@oxyhq/core 1.11.24 → 2.1.0

package/dist/cjs/mixins/OxyServices.auth.js

@@ -385,6 +385,241 @@ function OxyServicesAuthMixin(Base) {
                 throw this.handleError(error);
             }
         }
+        /**
+         * Refresh every device-local refresh-cookie slot in a single round trip
+         * (Google-style multi-account rebuild).
+         *
+         * Calls `POST {sessionBaseUrl}/auth/refresh-all` with `credentials: 'include'`
+         * and NO bearer. The browser attaches every `oxy_rt*` cookie it has; the
+         * server rotates each in parallel and returns one entry per VALID account.
+         *
+         * Failure handling:
+         * - 401 → no signed-in accounts on this device → returns `{ accounts: [] }`
+         *   (NOT an error; this is the cold-boot "not signed in" path).
+         * - 404 → server is older than the multi-account endpoint. We fall back to
+         *   `POST /auth/refresh` (single-slot) and wrap its response in the
+         *   refresh-all shape so callers can treat the two paths uniformly. The
+         *   fallback entry has `authuser: 0` (the legacy slot maps to slot 0 by
+         *   convention) and a minimal `user` shape — consumers needing the full
+         *   user must fetch it separately. Always exactly one account in this
+         *   shape.
+         * - Any other non-2xx → throws via `handleError`.
+         *
+         * The refresh cookie itself never enters JS — only the rotated access
+         * tokens do. Each access token still needs to be planted via
+         * `setTokens(...)` (or per-account in-memory storage) at the consumer.
+         */
+        async refreshAllSessions() {
+            const url = `${this.getSessionBaseUrl().replace(/\/$/, '')}/auth/refresh-all`;
+            let response;
+            try {
+                response = await fetch(url, {
+                    method: 'POST',
+                    credentials: 'include',
+                    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+                });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+            if (response.status === 401) {
+                return { accounts: [] };
+            }
+            if (response.status === 404) {
+                // Legacy single-account refresh fallback. Wrap the response so the
+                // caller can treat both paths identically.
+                const legacy = await this._refreshCookieRaw();
+                if (!legacy) {
+                    return { accounts: [] };
+                }
+                const fallbackAccount = {
+                    authuser: 0,
+                    accessToken: legacy.accessToken,
+                    expiresAt: legacy.expiresAt,
+                    sessionId: this._decodeSessionIdFromAccessToken(legacy.accessToken) ?? '',
+                    // Legacy /auth/refresh does NOT project the user shape; the caller
+                    // (AuthManager) is expected to hydrate via /users/me after planting.
+                    user: null,
+                };
+                return { accounts: [fallbackAccount] };
+            }
+            if (!response.ok) {
+                throw this.handleError(new Error(`Refresh-all failed with HTTP ${response.status}`));
+            }
+            const payload = (await response.json());
+            const raw = Array.isArray(payload.accounts) ? payload.accounts : [];
+            const accounts = [];
+            for (const entry of raw) {
+                if (entry === null || typeof entry !== 'object') {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const e = entry;
+                if (!e.accessToken || !e.expiresAt || !e.sessionId || !e.user) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                const userId = e.user.id ?? e.user._id;
+                if (!userId || !e.user.username) {
+                    continue;
+                }
+                // Normalise the legacy un-suffixed cookie (`authuser: null` on the
+                // wire) to slot 0. The SDK surface always operates on numeric indices.
+                const authuser = typeof e.authuser === 'number' ? e.authuser : 0;
+                accounts.push({
+                    authuser,
+                    accessToken: e.accessToken,
+                    expiresAt: e.expiresAt,
+                    sessionId: e.sessionId,
+                    user: {
+                        id: userId,
+                        username: e.user.username,
+                        name: e.user.name,
+                        avatar: e.user.avatar ?? null,
+                        email: e.user.email,
+                        color: e.user.color ?? null,
+                    },
+                });
+            }
+            return { accounts };
+        }
+        /**
+         * Rotate a single refresh-cookie slot and return the fresh access token.
+         *
+         * When `authuser` is provided, the server rotates ONLY that slot
+         * (`oxy_rt_${authuser}`) — sibling accounts on the same device stay
+         * untouched. When omitted, the server picks the lowest indexed slot
+         * present (legacy fallback applies). The refresh cookie itself never
+         * enters JS.
+         *
+         * Returns `null` on 401 (no cookie / expired / reused) so the caller can
+         * fall through cleanly to the unauthenticated path.
+         */
