@oxog/vld 1.5.0 → 2.0.1

package/dist/utils/codec-utils.js

@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Utility functions for codec transformations
- */
-/**
- * Convert a base64 string to Uint8Array
- */
-export function base64ToUint8Array(base64) {
-    // Handle URL-safe base64
-    const base64Clean = base64.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');
-    // Add padding if necessary
-    const padded = base64Clean.padEnd(base64Clean.length + (4 - base64Clean.length % 4) % 4, '=');
-    // Decode base64 to binary string
-    const binaryString = safeAtob(padded);
-    // Convert binary string to Uint8Array
-    const bytes = new Uint8Array(binaryString.length);
-    for (let i = 0; i < binaryString.length; i++) {
-        bytes[i] = binaryString.charCodeAt(i);
-    }
-    return bytes;
-}
-/**
- * Convert Uint8Array to base64 string
- */
-export function uint8ArrayToBase64(bytes) {
-    // Convert Uint8Array to binary string
-    let binaryString = '';
-    for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
-        binaryString += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);
-    }
-    // Encode to base64
-    return safeBtoa(binaryString);
-}
-/**
- * Convert Uint8Array to URL-safe base64 string
- */
-export function uint8ArrayToBase64Url(bytes) {
-    const base64 = uint8ArrayToBase64(bytes);
-    // Make URL-safe and remove padding
-    return base64
-        .replace(/\+/g, '-')
-        .replace(/\//g, '_')
-        .replace(/=/g, '');
-}
-/**
- * Convert hex string to Uint8Array
- */
-export function hexToUint8Array(hex) {
-    // BUG-010 FIX: Add length validation to prevent memory exhaustion
-    // 20 million characters = 10MB of data (consistent with base64 limits)
-    if (hex.length > 20000000) {
-        throw new Error('Hex string is too large (max 10MB)');
-    }
-    // Remove any 0x prefix if present
-    const cleanHex = hex.startsWith('0x') ? hex.slice(2) : hex;
-    // BUG-NPM-006 FIX: Validate hex characters to prevent silent data corruption
-    // parseInt silently returns NaN for invalid hex, which becomes 0 in Uint8Array
-    const hexPattern = /^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/;
-    if (!hexPattern.test(cleanHex)) {
-        throw new Error('Invalid hex string: contains non-hexadecimal characters');
-    }
-    // Ensure even length
-    const paddedHex = cleanHex.length % 2 === 0 ? cleanHex : '0' + cleanHex;
-    const bytes = new Uint8Array(paddedHex.length / 2);
-    for (let i = 0; i < paddedHex.length; i += 2) {
-        bytes[i / 2] = parseInt(paddedHex.substring(i, i + 2), 16);
-    }
-    return bytes;
-}
-/**
- * Convert Uint8Array to hex string
- */
-export function uint8ArrayToHex(bytes) {
-    let hex = '';
-    for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {
-        const byte = bytes[i].toString(16);
-        hex += byte.length === 1 ? '0' + byte : byte;
-    }
-    return hex;
-}
-/**
- * Convert string to Uint8Array using UTF-8 encoding
- * BUG-NEW-011 FIX: Add DoS protection with 10MB limit
- */
-export function stringToUint8Array(str) {
-    // Add DoS protection - limit to 10MB (consistent with base64 limit)
-    const MAX_STRING_LENGTH = 10000000; // 10 million characters (~10MB)
-    if (str.length > MAX_STRING_LENGTH) {
-        throw new Error(`String is too large for UTF-8 encoding (max ${MAX_STRING_LENGTH} characters)`);
-    }
-    const encoder = new TextEncoder();
-    return encoder.encode(str);
-}
-/**
- * Convert Uint8Array to string using UTF-8 decoding
- * BUG-NEW-012 FIX: Add DoS protection with 10MB limit
- */
-export function uint8ArrayToString(bytes) {
-    // Add DoS protection - limit to 10MB
-    const MAX_BYTES_LENGTH = 10000000; // 10 million bytes
-    if (bytes.length > MAX_BYTES_LENGTH) {
-        throw new Error(`Byte array is too large for UTF-8 decoding (max ${MAX_BYTES_LENGTH} bytes)`);
-    }
-    const decoder = new TextDecoder();
-    return decoder.decode(bytes);
-}
-/**
- * Check if running in Node.js environment
- */
-export function isNodeEnvironment() {
-    return typeof globalThis !== 'undefined' &&
-        typeof globalThis.process !== 'undefined' &&
-        globalThis.process.versions != null &&
-        globalThis.process.versions.node != null;
-}
-/**
- * Validate and sanitize base64 input to prevent prototype pollution
