@osqd/bothandlerjs 0.3.0

package/dist/adapters/index.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/internal/http.ts","../../src/internal/ip.ts","../../src/facts.ts","../../src/adapters/shared.ts","../../src/adapters/node.ts","../../src/adapters/fetch.ts","../../src/adapters/fastify.ts","../../src/adapters/koa.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/** Cookie parsing and serialisation, plus small header helpers. No dependencies. */\n\n/** Longest Cookie header we will parse. Beyond this it is a payload, not a session. */\nconst MAX_COOKIE_HEADER = 8192;\nconst MAX_COOKIES = 64;\n\n/**\n * Parses a `Cookie` header into a null-prototype bag.\n *\n * Null-prototype matters: a request carrying `__proto__=x` would otherwise hit the\n * prototype setter on a plain object and vanish, and any later `cookies.constructor`\n * lookup would find `Object`'s rather than `undefined`. Neither is a vulnerability by\n * itself; both are the kind of surprise that becomes one.\n */\nexport function parseCookies(header: string | undefined): Record<string, string> {\n  const cookies: Record<string, string> = Object.create(null) as Record<string, string>;\n  if (header === undefined || header.length === 0) return cookies;\n  const source = header.length > MAX_COOKIE_HEADER ? header.slice(0, MAX_COOKIE_HEADER) : header;\n\n  let count = 0;\n  for (const pair of source.split(\";\")) {\n    if (count >= MAX_COOKIES) break;\n    const equals = pair.indexOf(\"=\");\n    if (equals <= 0) continue;\n    const name = pair.slice(0, equals).trim();\n    if (name.length === 0) continue;\n    const rawValue = pair.slice(equals + 1).trim();\n    const value = rawValue.startsWith('\"') && rawValue.endsWith('\"') ? rawValue.slice(1, -1) : rawValue;\n    try {\n      cookies[name] = decodeURIComponent(value);\n    } catch {\n      // A malformed percent-escape is not worth rejecting the whole header over.\n      cookies[name] = value;\n    }\n    count++;\n  }\n  return cookies;\n}\n\nexport interface CookieOptions {\n  maxAgeMs?: number;\n  path?: string;\n  domain?: string;\n  secure?: boolean;\n  httpOnly?: boolean;\n  sameSite?: \"Lax\" | \"Strict\" | \"None\";\n}\n\n/** Builds a `Set-Cookie` value. Rejects names and values that would let a caller inject attributes. */\nexport function serializeCookie(name: string, value: string, options: CookieOptions = {}): string {\n  if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9!#$%&'*+.^_`|~-]+$/.test(name)) throw new TypeError(`Invalid cookie name: ${name}`);\n  const parts = [`${name}=${encodeURIComponent(value)}`];\n  if (options.maxAgeMs !== undefined) parts.push(`Max-Age=${Math.floor(options.maxAgeMs / 1000)}`);\n  parts.push(`Path=${options.path ?? \"/\"}`);\n  if (options.domain !== undefined) {\n    if (!/^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$/.test(options.domain)) throw new TypeError(`Invalid cookie domain: ${options.domain}`);\n    parts.push(`Domain=${options.domain}`);\n  }\n  if (options.secure !== false) parts.push(\"Secure\");\n  if (options.httpOnly !== false) parts.push(\"HttpOnly\");\n  // `SameSite=None` without `Secure` is rejected by browsers, so it is never a valid\n  // combination to emit — fail loudly here rather than shipping a cookie nothing keeps.\n  const sameSite = options.sameSite ?? \"Lax\";\n  if (sameSite === \"None\" && options.secure === false) {\n    throw new TypeError(\"SameSite=None requires Secure\");\n  }\n  parts.push(`SameSite=${sameSite}`);\n  return parts.join(\"; \");\n}\n\n/** Joins multi-value headers the way the rest of the library expects to see them. */\nexport function joinHeaderValue(value: string | string[] | undefined): string | undefined {\n  if (value === undefined) return undefined;\n  return Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(\", \") : value;\n}\n","/**\n * IP parsing, normalisation and CIDR matching, with no dependencies.\n *\n * Everything works on raw byte arrays rather than strings, because string\n * comparison of IPs is a classic source of bypasses: `::ffff:127.0.0.1`,\n * `0177.0.0.1` and `127.0.0.001` are all the same host to the network stack but\n * three different strings to a naive allowlist.\n */\n\n/** An IP as bytes: 4 for IPv4, 16 for IPv6. IPv4-mapped IPv6 is folded to 4. */\nexport type IpBytes = Uint8Array;\n\n/**\n * Parses an IPv4 or IPv6 literal into bytes, or `null` if it is not a valid\n * address. Deliberately strict: no octal, no hex, no shorthand octets, no zone\n * ids. Anything ambiguous is rejected rather than guessed at.\n */\nexport function parseIp(value: string): IpBytes | null {\n  const input = value.trim();\n  if (input.length === 0 || input.length > 45) return null;\n  // Bracketed form from a Host/Forwarded header: [2001:db8::1]\n  const bare = input.startsWith(\"[\") && input.endsWith(\"]\") ? input.slice(1, -1) : input;\n  if (bare.includes(\":\")) return parseIpv6(bare);\n  return parseIpv4(bare);\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv4(value: string): IpBytes | null {\n  const parts = value.split(\".\");\n  if (parts.length !== 4) return null;\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(4);\n  for (let i = 0; i < 4; i++) {\n    const part = parts[i]!;\n    // Reject empty, over-long, non-digit and leading-zero forms outright.\n    if (part.length === 0 || part.length > 3) return null;\n    if (!/^\\d+$/.test(part)) return null;\n    if (part.length > 1 && part[0] === \"0\") return null;\n    const n = Number(part);\n    if (n > 255) return null;\n    bytes[i] = n;\n  }\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nfunction parseIpv6(value: string): IpBytes | null {\n  // Strip a zone id (`%eth0`) — it is a local routing detail, not part of identity.\n  const withoutZone = value.split(\"%\")[0]!;\n  const doubleColon = withoutZone.indexOf(\"::\");\n  if (doubleColon !== withoutZone.lastIndexOf(\"::\")) return null;\n\n  const [headText, tailText] =\n    doubleColon === -1\n      ? [withoutZone, \"\"]\n      : [withoutZone.slice(0, doubleColon), withoutZone.slice(doubleColon + 2)];\n\n  const head = headText.length > 0 ? headText.split(\":\") : [];\n  const tail = tailText.length > 0 ? tailText.split(\":\") : [];\n\n  // A trailing dotted-quad (`::ffff:192.0.2.1`) occupies the last two groups.\n  let embedded: IpBytes | null = null;\n  const groups = [...head, ...tail];\n  const last = groups[groups.length - 1];\n  if (last !== undefined && last.includes(\".\")) {\n    embedded = parseIpv4(last);\n    if (!embedded) return null;\n    if (tail.length > 0) tail.pop();\n    else head.pop();\n  }\n\n  const groupCount = head.length + tail.length + (embedded ? 2 : 0);\n  if (doubleColon === -1 ? groupCount !== 8 : groupCount > 7) return null;\n\n  const bytes = new Uint8Array(16);\n  let offset = 0;\n  for (const group of head) {\n    if (!writeGroup(bytes, offset, group)) return null;\n    offset += 2;\n  }\n  // The gap the `::` stands for, left as the zeroes the array already holds.\n  offset = 16 - tail.length * 2 - (embedded ? 4 : 0);\n  for (const group of tail) {\n    if (!writeGroup(bytes, offset, group)) return null;\n    offset += 2;\n  }\n  if (embedded) bytes.set(embedded, 12);\n\n  // Fold IPv4-mapped (::ffff:0:0/96) down to a plain v4 address so that one host\n  // has exactly one representation regardless of which stack accepted it.\n  if (isIpv4Mapped(bytes)) return bytes.slice(12, 16);\n  return bytes;\n}\n\nfunction writeGroup(bytes: Uint8Array, offset: number, group: string): boolean {\n  if (group.length === 0 || group.length > 4 || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(group)) return false;\n  const n = Number.parseInt(group, 16);\n  bytes[offset] = n >> 8;\n  bytes[offset + 1] = n & 0xff;\n  return true;\n}\n\nfunction isIpv4Mapped(bytes: Uint8Array): boolean {\n  for (let i = 0; i < 10; i++) if (bytes[i] !== 0) return false;\n  return bytes[10] === 0xff && bytes[11] === 0xff;\n}\n\n/** Canonical string form, so the same host always produces the same actor key. */\nexport function formatIp(bytes: IpBytes): string {\n  if (bytes.length === 4) return `${bytes[0]}.${bytes[1]}.${bytes[2]}.${bytes[3]}`;\n  const groups: string[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) groups.push(((bytes[i]! << 8) | bytes[i + 1]!).toString(16));\n  // RFC 5952: compress the longest run of zero groups, leftmost on a tie.\n  let bestStart = -1;\n  let bestLen = 0;\n  for (let i = 0; i < 8; i++) {\n    if (groups[i] !== \"0\") continue;\n    let j = i;\n    while (j < 8 && groups[j] === \"0\") j++;\n    if (j - i > bestLen) {\n      bestLen = j - i;\n      bestStart = i;\n    }\n    i = j;\n  }\n  if (bestLen < 2) return groups.join(\":\");\n  return `${groups.slice(0, bestStart).join(\":\")}::${groups.slice(bestStart + bestLen).join(\":\")}`;\n}\n\n/** Normalises any accepted spelling of an address to its canonical form. Returns `null` if unparseable. */\nexport function normalizeIp(value: string): string | null {\n  const bytes = parseIp(value);\n  return bytes ? formatIp(bytes) : null;\n}\n\nexport interface Cidr {\n  readonly bytes: IpBytes;\n  readonly prefix: number;\n  readonly source: string;\n}\n\n/** Parses `\"10.0.0.0/8\"`, `\"2001:db8::/32\"`, or a bare address (treated as a /32 or /128). */\nexport function parseCidr(value: string): Cidr | null {\n  const slash = value.lastIndexOf(\"/\");\n  const addressText = slash === -1 ? value : value.slice(0, slash);\n  const bytes = parseIp(addressText);\n  if (!bytes) return null;\n  const maxPrefix = bytes.length * 8;\n  if (slash === -1) return { bytes, prefix: maxPrefix, source: value };\n  const prefixText = value.slice(slash + 1);\n  if (!