@oxyhq/contracts 0.16.0 → 0.18.0

package/dist/esm/devicePairing.js

@@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
+/**
+ * Device-to-device identity transfer contracts (b3 Feature 2 — "add a device").
+ *
+ * SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for the wire shape of the short-lived, unauthenticated
+ * relay that carries E2E-encrypted key material from an existing (old) device to
+ * a fresh (new) device so both end up holding the SAME secp256k1 private key
+ * (key cloning). The relay is E2E-encrypted via an ephemeral secp256k1 ECDH
+ * handshake: the server stores only the two ephemeral public keys plus an opaque
+ * AEAD ciphertext + nonce and NEVER holds a decryption key.
+ *
+ * Flow:
+ *  1. New device (no identity) generates an ephemeral pair and calls
+ *     `POST /identity/device-transfer/init { newEphPub, newDeviceLabel? }` →
+ *     `{ pairingId, expiresAt }`. The QR carries ONLY `pairingId` (not
+ *     self-contained — mirrors the QR sign-in `approve-info` resolution).
+ *  2. Old device (has identity) scans, resolves the request via
+ *     `GET /identity/device-transfer/:pairingId` (returns `newEphPub` + label),
+ *     derives `transferKey = HKDF(ECDH(oldEphPriv, newEphPub), pairingId,
+ *     'oxy-device-transfer-v1')`, AEAD-encrypts `{ privateKey, publicKey }`, and
+ *     calls `POST /identity/device-transfer/:pairingId/approve` with the
+ *     ciphertext PLUS a fresh signature over
+ *     `{ action:'approve_device_transfer', pairingId, timestamp }` made with the
+ *     CURRENT identity key (dual-proof: a bearer alone cannot exfiltrate the key).
+ *  3. New device (socket push or poll fallback) re-derives the same
+ *     `transferKey` from `ECDH(newEphPriv, oldEphPub)`, decrypts, and imports the
+ *     private key, then completes a NORMAL challenge/verify sign-in.
+ *
+ * The load-bearing response shapes are declared as explicit `interface`s (same
+ * `moduleResolution: node` rationale as `UserNameResponse` / the identity/civic
+ * contracts: a nested `z.infer<>` can degrade to `{}` under a consumer's
+ * `moduleResolution: "node"`), with the runtime schemas annotated
+ * `z.ZodType<Interface>`.
+ *
+ * Platform-agnostic — zod only, no react/react-native/expo, ESM-safe.
+ */
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*  Shared field validators                                                   */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/** Lowercase/uppercase hex string (no `0x` prefix). */
+const hexString = z
+    .string()
+    .trim()
+    .regex(/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/, 'must be a hex string');
+/**
+ * A secp256k1 public key, hex-encoded — compressed (`02`/`03` + 32 bytes = 66
+ * chars) or uncompressed (`04` + 64 bytes = 130 chars). The exact curve-point
+ * validity is re-checked server-side; this only bounds the shape/length.
+ */
+const publicKeyHex = hexString.min(66).max(130);
+/** DER-encoded ECDSA signature, hex (variable length, ~140–144 chars). */
+const signatureHex = hexString.min(2).max(256);
+/**
+ * The 24-byte XChaCha20-Poly1305 nonce, hex (exactly 48 chars). Matches
+ * `@oxyhq/core` `AEAD_NONCE_LENGTH` (24 bytes).
+ */
+const nonceHex = hexString.length(48);
+/**
+ * The AEAD ciphertext (Poly1305 tag appended), hex. The plaintext is the small
