@oxyhq/core 1.11.12 → 1.11.13

package/dist/cjs/crypto/keyManager.js

@@ -5,48 +5,46 @@
  * Handles secure generation, storage, and retrieval of cryptographic keys.
  * Private keys are stored securely using expo-secure-store and never leave the device.
  */
-var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
-    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
-      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
-    }
-    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
-}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    o[k2] = m[k];
-}));
-var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
-    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
-}) : function(o, v) {
-    o["default"] = v;
-});
-var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
-    var ownKeys = function(o) {
-        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
-            var ar = [];
-            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
-            return ar;
-        };
-        return ownKeys(o);
-    };
-    return function (mod) {
-        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
-        var result = {};
-        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
-        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
-        return result;
-    };
-})();
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.KeyManager = void 0;
+exports.KeyManager = exports.IdentityPersistError = exports.IdentityAlreadyExistsError = void 0;
 const elliptic_1 = require("elliptic");
 const platform_1 = require("../utils/platform");
+const platformCrypto_1 = require("../utils/platformCrypto");
 const loggerUtils_1 = require("../utils/loggerUtils");
 const debugUtils_1 = require("../shared/utils/debugUtils");
-// Lazy imports for React Native specific modules
-let SecureStore = null;
-let ExpoCrypto = null;
+/**
+ * Thrown when an identity-mutating operation (createIdentity / importKeyPair)
+ * is invoked while a valid identity already exists on the device.
+ *
+ * The local private key IS the user's identity — overwriting it without
+ * explicit consent permanently loses access to their account (unless
+ * they previously saved their recovery phrase). This error forces callers
+ * to make an explicit, audited decision instead of silently clobbering.
+ */
+class IdentityAlreadyExistsError extends Error {
+    constructor(existingPublicKey) {
+        super('An identity already exists on this device. Refusing to overwrite without explicit consent. ' +
+            'If you really want to replace it, ensure the user has saved their recovery phrase, then call ' +
+            'the operation with { overwrite: true }.');
+        this.name = 'IdentityAlreadyExistsError';
+        this.existingPublicKey = existingPublicKey;
+    }
+}
+exports.IdentityAlreadyExistsError = IdentityAlreadyExistsError;
+/**
+ * Thrown when a freshly written identity cannot be read back, parsed, or
+ * round-tripped through sign/verify. Indicates a storage failure or
+ * corruption that would otherwise silently leave the user with an
+ * unusable account.
+ */
+class IdentityPersistError extends Error {
+    constructor(message, cause) {
+        super(message);
+        this.cause = cause;
+        this.name = 'IdentityPersistError';
+    }
+}
+exports.IdentityPersistError = IdentityPersistError;
 const ec = new elliptic_1.ec('secp256k1');
 const STORAGE_KEYS = {
     PRIVATE_KEY: 'oxy_identity_private_key',
@@ -73,24 +71,22 @@ const IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP = 'group.com.oxy.shared';
 const ANDROID_ACCOUNT_TYPE = 'com.oxy.account';
 /**
  * Initialize React Native specific modules
- * This allows the module to work in both Node.js and React Native environments
+ *
+ * Delegates to `platformCrypto`, which is a per-platform module
+ * (`platformCrypto.ts` vs `platformCrypto.react-native.ts`) selected by the
+ * consumer's bundler. On RN it returns a statically-imported handle to
+ * `expo-secure-store`; off RN it throws (and is never called because every
+ * caller is gated by `isWebPlatform()` / native-only paths).
  */
 async function initSecureStore() {
-    if (!SecureStore) {
-        try {
-            // Variable indirection prevents bundlers (Vite, webpack) from statically resolving this
-            const moduleName = 'expo-secure-store';
-            SecureStore = await Promise.resolve(`${moduleName}`).then(s => __importStar(require(s)));
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
-            throw new Error(`Failed to load expo-secure-store: ${errorMessage}. Make sure expo-secure-store is installed and properly configured.`);
-        }
+    try {
+        return await (0, platformCrypto_1.loadSecureStore)();
     }
-    if (!SecureStore) {
-        throw new Error('expo-secure-store module is not available');
+    catch (error) {
+        const errorMessage = error instanceof Error ? error.message : String(error);
+        throw new Error(`Failed to load expo-secure-store: ${errorMessage}. ` +
+            'Make sure expo-secure-store is installed and properly configured.');
     }
-    return SecureStore;
 }
 /**
  * Check if we're on web platform
@@ -100,12 +96,8 @@ function isWebPlatform() {
     return (0, platform_1.isWeb)();
 }
 async function initExpoCrypto() {
-    if (!ExpoCrypto) {
-        // Variable indirection prevents bundlers (Vite, webpack) from statically resolving this
-        const moduleName = 'expo-crypto';
-        ExpoCrypto = await Promise.resolve(`${moduleName}`).then(s => __importStar(require(s)));
-    }
-    return ExpoCrypto;
+    // Same per-platform delegation as initSecureStore — see comment there.
