@ouro.bot/cli 0.1.0-alpha.884 → 0.1.0-alpha.887

package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary-unit16-host-broker.mjs

@@ -506,6 +506,7 @@ async function containerSnapshot(expectedImage) {
     { destination: "/run/ouro-events", source: PRODUCTION_EVENT_SPOOL_SOURCE, propagation: "rprivate", rw: false, type: "bind" },
     { destination: "/run/ouro-authority", source: "/run/ouro-authority", propagation: "rprivate", rw: false, type: "bind" },
     { destination: "/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro/psyche", source: `${PRODUCTION_BUNDLE_SOURCE}/psyche`, propagation: "rprivate", rw: false, type: "bind" },
+    { destination: "/etc/ouro/trust/sanctuary", source: "/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/trust/sanctuary", propagation: "rprivate", rw: false, type: "bind" },
   ]
   const mountsExact = mounts.length === expectedMounts.length && expectedMounts.every((expected) => mounts.some((mount) => mount.destination === expected.destination && mount.source === expected.source && mount.propagation === expected.propagation && mount.rw === expected.rw && mount.type === expected.type))
   const securityExact = value.privileged === false && (value.capAdd === null || (Array.isArray(value.capAdd) && value.capAdd.length === 0))

package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary.ouro/bundle-meta.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
-  "runtimeVersion": "0.1.0-alpha.884",
+  "runtimeVersion": "0.1.0-alpha.887",
   "bundleSchemaVersion": 3,
   "lastUpdated": "2026-09-03T00:00:00.000Z"
 }

package/deploy/unraid/sanctuary.xml

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 <?xml version="1.0"?>
 <Container version="2">
   <Name>ouro-butler</Name>
-  <Repository>ghcr.io/ourostack/ouroboros-butler:0.1.0-alpha.884</Repository>
+  <Repository>ghcr.io/ourostack/ouroboros-butler:0.1.0-alpha.887</Repository>
   <Registry>https://github.com/ourostack/ouroboros/pkgs/container/ouroboros-butler</Registry>
   <Network>host</Network>
   <Shell>sh</Shell>
@@ -26,4 +26,5 @@
   <Config Name="Privileged event spool" Target="/run/ouro-events" Default="/boot/config/custom/ouro-events/spool" Mode="ro" Description="Root-owned detector envelopes, read-only inside the Butler" Type="Path" Display="always" Required="true" Mask="false">/boot/config/custom/ouro-events/spool</Config>
   <Config Name="Root authority socket" Target="/run/ouro-authority" Default="/run/ouro-authority" Mode="ro" Description="Root-owned gateway socket and public issuer pins only" Type="Path" Display="always" Required="true" Mask="false">/run/ouro-authority</Config>
   <Config Name="Psyche (read-only)" Target="/home/ouro/AgentBundles/sanctuary.ouro/psyche" Default="/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/agent/sanctuary.ouro/psyche" Mode="ro" Description="The Butler's psyche files, read-only inside the Butler so they can be neither edited nor replaced" Type="Path" Display="always" Required="true" Mask="false">/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/agent/sanctuary.ouro/psyche</Config>
+  <Config Name="Operator trust (read-only)" Target="/etc/ouro/trust/sanctuary" Default="/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/trust/sanctuary" Mode="ro" Description="Root-owned grants the Butler honours (delegated commands, escalation). Read-only inside the Butler; only the host operator can change it" Type="Path" Display="always" Required="true" Mask="false">/mnt/user/appdata/ouro-butler/trust/sanctuary</Config>
 </Container>