/^\\d{1,3}$/.test(prefixText)) return null;\n  const prefix = Number(prefixText);\n  if (prefix > maxPrefix) return null;\n  return { bytes, prefix, source: value };\n}\n\n/** True when `ip` falls inside `cidr`. Address families never match across each other. */\nexport function cidrContains(cidr: Cidr, ip: IpBytes): boolean {\n  if (cidr.bytes.length !== ip.length) return false;\n  const fullBytes = cidr.prefix >> 3;\n  for (let i = 0; i < fullBytes; i++) if (cidr.bytes[i] !== ip[i]) return false;\n  const remainder = cidr.prefix & 7;\n  if (remainder === 0) return true;\n  const mask = 0xff << (8 - remainder);\n  return (cidr.bytes[fullBytes]! & mask) === (ip[fullBytes]! & mask);\n}\n\n/**\n * One range plus the position it was added at, so that when several ranges match the\n * same address the answer does not depend on how the index happens to be laid out.\n */\ninterface IndexedCidr {\n  readonly cidr: Cidr;\n  readonly order: number;\n}\n\n/**\n * Ranges for one address family, indexed on the first two bytes.\n *\n * A linear scan is fine for the handful of CIDRs in an allowlist and catastrophic for\n * the list this library actually asks operators to supply: AWS publishes around seven\n * thousand IPv4 prefixes, GCP and Azure comparable numbers, and `datacenterRanges` is\n * documented as the place to put them. Scanning that on every request measured at\n * ~87µs — several times the cost of the entire rest of an assessment — so the size of\n * a range list silently became the dominant term in request latency.\n *\n * Bucketing by the leading bytes fixes that without changing any answer. A prefix of\n * /16 or longer pins both leading bytes, so it is reachable from exactly one bucket;\n * a /8 to /15 pins only the first; anything shorter than /8 spans buckets and stays in\n * a list checked on every lookup. Real range lists are overwhelmingly /16 and longer,\n * which is why this collapses to a handful of comparisons.\n */\nclass FamilyIndex {\n  /** Prefix < 8. Spans first bytes, so it is always scanned. Realistically empty. */\n  private readonly wide: IndexedCidr[] = [];\n  private readonly buckets = new Map<number, { mid: IndexedCidr[]; deep: Map<number, IndexedCidr[]> }>();\n\n  add(entry: IndexedCidr): void {\n    const { cidr } = entry;\n    if (cidr.prefix < 8) {\n      this.wide.push(entry);\n      return;\n    }\n    const first = cidr.bytes[0]!;\n    let bucket = this.buckets.get(first);\n    if (bucket === undefined) {\n      bucket = { mid: [], deep: new Map() };\n      this.buckets.set(first, bucket);\n    }\n    if (cidr.prefix < 16) {\n      bucket.mid.push(entry);\n      return;\n    }\n    const second = cidr.bytes[1]!;\n    let deep = bucket.deep.get(second);\n    if (deep === undefined) {\n      deep = [];\n      bucket.deep.set(second, deep);\n    }\n    deep.push(entry);\n  }\n\n  /** The earliest-added range containing `ip`, or `undefined`. */\n  find(ip: IpBytes): IndexedCidr | undefined {\n    let best = scan(this.wide, ip, undefined);\n    const bucket = this.buckets.get(ip[0]!);\n    if (bucket !== undefined) {\n      best = scan(bucket.mid, ip, best);\n      const deep = bucket.deep.get(ip[1]!);\n      if (deep !== undefined) best = scan(deep, ip, best);\n    }\n    return best;\n  }\n}\n\nfunction scan(entries: readonly IndexedCidr[], ip: IpBytes, best: IndexedCidr | undefined): IndexedCidr | undefined {\n  let winner = best;\n  for (let i = 0; i < entries.length; i++) {\n    const entry = entries[i]!;\n    if (winner !== undefined && entry.order > winner.order) continue;\n    if (cidrContains(entry.cidr, ip)) winner = entry;\n  }\n  return winner;\n}\n\n/**\n * A compiled set of CIDR ranges. Building it once and reusing it keeps the hot\n * path free of string parsing — matching is a handful of byte comparisons, and stays\n * that way as the list grows into the thousands.\n */\nexport class IpRangeSet {\n  private readonly v4 = new FamilyIndex();\n  private readonly v6 = new FamilyIndex();\n  private count = 0;\n  /**\n   * Every range that parsed, in the order it was added.\n   *\n   * Kept as plain text beside the index rather than reconstructed from it. The index\n   * is shaped for lookups — bucketed by leading byte, prefix-split — and walking it\n   * back into a list would be both slower and, for anything that wants to *show* the\n   * set, wrong: what an operator recognises is the string they wrote, not a normalised\n   * form of it. These sets are configuration-sized, so the array costs nothing.\n   */\n  private readonly sources: string[] = [];\n  /** Ranges that failed to parse, surfaced so a typo in config is loud rather than silent. */\n  readonly invalid: string[] = [];\n\n  constructor(ranges: Iterable<string> = []) {\n    for (const range of ranges) this.add(range);\n  }\n\n  add(range: string): void {\n    const cidr = parseCidr(range);\n    if (!cidr) {\n      this.invalid.push(range);\n      return;\n    }\n    this.sources.push(cidr.source);\n    (cidr.bytes.length === 4 ? this.v4 : this.v6).add({ cidr, order: this.count++ });\n  }\n\n  get size(): number {\n    return this.count;\n  }\n\n  /** The ranges in this set, as written, oldest first. What a reader can act on. */\n  entries(): readonly string[] {\n    return this.sources;\n  }\n\n  /**\n   * Returns the matching range's original text, or `undefined`. Useful for explaining\n   * a decision. When several ranges match, the one added first wins, so the\n   * explanation does not depend on the index's internal layout.\n   */\n  match(ip: string | IpBytes): string | undefined {\n    const bytes = typeof ip === \"string\" ? parseIp(ip) : ip;\n    if (!bytes) return undefined;\n    return (bytes.length === 4 ? this.v4 : this.v6).find(bytes)?.cidr.source;\n  }\n\n  contains(ip: string | IpBytes): boolean {\n    const bytes = typeof ip === \"string\" ? parseIp(ip) : ip;\n    if (!bytes) return false;\n    return (bytes.length === 4 ? this.v4 : this.v6).find(bytes) !== undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/** IANA special-purpose ranges: loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT, documentation. */\nexport const SPECIAL_USE_RANGES = [\n  \"0.0.0.0/8\",\n  \"10.0.0.0/8\",\n  \"100.64.0.0/10\",\n  \"127.0.0.0/8\",\n  \"169.254.0.0/16\",\n  \"172.16.0.0/12\",\n  \"192.0.0.0/24\",\n  \"192.0.2.0/24\",\n  \"192.168.0.0/16\",\n  \"198.18.0.0/15\",\n  \"198.51.100.0/24\",\n  \"203.0.113.0/24\",\n  \"224.0.0.0/4\",\n  \"240.0.0.0/4\",\n  \"::1/128\",\n  \"fc00::/7\",\n  \"fe80::/10\",\n  \"2001:db8::/32\",\n] as const;\n\nconst SPECIAL_USE = new IpRangeSet(SPECIAL_USE_RANGES);\n\n/** True for loopback/private/link-local/documentation addresses — never public clients. */\nexport function isSpecialUse(ip: string): boolean {\n  return SPECIAL_USE.contains(ip);\n}\n\n/**\n * Masks an address to a coarse network for rate accounting: /24 for IPv4, /64 for\n * IPv6. IPv6 clients routinely get a whole /64 to themselves and rotate the host\n * bits freely, so per-address counting is trivially defeated there.\n */\nexport function networkKey(ip: string): string {\n  const bytes = parseIp(ip);\n  if (!bytes) return ip;\n  // Build the masked address at full width. Slicing to three bytes and formatting\n  // that would produce a 3-byte array, which `formatIp` reads as IPv6.\n  if (bytes.length === 4) {\n    const masked = new Uint8Array([bytes[0]!, bytes[1]!, bytes[2]!, 0]);\n    return `${formatIp(masked)}/24`;\n  }\n  const masked = new Uint8Array(16);\n  masked.set(bytes.subarray(0, 8), 0);\n  return `${formatIp(masked)}/64`;\n}\n","import { joinHeaderValue, parseCookies } from \"./internal/http.js\";\nimport { normalizeIp } from \"./internal/ip.js\";\nimport type { RequestFacts } from \"./types.js\";\n\n/** Longest URL we will parse. Anything beyond this is a payload, not a path. */\nconst MAX_URL_LENGTH = 8192;\n/** Cap on query parameters kept. */\nconst MAX_QUERY_PARAMS = 64;\n\nexport interface FactsInput {\n  method?: string | undefined;\n  /** Request target, path plus optional query — what `req.url` gives you. */\n  url?: string | undefined;\n  /** Raw header map. Values may be arrays; names may be any case. */\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n  /**\n   * Header names in wire order. Node exposes them via `req.rawHeaders` (alternating\n   * name/value) — pass that array directly, or a name-only list.