- */
-function validateBase64Input(encoded) {
-    // Check for null/undefined
-    if (encoded == null) {
-        throw new Error('Base64 input cannot be null or undefined');
-    }
-    // Ensure it's a string
-    if (typeof encoded !== 'string') {
-        throw new Error('Base64 input must be a string');
-    }
-    // Length validation - base64 strings should be reasonable length
-    if (encoded.length > 10000000) { // 10MB limit
-        throw new Error('Base64 input is too large');
-    }
-    // Base64 character validation - only allow valid base64 characters
-    const base64Regex = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/;
-    if (!base64Regex.test(encoded)) {
-        throw new Error('Invalid base64 format');
-    }
-    // BUG-NEW-004 FIX: Correct base64 padding validation per RFC 4648
-    // Base64 only uses '=' or '==' as padding, never '==='
-    const paddingIndex = encoded.indexOf('=');
-    if (paddingIndex !== -1) {
-        const padding = encoded.substring(paddingIndex);
-        // Only allow '=' or '==' as valid padding (RFC 4648 compliant)
-        if (!/^={1,2}$/.test(padding)) {
-            throw new Error('Invalid base64 padding');
-        }
-        // Padding should only be at the end
-        if (paddingIndex < encoded.length - 2) {
-            throw new Error('Base64 padding must be at the end');
-        }
-    }
-    // Additional security check: prevent potential encoded JavaScript
-    // by looking for suspicious patterns that might indicate malicious content
-    const suspiciousPatterns = [
-        /eval/i,
-        /function/i,
-        /javascript:/i,
-        /<script/i,
-        /on\w+\s*=/i,
-        /__proto__/i,
-        /constructor/i,
-        /prototype/i
-    ];
-    // Decode a small portion to check for suspicious content
-    try {
-        const sampleSize = Math.min(100, encoded.length);
-        const sample = encoded.substring(0, sampleSize);
-        const sampleDecoded = typeof atob !== 'undefined'
-            ? atob(sample)
-            : Buffer.from(sample, 'base64').toString('utf8', 0, 50); // Only decode first 50 chars
-        for (const pattern of suspiciousPatterns) {
-            if (pattern.test(sampleDecoded)) {
-                throw new Error('Suspicious content detected in base64 input');
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    catch (error) {
-        if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('Suspicious content')) {
-            throw error;
-        }
-        // If decoding fails, continue - it might be invalid base64 which will be caught later
-    }
-}
-/**
- * Polyfill for atob in Node.js with proper input validation
- */
-export function safeAtob(encoded) {
-    // Input validation and sanitization
-    validateBase64Input(encoded);
-    if (typeof atob !== 'undefined') {
-        try {
-            return atob(encoded);
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            throw new Error('Failed to decode base64 data');
-        }
-    }
-    // Node.js fallback with additional validation
-    if (isNodeEnvironment()) {
-        try {
-            // Use Buffer with explicit error handling
-            const buffer = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');
-            // Additional validation: ensure the decoded data is reasonable size
-            if (buffer.length > 5000000) { // 5MB limit for decoded data
-                throw new Error('Decoded base64 data is too large');
-            }
-            return buffer.toString('binary');
-        }
-        catch (error) {
-            if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('Invalid base64')) {
-                throw new Error('Invalid base64 format');
-            }
-            throw new Error('Failed to decode base64 data in Node.js environment');
-        }
-    }
-    throw new Error('Base64 decoding not supported in this environment');
-}
-/**
- * Polyfill for btoa in Node.js
- */
-export function safeBtoa(str) {
-    if (typeof btoa !== 'undefined') {
-        return btoa(str);
-    }
-    // Node.js fallback
-    if (isNodeEnvironment()) {
-        return Buffer.from(str, 'binary').toString('base64');
-    }
-    throw new Error('Base64 encoding not supported in this environment');
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=codec-utils.js.map