package/dist/a2a/client.js

@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
 "use strict";
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.A2ARpcError = void 0;
 exports.cardDid = cardDid;
 exports.endpointForCard = endpointForCard;
 exports.fetchA2AAgentCard = fetchA2AAgentCard;
@@ -50,6 +51,17 @@ async function fetchA2AAgentCard(cardUrl, fetchImpl = fetch) {
     });
     return parsed;
 }
+/** A JSON-RPC error answer from the peer. `data` carries the peer's structured detail (for a refused delegated command: reason, nothingRan, retry, next). */
+class A2ARpcError extends Error {
+    code;
+    data;
+    constructor(error) {
+        super(`A2A error ${error.code}: ${error.message}`);
+        this.code = error.code;
+        this.data = error.data;
+    }
+}
+exports.A2ARpcError = A2ARpcError;
 async function postJsonRpc(endpointUrl, request, fetchImpl, protocolVersion = "1.0") {
     const response = await fetchImpl(endpointUrl, {
         method: "POST",
@@ -112,7 +124,7 @@ async function sendA2AMessage(input) {
         }, fetchImpl);
     }
     if ("error" in rpc) {
-        throw new Error(`A2A error ${rpc.error.code}: ${rpc.error.message}`);
+        throw new A2ARpcError(rpc.error);
     }
     const result = rpc.result;
     const task = "task" in result && result.task ? result.task : result;
@@ -151,7 +163,7 @@ async function postA2AMessageEnvelope(input) {
         rpc = await postJsonRpc(input.endpointUrl, { ...request, method: "SendMessage" }, fetchImpl);
     }
     if ("error" in rpc) {
-        throw new Error(`A2A error ${rpc.error.code}: ${rpc.error.message}`);
+        throw new A2ARpcError(rpc.error);
     }
     (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({
         component: "channels",
@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ async function getA2ATask(input) {
         rpc = await postJsonRpc(input.endpointUrl, { ...request, method: "GetTask" }, fetchImpl);
     }
     if ("error" in rpc) {
-        throw new Error(`A2A error ${rpc.error.code}: ${rpc.error.message}`);
+        throw new A2ARpcError(rpc.error);
     }
     return rpc.result;
 }
@@ -225,7 +237,7 @@ async function sendSealedA2AChat(input) {
     (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({ component: "channels", event: "channel.a2a_chat_send_start", message: "sending sealed A2A chat message", meta: { endpointUrl, peerDid } });
     const rpc = await postJsonRpc(endpointUrl, request, fetchImpl);
     if ("error" in rpc)
-        throw new Error(`A2A error ${rpc.error.code}: ${rpc.error.message}`);
+        throw new A2ARpcError(rpc.error);
     const task = rpc.result;
     const replyMessage = task?.status?.message;
     if (!replyMessage)