\n   */\n  rawHeaders?: readonly string[] | undefined;\n  /** Socket address. Pass the *socket's* address; forwarding is resolved separately. */\n  ip: string;\n  timestamp?: number | undefined;\n  protocol?: \"http\" | \"https\" | undefined;\n  /**\n   * The HTTP version of the connection **this process accepted** — Node's\n   * `request.httpVersion`, not the version the client negotiated with your edge.\n   *\n   * The distinction has teeth. HTTP/2 forbids connection-specific headers, and\n   * `header-integrity` treats one as a deterministic protocol violation. If you set\n   * this from a forwarded header while the request itself arrived over HTTP/1.1 from\n   * a proxy — which adds `Connection: keep-alive` — you will manufacture that\n   * violation for every real browser behind that proxy, and it is a `certain` verdict,\n   * so it can block. Report the connection you actually have, or leave it unset.\n   */\n  httpVersion?: string | undefined;\n  tlsFingerprint?: string | undefined;\n  /** See {@link RequestFacts.partialHeaders}. Set it when the source cannot supply every header. */\n  partialHeaders?: boolean | undefined;\n  extra?: Record<string, unknown> | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Reduces a request to the facts detectors are allowed to see.\n *\n * Normalisation happens exactly once, here, and every detector reads the result. That\n * is partly performance — lowercasing a header map per detector would be absurd — but\n * mostly correctness: if one detector reads `req.headers['User-Agent']` and another\n * reads `req.headers['user-agent']`, they will eventually disagree about the same\n * request, and the bug will be invisible.\n *\n * Every field is bounded. Each one is attacker-controlled, and this runs on every\n * request to your site.\n */\nexport function createFacts(input: FactsInput): RequestFacts {\n  const rawUrl = input.url ?? \"/\";\n  const url = rawUrl.length > MAX_URL_LENGTH ? rawUrl.slice(0, MAX_URL_LENGTH) : rawUrl;\n  const queryStart = url.indexOf(\"?\");\n  const rawPath = queryStart === -1 ? url : url.slice(0, queryStart);\n\n  const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = Object.create(null) as Record<string, string | undefined>;\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(input.headers)) {\n    const joined = joinHeaderValue(value);\n    if (joined !== undefined) headers[name.toLowerCase()] = joined;\n  }\n\n  const facts: RequestFacts = {\n    method: (input.method ?? \"GET\").toUpperCase(),\n    path: normalizePath(rawPath),\n    query: parseQuery(queryStart === -1 ? \"\" : url.slice(queryStart + 1)),\n    headers,\n    headerOrder: extractOrder(input.rawHeaders, headers),\n    ip: normalizeIp(input.ip) ?? input.ip,\n    timestamp: input.timestamp ?? Date.now(),\n  };\n\n  // Only parse cookies that exist. Most bot traffic carries none, and building an\n  // empty bag for every one of those requests is pure garbage.\n  const cookieHeader = headers[\"cookie\"];\n  if (cookieHeader !== undefined) facts.cookies = parseCookies(cookieHeader);\n\n  if (input.protocol !== undefined) facts.protocol = input.protocol;\n  if (input.httpVersion !== undefined) facts.httpVersion = input.httpVersion;\n  if (input.tlsFingerprint !== undefined) facts.tlsFingerprint = input.tlsFingerprint;\n  if (input.partialHeaders === true) facts.partialHeaders = true;\n  if (input.extra !== undefined) facts.extra = input.extra;\n\n  return facts;\n}\n\n/**\n * Decodes and normalises a path.\n *\n * Rule matching is done on this value, so `/admin`, `/%61dmin` and `/./admin` must\n * not be three different paths as far as a policy is concerned — otherwise a rule\n * scoped to a path is trivially side-stepped by spelling it differently. Decoding is\n * single-pass: repeatedly decoding until it stops changing is how `%2525` becomes `%`\n * and how path-traversal filters get bypassed.\n */\nfunction normalizePath(rawPath: string): string {\n  let path = rawPath;\n  try {\n    path = decodeURIComponent(rawPath);\n  } catch {\n    // Malformed percent-encoding. Keep the raw form: it is still a fact about the\n    // request, and guessing at an intended decoding would be inventing one.\n  }\n  path = path.replace(/\\\\/g, \"/\").replace(/\\/{2,}/g, \"/\");\n  if (!path.startsWith(\"/\")) path = `/${path}`;\n\n  // Resolve `.` and `..` segments so a rule on a path prefix cannot be walked around.\n  if (path.includes(\"./\")) {\n    const resolved: string[] = [];\n    for (const segment of path.split(\"/\")) {\n      if (segment === \"\" || segment === \".\") continue;\n      if (segment === \"..\") resolved.pop();\n      else resolved.push(segment);\n    }\n    path = `/${resolved.join(\"/\")}`;\n  }\n  return path.length > 1 && path.endsWith(\"/\") ? path.slice(0, -1) : path;\n}\n\nfunction parseQuery(search: string): Record<string, string> {\n  // Null-prototype: a literal `?__proto__=x` becomes an ordinary own key instead of\n  // hitting the prototype setter and vanishing, so a detector can actually see it.\n  const query: Record<string, string> = Object.create(null) as Record<string, string>;\n  if (search.length === 0) return query;\n  let count = 0;\n  for (const [key, value] of new URLSearchParams(search)) {\n    if (count++ >= MAX_QUERY_PARAMS) break;\n    query[key] = value.length > 1024 ? value.slice(0, 1024) : value;\n  }\n  return query;\n}\n\n/**\n * Extracts wire-order header names.\n *\n * Both documented input shapes have to be told apart: Node's `rawHeaders`, which\n * alternates name and value, and a plain list of names.\n *\n * Asking whether the even-indexed entries *look like* header names cannot do it, and\n * used to get the common case backwards. Every entry of a name-only list looks like a\n * header name, so any such list of even length was read as Node-style and every second\n * name was discarded — silently halving the header order, which is a fingerprint, for\n * a shape the documentation invites callers to pass.\n *\n * The header map decides it instead. In a name-only list every entry is a header that\n * was actually received; in an alternating list the odd entries are values, which are\n * almost never also header names. That distinguishes the two even for a single-header\n * request, where any shape-based guess is ambiguous.\n */\nconst MAX_ORDERED_HEADERS = 64;\n\nfunction extractOrder(rawHeaders: readonly string[] | undefined, headers: Record<string, string | undefined>): readonly string[] {\n  if (!rawHeaders || rawHeaders.length === 0) return EMPTY_ORDER;\n\n  let isNodeStyle = rawHeaders.length % 2 === 0;\n  if (isNodeStyle) {\n    let everyEntryIsAHeader = true;\n    for (let i = 0; i < rawHeaders.length; i++) {\n      const entry = rawHeaders[i]!;\n      const known = headers[entry.toLowerCase()] !== undefined;\n      // An even entry that is neither a received header nor even a valid token cannot\n      // be a name in either shape; fall back to reading the list as names rather than\n      // dropping half of something unrecognised.\n      if (i % 2 === 0 && !known && !isHeaderName(entry)) {\n        isNodeStyle = false;\n        break;\n      }\n      if (!known) everyEntryIsAHeader = false;\n    }\n    if (everyEntryIsAHeader) isNodeStyle = false;\n  }\n\n  // One pass, one array. The previous version walked the input three times —\n  // `every`, then `filter`, then `slice().map()` — allocating at each step.\n  const step = isNodeStyle ? 2 : 1;\n  const order: string[] = [];\n  for (let i = 0; i < rawHeaders.length && order.length < MAX_ORDERED_HEADERS; i += step) {\n    order.push(rawHeaders[i]!.toLowerCase());\n  }\n  return order;\n}\n\nconst EMPTY_ORDER: readonly string[] = Object.freeze([]);\n\n/** RFC 9110 token characters. A scan rather than a regex: this runs once per header. */\nfunction isHeaderName(value: string): boolean {\n  if (value.length === 0) return false;\n  for (let i = 0; i < value.length; i++) {\n    const code = value.charCodeAt(i);\n    const ok =\n      (code >= 0x30 && code <= 0x39) || // 0-9\n      (code >= 0x41 && code <= 0x5a) || // A-Z\n      (code >= 0x61 && code <= 0x7a) || // a-z\n      code === 0x21 || (code >= 0x23 && code <= 0x27) || code === 0x2a || code === 0x2b ||\n      code === 0x2d || code === 0x2e || code === 0x5e || code === 0x5f || code === 0x60 ||\n      code === 0x7c || code === 0x7e;\n    if (!ok) return false;\n  }\n  return true;\n}\n","import type { IncomingMessage } from \"node:http\";\nimport type { ActionOutcome } from \"../actions/types.js\";\n\n/** Largest challenge-solution body we will read. A solution is a few hundred bytes. */\nexport const MAX_VERIFY_BODY = 4096;\n\n/**\n * Waits, with the timer unreferenced.\n *\n * The `unref` is what stops a pending `delay` action from holding a process open at\n * shutdown — which in a serverless runtime is the difference between a request that\n * finishes and an invocation that is billed until it is killed.\n */\nexport function pause(ms: number): Promise<void> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    const timer = setTimeout(resolve, ms);\n    (timer as { unref?: () => void }).unref?.