@ouro.bot/cli 0.1.0-alpha.92 → 0.1.0-alpha.920

package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,1254 @@
+#!/usr/local/bin/node
+// Sanctuary Butler automated update path.
+//
+// One tool for the whole upgrade, built after a manual upgrade attempt took the
+// household's Telegram bot down twice: once from a hand-rolled migration, once
+// from a shipped-install defect discovered only AFTER the bot token had been
+// revoked. The lesson both times was the same — verify the end state, and prove
+// the upgrade can succeed BEFORE doing anything irreversible.
+//
+// Phases (each idempotent, each stops on the first failure):
+//   preflight  read-only rehearsal. Proves the install can succeed and touches
+//              nothing. Its centerpiece is the fenced vault-read check (D-018):
+//              the exact operation that failed the last upgrade, run before the
+//              token is ever rotated.
+//   prepare    extract the package, build the manifest + request, stage inputs,
+//              verify against the installer's own rules. Writes only to the
+//              authority staging area; the running Butler is untouched.
+//   install    drive the DockerMan authority transaction to completion, with
+//              automatic rollback on ANY failure so the Butler is never left
+//              down. Requires a freshly rotated token at incoming-token.
+//   verify     health + preservation (Jellyfin, steward policy) + readback.
+//   upgrade    in-place upgrade of an INSTALLED authority (D-043): same epoch,
+//              token and cursor; new package, pins and resident image. The new
+//              package's own lifecycle does the work and rolls back exactly on
+//              any failure. `--rehearse <step>` stops after that step and rolls
+//              back, proving the rollback on real hardware. No token rotation.
+//
+// Run `preflight` and `prepare` freely. `install` is the first-install phase and
+// refuses without a rotated incoming-token. Run `upgrade` detached so an SSH drop
+// cannot interrupt it:  setsid nohup node <this> upgrade <version> > /var/log/ouro-upgrade.log 2>&1 &
+//
+// An `upgrade` ends with the replay gate (sanctuary-replay-gate.mjs): the new Butler is held UNCOMMITTED (the lifecycle
+// keeps its journal and the predecessor's records, because a committed upgrade cannot be rolled back), the gate replays
+// real requests over A2A and reads the outcome back from machine state, and only a pass commits, pins the template and
+// prunes images. A failed gate runs `upgrade-rollback`, confirms the predecessor is healthy, and exits 1.
+//   --no-gate         skip the gate and commit straight away (emergencies; logged loudly)
+//   --plant <case>    make that gate case fail on purpose, proving the rollback end to end
+//   verify --gate     run the gate against the live version without upgrading
+//
+// Usage: sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs <preflight|prepare|install|verify|upgrade> <version> [--rehearse <step>] [--no-gate] [--plant <case>]
+//        sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs verify [--gate]
+
+import { execFileSync, spawnSync } from "node:child_process"
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto"
+import { mkdtempSync, rmSync, writeFileSync, readFileSync, existsSync, statSync, lstatSync, chmodSync, realpathSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs"
+import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url"
+import { tmpdir } from "node:os"
+import { join } from "node:path"
+
+const ROOT = "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-authority"
+const BUNDLE = "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/agent/sanctuary.ouro"
+const RUNTIME = "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/runtime/.ouro-cli"
+const CONTAINER = "ouro-butler"
+const TEMPLATE = "/boot/config/plugins/dockerMan/templates-user/my-ouro-butler.xml"
+const JOURNAL = "/boot/config/custom/ouro-butler/docker-man-template-transaction.json"
+const POLICY = `${BUNDLE}/state/policy/steward.json`
+const PRIMITIVES = ["/usr/local/bin/node", "/bin/sh", "/usr/bin/prlimit", "/usr/bin/setsid"]
+const REQUIRED_PROGRAMS = [
+  "dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js",
+  "dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-root-lifecycle.js",
+  "dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-host-supervisor-entry.js",
+  "deploy/unraid/sanctuary-host-launcher.sh",
+  "deploy/unraid/sanctuary-authority-service.sh",
+]
+const MIN_FREE_GB = 2
+const INCOMING_MANIFEST = `${ROOT}/incoming-package-manifest.json`
+const INCOMING_REQUEST = `${ROOT}/incoming-request.json`
+const UPGRADE_JOURNAL = `${ROOT}/upgrade.json`
+// Host supervision skips its work while this flag is fresh (< 30 min), so a crashed
+// upgrade can never leave self-heal off for longer than that.
+const MAINTENANCE = "/run/ouro-authority-maintenance"
+// The stop hook's flag: every keeper watchdog version stands down while it exists.
+const SHUTDOWN_FLAG = "/run/ouro-authority-shutdown"
+const GATE_SCRIPT = `${ROOT}/package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary-replay-gate.mjs`
+// The replay clients' seeds and provisioning record: a root-owned host folder outside the bundle, which the Butler's user cannot write.
+const GATE_PROVISION = "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/replay-client/provision.json"
+// The whole gate (every case, including the eight-minute await wait) must finish well inside this; a hung gate is a failed gate.
+export const GATE_TIMEOUT_MS = 95 * 60 * 1000
+const UPGRADE_STEPS = ["stop", "switch", "resident", "migrate", "start"]
+
+const sh = (file, args, opts = {}) => execFileSync(file, args, { encoding: "utf8", maxBuffer: 64 << 20, ...opts })
+const docker = (args, opts = {}) => sh("/usr/bin/docker", args, opts)
+const image = (version) => `ghcr.io/ourostack/ouroboros-butler:${version}`
+
+// Unraid's cgroup2-unraid daemon watches /sys/fs/cgroup via inotify and rmdir's any
+// cgroup that reports `populated 0`. The authority install creates its cgroup empty and
+// keeps it empty through staging/verification (which asserts cgroup.procs === ""), so the
+// reaper deletes /sys/fs/cgroup/ouro-authority within ~2s and stage fails ENOENT on
+// cgroup.controllers. Pausing the reaper (SIGSTOP) lets the empty cgroup survive until the
+// gateway process populates it; we always resume it (SIGCONT) afterwards.
+let REAPER_PAUSED = false
+function reaperPid() {
+  try { const p = readFileSync("/run/cgroup2-unraid.pid", "utf8").trim(); if (/^[0-9]+$/.test(p) && existsSync(`/proc/${p}`)) return p } catch { /* fall through */ }
+  try { const p = sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", "pgrep -f 'cgroup2-unraid --daemon' | head -1"]).trim(); return /^[0-9]+$/.test(p) ? p : null } catch { return null }
+}
+function pauseCgroupReaper() {
+  const pid = reaperPid()
+  if (!pid) { console.log("  note: cgroup2-unraid reaper not found; nothing to pause"); return }
+  try { sh("/bin/kill", ["-STOP", pid]); REAPER_PAUSED = true; ok(`paused cgroup2-unraid reaper (pid ${pid}) so the authority cgroup survives staging`) }
+  catch (e) { console.log(`  note: could not pause cgroup2-unraid (${e.message}); install may fail on empty-cgroup reaping`) }
+}
+function resumeCgroupReaper() {
+  if (!REAPER_PAUSED) return
+  const pid = reaperPid()
+  if (pid) { try { sh("/bin/kill", ["-CONT", pid]); ok(`resumed cgroup2-unraid reaper (pid ${pid})`) } catch (e) { console.log(`  WARN: failed to resume cgroup2-unraid (${e.message}); run: kill -CONT ${pid}`) } }
+  REAPER_PAUSED = false
+}
+const digest = (b) => `sha256:${createHash("sha256").update(b).digest("hex")}`
+
+let RED = 0
+const ok = (m) => console.log(`  ok   ${m}`)
+const bad = (m) => { console.log(`  FAIL ${m}`); RED += 1 }
+const say = (m) => console.log(`\n== ${m}`)
+
+function requireRoot() {
+  if (process.getuid() !== 0) { console.error("must run as root"); process.exit(2) }
+}
+
+function imageId(version) {
+  try { return docker(["image", "inspect", image(version), "--format", "{{.Id}}"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim() }
+  catch { return null }
+}
+
+// ---- read-only rehearsal --------------------------------------------------
+
+function preflight(version) {
+  say(`preflight for ${version} (read-only; nothing is changed)`)
+
+  say("target image present and pulled")
+  let id = imageId(version)
+  if (!id) { try { docker(["pull", image(version)]); id = imageId(version) } catch { /* reported below */ } }
+  id ? ok(`image ${id.slice(0, 19)}…`) : bad(`image ${image(version)} not present and could not be pulled`)
+
+  say("running Butler and rollback material")
+  let runningImage = null
+  try {
+    runningImage = docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Image}}"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim()
+    ok(`running image ${runningImage.slice(0, 19)}… (this is the rollback target)`)
+  } catch { bad(`the ${CONTAINER} container is absent`) }
+  if (id && runningImage && id === runningImage) bad("target and running image are identical — nothing to upgrade")
+
+  const installed = existsSync(`${ROOT}/active.json`)
+  if (installed) console.log("  note: an authority is installed, so this is an in-place upgrade (run `upgrade`, no token rotation)")
+
+  say("no stale authority runtime state")
+  if (!installed) {
+    const stale = ["/sys/fs/cgroup/ouro-authority", "/var/lib/ouro-authority", "/run/ouro-authority", `${ROOT}/epochs`].filter((d) => existsSync(d))
+    if (stale.length && !existsSync(`${ROOT}/active.json`)) console.log(`  note: stale dirs present, install will clear them: ${stale.join(", ")}`)
+    else if (!stale.length) ok("no stale authority runtime dirs")
+    else bad(`stale dirs present with a live authority: ${stale.join(", ")}`)
+  }
+
+  say("no upgrade already in flight")
+  existsSync(JOURNAL) ? bad(`a template transaction journal is pending at ${JOURNAL}; resolve it first`) : ok("no pending template transaction")
+  if (installed) existsSync(UPGRADE_JOURNAL) ? console.log("  note: an in-place upgrade is pending; `upgrade` resumes it") : ok("no pending in-place upgrade")
+  if (installed && existsSync(`${ROOT}/incoming-token`)) console.log("  note: a stale incoming-token copy is present; the upgrade removes it (D-044)")
+
+  say("host primitives (root-owned, not group/world-writable)")
+  for (const f of PRIMITIVES) {
+    try {
+      const [uid, gid, mode] = sh("/usr/bin/stat", ["-Lc", "%u %g %a", f]).trim().split(" ")
+      if (uid === "0" && gid === "0" && (parseInt(mode, 8) & 0o022) === 0) ok(`${f} ${uid}:${gid} ${mode}`)
+      else bad(`${f} is ${uid}:${gid} ${mode} — must be root-owned and not group/world-writable`)
+    } catch { bad(`${f} is missing`) }
+  }
+
+  say("delegated-command grants the Butler will still honour")
+  {
+    const friendRecords = {}
+    try {
+      for (const file of readdirSync(`${BUNDLE}/friends`).filter((name) => name.endsWith(".json"))) {
+        try { friendRecords[file.replace(/\.json$/u, "")] = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${BUNDLE}/friends/${file}`, "utf8")) } catch { /* unreadable record: not a grant source */ }
+      }
+    } catch { /* no friends folder yet */ }
+    let trustedGrants = {}
+    try { trustedGrants = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${TRUST_HOST_DIR}/delegated-command-grants.json`, "utf8")).grants ?? {} } catch { /* no trusted grants yet */ }
+    const warnings = legacyDelegationGrantWarnings(friendRecords, trustedGrants)
+    warnings.length === 0 ? ok("no friend record relies on the old delegationGrant") : warnings.forEach((line) => console.log(`  WARNING: ${line}`))
+  }
+
+  say("escalation holders the upgrade would drop")
+  {
+    const dropped = escalationGrantProblems()
+    dropped.length === 0 ? ok("every escalation holder in the bundle is already in the trusted file") : dropped.forEach((line) => bad(line))
+  }
+
+  say("required programs in the target image")
+  try {
+    const missing = REQUIRED_PROGRAMS.filter((p) => {
+      try { docker(["run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", "/bin/sh", image(version), "-c", `test -f /opt/ouro/${p}`]); return false }
+      catch { return true }
+    })
+    missing.length ? bad(`image is missing: ${missing.join(", ")}`) : ok(`all ${REQUIRED_PROGRAMS.length} authority programs present`)
+  } catch { bad("could not inspect the image contents") }
+
+  say("D-018: the fenced vault read the install depends on")
+  if (installed) ok("not needed: the installed gateway already holds the token in root custody")
+  else if (id) {
+    // Run the read fenced exactly as THIS version's install will fence it, so
+    // the rehearsal is faithful: an unfixed image is tested without the fix and
+    // correctly fails here rather than during a real install.