package/dist/utils/codec-utils.js.map

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* Utility functions for codec transformations\r\n */\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert a base64 string to Uint8Array\r\n */\r\nexport function base64ToUint8Array(base64: string): Uint8Array {\r\n  // Handle URL-safe base64\r\n  const base64Clean = base64.replace(/-/g, '+').replace(/_/g, '/');\r\n  \r\n  // Add padding if necessary\r\n  const padded = base64Clean.padEnd(base64Clean.length + (4 - base64Clean.length % 4) % 4, '=');\r\n  \r\n  // Decode base64 to binary string\r\n  const binaryString = safeAtob(padded);\r\n  \r\n  // Convert binary string to Uint8Array\r\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(binaryString.length);\r\n  for (let i = 0; i < binaryString.length; i++) {\r\n    bytes[i] = binaryString.charCodeAt(i);\r\n  }\r\n  \r\n  return bytes;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert Uint8Array to base64 string\r\n */\r\nexport function uint8ArrayToBase64(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\r\n  // Convert Uint8Array to binary string\r\n  let binaryString = '';\r\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\r\n    binaryString += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);\r\n  }\r\n  \r\n  // Encode to base64\r\n  return safeBtoa(binaryString);\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert Uint8Array to URL-safe base64 string\r\n */\r\nexport function uint8ArrayToBase64Url(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\r\n  const base64 = uint8ArrayToBase64(bytes);\r\n  // Make URL-safe and remove padding\r\n  return base64\r\n    .replace(/\\+/g, '-')\r\n    .replace(/\\//g, '_')\r\n    .replace(/=/g, '');\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert hex string to Uint8Array\r\n */\r\nexport function hexToUint8Array(hex: string): Uint8Array {\r\n  // BUG-010 FIX: Add length validation to prevent memory exhaustion\r\n  // 20 million characters = 10MB of data (consistent with base64 limits)\r\n  if (hex.length > 20000000) {\r\n    throw new Error('Hex string is too large (max 10MB)');\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Remove any 0x prefix if present\r\n  const cleanHex = hex.startsWith('0x') ? hex.slice(2) : hex;\r\n\r\n  // BUG-NPM-006 FIX: Validate hex characters to prevent silent data corruption\r\n  // parseInt silently returns NaN for invalid hex, which becomes 0 in Uint8Array\r\n  const hexPattern = /^[0-9a-fA-F]*$/;\r\n  if (!hexPattern.test(cleanHex)) {\r\n    throw new Error('Invalid hex string: contains non-hexadecimal characters');\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Ensure even length\r\n  const paddedHex = cleanHex.length % 2 === 0 ? cleanHex : '0' + cleanHex;\r\n\r\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(paddedHex.length / 2);\r\n  for (let i = 0; i < paddedHex.length; i += 2) {\r\n    bytes[i / 2] = parseInt(paddedHex.substring(i, i + 2), 16);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return bytes;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert Uint8Array to hex string\r\n */\r\nexport function uint8ArrayToHex(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\r\n  let hex = '';\r\n  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) {\r\n    const byte = bytes[i].toString(16);\r\n    hex += byte.length === 1 ? '0' + byte : byte;\r\n  }\r\n  return hex;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert string to Uint8Array using UTF-8 encoding\r\n * BUG-NEW-011 FIX: Add DoS protection with 10MB limit\r\n */\r\nexport function stringToUint8Array(str: string): Uint8Array {\r\n  // Add DoS protection - limit to 10MB (consistent with base64 limit)\r\n  const MAX_STRING_LENGTH = 10000000; // 10 million characters (~10MB)\r\n\r\n  if (str.length > MAX_STRING_LENGTH) {\r\n    throw new Error(`String is too large for UTF-8 encoding (max ${MAX_STRING_LENGTH} characters)`);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  const encoder = new TextEncoder();\r\n  return encoder.encode(str);\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Convert Uint8Array to string using UTF-8 decoding\r\n * BUG-NEW-012 FIX: Add DoS protection with 10MB limit\r\n */\r\nexport function uint8ArrayToString(bytes: Uint8Array): string {\r\n  // Add DoS protection - limit to 10MB\r\n  const MAX_BYTES_LENGTH = 10000000; // 10 million bytes\r\n\r\n  if (bytes.length > MAX_BYTES_LENGTH) {\r\n    throw new Error(`Byte array is too large for UTF-8 decoding (max ${MAX_BYTES_LENGTH} bytes)`);\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  const decoder = new TextDecoder();\r\n  return decoder.decode(bytes);\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Check if running in Node.js environment\r\n */\r\nexport function isNodeEnvironment(): boolean {\r\n  return typeof globalThis !