package/dist/a2a/delegated-command-grants.js

@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+"use strict";
+Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.DELEGATED_COMMAND_GRANTS_FILE = void 0;
+exports.delegatedCommandGrantsPath = delegatedCommandGrantsPath;
+exports.viewDelegatedCommandGrants = viewDelegatedCommandGrants;
+exports.readDelegatedCommandGrants = readDelegatedCommandGrants;
+exports.checkDelegatedCommandGrant = checkDelegatedCommandGrant;
+exports.setDelegatedCommandGrant = setDelegatedCommandGrant;
+const runtime_1 = require("../nerves/runtime");
+const operator_trust_1 = require("./operator-trust");
+const replay_grant_holders_1 = require("./replay-grant-holders");
+const replay_harness_1 = require("./replay-harness");
+exports.DELEGATED_COMMAND_GRANTS_FILE = "delegated-command-grants.json";
+function delegatedCommandGrantsPath(agentRoot) {
+    return (0, operator_trust_1.operatorTrustFile)(agentRoot, exports.DELEGATED_COMMAND_GRANTS_FILE);
+}
+function validGrant(value) {
+    if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value))
+        return false;
+    const grant = value;
+    const keys = Object.keys(grant).sort().join(",");
+    return (keys === "did,grantedAt,scope,source" || keys === "did,expiresAt,grantedAt,scope,source")
+        && grant.scope === "principal_commands"
+        && typeof grant.did === "string" && grant.did.startsWith("did:") && grant.did.length <= 512
+        && typeof grant.grantedAt === "string" && !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(grant.grantedAt))
+        && typeof grant.source === "string" && grant.source.trim().length > 0
+        && (grant.expiresAt === undefined || typeof grant.expiresAt === "string");
+}
+/** The file's trust state, every well-formed grant in it keyed by friend id, and the friend ids whose entries were dropped. */
+function viewDelegatedCommandGrants(agentRoot) {
+    return (0, operator_trust_1.readGrantFile)(agentRoot, exports.DELEGATED_COMMAND_GRANTS_FILE, validGrant);
+}
+function readDelegatedCommandGrants(agentRoot) {
+    return viewDelegatedCommandGrants(agentRoot).grants;
+}
+/**
+ * The one answer to "may this friend relay the principal's commands right now?". Admission, the follow-up path and
+ * `list` all ask it, so they cannot disagree. `signerDid` is the DID the message was verified as: it must equal the
+ * DID the operator pinned. Order: file trusted, grant exists, DID matches, not expired (an expiry that is not a finite
+ * time counts as expired, and so does a replay identity whose root-owned window is closed), then family and active.
+ */
+function checkDelegatedCommandGrant(agentRoot, friend, signerDid, now = Date.now()) {
+    const view = viewDelegatedCommandGrants(agentRoot);
+    if (view.state === "untrusted")
+        return { ok: false, reason: "grants_untrusted" };
+    const grant = view.grants[friend.id];
+    if (!grant)
+        return { ok: false, reason: "no_grant" };
+    if (grant.did !== signerDid)
+        return { ok: false, reason: "grant_did_mismatch" };
+    if (grant.expiresAt !== undefined) {
+        const expiresAt = Date.parse(grant.expiresAt);
+        if (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || expiresAt <= now)
+            return { ok: false, reason: "grant_expired" };
+    }
+    // A grant for a friend on the root-owned replay list must be time-bounded by the trusted file itself. The bundle's replay registry is the agent's to move aside, so it only ever adds the window check below.
+    if (grant.expiresAt === undefined && (0, replay_grant_holders_1.isReplayGrantHolder)(agentRoot, friend.id))
+        return { ok: false, reason: "grant_expired" };
+    // A replay identity is a test peer of the host's replay gate: its grant means something only while the root-owned window is open.
+    if ((0, replay_harness_1.isReplayIdentity)(agentRoot, friend.id) && !(0, replay_harness_1.isReplayWindowOpen)(agentRoot, friend.id, now))
+        return { ok: false, reason: "grant_expired" };
+    if (friend.trustLevel !== "family" || friend.admissionState !== "active")
+        return { ok: false, reason: "not_family" };
+    return { ok: true };
+}
+/** Writes or removes one grant. The previous file is kept beside it as a timestamped backup before the change. */
+function setDelegatedCommandGrant(agentRoot, friendId, change, now = new Date()) {
+    return (0, operator_trust_1.withTrustedWriteLock)(agentRoot, () => setDelegatedCommandGrantLocked(agentRoot, friendId, change, now));
+}
+function setDelegatedCommandGrantLocked(agentRoot, friendId, change, now) {
+    const current = readDelegatedCommandGrants(agentRoot);
+    const had = current[friendId];
+    const next = { ...current };
+    if (change.grant) {
+        const entry = { scope: "principal_commands", did: change.did, grantedAt: now.toISOString(), source: change.source, ...(change.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: change.expiresAt } : {}) };
+        if (had && had.did === entry.did && had.source === entry.source && had.expiresAt === entry.expiresAt)
+            return { changed: false, backup: null };
+        next[friendId] = entry;
+    }
+    else {
+        if (had === undefined)
+            return { changed: false, backup: null };
+        delete next[friendId];
+    }
+    const { backup } = (0, operator_trust_1.writeTrustedFile)(agentRoot, exports.DELEGATED_COMMAND_GRANTS_FILE, `${JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, grants: next }, null, 2)}\n`, now);
+    (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({
+        component: "senses",
+        event: "senses.a2a_delegated_command_grant_changed",
+        message: change.grant ? "granted delegated commands to an A2A peer" : "revoked an A2A peer's delegated-command grant",
+        meta: { friendId, granted: change.grant },
+    });
+    return { changed: true, backup };
+}