+        async refreshTokenViaCookie(opts = {}) {
+            const result = await this._refreshCookieRaw(opts.authuser);
+            return result;
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sign out a single device-local account by its authuser slot index.
+         *
+         * Revokes that slot's refresh-token family and deactivates its session;
+         * sibling indexed slots stay signed in. The browser-side `oxy_rt_${n}`
+         * cookie is cleared by the server's `Set-Cookie` response header.
+         */
+        async logoutSessionByAuthuser(authuser) {
+            const url = `${this.getSessionBaseUrl().replace(/\/$/, '')}/auth/logout?authuser=${encodeURIComponent(String(authuser))}`;
+            try {
+                const response = await fetch(url, {
+                    method: 'POST',
+                    credentials: 'include',
+                    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+                });
+                if (!response.ok && response.status !== 401) {
+                    throw new Error(`Logout (authuser=${authuser}) failed with HTTP ${response.status}`);
+                }
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Sign out EVERY device-local account on this device by clearing every
+         * presented refresh-cookie slot at once. Revokes every family + clears
+         * every slot. Always succeeds (idempotent on unknown/garbage tokens).
+         */
+        async logoutAllSessionsViaCookie() {
+            const url = `${this.getSessionBaseUrl().replace(/\/$/, '')}/auth/logout`;
+            try {
+                const response = await fetch(url, {
+                    method: 'POST',
+                    credentials: 'include',
+                    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+                });
+                if (!response.ok && response.status !== 401) {
+                    throw new Error(`Logout-all failed with HTTP ${response.status}`);
+                }
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+        }
+        /**
+         * Internal: raw `POST /auth/refresh[?authuser=N]` call returning the
+         * minted access token. Returns `null` on 401 / non-2xx. Used as both the
+         * implementation of `refreshTokenViaCookie` and the legacy fallback for
+         * `refreshAllSessions` against older servers.
+         *
+         * @internal
+         */
+        async _refreshCookieRaw(authuser) {
+            const base = this.getSessionBaseUrl().replace(/\/$/, '');
+            const url = typeof authuser === 'number'
+                ? `${base}/auth/refresh?authuser=${encodeURIComponent(String(authuser))}`
+                : `${base}/auth/refresh`;
+            let response;
+            try {
+                response = await fetch(url, {
+                    method: 'POST',
+                    credentials: 'include',
+                    headers: { Accept: 'application/json' },
+                });
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                throw this.handleError(error);
+            }
+            if (!response.ok) {
+                return null;
+            }
+            const payload = (await response.json());
+            if (typeof payload.accessToken !== 'string' || !payload.accessToken) {
+                return null;
+            }
+            const expiresAt = typeof payload.expiresAt === 'string' ? payload.expiresAt : '';
+            const respAuthuser = typeof payload.authuser === 'number' ? payload.authuser : null;
+            return {
+                accessToken: payload.accessToken,
+                expiresAt,
+                authuser: respAuthuser,
+            };
+        }
+        /**
+         * Internal: decode (without verifying) the `sessionId` claim from a
+         * server-signed access token. The server already verified the signature;
+         * the client only reads the claim to drive multi-session state.
+         *
+         * @internal
+         */
+        _decodeSessionIdFromAccessToken(token) {
+            if (!token || typeof token !== 'string') {
+                return null;
+            }
+            const segments = token.split('.');
+            if (segments.length !== 3) {
+                return null;
+            }
+            const payloadSegment = segments[1];
+            if (!payloadSegment) {
+                return null;
+            }
+            try {
+                const base64 = payloadSegment.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');
+                const padded = base64.padEnd(base64.length + ((4 - (base64.length % 4)) % 4), '=');
+                if (typeof atob !== 'function') {
+                    return null;
+                }
+                const json = decodeURIComponent(atob(padded)
+                    .split('')
+                    .map((char) => `%${`00${char.charCodeAt(0).toString(16)}`.slice(-2)}`)
+                    .join(''));
+                const parsed = JSON.parse(json);
+                if (parsed === null || typeof parsed !== 'object') {
+                    return null;
+                }
+                const claims = parsed;
+                return typeof claims.sessionId === 'string' ? claims.sessionId : null;
+            }
+            catch {
+                return null;
+            }
+        }
         /**
          * Get sessions by session ID
          */