+    return (0, platformCrypto_1.loadExpoCrypto)();
 }
 /**
  * Convert Uint8Array to hexadecimal string
@@ -125,15 +117,19 @@ async function getSecureRandomBytes(length) {
         const Crypto = await initExpoCrypto();
         return Crypto.getRandomBytes(length);
     }
-    // In Node.js, use Node's crypto module
-    // Variable indirection prevents bundlers (Vite, webpack) from statically resolving this
+    // In Node.js, use Node's crypto module.
+    //
+    // `loadNodeCrypto` is per-platform: the default variant performs
+    // `await import('crypto')`, the RN variant throws (and we'd never reach
+    // here on RN because the early-return above caught it).
     try {
-        const cryptoModuleName = 'crypto';
-        const nodeCrypto = await Promise.resolve(`${cryptoModuleName}`).then(s => __importStar(require(s)));
+        const nodeCrypto = await (0, platformCrypto_1.loadNodeCrypto)();
         return new Uint8Array(nodeCrypto.randomBytes(length));
     }
     catch (error) {
-        // Fallback to expo-crypto if Node crypto fails
+        // Fallback to expo-crypto if Node crypto fails (defensive — should not
+        // happen on real Node, but the platform-detection edge cases are
+        // surprisingly varied).
         const Crypto = await initExpoCrypto();
         return Crypto.getRandomBytes(length);
     }
@@ -155,14 +151,32 @@ class KeyManager {
         KeyManager.cachedSharedPublicKey = null;
         KeyManager.cachedHasSharedIdentity = null;
     }
+    /**
+     * Lowercase and pad to canonical 64-hex-char form.
+     *
+     * Tolerates the 1-in-256 leading-zero-strip that elliptic's
+     * `getPrivate('hex')` produces, and the externally-imported uppercase-hex
+     * legacy keys. EVERY `ec.keyFromPrivate(...)` call site in this file must
+     * canonicalize first so that derivation is stable regardless of storage
+     * representation.
+     *
+     * Private (used only inside KeyManager) — public consumers should not need
+     * to think about hex representation.
+     */
+    static canonicalPrivateKey(key) {
+        return key.toLowerCase().padStart(64, '0');
+    }
     /**
      * Generate a new ECDSA secp256k1 key pair
      * Returns the keys in hexadecimal format
      */
     static generateKeyPairSync() {
         const keyPair = ec.genKeyPair();
+        // Pad to canonical 64 hex chars. `elliptic`'s `getPrivate('hex')` strips
+        // leading zero bytes which would otherwise corrupt strict-length checks
+        // and signature derivation on the read path.