package/dist/a2a/delegated-command.js

@@ -35,12 +35,15 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
 exports.DELEGATED_BANNER = exports.A2A_PRINCIPAL_PROFILE_ID = void 0;
 exports.delegatedCommandWasNoticed = delegatedCommandWasNoticed;
+exports.delegationRefusalGuidance = delegationRefusalGuidance;
+exports.shieldDelegatedBanner = shieldDelegatedBanner;
 exports.delegatedCommandNotice = delegatedCommandNotice;
 exports.admitDelegatedCommand = admitDelegatedCommand;
 const crypto_1 = require("crypto");
 const fs = __importStar(require("fs"));
 const path = __importStar(require("path"));
 const runtime_1 = require("../nerves/runtime");
+const delegated_command_grants_1 = require("./delegated-command-grants");
 const replay_harness_1 = require("./replay-harness");
 const relationship_authorization_1 = require("../repertoire/relationship-authorization");
 const NOTICE_EXCERPT_CHARS = 200;
@@ -67,16 +70,60 @@ function delegatedCommandWasNoticed(agentRoot, commandId, principalFriendId, del
     const artifact = JSON.parse(raw);
     return artifact.idempotencyKey === idempotencyKey && artifact.authorClass === "butler" && artifact.target?.friendId === principalFriendId;
 }
-/** Matches the banner only the server may put in front of an admitted command. */
-exports.DELEGATED_BANNER = /^\s*\[\s*delegated command/iu;
+/**
+ * What a refused sender is told. Every refusal says that nothing ran and names the next step; the reason code stays
+ * first on the wire (`delegated command refused: <reason>`) because the replay gate and older CLIs match it.
+ */
+function delegationRefusalGuidance(reason, hints) {
+    switch (reason) {
+        case "not_enabled":
+            return { message: "this agent does not accept delegated commands", next: "Send the message without --delegated, or ask the agent's operator to enable delegated commands.", retry: false };
+        case "no_grant":
+            return {
+                message: hints.legacyRecordGrant
+                    ? "the operator has not granted you delegated commands; a grant on your friend record is not honoured, because the agent could have written it"
+                    : "the operator has not granted you delegated commands",
+                next: `Ask the operator to run, as root on the agent's host: ouro a2a delegated-commands grant --friend <your friend id> --did <your DID> (your DID is in: ouro a2a identity --json).${hints.legacyRecordGrant ? " Grants live in the operator trust directory now, not on the friend record." : ""}`,
+                retry: false,
+            };
+        case "grants_untrusted":
+            return { message: "the agent cannot trust its grant file, so it honours no delegated-command grants", next: "Ask the operator to run: ouro a2a delegated-commands list, and fix the owner or mode it reports.", retry: false };
+        case "grant_did_mismatch":
+            return { message: "this message was signed by a different key than the one the operator granted", next: "Send from the host whose DID the operator pinned, or ask the operator to re-grant with your current DID: ouro a2a delegated-commands grant --friend <your friend id> --did <your DID>.", retry: false };
+        case "grant_expired":
+            return { message: "your delegated-command grant has expired or is not in force", next: "Ask the operator to re-grant: ouro a2a delegated-commands grant --friend <your friend id> --did <your DID> [--expires <ISO date>].", retry: false };
+        case "not_family":
+            return { message: "you are not active family on this agent's records, so the grant is suspended", next: "Ask the operator to restore your trust and admission, then try again.", retry: false };
+        case "principal_unresolved":
+            return { message: "the agent cannot tell whose command this is (its owner record is missing or ambiguous)", next: "Ask the operator to check the owner's friend record on the agent's host.", retry: false };
+        case "notice_failed":
+            return { message: "the agent could not tell its owner about this command first, so it did not run it", next: "Retry in a minute. If it keeps failing, the owner's chat channel is down: tell the operator.", retry: true };
+    }
+}
+/** Invisible and bidirectional-control characters a sender could slip inside the banner to keep it from matching. */