package/dist/cjs/mixins/OxyServices.fedcm.js

@@ -701,6 +701,42 @@ function OxyServicesFedCMMixin(Base) {
                     // Storage blocked
                 }
             }
+            /**
+             * List the authenticated user's authorized RP apps.
+             *
+             * Returns the intersection of the user's FedCM grants and the currently-
+             * approved RP catalog — what powers the "Connected apps" management UI in
+             * @oxyhq/services. Requires a real user session; service tokens are
+             * rejected by the underlying endpoint.
+             */
+            async listAuthorizedApps() {
+                try {
+                    const response = await this.makeRequest('GET', '/fedcm/me/authorized-apps', undefined, {
+                        cache: true,
+                        cacheTTL: 30 * 1000, // 30 second cache — short, this drives a manageable UI
+                    });
+                    return response.apps ?? [];
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    throw this.handleError(error);
+                }
+            }
+            /**
+             * Revoke the authenticated user's authorization for a specific RP origin.
+             *
+             * The next FedCM sign-in from that origin will require explicit re-consent.
+             * The corresponding cache entry is invalidated so a subsequent
+             * `listAuthorizedApps()` call sees fresh data.
+             */
+            async revokeAuthorizedApp(origin) {
+                try {
+                    await this.makeRequest('DELETE', `/fedcm/me/authorized-apps/${encodeURIComponent(origin)}`, undefined, { cache: false });
+                    this.clearCacheEntry('GET:/fedcm/me/authorized-apps');
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    throw this.handleError(error);
+                }
+            }
         },
         _a.DEFAULT_CONFIG_URL = 'https://auth.oxy.so/fedcm.json',
         _a.FEDCM_TIMEOUT = 15000 // 15 seconds for interactive

package/dist/cjs/mixins/OxyServices.popup.js

@@ -81,7 +81,37 @@ function OxyServicesPopupAuthMixin(Base) {
                     clientId: window.location.origin,
                     redirectUri: `${this.resolveAuthUrl()}/auth/callback`,
                 });
-                const popup = this.openCenteredPopup(authUrl, 'Oxy Sign In', width, height);
+                // If the caller pre-opened a popup on the raw user gesture (recommended
+                // path — see `openBlankPopup` and `PopupAuthOptions.popup`), navigate it
+                // to the auth URL instead of issuing a fresh `window.open` (which would
+                // be blocked once any prior `await` has consumed the user activation).
+                let popup;
+                const preOpened = options.popup ?? null;
+                if (preOpened) {
+                    if (preOpened.closed) {
+                        // The pre-opened popup is gone — distinguish a user cancel (they
+                        // closed the blank window before sign-in could navigate it) from a
+                        // blocker rejection. Lumping these together as "Popup blocked" is
+                        // misleading: the popup was NOT blocked, it was opened successfully
+                        // and then dismissed.
+                        throw new OxyServices_errors_1.OxyAuthenticationError('Sign-in window was closed before authentication could start.');
+                    }
+                    try {
+                        preOpened.location.replace(authUrl);
+                    }
+                    catch (replaceError) {
+                        // `location.replace` can throw in sandboxed / cross-origin-locked
+                        // environments. Fall back to `href` assignment, which is more
+                        // permissive. Logged at debug-level so consumers can correlate
+                        // unusual sign-in behaviour without producing noise in normal flows.
+                        debug.warn('location.replace failed, falling back to location.href', replaceError);
+                        preOpened.location.href = authUrl;
+                    }
+                    popup = preOpened;
+                }
+                else {
+                    popup = this.openCenteredPopup(authUrl, 'Oxy Sign In', width, height);
+                }
                 if (!popup) {
                     throw new OxyServices_errors_1.OxyAuthenticationError('Popup blocked. Please allow popups for this site and try again.');
                 }
@@ -224,6 +254,36 @@ function OxyServicesPopupAuthMixin(Base) {
                     document.body.removeChild(iframe);
                 }
             }
+            /**
+             * Open a blank, centered popup window SYNCHRONOUSLY.
+             *
+             * Use this in a click (or other user-gesture) handler BEFORE any `await`
+             * to capture the transient user-activation. Pass the returned handle into
+             * `signInWithPopup({ popup })` once the async portion of the flow runs.
+             *
+             * Returns `null` if the browser's popup blocker rejected the open.
+             *
+             * @example
+             * ```typescript
+             * const onSignInClick = () => {
+             *   const popup = oxyServices.openBlankPopup();
+             *   (async () => {
+             *     const silent = await oxyServices.silentSignInWithFedCM();
+             *     if (silent) { popup?.close(); return; }
+             *     await oxyServices.signInWithPopup({ popup });
+             *   })();
+             * };
+             * ```
+             */
+            openBlankPopup(width, height) {
+                if (typeof window === 'undefined') {
+                    return null;
+                }
+                const ctor = this.constructor;
+                const w = width ?? ctor.POPUP_WIDTH;
+                const h = height ?? ctor.POPUP_HEIGHT;
+                return this.openCenteredPopup('about:blank', 'Oxy Sign In', w, h);
+            }
             /**
              * Open a centered popup window
              *

