        /**
+         * Finish a WebAuthn / passkey REGISTRATION ceremony. Forwards the opaque
+         * browser `RegistrationResponseJSON` (`response`) alongside the Oxy envelope
+         * (desired `username` for signup + the device-session naming fields).
+         *
+         * Two server branches, disambiguated by the response shape:
+         *  - **Signup** (no bearer): the account is created and a session minted —
+         *    the response carries `sessionId`, is the SAME {@link LoginResult}
+         *    contract as `POST /auth/verify`, and its access token is planted here.
+         *  - **Link** (bearer present): the passkey is attached to the signed-in
+         *    account and the server returns `{ success, message }` with no session,
+         *    which is returned verbatim (no token planting).
+         */
+        webauthnRegisterVerify(response: unknown, envelope?: {
+            username?: string;
+            deviceName?: string;
+            deviceFingerprint?: string;
+            deviceId?: string;
+        }): Promise<{
+            success: true;
+            message: string;
+        } | LoginResult>;
         /**
-         * Convenience helper for email sign-in
+         * Begin a WebAuthn / passkey AUTHENTICATION ceremony. Requests the
+         * `PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions` the browser's `navigator.credentials
+         * .get()` (or `@simplewebauthn/browser`'s `startAuthentication`) needs.
+         *
+         * When `username` is present the server scopes `allowCredentials` to that
+         * user's passkeys (username-first); when omitted it returns an empty
+         * allow-list for the usernameless / discoverable-credential flow. The
+         * returned options are OPAQUE and pass through as `unknown`.
          */
-        signInWithEmail(email: string, password: string, deviceName?: string, deviceFingerprint?: any): Promise<SessionLoginResponse>;
+        webauthnLoginOptions(username?: string): Promise<unknown>;
         /**
-         * Device-first password sign-in. Unlike the legacy {@link signIn} (which
-         * assumes a one-step session and is kept intact for existing callers until
-         * the F4 cutover), this returns the FULL `POST /auth/login` contract — the
-         * discriminated {@link LoginResult}: either a 2FA challenge
-         * (`{ twoFactorRequired, loginToken }`) to complete via
-         * {@link completeTwoFactorSignIn}, or a session arm.
-         *
-         * On the session arm, a returned access token is planted immediately
-         * (mirroring {@link verifyChallenge}), so the caller has an authenticated
-         * client without a second round-trip. The response's `deviceId` +
-         * `deviceSecret` are the zero-cookie restore credential the caller persists.
+         * Finish a WebAuthn / passkey AUTHENTICATION ceremony. Forwards the opaque
+         * browser `AuthenticationResponseJSON` (`response`) alongside the
+         * device-session envelope. Resolves to the SAME {@link LoginResult} contract
+         * as `POST /auth/verify`; the access token is planted immediately, and the
+         * response's `deviceId` + `deviceSecret` are the zero-cookie restore
+         * credential.
          */
-        passwordSignIn(identifier: string, password: string, options?: {
+        webauthnLoginVerify(response: unknown, envelope?: {
             deviceName?: string;
             deviceFingerprint?: string;
             deviceId?: string;
         }): Promise<LoginResult>;
-        /**
-         * Complete a 2FA-gated sign-in started by {@link passwordSignIn}. Presents
-         * the short-lived `loginToken` with either a TOTP `token` or a `backupCode`
-         * to `POST /security/2fa/verify-login`, which must resolve to the session
-         * arm of {@link LoginResult} (a second 2FA challenge here is a protocol
-         * error). A returned access token is planted immediately.
-         */
-        completeTwoFactorSignIn(params: {
-            loginToken: string;
-            token?: string;
-            backupCode?: string;
-            deviceName?: string;
-            deviceId?: string;
-        }): Promise<LoginSessionResult>;
         /**
          * Exchange an OAuth authorization code (returned to the RP redirect URI
-         * after password sign-in at auth.oxy.so) for a device-first session.
+         * after sign-in at auth.oxy.so) for a device-first session.
          * Public first-party clients use PKCE (`codeVerifier`); the access token is
          * planted immediately on success.
          */

