@oxy.so/core 1.18.1 → 3.0.0

package/src/crypto/__tests__/keyManager.atomicity.test.ts

@@ -1,272 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Tests for KeyManager atomic-write & backup-restore safety under FLAKY storage.
- *
- * These pin the "never leave the device with zero recoverable copies of a
- * healthy identity" invariant. Each scenario corresponds to a real
- * account-loss / account-switch bug that a half-failed SecureStore write could
- * otherwise cause:
- *
- *   1. A failed OVERWRITE must roll the primary back to the ORIGINAL identity
- *      and must keep a recoverable backup of it — never switch to the
- *      half-written new identity.
- *   2. A transient read failure must not cause restoreIdentityFromBackup() to
- *      clobber a healthy-but-momentarily-locked primary with a stale backup.
- *   3. restoreIdentityFromBackup() must refuse when the backup identifies a
- *      different account than a private key still present in the primary slot.
- *   4. A first-time create still writes a backup (no regression).
- *
- * The identity now lives in the isolated v2 slots (primary service `oxy_identity`,
- * backup service `oxy_identity_backup`), so assertions read/write via the
- * service-scoped mock helpers.
- */
-
-import { setPlatformOS } from '../../utils/platform';
-
-jest.mock(
-  'expo-secure-store',
-  () => {
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    const { createSecureStoreMock } = require('./identityMocks');
-    return createSecureStoreMock();
-  },
-  { virtual: true },
-);
-
-jest.mock(
-  'expo-crypto',
-  () => ({
-    __esModule: true,
-    getRandomBytes: (length: number) => {
-      const out = new Uint8Array(length);
-      for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) out[i] = (Math.random() * 256) & 0xff;
-      return out;
-    },
-    digestStringAsync: async () => '0'.repeat(64),
-    CryptoDigestAlgorithm: { SHA256: 'SHA-256' },
-  }),
-  { virtual: true },
-);
-
-jest.mock('@oxy.so/protocol', () => {
-  const actual = jest.requireActual('@oxy.so/protocol');
-  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-  const { createAsyncStorageMock } = require('./identityMocks');
-  const asyncStorage = createAsyncStorageMock();
-  return {
-    __esModule: true,
-    ...actual,
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    loadExpoCrypto: async () => require('expo-crypto'),
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    loadSecureStore: async () => require('expo-secure-store'),
-    loadAsyncStorage: async () => ({ default: asyncStorage }),
-    loadSharedIdentityBridge: async () => null,
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    loadNodeCrypto: async () => require('crypto'),
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    getRandomBytesRN: (n: number) => require('expo-crypto').getRandomBytes(n),
-  };
-});
-
-// v2 slot key names + keychain services (must match keyManager.ts).
-const PRIMARY_SVC = 'oxy_identity';
-const BACKUP_SVC = 'oxy_identity_backup';
-const V2_PRIV = 'oxy_identity_private_key_v2';
-const V2_PUB = 'oxy_identity_public_key_v2';
-const V2_BPRIV = 'oxy_identity_backup_private_key_v2';
-const V2_BPUB = 'oxy_identity_backup_public_key_v2';
-
-interface SecureStoreTestHandle {
-  __resetStore__: () => void;
-  __getRaw__: (key: string, service?: string) => string | null;
-  __setRaw__: (key: string, value: string, service?: string) => void;
-  __deleteRaw__: (key: string, service?: string) => void;
-  __failPlan__: { failKey?: string; failOp?: 'set' | 'get'; failTimes?: number; failService?: string };
-}
-
-describe('KeyManager atomicity & recoverability under flaky storage', () => {
-  let KeyManager: typeof import('../keyManager').KeyManager;
-
-  const resetCaches = () => {
-    const km = KeyManager as unknown as {
-      cachedPublicKey: unknown;
-      cachedHasIdentity: unknown;
-      cachedPublicKeyResolved: unknown;
-    };
-    km.cachedPublicKey = null;
-    km.cachedHasIdentity = null;
-    km.cachedPublicKeyResolved = false;
-  };
-
-  beforeAll(() => {
-    setPlatformOS('ios');
-    (globalThis as unknown as { navigator: unknown }).navigator = { product: 'ReactNative' };
-  });
-
-  beforeEach(async () => {
-    jest.resetModules();
-    setPlatformOS('ios');
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-    ss.__resetStore__();
-    const km = await import('../keyManager');
-    KeyManager = km.KeyManager;
-    resetCaches();
-  });
-
-  it('a failed OVERWRITE leaves the ORIGINAL identity intact and recoverable (no silent switch)', async () => {
-    const originalPublic = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-    const originalPriv = ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // The new primary private write fails mid-overwrite.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = 'set';
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = V2_PRIV;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = PRIMARY_SVC;
-    await expect(KeyManager.createIdentity({ overwrite: true })).rejects.toBeDefined();
-
-    // Recover from the simulated fault.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = undefined;
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // Primary must still be the original identity (rolled back).
