@orygn/opa-mcp 0.3.0 → 0.5.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -17,6 +17,387 @@ not part of the public surface and may change in minor releases.
 
 ## [Unreleased]
 
+## [0.5.0] - 2026-09-04
+
+### Security
+
+- `opa_config` described its output as sanitized with secrets excluded. OPA
+  drops the `credentials` block from `GET /v1/config` but returns
+  `services.*.headers` verbatim, and a header is the ordinary place to put an
+  API key or a bearer token for a bundle service, so a live credential was
+  handed to whatever agent called the tool. `opa_status` returns the same
+  document and had the same exposure. Header values are now replaced with a
+  marker and the header names kept, so the document still says what the server
+  is configured to send.
+- `rego_verify` returned `proven` and `unsatisfiable` for claims that are false,
+  on ordinary policy shapes, and reported no unsupported constructs while doing
+  it, so nothing distinguished a real proof from a wrong one. A `proven` verdict
+  was not usable as evidence that a policy cannot be bypassed. Every released
+  version is affected. Five causes, each enough on its own: clauses whose head
+  shape the encoder does not support were dropped rather than reported, and a
+  rule with every clause dropped encoded to an empty body, which is vacuously
+  true; head values were discarded, so `allow := false if { ... }` was encoded as
+  though the head were true; `default` was not encoded at all, so
+  `default allow := true` with a non-matching body answered `never_true`; input
+  references were modelled as always present, so a body reading `input.x` was
+  treated as defined when `x` is absent; and locals were scoped by clause index
+  alone, so a helper and its caller sharing a variable name collapsed into one
+  symbol. Encoding now fails closed: a clause holding anything the encoder cannot
+  represent makes the verdict `inconclusive` rather than silently shrinking the
+  formula. That costs coverage, and about one generated policy in sixteen now
+  answers `inconclusive` where it previously gave a confident wrong answer.
+  Numbers encode as reals rather than integers, so `input.n > 0` with
+  `input.n < 1` is satisfiable at 0.5 instead of being falsely refuted.
+  Verification also ran without a mutex on the shared solver context.
+- `conftest_test` joined the `inlineConfigParser` value into the temp file name
+  for inline config without checking it, so a value carrying `../` segments
+  placed the inline config, whose content the caller also chooses, at any path
+  the server could write. Parser names are now a closed set (conftest 0.69's
+  nineteen), enforced in the schema and again in the handler, and the parser is
+  passed to conftest explicitly rather than through the file name.
+- Path validation followed links only for paths that already existed, so a
+  write destination that did not exist yet, such as an `opa_bundle_build` output
+  or a `conftest_pull` policy directory, was accepted on its spelling alone. A
+  junction or symbolic link inside an allowed root that pointed outside it made
+  such a write land outside the roots. A path is now judged by the real location
+  of its nearest existing ancestor with the missing segments re-attached, a
+  dangling link is refused, and roots and paths are compared in canonical form,
+  which also ends false rejections for a root spelled through a link (macOS
+  `/var`), a Windows short name, or a different letter case.
+- `conftest_pull` and `conftest_push` skipped the allow-list entirely when
+  `policy` was omitted. Both tools document that the policy directory must sit
+  inside `OPA_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS`, but the omitted case fell through to the
+  conftest default, resolved against the working directory of the server:
+  `conftest_pull` wrote policy files there, outside any allowed root. The
+  default is now resolved and checked like an explicit path, and refused with
+  `PATH_NOT_ALLOWED` when it falls outside.
+- `opa_bundle_sign` wrote `.signatures.json` into the server's working directory,
+  outside `OPA_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS`, and reported `signed: true` while the bundle it
+  was asked to sign stayed unsigned. `opa sign` puts the file wherever
+  `--output-file-path` says, that flag defaults to the process cwd, and it was
+  not being passed. A directory bundle is now signed in place and an archive
+  beside itself (or in `outputDir`), both validated like every other path the
+  server writes, and success is reported only after the file is observed on
+  disk. A `.signatures.json` already present as a symbolic link is refused
+  rather than written through. The response carries the path written, the
+  algorithm, and the number of files covered.
+
+### Fixed
+
+Results that were wrong without saying so:
+
+- The five OPA data tools read a key containing a dot as two path segments and
+  returned a different document than the one asked for, with nothing to signal
+  the substitution. `opa_get_data` on `hosts/example.com` fetched
+  `/v1/data/hosts/example/com`; the same substitution applied to
+  `opa_put_data`, `opa_patch_data`, `opa_delete_data` and `opa_query_decision`,
+  so a write or a delete could land on the wrong document. A path containing a
+  slash now treats slash as its only separator, and a path without one is read
+  as dotted. Segments are percent-encoded: a key holding `?` or `#` truncated
+  the request URL at that character and read the parent document, and keys
+  holding a space, a percent sign or non-ASCII characters were unreachable.