();\n  });\n}\n\n/** True when the outcome means the request should reach the application. */\nexport function isContinue(outcome: ActionOutcome): outcome is Extract<ActionOutcome, { kind: \"continue\" }> {\n  return outcome.kind === \"continue\";\n}\n\n/**\n * Parses a JSON body defensively.\n *\n * Returns `undefined` rather than throwing on anything malformed. This parses input\n * from a client that is, by construction, already under suspicion.\n */\nexport function parseJson(text: string): unknown {\n  if (text.length === 0 || text.length > MAX_VERIFY_BODY) return undefined;\n  try {\n    return JSON.parse(text) as unknown;\n  } catch {\n    return undefined;\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Reads at most {@link MAX_VERIFY_BODY} bytes from a Node request stream.\n *\n * The cap is enforced by destroying the socket rather than by buffering and then\n * discarding: a client that keeps sending after the limit is spending its own\n * bandwidth against a buffer that stopped growing. Errors resolve to an empty string,\n * because a malformed submission is a rejected challenge, not an exception.\n */\nexport function readBoundedBody(request: IncomingMessage): Promise<string> {\n  return new Promise((resolve) => {\n    let data = \"\";\n    let bytes = 0;\n    request.on(\"data\", (chunk: Buffer) => {\n      bytes += chunk.length;\n      if (bytes > MAX_VERIFY_BODY) {\n        request.destroy();\n        return;\n      }\n      data += chunk.toString(\"utf8\");\n    });\n    request.on(\"end\", () => resolve(data));\n    request.on(\"error\", () => resolve(\"\"));\n  });\n}\n\n/** The JSON body of a challenge verification response, shared by every adapter. */\nexport function verificationBody(outcome: { ok: true } | { ok: false; reason: string }): string {\n  return JSON.stringify(outcome.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: outcome.reason });\n}\n","import { createFacts } from \"../facts.js\";\nimport { pause, parseJson, readBoundedBody, verificationBody } from \"./shared.js\";\nimport type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from \"node:http\";\nimport type { BotHandler } from \"../core.js\";\nimport type { RequestFacts } from \"../types.js\";\n\nexport type NextFunction = (error?: unknown) => void;\nexport type NodeMiddleware = (request: IncomingMessage, response: ServerResponse, next: NextFunction) => void;\n\nexport interface NodeMiddlewareOptions {\n  /**\n   * Extracts a TLS fingerprint your edge computed, e.g. `\"x-ja3-hash\"` or\n   * Cloudflare's `\"cf-ja3-hash\"`. Only set it if the header cannot be forged by a\n   * client — that is, your edge always overwrites it.\n   */\n  tlsFingerprintHeader?: string;\n  /** Also handle the challenge verification endpoint. Default true. */\n  mountChallengeEndpoint?: boolean;\n  /** Extra facts, e.g. a session id for a better actor key. */\n  enrich?: (request: IncomingMessage, facts: RequestFacts) => RequestFacts;\n}\n\n/**\n * Connect/Express middleware. Also works with a bare `node:http` server.\n *\n * Mount it early — ahead of your routes, behind anything that terminates TLS and\n * sets forwarded headers — and after your body parser only if you need one, since\n * this reads no body except on its own verification endpoint.\n *\n * `next()` is always reached unless a response was actually produced, and any\n * unexpected error inside the engine results in the request being served rather than\n * refused. A bot filter that fails closed is an outage with extra steps.\n */\nexport function botHandler(handler: BotHandler, options: NodeMiddlewareOptions = {}): NodeMiddleware {\n  const mountChallenge = options.mountChallengeEndpoint ?? true;\n\n  return function botHandlerMiddleware(request, response, next): void {\n    let handedOff = false;\n    void (async (): Promise<void> => {\n      try {\n        const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};\n        for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(request.headers)) {\n          headers[name] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(\", \") : value;\n        }\n\n        const ip = handler.resolveIp(request.socket.remoteAddress, headers);\n        const fingerprint = options.tlsFingerprintHeader !== undefined ? headers[options.tlsFingerprintHeader.toLowerCase()] : undefined;\n\n        let facts = createFacts({\n          method: request.method,\n          url: request.url,\n          headers: request.headers,\n          rawHeaders: request.rawHeaders,\n          ip,\n          httpVersion: request.httpVersion,\n          // `encrypted` is present only on a TLS socket. Behind a terminating proxy\n          // the forwarded protocol header is the only truth available.\n          protocol: (request.socket as { encrypted?: boolean }).encrypted === true || headers[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] === \"https\" ? \"https\" : \"http\",\n          ...(fingerprint !== undefined ? { tlsFingerprint: fingerprint } : {}),\n        });\n        if (options.enrich) facts = options.enrich(request, facts);\n\n        if (mountChallenge && handler.isChallengeEndpoint(facts)) {\n          await serveVerification(handler, request, response, facts);\n          return;\n        }\n\n        const { outcome } = await handler.handle(facts);\n\n        if (outcome.kind === \"drop\") {\n          request.socket.destroy();\n          return;\n        }\n\n        if (outcome.kind === \"respond\") {\n          response.statusCode = outcome.status;\n          for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(outcome.headers)) response.setHeader(name, value);\n          response.end(outcome.body);\n          return;\n        }\n\n        for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(outcome.requestHeaders ?? {})) {\n          request.headers[name] = value;\n        }\n        if (outcome.responseHeaders) {\n          for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(outcome.responseHeaders)) response.setHeader(name, value);\n        }\n        if (outcome.delayMs !== undefined) await pause(outcome.delayMs);\n        handedOff = true;\n        next();\n      } catch (error) {\n        // Fail open, loudly: reported to the operator, invisible to the visitor.\n        // `next(error)` — which this used to call — routes into Express's error\n        // handler and answers 500, which is failing *closed* and contradicts the\n        // guarantee stated above.\n        //\n        // `handedOff` guards the case where the throw came from downstream rather\n        // than from us: once `next()` has run, the rest of the application owns the\n        // request, and calling `next` a second time would run it twice.\n        failOpen(handler, error, \"adapter:node\");\n        if (!handedOff && !response.headersSent) next();\n      }\n    })();\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Reports an error the engine raised and says whether the request can still be served.\n *\n * Every adapter promises the same thing in its own doc comment: an unexpected failure\n * inside detection serves the request rather than refusing it, because a bot filter\n * that fails closed is an outage with extra steps. Handing the error to the\n * framework's error path does the opposite — Express, Koa and Fastify all turn it into\n * a 500 — so a bug in this library became a broken page for a real visitor. The error\n * is reported through the operator's own `onError`, which is where it is useful, and\n * the visitor gets their page.\n */\nfunction failOpen(handler: BotHandler, error: unknown, source: string): void {\n  handler.config.onError(error, { source });\n}\n\nasync function serveVerification(handler: BotHandler, request: IncomingMessage, response: ServerResponse, facts: RequestFacts): Promise<void> {\n  const outcome = await handler.verifyChallenge(facts, parseJson(await readBoundedBody(request)));\n  response.setHeader(\"content-type\", \"application/json; charset=utf-8\");\n  response.setHeader(\"cache-control\", \"no-store\");\n  if (outcome.ok) response.setHeader(\"set-cookie\", outcome.setCookie);\n  response.statusCode = outcome.ok ? 200 : outcome.status;\n  response.end(verificationBody(outcome));\n}\n","import { createFacts } from \"../facts.js\";\nimport { MAX_VERIFY_BODY, parseJson, pause } from \"./shared.js\";\nimport type { BotHandler } from \"../core.js\";\nimport type { HandleResult } from \"../core.js\";\nimport type { RequestFacts } from \"../types.js\";\n\nexport interface FetchAdapterOptions {\n  /**\n   * Headers to read the client address from, in order of preference.\n   *\n   * Only headers your edge *overwrites* belong here. One a client can set is one it\n   * can use to choose its own identity — and with it the address you rate-limit,\n   * allowlist, denylist and block on. `x-forwarded-for` is deliberately **not** in the\n   * default list: it is appended to rather than replaced, so its leftmost entry is\n   * whatever the client wrote. List it explicitly only if you know your edge replaces\n   * the whole header.