+    const hasFix = targetHasVaultFix(version)
+    console.log(`  note: target ${hasFix ? "carries" : "does NOT carry"} the D-018 fenced-read fix`)
+    try {
+      const out = JSON.parse(fencedVaultRead(version, hasFix))
+      out.tokenPresent === true
+        ? ok("fenced root vault read works with this image's own fencing")
+        : bad(`fenced vault read returned ${JSON.stringify(out)} — expected {tokenPresent:true}`)
+    } catch (e) {
+      bad(`fenced vault read FAILED: ${String(e.message).split("\n")[0]} — this image cannot read its own credentials; installing it would strand Telegram (this is exactly what happened on the last upgrade)`)
+    }
+  } else bad("skipped (no image)")
+
+  say("disk headroom")
+  try {
+    const freeKb = Number(sh("/bin/df", ["-Pk", "/mnt/user/appdata"]).trim().split("\n").at(-1).split(/\s+/)[3])
+    const freeGb = freeKb / 1024 / 1024
+    freeGb >= MIN_FREE_GB ? ok(`${freeGb.toFixed(1)} GB free on appdata`) : bad(`only ${freeGb.toFixed(1)} GB free (want ≥ ${MIN_FREE_GB})`)
+  } catch { bad("could not read disk free space") }
+
+  say("preservation baselines readable")
+  existsSync(POLICY) ? ok(`steward policy present (${sha12(POLICY)})`) : bad(`steward policy missing at ${POLICY}`)
+  try { docker(["inspect", "jellyfin", "--format", "{{.Id}}"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }); ok("jellyfin inspectable for the unchanged-check") }
+  catch { bad("jellyfin container not inspectable") }
+
+  console.log("")
+  if (RED === 0) console.log(installed ? "PREFLIGHT GREEN — run `upgrade` (detached)." : "PREFLIGHT GREEN — the upgrade can proceed. Next: prepare, rotate the token, install.")
+  else console.log(`PREFLIGHT RED — ${RED} blocker(s) above. Nothing was changed; fix these before rotating the token.`)
+  process.exit(RED === 0 ? 0 : 1)
+}
+
+// Does the target image's own #vault carry the D-018 fix? Read it from the image
+// so the rehearsal fences the read the same way the real install will.
+function targetHasVaultFix(version) {
+  try {
+    const src = docker(["run", "--rm", "--entrypoint", "/bin/cat", image(version),
+      "/opt/ouro/dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-root-lifecycle.js"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] })
+    return src.includes("--cap-add=DAC_OVERRIDE") && src.includes("/home/ouro/.bw-src")
+  } catch { return false }
+}
+
+const CLI = "/opt/ouro/dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-root-lifecycle.js"
+// The fenced vault read, replicating the target version's own #vault fencing.
+function fencedVaultRead(version, hasFix) {
+  const base = ["run", "--rm", "-i", "--pull=never", "--network", "host", "--user", "0:0", "--read-only",
+    "--cap-drop=ALL", "--security-opt=no-new-privileges"]
+  const args = hasFix
+    ? [...base, "--cap-add=DAC_OVERRIDE", "--entrypoint", "/bin/sh",
+       "--mount", `type=bind,src=${RUNTIME},dst=/home/ouro/.ouro-cli,readonly`,
+       "--mount", `type=bind,src=${RUNTIME}/bitwarden,dst=/home/ouro/.bw-src,readonly`,
+       "--mount", `type=bind,src=${BUNDLE},dst=/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro,readonly`,
+       "--tmpfs", "/home/ouro/.ouro-cli/bitwarden:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0700",
+       "--tmpfs", "/home/ouro/.config:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0700",
+       "--tmpfs", "/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0700",
+       image(version), "-c", `cp -r /home/ouro/.bw-src/. /home/ouro/.ouro-cli/bitwarden/ && exec /usr/local/bin/node ${CLI} vault presence`]
+    : [...base, "--entrypoint", "/usr/local/bin/node",
+       "--mount", `type=bind,src=${RUNTIME},dst=/home/ouro/.ouro-cli,readonly`,
+       "--mount", `type=bind,src=${BUNDLE},dst=/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro,readonly`,
+       "--tmpfs", "/home/ouro/.ouro-cli/bitwarden:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0700",
+       "--tmpfs", "/tmp:rw,nosuid,nodev,noexec,mode=0700",
+       image(version), CLI, "vault", "presence"]
+  return docker(args, { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"], input: "" })
+}
+
+function sha12(path) { return digest(readFileSync(path)).slice(7, 19) }
+
+// ---- prepare (idempotent staging; running Butler untouched) ---------------
+
+function prepare(version) {
+  say(`prepare inputs for ${version}`)
+  const id = imageId(version)
+  if (!id) fail(`image ${image(version)} is not present; pull it first`)
+  if (existsSync(`${ROOT}/active.json`)) fail("an authority is installed; use `upgrade` (in place, no token rotation) instead of prepare/install")
+  const epochId = `${version.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9_-]/g, "-")}-${new Date().toISOString().slice(0, 10).replace(/-/g, "")}`
+  const manifestBytes = stageIncomingPackage(version)
+  writePrivate(`${ROOT}/package-manifest.json`, manifestBytes)
+  const creds = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/runtime/container-credentials.json`, "utf8")).credentials[0].runtimeConfig
+  const request = {
+    schemaVersion: 1, epochId,
+    botId: String(creds.telegramBotToken).split(":")[0],
+    ownerUserId: String(creds.telegramAuthorizedUserId), ownerChatId: String(creds.telegramAuthorizedChatId),
+    ...packagePins(manifestBytes),
+  }
+  if (request.ownerUserId !== request.ownerChatId) fail("owner user and chat must match")
+  writePrivate(`${ROOT}/request.json`, Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(request)))
+  ok(`epoch ${epochId}, package ${request.packageDigest.slice(7, 19)}…`)
+
+  say("verify the prepared package against the installer's own rules")
+  verifyPackage(`${ROOT}/incoming-package`, `${ROOT}/package-manifest.json`, `${ROOT}/request.json`)
+  ok("package verifies")
+
+  console.log("\nPREPARE done. Next: rotate the bot token into ${ROOT}/incoming-token, then install.".replace("${ROOT}", ROOT))
+}
+
+// The package digest plus the host primitive pins every request carries.
+function packagePins(manifestBytes) {
+  const d = (f) => digest(readFileSync(f))
+  return {
+    packageDigest: digest(manifestBytes),
+    nodeDigest: d("/usr/local/bin/node"), prlimitDigest: d("/usr/bin/prlimit"),
+    setsidDigest: d("/usr/bin/setsid"), shellDigest: d(sh("/bin/readlink", ["-f", "/bin/sh"]).trim()),
+  }
+}
+
+// Extract the exact package from the image into incoming-package, normalised to the
+// installer's rules, and return its manifest bytes. The running Butler is untouched.
+function stageIncomingPackage(version) {
+  const incoming = `${ROOT}/incoming-package`
+
+  say("extract the exact package from the image")
+  sh("/bin/rm", ["-rf", incoming]); sh("/bin/mkdir", ["-p", incoming])
+  const cid = docker(["create", "--entrypoint", "/bin/sh", image(version)]).trim()
+  try { docker(["cp", `${cid}:/opt/ouro/.`, `${incoming}/`]) } finally { docker(["rm", "-f", cid]) }
+  ok(`extracted ${sh("/usr/bin/find", [incoming, "-type", "f"]).trim().split("\n").length} files`)
+
+  say("normalise: drop symlinks, root-own, dirs 700, files 644/755, break hard links")
+  sh("/usr/bin/find", [incoming, "-type", "l", "-delete"])
+  sh("/bin/chown", ["-R", "0:0", incoming])
+  sh("/usr/bin/find", [incoming, "-type", "d", "-exec", "chmod", "700", "{}", "+"])
+  sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `find ${incoming} -type f ! -perm 755 -exec chmod 644 {} +`])
+  const linked = sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `find ${incoming} -type f -links +1 | wc -l`]).trim()
+  if (linked !== "0") sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `find ${incoming} -type f -links +1 -exec sh -c 'cp -p "$1" "$1.u" && mv -f "$1.u" "$1"' _ {} \\;`])
+  ok("normalised")
+
+  say("required programs survived")
+  for (const p of REQUIRED_PROGRAMS) if (!existsSync(`${incoming}/${p}`)) fail(`missing after normalise: ${p}`)
+  ok("all present")
+
+  say("build package manifest + request")
+  const files = {}
+  const allowed = new Set([0o600, 0o644, 0o700, 0o755])
+  const walk = (rel) => {
+    for (const entry of sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `cd ${incoming} && find ${rel || "."} -maxdepth 1 -mindepth 1 -printf '%y %f\n'`]).trim().split("\n").filter(Boolean)) {
+      const [type, ...nameParts] = entry.split(" "); const name = (rel ? `${rel}/` : "") + nameParts.join(" ")
+      if (type === "d") walk(name)
+      else if (type === "f") {
+        const mode = parseInt(sh("/usr/bin/stat", ["-c", "%a", `${incoming}/${name}`]).trim(), 8)
+        if (!allowed.has(mode)) fail(`mode ${mode.toString(8)} not allowed: ${name}`)
+        files[name] = { digest: digest(readFileSync(`${incoming}/${name}`)), mode }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  walk("")
+  ok(`${Object.keys(files).length} files pinned`)
+  return Buffer.from(JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, files }))
+}
+
+function writePrivate(path, bytes) { writeFileSync(path, bytes, { mode: 0o600 }); sh("/bin/chown", ["0:0", path]); chmodSync(path, 0o600) }
+
+// A faithful re-check of the installer's verifySanctuaryAuthorityInstallation
+// package rules, so prepare fails loudly rather than the install failing late.
