@oxygen-agent/cli 1.739.1 → 1.766.0

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/provider-funding-errors.js

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+/**
+ * One vocabulary for "the provider refused because of money".
+ *
+ * A provider 402 has reached customers wearing four different costumes:
+ *   - `provider_credits_exhausted`        (tool runner, managed pool)
+ *   - `connection_credits_exhausted`      (tool runner, BYOK connection)
+ *   - `provider_insufficient_credits`     (enrichment column runner + waterfall)
+ *   - `provider_credit_exhausted`         (worker lane exclusion, singular)
+ * plus `provider_plan_limit` for the adjacent "your plan does not include this"
+ * refusal, which is also a money problem and also not retryable.
+ *
+ * Only the first two were known to the run-bottleneck classifier. The others
+ * fell through to a `/rate|limit|429/` test — which `provider_plan_limit`
+ * matches on the substring "limit" — or to the deferral branch, so a hard 402
+ * surfaced to the customer as `bottlenecks: [provider_rate_limit]`. That reads
+ * as "wait and retry": a partner agency spent hours lowering concurrency against
+ * an account that was simply out of credits, and the real 402 was only visible
+ * through a different command.
+ *
+ * The distinction that matters operationally: a rate limit clears by waiting, a
+ * funding failure never does. Anything that decides "should the customer wait?"
+ * must ask this predicate, not a regex over the code string.
+ */
+/** Codes meaning the provider refused for funding/entitlement reasons. Never retryable by waiting. */
+export const PROVIDER_FUNDING_ERROR_CODES = [
+    "provider_credits_exhausted",
+    "provider_credits_exhausted_deferred",
+    "connection_credits_exhausted",
+    "provider_insufficient_credits",
+    "provider_credit_exhausted",
+    "provider_plan_limit",
+    "blocked_provider_funding",
+];
+const FUNDING_CODE_SET = new Set(PROVIDER_FUNDING_ERROR_CODES);
+/**
+ * True when the code means "this failed over money", in any of its spellings.
+ *
+ * Matches on the exact code first, then falls back to a narrow shape test so a
+ * provider-specific variant (`peopledatalabs_credits_exhausted`) is still
+ * classified as funding rather than silently treated as retryable. Deliberately
+ * does NOT match on "limit" alone — `rate_limit_exceeded` is a real rate limit.
+ */
+export function isProviderFundingErrorCode(code) {
+    if (!code)
+        return false;
+    const normalized = code.trim().toLowerCase();
+    if (!normalized)
+        return false;
+    if (FUNDING_CODE_SET.has(normalized))
+        return true;
+    if (/_credits?_exhausted(_deferred)?$/.test(normalized))
+        return true;
+    if (/insufficient_credits?$/.test(normalized))
+        return true;
+    if (/^blocked_provider_funding/.test(normalized))
+        return true;
+    return /(?:payment_required|plan_limit|quota_exceeded)$/.test(normalized);
+}
+/**
+ * True for a genuine rate limit — one that clears by waiting.
+ *
+ * A funding failure always wins: `provider_plan_limit` contains "limit" and
+ * would otherwise read as retryable.
+ */
+export function isProviderRateLimitErrorCode(code) {
+    if (!code)
+        return false;
+    if (isProviderFundingErrorCode(code))
+        return false;
+    return /rate|limit|429|capacity_deferred/i.test(code);
+}
+/** The customer-facing next step for a funding refusal, by credential ownership. */
+export function providerFundingNextStep(credentialMode) {
+    if (credentialMode === "byok") {
+        return "Top up or upgrade the provider account behind your connected key, then retry. Waiting will not clear this.";
+    }
+    if (credentialMode === "managed") {
+        return "This is OXYGEN's managed provider account, not your credit balance — contact support. Waiting will not clear this; route the run to another provider in the meantime.";
+    }
+    return "Check the provider account's balance and plan entitlement, then retry. Waiting will not clear this.";
+}

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/publishing-limits.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/**
+ * Broadcast character caps, in one place.
+ *
+ * These were defined three times — the web composer, the tenant-db lint, and an
+ * implicit `maxLength` on the MCP tool schema — and the MCP copy had drifted to
+ * 20,000. An X Premium account may post 25,000 characters, so a post between the
+ * two numbers was rejected by OXYGEN's own schema before X ever saw it, with an
+ * error that blamed the length rather than our stale constant. A customer hit
+ * exactly that after we told them the Premium cap was supported.
+ *
+ * `PUBLISHING_CONTENT_MAX_CHARS` is the outermost bound any surface should
+ * enforce: it must be >= the largest per-channel cap, because per-channel
+ * validation is where a too-long post gets an accurate, channel-specific error.
+ */
+/** X free tier. */
+export declare const X_FREE_MAX_CHARS = 280;
+/** X Premium. The largest single-post cap across every supported channel. */
+export declare const X_PREMIUM_MAX_CHARS = 25000;
+/**
+ * Outermost content bound for any publishing surface (CLI/MCP schema, API).
+ * Never set a surface's cap below this — let the per-channel lint produce the
+ * specific error instead of a generic schema rejection.
+ */
+export declare const PUBLISHING_CONTENT_MAX_CHARS = 25000;