\n   */\n  ipHeaders?: readonly string[];\n  /** Reads the address from the platform's own context object, e.g. a Workers `ConnInfo`. */\n  clientIp?: (request: Request, context: unknown) => string | undefined;\n  /** Header carrying an edge-computed JA3/JA4 fingerprint. */\n  tlsFingerprintHeader?: string;\n  mountChallengeEndpoint?: boolean;\n  enrich?: (request: Request, facts: RequestFacts) => RequestFacts;\n}\n\n/**\n * Address headers trusted without being asked for.\n *\n * Both are single-valued and written by the edge that terminates the connection, so a\n * client cannot choose what they say. `x-forwarded-for` used to be here and is not any\n * more: it is a chain a proxy *appends* to, so its leftmost entry — the one this\n * adapter reads — is supplied by the client. Trusting it by default let anyone pick\n * their own address and walk straight past a denylist, a rate limit and every\n * behavioural signal keyed on the actor. The other three adapters never did: they go\n * through `resolveIp`, where reading a forwarded header at all requires\n * `proxy.trustProxy` and the configuration warns at length about exactly this. This\n * one now agrees with them.\n */\nconst DEFAULT_IP_HEADERS = [\"cf-connecting-ip\", \"x-real-ip\"] as const;\n\nexport interface FetchDecision {\n  /** Serve this instead of calling your handler. `undefined` means carry on. */\n  response?: Response | undefined;\n  /** The request to pass on, carrying the verdict headers. */\n  request: Request;\n  /**\n   * What the engine concluded — absent for a challenge verification request, which is\n   * answered without being assessed.\n   *\n   * Reported as missing rather than filled in with a placeholder assessment: \"we did\n   * not judge this request\" and \"we judged it and found nothing\" must not look the\n   * same to whatever is reading this.\n   */\n  result?: HandleResult | undefined;\n}\n\n/**\n * Web-standard adapter, for Cloudflare Workers, Deno, Bun, Vercel Edge and anything\n * else built on `Request`/`Response`.\n *\n * Returns a decision rather than wrapping your handler, so the same primitive fits a\n * router, a middleware chain or a plain `fetch` export. {@link withBotHandler} wraps it\n * for the common case.\n *\n * Note that the engine uses `node:crypto` for HMAC and hashing. On Workers that means\n * enabling `nodejs_compat`; Deno and Bun provide it natively.\n */\nexport function createFetchAdapter(handler: BotHandler, options: FetchAdapterOptions = {}) {\n  const ipHeaders = options.ipHeaders ?? DEFAULT_IP_HEADERS;\n  const mountChallenge = options.mountChallengeEndpoint ?? true;\n  let warnedAboutAddress = false;\n\n  return async function evaluate(request: Request, context: unknown = undefined): Promise<FetchDecision> {\n    try {\n      return await decide(request, context);\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Fail open, loudly — the same promise the node, Koa and Fastify adapters make,\n      // and the one this adapter was not keeping. An error escaping here reaches the\n      // runtime's own handler, and Workers, Deno and Bun all answer 500: a detection\n      // bug charged to the visitor. Returning the request unchanged, with no verdict,\n      // serves the page instead; `result` is absent, which already means \"we did not\n      // judge this request\" to everything downstream.\n      handler.config.onError(error, { source: \"adapter:fetch\" });\n      return { request };\n    }\n  };\n\n  async function decide(request: Request, context: unknown): Promise<FetchDecision> {\n    const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};\n    const order: string[] = [];\n    for (const [name, value] of request.headers) {\n      headers[name] = value;\n      order.push(name);\n    }\n\n    const url = new URL(request.url);\n    const ip = options.clientIp?.(request, context) ?? firstHeaderAddress(headers, ipHeaders) ?? \"\";\n    // An empty address is not a harmless blank: it becomes the actor key, so every\n    // visitor collapses into one actor and every rate limit and behavioural signal\n    // becomes site-wide. Said once, because it is a deployment mistake rather than a\n    // per-request event, and a warning on every request is a warning nobody reads.\n    if (ip === \"\" && !warnedAboutAddress) {\n      warnedAboutAddress = true;\n      // Through the handler rather than straight to the callback, so a subscriber —\n      // and the dashboard's notices panel — hears about it too.\n      handler.warn(\n        `The fetch adapter could not determine a client address: none of ${ipHeaders.join(\", \")} is present and no \\`clientIp\\` was supplied. ` +\n          `Every request will be tracked under one empty actor key, so rate limits and behavioural detection apply to your whole site at once. ` +\n          `Pass \\`clientIp\\` to read the address from your platform's connection info, or list the header your edge sets.`,\n      );\n    }\n    const fingerprint = options.tlsFingerprintHeader !== undefined ? headers[options.tlsFingerprintHeader.toLowerCase()] : undefined;\n\n    let facts = createFacts({\n      method: request.method,\n      url: `${url.pathname}${url.search}`,\n      headers,\n      // The Fetch API normalises and sorts headers, so wire order is genuinely\n      // unavailable here. Passing the sorted order would be worse than passing none:\n      // the header-order detector would compare against an ordering no client chose.\n      rawHeaders: [],\n      ip,\n      protocol: url.protocol === \"https:\" ? \"https\" : \"http\",\n      ...(fingerprint !== undefined ? { tlsFingerprint: fingerprint } : {}),\n    });\n    if (options.enrich) facts = options.enrich(request, facts);\n\n    if (mountChallenge && handler.isChallengeEndpoint(facts)) {\n      const body = await readBounded(request);\n      const outcome = await handler.verifyChallenge(facts, parseJson(body));\n      const responseHeaders = new Headers({ \"content-type\": \"application/json; charset=utf-8\", \"cache-control\": \"no-store\" });\n      if (outcome.ok) responseHeaders.set(\"set-cookie\", outcome.setCookie);\n      // Deliberately not assessed. `assess` records the request against the actor, so\n      // running it here inflated the request count and arrival cadence of the one\n      // client that is trying to answer a challenge — feeding the rate and cadence\n      // detectors with the evidence of its own compliance. The comment here already\n      // said the request was not assessed; the code called `assess` anyway.\n      return {\n        response: new Response(JSON.stringify(outcome.ok ? { ok: true } : { ok: false, error: outcome.reason }), {\n          status: outcome.ok ? 200 : outcome.status,\n          headers: responseHeaders,\n        }),\n        request,\n      };\n    }\n\n    const result = await handler.handle(facts);\n    const { outcome } = result;\n\n    if (outcome.kind === \"drop\") {\n      // A Fetch runtime cannot close a connection without answering, so the nearest\n      // equivalent is an empty 444-style refusal. Say so rather than pretend.\n      return { response: new Response(null, { status: 444 }), request, result };\n    }\n\n    if (outcome.kind === \"respond\") {\n      return { response: new Response(outcome.body, { status: outcome.status, headers: outcome.headers }), request, result };\n    }\n\n    if (outcome.delayMs !== undefined) await pause(outcome.delayMs);\n\n    // Requests are immutable, so tagging means constructing a new one.\n    const tagged = outcome.requestHeaders\n      ? new Request(request, { headers: mergeHeaders(request.headers, outcome.requestHeaders) })\n      : request;\n\n    return { request: tagged, result };\n  }\n}\n\n/** Wraps a handler. The common case: one call, one line. */\nexport function withBotHandler(\n  handler: BotHandler,\n  next: (request: Request, context: unknown) => Response | Promise<Response>,\n  options: FetchAdapterOptions = {},\n): (request: Request, context?: unknown) => Promise<Response> {\n  const evaluate = createFetchAdapter(handler, options);\n  return async (request, context = undefined) => {\n    const decision = await evaluate(request, context);\n    if (decision.response) return decision.response;\n    const response = await next(decision.request, context);\n    const extra = decision.result?.outcome.kind === \"continue\" ? decision.result.outcome.responseHeaders : undefined;\n    if (!extra) return response;\n    const merged = new Response(response.body, response);\n    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(extra)) merged.headers.set(name, value);\n    return merged;\n  };\n}\n\nfunction firstHeaderAddress(headers: Record<string, string | undefined>, names: readonly string[]): string | undefined {\n  for (const name of names) {\n    const value = headers[name];\n    if (value === undefined) continue;\n    // A forwarded chain is left-to-right, oldest first. The leftmost entry is the\n    // one the client itself can write, so it is taken only from headers the caller\n    // has declared trustworthy by listing them.\n    const first = value.split(\",\")[0]?.trim();\n    if (first !