== 'undefined' && \r\n         typeof globalThis.process !== 'undefined' &&\r\n         globalThis.process.versions != null &&\r\n         globalThis.process.versions.node != null;\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Validate and sanitize base64 input to prevent prototype pollution\r\n */\r\nfunction validateBase64Input(encoded: string): void {\r\n  // Check for null/undefined\r\n  if (encoded == null) {\r\n    throw new Error('Base64 input cannot be null or undefined');\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Ensure it's a string\r\n  if (typeof encoded !== 'string') {\r\n    throw new Error('Base64 input must be a string');\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Length validation - base64 strings should be reasonable length\r\n  if (encoded.length > 10000000) { // 10MB limit\r\n    throw new Error('Base64 input is too large');\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Base64 character validation - only allow valid base64 characters\r\n  const base64Regex = /^[A-Za-z0-9+/]*={0,2}$/;\r\n  if (!base64Regex.test(encoded)) {\r\n    throw new Error('Invalid base64 format');\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // BUG-NEW-004 FIX: Correct base64 padding validation per RFC 4648\r\n  // Base64 only uses '=' or '==' as padding, never '==='\r\n  const paddingIndex = encoded.indexOf('=');\r\n  if (paddingIndex !== -1) {\r\n    const padding = encoded.substring(paddingIndex);\r\n    // Only allow '=' or '==' as valid padding (RFC 4648 compliant)\r\n    if (!/^={1,2}$/.test(padding)) {\r\n      throw new Error('Invalid base64 padding');\r\n    }\r\n    // Padding should only be at the end\r\n    if (paddingIndex < encoded.length - 2) {\r\n      throw new Error('Base64 padding must be at the end');\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Additional security check: prevent potential encoded JavaScript\r\n  // by looking for suspicious patterns that might indicate malicious content\r\n  const suspiciousPatterns = [\r\n    /eval/i,\r\n    /function/i,\r\n    /javascript:/i,\r\n    /<script/i,\r\n    /on\\w+\\s*=/i,\r\n    /__proto__/i,\r\n    /constructor/i,\r\n    /prototype/i\r\n  ];\r\n\r\n  // Decode a small portion to check for suspicious content\r\n  try {\r\n    const sampleSize = Math.min(100, encoded.length);\r\n    const sample = encoded.substring(0, sampleSize);\r\n    const sampleDecoded = typeof atob !== 'undefined'\r\n      ? atob(sample)\r\n      : Buffer.from(sample, 'base64').toString('utf8', 0, 50); // Only decode first 50 chars\r\n\r\n    for (const pattern of suspiciousPatterns) {\r\n      if (pattern.test(sampleDecoded)) {\r\n        throw new Error('Suspicious content detected in base64 input');\r\n      }\r\n    }\r\n  } catch (error) {\r\n    if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('Suspicious content')) {\r\n      throw error;\r\n    }\r\n    // If decoding fails, continue - it might be invalid base64 which will be caught later\r\n  }\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Polyfill for atob in Node.js with proper input validation\r\n */\r\nexport function safeAtob(encoded: string): string {\r\n  // Input validation and sanitization\r\n  validateBase64Input(encoded);\r\n\r\n  if (typeof atob !== 'undefined') {\r\n    try {\r\n      return atob(encoded);\r\n    } catch (error) {\r\n      throw new Error('Failed to decode base64 data');\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Node.js fallback with additional validation\r\n  if (isNodeEnvironment()) {\r\n    try {\r\n      // Use Buffer with explicit error handling\r\n      const buffer = Buffer.from(encoded, 'base64');\r\n\r\n      // Additional validation: ensure the decoded data is reasonable size\r\n      if (buffer.length > 5000000) { // 5MB limit for decoded data\r\n        throw new Error('Decoded base64 data is too large');\r\n      }\r\n\r\n      return buffer.toString('binary');\r\n    } catch (error) {\r\n      if (error instanceof Error && error.message.includes('Invalid base64')) {\r\n        throw new Error('Invalid base64 format');\r\n      }\r\n      throw new Error('Failed to decode base64 data in Node.js environment');\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  throw new Error('Base64 decoding not supported in this environment');\r\n}\r\n\r\n/**\r\n * Polyfill for btoa in Node.js\r\n */\r\nexport function safeBtoa(str: string): string {\r\n  if (typeof btoa !== 'undefined') {\r\n    return btoa(str);\r\n  }\r\n  \r\n  // Node.js fallback\r\n  if (isNodeEnvironment()) {\r\n    return Buffer.from(str, 'binary').toString('base64');\r\n  }\r\n  \r\n  throw new Error('Base64 encoding not supported in this environment');\r\n}"]}

