@oxy.so/contracts 4.16.0 → 4.21.0

package/dist/cjs/agency.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.normalizedAppEventSchema = exports.catalogRegistrationSchema = exports.appCapabilityCatalogSchema = exports.catalogEventSchema = exports.catalogToolSchema = exports.auditEventSchema = exports.auditResultSchema = exports.policyDecisionSchema = exports.invocationPrincipalSchema = exports.capabilityTicketClaimsSchema = exports.automationDefinitionSchema = exports.automationDataFlowSchema = exports.automationActorSelectionSchema = exports.automationTriggerSchema = exports.delegationGrantSchema = exports.capabilityTicketRequestSchema = exports.capabilityCoordinatorSchema = exports.executionAuthorizationRefSchema = exports.capabilityCatalogBindingSchema = exports.grantLimitSchema = exports.toolGrantOverrideSchema = exports.resourceRefSchema = exports.foregroundExecutionAuthorizationInputSchema = exports.executionActorRefSchema = exports.actorRefSchema = exports.capabilityPackageSchema = exports.CAPABILITY_PACKAGES = exports.autonomyLevelSchema = exports.AUTONOMY_LEVELS = void 0;
+exports.normalizedAppEventSchema = exports.catalogRegistrationSchema = exports.appCapabilityCatalogSchema = exports.CATALOG_INTERNAL_TRANSPORTS = exports.catalogFeatureSchema = exports.catalogEventSchema = exports.catalogToolSchema = exports.auditEventSchema = exports.auditResultSchema = exports.policyDecisionSchema = exports.invocationPrincipalSchema = exports.capabilityTicketClaimsSchema = exports.automationDefinitionSchema = exports.automationDataFlowSchema = exports.automationActorSelectionSchema = exports.automationTriggerSchema = exports.agentRequesterCeilingSchema = exports.agentRequesterCeilingWriteSchema = exports.AGENT_REQUESTER_CEILING_AUTONOMY = exports.delegationGrantSchema = exports.capabilityTicketRequestSchema = exports.capabilityCoordinatorSchema = exports.executionAuthorizationRefSchema = exports.capabilityCatalogBindingSchema = exports.grantLimitSchema = exports.toolGrantOverrideSchema = exports.resourceRefSchema = exports.foregroundExecutionAuthorizationInputSchema = exports.executionActorRefSchema = exports.actorRefSchema = exports.capabilityPackageSchema = exports.CAPABILITY_PACKAGES = exports.autonomyLevelSchema = exports.AUTONOMY_LEVELS = void 0;
 const zod_1 = require("zod");
 const capabilityInvocation_1 = require("./capabilityInvocation");
 const nonEmptyStringSchema = zod_1.z.string().trim().min(1);
@@ -143,6 +143,35 @@ exports.delegationGrantSchema = zod_1.z
     updatedAt: zod_1.z.string().datetime(),
 })
     .strict();
+/**
+ * The two levels an owner publishes for whoever uses their agent (ADR 0042):
+ * "Ver" and "Ver y actuar". A ceiling never says `draft` or `execute_on_request`:
+ * an agent is either allowed to act on its own or not at all, and nothing ever
+ * asks the person for approval.