         return {
-            privateKey: keyPair.getPrivate('hex'),
+            privateKey: keyPair.getPrivate('hex').padStart(64, '0'),
             publicKey: keyPair.getPublic('hex'),
         };
     }
@@ -172,9 +186,9 @@ class KeyManager {
     static async generateKeyPair() {
         const randomBytes = await getSecureRandomBytes(32);
         const privateKeyHex = uint8ArrayToHex(randomBytes);
-        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(privateKeyHex);
+        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKeyHex));
         return {
-            privateKey: keyPair.getPrivate('hex'),
+            privateKey: keyPair.getPrivate('hex').padStart(64, '0'),
             publicKey: keyPair.getPublic('hex'),
         };
     }
@@ -205,13 +219,15 @@ class KeyManager {
             // iOS: Store in shared keychain group
             // Note: keychainAccessGroup requires Keychain Sharing capability in Xcode
             try {
-                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, privateKey, {
+                const privateOpts = {
                     keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP, // This enables sharing across apps
-                }); // Type assertion: keychainAccessGroup may not be in older @types but is supported
-                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey, {
+                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP, // Enables sharing across apps
+                };
+                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, privateKey, privateOpts);
+                const publicOpts = {
                     keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
+                };
+                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey, publicOpts);
             }
             catch (error) {
                 throw new Error(`Failed to create shared identity on iOS. Ensure your app has the Keychain Sharing capability enabled with access group "${IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP}". Error: ${error}`);
@@ -250,9 +266,8 @@ class KeyManager {
             const store = await initSecureStore();
             let publicKey = null;
             if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
-                publicKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, {
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
+                const opts = { keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP };
+                publicKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, opts);
             }
             else if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)()) {
                 publicKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY);
@@ -285,9 +300,8 @@ class KeyManager {
             const store = await initSecureStore();
             let privateKey = null;
             if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
-                privateKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, {
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
+                const opts = { keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP };
+                privateKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, opts);
             }
             else if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)()) {
                 privateKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY);
@@ -345,19 +359,25 @@ class KeyManager {
             throw new Error('Shared identity import is only available on native platforms.');
         }
         const store = await initSecureStore();
-        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(privateKey);
+        // Canonicalize incoming key BEFORE storage so the stored value is always
+        // in canonical 64-hex-char lowercase form going forward. Without this,
+        // legacy short keys would derive a different public key on the read path.
+        const canonicalPrivate = KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey);
+        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(canonicalPrivate);
         const publicKey = keyPair.getPublic('hex');
         if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
-            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, privateKey, {
+            const privateOpts = {
                 keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
                 keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-            });
-            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey, {
+            };
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, canonicalPrivate, privateOpts);
+            const publicOpts = {
                 keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-            });
+            };
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey, publicOpts);
         }
         else if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)()) {
-            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, privateKey, {
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PRIVATE_KEY, canonicalPrivate, {
                 keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
             });
             await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey);
@@ -387,13 +407,15 @@ class KeyManager {
         try {
             const store = await initSecureStore();
             if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
-                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, sessionId, {
+                const sessionIdOpts = {
                     keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
-                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN, accessToken, {
+                };
+                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, sessionId, sessionIdOpts);
+                const tokenOpts = {
                     keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED,
                     keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
+                };
+                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN, accessToken, tokenOpts);
             }
             else if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)()) {
                 await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, sessionId);
@@ -427,12 +449,9 @@ class KeyManager {
             let sessionId = null;
             let accessToken = null;
             if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
-                sessionId = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, {
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
-                accessToken = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN, {
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
+                const opts = { keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP };
+                sessionId = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, opts);
+                accessToken = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN, opts);
             }
             else if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)()) {
                 sessionId = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID);
@@ -463,12 +482,9 @@ class KeyManager {
         try {
             const store = await initSecureStore();
             if ((0, platform_1.isIOS)()) {
-                await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, {
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
-                await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN, {
-                    keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP,
-                });
+                const opts = { keychainAccessGroup: IOS_KEYCHAIN_GROUP };
+                await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID, opts);
+                await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_TOKEN, opts);
             }
             else if ((0, platform_1.isAndroid)()) {
                 await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.SHARED_SESSION_ID);
@@ -530,41 +546,174 @@ class KeyManager {
     }
     // ==================== END SHARED IDENTITY METHODS ====================
     /**
-     * Generate and securely store a new key pair on the device
-     * Returns only the public key (private key is stored securely)
+     * Atomically persist a key pair to secure storage with verification + backup.
+     *
+     * Write order is critical:
+     *   1. Backup (BACKUP_PRIVATE_KEY + BACKUP_PUBLIC_KEY + BACKUP_TIMESTAMP)
+     *   2. Primary public key
+     *   3. Primary private key (last so a partial write leaves us in a known
+     *      "no identity yet" state — easier to retry than a half-written one)
+     *   4. Read back + sign/verify to confirm the storage round-trip works
+     *
+     * If any step throws, the caller sees the error AND any partial state is
+     * cleaned up so the device is left either fully consistent or fully empty.
+     * It never leaves an unusable half-identity that would fool `hasIdentity()`.
+     *
+     * @internal
      */
-    static async createIdentity() {
+    static async _persistIdentityAtomic(privateKey, publicKey) {
+        const store = await initSecureStore();
+        // Canonicalize BEFORE persistence so the stored value is always in
+        // canonical 64-hex-char lowercase form going forward. This is the single
+        // place all primary writes flow through, so once a value lands here all
+        // subsequent reads see a stable representation.