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/publishing-limits.js

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+/**
+ * Broadcast character caps, in one place.
+ *
+ * These were defined three times — the web composer, the tenant-db lint, and an
+ * implicit `maxLength` on the MCP tool schema — and the MCP copy had drifted to
+ * 20,000. An X Premium account may post 25,000 characters, so a post between the
+ * two numbers was rejected by OXYGEN's own schema before X ever saw it, with an
+ * error that blamed the length rather than our stale constant. A customer hit
+ * exactly that after we told them the Premium cap was supported.
+ *
+ * `PUBLISHING_CONTENT_MAX_CHARS` is the outermost bound any surface should
+ * enforce: it must be >= the largest per-channel cap, because per-channel
+ * validation is where a too-long post gets an accurate, channel-specific error.
+ */
+/** X free tier. */
+export const X_FREE_MAX_CHARS = 280;
+/** X Premium. The largest single-post cap across every supported channel. */
+export const X_PREMIUM_MAX_CHARS = 25_000;
+/**
+ * Outermost content bound for any publishing surface (CLI/MCP schema, API).
+ * Never set a surface's cap below this — let the per-channel lint produce the
+ * specific error instead of a generic schema rejection.
+ */
+export const PUBLISHING_CONTENT_MAX_CHARS = X_PREMIUM_MAX_CHARS;

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/spend-safety.d.ts

@@ -54,13 +54,34 @@ export declare function resolveByokProviderDailyCapEnforcementMode(configured?:
 /**
  * Implicit org-level DAILY budget guard, evaluated only when the org has no
  * explicit org-scope daily budget policy and the plan has finite positive
- * monthly credits. Warn when one rolling day spends past WARN_PCT of the
- * monthly grant; hard-block at BLOCK_PCT (a loop burning a whole month in a
- * day is near-certainly runaway — this also protects large top-up balances).
- * Setting any explicit org-daily policy fully suppresses the implicit pair.
+ * monthly credits. Expressed as a MULTIPLE of the plan's monthly grant spent in
+ * one UTC day: warn past WARN_MULTIPLE, hard-block at BLOCK_MULTIPLE. Setting
+ * any explicit org-daily policy fully suppresses the implicit pair.
+ *
+ * This is a runaway-loop backstop, NOT a spend ceiling. The available balance is
+ * the real bound on what a workspace can spend, and legitimate single-day work
+ * routinely exceeds a month's grant: standing up cold-email infrastructure
+ * (a managed domain plus three warmed inboxes is ~31k credits, so a full sending
+ * estate is hundreds of thousands in an afternoon) and large enrichment bursts
+ * funded by a top-up are both deliberate purchases, not loops. Raised 20x on
+ * 2026-08-17 for exactly that reason — at the previous 1x the guard refused a
+ * customer who had already paid for the credits, and the refusal was invisible
+ * on every surface. 20x still stops an unattended loop within hours.
+ */
+export declare const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_WARN_MULTIPLE = 5;
+export declare const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_BLOCK_MULTIPLE = 20;
+/** Resolved credit thresholds of the implicit org-daily guard for one plan. */
+export type OrgDailySpendGuard = {
+    warnCredits: number;
+    blockCredits: number;
+};
+/**
+ * Resolve the implicit guard's thresholds from a plan's monthly grant. `null`
+ * means the guard is suppressed because the plan has no finite positive grant to
+ * scale from (free at 0, enterprise/custom at null) — the single place that
+ * decision is made, so enforcement and the read surfaces cannot drift apart.
  */
-export declare const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_WARN_PCT = 0.25;
-export declare const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_BLOCK_PCT = 1;
+export declare function resolveOrgDailySpendGuard(monthlyCredits: number | null | undefined): OrgDailySpendGuard | null;
 export declare function resolveDefaultTriggerRunCreditCeiling(tier: PlanTier): number | null;
 export declare function resolveDefaultAutoRunBatchCreditCeiling(tier: PlanTier): number | null;
 export declare function resolveDefaultByokColumnRunMaxRows(tier: PlanTier): number | null;