+ */
+exports.AGENT_REQUESTER_CEILING_AUTONOMY = ['read_only', 'autonomous'];
+/** What an agent may do in one app for whoever uses it; written by an operator of the bot. */
+exports.agentRequesterCeilingWriteSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    capabilityPackages: zod_1.z.array(exports.capabilityPackageSchema),
+    capabilities: zod_1.z.array(identifierSchema).default([]),
+    toolOverrides: zod_1.z.array(exports.toolGrantOverrideSchema).default([]),
+    limits: zod_1.z.array(exports.grantLimitSchema).default([]),
+    maximumAutonomy: zod_1.z.enum(exports.AGENT_REQUESTER_CEILING_AUTONOMY),
+})
+    .strict();
+exports.agentRequesterCeilingSchema = exports.agentRequesterCeilingWriteSchema
+    .extend({
+    id: identifierSchema,
+    agentAccountId: identifierSchema,
+    appId: identifierSchema,
+    catalog: exports.capabilityCatalogBindingSchema,
+    version: zod_1.z.number().int().positive(),
+    revokedAt: zod_1.z.string().datetime().nullable(),
+    createdAt: zod_1.z.string().datetime(),
+    updatedAt: zod_1.z.string().datetime(),
+})
+    .strict();
 exports.automationTriggerSchema = zod_1.z.discriminatedUnion('type', [
     zod_1.z.object({ type: zod_1.z.literal('manual') }).strict(),
     zod_1.z
@@ -204,6 +233,8 @@ exports.capabilityTicketClaimsSchema = zod_1.z
     /** Signed only for callers that explicitly requested a pinned catalogue. */
     catalog: exports.capabilityCatalogBindingSchema.optional(),
     grantId: identifierSchema.optional(),
+    /** The owner's published ceiling that bounds an agent acting for a non-owner (ADR 0042). */
+    ceilingId: identifierSchema.optional(),
     requesterAccountId: identifierSchema,
     ownerAccountId: identifierSchema,
     actor: exports.executionActorRefSchema,
@@ -242,6 +273,24 @@ exports.capabilityTicketClaimsSchema = zod_1.z
             message: 'requester actors require their exact principal and direct read-only authority without standing grants',
         });
     }
+    if (claims.ceilingId !== undefined) {
+        if (claims.grantId !== undefined) {
+            context.addIssue({
+                code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+                path: ['ceilingId'],
+                message: 'a ticket is bounded by either a grant or a ceiling, never both',
+            });
+        }
+        if (claims.actor.type !== 'agent' ||
+            claims.ownerAccountId !== claims.requesterAccountId ||
+            claims.resource.resourceId !== claims.resource.effectiveAccountId) {
+            context.addIssue({
+                code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+                path: ['ceilingId'],
+                message: "a ceiling bounds an agent acting on the requester's own authority at an account root",
+            });
+        }
+    }
     if (claims.exp <= claims.iat) {
         context.addIssue({
             code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
@@ -303,6 +352,7 @@ exports.policyDecisionSchema = zod_1.z
     reason: identifierSchema,
     effectiveAutonomy: exports.autonomyLevelSchema.optional(),
     grantId: identifierSchema.optional(),
+    ceilingId: identifierSchema.optional(),
 })
     .strict();
 exports.auditResultSchema = zod_1.z
@@ -512,6 +562,24 @@ exports.catalogEventSchema = zod_1.z
     resourceTypes: zod_1.z.array(identifierSchema).min(1),
 })
     .strict();
+/**
+ * A feature an agent may gate on (Alia ADR 0020 §6): the app answers whether the
+ * person may use it (`checkTool`) and, when using it costs something, spends it
+ * (`consumeTool`). Both are internal tools of the same catalogue.
+ */
+exports.catalogFeatureSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    key: zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .regex(/^[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*(?:\.[a-z][a-z0-9_-]*)*$/, 'feature keys are dot-separated slugs')
+        .max(128),
+    description: nonEmptyStringSchema,
+    checkTool: identifierSchema,
+    consumeTool: identifierSchema.optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
+/** How a coordinator reaches the catalogue's internal tools. */
+exports.CATALOG_INTERNAL_TRANSPORTS = ['http', 'mcp'];
 exports.appCapabilityCatalogSchema = zod_1.z
     .object({
     schemaVersion: zod_1.z.literal('1'),
@@ -567,11 +635,54 @@ exports.appCapabilityCatalogSchema = zod_1.z
     })
         .strict()
         .optional(),
+    /**
+     * `mcp`: internal tools are served at `<internalBaseUrl>/_oxy/mcp`. Absent or
+     * `http`: each tool's `invocation` path on `internalBaseUrl`.