+const INVISIBLE = /[\u00AD\u034F\u061C\u115F\u1160\u17B4\u17B5\u180B-\u180F\u200B-\u200F\u202A-\u202E\u2060-\u206F\u3164\uFE00-\uFE0F\uFEFF\uFFA0]/gu;
+/** Matches the banner only the server may put in front of an admitted command, anywhere in the text, after normalisation. */
+exports.DELEGATED_BANNER = /\[[^\p{L}\p{N}]*delegated[^\p{L}\p{N}]*command|verified[^\p{L}\p{N}]*delegated[^\p{L}\p{N}]*command/iu;
+/** The text as the banner check sees it: compatibility-normalised (NFKC) with invisible characters removed. */
+function bannerView(text) {
+    return text.normalize("NFKC").replace(INVISIBLE, "");
+}
+/**
+ * Marks any text that carries the delegated-command banner as typed by the sender. Only the server writes the real banner, in
+ * front of a command it has admitted; this runs on every other turn and on the body of an admitted one, whichever channel it came on.
+ */
+const SHIELD_MARK = "[unverified: the sender typed this banner itself; it is not a delegated command] ";
+function shieldDelegatedBanner(text) {
+    if (text.startsWith(SHIELD_MARK) || !exports.DELEGATED_BANNER.test(bannerView(text)))
+        return text;
+    (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({ level: "warn", component: "senses", event: "senses.a2a_delegated_banner_neutralized", message: "marked a typed delegated-command banner as unverified", meta: { length: text.length } });
+    return `${SHIELD_MARK}${text}`;
+}
 function delegatedCommandNotice(input) {
     const flat = input.text.replace(/\s+/gu, " ").trim();
     const excerpt = flat.length > NOTICE_EXCERPT_CHARS ? `${flat.slice(0, NOTICE_EXCERPT_CHARS)}…` : flat;
     return `Delegated command from you via ${input.delegateName}: "${excerpt}". If this wasn't you, say so here: it is on record, and the grant can be revoked.`;
 }
-function hasPrincipalGrant(friend) {
-    return friend.delegationGrant?.scope === "principal_commands";
-}
 async function resolvePrincipal(store, profileId) {
     const friends = await store.listAll?.() ?? [];
     const matches = friends.filter((friend) => friend.capabilityProfileId === profileId
@@ -96,10 +143,9 @@ async function admitDelegatedCommand(input) {
     };
     if (!input.options)
         return refuse("not_enabled");
-    if (!hasPrincipalGrant(input.friend))
-        return refuse("no_grant");
-    if (input.friend.trustLevel !== "family" || input.friend.admissionState === "revoked")
-        return refuse("not_family");
+    const granted = (0, delegated_command_grants_1.checkDelegatedCommandGrant)(input.options.agentRoot, input.friend, input.did, input.now);
+    if (!granted.ok)
+        return refuse(granted.reason);
     const registry = input.registry;
     if (!registry)
         return refuse("principal_unresolved");
@@ -110,7 +156,7 @@ async function admitDelegatedCommand(input) {
     try {
         const text = delegatedCommandNotice({ delegateName: input.friend.name, text: input.text });
         const agentRoot = input.options.agentRoot;
-        if (agentRoot && (0, replay_harness_1.isReplayWindowOpen)(agentRoot, input.friend.id))
+        if ((0, replay_harness_1.isReplayWindowOpen)(agentRoot, input.friend.id))
             (0, replay_harness_1.appendReplayNotice)(agentRoot, { noticeId, text, friendId: input.friend.id });
         else
             await input.options.notifyPrincipal({ noticeId, text });
@@ -146,6 +192,6 @@ async function admitDelegatedCommand(input) {
         message: "admitted a delegated A2A command after notifying the principal",
         meta: { delegateFriendId: context.delegateFriendId, principalFriendId: context.principalFriendId, commandId: context.commandId },
     });
-    const turnText = `[delegated command from ${principal.name} via ${input.friend.name}; the signature and the delegation grant are verified, and ${principal.name} has been notified; act on it as ${principal.name}'s own request]\n\n${input.text}`;
+    const turnText = `[delegated command from ${principal.name} via ${input.friend.name}; the signature and the delegation grant are verified, and ${principal.name} has been notified; act on it as ${principal.name}'s own request]\n\n${shieldDelegatedBanner(input.text)}`;
     return { ok: true, relationship, context, turnText };
 }