package/dist/cjs/mixins/OxyServices.user.js

@@ -218,6 +218,24 @@ function OxyServicesUserMixin(Base) {
                 throw this.handleError(error);
             }
         }
+        /**
+         * Update the authenticated user's notification preferences.
+         *
+         * Thin wrapper over `updateProfile` that constrains the patch to known
+         * notification channels — same persistence path, same cache invalidation,
+         * but type-safe at the call site.
+         */
+        async updateNotificationPreferences(preferences) {
+            return this.updateProfile({ notificationPreferences: preferences });
+        }
+        /**
+         * Update the authenticated user's general preferences (language, theme,
+         * reduce-motion, timezone). Persisted on the User document via
+         * `PUT /users/me` — same cache-invalidation behaviour as `updateProfile`.
+         */
+        async updateUserPreferences(preferences) {
+            return this.updateProfile({ userPreferences: preferences });
+        }
         /**
          * Request account verification
          */

package/dist/cjs/utils/accountUtils.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
  * Used by both @oxyhq/services (React Native) and @oxyhq/auth (Web) account stores.
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.createQuickAccount = exports.buildAccountsArray = exports.getAccountFallbackHandle = exports.getAccountDisplayName = exports.formatPublicKeyHandle = void 0;
+exports.getAccountColor = exports.mergeAccountsFromRefreshAll = exports.createQuickAccount = exports.buildAccountsArray = exports.getAccountFallbackHandle = exports.getAccountDisplayName = exports.formatPublicKeyHandle = void 0;
 const i18n_1 = require("../i18n");
 /**
  * Truncate a long public key for display, e.g. `0x12345678…`.
@@ -116,3 +116,66 @@ const createQuickAccount = (sessionId, userData, existingAccount, getFileDownloa
     };
 };
 exports.createQuickAccount = createQuickAccount;
+/**
+ * Merge a fresh `/auth/refresh-all` snapshot into an existing QuickAccount
+ * list, preserving any cached fields (`avatarUrl`) for slots that didn't
+ * change. The fresh response is canonical: the resulting list contains EXACTLY
+ * the slots present in `fresh`, sorted by `authuser` ascending. Stale stored
+ * accounts that no longer appear in `fresh` are dropped (the server already
+ * authoritatively cleared the corresponding cookie).
+ *
+ * @param stored Previously persisted QuickAccount list (any order).
+ * @param fresh Server's authoritative refresh-all response.
+ * @returns Canonical merged list, sorted by `authuser` asc.
+ */
+const mergeAccountsFromRefreshAll = (stored, fresh) => {
+    const storedByAuthuser = new Map();
+    if (stored) {
+        for (const account of stored) {
+            if (typeof account.authuser === 'number') {
+                storedByAuthuser.set(account.authuser, account);
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    const merged = fresh.map((entry) => {
+        const previous = storedByAuthuser.get(entry.authuser);
+        // `entry.user` is null on the SDK legacy-fallback path; preserve any
+        // previously cached identity for that slot rather than overwriting
+        // it with blanks, and let the AuthManager's getCurrentUser() hydration
+        // refresh it on the next snapshot.
+        const wireUser = entry.user;
+        const username = wireUser?.username ?? previous?.username ?? '';
+        const displayName = (0, exports.getAccountDisplayName)({
+            name: wireUser?.name,
+            username,
+        });
+        const avatar = wireUser?.avatar ?? previous?.avatar ?? undefined;
+        const avatarUrl = previous && previous.avatar === avatar ? previous.avatarUrl : undefined;
+        return {
+            sessionId: entry.sessionId,
+            userId: wireUser?.id ?? previous?.userId,
+            username,
+            displayName,
+            avatar,
+            avatarUrl,
+            authuser: entry.authuser,
+            color: wireUser?.color ?? previous?.color ?? null,
+        };
+    });
+    merged.sort((a, b) => {
+        const aIdx = a.authuser ?? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;
+        const bIdx = b.authuser ?? Number.POSITIVE_INFINITY;
+        return aIdx - bIdx;
+    });
+    return merged;
+};
+exports.mergeAccountsFromRefreshAll = mergeAccountsFromRefreshAll;
+/**
+ * Return the account's preferred Bloom color preset, or `null` if it has no
+ * preference. Centralises the `color ?? null` normalisation so consumers can
+ * drive per-account theming without duplicating the nullish-handling.
+ */
+const getAccountColor = (account) => {
+    return account.color ?? null;
+};
+exports.getAccountColor = getAccountColor;