== undefined && first.length > 0) return first;\n  }\n  return undefined;\n}\n\nfunction mergeHeaders(original: Headers, additions: Record<string, string>): Headers {\n  const merged = new Headers(original);\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(additions)) merged.set(name, value);\n  return merged;\n}\n\nasync function readBounded(request: Request): Promise<string> {\n  const text = await request.clone().text();\n  return text.length > MAX_VERIFY_BODY ? \"\" : text;\n}\n","import { createFacts } from \"../facts.js\";\nimport { pause, parseJson, readBoundedBody, verificationBody } from \"./shared.js\";\nimport type { BotHandler } from \"../core.js\";\nimport type { RequestFacts } from \"../types.js\";\n\n/**\n * The parts of Fastify's request and reply this adapter touches, described\n * structurally so the library takes no dependency on Fastify or its types.\n */\nexport interface FastifyLikeRequest {\n  method: string;\n  url: string;\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n  raw: import(\"node:http\").IncomingMessage;\n}\n\nexport interface FastifyLikeReply {\n  code(status: number): FastifyLikeReply;\n  header(name: string, value: string): FastifyLikeReply;\n  send(body: unknown): unknown;\n  hijack?(): void;\n}\n\nexport interface FastifyAdapterOptions {\n  tlsFingerprintHeader?: string;\n  /**\n   * Also serve the challenge verification endpoint. Default true.\n   *\n   * Fastify parses bodies after `onRequest`, so this reads the raw stream itself.\n   * That is why it must run here rather than as a route: by the time a route handler\n   * sees the request, the body has been consumed by a parser that does not know about\n   * this endpoint.\n   */\n  mountChallengeEndpoint?: boolean;\n  enrich?: (request: FastifyLikeRequest, facts: RequestFacts) => RequestFacts;\n}\n\n/**\n * An `onRequest` hook for Fastify.\n *\n * ```ts\n * fastify.addHook(\"onRequest\", fastifyBotHandler(handler));\n * ```\n *\n * `onRequest` rather than `preHandler` on purpose: it is the earliest hook, so a\n * refused request never reaches routing, validation or your body parser — none of\n * which should be doing work for traffic that has already been decided about.\n */\nexport function fastifyBotHandler(handler: BotHandler, options: FastifyAdapterOptions = {}) {\n  const mountChallenge = options.mountChallengeEndpoint ?? true;\n\n  return async function onRequest(request: FastifyLikeRequest, reply: FastifyLikeReply): Promise<void> {\n    try {\n      await evaluate(handler, options, mountChallenge, request, reply);\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Returning normally lets routing continue. Letting the throw reach Fastify\n      // would answer 500 instead — a detection bug charged to the visitor, which is\n      // the one thing every adapter here promises not to do.\n      handler.config.onError(error, { source: \"adapter:fastify\" });\n    }\n  };\n}\n\nasync function evaluate(\n  handler: BotHandler,\n  options: FastifyAdapterOptions,\n  mountChallenge: boolean,\n  request: FastifyLikeRequest,\n  reply: FastifyLikeReply,\n): Promise<void> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(request.headers)) {\n    headers[name] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(\", \") : value;\n  }\n\n  const ip = handler.resolveIp(request.raw.socket.remoteAddress, headers);\n  const fingerprint = options.tlsFingerprintHeader !== undefined ? headers[options.tlsFingerprintHeader.toLowerCase()] : undefined;\n\n  let facts = createFacts({\n    method: request.method,\n    url: request.url,\n    headers: request.headers,\n    rawHeaders: request.raw.rawHeaders,\n    ip,\n    httpVersion: request.raw.httpVersion,\n    protocol: (request.raw.socket as { encrypted?: boolean }).encrypted === true || headers[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] === \"https\" ? \"https\" : \"http\",\n    ...(fingerprint !== undefined ? { tlsFingerprint: fingerprint } : {}),\n  });\n  if (options.enrich) facts = options.enrich(request, facts);\n\n  if (mountChallenge && handler.isChallengeEndpoint(facts)) {\n    const verification = await handler.verifyChallenge(facts, parseJson(await readBoundedBody(request.raw)));\n    reply.code(verification.ok ? 200 : verification.status);\n    reply.header(\"content-type\", \"application/json; charset=utf-8\");\n    reply.header(\"cache-control\", \"no-store\");\n    if (verification.ok) reply.header(\"set-cookie\", verification.setCookie);\n    reply.send(verificationBody(verification));\n    return;\n  }\n\n  const { outcome } = await handler.handle(facts);\n\n  if (outcome.kind === \"drop\") {\n    // `hijack` tells Fastify this route will not produce a reply, so it does not\n    // try to serialise one for a socket that is about to disappear.\n    reply.hijack?.();\n    request.raw.socket.destroy();\n    return;\n  }\n\n  if (outcome.kind === \"respond\") {\n    reply.code(outcome.status);\n    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(outcome.headers)) reply.header(name, value);\n    reply.send(outcome.body);\n    return;\n  }\n\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(outcome.requestHeaders ?? {})) {\n    request.headers[name] = value;\n  }\n  if (outcome.responseHeaders) {\n    for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(outcome.responseHeaders)) reply.header(name, value);\n  }\n  if (outcome.delayMs !== undefined) await pause(outcome.delayMs);\n}\n","import { createFacts } from \"../facts.js\";\nimport { pause, parseJson, readBoundedBody, verificationBody } from \"./shared.js\";\nimport type { BotHandler } from \"../core.js\";\n\n/** The parts of a Koa context this adapter touches, described structurally. */\nexport interface KoaLikeContext {\n  method: string;\n  url: string;\n  headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;\n  req: import(\"node:http\").IncomingMessage;\n  status: number;\n  body: unknown;\n  set(name: string, value: string): void;\n  secure?: boolean;\n}\n\nexport interface KoaAdapterOptions {\n  /** Also serve the challenge verification endpoint. Default true. */\n  mountChallengeEndpoint?: boolean;\n}\n\n/**\n * Koa middleware.\n *\n * ```ts\n * app.use(koaBotHandler(handler));\n * ```\n *\n * Place it above everything else. Koa's downstream-then-upstream flow means anything\n * mounted before this still runs for a request that is about to be refused.\n */\nexport function koaBotHandler(handler: BotHandler, options: KoaAdapterOptions = {}) {\n  const mountChallenge = options.mountChallengeEndpoint ?? true;\n\n  return async function botHandlerMiddleware(context: KoaLikeContext, next: () => Promise<void>): Promise<void> {\n    let proceed: boolean;\n    try {\n      proceed = await evaluate(handler, mountChallenge, context);\n    } catch (error) {\n      // Serve the request rather than let a detection bug become a 500. The try\n      // covers the engine only: `next()` runs the rest of your application, and\n      // catching *its* failures here would both swallow them and call `next` twice.\n      handler.config.onError(error, { source: \"adapter:koa\" });\n      proceed = true;\n    }\n    if (proceed) await next();\n  };\n}\n\n/** Runs the engine and applies its outcome. Returns whether the request continues downstream. */\nasync function evaluate(handler: BotHandler, mountChallenge: boolean, context: KoaLikeContext): Promise<boolean> {\n  const headers: Record<string, string | undefined> = {};\n  for (const [name, value] of Object.entries(context.headers)) {\n    headers[name] = Array.isArray(value) ? value.join(\", \") : value;\n  }\n\n  const facts = createFacts({\n    method: context.method,\n    url: context.url,\n    headers: context.headers,\n    rawHeaders: context.req.rawHeaders,\n    ip: handler.resolveIp(context.req.socket.remoteAddress, headers),\n    httpVersion: context.req.httpVersion,\n    protocol:\n      context.secure === true || (context.req.socket as { encrypted?: boolean }).encrypted === true || headers[\"x-forwarded-proto\"] === \"https\" ? \"https\" : \"http\",\n  });\n\n  if (mountChallenge && handler.isChallengeEndpoint(facts)) {\n    const verification = await handler.verifyChallenge(facts, parseJson(await 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package/dist/adapters/koa.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+import type { BotHandler } from "../core.js";
+/** The parts of a Koa context this adapter touches, described structurally. */
+export interface KoaLikeContext {
+    method: string;
+    url: string;
+    headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>;
+    req: import("node:http").IncomingMessage;
+    status: number;
+    body: unknown;
+    set(name: string, value: string): void;
+    secure?: boolean;
+}
+export interface KoaAdapterOptions {
+    /** Also serve the challenge verification endpoint. Default true. */
+    mountChallengeEndpoint?: boolean;
+}
+/**
+ * Koa middleware.
+ *
+ * ```ts
+ * app.use(koaBotHandler(handler));
+ * ```
+ *
+ * Place it above everything else. Koa's downstream-then-upstream flow means anything
+ * mounted before this still runs for a request that is about to be refused.