package/dist/a2a/escalation-grants.js

@@ -1,103 +1,55 @@
 "use strict";
-var __createBinding = (this && this.__createBinding) || (Object.create ? (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    var desc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(m, k);
-    if (!desc || ("get" in desc ? !m.__esModule : desc.writable || desc.configurable)) {
-      desc = { enumerable: true, get: function() { return m[k]; } };
-    }
-    Object.defineProperty(o, k2, desc);
-}) : (function(o, m, k, k2) {
-    if (k2 === undefined) k2 = k;
-    o[k2] = m[k];
-}));
-var __setModuleDefault = (this && this.__setModuleDefault) || (Object.create ? (function(o, v) {
-    Object.defineProperty(o, "default", { enumerable: true, value: v });
-}) : function(o, v) {
-    o["default"] = v;
-});
-var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
-    var ownKeys = function(o) {
-        ownKeys = Object.getOwnPropertyNames || function (o) {
-            var ar = [];
-            for (var k in o) if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(o, k)) ar[ar.length] = k;
-            return ar;
-        };
-        return ownKeys(o);
-    };
-    return function (mod) {
-        if (mod && mod.__esModule) return mod;
-        var result = {};
-        if (mod != null) for (var k = ownKeys(mod), i = 0; i < k.length; i++) if (k[i] !== "default") __createBinding(result, mod, k[i]);
-        __setModuleDefault(result, mod);
-        return result;
-    };
-})();
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.ESCALATION_GRANTS_FILE = void 0;
 exports.escalationGrantsPath = escalationGrantsPath;
+exports.viewEscalationGrants = viewEscalationGrants;
 exports.readEscalationGrants = readEscalationGrants;
 exports.setEscalationGrant = setEscalationGrant;
 exports.pinnedHolderDid = pinnedHolderDid;
 exports.holdsEscalation = holdsEscalation;
 exports.escalationHolders = escalationHolders;
-const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
-const path = __importStar(require("node:path"));
 const runtime_1 = require("../nerves/runtime");
-const trusted_files_1 = require("./trusted-files");
+const replay_grant_holders_1 = require("./replay-grant-holders");
+const operator_trust_1 = require("./operator-trust");
+exports.ESCALATION_GRANTS_FILE = "escalation-grants.json";
 function escalationGrantsPath(agentRoot) {
-    return path.join(agentRoot, "state", "a2a", "escalation-grants.json");
+    return (0, operator_trust_1.operatorTrustFile)(agentRoot, exports.ESCALATION_GRANTS_FILE);
 }
 function validGrant(value) {
     if (!value || typeof value !== "object" || Array.isArray(value))
         return false;
     const grant = value;
-    return Object.keys(grant).sort().join(",") === "did,grantedAt,scope,source"
+    const keys = Object.keys(grant).sort().join(",");
+    return (keys === "did,grantedAt,scope,source" || keys === "did,expiresAt,grantedAt,scope,source")
+        && (grant.expiresAt === undefined || typeof grant.expiresAt === "string")
         && typeof grant.did === "string" && grant.did.startsWith("did:") && grant.did.length <= 512
         && grant.scope === "escalation"
         && typeof grant.grantedAt === "string" && !Number.isNaN(Date.parse(grant.grantedAt))
         && typeof grant.source === "string" && grant.source.trim().length > 0;
 }
+/** The file's trust state and every well-formed grant in it, keyed by friend id. */
+function viewEscalationGrants(agentRoot) {
+    return (0, operator_trust_1.readGrantFile)(agentRoot, exports.ESCALATION_GRANTS_FILE, validGrant);
+}
 /** Every well-formed grant in the file, keyed by friend id. Anything else in the file is ignored. */
 function readEscalationGrants(agentRoot) {
-    const file = escalationGrantsPath(agentRoot);
-    if (!(0, trusted_files_1.isTrustedDirectory)(path.dirname(file)))
-        return {};
-    const parsed = (0, trusted_files_1.readTrustedJson)(file);
-    const grants = parsed?.grants;
-    if (!grants || typeof grants !== "object" || Array.isArray(grants))
-        return {};
-    return Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(grants).filter((entry) => validGrant(entry[1])));
-}
-/** Run as root, the operator's grant leaves the file and its directory root-owned and closed to everyone else, even if an earlier recursive chown had handed them to the resident. */
-function ownAsRoot(target, mode) {