package/dist/cjs/utils/coldBoot.js

@@ -0,0 +1,71 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * coldBoot — a pure, ordered, short-circuit runner for "cold boot"
+ * authentication resolution.
+ *
+ * On a fresh page load / app launch the SDK may have several ways to recover an
+ * existing session (silent FedCM, a persisted refresh token, a cross-domain
+ * claim, an explicit popup flow, …). They must be attempted in a *deterministic
+ * order*, and the FIRST one that yields a session wins — every later step is
+ * skipped. This module encodes exactly that contract and nothing else.
+ *
+ * Design constraints (all enforced):
+ *   - PURE: no DOM, no `navigator`, no `window`, no React, no platform globals.
+ *   - NO module-level mutable state. Every call to {@link runColdBoot} is fully
+ *     self-contained, so it is safe under bundler re-evaluation (e.g. the Metro
+ *     web bundle, which is precisely why the FedCM silent-SSO guard had to live
+ *     in consumers rather than a core singleton).
+ *   - Architecture-agnostic: both candidate cross-domain SSO designs consume
+ *     this same primitive; it knows nothing about HOW a step resolves a session.
+ *
+ * A step is skipped (without running) when its `enabled` predicate returns
+ * false. Any thrown error — from either `enabled` or `run` — is reported via
+ * `onStepError` and treated as a non-fatal skip, so one broken recovery path
+ * can never prevent a later, healthy one from succeeding.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.runColdBoot = runColdBoot;
+/**
+ * Run the ordered cold-boot steps and resolve to the first recovered session,
+ * or `unauthenticated` if none recovers one.
+ *
+ * Semantics:
+ *   1. Iterate `steps` in order.
+ *   2. If a step has an `enabled` predicate, call it inside try/catch:
+ *      - throw → report via `onStepError(id, err)` → treat as disabled → continue.
+ *      - returns false → continue (skip, `run` not called).
+ *   3. Otherwise await `step.run()` inside try/catch:
+ *      - throw → report via `onStepError(id, err)` → continue.
+ *      - `{ kind: 'session' }` → return `{ kind: 'session', via: step.id, session }`.
+ *      - `{ kind: 'skip' }` → continue.
+ *   4. After the loop with no winner → `{ kind: 'unauthenticated' }`.
+ */
+async function runColdBoot(options) {
+    const { steps, onStepError } = options;
+    for (const step of steps) {
+        if (step.enabled) {
+            let isEnabled;
+            try {
+                isEnabled = step.enabled();
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                onStepError?.(step.id, error);
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (!isEnabled)
+                continue;
+        }
+        let result;
+        try {
+            result = await step.run();
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            onStepError?.(step.id, error);
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (result.kind === 'session') {
+            return { kind: 'session', via: step.id, session: result.session };
+        }
+    }
+    return { kind: 'unauthenticated' };
+}

