@oxyhq/contracts 0.18.0 → 0.19.0

package/dist/esm/commonsSignIn.js

@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical contract for the "Sign in with Oxy" approval handoff.
+ *
+ * SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for the closed set of reasons an approver may attach
+ * when it DENIES a pending request via
+ * `POST /auth/session/deny/:authorizeCode`.
+ *
+ * That endpoint is UNAUTHENTICATED — the public `authorizeCode` is the only
+ * credential — so a free-form string from it is never stored: it would be an
+ * unauthenticated write of arbitrary text onto a record other surfaces read.
+ * The set is therefore deliberately tiny, and closed:
+ *
+ *  - `'declined'` the approver rejected a request they recognised ("Not now").
+ *  - `'not_me'`   the approver did not start the request ("This wasn't me").
+ *                 The ONE value that records the denial as suspicious rather
+ *                 than an ordinary cancel, so a UI may only offer it where the
+ *                 user genuinely said so.
+ *
+ * Why this lives in `@oxyhq/contracts` rather than in either consumer: the same
+ * closed set is enforced in three places — the request schema of the API route,
+ * the `enum` of the persisted `AuthSession.deniedReason` field, and the client
+ * SDK's `denyCommonsSignIn` parameter. Two hand-maintained copies of a wire
+ * contract drift the moment a value is added on one side only, and the failure
+ * lands at runtime, in an auth path, as a generic validation error. One
+ * declaration makes that impossible.
+ *
+ * Platform-agnostic — zod only, no react/react-native/expo. ESM-safe (no
+ * `require()`).
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/**
+ * The closed set, as a value — consumed directly where a runtime list is
+ * required (e.g. the Mongoose `enum` of `AuthSession.deniedReason`, which is
+ * the storage-level guarantee that an unauthenticated caller can never write
+ * free-form text into the field).
+ */
+export const COMMONS_DENY_REASONS = ['declined', 'not_me'];
+/**
+ * The same set as a zod enum — the edge validator. Anything outside it
+ * (including free-form text) is rejected with 400 before any handler runs.
+ */
+export const commonsDenyReasonSchema = z.enum(COMMONS_DENY_REASONS);
+/**
+ * Android notification channel id the identity-approval push is sent on.
+ *
+ * A wire contract for the same reason the deny set is: Android 8+ DROPS a
+ * notification whose channel id the app has not created, silently and with no
+ * client-side error. The API attaches this id when it sends, and the vault
+ * creates the channel with it before registering a push token — two hand-typed
+ * copies of that string would fail as "the notification never arrived", which
+ * is the single hardest push symptom to diagnose.
+ *
+ * The channel's user-visible NAME and description are deliberately NOT here:
+ * those are localized app copy, and the vault owns them.
+ */
+export const IDENTITY_APPROVAL_PUSH_CHANNEL = 'auth-approval';

package/dist/esm/deviceSession.js

@@ -57,28 +57,6 @@ export const deviceTokenMintResponseSchema = z.object({
     state: deviceSessionStateSchema,
 });
 /* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/*  Hub ticket — server-side cross-origin device credential sync               */
-/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
-/** Request body for `POST /session/device/hub-ticket`. */
-export const deviceHubTicketIssueRequestSchema = z.object({
-    returnOrigin: z.string().min(1),
-});
-/** Response from `POST /session/device/hub-ticket`. */
-export const deviceHubTicketIssueResponseSchema = z.object({
-    ticket: z.string().min(1),
-    expiresIn: z.number().int().positive(),
-});
-/** Request body for `POST /session/device/redeem-ticket`. */
-export const deviceHubTicketRedeemRequestSchema = z.object({
-    ticket: z.string().min(1),
-    returnOrigin: z.string().min(1),
-});
-/** Response from `POST /session/device/redeem-ticket`. */
-export const deviceHubTicketRedeemResponseSchema = z.object({
-    deviceId: z.string().min(1),
-    deviceSecret: z.string().min(1),
-});
-/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
 /*  Instant cross-app session sync (token-free socket signal)                 */
 /* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
 /**

package/dist/esm/inboxPush.js

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+/**
+ * Canonical contract for Inbox new-mail push notifications.
+ *
+ * The Android channel id and payload `type` are wire contracts: Android 8+
+ * drops a notification whose channel the app has not created, and the client
+ * only routes taps it recognises. Two hand-typed copies of either string fail as
+ * "the notification never arrived" or "tapping does nothing" — the hardest push
+ * symptoms to diagnose.
+ *
+ * Platform-agnostic — zod only, no react/react-native/expo.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/** Android notification channel id the new-mail push is sent on. */
+export const INBOX_EMAIL_PUSH_CHANNEL = 'email';
+/** Runtime type discriminator of the new-mail push payload. */
+export const INBOX_EMAIL_PUSH_TYPE = 'oxy_inbox_new_message';
+export const inboxEmailPushDataSchema = z.object({
+    type: z.literal(INBOX_EMAIL_PUSH_TYPE),
+    messageId: z.string().min(1),
+    mailboxId: z.string().min(1),
+});

package/dist/esm/index.js

@@ -19,6 +19,12 @@ export {
 // Schemas
 applicationTypeSchema, publicApplicationSchema, sessionStatusSchema, } from './sessionStatus.js';
 export { 
+// Closed set of denial reasons for POST /auth/session/deny/:authorizeCode —
+// shared by the API request schema, the persisted `AuthSession.deniedReason`
+// enum, and the SDK's `denyCommonsSignIn`.
+COMMONS_DENY_REASONS, commonsDenyReasonSchema, IDENTITY_APPROVAL_PUSH_CHANNEL, } from './commonsSignIn.js';
+export { INBOX_EMAIL_PUSH_CHANNEL, INBOX_EMAIL_PUSH_TYPE, inboxEmailPushDataSchema, } from './inboxPush.js';
+export { 
 // Schemas
 recommendationExcludeTypeSchema, recommendationBoostSchema, recommendationSignalWeightsSchema, recommendationRequestSchema, recommendationCountSchema, recommendationItemSchema, recommendationResponseSchema, appEndorsementInputSchema, appInterestInputSchema, appUserSignalIngestSchema, appAffinityEventTypeSchema, appAffinityEventSchema, appAffinityEventsIngestSchema, } from './recommendations.js';
 export { 
@@ -38,7 +44,7 @@ credentialRecordSchema, verifiableCredentialResponseSchema, credentialIssueResul
 export { 
 // Schemas
 linkPreviewSchema, linkPreviewBatchRequestSchema, linkPreviewBatchResponseSchema, linkPreviewResponseSchema, } from './links.js';
-export { sessionAccountSchema, deviceSessionStateSchema, activeTokenSchema, deviceSessionSyncSchema, deviceTokenMintRequestSchema, deviceTokenMintResponseSchema, deviceHubTicketIssueRequestSchema, deviceHubTicketIssueResponseSchema, deviceHubTicketRedeemRequestSchema, deviceHubTicketRedeemResponseSchema, SESSION_ACCOUNTS_CHANGED_EVENT, sessionAccountsChangedReasonSchema, sessionAccountsChangedEventSchema, } from './deviceSession.js';
+export { sessionAccountSchema, deviceSessionStateSchema, activeTokenSchema, deviceSessionSyncSchema, deviceTokenMintRequestSchema, deviceTokenMintResponseSchema, SESSION_ACCOUNTS_CHANGED_EVENT, sessionAccountsChangedReasonSchema, sessionAccountsChangedEventSchema, } from './deviceSession.js';
 export { 
 // Schemas
 loginResultSchema, } from './deviceBoot.js';