-    expect(await KeyManager.hasIdentity()).toBe(true);
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(originalPublic);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC)).toBe(originalPriv);
-
-    // And the backup must still hold the ORIGINAL identity, never the new one.
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_BPRIV, BACKUP_SVC)).toBe(originalPriv);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_BPUB, BACKUP_SVC)).toBe(originalPublic);
-  });
-
-  it('a failed final backup refresh rejects and rolls back instead of succeeding with a stale backup', async () => {
-    const originalPublic = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-    const originalPriv = ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // Let the new primary write and verify, then fail exactly once while
-    // refreshing the backup to the new identity. This used to return success
-    // with primary=B and backup=A, enabling a later absent-primary restore to
-    // silently switch back to A.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = 'set';
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = V2_BPUB;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = BACKUP_SVC;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failTimes = 1;
-    await expect(KeyManager.createIdentity({ overwrite: true })).rejects.toBeDefined();
-
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // The operation failed atomically: primary and backup both still identify
-    // the original account, so callers cannot observe success with a stale
-    // cross-account backup.
-    expect(await KeyManager.hasIdentity()).toBe(true);
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(originalPublic);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC)).toBe(originalPriv);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PUB, PRIMARY_SVC)).toBe(originalPublic);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_BPRIV, BACKUP_SVC)).toBe(originalPriv);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_BPUB, BACKUP_SVC)).toBe(originalPublic);
-  });
-
-  it('restoreIdentityFromBackup does NOT clobber a healthy primary that is only transiently unreadable', async () => {
-    const original = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-
-    // Put a DIFFERENT identity in the backup slot (simulates a stale backup
-    // from a previous account that a failed backup-refresh left behind).
-    const other = await KeyManager.generateKeyPair();
-    ss.__setRaw__(V2_BPRIV, other.privateKey, BACKUP_SVC);
-    ss.__setRaw__(V2_BPUB, other.publicKey, BACKUP_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // Make the primary PRIVATE read throw (transient keychain lock).
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = 'get';
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = V2_PRIV;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = PRIMARY_SVC;
-
-    const restored = await KeyManager.restoreIdentityFromBackup();
-    expect(restored).toBe(false); // refused — transient read must not trigger a restore
-
-    // Clear the fault; the original primary must be intact and unchanged.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = undefined;
-    resetCaches();
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(original);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PUB, PRIMARY_SVC)).toBe(original);
-  });
-
-  it('restoreIdentityFromBackup refuses when a present primary private key identifies a different account than the backup', async () => {
-    // Primary holds identity A (valid). Corrupt ONLY the public key so the
-    // primary fails its consistency check but the private key still derives a
-    // real, different identity than the backup.
-    const a = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-
-    // Backup holds a DIFFERENT identity B.
-    const b = await KeyManager.generateKeyPair();
-    ss.__setRaw__(V2_BPRIV, b.privateKey, BACKUP_SVC);
-    ss.__setRaw__(V2_BPUB, b.publicKey, BACKUP_SVC);
-    // Corrupt A's stored public key (private key A still present & valid).
-    ss.__setRaw__(V2_PUB, `04${'e'.repeat(128)}`, PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    const restored = await KeyManager.restoreIdentityFromBackup();
-    expect(restored).toBe(false);
-    // Must NOT have switched the primary to B.
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PUB, PRIMARY_SVC)).not.toBe(b.publicKey);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC)).not.toBe(b.privateKey);
-    // The original A private key is still in place (untouched).