package/dist/cjs/utils/fapiAutoDetect.js

@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Auto-detect the FAPI (IdP) URL from the current browser hostname.
+ *
+ * This is the canonical cross-domain IdP-resolution primitive for the Oxy
+ * ecosystem. Both candidate cross-domain SSO designs derive `auth.<rp-apex>`
+ * through this helper; do not fork it.
+ *
+ * Clerk-style multi-domain SSO depends on the IdP being reachable on a
+ * subdomain of the RP's own apex (e.g. `auth.mention.earth` CNAMEd to the
+ * central Oxy IdP). That way every FedCM endpoint, the session cookie,
+ * and any popup/redirect target are same-site with the RP — the only way
+ * to get first-party cookies in Safari ITP and Firefox Total Cookie
+ * Protection.
+ *
+ * This helper computes `https://auth.<rp-apex>` from
+ * `window.location.hostname` so a consuming app doesn't have to pass
+ * `authWebUrl` explicitly. Returns `undefined` for environments where
+ * auto-detection would be wrong:
+ *
+ *   - SSR / non-browser (no `window`).
+ *   - `localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, IPv4/IPv6 literals.
+ *   - Hostnames with fewer than two labels.
+ *   - Hostnames whose trailing two labels form a known multi-part public
+ *     suffix (e.g. `co.uk`), where the naive `labels.slice(-2)` apex would be
+ *     an attacker-registrable suffix like `auth.co.uk` rather than the real
+ *     registrable domain.
+ *
+ * When the page is already loaded ON the IdP itself (`auth.<anything>`),
+ * the helper returns the current origin so the SDK keeps everything
+ * same-origin instead of hopping to a different IdP host.
+ *
+ * The IdP backend independently derives `iss`, `provider_urls`, and the
+ * `fedcm.json` icon URLs from the request host
+ * (`packages/auth/server/index.ts`), so an honest CNAME pair is all that
+ * is required for end-to-end FedCM correctness — no per-RP config.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.autoDetectAuthWebUrl = autoDetectAuthWebUrl;
+/**
+ * Known multi-part public suffixes where the registrable domain is the LAST
+ * THREE labels, not two. Deriving an apex from `labels.slice(-2)` against any
+ * of these would yield an attacker-registrable suffix (e.g. `auth.co.uk`),
+ * so we bail out instead.
+ *
+ * This is intentionally a small, explicit allow-list rather than the full
+ * Public Suffix List — it covers the suffixes the Oxy ecosystem's RPs use.
+ * Any multi-part-TLD RP MUST extend this set (or wire in a proper PSL check)
+ * before relying on this helper, otherwise auto-detection silently bails to
+ * `undefined` and the consumer must pass `authWebUrl` explicitly.
+ */
+const MULTIPART_TLDS = new Set([
+    'co.uk',
+    'com.au',
+    'co.jp',
+    'co.nz',
+    'com.br',
+    'co.za',
+    'com.mx',
+    'co.in',
+    'co.kr',
+    'com.sg',
+]);
+function autoDetectAuthWebUrl(location = typeof window !== 'undefined' ? window.location : undefined) {
+    if (!location)
+        return undefined;
+    const { hostname, protocol } = location;
+    if (!hostname)
+        return undefined;
+    if (protocol !== 'https:' && protocol !== 'http:')
+        return undefined;
+    if (hostname === 'localhost' || hostname === '127.0.0.1')
+        return undefined;
+    if (/^\d+\.\d+\.\d+\.\d+$/.test(hostname))
+        return undefined;
+    if (hostname.startsWith('['))
+        return undefined;
+    if (hostname.startsWith('auth.')) {
+        return `${protocol}//${hostname}`;
+    }
+    const labels = hostname.split('.');
+    if (labels.length < 2)
+        return undefined;
+    if (MULTIPART_TLDS.has(labels.slice(-2).join('.')))
+        return undefined;
+    const apex = labels.slice(-2).join('.');
+    return `${protocol}//auth.${apex}`;
+}