package/dist/types/mixins/OxyServices.identity.d.ts

@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ import type { OxyServicesBase } from '../OxyServices.base';
  */
 export type IdentityRecordType = OxySignedRecordType;
 /** Auth-method types that can be unlinked via {@link OxyServicesIdentityMixin}. */
-export type UnlinkableAuthMethodType = 'identity' | 'password' | 'google' | 'apple' | 'github';
+export type UnlinkableAuthMethodType = 'identity' | 'webauthn';
 /**
  * Result of a link/unlink auth-method mutation (`POST /auth/link`,
  * `DELETE /auth/link/:type`).
@@ -106,14 +106,6 @@ export declare function OxyServicesIdentityMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBas
          * exact bytes the server reconstructs and verifies.
          */
         linkIdentityKey(): Promise<LinkAuthMethodResult>;
-        /**
-         * Link password authentication to the current account. Adds a `password`
-         * auth method (does not remove existing methods).
-         *
-         * @param email - The email to associate with password auth.
-         * @param password - The new password (server enforces strength rules).
-         */
-        linkPassword(email: string, password: string): Promise<LinkAuthMethodResult>;
         /**
          * Unlink an authentication method from the current account. The server
          * refuses to remove the last remaining method (the account would become
@@ -122,6 +114,18 @@ export declare function OxyServicesIdentityMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBas
          * @param type - The auth-method type to remove.
          */
         unlinkAuthMethod(type: UnlinkableAuthMethodType): Promise<LinkAuthMethodResult>;
+        /**
+         * Remove ONE passkey (WebAuthn credential) from the current account.
+         *
+         * Passkeys are per-credential, so unlike {@link unlinkAuthMethod} (which
+         * removes an auth method by type) this targets a specific credential id.
+         * The server refuses to remove the last remaining auth method (the account
+         * would become inaccessible) and deletes the stored `WebauthnCredential`.
+         *
+         * @param credentialId - The passkey's public credential id
+         *   (`AuthMethodEntry.credentialId`).
+         */
+        removePasskey(credentialId: string): Promise<LinkAuthMethodResult>;
         /**
          * Sign a record with the on-device identity key, WITHOUT publishing it.
          * The subject is the current user's DID. NATIVE-ONLY (requires a stored

package/dist/types/session/accountDialogController.d.ts

@@ -21,9 +21,8 @@
  *     `oxyServices.signInWithSharedIdentity`, else the cross-device QR handoff
  *     via `startCommonsSignIn` → poll → `claimSessionByToken`).
  *
- * It deliberately owns NO password/2FA logic — those live at the IdP
- * (auth.oxy.so). {@link AccountDialogController.openPasswordAtOxyAuth} only
- * builds the hand-off URL; device-first convergence syncs the session back.
+ * Sign-in is passkey (WebAuthn) or the Commons QR / shared-keychain handoff —
+ * password, social login, and 2FA were removed ecosystem-wide.
  */
 import type { OxyServices } from '../OxyServices';
 import type { SessionLoginResponse, MinimalUserData } from '../models/session';
@@ -96,14 +95,6 @@ export interface AccountDialogControllerOptions {
     commitSession?: (session: SessionLoginResponse) => Promise<void>;
     /** Notified after a completed sign-in (bearer planted + session committed). */
     onSignedIn?: (user: MinimalUserData) => void;
-    /** Central IdP apex for `openPasswordAtOxyAuth` (defaults to `CENTRAL_IDP_APEX`). */
-    idpApex?: string;
-    /**
-     * Registered OAuth redirect URI for this RP (exact match against
-     * `Application.redirectUris`). When set, wins over `returnUrl` /
-     * `location.origin` normalization in {@link openPasswordAtOxyAuth}.
-     */
-    authRedirectUri?: string | null;
     /**
      * QR device-flow FALLBACK poll interval in ms (default 12000). The primary
      * approval signal is the `/auth-session` socket's `auth_update` event (instant);
@@ -119,8 +110,8 @@ export interface AccountDialogControllerOptions {
      */
     socketFactory?: SocketIOFactory;
     /**
-     * Optional URL opener. When provided, `openPasswordAtOxyAuth` invokes it with
-     * the built URL in addition to returning it (web: `location.assign`; native:
+     * Optional URL opener. When provided, the controller invokes it to deep-link
+     * the Commons app for the QR handoff (web: `location.assign`; native:
      * `Linking.openURL`). Headless core never touches `window`/`Linking` itself.
      */
     openUrl?: (url: string) => void;
@@ -143,8 +134,6 @@ export declare class AccountDialogController {
     private readonly locale?;
     private readonly commitSession?;
     private readonly onSignedIn?;
-    private readonly idpApex;
-    private readonly authRedirectUri;
     private readonly pollIntervalMs;
     private readonly openUrl?;
     private readonly canOpenApp?;
@@ -277,25 +266,6 @@ export declare class AccountDialogController {
     private maybeOpenCommons;
     /** Tear down the active sign-in device flow (timers + socket + token) and reset to idle. */
     cancelSignIn(): void;
-    /**
-     * Build (and, when an `openUrl` handler was supplied, open) the auth.oxy.so
-     * password sign-in URL. Password + 2FA are NOT in the SDK — they live at the
-     * IdP; this only hands off. Device-first: after login at the IdP the device
-     * session converges and the caller is woken via the device socket /
-     * `BroadcastChannel`, so the URL only needs to point at the IdP sign-in with
-     * the right return.
-     *
-     * @param params.returnUrl - Where the IdP returns after login. Defaults to the
-     *   current document URL on web (`globalThis.location.href`); pass explicitly
-     *   on native (no `location`).
-     * @param params.state - Optional opaque state echoed back on return.
-     * @returns The absolute auth.oxy.so sign-in URL.
-     */
-    openPasswordAtOxyAuth(params?: {
-        returnUrl?: string;
-        state?: string;
-        redirectUri?: string;
-    }): Promise<string>;
     private scheduleNextPoll;
     /**
      * Run one status check + (on approval) claim. Triggered by the fallback timer