+ * JSON `{ privateKey, publicKey }` (~200 bytes), so the ciphertext stays well
+ * under the cap; the bound blunts relay-abuse via oversized blobs.
+ */
+const ciphertextHex = hexString.min(2).max(8192);
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*  Status                                                                    */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Pairing lifecycle:
+ *  - `pending`  — created by the new device, awaiting the old device's approval.
+ *  - `approved` — the old device sealed and posted the encrypted key material.
+ *  - `denied`   — the old device explicitly cancelled the transfer.
+ *  - `expired`  — the 3-minute TTL elapsed before approval.
+ */
+export const devicePairingStatusSchema = z.enum([
+    'pending',
+    'approved',
+    'denied',
+    'expired',
+]);
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*  POST /identity/device-transfer/init                                       */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/** Request body for `POST /identity/device-transfer/init` (public). */
+export const deviceTransferInitRequestSchema = z.object({
+    /** The new device's ephemeral secp256k1 public key (single-use). */
+    newEphPub: publicKeyHex,
+    /** Optional human-readable label for the new device (e.g. "iPhone 15"). */
+    newDeviceLabel: z.string().trim().min(1).max(120).optional(),
+});
+export const deviceTransferInitResponseSchema = z.object({
+    pairingId: z.string(),
+    expiresAt: z.string(),
+});
+export const deviceTransferInfoResponseSchema = z.object({
+    pairingId: z.string(),
+    newDeviceEphemeralPublicKey: z.string(),
+    newDeviceLabel: z.string().nullable(),
+    status: devicePairingStatusSchema,
+    expiresAt: z.string(),
+    oldDeviceEphemeralPublicKey: z.string().nullable(),
+    ciphertext: z.string().nullable(),
+    nonce: z.string().nullable(),
+});
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*  POST /identity/device-transfer/:pairingId/approve                         */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/**
+ * Request body for `POST /identity/device-transfer/:pairingId/approve`
+ * (bearer-authenticated AND signature-proven). The `signature` covers
+ * `JSON.stringify({ action:'approve_device_transfer', pairingId, timestamp })`
+ * made with the caller's CURRENT identity key — dual-proof so a bearer token
+ * alone can never exfiltrate the private key.
+ */
+export const deviceTransferApproveRequestSchema = z.object({
+    /** The old device's ephemeral secp256k1 public key (single-use). */
+    oldEphPub: publicKeyHex,
+    /** AEAD ciphertext of `{ privateKey, publicKey }`, hex. */
+    ciphertext: ciphertextHex,
+    /** AEAD nonce, hex (24 bytes). */
+    nonce: nonceHex,
+    /** ECDSA (DER, hex) signature proving control of the CURRENT identity key. */
+    signature: signatureHex,
+    /** Signing timestamp (ms since epoch) — freshness-checked server-side. */
+    timestamp: z.number().int().positive(),
+});
+export const deviceTransferApproveResponseSchema = z.object({
+    success: z.boolean(),
+    pairingId: z.string(),
+    status: devicePairingStatusSchema,
+});
+export const deviceTransferDenyResponseSchema = z.object({
+    success: z.boolean(),
+    pairingId: z.string(),
+    status: devicePairingStatusSchema,
+});