-    expect(KeyManager.derivePublicKey(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC) as string)).toBe(a);
-  });
-
-  it('a failed primary write during the post-rotation importKeyPair leaves the OLD key recoverable from backup', async () => {
-    // b3 key rotation: the server has already swapped to the NEW key; the device
-    // now commits it via importKeyPair({overwrite:true}). If that write fails
-    // mid-overwrite, the OLD key MUST remain intact and recoverable — never a
-    // half-written new identity that can't be decrypted or backed up.
-    const oldPublic = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-    const oldPriv = ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // The NEW rotated key material (generateKeyPair does NOT persist).
-    const rotated = await KeyManager.generateKeyPair();
-
-    // The new primary private write fails mid-commit.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = 'set';
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = V2_PRIV;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = PRIMARY_SVC;
-    await expect(KeyManager.importKeyPair(rotated.privateKey, { overwrite: true })).rejects.toBeDefined();
-
-    // Recover from the simulated fault.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = undefined;
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // Primary is STILL the old identity (rolled back — never the new one).
-    expect(await KeyManager.hasIdentity()).toBe(true);
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(oldPublic);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC)).toBe(oldPriv);
-    // And the backup still holds the OLD identity, so the user can recover it.
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_BPRIV, BACKUP_SVC)).toBe(oldPriv);
-    expect(ss.__getRaw__(V2_BPUB, BACKUP_SVC)).toBe(oldPublic);
-  });
-
-  it('restores a provably-absent primary from a valid backup', async () => {
-    const original = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-    // Wipe the primary entirely (backup remains).
-    ss.__deleteRaw__(V2_PRIV, PRIMARY_SVC);
-    ss.__deleteRaw__(V2_PUB, PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    const restored = await KeyManager.restoreIdentityFromBackup();
-    expect(restored).toBe(true);
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(original);
-    expect(await KeyManager.verifyIdentityIntegrity()).toBe(true);
-  });
-});

package/src/crypto/__tests__/keyManager.cacheSafety.test.ts

@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Cache-poisoning safety: a thrown read must never be cached as "no identity",
- * and the create/import overwrite guards must read storage DIRECTLY (+ the
- * marker), never a stale/poisoned cache — so a transient failure can never let
- * onboarding silently overwrite a real identity.
- */
-
-import { setPlatformOS } from '../../utils/platform';
-
-jest.mock(
-  'expo-secure-store',
-  () => {
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    const { createSecureStoreMock } = require('./identityMocks');
-    return createSecureStoreMock();
-  },
-  { virtual: true },
-);
-
-jest.mock(
-  'expo-crypto',
-  () => ({
-    __esModule: true,
-    getRandomBytes: (length: number) => {
-      const out = new Uint8Array(length);
-      for (let i = 0; i < length; i++) out[i] = (Math.random() * 256) & 0xff;
-      return out;
-    },
-    digestStringAsync: async () => '0'.repeat(64),
-    CryptoDigestAlgorithm: { SHA256: 'SHA-256' },
-  }),
-  { virtual: true },
-);
-
-jest.mock('@oxy.so/protocol', () => {
-  const actual = jest.requireActual('@oxy.so/protocol');
-  // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-  const { createAsyncStorageMock } = require('./identityMocks');
-  const asyncStorage = createAsyncStorageMock();
-  return {
-    __esModule: true,
-    ...actual,
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    loadExpoCrypto: async () => require('expo-crypto'),
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    loadSecureStore: async () => require('expo-secure-store'),
-    loadAsyncStorage: async () => ({ default: asyncStorage }),
-    loadSharedIdentityBridge: async () => null,
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    loadNodeCrypto: async () => require('crypto'),
-    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports
-    getRandomBytesRN: (n: number) => require('expo-crypto').getRandomBytes(n),
-  };
-});
-
-const PRIMARY_SVC = 'oxy_identity';
-const V2_PRIV = 'oxy_identity_private_key_v2';
-const V2_PUB = 'oxy_identity_public_key_v2';
-
-interface SecureStoreTestHandle {
-  __resetStore__: () => void;
-  __getRaw__: (key: string, service?: string) => string | null;
-  __simulateKeystoreDeath__: (service: string) => void;
-  __failPlan__: { failKey?: string; failOp?: 'set' | 'get'; failTimes?: number; failService?: string };
-}
-