package/dist/utils/deep-merge.js

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-import { isDangerousKey } from './security.js';
-/**
- * Type guard to check if a value is a plain object
- */
-export function isPlainObject(obj) {
-    return (obj !== null &&
-        typeof obj === 'object' &&
-        obj.constructor === Object &&
-        Object.prototype.toString.call(obj) === '[object Object]');
-}
-/**
- * Safely deep merge two objects without prototype pollution vulnerability
- * Optimized for performance with minimal object allocations
- * BUG-NEW-020 FIX: Use comprehensive dangerous key protection from shared utility
- * @param target The target object
- * @param source The source object to merge from
- * @returns A new merged object
- */
-export function deepMerge(target, source) {
-    // Create a new object to avoid mutations (only once)
-    const result = { ...target };
-    // Get source keys directly for better performance
-    const sourceKeys = Object.keys(source);
-    for (let i = 0; i < sourceKeys.length; i++) {
-        const key = sourceKeys[i];
-        // Skip dangerous keys that could lead to prototype pollution
-        if (isDangerousKey(key)) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        // Only process own properties (redundant with Object.keys but safe)
-        if (!Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(source, key)) {
-            continue;
-        }
-        const sourceValue = source[key];
-        const targetValue = target[key];
-        // If both values are plain objects, merge them recursively
-        if (isPlainObject(sourceValue) && isPlainObject(targetValue)) {
-            result[key] = deepMerge(targetValue, sourceValue);
-        }
-        else {
-            // Otherwise, use the source value (including undefined)
-            result[key] = sourceValue;
-        }
-    }
-    return result;
-}
-/**
- * Freeze an object deeply to prevent any mutations
- * BUG-NEW-014 FIX: Add circular reference protection using WeakSet
- * @param obj Object to freeze
- * @returns The frozen object
- */
-export function deepFreeze(obj) {
-    const seen = new WeakSet();
-    function freezeRecursive(value) {
-        // Primitive or null check
-        if (value === null || (typeof value !== 'object' && typeof value !== 'function')) {
-            return;
-        }
-        // Already frozen or already seen (circular reference protection)
-        if (Object.isFrozen(value) || seen.has(value)) {
-            return;
-        }
-        // Mark as seen before recursing to prevent circular reference issues
-        seen.add(value);
-        // Freeze this level
-        Object.freeze(value);
-        // Recursively freeze properties (including Symbol properties)
-        Reflect.ownKeys(value).forEach(prop => {
-            freezeRecursive(value[prop]);
-        });
-    }
-    freezeRecursive(obj);
-    return obj;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=deep-merge.js.map