+- `opa_patch_data` documented an empty path for patching the root of the data
+  hierarchy, but the schema required at least one character and the path it
+  built for the root is one OPA answers with a redirect. Omitting both `path`
+  and `segments` now patches the root.
+- `opa_exec` did not evaluate the rule it was asked for. Its `decision`
+  description told callers to pass a fully-qualified Rego reference such as
+  `data.authz.allow`, but `opa exec --decision` names a decision by
+  slash-separated path with no `data.` prefix. Any other spelling is accepted by
+  the flag and resolves to nothing, so every input file came back with
+  `opa_undefined_error`, which under a `deny`-style policy reads as a clean
+  pass. Both spellings are now converted to the path OPA expects, and a
+  reference with nothing left to name is rejected as `INVALID_INPUT`.
+- `rego_test` and `rego_test_multiroot` counted a test OPA could not evaluate as
+  a passing test. OPA marks such a record with an `error` object and does not set
+  `fail`, so deriving the pass count as `total - failed - skipped` absorbed it,
+  and a suite whose tests all raised (a rule conflict, for instance) was reported
+  as fully passing with zero failures. Both tools now report `errored`
+  separately, and the multiroot aggregate carries `totalErrored`.
+- Windows: a data document passed by absolute path was loaded under its drive
+  letter instead of where the policy expected it. OPA reads every load path as
+  an optional `prefix:path` pair and splits on the first colon, so
+  `C:\policies\data.json` mounted at `data.C` and a rule reading `data.tier`
+  found nothing, while the tool reported success. `opa test` on a suite whose
+  tests read data reported those tests as failing. Load paths are now passed
+  relative to a directory the `opa` process runs in, which is the only spelling
+  OPA reads correctly. Rego modules are unaffected either way, because a module
+  mounts at its own `package` rather than at its path, which is why policies
+  worked and only their data did not. Nothing changes on macOS or Linux, whose
+  absolute paths carry no drive letter. Load paths spanning two drives are now
+  reported as an error, since OPA cannot load documents from two drives in one
+  invocation.
+- The ABAC example in the `opa://patterns` resource failed to evaluate on the
+  case it exists to handle. It expressed "hide secret resources from other
+  organizations" as a second rule assigning `allow := false`, which in Rego is a
+  conflict rather than an override: a user reading their own secret resource
+  from another organization got `eval_conflict_error` instead of a denial. The
+  denial is now a condition the permissive rules consult. The pitfalls list,
+  which recommended the broken form, says why it does not work.
+- The Terraform example in the `opa://patterns` resource did not reject a
+  full-admin IAM policy. It tested `"*" in statement.Action`, which requires
+  `Action` to be a collection, and AWS accepts a bare string there, in
+  `Resource`, and for `Statement` itself. Of the four ways to spell
+  `Allow * on *`, the rule caught one; the most common form,
+  `{"Action": "*", "Resource": "*"}`, was allowed. Each position is now widened
+  to a set before the wildcard test. Scoped policies and `Deny` statements are
+  still allowed, so the rule has not become indiscriminate.
+- `rego_test` with `coverage` or `threshold` reported `One or more tests
+  failed` for a suite where none did. A suite holding a `todo_` test exits
+  non-zero under `--coverage` with an empty stderr, and the coverage report is
+  on stdout as asked for. The report was discarded and the run called a
+  failure. A non-zero exit with a parseable report and no failure lines is now
+  the coverage result it is, and a report OPA did produce is kept in the error
+  details when tests really did fail.
+- `rego_coverage_gaps` reported `testsPassed`, `testsFailed` and
+  `testsSkipped` as zero on every call. OPA emits no per-test records in
+  coverage mode, so the three counts could never be anything else, and three
+  zeros read as "no tests ran" rather than "not reported". They are now
+  omitted unless OPA supplied records.
+- `opa_health` reported a reachable server as `OPA_UNREACHABLE`. A server that
+  answers `/health?bundles=true` with `one or more bundles are not activated`
+  is running; the caller was told no server was found and to go start one, and
+  OPA's own reason was buried in a stringified error. Such a response is now a
+  result, `healthy: false` with `reason`. A 401 maps to `OPA_AUTH_FAILED`, and
+  `OPA_UNREACHABLE` is left for a server that could not be reached.