package/dist/types/utils/officialOrigins.d.ts

@@ -5,6 +5,12 @@
 export declare function buildIdpHubOrigin(): string;
 /** Whether the current web origin is the central IdP hub (`auth.oxy.so`). */
 export declare function isIdpHubOrigin(): boolean;
+/**
+ * Whether an origin is a loopback / local-dev origin (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`,
+ * or `[::1]` on any port, http or https). Local dev must never be bounced to a
+ * hosted IdP for cross-origin session restore.
+ */
+export declare function isLoopbackOrigin(origin: string): boolean;
 /** Whether an origin belongs to the official Oxy web ecosystem. */
 export declare function isOfficialWebOrigin(origin: string): boolean;
 /** Normalize and validate a return URL against official origins. Returns origin only. */

package/dist/types/utils/webauthnOrigin.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+/**
+ * WebAuthn relying-party origin guard (client side).
+ *
+ * The passkey ceremonies (`OxyServices.webauthn*`) are only meaningful when the
+ * page is served from a first-party Oxy web origin: a credential minted with
+ * `WEBAUTHN_RP_ID=oxy.so` can only be created/asserted from `oxy.so`, one of its
+ * subdomains, or a loopback dev server. This is the browser-side mirror of the
+ * server's `isOxyApexOrigin` (`packages/api/src/utils/origin.ts`), which forms
+ * the server's `expectedOrigin` allow-set — consumers use it to decide whether to
+ * even offer the passkey UI on the current page.
+ *
+ * It reads `globalThis.location` directly (no argument) because that is the only
+ * origin the browser will let a WebAuthn ceremony run against. On native / SSR /
+ * any environment without a DOM `location`, it returns `false` (there is no
+ * relying-party origin, so passkeys are not applicable).
+ */
+/**
+ * True iff the current page's host is a first-party Oxy relying-party origin:
+ * `oxy.so`, any `*.oxy.so` subdomain, or a loopback dev host
+ * (`localhost` / `127.0.0.1` / `[::1]`).
+ *
+ * Fails closed: no `location` (native/SSR), a non-string/empty hostname, or a
+ * host that merely ends in the literal `oxy.so` without the dot boundary
+ * (`evil-oxy.so`, `oxy.so.evil.com`) all return `false`.
+ *
+ * @example
+ *   isOxyRpOrigin() // true  on https://accounts.oxy.so
+ *   isOxyRpOrigin() // true  on http://localhost:8081
+ *   isOxyRpOrigin() // false on https://evil.com
+ *   isOxyRpOrigin() // false in a React Native / SSR context (no location)
+ */
+export declare function isOxyRpOrigin(): boolean;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@oxyhq/core",
-  "version": "11.0.0",
+  "version": "12.0.0",
   "description": "OxyHQ SDK Foundation — API client, authentication, cryptographic identity, and shared utilities",
   "main": "dist/cjs/index.js",
   "module": "dist/esm/index.js",
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@
     }
   },
   "dependencies": {
-    "@oxyhq/contracts": "^0.14.1",
+    "@oxyhq/contracts": "^0.15.0",
     "@oxyhq/protocol": "^0.1.5",
     "bip39": "^3.1.0",
     "buffer": "^6.0.3",