-describe('KeyManager cache-poisoning safety', () => {
-  let KeyManager: typeof import('../keyManager').KeyManager;
-  let IdentityAlreadyExistsError: typeof import('../keyManager').IdentityAlreadyExistsError;
-  let ss: SecureStoreTestHandle;
-
-  const km = () =>
-    KeyManager as unknown as {
-      cachedPublicKey: unknown;
-      cachedHasIdentity: unknown;
-      cachedPublicKeyResolved: unknown;
-    };
-  const resetCaches = () => {
-    km().cachedPublicKey = null;
-    km().cachedHasIdentity = null;
-    km().cachedPublicKeyResolved = false;
-  };
-
-  beforeAll(() => {
-    setPlatformOS('ios');
-    (globalThis as unknown as { navigator: unknown }).navigator = { product: 'ReactNative' };
-  });
-
-  beforeEach(async () => {
-    jest.resetModules();
-    setPlatformOS('ios');
-    ss = (await import('expo-secure-store' as string)) as unknown as SecureStoreTestHandle;
-    ss.__resetStore__();
-    const mod = await import('../keyManager');
-    KeyManager = mod.KeyManager;
-    IdentityAlreadyExistsError = mod.IdentityAlreadyExistsError;
-    resetCaches();
-  });
-
-  it('getPublicKey does NOT cache null when the read throws (a later read still succeeds)', async () => {
-    const pub = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    resetCaches();
-
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = 'get';
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = V2_PUB;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = PRIMARY_SVC;
-    await expect(KeyManager.getPublicKey()).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'IdentityUnavailableError' });
-
-    // Cache must NOT hold a null verdict — clearing the fault returns the key.
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = undefined;
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(pub.toLowerCase());
-  });
-
-  it('getPublicKey caches a genuine-absent (successful empty) read as null', async () => {
-    // Fresh device: read succeeds empty → null, cacheable.
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBeNull();
-    // The resolved-null flag is set (distinct from a thrown read).
-    expect(km().cachedPublicKeyResolved).toBe(true);
-  });
-
-  it('createIdentity overwrite guard refuses over a POISONED cache (direct read finds the identity)', async () => {
-    await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    // Poison the read cache as if a prior transient failure had "resolved null".
-    resetCaches();
-    km().cachedPublicKeyResolved = true; // getPublicKey would now claim "no identity"
-
-    await expect(KeyManager.createIdentity()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(IdentityAlreadyExistsError);
-  });
-
-  it('createIdentity overwrite guard refuses (IdentityUnavailableError) when storage throws — never writes blind', async () => {
-    const pub = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    resetCaches();
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = 'get';
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = V2_PRIV;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = PRIMARY_SVC;
-
-    await expect(KeyManager.createIdentity()).rejects.toMatchObject({ name: 'IdentityUnavailableError' });
-
-    // The identity was untouched (no blind overwrite).
-    ss.__failPlan__.failKey = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failOp = undefined;
-    ss.__failPlan__.failService = undefined;
-    resetCaches();
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(pub.toLowerCase());
-  });
-
-  it('createIdentity refuses over a LOST identity (marker present, keys gone) — routes to recovery, not create', async () => {
-    await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    ss.__simulateKeystoreDeath__(PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // Even with keys gone, the marker records an identity → refuse a blind create.
-    await expect(KeyManager.createIdentity()).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(IdentityAlreadyExistsError);
-  });
-
-  it('importKeyPair refuses a DIFFERENT key in the lost state, but ALLOWS re-importing the same (recovery)', async () => {
-    const pub = await KeyManager.createIdentity();
-    const originalPriv = await KeyManager.getPrivateKey();
-    if (!originalPriv) throw new Error('expected private key');
-    ss.__simulateKeystoreDeath__(PRIMARY_SVC);
-    resetCaches();
-
-    // A different key over a lost identity → refuse.
-    const otherPriv = (await KeyManager.generateKeyPair()).privateKey;
-    await expect(KeyManager.importKeyPair(otherPriv)).rejects.toBeInstanceOf(IdentityAlreadyExistsError);
-
-    // The SAME key (recovery-by-phrase into the lost state) → allowed.
-    resetCaches();
-    const restored = await KeyManager.importKeyPair(originalPriv);
-    expect(restored).toBe(pub.toLowerCase());
-    expect(await KeyManager.getPublicKey()).toBe(pub.toLowerCase());
-  });
-});