+        const canonicalPrivate = KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey);
+        const canonicalPublic = publicKey.toLowerCase();
+        // Step 1: Backup BEFORE touching primary storage so we always have a
+        // recoverable copy even if the device crashes mid-write. Store the
+        // backup in canonical form too so a backup-restore cycle preserves
+        // canonicalization.
+        try {
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_PRIVATE_KEY, canonicalPrivate, {
+                keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
+            });
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_PUBLIC_KEY, canonicalPublic);
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_TIMESTAMP, Date.now().toString());
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to write identity backup before primary', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+            throw new IdentityPersistError('Failed to write identity backup', error);
+        }
+        // Step 2 + 3: Write primary keys. Public first so that if private write
+        // fails we are still missing the most critical bit.
+        try {
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY, canonicalPublic);
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY, canonicalPrivate, {
+                keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
+            });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to write primary identity to secure store', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+            // Roll back the public-key half-write so hasIdentity() doesn't lie later.
+            try {
+                await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY);
+            }
+            catch { /* best effort */ }
+            try {
+                await store.deleteItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY);
+            }
+            catch { /* best effort */ }
+            throw new IdentityPersistError('Failed to write identity to secure store', error);
+        }
+        // Step 4: Verify round-trip. If the store silently drops our writes
+        // (e.g., a misconfigured keychain access group), we MUST surface it
+        // before declaring success — otherwise the caller will think the
+        // identity was saved and discard the in-memory copy.
+        let readBackPrivate;
+        let readBackPublic;
+        try {
+            readBackPrivate = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY);
+            readBackPublic = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to read identity back after write', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+            throw new IdentityPersistError('Failed to verify identity after write', error);
+        }
+        // Hex comparisons are case-insensitive — normalize on both sides so a
+        // store that uppercases on round-trip (some keychain backends) doesn't
+        // trigger a spurious mismatch.
+        if (readBackPrivate?.toLowerCase() !== canonicalPrivate ||
+            readBackPublic?.toLowerCase() !== canonicalPublic) {
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Identity round-trip mismatch after write', undefined, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+            throw new IdentityPersistError('Identity write was not persisted correctly (round-trip mismatch).');
+        }
+        // Final sanity: derive public from the stored private and confirm the
+        // pair signs/verifies cleanly. Catches a (theoretical) elliptic library
+        // corruption immediately rather than the next time the user tries to
+        // sign in.
+        try {
+            const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(readBackPrivate));
+            const derived = keyPair.getPublic('hex');
+            if (derived.toLowerCase() !== readBackPublic.toLowerCase()) {
+                throw new IdentityPersistError('Stored public key does not match derived public key.');
+            }
+            // Sign/verify roundtrip using a known test vector
+            const probeHash = '0'.repeat(64);
+            const signature = keyPair.sign(probeHash);
+            if (!keyPair.verify(probeHash, signature)) {
+                throw new IdentityPersistError('Sign/verify roundtrip failed for newly stored identity.');
+            }
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            if (error instanceof IdentityPersistError)
+                throw error;
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Identity sign/verify probe failed', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+            throw new IdentityPersistError('Stored identity failed crypto self-test', error);
+        }
+        // Update cache only after we are certain the identity is durable.
+        KeyManager.cachedPublicKey = canonicalPublic;
+        KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = true;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Generate and securely store a new key pair on the device.
+     *
+     * Refuses to overwrite an existing identity unless `options.overwrite === true`.
+     * Returns the public key. The private key never leaves secure storage.
+     *
+     * @throws IdentityAlreadyExistsError if an identity already exists and overwrite is not set
+     * @throws IdentityPersistError if the key cannot be durably written
+     */
+    static async createIdentity(options) {
         if (isWebPlatform()) {
             throw new Error('Identity creation is only available on native platforms (iOS/Android). Please use the native app to create your identity.');
         }
-        const store = await initSecureStore();
+        // CRITICAL SAFEGUARD: never silently overwrite an existing identity.
+        // The local key IS the account — clobbering it without consent is
+        // catastrophic. Callers must opt in explicitly when they have already
+        // confirmed (via UI) that the user has saved their recovery phrase.