package/src/index.ts

@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
  * ```ts
  * import { OxyServices, oxyClient } from '@oxyhq/core';
  *
- * const user = await oxyClient.signIn(publicKey);
+ * const user = await oxyClient.getCurrentUser();
  * ```
  *
  * Every export below is NOMINAL — no `export *`, no barrels, no compat shims.
@@ -517,6 +517,11 @@ export type { QuickAccount, DisplayNameUserShape } from './utils/accountUtils';
 export { registrableApex } from './utils/registrableApex';
 export { CENTRAL_IDP_APEX } from './utils/authWebUrl';
 
+// WebAuthn relying-party origin guard (client side). Mirrors the server's
+// `isOxyApexOrigin` so consumers can decide whether to offer passkey UI on the
+// current page (first-party Oxy origin / loopback only).
+export { isOxyRpOrigin } from './utils/webauthnOrigin';
+
 export { runColdBoot } from './utils/coldBoot';
 export type {
     ColdBootStep,
@@ -553,6 +558,7 @@ export {
     buildIdpHubOrigin,
     buildHubSyncUrl,
     isIdpHubOrigin,
+    isLoopbackOrigin,
     isOfficialWebOrigin,
     isAllowedDeviceJoinOrigin,
     normalizeOfficialReturnOrigin,
@@ -605,9 +611,10 @@ export type {
 
 // Headless controller for the unified account dialog. Framework-agnostic
 // state machine + subscribe/getSnapshot store (bind via `useSyncExternalStore`)
-// — no password/2FA logic (that lives at the IdP; `openPasswordAtOxyAuth` only
-// hands off). Reuses `SessionClient.switchAccount` / `oxyServices.switchToAccount`
-// for the uniform switch and the existing device-flow methods for sign-in.
+// — sign-in is passkey (WebAuthn) or the Commons QR / shared-keychain handoff;
+// password, social login, and 2FA were removed ecosystem-wide. Reuses
+// `SessionClient.switchAccount` / `oxyServices.switchToAccount` for the uniform
+// switch and the existing device-flow methods for sign-in.
 export {
     AccountDialogController,
     createAccountDialogController,

package/src/mixins/OxyServices.auth.ts

@@ -1059,133 +1059,128 @@ export function OxyServicesAuthMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBase>(Base: T)
     }
 
     /**
-     * Register a new user with email/username and password
+     * Begin a WebAuthn / passkey REGISTRATION ceremony. Requests the
+     * `PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions` the browser's `navigator.credentials
+     * .create()` (or `@simplewebauthn/browser`'s `startRegistration`) needs.
+     *
+     * With a bearer token planted this links a passkey to the signed-in account
+     * (`username` ignored); without one it is a prospective signup and `username`
+     * is the desired handle. The returned options are OPAQUE — Oxy does not own
+     * their shape (the browser / `@simplewebauthn` does), so they pass through
+     * as `unknown` for the caller to hand straight to the ceremony.
      */
-    async signUp(
-      username: string,
-      email: string,
-      password: string,
-      deviceName?: string,
-      deviceFingerprint?: any
-    ): Promise<SessionLoginResponse> {
+    async webauthnRegisterOptions(username?: string): Promise<unknown> {
       try {
-        const session = await this.makeRequest<SessionLoginResponse>('POST', '/auth/signup', {
-          username,
-          email,
-          password,
-          deviceName,
-          deviceFingerprint,
-        }, { cache: false });
-        return {
-          ...session,
-          user: normalizeUserIdentity(session.user),
-        };
+        return await this.makeRequest<unknown>(
+          'POST',
+          '/auth/webauthn/register/options',
+          { ...(username !== undefined ? { username } : {}) },
+          { cache: false },
+        );
       } catch (error) {
         throw this.handleError(error);
       }
     }
 