+     */
+    internalTransport: zod_1.z.enum(exports.CATALOG_INTERNAL_TRANSPORTS).optional(),
+    features: zod_1.z.array(exports.catalogFeatureSchema).optional(),
     tools: zod_1.z.array(exports.catalogToolSchema),
     events: zod_1.z.array(exports.catalogEventSchema),
 })
     .strict()
     .superRefine((catalog, context) => {
+    const toolsByName = new Map(catalog.tools.map((tool) => [tool.name, tool]));
+    const featureKeys = new Set();
+    for (const [index, feature] of (catalog.features ?? []).entries()) {
+        if (featureKeys.has(feature.key)) {
+            context.addIssue({
+                code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+                message: `Duplicate feature key: ${feature.key}`,
+                path: ['features', index, 'key'],
+            });
+        }
+        featureKeys.add(feature.key);
+        const check = toolsByName.get(feature.checkTool);
+        if (!check ||
+            check.effect !== 'read' ||
+            check.exposure.length !== 1 ||
+            check.exposure[0] !== 'internal') {
+            context.addIssue({
+                code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+                message: 'checkTool must name an internal-only read tool of this catalogue',
+                path: ['features', index, 'checkTool'],
+            });
+        }
+        if (feature.consumeTool !== undefined) {
+            const consume = toolsByName.get(feature.consumeTool);
+            if (!consume ||
+                consume.effect === 'read' ||
+                consume.idempotency !== 'required' ||
+                consume.exposure.length !== 1 ||
+                consume.exposure[0] !== 'internal') {
+                context.addIssue({
+                    code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+                    message: 'consumeTool must name an internal-only effectful tool that requires idempotency keys',
+                    path: ['features', index, 'consumeTool'],
+                });
+            }
+        }
+    }
     const names = new Set();
     for (const [index, tool] of catalog.tools.entries()) {
         if (names.has(tool.name)) {

package/dist/cjs/agentKeys.js

@@ -1,25 +1,24 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.agentKeyListResponseSchema = exports.ACCOUNT_AUTH_METHODS = exports.agentKeyOperationResultSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationChallengeSchema = exports.executeAgentKeyOperationSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationProofSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationSchema = exports.agentVerifyRequestSchema = exports.agentChallengeRequestSchema = exports.agentSignatureSchema = exports.agentProofClaimsSchema = exports.AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS = exports.AGENT_PROOF_TTL_MS = exports.AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE = void 0;
+exports.agentKeyListResponseSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationResultSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationChallengeSchema = exports.executeAgentKeyOperationSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationProofSchema = exports.agentKeyOperationSchema = exports.agentVerifyRequestSchema = exports.agentChallengeRequestSchema = exports.agentSignatureSchema = exports.agentProofClaimsSchema = exports.ACCOUNT_AUTH_METHODS = exports.AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS = exports.AGENT_PROOF_TTL_MS = exports.AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE = void 0;
 exports.buildAgentProofMessage = buildAgentProofMessage;
 /** Autonomous runtime proof. No private key crosses this contract. */
 const zod_1 = require("zod");
 const signIn_1 = require("./signIn");
 const identityProof_1 = require("./identityProof");
-exports.AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE = 'oxy-api/agent';
-exports.AGENT_PROOF_TTL_MS = 60000;
-exports.AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS = [
-    'agent_signin',
-    'agent_enroll',
-    'agent_rotate',
-    'agent_recover',
-    'agent_governance',
-];
+// The Zod-free half of this contract lives in `./client/` (`@oxy.so/contracts/client`);
+// it is re-exported here so the root entry is unchanged.
+const agentKeys_1 = require("./client/agentKeys");
+var agentKeys_2 = require("./client/agentKeys");
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return agentKeys_2.AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "AGENT_PROOF_TTL_MS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return agentKeys_2.AGENT_PROOF_TTL_MS; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return agentKeys_2.AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS; } });
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "ACCOUNT_AUTH_METHODS", { enumerable: true, get: function () { return agentKeys_2.ACCOUNT_AUTH_METHODS; } });
 exports.agentProofClaimsSchema = zod_1.z
     .object({
     version: zod_1.z.literal(1),
-    audience: zod_1.z.literal(exports.AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE),
-    action: zod_1.z.enum(exports.AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS),
+    audience: zod_1.z.literal(agentKeys_1.AGENT_PROOF_AUDIENCE),
+    action: zod_1.z.enum(agentKeys_1.AGENT_PROOF_ACTIONS),
     accountId: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
     actorId: zod_1.z.string().min(1),
     authMethodId: zod_1.z.string().nullable(),
@@ -101,7 +100,6 @@ exports.agentKeyOperationResultSchema = zod_1.z
     revokedMethodIds: zod_1.z.array(zod_1.z.string()),
 })
     .strict();
-exports.ACCOUNT_AUTH_METHODS = ['identity', 'agent_key'];
 /** Public credential inventory. Never includes a proof, bearer or private key. */
 exports.agentKeyListResponseSchema = zod_1.z
     .object({

package/dist/cjs/applicationRoles.js

@@ -0,0 +1,211 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Application roles — the wire contract for permissions an APPLICATION declares
+ * about its own users, and for the grants that give them to Oxy users.
+ *
+ * Oxy decides who holds an app's operator powers (who may run Mercaria's
+ * payments desk, moderate GoWay, administer Homiio), so no app keeps an
+ * allow-list of Oxy user ids in its environment. The app declares a closed
+ * vocabulary of keys, its owners grant them to people, and the app's backend
+ * asks Oxy which of them the human behind a request holds
+ * (`GET /applications/:appId/roles/me`, read through `@oxy.so/core/server`).