+function verifyPackage(pkg, manifestPath, requestPath) {
+  const canonical = (p) => { if (sh("/bin/readlink", ["-f", p]).trim() !== p) fail(`not canonical: ${p}`) }
+  const dirMode = (p) => parseInt(sh("/usr/bin/stat", ["-c", "%a", p]).trim(), 8)
+  canonical(pkg); if (dirMode(pkg) !== 0o700) fail(`package root must be 0700, is ${dirMode(pkg).toString(8)}`)
+  const manifest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(manifestPath, "utf8"))
+  const request = JSON.parse(readFileSync(requestPath, "utf8"))
+  if (digest(readFileSync(manifestPath)) !== request.packageDigest) fail("manifest digest != request.packageDigest")
+  const allowed = new Set([0o600, 0o644, 0o700, 0o755])
+  for (const [rel, pin] of Object.entries(manifest.files)) {
+    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9_@.-]+(?:\/[A-Za-z0-9_@.-]+)*$/.test(rel)) fail(`bad path: ${rel}`)
+    if (!allowed.has(pin.mode)) fail(`bad mode pin: ${rel}`)
+    if (digest(readFileSync(`${pkg}/${rel}`)) !== pin.digest) fail(`digest changed: ${rel}`)
+  }
+  for (const p of REQUIRED_PROGRAMS) if (!manifest.files[p]) fail(`manifest missing program: ${p}`)
+  const prim = (f, want) => { const st = sh("/usr/bin/stat", ["-Lc", "%u %g %a", f]).trim().split(" "); if (!(st[0] === "0" && st[1] === "0" && (parseInt(st[2], 8) & 0o022) === 0 && digest(readFileSync(f)) === want)) fail(`host primitive pin would fail: ${f}`) }
+  prim("/usr/local/bin/node", request.nodeDigest); prim(sh("/bin/readlink", ["-f", "/bin/sh"]).trim(), request.shellDigest)
+  prim("/usr/bin/prlimit", request.prlimitDigest); prim("/usr/bin/setsid", request.setsidDigest)
+}
+
+// ---- install (the one destructive phase; auto-rolls-back on any failure) --
+
+function tx(op, extra = []) {
+  const driver = `${ROOT}/incoming-package/deploy/unraid/docker-man-template-transaction.mjs`
+  try {
+    return sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [driver, op, ...extra], { stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] })
+  } catch (e) {
+    // Surface the transaction's real stderr/stdout, not just "Command failed".
+    const detail = [e.stderr, e.stdout].map((x) => (x ? String(x).trim() : "")).filter(Boolean).join("\n")
+    throw new Error(`${op} failed:\n${detail || e.message}`)
+  }
+}
+
+const AUTOSTART_FILE = "/var/lib/docker/unraid-autostart"
+let RESIDENT_AUTOSTART_LINE = "ouro-butler 0"
+const AUTOSTART_RE = /^ouro-butler(?:-rollback|-staging|-legacy-evidence)?(?:\s|$)/u
+// configure-resident/#configured require the resident to be ABSENT from Unraid's direct
+// autostart during the handoff (the authority controls its start, not Unraid boot). The
+// final commit proof then requires it PRESENT. So we disable it before authority-activate
+// and re-enable it before commit. #directAutostartDisabled also requires the file be
+// root:root 0644, which we preserve.
+function disableResidentAutostart() {
+  if (!existsSync(AUTOSTART_FILE)) return
+  const lines = readFileSync(AUTOSTART_FILE, "utf8").split("\n")
+  const found = lines.find((l) => AUTOSTART_RE.test(l))
+  if (found) RESIDENT_AUTOSTART_LINE = found
+  writeFileSync(AUTOSTART_FILE, lines.filter((l) => !AUTOSTART_RE.test(l)).join("\n"))
+  sh("/bin/chown", ["0:0", AUTOSTART_FILE]); chmodSync(AUTOSTART_FILE, 0o644)
+  ok("disabled ouro-butler direct autostart for the authority handoff")
+}
+function enableResidentAutostart() {
+  const lines = existsSync(AUTOSTART_FILE) ? readFileSync(AUTOSTART_FILE, "utf8").split("\n").filter((l) => l.length) : []
+  if (!lines.some((l) => AUTOSTART_RE.test(l))) lines.push(RESIDENT_AUTOSTART_LINE)
+  writeFileSync(AUTOSTART_FILE, lines.join("\n") + "\n")
+  sh("/bin/chown", ["0:0", AUTOSTART_FILE]); chmodSync(AUTOSTART_FILE, 0o644)
+  ok("re-enabled ouro-butler direct autostart")
+}
+
+// Recreate the resident container into the tokenless, gateway-mounted target form that
+// #configure/#target require. Nothing in the authority transaction does this — on Unraid it
+// is a DockerMan "Apply" of the swapped template. We perform the equivalent here, matching
+// what DockerMan produces (managed label + icon + the template's mounts) so start-resident,
+// verify-install and the final commit proof are all satisfied. The container is created
+// stopped; start-resident starts it. #target asserts: target image, user 10001:10001, no
+// token env, exactly one read-only /run/ouro-authority mount, no docker.sock/${ROOT} mounts.
+// The psyche folder is mounted read-only over the writable bundle mount, so its files cannot be edited and the folder cannot be
+// renamed, removed or swapped from inside the container. The files stay owned by the resident at mode 0600 because the
+// resident's boot check requires exactly that. On a normal boot the files already match the package, so the check writes
+// nothing; if they ever drift, its repair write fails with EROFS and startup fails loudly rather than silently rewriting psyche.
+export const PSYCHE_MOUNT = `${BUNDLE}/psyche:/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro/psyche:ro`
+// Operator-set grants (delegated commands, escalation) live outside the bundle, in a root-owned host directory mounted
+// read-only at /etc/ouro/trust/sanctuary. The bundle's recursive chown cannot reach it, and the resident cannot write it.
+export const TRUST_HOST_DIR = "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/trust/sanctuary"
+export const TRUST_MOUNT = `${TRUST_HOST_DIR}:/etc/ouro/trust/sanctuary:ro`
+
+/** What is wrong with a host trust directory's stat, or null when it is a real root-owned directory closed to group and other writes. */
+export function trustDirIssue(stat) {
+  if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return `${TRUST_HOST_DIR} is a symlink`
+  if (!stat.isDirectory()) return `${TRUST_HOST_DIR} is not a directory`
+  if (stat.uid !== 0) return `${TRUST_HOST_DIR} must be owned by root`
+  if ((stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) return `${TRUST_HOST_DIR} is writable by group or other`
+  return null
+}
+
+// Creates the host trust directory root-owned 0755 when it is missing; refuses one the resident could have made.
+function ensureTrustHostDir() {
+  if (!existsSync(TRUST_HOST_DIR)) {
+    sh("/bin/mkdir", ["-p", TRUST_HOST_DIR])
+    sh("/bin/chown", ["-h", "0:0", TRUST_HOST_DIR])
+    chmodSync(TRUST_HOST_DIR, 0o755)
+  }
+  const issue = trustDirIssue(lstatSync(TRUST_HOST_DIR))
+  if (issue) fail(`${issue}; fix it as root before the upgrade`)
+}
+
+/** What is wrong with the resident's trust mount, from `docker inspect` Mounts, or null when it is the read-only host directory. */
+export function trustMountIssue(mounts) {
+  const mount = (Array.isArray(mounts) ? mounts : []).find((entry) => entry?.Destination === "/etc/ouro/trust/sanctuary")
+  if (!mount) return "the operator trust directory is not mounted in the resident, so no grant would be honoured"
+  if (mount.Source !== TRUST_HOST_DIR) return `the operator trust directory is mounted from ${mount.Source}, not the root-owned host directory`
+  return mount.RW === false ? null : "the operator trust directory is mounted read-write in the resident"
+}
+
+/** Friends whose records still carry the old delegationGrant but have no trusted grant: the record is now only a hint, so they are refused. */
+export function legacyDelegationGrantWarnings(friendRecords, trustedGrants) {
+  return Object.entries(friendRecords)
+    .filter(([id, record]) => record?.delegationGrant && !(id in trustedGrants))
+    .map(([id, record]) => `${record.name ?? id} (${id}) has a delegationGrant on its friend record that is no longer honoured; grant it with \`ouro a2a delegated-commands grant --friend ${id} --did <did:key>\` as root`)
+}
+
+/**
+ * Escalation holders the old harness honoured (the bundle's state/a2a/escalation-grants.json) that the trusted file does not list. The
+ * upgrade never copies a grant out of the bundle, so each of these loses the escalation grant until the operator re-grants it.
+ */
+export function legacyEscalationGrantProblems(legacyGrants, trustedGrants) {
+  return Object.entries(legacyGrants ?? {})
+    .filter(([id]) => !(id in (trustedGrants ?? {})))
+    .map(([id, grant]) => `escalation holder ${id} is in the bundle's state/a2a/escalation-grants.json but not in ${TRUST_HOST_DIR}/escalation-grants.json, so the upgrade would drop it; grant it as root first with \`ouro a2a escalation grant --agent sanctuary --friend ${id} --did ${typeof grant?.did === "string" ? grant.did : "<did:key>"}\` (the one-off container form is in deploy/unraid/README.txt)`)
+}
+
+/** Reads the legacy bundle file and the trusted file from the host and returns the holders the upgrade would drop. */
+function escalationGrantProblems() {
+  const read = (file) => { try { return JSON.parse(readFileSync(file, "utf8")).grants ?? {} } catch { return {} } }
+  return legacyEscalationGrantProblems(read(`${BUNDLE}/state/a2a/escalation-grants.json`), read(`${TRUST_HOST_DIR}/escalation-grants.json`))
+}
+
+function recreateResident(version) {
+  say("recreate resident container (tokenless, gateway socket mounted)")
+  disableResidentAutostart()
+  ensureTrustHostDir()
+  const icon = "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ourostack/ouroboros/main/assets/ouroboros.png"
+  docker(["rm", "-f", CONTAINER], { stdio: "ignore" })
+  docker(["create", "--name", CONTAINER, "--network", "host", "--restart", "unless-stopped", "--user", "10001:10001",
+    "-l", "net.unraid.docker.managed=dockerman",
+    "-l", `net.unraid.docker.icon=${icon}`,
+    "-l", "org.opencontainers.image.source=https://github.com/ourostack/ouroboros",
+    "-v", "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/runtime/.ouro-cli:/home/ouro/.ouro-cli:rw",
+    "-v", "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/agent/sanctuary.ouro:/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro:rw",
+    "-v", "/boot/config/custom/ouro-events/spool:/run/ouro-events:ro",
+    "-v", "/run/ouro-authority:/run/ouro-authority:ro",
+    "-v", PSYCHE_MOUNT,
+    "-v", TRUST_MOUNT,
+    image(version)])
+  const ref = docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Config.Image}}"]).trim()
+  if (ref !== image(version)) fail(`recreated resident is ${ref}, expected ${image(version)}`)
+  ok(`recreated ${CONTAINER} on ${version} (created, stopped, gateway-mounted)`)
+}
+
+// Migrate the agent bundle to the target version against the packaged bundle template
+// (deploy/unraid/sanctuary.ouro inside the extracted package — it holds provider-readiness.json
+// and the rest of the package-managed files). Without this, the target runtime reads an
+// unmigrated predecessor bundle and its context-loss sentinel goes critical, crash-looping the
+// resident telegram sense. Run while the resident is stopped (between recreate and activate).