package/dist/esm/deviceSession.js

@@ -29,10 +29,19 @@ export const deviceSessionSyncSchema = z.object({
  * possession of the secret IS the proof of device ownership. The server matches
  * `sha256(deviceSecret)` against the device's stored `secretHash` (constant-time)
  * and mints a short access token for the device's active account.
+ *
+ * `accountId` pins the mint to ONE account of that device instead of whichever
+ * account is currently active. It exists for identity-bound clients (Commons),
+ * whose authenticated user is determined by a local cryptographic key and must
+ * never follow an account switch made by another app on the same device. The
+ * account must already be a member of the device session; the mint NEVER
+ * mutates `activeAccountId`, so pinning is read-only with respect to the device
+ * state every other app observes.
  */
 export const deviceTokenMintRequestSchema = z.object({
     deviceId: z.string().min(1),
     deviceSecret: z.string().min(1),
+    accountId: z.string().min(1).optional(),
 });
 /**
  * Wire shape of a successful `POST /session/device/token`: the freshly-minted

package/dist/esm/index.js

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 export { ORGANIZATION_CATEGORIES, organizationCategorySchema, createAccountRequestSchema, } from './accountGraph.js';
 export { 
 // Schemas
-userNameSchema, userResponseSchema, userProfileUpdateSchema, currentUserResponseSchema, deviceLinkedSessionSchema, deviceLinkedSessionsResponseSchema, 
+userNameSchema, userRelationshipSchema, themePreferenceSchema, userResponseSchema, userProfileUpdateSchema, currentUserResponseSchema, deviceLinkedSessionSchema, deviceLinkedSessionsResponseSchema, 
 // Helpers
 resolveUserId, safeParseContract, } from './userResponse.js';
 export { 
@@ -62,3 +62,9 @@ rollbackRequestSchema, rollbackToEmbeddedRequestSchema, promoteRequestSchema, up
 export { 
 // Schemas
 webauthnRegisterOptionsRequestSchema, webauthnLoginOptionsRequestSchema, webauthnRegisterVerifyRequestSchema, webauthnLoginVerifyRequestSchema, } from './webauthn.js';
+export { 
+// Schemas
+devicePairingStatusSchema, deviceTransferInitRequestSchema, deviceTransferInitResponseSchema, deviceTransferInfoResponseSchema, deviceTransferApproveRequestSchema, deviceTransferApproveResponseSchema, deviceTransferDenyResponseSchema, } from './devicePairing.js';
+export { 
+// Schemas — transparency log (checkpoints + inclusion proofs)
+transparencyCheckpointSignatureSchema, transparencyAnchorSchema, transparencyCheckpointSchema, transparencyInclusionProofSchema, transparencyCheckpointListSchema, } from './transparency.js';

package/dist/esm/sessionStatus.js

@@ -90,6 +90,14 @@ export const publicApplicationSchema = z.object({
  * current producer and are never `null`, but stay `.optional()` so the contract
  * tolerates leaner shapes from other producers of this same payload without a
  * coordinated bump.
+ *
+ * `pushSentAt` / `openedAt` are DELIVERY PROGRESS, not authorization state: they
+ * let a waiting surface render "Check Commons on your phone" → "Opened in
+ * Commons" without inventing competing statuses. `status` remains the only
+ * authority on whether the request is pending, authorized, cancelled or expired.
+ * Both are `.nullable().optional()` for the same reason as `sessionId` — the
+ * producer always emits the key with `null` until that step happens, and an
+ * older API that omits them entirely must degrade, not fail the parse.
  */
 export const sessionStatusSchema = z.object({
     status: z.string(),
@@ -100,4 +108,11 @@ export const sessionStatusSchema = z.object({
     sessionId: z.string().nullable().optional(),
     publicKey: z.string().nullable().optional(),
     userId: z.string().nullable().optional(),
+    /**
+     * What approving this request does. Legacy rows read as `device_sign_in`.
+     * OAuth-bound sessions finalize into an authorization code (no `sessionId`).
+     */
+    purpose: z.enum(['device_sign_in', 'oauth_authorization']).optional(),
+    pushSentAt: z.string().nullable().optional(),
+    openedAt: z.string().nullable().optional(),
 });