+ *
+ * ## Why an application key can never collide with an Oxy permission
+ *
+ * Every permission Oxy itself checks (`app:update`, `apps:create`,
+ * `credentials:rotate`, every scope) is spelled with a COLON. An application key
+ * is dot-separated lowercase segments and cannot contain one, so the two
+ * vocabularies are disjoint by syntax, not by convention. They are also stored
+ * apart (scoped to one application id) and no Oxy gate ever reads an
+ * application key. A key means something only to the application that declared
+ * it.
+ *
+ * The pattern is exported as a SOURCE string because the API renders the same
+ * text into a Postgres CHECK; JavaScript's `RegExp` and Postgres' ARE agree on
+ * everything it uses (anchors, classes, a capturing group, a bounded repeat).
+ *
+ * Platform-agnostic — zod only, no react/react-native/expo.
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.applicationRolesMeSchema = exports.listApplicationRoleGrantsQuerySchema = exports.revokeApplicationRoleGrantRequestSchema = exports.createApplicationRoleGrantRequestSchema = exports.applicationRoleGrantListSchema = exports.applicationRoleGrantSchema = exports.declareApplicationPermissionsResponseSchema = exports.applicationPermissionListSchema = exports.applicationPermissionSchema = exports.declareApplicationPermissionsRequestSchema = exports.applicationPermissionDeclarationSchema = exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema = exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_ERROR_CODES = exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_GRANTS_PAGE_MAX = exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_GRANTS_PAGE_DEFAULT = exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_REASON_MAX_LENGTH = exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSIONS_MAX_DECLARED = exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_DESCRIPTION_MAX_LENGTH = exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_MAX_LENGTH = exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN = exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN_SOURCE = void 0;
+exports.isApplicationPermissionKey = isApplicationPermissionKey;
+const zod_1 = require("zod");
+/**
+ * Two to four dot-separated segments, each a lowercase letter followed by
+ * lowercase letters, digits or underscores: `payments.operate`,
+ * `catalog.review.publish`. At least two segments so a key always names an
+ * area and an action; never a colon (see the header).
+ */
+exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN_SOURCE = '^[a-z][a-z0-9_]*(\\.[a-z][a-z0-9_]*){1,3}$';
+exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN = new RegExp(exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN_SOURCE);
+exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_MAX_LENGTH = 64;
+exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_DESCRIPTION_MAX_LENGTH = 280;
+/** How many live keys one application may declare. Operator powers are few. */
+exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSIONS_MAX_DECLARED = 64;
+exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_REASON_MAX_LENGTH = 500;
+exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_GRANTS_PAGE_DEFAULT = 50;
+exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_GRANTS_PAGE_MAX = 200;
+/**
+ * The `error` codes the application-roles routes answer beyond the generic
+ * ones (`BAD_REQUEST`, `UNAUTHORIZED`, `FORBIDDEN`, `NOT_FOUND`). Renaming one
+ * is a breaking change.
+ */
+exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_ERROR_CODES = {
+    /** 403: a grant naming yourself on an application you do not own outright. */
+    selfGrantForbidden: 'SELF_GRANT_FORBIDDEN',
+    /** 422: the key is not a live declared permission of this application. */
+    unknownPermission: 'UNKNOWN_PERMISSION',
+    /** 422: the grantee is not a person (an organization, project, bot or channel). */
+    granteeNotAPerson: 'GRANTEE_NOT_A_PERSON',
+    /** 409: the grantee already holds the key; `details.grantId` names the live grant. */
+    alreadyGranted: 'ALREADY_GRANTED',
+    /** 409: the grant was already revoked. */
+    alreadyRevoked: 'ALREADY_REVOKED',
+    /** 403: the bearer's session belongs to a DIFFERENT application. */
+    sessionApplicationMismatch: 'SESSION_APPLICATION_MISMATCH',
+};
+/** Whether `value` is a well-formed application permission key. */
+function isApplicationPermissionKey(value) {
+    return (typeof value === 'string' &&
+        value.length <= exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_MAX_LENGTH &&
+        exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN.test(value));
+}
+exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema = zod_1.z
+    .string()
+    .max(exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_MAX_LENGTH)
+    .regex(exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_KEY_PATTERN, 'A permission key is 2-4 dot-separated lowercase segments, e.g. payments.operate');
+/** Plain text: no control characters other than a newline or a tab. */
+function plainText(max) {
+    return zod_1.z
+        .string()
+        .trim()
+        .min(1)
+        .max(max)
+        .refine((value) => Array.from(value).every((character) => {
+        const code = character.charCodeAt(0);
+        return (code >= 32 && code !== 127) || character === '\n' || character === '\t';
+    }), 'Must be plain text');
+}
+const id = zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(128);
+const isoTimestamp = zod_1.z.string().min(1);
+const reasonSchema = plainText(exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_REASON_MAX_LENGTH);
+/** One key as the application's owners declare it. */
+exports.applicationPermissionDeclarationSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    key: exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema,
+    description: plainText(exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSION_DESCRIPTION_MAX_LENGTH),
+})
+    .strict();
+/**
+ * `PUT /applications/:appId/roles/permissions` — the WHOLE vocabulary.