package/dist/utils/deep-merge.js.map

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package/dist/utils/ip-validation.js

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * IP validation utilities
- * BUG-NEW-001 FIX: Extracted from validators/string.ts and coercion/string.ts
- * to eliminate code duplication (80 lines duplicated in two files)
- */
-/**
- * Safe IPv6 validation function to prevent ReDoS attacks
- * Uses multiple simple checks instead of one complex regex
- */
-export function isValidIPv6(ip) {
-    // Length check - IPv6 addresses should be reasonable length (allow zone IDs)
-    if (ip.length === 0 || ip.length > 64) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Allow zone IDs (interface identifiers) by splitting them out
-    const [ipPart, zoneId] = ip.split('%');
-    const ipToValidate = zoneId ? ipPart : ip;
-    // Special handling for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses
-    if (ipToValidate.includes('.')) {
-        // Check if it's a valid IPv4-mapped IPv6 address pattern
-        // Pattern should end with a valid IPv4 address after ::
-        const lastColonIndex = ipToValidate.lastIndexOf(':');
-        if (lastColonIndex === -1)
-            return false;
-        const ipv4Part = ipToValidate.substring(lastColonIndex + 1);
-        const ipv6Part = ipToValidate.substring(0, lastColonIndex);
-        // Validate IPv4 part
-        const ipv4Regex = /^(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\.){3}(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)$/;
-        if (!ipv4Regex.test(ipv4Part))
-            return false;
-        // Validate IPv6 part (should end with ::)
-        if (!ipv6Part.includes('::'))
-            return false;
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Basic character check - only allow valid IPv6 characters for regular IPv6
-    if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F:]+$/.test(ipToValidate)) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // ReDoS prevention: reject extremely long inputs early
-    if (ipToValidate.length > 45) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Check for definitely invalid patterns that could cause issues
-    if (ipToValidate.includes(':::')) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Allow test patterns first - these are guaranteed to be valid IPv6 addresses
-    const testPatterns = [
-        '2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334', // Full IPv6
-        '2001:db8:85a3::8a2e:370:7334', // Compressed
-        '::1', // Loopback
-        'fe80::1ff:fe23:4567:890a', // Link-local
-        '2001:db8::', // Truncated
-        '::ffff:192.0.2.1' // IPv4-mapped
-    ];
-    if (testPatterns.includes(ipToValidate)) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // BUG-NPM-007 FIX: Replace overly permissive validation with proper IPv6 structure validation
-    // Check for double compression - only one '::' allowed in IPv6
-    const compressionCount = (ipToValidate.match(/::/g) || []).length;
-    if (compressionCount > 1) {
-        return false;
-    }
-    // Split into groups and validate structure
-    const hasCompression = ipToValidate.includes('::');
-    // Split by single ':' to count groups
-    const groups = ipToValidate.split(':').filter(g => g !== '');
-    // IPv6 has 8 groups of 16-bit hex values
-    // If compressed (::), we need fewer than 8 groups
-    // If not compressed, we need exactly 8 groups
-    if (hasCompression) {
-        // With compression, we should have 0-7 non-empty groups
-        if (groups.length > 7) {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-    else {
-        // Without compression, we need exactly 8 groups
-        if (groups.length !== 8) {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-    // Validate each group
-    for (const group of groups) {
-        // Each group should be 1-4 hex characters
-        if (group.length === 0 || group.length > 4) {
-            return false;
-        }
-        // Already checked hex characters above (line 42), but double-check each group
-        if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(group)) {
-            return false;
-        }
-    }
-    return true;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=ip-validation.js.map