package/dist/esm/transparency.js

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+import { z } from 'zod';
+/**
+ * Transparency log — the public wire contract of the checkpoint surface.
+ *
+ * A checkpoint is the operator's signed commitment to EVERY subject's chain head
+ * at a point in time: "at `periodEnd` I committed to `root` over `treeSize`
+ * subjects, and the previous checkpoint hashed to `prevCheckpointHash`". Anyone
+ * can then ask for an inclusion proof of their own head and verify it against
+ * that root without trusting the server — which is what closes the one gap a
+ * per-subject hash chain cannot close on its own (the server serving two
+ * different histories, or quietly dropping a record).
+ *
+ * The Merkle math, the leaf/checkpoint signing bytes, and the proof verifier all
+ * live in `@oxyhq/protocol` (`src/transparency/`); this module only fixes the
+ * SHAPES that cross the wire, so a client and the API cannot drift on them.
+ *
+ * Digest fields are pinned to 64-char LOWERCASE hex on purpose: the digests are
+ * compared as strings against locally recomputed hashes, so accepting an
+ * upper-case or truncated variant would turn a real mismatch into a confusing
+ * verification failure at a distance.
+ */
+/** A SHA-256 digest in the exact form the protocol emits: 64 lowercase hex chars. */
+const hexDigestSchema = z.string().regex(/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/, 'Expected a 64-char lowercase hex digest');
+/**
+ * One signer's endorsement of a checkpoint's signed fields.
+ *
+ * The operator and every independent witness produce this same shape over the
+ * SAME bytes, so the array on a checkpoint can grow without coordination.
+ */
+export const transparencyCheckpointSignatureSchema = z.object({
+    /** Uncompressed hex public key of the signer. */
+    publicKey: z.string().min(1),
+    alg: z.literal('ES256K-DER-SHA256'),
+    /** DER-encoded hex secp256k1 signature over the checkpoint signing input. */
+    signature: z.string().min(1),
+});
+/** Where a checkpoint root was published on a public chain. */
+export const transparencyAnchorSchema = z.object({
+    /** Chain/network identifier, e.g. `faircoin-main`. */
+    network: z.string().min(1),
+    txid: z.string().min(1),
+    confirmations: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    /** When the anchoring transaction was broadcast (ms epoch). */
+    anchoredAt: z.number().int().positive(),
+});
+/**
+ * A published checkpoint.
+ *
+ * `signatures` is non-empty by contract: an unsigned root commits nobody and
+ * must never be served as a checkpoint. `anchors` may be empty — a checkpoint is
+ * published immediately and anchored asynchronously, so "not yet anchored" is a
+ * normal, temporary state rather than an error.
+ */
+export const transparencyCheckpointSchema = z.object({
+    index: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    /** End of the committed period (ms epoch). */
+    periodEnd: z.number().int().positive(),
+    /** Number of subjects (leaves) committed. */
+    treeSize: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    root: hexDigestSchema,
+    /** Hash of the previous checkpoint; `null` only at genesis. */
+    prevCheckpointHash: hexDigestSchema.nullable(),
+    signatures: z.array(transparencyCheckpointSignatureSchema).min(1),
+    anchors: z.array(transparencyAnchorSchema),
+});
+/**
+ * An inclusion proof for one subject against one checkpoint.
+ *
+ * Carries the leaf PREIMAGE (`subjectDid`, `seq`, `headRecordId`) as well as the
+ * `leaf` digest so the verifier re-derives the leaf itself rather than trusting
+ * the server's hash, then walks `proof` up to the checkpoint's `root`.
+ */
+export const transparencyInclusionProofSchema = z.object({
+    checkpoint: transparencyCheckpointSchema,
+    subjectDid: z.string().min(1),
+    seq: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    headRecordId: hexDigestSchema,
+    leaf: hexDigestSchema,
+    leafIndex: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    /** Audit path, leaf-adjacent sibling first; empty for a single-leaf tree. */
+    proof: z.array(hexDigestSchema),
+});
+/** A page of the checkpoint chain, oldest first, for walking `prevCheckpointHash`. */
+export const transparencyCheckpointListSchema = z.object({
+    checkpoints: z.array(transparencyCheckpointSchema),
+});

package/dist/esm/userResponse.js

@@ -39,6 +39,14 @@ export const userNameSchema = z
     displayName: z.string().optional(),
 })
     .passthrough();
+export const userRelationshipSchema = z.object({
+    isFollowing: z.boolean(),
+    followsYou: z.boolean(),
+});
+export const themePreferenceSchema = z.object({
+    mode: z.enum(['light', 'dark', 'system']),
+    colorPreset: z.string(),
+});
 /**
  * The canonical user object emitted by `formatUserResponse`.
  *
@@ -97,6 +105,19 @@ export const userResponseSchema = z
      * Absent on personal, project, and bot accounts.
      */
     organizationCategory: organizationCategorySchema.optional(),
+    /**
+     * The authenticated viewer's relationship to this profile. Present ONLY
+     * on single-profile fetches (`GET /profiles/username/:username`,
+     * `GET /users/:userId`) when the request is authenticated; OMITTED for
+     * anonymous requests and for the bulk `POST /users/by-ids` fan-out.
+     */
+    relationship: userRelationshipSchema.optional(),
+    /**
+     * Portable theme preference. Rides the self/session payload (cold boot),
+     * so it is present on the current-user DTO (`GET /users/me`,
+     * `GET /session/user/:sessionId`) and absent until the user sets it.
+     */
+    themePreference: themePreferenceSchema.optional(),
 })
     .passthrough();
 export const userProfileUpdateSchema = z
@@ -137,6 +158,11 @@ export const userProfileUpdateSchema = z
     notificationPreferences: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),
     userPreferences: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),
     privacySettings: z.record(z.unknown()).optional(),
+    /**
+     * Portable theme preference. Written through the same `PUT /users/me`
+     * settings-update path as `languages`/`userPreferences`.
+     */
+    themePreference: themePreferenceSchema.optional(),
 })
     .passthrough();
 /**