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/spend-safety.js

@@ -71,13 +71,41 @@ export function resolveByokProviderDailyCapEnforcementMode(configured = process.
 /**
  * Implicit org-level DAILY budget guard, evaluated only when the org has no
  * explicit org-scope daily budget policy and the plan has finite positive
- * monthly credits. Warn when one rolling day spends past WARN_PCT of the
- * monthly grant; hard-block at BLOCK_PCT (a loop burning a whole month in a
- * day is near-certainly runaway — this also protects large top-up balances).
- * Setting any explicit org-daily policy fully suppresses the implicit pair.
+ * monthly credits. Expressed as a MULTIPLE of the plan's monthly grant spent in
+ * one UTC day: warn past WARN_MULTIPLE, hard-block at BLOCK_MULTIPLE. Setting
+ * any explicit org-daily policy fully suppresses the implicit pair.
+ *
+ * This is a runaway-loop backstop, NOT a spend ceiling. The available balance is
+ * the real bound on what a workspace can spend, and legitimate single-day work
+ * routinely exceeds a month's grant: standing up cold-email infrastructure
+ * (a managed domain plus three warmed inboxes is ~31k credits, so a full sending
+ * estate is hundreds of thousands in an afternoon) and large enrichment bursts
+ * funded by a top-up are both deliberate purchases, not loops. Raised 20x on
+ * 2026-08-17 for exactly that reason — at the previous 1x the guard refused a
+ * customer who had already paid for the credits, and the refusal was invisible
+ * on every surface. 20x still stops an unattended loop within hours.
  */
-export const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_WARN_PCT = 0.25;
-export const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_BLOCK_PCT = 1;
+export const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_WARN_MULTIPLE = 5;
+export const DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_BLOCK_MULTIPLE = 20;
+/**
+ * Resolve the implicit guard's thresholds from a plan's monthly grant. `null`
+ * means the guard is suppressed because the plan has no finite positive grant to
+ * scale from (free at 0, enterprise/custom at null) — the single place that
+ * decision is made, so enforcement and the read surfaces cannot drift apart.
+ */
+export function resolveOrgDailySpendGuard(monthlyCredits) {
+    if (typeof monthlyCredits !== "number" || !Number.isFinite(monthlyCredits) || monthlyCredits <= 0) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return {
+        warnCredits: roundCredits(monthlyCredits * DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_WARN_MULTIPLE),
+        blockCredits: roundCredits(monthlyCredits * DEFAULT_ORG_DAILY_SPEND_BLOCK_MULTIPLE),
+    };
+}
+/** Credits carry 3 decimals everywhere (control-DB numeric(18,3)). */
+function roundCredits(value) {
+    return Math.round(value * 1000) / 1000;
+}
 export function resolveDefaultTriggerRunCreditCeiling(tier) {
     return DEFAULT_TRIGGER_RUN_CREDIT_CEILING[tier];
 }

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/version.d.ts

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
-export declare const OXYGEN_VERSION = "1.739.1";
+export declare const OXYGEN_VERSION = "1.766.0";
 export declare const OXYGEN_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.181.0";
 export declare const MANAGED_INBOX_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.326.2";
+export declare const SUPPORT_AGENT_REPLY_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.747.0";

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/dist/version.js

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-export const OXYGEN_VERSION = "1.739.1";
+export const OXYGEN_VERSION = "1.766.0";
 // The GLOBAL CLI compatibility floor: the oldest CLI allowed to call any
 // operational route. Raising it hard-rejects every older CLI from the entire
 // product, so it obeys one law, enforced by scripts/ci/cli-min-version-gate.mjs:
@@ -26,8 +26,11 @@ export const OXYGEN_VERSION = "1.739.1";
 // (oxygen sequences|inbox|senders, /api/cli/{sequences,inbox,senders}) and
 // removed the old /api/cli/linkedin/* routes — older CLIs would 404.
 export const OXYGEN_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.181.0";
-// Per-surface floor for the whitelabel/managed-inbox purchase path, enforced only
-// by /api/cli/managed-inboxes/subscribe.
+// Per-surface floor for the whitelabel/managed-inbox purchase path, enforced by
+// BOTH paid inbox routes: /api/cli/managed-inboxes/subscribe and
+// /api/cli/managed-inboxes/[domain]/mailboxes. (The comment used to say subscribe
+// only; the expansion route has enforced it too since it shipped, and three
+// separate reads of this file have since reasoned from the wrong half.)
 //
 // 1.326.2: Pricing Model 2.0 (2026-07-14) moved whitelabel inbox subscribe from the
 // USD Stripe rail back to Oxygen credits: the preview now returns
@@ -39,3 +42,11 @@ export const OXYGEN_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.181.0";
 // so it can never exceed npm's newest CLI. (1.298.0 was the prior credits→Stripe
 // contract move.) Do NOT raise the global OXYGEN_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION for this.
 export const MANAGED_INBOX_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.326.2";
+// Per-surface floor for guarded Plain agent reply + Done. CLI 1.747.0 is the
+// first client that declares --agent, binds the latest customer message and
+// body-authenticated preview token, carries the live agent_done_token into the
+// separate Done confirmation, and never falls through to the retired resolve
+// shape. This floor MUST remain dormant in production until 1.747.0 has been
+// published by the preceding release per OXY-4091; the live feature gate is the
+// rollout boundary that preserves that two-phase ordering.
+export const SUPPORT_AGENT_REPLY_MINIMUM_CLI_VERSION = "1.747.0";