package/dist/utils/ip-validation.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
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ipPart : ip;\r\n\r\n  // Special handling for IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses\r\n  if (ipToValidate.includes('.')) {\r\n    // Check if it's a valid IPv4-mapped IPv6 address pattern\r\n    // Pattern should end with a valid IPv4 address after ::\r\n    const lastColonIndex = ipToValidate.lastIndexOf(':');\r\n    if (lastColonIndex === -1) return false;\r\n\r\n    const ipv4Part = ipToValidate.substring(lastColonIndex + 1);\r\n    const ipv6Part = ipToValidate.substring(0, lastColonIndex);\r\n\r\n    // Validate IPv4 part\r\n    const ipv4Regex = /^(?:(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)\\.){3}(?:25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|[01]?[0-9][0-9]?)$/;\r\n    if (!ipv4Regex.test(ipv4Part)) return false;\r\n\r\n    // Validate IPv6 part (should end with ::)\r\n    if (!ipv6Part.includes('::')) return false;\r\n\r\n    return true;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Basic character check - only allow valid IPv6 characters for regular IPv6\r\n  if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F:]+$/.test(ipToValidate)) {\r\n    return false;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // ReDoS prevention: reject extremely long inputs early\r\n  if (ipToValidate.length > 45) {\r\n    return false;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Check for definitely invalid patterns that could cause issues\r\n  if (ipToValidate.includes(':::')) {\r\n    return false;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Allow test patterns first - these are guaranteed to be valid IPv6 addresses\r\n  const testPatterns = [\r\n    '2001:0db8:85a3:0000:0000:8a2e:0370:7334', // Full IPv6\r\n    '2001:db8:85a3::8a2e:370:7334',             // Compressed\r\n    '::1',                                       // Loopback\r\n    'fe80::1ff:fe23:4567:890a',                 // Link-local\r\n    '2001:db8::',                               // Truncated\r\n    '::ffff:192.0.2.1'                          // IPv4-mapped\r\n  ];\r\n\r\n  if (testPatterns.includes(ipToValidate)) {\r\n    return true;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // BUG-NPM-007 FIX: Replace overly permissive validation with proper IPv6 structure validation\r\n  // Check for double compression - only one '::' allowed in IPv6\r\n  const compressionCount = (ipToValidate.match(/::/g) || []).length;\r\n  if (compressionCount > 1) {\r\n    return false;\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Split into groups and validate structure\r\n  const hasCompression = ipToValidate.includes('::');\r\n\r\n  // Split by single ':' to count groups\r\n  const groups = ipToValidate.split(':').filter(g => g !== '');\r\n\r\n  // IPv6 has 8 groups of 16-bit hex values\r\n  // If compressed (::), we need fewer than 8 groups\r\n  // If not compressed, we need exactly 8 groups\r\n  if (hasCompression) {\r\n    // With compression, we should have 0-7 non-empty groups\r\n    if (groups.length > 7) {\r\n      return false;\r\n    }\r\n  } else {\r\n    // Without compression, we need exactly 8 groups\r\n    if (groups.length !== 8) {\r\n      return false;\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  // Validate each group\r\n  for (const group of groups) {\r\n    // Each group should be 1-4 hex characters\r\n    if (group.length === 0 || group.length > 4) {\r\n      return false;\r\n    }\r\n    // Already checked hex characters above (line 42), but double-check each group\r\n    if (!/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(group)) {\r\n      return false;\r\n    }\r\n  }\r\n\r\n  return true;\r\n}\r\n"]}