+        if (!options?.overwrite) {
+            const existing = await KeyManager.getPublicKey();
+            if (existing) {
+                throw new IdentityAlreadyExistsError(existing);
+            }
+        }
         const { privateKey, publicKey } = await KeyManager.generateKeyPair();
-        await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY, privateKey, {
-            keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
-        });
-        await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey);
-        // Update cache
-        KeyManager.cachedPublicKey = publicKey;
-        KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = true;
+        await KeyManager._persistIdentityAtomic(privateKey, publicKey);
         return publicKey;
     }
     /**
-     * Import an existing key pair (e.g., from recovery phrase)
+     * Import an existing key pair (e.g., from recovery phrase).
+     *
+     * Refuses to overwrite an existing identity unless `options.overwrite === true`.
+     *
+     * @throws IdentityAlreadyExistsError if an identity already exists and overwrite is not set
+     * @throws IdentityPersistError if the key cannot be durably written
      */
-    static async importKeyPair(privateKey) {
+    static async importKeyPair(privateKey, options) {
         if (isWebPlatform()) {
             throw new Error('Identity import is only available on native platforms (iOS/Android). Please use the native app to import your identity.');
         }
-        const store = await initSecureStore();
-        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(privateKey);
+        if (!KeyManager.isValidPrivateKey(privateKey)) {
+            throw new Error('Invalid private key supplied to importKeyPair.');
+        }
+        // Canonicalize the incoming private key so the stored value (and the
+        // derived public key) are always in canonical form. Without this, an
+        // externally-imported short or uppercase key would derive one public
+        // key here and a different one when later read back unpadded.
+        const canonicalPrivate = KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey);
+        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(canonicalPrivate);
         const publicKey = keyPair.getPublic('hex');
-        await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY, privateKey, {
-            keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
-        });
-        await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY, publicKey);
-        // Update cache
-        KeyManager.cachedPublicKey = publicKey;
-        KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = true;
+        // Refuse silent overwrite — see createIdentity() for rationale.
+        if (!options?.overwrite) {
+            const existing = await KeyManager.getPublicKey();
+            if (existing && existing.toLowerCase() !== publicKey.toLowerCase()) {
+                throw new IdentityAlreadyExistsError(existing);
+            }
+            // If existing === publicKey, the device already has this exact identity;
+            // re-persisting is a no-op but harmless. Fall through to ensure backup
+            // is up to date.
+        }
+        await KeyManager._persistIdentityAtomic(canonicalPrivate, publicKey);
         return publicKey;
     }
     /**
@@ -616,7 +765,15 @@ class KeyManager {
         }
     }
     /**
-     * Check if an identity (key pair) exists on this device (cached for performance)
+     * Check if a complete, parseable identity exists on this device.
+     *
+     * Returns `true` only when BOTH the private and public keys are present,
+     * both are well-formed, AND the public key derives from the private key.
+     * A partially-written or corrupted identity returns `false` so that
+     * downstream code can resume the create / restore flow correctly.
+     *
+     * Note: this does NOT perform the full sign/verify roundtrip — call
+     * `verifyIdentityIntegrity()` for that.
      */
     static async hasIdentity() {
         if (isWebPlatform()) {
@@ -625,22 +782,75 @@ class KeyManager {
         if (KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity !== null) {
             return KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity;
         }
+        let privateKey;
+        let publicKey;
         try {
-            const privateKey = await KeyManager.getPrivateKey();
-            const hasIdentity = privateKey !== null;
-            // Cache result
-            KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = hasIdentity;
-            return hasIdentity;
+            const store = await initSecureStore();
+            [privateKey, publicKey] = await Promise.all([
+                store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY),
+                store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY),
+            ]);
         }
         catch (error) {
-            // If we can't check, assume no identity (safer default)
-            // Cache false to avoid repeated failed attempts
-            KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = false;
-            if ((0, debugUtils_1.isDev)()) {
-                loggerUtils_1.logger.warn('Failed to check identity', { component: 'KeyManager' }, error);
-            }
+            // Storage threw — could be a transient keychain lock (e.g., background
+            // fetch before the device is unlocked). Do NOT cache `false`: if we
+            // did, the next call would skip storage entirely and return false even
+            // after the device is unlocked. Just return false and let the next
+            // call retry from storage.