+ */
+export declare function koaBotHandler(handler: BotHandler, options?: KoaAdapterOptions): (context: KoaLikeContext, next: () => Promise<void>) => Promise<void>;

package/dist/adapters/node.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+import type { IncomingMessage, ServerResponse } from "node:http";
+import type { BotHandler } from "../core.js";
+import type { RequestFacts } from "../types.js";
+export type NextFunction = (error?: unknown) => void;
+export type NodeMiddleware = (request: IncomingMessage, response: ServerResponse, next: NextFunction) => void;
+export interface NodeMiddlewareOptions {
+    /**
+     * Extracts a TLS fingerprint your edge computed, e.g. `"x-ja3-hash"` or
+     * Cloudflare's `"cf-ja3-hash"`. Only set it if the header cannot be forged by a
+     * client — that is, your edge always overwrites it.
+     */
+    tlsFingerprintHeader?: string;
+    /** Also handle the challenge verification endpoint. Default true. */
+    mountChallengeEndpoint?: boolean;
+    /** Extra facts, e.g. a session id for a better actor key. */
+    enrich?: (request: IncomingMessage, facts: RequestFacts) => RequestFacts;
+}
+/**
+ * Connect/Express middleware. Also works with a bare `node:http` server.
+ *
+ * Mount it early — ahead of your routes, behind anything that terminates TLS and
+ * sets forwarded headers — and after your body parser only if you need one, since
+ * this reads no body except on its own verification endpoint.
+ *
+ * `next()` is always reached unless a response was actually produced, and any
+ * unexpected error inside the engine results in the request being served rather than
+ * refused. A bot filter that fails closed is an outage with extra steps.
+ */
+export declare function botHandler(handler: BotHandler, options?: NodeMiddlewareOptions): NodeMiddleware;

package/dist/adapters/shared.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import type { IncomingMessage } from "node:http";
+import type { ActionOutcome } from "../actions/types.js";
+/** Largest challenge-solution body we will read. A solution is a few hundred bytes. */
+export declare const MAX_VERIFY_BODY = 4096;
+/**
+ * Waits, with the timer unreferenced.
+ *
+ * The `unref` is what stops a pending `delay` action from holding a process open at
+ * shutdown — which in a serverless runtime is the difference between a request that
+ * finishes and an invocation that is billed until it is killed.
+ */
+export declare function pause(ms: number): Promise<void>;
+/** True when the outcome means the request should reach the application. */
+export declare function isContinue(outcome: ActionOutcome): outcome is Extract<ActionOutcome, {
+    kind: "continue";
+}>;
+/**
+ * Parses a JSON body defensively.
+ *
+ * Returns `undefined` rather than throwing on anything malformed. This parses input
+ * from a client that is, by construction, already under suspicion.
+ */
+export declare function parseJson(text: string): unknown;
+/**
+ * Reads at most {@link MAX_VERIFY_BODY} bytes from a Node request stream.
+ *
+ * The cap is enforced by destroying the socket rather than by buffering and then
+ * discarding: a client that keeps sending after the limit is spending its own
+ * bandwidth against a buffer that stopped growing. Errors resolve to an empty string,
+ * because a malformed submission is a rejected challenge, not an exception.
+ */
+export declare function readBoundedBody(request: IncomingMessage): Promise<string>;
+/** The JSON body of a challenge verification response, shared by every adapter. */
+export declare function verificationBody(outcome: {
+    ok: true;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    reason: string;
+}): string;

package/dist/audit.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+import type { Clock } from "./internal/clock.js";
+import type { Assessment } from "./types.js";
+import type { Decision } from "./policy/types.js";
+/**
+ * Watching the shape of your traffic change.
+ *
+ * Counters tell you what is happening; they do not tell you that it is *unusual*.
+ * Bot traffic is not a level, it is an event — a scrape starts, a scanner sweeps a
+ * range, someone points a stuffing tool at your login form — and the number that
+ * matters is not "12% of requests are bots" but "12% today, 2% for the fortnight
+ * before". So this module keeps a short window and a longer baseline, compares them
+ * on a schedule, and raises a structured anomaly when the comparison clears a bar you
+ * set.
+ *
+ * Three properties make it safe to leave on:
+ *
+ * **It costs a handful of increments per request.** No allocation, no timestamp
+ * sorting, no history beyond a fixed ring of buckets.
+ *
+ * **It refuses to speak from a small sample.** Every check has a minimum, because a
+ * quiet site at 3am produces ratios like "800% more bots" from four requests, and an
+ * alerting system that cries wolf at 3am gets muted, which is worse than not having
+ * one.
+ *
+ * **It has a cooldown.** A spike lasting an hour is one event, not sixty.
+ */
+/** What an anomaly is worth waking somebody for. */
+export type AnomalySeverity = "info" | "warning" | "critical";
+export interface TrafficAnomaly {
+    /** Stable id of the check that fired, e.g. `"bot-share-spike"`. */
+    id: string;
+    severity: AnomalySeverity;
+    /** One sentence, safe to put in an alert. */
+    summary: string;
+    /** The measure that moved, e.g. `"bot share"`. */
+    metric: string;
+    /** Value in the recent window, and in the baseline it was compared against. */
+    value: number;
+    baseline: number;
+    /** `value / baseline`, or `undefined` when the baseline was zero. */
+    ratio?: number | undefined;
+    at: number;
+    window: AuditWindow;
+    baselineWindow: AuditWindow;
+}
+/** Counters for one stretch of time. */
+export interface AuditWindow {
+    /** Milliseconds the window covers, rounded up to whole buckets. */
+    spanMs: number;
+    requests: number;
+    /** Requests that skipped detection: allowlisted, or an ignored path. */
+    bypassed: number;
+    bots: number;
+    humans: number;
+    denials: number;
+    challenges: number;
+    /**
+     * Challenges that were solved in this span.
+     *
+     * Counted separately from `challenges` because the ratio between them is the one
+     * measurement that says whether the mitigations are landing on machines or on people.
+     * See {@link challengeSolveRate}.
+     */
+    challengesSolved: number;
+    downgrades: number;
+    failures: number;
+    /** Requests per minute over the span. */
+    rate: number;
+    /** Bots as a fraction of the requests detection actually ran on, 0–1. */
+    botShare: number;
+    /**
+     * Solved challenges as a fraction of those issued, 0–1. `undefined` below the sample
+     * floor, because a rate over three challenges is not a rate.
+     *
+     * **High is the bad direction**, which is the opposite of what the name suggests to
+     * most people. A proof-of-work challenge is trivial for a browser and trivial for a
+     * competent scraper; what it costs is a few seconds of somebody's afternoon. So a
+     * solve rate near one does not mean the challenges are working — it means almost
+     * everything being challenged can pass, and the population that can pass a browser
+     * challenge is overwhelmingly people.
+     */
+    challengeSolveRate: number | undefined;
+}
+export interface AuditContext {
+    window: AuditWindow;
+    baseline: AuditWindow;
+    at: number;
+    /** The configured floor for a check to speak at all. */
+    minSamples: number;
+}
+export interface AuditCheck {
+    id: string;
+    /** One line, shown by `describeAudit()` and on the dashboard. */
+    description: string;
+    /** Returns an anomaly, or `undefined` when nothing is worth saying. */
+    evaluate(context: AuditContext): Omit<TrafficAnomaly, "at" | "window" | "baselineWindow"> | undefined;
+}
+export interface AuditOptions {
+    /** The recent stretch being judged. Default 300000 (5 minutes). */
+    windowMs?: number;
+    /**
+     * What it is compared against — the *preceding* stretch, not one containing it.
+     * Default 3600000 (1 hour).
+     *
+     * Ending the baseline where the window begins is what makes a spike visible: a
+     * baseline that included the window would be partly made of the thing being
+     * measured, and a large enough spike would raise its own bar until it stopped
+     * looking like one.
+     */
+    baselineMs?: number;
+    /** How often the comparison runs, ms. Default 60000. */
+    intervalMs?: number;
+    /** Requests needed in the window before any check may speak. Default 50. */
+    minSamples?: number;
+    /** Silence per check id after it fires, ms. Default 900000 (15 minutes). */
+    cooldownMs?: number;
+    /** Replaces the built-in checks entirely. */
+    checks?: readonly AuditCheck[];
+    /** Appended to the built-in checks. */
+    extraChecks?: readonly AuditCheck[];
+    clock?: Clock;
+}
+export declare class TrafficAudit {
+    readonly checks: readonly AuditCheck[];
+    /** Effective spans: the requested ones rounded up to whole buckets. */
+    private windowMs;
+    private baselineMs;
+    private readonly bucketMs;
+    private readonly buckets;
+    private readonly minSamples;
+    private readonly cooldownMs;
+    private readonly lastFired;
+    private readonly clock;
+    private timer;
+    constructor(options?: AuditOptions);
+    /** Starts the periodic comparison. Unreffed: an audit never keeps a process alive. */
+    start(intervalMs: number, onAnomaly: (anomaly: TrafficAnomaly) => void): void;
+    stop(): void;
+    record(assessment: Assessment): void;
+    /**
+     * A challenge was solved.
+     *
+     * Recorded here rather than derived from decisions because a solve happens on a
+     * *later* request than the challenge that prompted it — usually the next one, from a
+     * client that is now carrying a clearance token and will not be challenged again. No
+     * amount of looking at decisions finds it.