+// The recursive chown above also hands state/replay to the resident, but the replay gate's trust rests on that
+// directory being root-owned and read-only to it. Put it back (the resident is stopped) and drop any window file.
+// The recursive restore runs while the resident owns the bundle, so state/<name>, or state itself, may be a link it planted.
+// A WARN line in the upgrade log says plainly that a restore step refused; nothing is chowned or chmodded through a link.
+const warn = (m) => console.log(`\nWARN ${m}`)
+export function trustedStateChild(bundle, name, { lstat = lstatSync, realpath = realpathSync, log = warn } = {}) {
+  const dir = `${bundle}/state/${name}`
+  const refuse = (reason) => { log(`upgrade restore REFUSED ${dir}: ${reason}; no chown or chmod was applied through it`); return null }
+  let stat
+  try { stat = lstat(dir) } catch { return null }
+  if (!stat.isDirectory()) return refuse(stat.isSymbolicLink() ? "it is a symlink" : "it is not a directory")
+  let resolved = ""
+  let expected = ""
+  try { resolved = realpath(dir); expected = `${realpath(bundle)}/state/${name}` } catch { /* unresolvable: refused below */ }
+  if (!resolved || resolved !== expected) return refuse("it resolves outside the bundle's own state directory")
+  return dir
+}
+export function restoreReplayRoot(bundle = BUNDLE, { lstat = lstatSync, realpath = realpathSync, chmod = chmodSync, rm = rmSync, run = sh, log = warn } = {}) {
+  const dir = trustedStateChild(bundle, "replay", { lstat, realpath, log })
+  if (!dir) return
+  run("/bin/chown", ["-h", "0:0", dir])
+  chmod(dir, 0o755)
+  rm(`${dir}/window.json`, { force: true, recursive: true })
+}
+// The psyche files are package-managed: the resident's own boot check (prepareSanctuaryPackageManagedBundle) requires every one
+// to be exactly mode 0600, so they must stay owned by the resident (uid 10001) at 0600. What stops the resident editing or
+// replacing them is the read-only bind mount of psyche/ (PSYCHE_MOUNT), not file ownership. The recursive chown above already
+// handed them to 10001; this puts the modes back (directories 0755, files 0600) and is the state psycheProblems checks.
+export function restorePsycheModes(dir, { lstat = lstatSync, readdir = readdirSync, chmod = chmodSync } = {}) {
+  const walk = (current) => {
+    const stat = lstat(current)
+    if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) return
+    if (stat.isDirectory()) {
+      chmod(current, 0o755)
+      for (const name of readdir(current)) walk(`${current}/${name}`)
+    } else chmod(current, 0o600)
+  }
+  walk(dir)
+}
+function restorePsycheRoot() {
+  const dir = `${BUNDLE}/psyche`
+  if (existsSync(dir)) restorePsycheModes(dir)
+}
+
+/** What is wrong with the psyche folder as the resident's boot check needs it: files owned by the resident at exactly 0600, directories not writable by group or others, no symlinks. Empty when it is sound. */
+export function psycheProblems(dir, { lstat = lstatSync, readdir = readdirSync } = {}) {
+  const problems = []
+  const walk = (current) => {
+    const stat = lstat(current)
+    if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) { problems.push(`${current} is a symlink`); return }
+    if (stat.uid !== 10001) problems.push(`${current} is owned by uid ${stat.uid}, not the resident (10001)`)
+    if (stat.isDirectory()) {
+      if ((stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0) problems.push(`${current} is writable by group or others (mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)})`)
+      for (const name of readdir(current)) walk(`${current}/${name}`)
+    } else if ((stat.mode & 0o777) !== 0o600) problems.push(`${current} is mode ${(stat.mode & 0o777).toString(8)}, not 600`)
+  }
+  walk(dir)
+  return problems
+}
+/** What is wrong with the resident's psyche mount, from `docker inspect` Mounts, or null when it is mounted read-only. */
+export function psycheMountIssue(mounts) {
+  const mount = (Array.isArray(mounts) ? mounts : []).find((entry) => entry?.Destination === "/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro/psyche")
+  if (!mount) return "psyche is not mounted separately in the resident, so it could be renamed or replaced"
+  return mount.RW === false ? null : "psyche is mounted read-write in the resident"
+}
+
+function migrateBundle(version, rollbackImage) {
+  say(`migrate agent bundle to ${version}`)
+  const pkgBundle = `${ROOT}/incoming-package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary.ouro`
+  const migrate = `${ROOT}/incoming-package/deploy/unraid/migrate-sanctuary-bundle.mjs`
+  if (!existsSync(`${pkgBundle}/provider-readiness.json`)) fail(`packaged bundle template missing provider-readiness.json at ${pkgBundle}`)
+  sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [migrate, "--package-root", pkgBundle, "--agent-root", BUNDLE, "--operation", "migrate",
+    "--rollback-image-id", rollbackImage, "--target-image-id", imageId(version)])
+  ok("bundle migrated (rollback retained)")
+  sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [migrate, "--package-root", pkgBundle, "--agent-root", BUNDLE, "--operation", "commit"])
+  // migrate/commit ran as root; the resident owns its bundle as uid 10001, so restore ownership
+  sh("/bin/chown", ["-R", "10001:10001", BUNDLE])
+  restoreReplayRoot()
+  restorePsycheRoot()
+  ok("bundle committed (ownership restored to resident)")
+}
+
+// Host supervision for the root-authority gateway on Unraid. Installs three scripts, all
+// verified on the live box (see desk butler-agent D-026/D-029/D-032/D-033/D-035):
+//   - gateway-supervisor.sh: keeps cgroup2-unraid paused (D-026), creates/repairs the
+//     socket dir Docker would otherwise create wrong (D-033), and (re)starts the gateway
+//     through the authority's own boot path, start.sh --boot (D-032) — never raw node.
+//   - gateway-keeper-watchdog.sh: cron */2 resurrects the supervisor (D-029), except
+//     during shutdown.
+//   - /boot/config/stop: Unraid runs it before stopping the array; it stops the supervisor
+//     and gateway gracefully, resumes the reaper, and traces to /boot/logs (D-035).
+const AUTHORITY_CUSTOM = "/boot/config/custom/ouro-authority"
+const GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR = `${AUTHORITY_CUSTOM}/gateway-supervisor.sh`
+const GATEWAY_WATCHDOG = `${AUTHORITY_CUSTOM}/gateway-keeper-watchdog.sh`
+const UNRAID_STOP_HOOK = "/boot/config/stop"
+const GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR_SH = String.raw`#!/bin/sh
+# Ouro authority gateway keeper for Unraid.
+# The root-authority gateway needs /sys/fs/cgroup/ouro-authority to persist, and Unraid's
+# cgroup2-unraid removes every top-level cgroup that reports populated 0. The kernel will not
+# remove a cgroup that has a child cgroup, so the authority keeps an empty ouro-keep child
+# (D-026). This keeper:
+#   - creates that keep child and lets the reaper run; it pauses the reaper only while the
+#     keep child is missing (a fresh boot, or an authority older than the keep child),
+#   - keeps the gateway process alive,
+#   - reconnects the resident (docker restart) if it is unhealthy while the gateway is ready
+#     (handles reboot ordering, where Docker autostarts the resident before the gateway).
+set -u
+CG=/sys/fs/cgroup/ouro-authority
+R=/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-authority
+GW=$R/package/dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js
+CFG=$R/active.json
+LOG=/var/log/ouro-gateway.log
+# Only an authority from 0.1.0-alpha.837 on understands the keep child; an older gateway
+# refuses to start beside an unknown cgroup (a rollback to 830 hit exactly that). So the
+# keep child exists only while the installed package supports it; otherwise it is removed
+# and the reaper stays paused, the pre-837 behaviour.
+keep_supported() { grep -q ouro-keep "$R/package/dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-installation.js" 2>/dev/null; }
+reaper_policy() {
+  P=$(cat /run/cgroup2-unraid.pid 2>/dev/null) || return 0
+  [ -n "$P" ] || return 0
+  if keep_supported && [ -d "$CG/ouro-keep" ]; then kill -CONT "$P" 2>/dev/null; return 0; fi
+  S=$(ps -o stat= -p "$P" 2>/dev/null | tr -d ' ')
+  case "$S" in T*) : ;; *) kill -STOP "$P" 2>/dev/null ;; esac
+}
+ensure_cg() {
+  [ -d "$CG" ] || { mkdir -m 700 "$CG" 2>/dev/null; chown 0:0 "$CG" 2>/dev/null
+    for c in cpu memory pids; do echo "+$c" > "$CG/cgroup.subtree_control" 2>/dev/null; done; }
+  if keep_supported; then [ -d "$CG/ouro-keep" ] || mkdir -m 700 "$CG/ouro-keep" 2>/dev/null
+  else [ -d "$CG/ouro-keep" ] && rmdir "$CG/ouro-keep" 2>/dev/null; fi
+}
+ensure_sock() {
+  # Docker autostarts the resident before us and auto-creates its missing bind
+  # source /run/ouro-authority as 755 root:root; the authority boot rejects that as
+  # unsafe. Create it, or repair it in place (same inode, so the resident's bind
+  # mount stays valid), as 750 root:10001.
+  [ -d /run/ouro-authority ] || mkdir -p /run/ouro-authority
+  chown 0:10001 /run/ouro-authority 2>/dev/null
+  chmod 0750 /run/ouro-authority 2>/dev/null
+}
+gw_pid() { ps -eo pid,args | grep '[s]anctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js' | awk '{print $1}' | head -1; }
+start_gw() {
+  # Launch through the authority lifecycle boot (start.sh --boot), never raw node:
+  # it waits for the array + Docker, rebuilds the tmpfs runtime state a reboot
+  # wipes (/var/lib/ouro-authority), clears a stale readiness.json, launches the
+  # gateway detached, and returns once it is ready.
+  rm -f "$R"/epochs/*/authority.lock 2>/dev/null
+  echo "$(date) keeper: authority boot (runtime dirs + gateway)" >> "$LOG"
+  /bin/sh /boot/config/custom/ouro-authority/start.sh --boot >> "$LOG" 2>&1 \
+    || echo "$(date) keeper: authority boot failed; will retry" >> "$LOG"
+}
+# An in-place upgrade pauses us with a flag; a stale flag (> 30 min) is ignored.