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to read identity from secure storage', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
             return false;
         }
+        // Storage succeeded. Now classify the result. From here onward, any
+        // outcome is stable and safe to cache (the bytes won't change between
+        // calls).
+        let hasIdentity = false;
+        if (privateKey && publicKey) {
+            // Require BOTH bytes-present AND parseable AND matching. Any weaker
+            // check would let a half-written identity (private without public)
+            // pretend to be a real one, which then fails opaquely later in the
+            // sign-in flow when SignatureService.sign() can't find the keypair.
+            if (KeyManager.isValidPrivateKey(privateKey) && KeyManager.isValidPublicKey(publicKey)) {
+                try {
+                    const derived = ec
+                        .keyFromPrivate(KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey))
+                        .getPublic('hex');
+                    // Hex equality is case-insensitive; normalize on both sides to
+                    // tolerate legacy uppercase-stored public keys.
+                    hasIdentity = derived.toLowerCase() === publicKey.toLowerCase();
+                    if (!hasIdentity) {
+                        loggerUtils_1.logger.warn('KeyManager.hasIdentity: stored public key does not match derived public key', { component: 'KeyManager' });
+                    }
+                }
+                catch (error) {
+                    loggerUtils_1.logger.warn('KeyManager.hasIdentity: failed to derive public key from stored private key', { component: 'KeyManager' }, error);
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.warn('KeyManager.hasIdentity: stored key material is malformed', { component: 'KeyManager' });
+            }
+        }
+        // Cache result. Storage succeeded, so this verdict is stable:
+        //   - true  → identity exists and round-trips cleanly
+        //   - false → storage is empty / partial / malformed (a stable result;
+        //             callers should run integrity-recovery / restore from
+        //             backup explicitly)
+        KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = hasIdentity;
+        if (hasIdentity && publicKey) {
+            KeyManager.cachedPublicKey = publicKey;
+        }
+        // Diagnostic breadcrumb (dev only). Logs lengths + validity flags so we
+        // can tell from `adb logcat` exactly WHY hasIdentity returned what it
+        // did. Never log the key material itself.
+        if ((0, debugUtils_1.isDev)()) {
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.debug('KeyManager.hasIdentity result', { component: 'KeyManager' }, {
+                privateLen: privateKey?.length ?? 0,
+                publicLen: publicKey?.length ?? 0,
+                privateValid: privateKey ? KeyManager.isValidPrivateKey(privateKey) : null,
+                publicValid: publicKey ? KeyManager.isValidPublicKey(publicKey) : null,
+                derived: hasIdentity,
+            });
+        }
+        return hasIdentity;
     }
     /**
      * Delete the stored identity (both keys)
@@ -726,7 +936,12 @@ class KeyManager {
         }
     }
     /**
-     * Verify identity integrity - checks if keys are valid and accessible
+     * Verify identity integrity — checks keys are valid, accessible, derive
+     * consistently, AND can sign + verify a probe message.
+     *
+     * Returns true only when the full sign/verify roundtrip succeeds. Use
+     * this on app start to detect silent corruption before the user finds
+     * out by failing to sign in.
      */
     static async verifyIdentityIntegrity() {
         if (isWebPlatform()) {
@@ -738,35 +953,49 @@ class KeyManager {
             if (!privateKey || !publicKey) {
                 return false;
             }
-            // Validate private key format
+            // Validate formats
             if (!KeyManager.isValidPrivateKey(privateKey)) {
                 return false;
             }
-            // Validate public key format
             if (!KeyManager.isValidPublicKey(publicKey)) {
                 return false;
             }
-            // Verify public key can be derived from private key
+            // Verify public key derives from private key (case-insensitive
+            // because hex is case-insensitive — legacy uppercase stored values
+            // must still validate).
             const derivedPublicKey = KeyManager.derivePublicKey(privateKey);
-            if (derivedPublicKey !== publicKey) {
+            if (derivedPublicKey.toLowerCase() !== publicKey.toLowerCase()) {
                 return false; // Keys don't match
             }
-            // Verify we can create a key pair object (tests elliptic curve operations)
-            const keyPair = await KeyManager.getKeyPairObject();
-            if (!keyPair) {
+            // Full sign/verify probe — proves the keypair is functional, not just
+            // bytewise parseable. A previous version of this method would return
+            // true even when the underlying elliptic curve state was wedged.