+     */
+    recordChallengeSolved(at: number): void;
+    recordDecision(decision: Decision, at: number): void;
+    /** The two spans as they stand right now. Also what the dashboard draws. */
+    summary(now?: number): {
+        window: AuditWindow;
+        baseline: AuditWindow;
+    };
+    /**
+     * Runs every check. Anomalies come back in the order the checks are configured.
+     *
+     * Safe to call as often as you like: a check that has fired inside its cooldown is
+     * skipped, and a window below `minSamples` produces nothing at all.
+     */
+    evaluate(now?: number): TrafficAnomaly[];
+    private bucketFor;
+    private aggregate;
+}
+/**
+ * The checks that ship.
+ *
+ * Each one earns its place by describing a *different* thing going wrong, and each
+ * states its floor in the code rather than in a comment. Replace them wholesale with
+ * `audit.checks`, or add your own with `audit.extraChecks`.
+ */
+export declare const DEFAULT_CHECKS: readonly AuditCheck[];

package/dist/challenge/index.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,176 @@
+import type { ChallengeCopy } from "./language.js";
+import type { Clock } from "../internal/clock.js";
+import type { BotHandlerStore } from "../stores/types.js";
+import type { ClearanceClaims, ClearanceLevel } from "./token.js";
+export { renderChallengePage } from "./page.js";
+export { parseAcceptLanguage, pickTranslation } from "./language.js";
+export type { ChallengeCopy } from "./language.js";
+export type { ChallengePageOptions, RenderedChallenge } from "./page.js";
+export { DEFAULT_DIFFICULTY, MAX_DIFFICULTY, clampDifficulty, countLeadingZeroBits, solveProofOfWork, verifyProofOfWork } from "./pow.js";
+export { issueToken, verifyToken, newChallenge, newClearance } from "./token.js";
+export type { ChallengeClaims, ClearanceClaims, ClearanceLevel, TokenVerification } from "./token.js";
+export interface ChallengeOptions {
+    /**
+     * HMAC secrets. The first signs, all of them verify — prepend a new one and keep
+     * the old for a token lifetime to rotate without logging anyone out.
+     *
+     * Required, with no default, on purpose: a library-supplied fallback secret is a
+     * library-supplied forgery key, and it would end up in production somewhere.
+     */
+    secrets: readonly string[];
+    /** Leading zero bits demanded. Default 16 — a few tens of ms in a browser. */
+    difficulty?: number;
+    /** How long a challenge may be solved for, ms. Default 120000. */
+    challengeTtlMs?: number;
+    /** How long a granted clearance lasts, ms. Default 3600000 (1h). */
+    clearanceTtlMs?: number;
+    /** Path the solution is POSTed to. Default "/__bothandler/verify". */
+    verifyPath?: string;
+    /** Cookie carrying the clearance. Default "__bh_clearance". */
+    cookieName?: string;
+    /** Emit `Secure`. Default true. Set false only for local plaintext development. */
+    cookieSecure?: boolean;
+    /** SameSite attribute. Default "Lax". */
+    cookieSameSite?: "Lax" | "Strict" | "None";
+    /** Page heading. */
+    title?: string;
+    /** Page body copy. */
+    message?: string;
+    /**
+     * HTML shown to anyone the check locks out — no JavaScript, no WebCrypto, a device
+     * too slow to finish. Supply something real: a support address, a phone number, a
+     * link to a form. Everyone who sees it is a person your site just turned away.
+     */
+    contactHtml?: string;
+    /**
+     * Copy for other languages, keyed by language tag — `"ja"`, `"pt-BR"`, `"de"`.
+     *
+     * The interstitial is the only page this library shows to a member of the public, and
+     * it is shown because a *probabilistic* verdict went against them. Somebody who
+     * cannot read it cannot find the contact link on it either, which turns a check into
+     * a wall.
+     *
+     * The library ships no translations and will not: a machine-translated apology on a
+     * page that just turned somebody away is worse than an honest English one, and only
+     * you know which languages your audience reads. Supply the ones you can stand behind
+     * and the best match for each visitor's `Accept-Language` is chosen; anything you
+     * leave out of a translation falls back to the default text.
+     *
+     * ```ts
+     * translations: {
+     *   ja: { title: "ブラウザーを確認しています", message: "数秒で完了します。" },
+     *   "pt-BR": { title: "Verificando seu navegador" },
+     * }
+     * ```
+     *
+     * **Key by the primary tag** — `pt`, `zh`, `de` — unless you genuinely have separate
+     * regional copy. Matching is exact-tag first and then primary-subtag, and it stops
+     * there: a visitor asking for `pt-PT` will *not* be handed `pt-BR`. That looks
+     * unhelpful until you consider the case it is protecting — serving Simplified Chinese
+     * to somebody who asked for Traditional is a worse failure than serving English, and
+     * no rule can tell the two situations apart. Whether one regional variant stands in
+     * for another is a judgement about your audience, so it is made by which keys you
+     * write rather than by a heuristic here.
+     */
+    translations?: Record<string, ChallengeCopy>;
+    store?: BotHandlerStore;
+    clock?: Clock;
+}
+export interface ChallengeResponse {
+    status: number;
+    headers: Record<string, string>;
+    body: string;
+}
+export type SolutionOutcome = {
+    ok: true;
+    setCookie: string;
+    level: ClearanceLevel;
+} | {
+    ok: false;
+    status: number;
+    reason: string;
+};
+/**
+ * Issues challenges, verifies solutions and grants clearance.
+ *
+ * The lifecycle is deliberately stateless up to the moment of success. A challenge is
+ * a signed blob the client carries; the server stores nothing while it is being
+ * solved, so a flood of unsolved challenges costs nothing but the bytes to send them.
+ * Exactly one piece of state is written, at the one moment it is indispensable: the
+ * solved challenge's nonce is claimed atomically so a solution cannot be replayed.
+ */
+export declare class ChallengeService {
+    private readonly options;
+    private readonly secrets;
+    private readonly difficulty;
+    private readonly challengeTtlMs;
+    private readonly clock;
+    private readonly store;
+    readonly verifyPath: string;
+    readonly cookieName: string;
+    /**
+     * How long a granted clearance lasts. Public because the engine mirrors it into its
+     * own actor registry, and the two must expire together: a local record that outlives
+     * the cookie hands a solved actor a window in which it is never re-challenged.
+     */
+    readonly clearanceTtlMs: number;
+    constructor(options: ChallengeOptions);
+    /**
+     * Derives the subject a token is bound to.
+     *
+     * The actor key is hashed rather than embedded, for two independent reasons. Tokens
+     * are readable by the client, and the actor key is frequently an IP address — which
+     * would mean handing every visitor a cookie containing their own address, and
+     * anyone who obtained the cookie a record of where it was issued. Hashing under the
+     * signing secret also means a token cannot be correlated across deployments.
+     */
+    subjectFor(actorKey: string): string;
+    /**
+     * Every subject this actor could legitimately be carrying, newest first.
+     *
+     * The subject is derived under a secret, so rotating secrets changes it — and
+     * binding verification to `secrets[0]` alone would mean that prepending a new key
+     * silently rejected every outstanding cookie as `wrong-actor`. The signature would
+     * still verify against the retained old key; only the binding would fail. Every
+     * visitor holding valid clearance would be sent back through the interstitial at the
+     * moment of rotation, which is exactly the documented promise this class makes and
+     * exactly the kind of quiet mass false positive the library exists to avoid.
+     *
+     * So the same rule the signature follows applies to the binding: the newest secret
+     * mints, every configured secret verifies.
+     */
+    private subjectsFor;
+    /**
+     * Builds the full interstitial response for an actor.
+     *
+     * `acceptLanguage` is the visitor's header, and passing it is what lets the page be
+     * written in a language they read. It is optional because a caller that has no request
+     * to hand — a test, a script — should still be able to render one.
+     */
+    issue(actorKey: string, options?: {
+        acceptLanguage?: string | undefined;
+    }): ChallengeResponse;
+    /**
+     * Validates a submitted solution and, on success, returns the `Set-Cookie` that
+     * grants clearance.
+     *
+     * The checks run in the order that costs least on the way to a rejection:
+     * signature, then binding, then expiry, then the hash, then the replay claim. The
+     * expensive shared-state round trip happens only for a submission that has already
+     * proven itself in every cheaper respect.
+     */
+    verifySolution(actorKey: string, payload: unknown): Promise<SolutionOutcome>;
+    /**
+     * Mints a clearance cookie directly, bypassing the puzzle.
+     *
+     * Use it the moment your application knows something the request cannot show — a
+     * completed login, a verified payment, a session you already trust. `operator`
+     * level is the only clearance this library treats as conclusive proof of a person,
+     * precisely because the assertion comes from your code rather than from the client.
+     */
+    grant(actorKey: string, level?: ClearanceLevel): string;
+    /** Reads and validates the clearance cookie for an actor. Returns `undefined` if there is none valid. */
+    read(actorKey: string, cookies: Record<string, string> | undefined): ClearanceClaims | undefined;
+    /** A `Set-Cookie` that removes any clearance. Call it on logout. */
+    revoke(): string;
+}