-    fs.chownSync(target, 0, 0);
-    fs.chmodSync(target, mode);
+    return viewEscalationGrants(agentRoot).grants;
 }
 /** Writes or removes one grant. The previous file is kept beside it as a timestamped backup before the change. */
 function setEscalationGrant(agentRoot, friendId, change, now = new Date()) {
-    const file = escalationGrantsPath(agentRoot);
-    // Root repairs the directory first; a grants file the resident owns stays untrusted and is replaced, never blessed.
-    fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true, mode: 0o755 });
-    if (process.geteuid?.() === 0)
-        ownAsRoot(path.dirname(file), 0o755);
+    return (0, operator_trust_1.withTrustedWriteLock)(agentRoot, () => setEscalationGrantLocked(agentRoot, friendId, change, now));
+}
+function setEscalationGrantLocked(agentRoot, friendId, change, now) {
     const current = readEscalationGrants(agentRoot);
     const had = current[friendId];
-    if (change.grant ? had?.did === change.did : had === undefined)
+    if (change.grant ? had?.did === change.did && had.expiresAt === change.expiresAt : had === undefined)
         return { changed: false, backup: null };
-    let backup = null;
-    if (fs.existsSync(file)) {
-        backup = `${file}.bak-${now.toISOString().replace(/[:.]/gu, "-")}`;
-        fs.copyFileSync(file, backup);
-    }
     const next = { ...current };
     if (change.grant)
-        next[friendId] = { scope: "escalation", grantedAt: now.toISOString(), source: change.source, did: change.did };
+        next[friendId] = { scope: "escalation", grantedAt: now.toISOString(), source: change.source, did: change.did, ...(change.expiresAt ? { expiresAt: change.expiresAt } : {}) };
     else
         delete next[friendId];
-    const tmp = `${file}.${process.pid}.tmp`;
-    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, `${JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, grants: next }, null, 2)}\n`, { mode: 0o644 });
-    fs.renameSync(tmp, file);
-    if (process.geteuid?.() === 0)
-        ownAsRoot(file, 0o644);
+    const { backup } = (0, operator_trust_1.writeTrustedFile)(agentRoot, exports.ESCALATION_GRANTS_FILE, `${JSON.stringify({ schemaVersion: 1, grants: next }, null, 2)}\n`, now);
     (0, runtime_1.emitNervesEvent)({
         component: "senses",
         event: "senses.a2a_escalation_grant_changed",
@@ -106,17 +58,27 @@ function setEscalationGrant(agentRoot, friendId, change, now = new Date()) {
     });
     return { changed: true, backup };
 }
-/** The DID the operator pinned for this holder, or null when it holds no (complete) grant. */
-function pinnedHolderDid(agentRoot, friendId) {
-    return readEscalationGrants(agentRoot)[friendId]?.did ?? null;
+/** A grant is in force when its trusted expiry has not passed; a grant with no expiry for a friend on the root-owned replay list is never in force. */
+function inForce(agentRoot, friendId, grant, now) {
+    if (!grant)
+        return false;
+    if (grant.expiresAt === undefined)
+        return !(0, replay_grant_holders_1.isReplayGrantHolder)(agentRoot, friendId);
+    const expiresAt = Date.parse(grant.expiresAt);
+    return Number.isFinite(expiresAt) && expiresAt > now;
+}
+/** The DID the operator pinned for this holder, or null when it holds no (complete, unexpired) grant. */
+function pinnedHolderDid(agentRoot, friendId, now = Date.now()) {
+    const grant = readEscalationGrants(agentRoot)[friendId];
+    return inForce(agentRoot, friendId, grant, now) ? grant.did : null;
 }
 /** True only for an active family friend that the operator listed in the grants file, with a pinned DID. */
-function holdsEscalation(agentRoot, friend) {
-    return readEscalationGrants(agentRoot)[friend.id] !== undefined
+function holdsEscalation(agentRoot, friend, now = Date.now()) {
+    return inForce(agentRoot, friend.id, readEscalationGrants(agentRoot)[friend.id], now)
         && friend.trustLevel === "family"
         && friend.admissionState === "active";
 }
-async function escalationHolders(agentRoot, store) {
+async function escalationHolders(agentRoot, store, now = Date.now()) {
     const friends = await store.listAll?.() ?? [];
-    return friends.filter((friend) => holdsEscalation(agentRoot, friend));
+    return friends.filter((friend) => holdsEscalation(agentRoot, friend, now));
 }