+            const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey));
+            const probeHash = '0'.repeat(64);
+            const signature = keyPair.sign(probeHash);
+            if (!keyPair.verify(probeHash, signature)) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Identity sign/verify probe failed during integrity check', undefined, { component: 'KeyManager' });
                 return false;
             }
             return true;
         }
         catch (error) {
-            if ((0, debugUtils_1.isDev)()) {
-                loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Identity integrity check failed', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
-            }
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Identity integrity check failed', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
             return false;
         }
     }
     /**
-     * Restore identity from backup if primary storage is corrupted
+     * Restore identity from backup if primary storage is corrupted.
+     *
+     * SAFETY: this method will NEVER overwrite a verifying primary identity.
+     * If the primary passes a sign/verify probe, the backup is left untouched
+     * and `false` is returned — this protects against a transient
+     * `verifyIdentityIntegrity()` blip clobbering valid keys with stale
+     * backup keys (e.g., from a previous account before an import).
+     *
+     * Additionally, if the backup public key does NOT match the (still-
+     * present-but-failing) primary public key, we refuse to overwrite — the
+     * backup may belong to a different identity entirely.
      */
     static async restoreIdentityFromBackup() {
         if (isWebPlatform()) {
@@ -774,6 +1003,13 @@ class KeyManager {
         }
         try {
             const store = await initSecureStore();
+            // First: if the primary still works, do nothing. Returning true here
+            // would be misleading; returning false (no restore needed) is the
+            // honest answer.
+            const primaryOk = await KeyManager.verifyIdentityIntegrity();
+            if (primaryOk) {
+                return false;
+            }
             // Check if backup exists
             const backupPrivateKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_PRIVATE_KEY);
             const backupPublicKey = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_PUBLIC_KEY);
@@ -781,35 +1017,42 @@ class KeyManager {
                 return false; // No backup available
             }
             // Verify backup integrity
-            if (!KeyManager.isValidPrivateKey(backupPrivateKey)) {
+            if (!KeyManager.isValidPrivateKey(backupPrivateKey) || !KeyManager.isValidPublicKey(backupPublicKey)) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.warn('Backup identity is malformed; refusing to restore', { component: 'KeyManager' });
                 return false;
             }
-            if (!KeyManager.isValidPublicKey(backupPublicKey)) {
+            // Verify backup keys derive consistently. Hex is case-insensitive so
+            // normalize both sides — a legacy uppercase-stored backup must still
+            // be considered valid.
+            const derivedPublicKey = KeyManager.derivePublicKey(backupPrivateKey);
+            if (derivedPublicKey.toLowerCase() !== backupPublicKey.toLowerCase()) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.warn('Backup public key does not match derived; refusing to restore', { component: 'KeyManager' });
                 return false;
             }
-            // Verify keys match
-            const derivedPublicKey = KeyManager.derivePublicKey(backupPrivateKey);
-            if (derivedPublicKey !== backupPublicKey) {
-                return false; // Backup keys don't match
+            // CRITICAL: if there is still a (broken) primary public key present
+            // that does NOT match the backup, the backup may be from a completely
+            // different identity. Better to surface a corrupted state than
+            // silently switch the user to a different account.
+            const currentPrimaryPublic = await store.getItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY).catch(() => null);
+            if (currentPrimaryPublic &&
+                currentPrimaryPublic.toLowerCase() !== backupPublicKey.toLowerCase()) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Primary identity is corrupted AND does not match the backup. Refusing to restore to avoid switching accounts.', undefined, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+                return false;
             }
-            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PRIVATE_KEY, backupPrivateKey, {
-                keychainAccessible: store.WHEN_UNLOCKED_THIS_DEVICE_ONLY,
-            });
-            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.PUBLIC_KEY, backupPublicKey);
-            const restored = await KeyManager.verifyIdentityIntegrity();
-            if (restored) {
-                // Update cache
-                KeyManager.cachedPublicKey = backupPublicKey;
-                KeyManager.cachedHasIdentity = true;
-                await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_TIMESTAMP, Date.now().toString());
-                return true;
+            // Safe to restore: rebuild the primary using the same atomic write
+            // path createIdentity uses, including verification.
