@oxyhq/contracts 0.13.0 → 0.13.2

package/dist/esm/fedcmToken.js

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Canonical contract for the FedCM ID-token JWT payload.
- *
- * DEAD SINCE THE WAVE-2 FEDCM DELETION (found during the comment sweep, not
- * fixed here — this is a published `@oxyhq/contracts` export, so removing it
- * is a breaking change/major-version decision, out of scope for a comment
- * fix): `POST /fedcm/exchange`, `fedcm.service.exchangeIdToken`, and
- * `packages/auth/server/index.ts`'s `mintSessionForClient` — every consumer
- * and producer this file describes — are all deleted. No current code
- * imports `fedcmTokenPayloadSchema` / `FedcmTokenPayload` outside this
- * package. Flag for a follow-up major-version cleanup.
- *
- * Original doc (historical, describes the now-deleted system):
- * SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for the decoded claims of the HS256 ID token the auth
- * IdP (`auth.oxy.so`) signs and `POST /fedcm/exchange` consumes. The API decodes
- * the JWT, verifies its signature, then validates the resulting claim object
- * against this schema before trusting any field — a malformed payload (e.g. a
- * forged token whose signature happened to match but whose body is the wrong
- * shape) is rejected at the boundary instead of being cast and used.
- *
- * Validation philosophy — match the existing exchange behaviour exactly:
- *  - This schema validates the STRUCTURAL shape of the decoded claims only
- *    (types of the fields, not their presence or business-rule validity).
- *  - `sub` / `aud` / `nonce` / `iss` / `exp` presence + value checks remain in
- *    `fedcm.service.exchangeIdToken`, which returns the specific
- *    `missing_required_fields` / `invalid_issuer` / `token_expired` errors. So
- *    every field is `.optional()` here: a token missing `nonce` must still reach
- *    the `missing_required_fields` branch, not be rejected as a malformed token.
- *  - `.passthrough()` preserves any additional claims the IdP may add without a
- *    coordinated contract bump.
- *
- * Faithful to the producer:
- *  - `packages/auth/server/index.ts` `mintSessionForClient` — builds the
- *    assertion with `iss` (central issuer), `sub` (user id), `aud` (RP origin),
- *    `exp` / `iat` (numeric epoch seconds), and `nonce` (the server-minted,
- *    origin-bound nonce).
- *
- * Platform-agnostic — zod only, no react/react-native/expo. ESM-safe (no
- * `require()`).
- */
-import { z } from 'zod';
-/**
- * Decoded FedCM ID-token claims. Every field is optional because presence is
- * enforced downstream (see module doc); the schema's job is to guarantee that
- * any present claim has the correct primitive type before it is read.
- */
-export const fedcmTokenPayloadSchema = z
-    .object({
-    iss: z.string().optional(),
-    sub: z.string().optional(),
-    aud: z.string().optional(),
-    exp: z.number().optional(),
-    iat: z.number().optional(),
-    nonce: z.string().optional(),
-    /**
-     * An explicit central deviceId minted by the IdP, threaded through so the
-     * RP session can inherit a unified device id instead of deriving one from
-     * the (userId, RP origin) stableDeviceKey. Optional and additive — omitted
-     * tokens fall back to the existing stableDeviceKey/UA-IP derivation.
-     */
-    deviceId: z.string().optional(),
-})
-    .passthrough();

package/dist/types/fedcmToken.d.ts

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Canonical contract for the FedCM ID-token JWT payload.
- *
- * DEAD SINCE THE WAVE-2 FEDCM DELETION (found during the comment sweep, not
- * fixed here — this is a published `@oxyhq/contracts` export, so removing it
- * is a breaking change/major-version decision, out of scope for a comment
- * fix): `POST /fedcm/exchange`, `fedcm.service.exchangeIdToken`, and
- * `packages/auth/server/index.ts`'s `mintSessionForClient` — every consumer
- * and producer this file describes — are all deleted. No current code
- * imports `fedcmTokenPayloadSchema` / `FedcmTokenPayload` outside this
- * package. Flag for a follow-up major-version cleanup.
- *
- * Original doc (historical, describes the now-deleted system):
- * SINGLE SOURCE OF TRUTH for the decoded claims of the HS256 ID token the auth
- * IdP (`auth.oxy.so`) signs and `POST /fedcm/exchange` consumes. The API decodes
- * the JWT, verifies its signature, then validates the resulting claim object
- * against this schema before trusting any field — a malformed payload (e.g. a
- * forged token whose signature happened to match but whose body is the wrong
- * shape) is rejected at the boundary instead of being cast and used.
- *
- * Validation philosophy — match the existing exchange behaviour exactly:
- *  - This schema validates the STRUCTURAL shape of the decoded claims only
- *    (types of the fields, not their presence or business-rule validity).
- *  - `sub` / `aud` / `nonce` / `iss` / `exp` presence + value checks remain in
- *    `fedcm.service.exchangeIdToken`, which returns the specific
- *    `missing_required_fields` / `invalid_issuer` / `token_expired` errors. So
- *    every field is `.optional()` here: a token missing `nonce` must still reach
- *    the `missing_required_fields` branch, not be rejected as a malformed token.
- *  - `.passthrough()` preserves any additional claims the IdP may add without a
- *    coordinated contract bump.
- *
- * Faithful to the producer:
- *  - `packages/auth/server/index.ts` `mintSessionForClient` — builds the
- *    assertion with `iss` (central issuer), `sub` (user id), `aud` (RP origin),
- *    `exp` / `iat` (numeric epoch seconds), and `nonce` (the server-minted,
- *    origin-bound nonce).
- *
- * Platform-agnostic — zod only, no react/react-native/expo. ESM-safe (no
- * `require()`).
- */
-import { z } from 'zod';
-/**
- * Decoded FedCM ID-token claims. Every field is optional because presence is
- * enforced downstream (see module doc); the schema's job is to guarantee that
- * any present claim has the correct primitive type before it is read.
- */
-export declare const fedcmTokenPayloadSchema: z.ZodObject<{
-    iss: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    sub: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    aud: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    exp: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
-    iat: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
-    nonce: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    /**
-     * An explicit central deviceId minted by the IdP, threaded through so the
-     * RP session can inherit a unified device id instead of deriving one from
-     * the (userId, RP origin) stableDeviceKey. Optional and additive — omitted
-     * tokens fall back to the existing stableDeviceKey/UA-IP derivation.
-     */
-    deviceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-}, "passthrough", z.ZodTypeAny, z.objectOutputType<{
-    iss: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    sub: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    aud: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    exp: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
-    iat: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
-    nonce: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    /**
-     * An explicit central deviceId minted by the IdP, threaded through so the
-     * RP session can inherit a unified device id instead of deriving one from
-     * the (userId, RP origin) stableDeviceKey. Optional and additive — omitted
-     * tokens fall back to the existing stableDeviceKey/UA-IP derivation.
-     */
-    deviceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-}, z.ZodTypeAny, "passthrough">, z.objectInputType<{
-    iss: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    sub: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    aud: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    exp: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
-    iat: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodNumber>;
-    nonce: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-    /**
-     * An explicit central deviceId minted by the IdP, threaded through so the
-     * RP session can inherit a unified device id instead of deriving one from
-     * the (userId, RP origin) stableDeviceKey. Optional and additive — omitted
-     * tokens fall back to the existing stableDeviceKey/UA-IP derivation.
-     */
-    deviceId: z.ZodOptional<z.ZodString>;
-}, z.ZodTypeAny, "passthrough">>;
-export type FedcmTokenPayload = z.infer<typeof fedcmTokenPayloadSchema>;