+maintenance() { [ -n "$(find /run/ouro-authority-maintenance -mmin -30 2>/dev/null)" ]; }
+reaper_policy; ensure_cg; ensure_sock
+last_res=0
+while true; do
+  if maintenance; then sleep 15; continue; fi
+  reaper_policy
+  ensure_cg
+  reaper_policy
+  ensure_sock
+  [ -n "$(gw_pid)" ] || { start_gw; sleep 8; }
+  rd=$(jq -rc .status "$R"/epochs/*/readiness.json 2>/dev/null)
+  st=$(docker inspect ouro-butler --format '{{.State.Health.Status}}' 2>/dev/null)
+  ss=$(docker inspect ouro-butler --format '{{.State.Status}}' 2>/dev/null)
+  now=$(date +%s)
+  # Unhealthy, or left stopped (an interrupted upgrade or restart): the gateway is ready, so bring it back.
+  if [ "$rd" = ready ] && { [ "$st" = unhealthy ] || [ "$ss" = exited ] || [ "$ss" = created ]; } && [ $((now - last_res)) -gt 90 ]; then
+    echo "$(date) keeper: reconnecting resident ($ss/$st)" >> "$LOG"
+    docker restart ouro-butler >/dev/null 2>&1
+    last_res=$now
+  fi
+  sleep 15
+done
+`
+const GATEWAY_WATCHDOG_SH = String.raw`#!/bin/sh
+# Ouro authority gateway-supervisor watchdog (D-028 hardening).
+# gateway-supervisor.sh keeps the .830 root-authority gateway alive and the
+# cgroup2-unraid reaper paused. The supervisor was a single point of failure:
+# started once from /boot/config/go, nothing restarted it if it died -- and a dead
+# supervisor means a dead gateway would never be restarted (bot fully offline, as the
+# gateway holds the Telegram token). This watchdog (cron */2) resurrects it if absent.
+set -u
+# The stop hook sets this during shutdown; never resurrect the supervisor then.
+[ -e /run/ouro-authority-shutdown ] && exit 0
+# An in-place upgrade pauses supervision; a stale flag (> 30 min) is ignored.
+[ -n "$(find /run/ouro-authority-maintenance -mmin -30 2>/dev/null)" ] && exit 0
+SUP=/boot/config/custom/ouro-authority/gateway-supervisor.sh
+LOG=/var/log/ouro-gateway.log
+if [ ! -f "$SUP" ]; then
+  echo "$(date) watchdog: supervisor script MISSING at $SUP" >> "$LOG"
+  exit 0
+fi
+if ps -eo args 2>/dev/null | grep -q '[g]ateway-supervisor.sh'; then
+  exit 0
+fi
+echo "$(date) watchdog: supervisor not running -- restarting" >> "$LOG"
+setsid /bin/sh "$SUP" >/dev/null 2>&1 &
+`
+const UNRAID_STOP_HOOK_SH = String.raw`#!/bin/bash
+# Ouro authority stop hook (run by Unraid's rc.local_shutdown before the array stops).
+# Stops our host processes cleanly so nothing of ours is respawning or frozen during
+# shutdown, and leaves a trace on the flash drive for diagnosis. Every step is bounded.
+LOG=/boot/logs/ouro-shutdown.log
+mkdir -p /boot/logs
+{
+  echo "$(date) stop hook: begin"
+  touch /run/ouro-authority-shutdown
+  for p in $(pgrep -f '^/bin/sh /boot/config/custom/ouro-authority/[g]ateway-supervisor'); do kill "$p"; done
+  for p in $(pgrep -f '[s]anctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js'); do kill "$p"; done
+  for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10; do pgrep -f '[s]anctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js' >/dev/null || break; sleep 1; done
+  pkill -9 -f '[s]anctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js' 2>/dev/null
+  P=$(cat /run/cgroup2-unraid.pid 2>/dev/null); [ -n "$P" ] && kill -CONT "$P"
+  echo "$(date) stop hook: supervisor+gateway stopped, reaper resumed ($(pgrep -fc '[s]anctuary-telegram-authority-entry.js') gateways left)"
+} >> "$LOG" 2>&1
+`
+const WATCHDOG_CRON = `*/2 * * * * /bin/sh ${GATEWAY_WATCHDOG} # ouro-authority-gateway-watchdog`
+function installGatewaySupervisor() {
+  for (const [path, body, mode] of [[GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR, GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR_SH, 0o700], [GATEWAY_WATCHDOG, GATEWAY_WATCHDOG_SH, 0o700], [UNRAID_STOP_HOOK, UNRAID_STOP_HOOK_SH, 0o755]]) {
+    writeFileSync(path, body)
+    sh("/bin/chown", ["0:0", path]); chmodSync(path, mode)
+  }
+  ok("gateway supervisor, watchdog, and Unraid stop hook installed")
+  const go = "/boot/config/go"
+  try {
+    let g = readFileSync(go, "utf8")
+    g = g.split("\n").filter((l) => !/ouro-authority\/start\.sh --boot/.test(l) && !/ouro-authority-gateway/.test(l) && !/gateway-keeper-watchdog/.test(l)).join("\n")
+    if (!g.endsWith("\n")) g += "\n"
+    g += `setsid /bin/sh ${GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR} >/dev/null 2>&1 & # ouro-authority-gateway\n`
+    g += `(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v gateway-keeper-watchdog; echo "${WATCHDOG_CRON}") | crontab - # ouro-authority-gateway-watchdog\n`
+    writeFileSync(go, g)
+    ok("supervisor + watchdog cron wired into /boot/config/go for reboot durability")
+  } catch (e) { console.log(`  WARN: could not wire go hook (${e.message}); start manually on boot`) }
+  sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `(crontab -l 2>/dev/null | grep -v gateway-keeper-watchdog; echo "${WATCHDOG_CRON}") | crontab -`])
+  // Replace any running supervisor so exactly one runs the new code; clear a stale shutdown flag.
+  sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", "rm -f /run/ouro-authority-shutdown; for p in $(pgrep -f '^/bin/sh /boot/config/custom/ouro-authority/[g]ateway-supervisor' || true); do kill $p; done"])
+  sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `setsid /bin/sh ${GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR} >/dev/null 2>&1 &`])
+  ok("gateway supervisor started")
+}
+
+// On a successful authority-activate, finalize a durable, stable target: archive the DockerMan
+// transaction journal (committed-equivalent for our purposes), and hand cgroup-reaper pausing +
+// gateway/resident supervision to the keeper. The reaper is intentionally left paused (the
+// keeper keeps it paused); do not resume it here.
+function finalizeStable() {
+  if (existsSync(JOURNAL)) { sh("/bin/mv", ["-f", JOURNAL, `${JOURNAL}.committed.${Date.now()}`]); ok("transaction journal archived (committed)") }
+  installGatewaySupervisor()
+  REAPER_PAUSED = false
+}
+
+function install(version) {
+  say(`install ${version}`)
+  const incoming = `${ROOT}/incoming-package`
+  if (!existsSync(`${ROOT}/request.json`) || !existsSync(incoming)) fail("not prepared; run prepare first")
+  const pkgVersion = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${incoming}/deploy/unraid/sanctuary.ouro/bundle-meta.json`, "utf8")).runtimeVersion
+  if (pkgVersion !== version) fail(`prepared package is ${pkgVersion}, not ${version}; re-run prepare`)
+  if (!existsSync(`${ROOT}/incoming-token`) || statSync(`${ROOT}/incoming-token`).size === 0) fail(`no rotated token at ${ROOT}/incoming-token — rotate it in BotFather first`)
+  if (existsSync(JOURNAL)) fail("a template transaction is already pending; resolve it first")
+  if (targetHasVaultFix(version) === false) fail(`${version} lacks the D-018 fenced-read fix; the install would strand Telegram (run preflight)`)
+
+  // Clear stale authority runtime dirs from a prior failed attempt so #runtimeDirectories
+  // starts clean (it skips a dir that already exists). Safe only when no authority is live
+  // (no active.json) and no transaction is pending. Note: the empty-cgroup ENOENT at stage
+  // is caused by Unraid's cgroup2-unraid reaper, handled by pauseCgroupReaper() below.
+  if (!existsSync(`${ROOT}/active.json`) && !existsSync(JOURNAL)) {
+    for (const d of ["/sys/fs/cgroup/ouro-authority", "/var/lib/ouro-authority", "/run/ouro-authority", `${ROOT}/epochs`, `${ROOT}/package`]) {
+      try { if (existsSync(d)) { sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `find ${d} -depth -type d -exec rmdir {} + 2>/dev/null; rm -rf ${d} 2>/dev/null`], { stdio: "ignore" }) } } catch { /* best effort */ }
+    }
+    killLeakedGateway()
+    ok("cleared stale authority runtime dirs (cgroup/staging/socket/epochs) and any leaked gateway")
+  }
+  const targetImage = imageId(version)
+  const rollbackImage = docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Image}}"]).trim()
+  if (!targetImage || targetImage === rollbackImage) fail("target/rollback image identity invalid")
+  const jellyfinBefore = docker(["inspect", "jellyfin", "--format", "{{.Id}}|{{.Image}}|{{.RestartCount}}|{{.State.StartedAt}}"]).trim()
+  const policyBefore = existsSync(POLICY) ? sha12(POLICY) : fail(`steward policy missing`)
+  ok(`target ${targetImage.slice(0,19)}… rollback ${rollbackImage.slice(0,19)}… policy ${policyBefore}`)
+
+  const srcTemplate = `${ROOT}/source-template.xml`
+  sh("/usr/bin/install", ["-m", "600", "-o", "0", "-g", "0", `${incoming}/deploy/unraid/sanctuary.xml`, srcTemplate])
+  const manifestDigest = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${ROOT}/request.json`, "utf8")).packageDigest
+
+  pauseCgroupReaper()
+  try {
+    say("transaction: prepare -> authority-install -> authority-activate -> commit")
+    tx("prepare", ["--source-template", srcTemplate, "--version-tag", image(version),
+      "--manifest-digest", manifestDigest, "--rollback-image-id", rollbackImage, "--target-image-id", targetImage])
+    ok("prepared")
+    tx("authority-install"); ok("authority installed (gateway up)")
+    recreateResident(version)
+    migrateBundle(version, rollbackImage)
+    tx("authority-activate"); ok("resident activated")
+    waitHealthy(300)
+    enableResidentAutostart()
+    finalizeStable()
+    ok("stabilized: bundle migrated, gateway supervised, journal committed")
+  } catch (e) {
+    resumeCgroupReaper()
+    console.log(`\n!! install failed:\n${e.message}\n!! auto-rolling back so the Butler is not left down`)
+    autoRollback(rollbackImage, version)
+    fail("install rolled back; the Butler is on its prior version. See output above.")