+ *
+ * Declarative: a key present here and not live is added, a live key absent
+ * here is retired (and every grant of it revoked), a live key present here
+ * keeps its identity and takes the new description. Sending the same body twice
+ * changes nothing.
+ */
+exports.declareApplicationPermissionsRequestSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    permissions: zod_1.z
+        .array(exports.applicationPermissionDeclarationSchema)
+        .max(exports.APPLICATION_PERMISSIONS_MAX_DECLARED),
+})
+    .strict()
+    .superRefine((value, ctx) => {
+    const seen = new Set();
+    value.permissions.forEach((permission, index) => {
+        if (seen.has(permission.key)) {
+            ctx.addIssue({
+                code: zod_1.z.ZodIssueCode.custom,
+                path: ['permissions', index, 'key'],
+                message: `Duplicate permission key ${permission.key}`,
+            });
+        }
+        seen.add(permission.key);
+    });
+});
+/** A declared key. Retired keys are history: they confer nothing. */
+exports.applicationPermissionSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    key: exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema,
+    description: zod_1.z.string(),
+    declaredAt: isoTimestamp,
+    declaredByUserId: id.nullable(),
+    retiredAt: isoTimestamp.nullable(),
+    retiredByUserId: id.nullable(),
+});
+exports.applicationPermissionListSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    items: zod_1.z.array(exports.applicationPermissionSchema),
+});
+exports.declareApplicationPermissionsResponseSchema = exports.applicationPermissionListSchema.extend({
+    /** Keys that became live with this declaration. */
+    added: zod_1.z.array(exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema),
+    /** Keys this declaration retired. */
+    retired: zod_1.z.array(exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema),
+    /** Live keys whose description changed. */
+    described: zod_1.z.array(exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema),
+    /** Live grants revoked because their key was retired. */
+    revokedGrants: zod_1.z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+});
+/** One grant of one key to one Oxy user. Revocation is a stamp, never a delete. */
+exports.applicationRoleGrantSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    id,
+    applicationId: id,
+    permission: exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema,
+    userId: id,
+    /** The grantee's handle, for display. */
+    username: zod_1.z.string().nullable(),
+    /** The HUMAN who granted it; null once that account was erased. */
+    grantedByUserId: id.nullable(),
+    grantedAt: isoTimestamp,
+    grantReason: zod_1.z.string().nullable(),
+    revokedAt: isoTimestamp.nullable(),
+    revokedByUserId: id.nullable(),
+    revokeReason: zod_1.z.string().nullable(),
+});
+exports.applicationRoleGrantListSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    items: zod_1.z.array(exports.applicationRoleGrantSchema),
+    nextCursor: zod_1.z.string().nullable(),
+});
+/** `POST /applications/:appId/roles/grants` — name the grantee by id OR handle. */
+exports.createApplicationRoleGrantRequestSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    userId: id.optional(),
+    username: zod_1.z.string().trim().min(1).max(64).optional(),
+    permission: exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema,
+    reason: reasonSchema.optional(),
+})
+    .strict()
+    .refine((value) => (value.userId === undefined) !== (value.username === undefined), {
+    message: 'Name the grantee with exactly one of userId or username',
+    path: ['userId'],
+});
+/** `POST /applications/:appId/roles/grants/:grantId/revoke`. */
+exports.revokeApplicationRoleGrantRequestSchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    reason: reasonSchema.optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
+/** `GET /applications/:appId/roles/grants` query. */
+exports.listApplicationRoleGrantsQuerySchema = zod_1.z
+    .object({
+    permission: exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema.optional(),
+    userId: id.optional(),
+    includeRevoked: zod_1.z
+        .enum(['true', 'false'])
+        .transform((value) => value === 'true')
+        .optional(),
+    limit: zod_1.z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(exports.APPLICATION_ROLE_GRANTS_PAGE_MAX).optional(),
+    cursor: zod_1.z.string().min(1).max(512).optional(),
+})
+    .strict();
+/**
+ * `GET /applications/:appId/roles/me` — the keys the HUMAN behind the bearer
+ * holds for this application, in no particular order. `userId` is that human
+ * (the operator), which is NOT the account the session speaks as when a person
+ * is acting as an organization.