package/dist/a2a/identity.js

@@ -33,9 +33,13 @@ var __importStar = (this && this.__importStar) || (function () {
     };
 })();
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
+exports.PUBLIC_A2A_IDENTITY_FILE = void 0;
 exports.readStoredA2ASeed = readStoredA2ASeed;
 exports.loadOrMintA2AIdentity = loadOrMintA2AIdentity;
 exports.loadSelfA2AIdentity = loadSelfA2AIdentity;
+exports.publishOwnA2ADid = publishOwnA2ADid;
+exports.readPublishedA2ADid = readPublishedA2ADid;
+exports.readOwnA2ADid = readOwnA2ADid;
 exports.loadOrMintA2AIdentityFile = loadOrMintA2AIdentityFile;
 const crypto = __importStar(require("node:crypto"));
 const fs = __importStar(require("node:fs"));
@@ -171,6 +175,56 @@ async function loadSelfA2AIdentity(input) {
         },
     });
 }
+/** Where the agent publishes its own DID inside its bundle: a public value (a DID is a public key), never the seed. */
+exports.PUBLIC_A2A_IDENTITY_FILE = path.join("a2a", "public-identity.json");
+/**
+ * Publish this agent's own DID into its bundle so a one-off operator command (which has no vault access) can compare against it
+ * through the read-only bundle mount. Best effort: a read-only bundle just means the fallback stays unavailable.
+ */
+function publishOwnA2ADid(agentRoot, did) {
+    try {
+        const file = path.join(agentRoot, exports.PUBLIC_A2A_IDENTITY_FILE);
+        if (readPublishedA2ADid(agentRoot) === did)
+            return;
+        fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(file), { recursive: true });
+        fs.writeFileSync(file, `${JSON.stringify({ did }, null, 2)}\n`);
+    }
+    catch {
+        // The bundle may be mounted read-only; the DID then simply is not published.
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * The DID published in the bundle's public identity file, or null when it is absent or malformed. Read-only and ADVISORY: the agent can
+ * write its own bundle, so this value is never proof of which key is the agent's. Operator checks may report it, never rely on it alone.
+ */
+function readPublishedA2ADid(agentRoot) {
+    try {
+        const parsed = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync(path.join(agentRoot, exports.PUBLIC_A2A_IDENTITY_FILE), "utf8"));
+        return typeof parsed.did === "string" && parsed.did.startsWith("did:key:") ? parsed.did : null;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * This agent's own A2A DID if its seed is already in this process's cached machine config, else null. Strictly read-only: it
+ * never mints a seed, never creates the machine identity file and never refreshes the vault, because an operator command only
+ * wants to compare, not to create or fetch anything. A one-off root command has no cached config, so it gets null and the caller
+ * falls back to the published DID (advisory only, see `readPublishedA2ADid`) and to comparing the DID against the friend records.
+ */
+async function readOwnA2ADid(agentName) {
+    try {
+        const cached = (0, runtime_credentials_1.readMachineRuntimeCredentialConfig)(agentName);
+        if (!cached.ok || !readStoredA2ASeed(cached.config))
+            return null;
+        /* v8 ignore next -- the seed is already stored here, so the load never reaches upsert; it exists only to make minting impossible @preserve */
+        const identity = await loadOrMintA2AIdentity({ agentName, sodium: await (0, a2a_client_1.ready)(), config: cached.config, upsert: async () => { throw new Error("readOwnA2ADid never mints"); } });
+        return identity.did;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return null;
+    }
+}
 /**
  * A file-backed A2A identity for a client that is not an ouro agent (for example a
  * coding harness talking to an agent over A2A). The file holds the Ed25519 seed, so