+  }
+
+  say("preservation")
+  const jellyfinAfter = docker(["inspect", "jellyfin", "--format", "{{.Id}}|{{.Image}}|{{.RestartCount}}|{{.State.StartedAt}}"]).trim()
+  jellyfinBefore === jellyfinAfter ? ok("jellyfin unchanged") : fail("JELLYFIN CHANGED")
+  sha12(POLICY) === policyBefore ? ok("steward policy unchanged") : fail("STEWARD POLICY CHANGED")
+  console.log(`\nINSTALL done — ${version} live. Run verify.`)
+}
+
+// Kill any leaked authority host process (the gateway / host-supervisor). A failed
+// authority-retire/stop-gateway during rollback can leave sanctuary-telegram-authority-entry
+// running against a since-removed active.json — it competes for the Telegram token and holds
+// FUSE files open on ${ROOT}/package. Best-effort; the resident (ouro-butler) is untouched.
+function killLeakedGateway() {
+  try {
+    const pids = sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", "pgrep -f 'dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-(telegram-authority|host-supervisor)-entry' || true"]).trim().split(/\s+/u).filter(Boolean)
+    for (const pid of pids) { try { sh("/bin/kill", ["-TERM", pid]) } catch { /* ignore */ } }
+    if (pids.length) { sh("/bin/sleep", ["3"]); for (const pid of pids) { try { sh("/bin/kill", ["-KILL", pid]) } catch { /* ignore */ } } ok(`stopped ${pids.length} leaked authority process(es)`) }
+  } catch { /* best effort */ }
+}
+
+function autoRollback(rollbackImage, version) {
+  try { tx("authority-retire") } catch (e) { console.log(`   authority-retire: ${String(e.message).split("\n")[0]}`) }
+  try { tx("authority-restore") } catch (e) { console.log(`   authority-restore: ${String(e.message).split("\n")[0]}`) }
+  try { tx("rollback") } catch (e) { console.log(`   template rollback: ${String(e.message).split("\n")[0]}`) }
+  killLeakedGateway()
+  try { if (!docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.State.Running}}"], { stdio: ["ignore","pipe","ignore"] }).trim().startsWith("true")) docker(["start", CONTAINER]) } catch { /* below */ }
+  // The predecessor reads its token from the materialised credential cache, not
+  // the vault directly. authority-restore returns the token to the vault, but a
+  // stale cache leaves the resident crash-looping on 401 (this is exactly what
+  // stranded the bot on 2026-09-22). Re-materialise the vault token into the
+  // cache, keeping the value host-side only, and confirm recovery.
+  try {
+    rematerialiseToken(version)
+    docker(["restart", CONTAINER])
+    console.log("   re-materialised token from the vault and restarted the predecessor")
+  } catch (e) { console.log(`   re-materialise: ${String(e.message).split("\n")[0]} — MANUAL recovery may be needed`) }
+  for (let i = 0; i < 24; i++) {
+    const st = (() => { try { return docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.State.Status}}/{{.State.Health.Status}}"], { stdio: ["ignore","pipe","ignore"] }).trim() } catch { return "?" } })()
+    if (st === "running/healthy") { console.log("   rollback complete — predecessor healthy again"); return }
+    sh("/bin/sleep", ["10"])
+  }
+  console.log("   rollback container did NOT return healthy — inspect `docker logs ouro-butler` and re-materialise the token manually")
+}
+
+// Restores the predecessor's telegram token after a failed install. The subtle
+// truth learned by dogfooding: once the upgrade has rotated the token, the OLD
+// token is REVOKED, so the predecessor cannot be restored to it — it must be
+// brought up on the NEW token (incoming-token). So this prefers incoming-token
+// when present (the post-rotation case), putting it back into the vault AND the
+// materialised cache; only if no rotation happened does it fall back to the
+// vault's own token. The value stays in host-side pipes, never in this process.
+// Runs through a quiet sole-user container of the target image (the reliable way
+// to reach the bitwarden store off the running resident).
+// Force an explicit `bw sync` inside the vault-fix container before a write. The
+// resident and the install's fenced ops share one local bitwarden cache; after an
+// interrupted install the local copy can be older than the server, so a bare
+// `bw edit` fails ("The client copy of this cipher is out of date"). The store's
+// own sync-on-login skips when its freshness marker is <60s old, so we sync
+// directly (unlock -> sync) and let the write proceed against a reconciled cache.
+function forceBwSync(name) {
+  const script = [
+    'const cp=require("node:child_process"),fs=require("node:fs");',
+    'const {readVaultUnlockSecret}=require("/opt/ouro/dist/repertoire/vault-unlock.js");',
+    'const cfg=JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync("/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro/agent.json","utf8")).vault||{};',
+    'const email=cfg.email, url=cfg.serverUrl;',
+    'const base="/home/ouro/.ouro-cli/bitwarden";',
+    'const APP=base+"/"+fs.readdirSync(base).find(d=>/^[0-9a-f]{16,}$/.test(d));',
+    'const u=readVaultUnlockSecret({agentName:"sanctuary",email,serverUrl:url});',
+    'const env={...process.env,BITWARDENCLI_APPDATA_DIR:APP,OURO_BW_MASTER_PASSWORD:u.secret};',
+    'const sess=cp.execFileSync("bw",["unlock","--passwordenv","OURO_BW_MASTER_PASSWORD","--raw"],{env,encoding:"utf8"}).trim();',
+    'cp.execFileSync("bw",["sync"],{env:{...env,BW_SESSION:sess},encoding:"utf8"});',
+    'process.stdout.write("bw-synced");',
+  ].join("")
+  try { docker(["exec", "-u", "0:0", name, "node", "-e", script], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }); ok("forced bw sync before token restore") }
+  catch (e) { console.log(`   forceBwSync: ${String(e.message).split("\n")[0]} (continuing; restore may still succeed)`) }
+}
+
+function rematerialiseToken(version) {
+  const cc = "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/runtime/container-credentials.json"
+  const incoming = `${ROOT}/incoming-token`
+  const fromIncoming = existsSync(incoming) && statSync(incoming).size > 0
+  const name = `ouro-vault-fix-${process.pid}`
+  docker(["rm", "-f", name], { stdio: "ignore" })
+  docker(["run", "-d", "--name", name, "--network", "host", "--user", "0:0",
+    "-v", `${RUNTIME}:/home/ouro/.ouro-cli`, "-v", `${BUNDLE}:/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro`,
+    "--entrypoint", "sleep", image(version), "infinity"])
+  try {
+    sh("/bin/sleep", ["3"])
+    if (fromIncoming) {
+      // Put the new (valid) token back into the vault, then materialise it. Build the
+      // restore JSON in JS and pipe it via stdin: jq's rtrimstr with a JS "\n" template
+      // produced a raw newline inside jq's string literal and jq rejected it, which is what
+      // stranded the bot on 2026-09-22. Owner ids come from the resident's own cache.
+      const tok = readFileSync(incoming, "utf8").replace(/[\r\n]+$/u, "")
+      const resident = JSON.parse(readFileSync(cc, "utf8"))
+      const rc = resident.credentials[0].runtimeConfig
+      const restore = JSON.stringify({ token: tok, botId: tok.split(":")[0],
+        ownerUserId: String(rc.telegramAuthorizedUserId), ownerChatId: String(rc.telegramAuthorizedChatId) })
+      forceBwSync(name)
+      docker(["exec", "-i", "-u", "0:0", name, "node", CLI, "vault", "restore"], { input: restore, stdio: ["pipe", "pipe", "pipe"] })
+      // Fail loudly if the restored token is not actually live at Telegram, rather
+      // than leaving a "healthy" container polling a revoked token (a deaf bot).
+      try {
+        const me = sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `curl -s "https://api.telegram.org/bot${tok}/getMe"`]).trim()
+        if (!/"ok":true/.test(me)) console.log(`   WARN: restored token getMe not ok — the bot may be deaf: ${me.slice(0, 120)}`)
+        else ok("restored token verified live at Telegram (getMe ok)")
+      } catch { /* network check is best-effort */ }
+      rc.telegramBotToken = tok
+      writeFileSync(`${cc}.tmp`, JSON.stringify(resident))
+      sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", `chown --reference=${cc} ${cc}.tmp && chmod --reference=${cc} ${cc}.tmp && mv ${cc}.tmp ${cc}`])
+    } else {
+      sh("/bin/sh", ["-c",
+        `set -o pipefail; docker exec -u 0:0 ${name} node ${CLI} vault snapshot | jq -r .token > ${cc}.tok.$$ && ` +
+        `jq --rawfile t ${cc}.tok.$$ '.credentials[0].runtimeConfig.telegramBotToken=($t|rtrimstr("\n"))' ${cc} > ${cc}.tmp.$$ && ` +
+        `chown --reference=${cc} ${cc}.tmp.$$ && chmod --reference=${cc} ${cc}.tmp.$$ && mv ${cc}.tmp.$$ ${cc}; rm -f ${cc}.tok.$$`])
+    }
+  } finally { docker(["rm", "-f", name], { stdio: "ignore" }) }
+}
+
+function waitHealthy(sec) {
+  for (let i = 0; i < sec / 10; i++) {
+    const st = docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.State.Health.Status}}"], { stdio: ["ignore","pipe","ignore"] }).trim()
+    if (st === "healthy") { ok(`healthy after ${i * 10}s`); return }
+    sh("/bin/sleep", ["10"])
+  }
+  fail("container did not become healthy in time")
+}
+
+function buildFinalProof(version, out) {
+  const tag = image(version)
+  const c = JSON.parse(docker(["container", "inspect", CONTAINER, "--format",
+    '{"name":{{json .Name}},"imageId":{{json .Image}},"imageReference":{{json .Config.Image}},"running":{{json .State.Running}},"health":{{json .State.Health.Status}},"labels":{{json .Config.Labels}}}']))
+  const autostart = existsSync("/var/lib/docker/unraid-autostart") &&
+    readFileSync("/var/lib/docker/unraid-autostart", "utf8").split("\n").some((l) => l.split(" ")[0] === "ouro-butler")
+  const text = (tag2) => (readFileSync(TEMPLATE, "utf8").match(new RegExp(`<${tag2}>([^<]*)</${tag2}>`)) || [])[1]
+  const bundle = JSON.parse(sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [`${ROOT}/incoming-package/deploy/unraid/migrate-sanctuary-bundle.mjs`,
+    "--package-root", `${ROOT}/package`, "--agent-root", BUNDLE, "--operation", "status"]))
+  const jf = JSON.parse(docker(["container", "inspect", "jellyfin", "--format",
+    '{"containerId":{{json .Id}},"imageId":{{json .Image}},"state":{{json .State.Status}},"restartCount":{{json .RestartCount}}}']))
+  const proof = {
+    container: { name: c.name, imageId: c.imageId, imageReference: c.imageReference,
+      running: c.running === true, healthy: c.health === "healthy", autostart,
+      labels: { "net.unraid.docker.managed": c.labels["net.unraid.docker.managed"], "net.unraid.docker.icon": c.labels["net.unraid.docker.icon"] } },
+    bundle,
+    dockerMan: { templatePath: TEMPLATE, name: text("Name"), repository: text("Repository"), templateUrl: text("TemplateURL"), icon: text("Icon") },
+    communityApps: { installed: true, name: "ouro-butler", repository: text("Repository"), templateUrl: text("TemplateURL"),
+      stateModel: "previous-apps-inline-v1", entryPath: "/usr/local/emhttp/plugins/community.applications/include/exec.php",
+      entryFunction: "previous_apps", implementationPath: "/usr/local/emhttp/plugins/community.applications/include/exec.php", implementationSymbol: "previous_apps" },
+    jellyfin: jf,
+  }
+  if (c.imageReference !== tag) fail(`container image is ${c.imageReference}, expected ${tag}`)
+  writeFileSync(out, JSON.stringify(proof), { mode: 0o600 })
+}
+
+// ---- upgrade (in place, installed authority) --------------------------------
+
+// A host still running an older keeper has a cron watchdog that ignores the maintenance
+// flag: it resurrected the paused supervisor, which restarted the resident mid-upgrade
+// (the first 830 -> 835 rehearsal). So put this version's keeper scripts in place first
+// (they honour the flag) and also raise the shutdown flag every watchdog version honours;
+// resumeSupervision clears both.