+ */
+exports.applicationRolesMeSchema = zod_1.z.object({
+    applicationId: id,
+    userId: id,
+    permissions: zod_1.z.array(exports.applicationPermissionKeySchema),
+});

package/dist/cjs/client/accountEmail.js

@@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
+"use strict";
+/**
+ * Account-email constants and response checks, without Zod. Schemas: `../accountEmail.ts`.
+ *
+ * Part of `@oxy.so/contracts/client`: never import `zod` here (see `./check.ts`).
+ */
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.emailVerificationConfirmResponseCheck = exports.emailVerificationStartResponseCheck = exports.emailTicketCheck = exports.emailAddressCheck = exports.EMAIL_VERIFICATION_ERROR_CODES = exports.EMAIL_TICKET_TTL_MS = exports.EMAIL_CODE_MAX_ATTEMPTS = exports.EMAIL_CODE_TTL_MS = exports.EMAIL_CODE_LENGTH = exports.EMAIL_VERIFICATION_PURPOSES = void 0;
+const check_1 = require("./check");
+/**
+ * - `signup`: above.
+ * - `signin`: the code (and link) of an email sign-in (`POST /auth/signin/email/start`).
+ * - `reauth`: a signed-in person proving it is them before a sensitive step
+ *   (`POST /users/me/reauth/email`): a password, an authenticator, deleting the
+ *   account, linking Commons.
+ */
+exports.EMAIL_VERIFICATION_PURPOSES = ['signup', 'signin', 'reauth'];
+/** Digits in a code. */
+exports.EMAIL_CODE_LENGTH = 6;
+/** How long a code can be confirmed. */
+exports.EMAIL_CODE_TTL_MS = 10 * 60 * 1000;
+/** Wrong codes before a verification is spent and a new code is needed. */
+exports.EMAIL_CODE_MAX_ATTEMPTS = 5;
+/** How long a confirmed code's ticket can be spent. */
+exports.EMAIL_TICKET_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
+/**
+ * Stable error codes (`error.code` in the API error body). Clients map these
+ * through their localization, never the English message.
+ */
+exports.EMAIL_VERIFICATION_ERROR_CODES = {
+    /** The code is wrong, or its verification expired or was spent. */
+    codeInvalid: 'EMAIL_CODE_INVALID',
+    /** Too many wrong codes: request a new one. */
+    tooManyAttempts: 'EMAIL_CODE_TOO_MANY_ATTEMPTS',
+    /** The ticket is unknown, expired, spent, or for another email or purpose. */
+    ticketInvalid: 'EMAIL_TICKET_INVALID',
+    /** A sign-up without a confirmed email. */
+    ticketRequired: 'EMAIL_TICKET_REQUIRED',
+    /** This server cannot send mail. */
+    unavailable: 'EMAIL_UNAVAILABLE',
+};
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+/*  Checks                                                                    */
+/* -------------------------------------------------------------------------- */
+exports.emailAddressCheck = (0, check_1.string)(check_1.trim, check_1.toLowerCase, (0, check_1.minLength)(3), (0, check_1.maxLength)(254), check_1.email);
+exports.emailTicketCheck = (0, check_1.string)(check_1.trim, (0, check_1.pattern)(/^[A-Za-z0-9_-]{43}$/, 'ticket must be 32 bytes of base64url'));
+exports.emailVerificationStartResponseCheck = (0, check_1.exact)()((0, check_1.object)({ verificationId: (0, check_1.string)((0, check_1.minLength)(1), (0, check_1.maxLength)(64)), expiresAt: (0, check_1.number)(check_1.int, check_1.positive) }));
+exports.emailVerificationConfirmResponseCheck = (0, check_1.exact)()((0, check_1.object)({ ticket: exports.emailTicketCheck, expiresAt: (0, check_1.number)(check_1.int, check_1.positive) }));