     /**
-     * Sign in with email or username and password
+     * Finish a WebAuthn / passkey REGISTRATION ceremony. Forwards the opaque
+     * browser `RegistrationResponseJSON` (`response`) alongside the Oxy envelope
+     * (desired `username` for signup + the device-session naming fields).
+     *
+     * Two server branches, disambiguated by the response shape:
+     *  - **Signup** (no bearer): the account is created and a session minted —
+     *    the response carries `sessionId`, is the SAME {@link LoginResult}
+     *    contract as `POST /auth/verify`, and its access token is planted here.
+     *  - **Link** (bearer present): the passkey is attached to the signed-in
+     *    account and the server returns `{ success, message }` with no session,
+     *    which is returned verbatim (no token planting).
      */
-    async signIn(
-      identifier: string,
-      password: string,
-      deviceName?: string,
-      deviceFingerprint?: any
-    ): Promise<SessionLoginResponse> {
+    async webauthnRegisterVerify(
+      response: unknown,
+      envelope: {
+        username?: string;
+        deviceName?: string;
+        deviceFingerprint?: string;
+        deviceId?: string;
+      } = {},
+    ): Promise<{ success: true; message: string } | LoginResult> {
       try {
-        const session = await this.makeRequest<SessionLoginResponse>('POST', '/auth/login', {
-          identifier,
-          password,
-          deviceName,
-          deviceFingerprint,
-        }, { cache: false });
-        return {
-          ...session,
-          user: normalizeUserIdentity(session.user),
-        };
+        const res = await this.makeRequest<unknown>(
+          'POST',
+          '/auth/webauthn/register/verify',
+          { response, ...envelope },
+          { cache: false },
+        );
+        if (res && typeof res === 'object') {
+          const record = res as Record<string, unknown>;
+          // Signup branch: mints a session (LoginSessionResult, carries
+          // `sessionId`). Parse against the login contract and plant the token.
+          if ('sessionId' in record) {
+            const parsed = safeParseContract(loginResultSchema, record);
+            if (!parsed) {
+              throw new Error('auth/webauthn/register/verify returned an unexpected response shape');
+            }
+            if (parsed.accessToken) {
+              this.setTokens(parsed.accessToken);
+            }
+            return parsed;
+          }
+          // Link branch: passkey attached to the signed-in account, no session.
+          if (record.success === true && typeof record.message === 'string') {
+            return { success: true, message: record.message };
+          }
+        }
+        throw new Error('auth/webauthn/register/verify returned an unexpected response shape');
       } catch (error) {
         throw this.handleError(error);
       }
     }
 