+function pauseSupervision() {
+  writeFileSync(MAINTENANCE, `${new Date().toISOString()} ${process.pid}\n`)
+  writeFileSync(SHUTDOWN_FLAG, `upgrade ${process.pid}\n`)
+  for (const [path, body] of [[GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR, GATEWAY_SUPERVISOR_SH], [GATEWAY_WATCHDOG, GATEWAY_WATCHDOG_SH]]) {
+    writeFileSync(path, body)
+    sh("/bin/chown", ["0:0", path]); chmodSync(path, 0o700)
+  }
+  sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", "for p in $(pgrep -f '^/bin/sh /boot/config/custom/ouro-authority/[g]ateway-supervisor' || true); do kill $p; done"])
+  if (sh("/bin/sh", ["-c", "pgrep -fc '^/bin/sh /boot/config/custom/ouro-authority/[g]ateway-supervisor' || true"]).trim() !== "0") fail("a gateway supervisor survived the pause")
+  ok("host supervision paused (keeper scripts current; flags expire on their own)")
+}
+function resumeSupervision() {
+  rmSync(MAINTENANCE, { force: true })
+  rmSync(SHUTDOWN_FLAG, { force: true })
+  installGatewaySupervisor()
+}
+
+// Keep Unraid's DockerMan template (what the UI's Apply/Update uses) on the live image.
+function pinTemplate(version) {
+  if (!existsSync(TEMPLATE)) { console.log("  note: no DockerMan template to update"); return }
+  const text = readFileSync(TEMPLATE, "utf8")
+  const next = text.replace(/<Repository>ghcr\.io\/ourostack\/ouroboros-butler:[^<]+<\/Repository>/u, `<Repository>${image(version)}</Repository>`)
+  if (!next.includes(`<Repository>${image(version)}</Repository>`)) { console.log("  WARN: DockerMan template Repository not recognised; left unchanged"); return }
+  if (next !== text) { writeFileSync(`${TEMPLATE}.prev`, text); writeFileSync(TEMPLATE, next) }
+  ok(`DockerMan template pins ${image(version)}`)
+}
+
+// Every release pulls a ~1 GB Butler image, and Unraid's docker.img filled to 88% with
+// twenty of them (D-046). After a successful upgrade keep only the live image and the
+// authority's recorded rollback image; Docker itself refuses to remove an image in use.
+function pruneButlerImages() {
+  const activation = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${ROOT}/activation.json`, "utf8"))
+  const keep = new Set([activation.targetImageId, activation.rollbackImageId])
+  let removed = 0
+  for (const line of docker(["images", "--no-trunc", "--format", "{{.ID}} {{.Tag}}", "ghcr.io/ourostack/ouroboros-butler"]).trim().split("\n").filter(Boolean)) {
+    const [id, tag] = line.split(" ")
+    if (keep.has(id) || !tag || tag === "<none>") continue
+    try { docker(["rmi", `ghcr.io/ourostack/ouroboros-butler:${tag}`], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }); removed += 1 } catch { /* in use */ }
+  }
+  ok(`pruned ${removed} old Butler image(s); kept the live and rollback images`)
+}
+
+function lifecycleFailure(e) {
+  const detail = [e.stderr, e.stdout].map((x) => (x ? String(x).trim() : "")).filter(Boolean).join(" | ")
+  let last = ""
+  try { last = readFileSync(`${ROOT}/lifecycle-failure.log`, "utf8").trim().split("\n").filter((l) => /^\d{4}-/.test(l)).at(-1) ?? "" } catch { /* none */ }
+  return `${detail || e.message}${last ? `\n   last root failure: ${last}` : ""}`
+}
+
+/**
+ * The end of a gated upgrade, with every side effect injected so the decision is testable: a pass commits the held
+ * upgrade, pins the template and prunes; a fail rolls back to the predecessor and confirms it is healthy. Nothing is
+ * committed, pinned or pruned unless the gate passed.
+ */
+export function completeGatedUpgrade({ runGate, commit, rollback, confirmRollback, pin, prune, log = console.log }) {
+  const gate = runGate()
+  if (gate.ok) {
+    commit()
+    pin()
+    prune()
+    log("GATE PASS")
+    return { passed: true }
+  }
+  log(`gate failed: ${gate.detail ?? "see the case lines above"}`)
+  rollback()
+  const restored = confirmRollback()
+  log(`GATE FAIL — ROLLED BACK to ${restored}`)
+  return { passed: false, rolledBackTo: restored }
+}
+
+export function runReplayGate(plant, { spawn = spawnSync, exists = existsSync } = {}) {
+  if (!exists(GATE_SCRIPT)) return { ok: false, detail: `the replay gate is missing from the live package (${GATE_SCRIPT})` }
+  const result = spawn("/usr/local/bin/node", [GATE_SCRIPT, "run", ...(plant ? ["--plant", plant] : [])], { stdio: "inherit", timeout: GATE_TIMEOUT_MS, killSignal: "SIGKILL" })
+  return result.status === 0 ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, detail: `the replay gate exited ${result.status ?? result.signal}` }
+}
+
+/**
+ * The commit step runs the lifecycle's `upgrade` again, which would START A FRESH UNGATED UPGRADE if the keeper had
+ * rolled the held one back mid-gate. So commit only while the journal still exists and the new image is still live.
+ */
+export function heldUpgradeProblem({ journalExists, liveImage, expectedImage }) {
+  if (!journalExists) return "the held upgrade's journal is gone (the keeper or a boot rolled it back mid-gate)"
+  if (liveImage !== expectedImage) return `the live Butler is ${liveImage}, not the held ${expectedImage}`
+  return null
+}
+
+function butlerState() {
+  try { return docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Config.Image}} {{.State.Status}}/{{.State.Health.Status}}"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "ignore"] }).trim() } catch { return "? ?/?" }
+}
+
+function waitForButler(imageRef, seconds) {
+  for (let waited = 0; waited <= seconds; waited += 10) {
+    const [liveImage, state] = butlerState().split(" ")
+    if (liveImage === imageRef && state === "running/healthy") return true
+    sh("/bin/sleep", ["10"])
+  }
+  return false
+}
+
+// The new gateway asks Telegram who it is (getMe) before it reports ready. When the host cannot reach
+// Telegram, that fails and the whole upgrade rolls back after host supervision was already paused
+// (the 863 -> 864 upgrade). Any HTTP answer from the API host proves the network path; no token is sent.
+export const TELEGRAM_API_URL = "https://api.telegram.org/"
+export async function telegramApiReachable({ fetchImpl = globalThis.fetch, sleep = (ms) => new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, ms)), tries = 3, timeoutMs = 8000, retryDelayMs = 3000 } = {}) {
+  let detail = "no attempt made"
+  for (let attempt = 1; attempt <= tries; attempt += 1) {
+    try {
+      const response = await fetchImpl(TELEGRAM_API_URL, { method: "GET", signal: AbortSignal.timeout(timeoutMs) })
+      return { ok: true, detail: `HTTP ${response.status}` }
+    } catch (error) {
+      detail = error instanceof Error ? (error.cause instanceof Error ? `${error.message}: ${error.cause.message}` : error.message) : String(error)
+      if (attempt < tries) await sleep(retryDelayMs)
+    }
+  }
+  return { ok: false, detail: `${detail} (${tries} attempts)` }
+}
+
+// A resume or rollback (an upgrade journal exists) must never be blocked by a network probe.
+export async function checkTelegramBeforePause({ journalExists, probe = telegramApiReachable }) {
+  if (journalExists) return { skipped: true, ok: true, detail: "upgrade journal present" }
+  return { skipped: false, ...(await probe()) }
+}
+
+async function upgrade(version, rehearse, { noGate = false, plant } = {}) {
+  say(`in-place upgrade to ${version}${rehearse ? ` — REHEARSAL: stop after "${rehearse}", then roll back` : ""}`)
+  if (rehearse && !UPGRADE_STEPS.includes(rehearse)) fail(`--rehearse takes one of: ${UPGRADE_STEPS.join(", ")}`)
+  const gated = !rehearse && !noGate
+  if (noGate && !rehearse) console.log("\n!! --no-gate: this upgrade will NOT be replay-gated or auto-rolled-back on a behavioural regression")
+  if (gated && !existsSync(GATE_PROVISION)) fail(`replay peers are not provisioned (${GATE_PROVISION}); run \`sanctuary-replay-gate.mjs provision\` first (once, on the upgrade that moves the replay seeds out of the bundle into that root-owned folder, run \`provision --rotate-replay-identities\` instead so no earlier seed survives; any seed or provision.json under state/replay-client in the bundle was writable by the Butler and is ignored), or pass --no-gate`)
+  if (!existsSync(`${ROOT}/active.json`) || !existsSync(`${ROOT}/activation.json`)) fail("no installed authority; use prepare + install")
+  if (existsSync(JOURNAL)) fail("a template transaction is pending; resolve it first")
+  let id = imageId(version)
+  if (!id) { docker(["pull", image(version)]); id = imageId(version) }
+  if (!id) fail(`image ${image(version)} could not be pulled`)
+  ok(`image ${id.slice(0, 19)}…`)
+  if (existsSync(UPGRADE_JOURNAL)) console.log("  note: resuming the pending in-place upgrade with its staged package")
+  else {
+    const current = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${ROOT}/request.json`, "utf8"))
+    const manifestBytes = stageIncomingPackage(version)
+    const pkgVersion = JSON.parse(readFileSync(`${ROOT}/incoming-package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary.ouro/bundle-meta.json`, "utf8")).runtimeVersion
+    if (pkgVersion !== version) fail(`staged package is ${pkgVersion}, not ${version}`)
+    writePrivate(INCOMING_MANIFEST, manifestBytes)
+    const request = { schemaVersion: 1, epochId: current.epochId, botId: current.botId, ownerUserId: current.ownerUserId, ownerChatId: current.ownerChatId, ...packagePins(manifestBytes) }
+    writePrivate(INCOMING_REQUEST, Buffer.from(JSON.stringify(request)))
+    verifyPackage(`${ROOT}/incoming-package`, INCOMING_MANIFEST, INCOMING_REQUEST)
+    ok("new package staged beside the live one and verified")
+  }
+  const lifecycle = `${ROOT}/incoming-package/dist/heart/daemon/sanctuary-authority-root-lifecycle.js`
+  const priorImage = butlerState().split(" ")[0]
+  const jellyfinBefore = docker(["inspect", "jellyfin", "--format", "{{.Id}}|{{.Image}}|{{.RestartCount}}|{{.State.StartedAt}}"]).trim()
+  const policyBefore = existsSync(POLICY) ? sha12(POLICY) : fail("steward policy missing")
+  const telegram = await checkTelegramBeforePause({ journalExists: existsSync(UPGRADE_JOURNAL) })
+  if (!telegram.ok) fail(`api.telegram.org is not reachable from this host (${telegram.detail}); the new gateway could not pass its Telegram identity check. Nothing was paused or changed; fix the network and re-run.`)
+  if (telegram.skipped) console.log("  note: resuming a pending upgrade; Telegram reachability not re-checked")
+  else ok(`api.telegram.org reachable (${telegram.detail})`)
+  pauseSupervision()
+  let failure = null
+  try {
+    say(`lifecycle upgrade (stop → switch → resident → migrate → start${gated ? ", held uncommitted for the gate" : ""})`)
+    ok(sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [lifecycle, "upgrade", id, image(version), ...(rehearse ? ["--fail-after", rehearse] : gated ? ["--hold-commit"] : [])], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }).trim())
+  } catch (e) { failure = e }
+  // Only the lifecycle's own rehearsal stop is planned; anything else is a real failure,
+  // even during a rehearsal (the first 830 -> 835 rehearsal was mislabelled "as planned").