package/node_modules/@oxygen/shared/package.json

@@ -61,6 +61,11 @@
       "import": "./dist/object-storage.js",
       "default": "./dist/object-storage.js"
     },
+    "./person-name": {
+      "types": "./dist/person-name.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/person-name.js",
+      "default": "./dist/person-name.js"
+    },
     "./select-options": {
       "types": "./dist/select-options.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/select-options.js",
@@ -145,6 +150,11 @@
       "types": "./dist/schedule-label.d.ts",
       "import": "./dist/schedule-label.js",
       "default": "./dist/schedule-label.js"
+    },
+    "./publishing-limits": {
+      "types": "./dist/publishing-limits.d.ts",
+      "import": "./dist/publishing-limits.js",
+      "default": "./dist/publishing-limits.js"
     }
   },
   "dependencies": {}

package/node_modules/@oxygen/workflows/dist/graph/expression.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type { WorkflowCompareOp, WorkflowCondition, WorkflowValueRef } from "./types.js";
+import type { WorkflowCompareOp, WorkflowCondition, WorkflowValueCoercion, WorkflowValueRef } from "./types.js";
 /**
  * The data a v2 run exposes to its value refs.
  *
@@ -22,6 +22,20 @@ export type WorkflowRunScope = {
     contextProfile?: unknown;
     contextAssets?: Record<string, unknown>;
 };
+/** A deterministic authoring/data error; retrying the same revision cannot repair it. */
+export declare class WorkflowValueCoercionError extends Error {
+    readonly coercion: WorkflowValueCoercion;
+    readonly code = "workflow_value_coercion_failed";
+    constructor(coercion: WorkflowValueCoercion);
+}
+/** A direct mapping named data the run does not carry; sending undefined is never intentional. */
+export declare class WorkflowValueRefUnresolvedError extends Error {
+    readonly path: string;
+    readonly code = "workflow_value_ref_unresolved";
+    constructor(path: string);
+}
+/** Apply one explicit scalar conversion without lossy truthiness or truncation. */
+export declare function coerceWorkflowValue(value: unknown, coercion: WorkflowValueCoercion): string | number | boolean;
 /** The roots a `ref` path may start from. Anything else is not a scope path. */
 export declare const SCOPE_PATH_ROOTS: ReadonlySet<string>;
 export declare const WORKFLOW_COMPARE_OPS: ReadonlySet<WorkflowCompareOp>;
@@ -40,6 +54,8 @@ export declare const UNARY_COMPARE_OPS: ReadonlySet<WorkflowCompareOp>;
  * typo surfaces in lint rather than as a silently empty value at run time.
  */
 export declare function parseScopePath(path: string): string[] | null;
+/** Canonical path formatter: dots for simple keys, JSON brackets for every other key. */
+export declare function formatScopePath(segments: readonly string[]): string | null;
 /** Resolve a dotted (+ `[n]`) scope path. Missing or malformed → undefined. */
 export declare function resolvePath(path: string, scope: WorkflowRunScope): unknown;
 /**
@@ -49,6 +65,16 @@ export declare function resolvePath(path: string, scope: WorkflowRunScope): unkn
  */
 export declare function renderTemplate(template: string, scope: WorkflowRunScope): string;
 export declare function resolveValueRef(ref: WorkflowValueRef, scope: WorkflowRunScope): unknown;
+/**
+ * Resolve a binding that is about to cross an execution boundary.
+ *
+ * Conditions and optional control-flow refs deliberately keep total lookup
+ * semantics: a missing path is `undefined`, so `is_empty` remains useful. Tool
+ * requests are different — silently handing `undefined` to a provider makes a
+ * stale mapping look like a provider bug. Call this stricter adapter at that
+ * boundary so the failure names the mapped path before any provider executes.
+ */
+export declare function resolveRequiredValueRef(ref: WorkflowValueRef, scope: WorkflowRunScope): unknown;
 export declare function evaluateCondition(condition: WorkflowCondition, scope: WorkflowRunScope): boolean;
 /**
  * Compile a `matches` pattern, or return null when it is unsafe or invalid.
@@ -76,3 +102,5 @@ export declare function compileConditionPattern(pattern: string): RegExp | null;
  * with the manifest's declared node ids.
  */
 export declare function referencedNodeIds(ref: WorkflowValueRef | WorkflowCondition): string[];
+/** Exact rooted scope paths a ref/condition can read, excluding ambiguous bare formula names. */
+export declare function referencedScopePaths(ref: WorkflowValueRef | WorkflowCondition): string[];