     /**
-     * Convenience helper for email sign-in
-     */
-    async signInWithEmail(
-      email: string,
-      password: string,
-      deviceName?: string,
-      deviceFingerprint?: any
-    ): Promise<SessionLoginResponse> {
-      return this.signIn(email, password, deviceName, deviceFingerprint);
-    }
-
-    /**
-     * Device-first password sign-in. Unlike the legacy {@link signIn} (which
-     * assumes a one-step session and is kept intact for existing callers until
-     * the F4 cutover), this returns the FULL `POST /auth/login` contract — the
-     * discriminated {@link LoginResult}: either a 2FA challenge
-     * (`{ twoFactorRequired, loginToken }`) to complete via
-     * {@link completeTwoFactorSignIn}, or a session arm.
+     * Begin a WebAuthn / passkey AUTHENTICATION ceremony. Requests the
+     * `PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions` the browser's `navigator.credentials
+     * .get()` (or `@simplewebauthn/browser`'s `startAuthentication`) needs.
      *
-     * On the session arm, a returned access token is planted immediately
-     * (mirroring {@link verifyChallenge}), so the caller has an authenticated
-     * client without a second round-trip. The response's `deviceId` +
-     * `deviceSecret` are the zero-cookie restore credential the caller persists.
+     * When `username` is present the server scopes `allowCredentials` to that
+     * user's passkeys (username-first); when omitted it returns an empty
+     * allow-list for the usernameless / discoverable-credential flow. The
+     * returned options are OPAQUE and pass through as `unknown`.
      */
-    async passwordSignIn(
-      identifier: string,
-      password: string,
-      options: { deviceName?: string; deviceFingerprint?: string; deviceId?: string } = {},
-    ): Promise<LoginResult> {
+    async webauthnLoginOptions(username?: string): Promise<unknown> {
       try {
-        const res = await this.makeRequest<unknown>('POST', '/auth/login', {
-          identifier,
-          password,
-          deviceName: options.deviceName,
-          deviceFingerprint: options.deviceFingerprint,
-          ...(options.deviceId ? { deviceId: options.deviceId } : {}),
-        }, { cache: false });
-        const parsed = safeParseContract(loginResultSchema, res);
-        if (!parsed) {
-          throw new Error('auth/login returned an unexpected response shape');
-        }
-        if (!('twoFactorRequired' in parsed) && parsed.accessToken) {
-          this.setTokens(parsed.accessToken);
-        }
-        return parsed;
+        return await this.makeRequest<unknown>(
+          'POST',
+          '/auth/webauthn/login/options',
+          { ...(username !== undefined ? { username } : {}) },
+          { cache: false },
+        );
       } catch (error) {
         throw this.handleError(error);
       }
     }
 
     /**
-     * Complete a 2FA-gated sign-in started by {@link passwordSignIn}. Presents
-     * the short-lived `loginToken` with either a TOTP `token` or a `backupCode`
-     * to `POST /security/2fa/verify-login`, which must resolve to the session
-     * arm of {@link LoginResult} (a second 2FA challenge here is a protocol
-     * error). A returned access token is planted immediately.
+     * Finish a WebAuthn / passkey AUTHENTICATION ceremony. Forwards the opaque
+     * browser `AuthenticationResponseJSON` (`response`) alongside the
+     * device-session envelope. Resolves to the SAME {@link LoginResult} contract
+     * as `POST /auth/verify`; the access token is planted immediately, and the
+     * response's `deviceId` + `deviceSecret` are the zero-cookie restore
+     * credential.
      */
-    async completeTwoFactorSignIn(params: {
-      loginToken: string;
-      token?: string;
-      backupCode?: string;
-      deviceName?: string;
-      deviceId?: string;
-    }): Promise<LoginSessionResult> {
+    async webauthnLoginVerify(
+      response: unknown,
+      envelope: { deviceName?: string; deviceFingerprint?: string; deviceId?: string } = {},
+    ): Promise<LoginResult> {
       try {
-        const res = await this.makeRequest<unknown>('POST', '/security/2fa/verify-login', {
-          loginToken: params.loginToken,
-          token: params.token,
-          backupCode: params.backupCode,
-          deviceName: params.deviceName,
-          ...(params.deviceId ? { deviceId: params.deviceId } : {}),
-        }, { cache: false });
+        const res = await this.makeRequest<unknown>(
+          'POST',
+          '/auth/webauthn/login/verify',
+          { response, ...envelope },
+          { cache: false },
+        );
         const parsed = safeParseContract(loginResultSchema, res);
-        if (!parsed || 'twoFactorRequired' in parsed) {
-          throw new Error('security/2fa/verify-login returned an unexpected response shape');
+        if (!parsed) {
+          throw new Error('auth/webauthn/login/verify returned an unexpected response shape');
         }
         if (parsed.accessToken) {
           this.setTokens(parsed.accessToken);
@@ -1198,7 +1193,7 @@ export function OxyServicesAuthMixin<T extends typeof OxyServicesBase>(Base: T)
 
     /**
      * Exchange an OAuth authorization code (returned to the RP redirect URI
-     * after password sign-in at auth.oxy.so) for a device-first session.
+     * after sign-in at auth.oxy.so) for a device-first session.
      * Public first-party clients use PKCE (`codeVerifier`); the access token is
      * planted immediately on success.
      */