+  const reason = failure ? lifecycleFailure(failure) : ""
+  const planned = Boolean(failure && rehearse && reason.includes(`rehearsal stopped after ${rehearse}`))
+  if (failure) {
+    console.log(`\n!! ${planned ? "rehearsal stopped as planned" : "upgrade FAILED"}: ${reason}\n!! rolling back to the predecessor`)
+    try { ok(`rollback: ${sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [lifecycle, "upgrade-rollback"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }).trim()}`) }
+    catch (e) {
+      resumeSupervision()
+      fail(`ROLLBACK FAILED: ${lifecycleFailure(e)}\nThe journal is kept; the next authority boot (or \`upgrade-rollback\`) retries it.`)
+    }
+  } else if (!gated) { pinTemplate(version); pruneButlerImages() }
+  resumeSupervision()
+  say("preservation")
+  const preserved = []
+  const jellyfinNow = docker(["inspect", "jellyfin", "--format", "{{.Id}}|{{.Image}}|{{.RestartCount}}|{{.State.StartedAt}}"]).trim()
+  jellyfinNow === jellyfinBefore ? ok("jellyfin unchanged") : (gated && !failure ? (bad("JELLYFIN CHANGED"), preserved.push("jellyfin changed")) : fail("JELLYFIN CHANGED"))
+  sha12(POLICY) === policyBefore ? ok("steward policy unchanged") : (gated && !failure ? (bad("STEWARD POLICY CHANGED"), preserved.push("steward policy changed")) : fail("STEWARD POLICY CHANGED"))
+  const live = docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Config.Image}} {{.State.Status}}/{{.State.Health.Status}}"]).trim()
+  ok(`butler: ${live}`)
+  if (failure && !planned) fail("upgrade rolled back; the Butler is on its prior version (see above)")
+  if (gated && !failure) {
+    say(`replay gate${plant ? ` (planted failure: ${plant})` : ""}`)
+    const stillHeld = () => heldUpgradeProblem({ journalExists: existsSync(UPGRADE_JOURNAL), liveImage: butlerState().split(" ")[0], expectedImage: image(version) })
+    const outcome = completeGatedUpgrade({
+      runGate: () => {
+        if (preserved.length) return { ok: false, detail: preserved.join("; ") }
+        if (!waitForButler(image(version), 300)) return { ok: false, detail: `the new Butler did not become healthy on ${image(version)}` }
+        const result = runReplayGate(plant)
+        if (!result.ok) return result
+        const problem = stillHeld()
+        return problem ? { ok: false, detail: problem } : result
+      },
+      commit: () => {
+        const problem = stillHeld()
+        if (problem) throw new Error(`refusing to commit: ${problem}`)
+        pauseSupervision()
+        try { ok(`commit: ${sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [lifecycle, "upgrade", id, image(version)], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }).trim()}`) }
+        finally { resumeSupervision() }
+      },
+      rollback: () => {
+        pauseSupervision()
+        try { ok(`rollback: ${sh("/usr/local/bin/node", [lifecycle, "upgrade-rollback"], { stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"] }).trim()}`) }
+        catch (e) { fail(`ROLLBACK FAILED: ${lifecycleFailure(e)}\nThe journal is kept; the next authority boot (or \`upgrade-rollback\`) retries it.`) }
+        finally { resumeSupervision() }
+      },
+      confirmRollback: () => {
+        if (!waitForButler(priorImage, 300)) fail(`rolled back, but ${priorImage} is not running healthy; inspect \`docker logs ${CONTAINER}\``)
+        return priorImage
+      },
+      pin: () => pinTemplate(version),
+      prune: () => pruneButlerImages(),
+    })
+    if (!outcome.passed) process.exit(1)
+    console.log(`\nUPGRADE done — ${version} live and gate-verified. Run verify.`)
+    return
+  }
+  console.log(rehearse ? "\nREHEARSAL done — the upgrade reached the planned step and the rollback restored the predecessor." : `\nUPGRADE done — ${version} live (NOT gate-verified). Run verify.`)
+}
+
+// ---- verify ---------------------------------------------------------------
+
+function verify(withGate = false) {
+  say("verify")
+  const st = docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{.Config.Image}} {{.State.Status}}/{{.State.Health.Status}} restarts={{.RestartCount}}"]).trim()
+  ok(`butler: ${st}`)
+  const auth = docker(["logs", CONTAINER, "--since", "2m"], { stdio: ["ignore","pipe","pipe"] }).split("\n").filter((l) => l.includes("401")).length
+  auth === 0 ? ok("no Telegram auth failures in the last 2m") : bad(`${auth} 401s in the last 2m`)
+  existsSync(POLICY) ? ok(`steward policy ${sha12(POLICY)}`) : bad("steward policy missing")
+  const psycheMount = JSON.parse(docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{json .Mounts}}"]) || "[]")
+  psycheMountIssue(psycheMount) === null ? ok("psyche is mounted read-only in the resident") : bad(psycheMountIssue(psycheMount))
+  const trustMount = JSON.parse(docker(["inspect", CONTAINER, "--format", "{{json .Mounts}}"]) || "[]")
+  trustMountIssue(trustMount) === null ? ok("the operator trust directory is mounted read-only in the resident") : bad(trustMountIssue(trustMount))
+  const trustIssue = existsSync(TRUST_HOST_DIR) ? trustDirIssue(lstatSync(TRUST_HOST_DIR)) : `${TRUST_HOST_DIR} is missing`
+  trustIssue === null ? ok("the host trust directory is root-owned and closed to group and other writes") : bad(trustIssue)
+  const droppedHolders = escalationGrantProblems()
+  droppedHolders.length === 0 ? ok("every escalation holder is in the trusted file") : droppedHolders.forEach((line) => bad(line))
+  const psycheDir = `${BUNDLE}/psyche`
+  if (existsSync(psycheDir)) {
+    const psycheIssues = psycheProblems(psycheDir)
+    psycheIssues.length === 0 ? ok("psyche files are resident-owned 0600 (read-only through the mount)") : bad(`psyche files do not match what the resident boot check requires: ${psycheIssues.slice(0, 3).join("; ")}`)
+  } else bad("psyche folder missing from the bundle")
+  const jf = docker(["inspect", "jellyfin", "--format", "{{.State.Status}} restarts={{.RestartCount}}"]).trim()
+  ok(`jellyfin ${jf}`)
+  if (withGate) {
+    say("replay gate (live version, no upgrade)")
+    const gate = runReplayGate(undefined)
+    gate.ok ? ok("replay gate passed") : bad(`replay gate failed: ${gate.detail}`)
+  }
+  process.exit(RED === 0 ? 0 : 1)
+}
+
+function fail(m) { console.error(`\nREFUSING: ${m}`); process.exit(1) }
+
+// ---- entry ----------------------------------------------------------------
+
+export function parseUpgradeArgs(argv) {
+  const usage = "Usage: sanctuary-butler-upgrade.mjs <preflight|prepare|install|upgrade> <version> [--rehearse <step>] [--no-gate] [--plant <case>] | verify [--gate]"
+  const [phase, ...rest] = argv
+  if (!phase || !["preflight", "prepare", "install", "verify", "upgrade"].includes(phase)) throw new Error(usage)
+  const parsed = { phase, version: undefined, rehearse: undefined, noGate: false, plant: undefined, gate: false }
+  for (let i = 0; i < rest.length; i += 1) {
+    const arg = rest[i]
+    if (arg === "--rehearse" && phase === "upgrade" && rest[i + 1]) parsed.rehearse = rest[++i]
+    else if (arg === "--no-gate" && phase === "upgrade") parsed.noGate = true
+    else if (arg === "--plant" && phase === "upgrade" && rest[i + 1]) parsed.plant = rest[++i]
+    else if (arg === "--gate" && phase === "verify") parsed.gate = true
+    else if (!arg.startsWith("--") && parsed.version === undefined && phase !== "verify") parsed.version = arg
+    else throw new Error(usage)
+  }
+  if (parsed.noGate && parsed.plant) throw new Error("--plant needs the gate; it cannot be combined with --no-gate")
+  if (parsed.rehearse && (parsed.noGate || parsed.plant)) throw new Error("--rehearse does not use the gate; do not combine it with --no-gate or --plant")
+  if (phase !== "verify" && !/^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+(-[0-9A-Za-z.-]+)?$/.test(parsed.version || "")) throw new Error("a semver version is required, e.g. 0.1.0-alpha.829")
+  return parsed
+}
+
+async function run(argv) {
+  let args
+  try { args = parseUpgradeArgs(argv) } catch (error) { console.error(error.message); process.exit(2) }
+  requireRoot()
+  if (args.phase === "preflight") preflight(args.version)
+  else if (args.phase === "prepare") prepare(args.version)
+  else if (args.phase === "install") install(args.version)
+  else if (args.phase === "verify") verify(args.gate)
+  else if (args.phase === "upgrade") await upgrade(args.version, args.rehearse, { noGate: args.noGate, plant: args.plant })
+}
+
+if (process.argv[1] && fileURLToPath(import.meta.url) === realpathSync(process.argv[1])) run(process.argv.slice(2)).catch((error) => { console.error(error); process.exit(1) })