+            try {
+                await KeyManager._persistIdentityAtomic(backupPrivateKey, backupPublicKey);
             }
-            return false;
+            catch (error) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to persist identity restored from backup', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
+                return false;
+            }
+            await store.setItemAsync(STORAGE_KEYS.BACKUP_TIMESTAMP, Date.now().toString());
+            return true;
         }
         catch (error) {
-            if ((0, debugUtils_1.isDev)()) {
-                loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to restore identity from backup', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
-            }
+            loggerUtils_1.logger.error('Failed to restore identity from backup', error, { component: 'KeyManager' });
             return false;
         }
     }
@@ -824,38 +1067,99 @@ class KeyManager {
         const privateKey = await KeyManager.getPrivateKey();
         if (!privateKey)
             return null;
-        return ec.keyFromPrivate(privateKey);
+        return ec.keyFromPrivate(KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey));
     }
     /**
      * Derive public key from a private key (without storing)
      */
     static derivePublicKey(privateKey) {
-        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(privateKey);
+        const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(KeyManager.canonicalPrivateKey(privateKey));
         return keyPair.getPublic('hex');
     }
     /**
      * Validate that a string is a valid public key
+     *
+     * Returns false on parse errors (invalid input is the expected fail mode here).
+     * Errors are logged at debug level so they're available when troubleshooting
+     * but don't pollute production logs.
      */
     static isValidPublicKey(publicKey) {
+        if (typeof publicKey !== 'string' || publicKey.length === 0) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // secp256k1 public keys are either uncompressed (130 hex chars, starts with 04)
+        // or compressed (66 hex chars, starts with 02 or 03). Anything else is
+        // clearly bogus; reject up front so we never silently widen the trust
+        // boundary by accepting whatever BN(...) parses out of junk input.
+        if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(publicKey)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (publicKey.length !== 130 && publicKey.length !== 66) {
+            return false;
+        }
         try {
             ec.keyFromPublic(publicKey, 'hex');
             return true;
         }
-        catch {
+        catch (error) {
+            if ((0, debugUtils_1.isDev)()) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.debug('[oxy.crypto] isValidPublicKey rejected input', { component: 'KeyManager' }, error);
+            }
             return false;
         }
     }
     /**
-     * Validate that a string is a valid private key
+     * Validate that a string is a valid private key.
+     *
+     * secp256k1 private keys are 256-bit, so 64 hex chars. We require strict
+     * hex-only input because `elliptic`'s underlying `BN(input, 16)` happily
+     * accepts non-hex characters (treating them as zero), which would let
+     * "not-hex" pass through as a valid (but compromised, near-zero) key.
      */
     static isValidPrivateKey(privateKey) {
+        if (typeof privateKey !== 'string' || privateKey.length === 0) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(privateKey)) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        // secp256k1 private keys are 32 bytes (64 hex chars). `elliptic`'s
+        // `getPrivate('hex')` strips leading zero bytes, so a valid key whose
+        // leading byte is 0 ends up as 62 hex chars in storage. Accept any
+        // length from 1..64 here — we re-pad before deriving below — and
+        // reject longer than 64.
+        if (privateKey.length > 64) {
+            return false;
+        }
+        const padded = privateKey.padStart(64, '0').toLowerCase();
+        // After padding, require minimum entropy: reject obvious low-scalar
+        // keys. A scalar that fits in 8 hex chars (~32 bits of entropy) is a
+        // degenerate / accidental key, not a real one. The existing isZero()
+        // check below covers literal 0; this also rejects trivially small
+        // scalars like '1', '2', etc. that would otherwise pad to a valid but
+        // weak key whose public point is trivially derivable.
+        if (/^0{56}/.test(padded)) {
+            return false;
+        }
         try {
-            const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(privateKey);
+            const keyPair = ec.keyFromPrivate(padded);
+            const priv = keyPair.getPrivate();
+            // Private key must be > 0 and < curve order n. elliptic doesn't
+            // enforce this on keyFromPrivate, so we do it here.
+            if (priv.isZero() || priv.cmp(ec.curve.n) >= 0) {
+                return false;
+            }
             // Verify it can derive a public key
-            keyPair.getPublic('hex');
+            const pub = keyPair.getPublic('hex');
+            if (!pub || pub.length === 0) {
+                return false;
+            }
             return true;
         }
-        catch {
+        catch (error) {
+            if ((0, debugUtils_1.isDev)()) {
+                loggerUtils_1.logger.debug('[oxy.crypto] isValidPrivateKey rejected input', { component: 'KeyManager' }, error);
+            }
             return false;
         }
     }