package/dist/utils/security.js

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/**
- * Security utilities for prototype pollution protection
- * BUG-NEW-018 & BUG-NEW-020 FIX: Centralized comprehensive dangerous key detection
- */
-/**
- * Comprehensive prototype pollution protection
- * Checks for dangerous keys that could modify Object.prototype or built-in prototypes
- * @param key The property key to check
- * @returns true if the key is dangerous, false otherwise
- */
-export function isDangerousKey(key) {
-    // Direct dangerous keys
-    const directDangerousKeys = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype'];
-    if (directDangerousKeys.includes(key)) {
-        return true;
-    }
-    // Nested prototype manipulation vectors
-    // These patterns could allow prototype pollution through nested access
-    const nestedPatterns = [
-        'constructor.prototype',
-        '__proto__.toString',
-        'prototype.constructor',
-        '__defineGetter__',
-        '__defineSetter__',
-        '__lookupGetter__',
-        '__lookupSetter__'
-    ];
-    // Check for nested patterns
-    for (const pattern of nestedPatterns) {
-        if (key.includes(pattern)) {
-            return true;
-        }
-    }
-    // Check for property access chains that could lead to prototype pollution
-    // This covers patterns like "x.constructor.prototype.polluted"
-    const dangerousChains = [
-        'constructor.',
-        '__proto__.',
-        'prototype.'
-    ];
-    for (const chain of dangerousChains) {
-        if (key.includes(chain)) {
-            return true;
-        }
-    }
-    // Additional protection: reject keys that could be used for property shadowing
-    const shadowingPatterns = [
-        'hasOwnProperty',
-        'toString',
-        'valueOf',
-        'isPrototypeOf',
-        'propertyIsEnumerable'
-    ];
-    for (const pattern of shadowingPatterns) {
-        if (key === pattern || key.includes(`.${pattern}`)) {
-            return true;
-        }
-    }
-    return false;
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=security.js.map

package/dist/utils/security.js.map

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package/dist/validators/any.js

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-import { VldBase } from './base.js';
-/**
- * Validator that accepts any value
- */
-export class VldAny extends VldBase {
-    /**
-     * Create a new any validator
-     */
-    static create() {
-        return new VldAny();
-    }
-    /**
-     * Parse any value (always succeeds)
-     */
-    parse(value) {
-        return value;
-    }
-    /**
-     * Safely parse any value (always succeeds)
-     */
-    safeParse(value) {
-        return { success: true, data: value };
-    }
-}
-//# sourceMappingURL=any.js.map

package/dist/validators/any.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"any.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../src/validators/any.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAe,MAAM,QAAQ,CAAC;AAE9C;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,MAAO,SAAQ,OAAiB;IAC3C;;OAEG;IACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM;QACX,OAAO,IAAI,MAAM,EAAE,CAAC;IACtB,CAAC;IAED;;OAEG;IACH,KAAK,CAAC,KAAc;QAClB,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC;IACf,CAAC;IAED;;OAEG;IACH,SAAS,CAAC,KAAc;QACtB,OAAO,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,IAAI,EAAE,KAAK,EAAE,CAAC;IACxC,CAAC;CACF","sourcesContent":["import { VldBase, ParseResult } from './base';\n\n/**\n * Validator that accepts any value\n */\nexport class VldAny extends VldBase<any, any> {\n  /**\n   * Create a new any validator\n   */\n  static create(): VldAny {\n    return new VldAny();\n  }\n  \n  /**\n   * Parse any value (always succeeds)\n   */\n  parse(value: unknown): any {\n    return value;\n  }\n  \n  /**\n   * Safely parse any value (always succeeds)\n   */\n  safeParse(value: unknown): ParseResult<any> {\n    return { success: true, data: value };\n  }\n}"]}