+
+Tools that did not work as documented:
+
+- `opa_bundle_verify` passed `--verification-key` to `opa eval`, which has no
+  such flag, so verification always failed with "unknown flag" and was reported
+  as `INVALID_BUNDLE`, signed or not. Verification now runs through
+  `opa build --verification-key` into a discarded temp file, which is the path
+  OPA provides. Failures carry `details.reason`: `signature_invalid`,
+  `scope_mismatch`, `file_modified`, `file_added`, `file_missing`,
+  `file_unparseable`, `unsigned`, `signatures_malformed`, `not_a_bundle`,
+  `bundle_load_error`, or `unknown` when OPA's message is not recognised. A key
+  or algorithm OPA cannot use is reported as `INVALID_INPUT` by both tools.
+- Directory bundles are signed and verified by name from the parent directory,
+  the way `opa sign --bundle <name>` records them, so a signed directory stays
+  valid wherever it is placed under that name and a directory signed with the
+  OPA CLI verifies. A symbolic link or junction given as the bundle is resolved
+  first; OPA does not descend a linked root and would sign an empty file list.
+- `opa_bundle_build` passed `--signing-key` and `--verification-key` without
+  `--bundle`, which `opa build` refuses, so neither option worked unless
+  `bundle: true` was also set. Either option now implies bundle mode.
+- `opa_bundle_sign` returned an empty `stderr` on failure because `opa sign`
+  prints its errors on stdout. `details` now carries both streams.
+- `conftest_test` and `conftest_verify` threw `UNKNOWN_ERROR` on every clean run.
+  conftest omits every empty array from its JSON, so a passing file arrives with
+  no `failures` key and the summary code dereferenced it. Results now always
+  carry their arrays, `conftest_verify` reports `NO_TESTS_FOUND` for a policy
+  directory with no test rules (conftest prints `null` there), and both
+  summaries count files by name, since conftest emits one entry per namespace
+  or per test rule. `summary.successes` and `summary.failures` are added to
+  `conftest_test`. `exceptions` are messages, not strings, matching conftest.
+- `conftest_pull` did not write to the directory it was given. Conftest resolves
+  `--policy` against the working directory rather than honouring an absolute
+  path, and the tool resolves the caller's path against the allow-list before
+  handing it over, so the path was always absolute. On Windows the pull failed
+  outright, reporting a path of the form `.\C:\...`. `conftest_push` had the
+  same handling and read from the same path on whichever drive it happened to
+  start on. Both now run from the parent directory and name the target
+  relatively.
+- `rego_test` with `count` above 1 reported the suite as having no tests. OPA
+  prints one pretty-printed JSON array per repetition, back to back, which is
+  neither a single JSON value nor one record per line, so nothing parsed and the
+  tool returned `NO_TESTS_FOUND` for a suite that had just run. The repetitions
+  are now read and collapsed to one record per test carrying its worst outcome,
+  so a test that fails intermittently is reported as failing.
+- `rego_test` did not populate `parameterizedGroups`. OPA reports a
+  `test_x[case]` rule as a single record carrying the per-case outcomes in
+  `sub_results`, not as one record per case, so looking for a bracketed test
+  name found nothing on any OPA 1.x run. A rule whose cases mostly passed was
+  reported as one failing test with no indication of which case failed. The
+  cases are now grouped under the rule name, and the bracketed form older
+  versions emitted is still read.
+- `rego_bench` failed with `UNKNOWN_ERROR` for any `count` above 1. OPA prints
+  one JSON document per repetition, back to back, which is not a single JSON
+  value, so nothing parsed. Every repetition is now returned in `runs`, and the
+  top-level figures come from the fastest of them per iteration.
+- `rego_bench` reported a failed benchmark with an empty error. `opa bench
+  --format=json` writes its diagnostics to stdout as an `errors` array and
+  leaves stderr empty, and the tool reported only stderr, so a query with a
+  syntax error came back as `EVAL_ERROR` with nothing in it. The diagnostics
+  are now included.
+- `opa_list_policies` returned nothing but a truncation notice on a server
+  holding more than a couple of dozen policies. OPA answers the policy
+  endpoints with each policy's parsed AST alongside its source, and the AST is
+  far larger than the text it came from, so the response passed
+  `OPA_MCP_MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES` and the payload was replaced with advice to
+  narrow the scope. The tool took no arguments, so there was no scope to
+  narrow. It now returns the policy IDs and a count, with `includeSource` and
+  `includeAst` to ask for more.
+- `opa_get_policy` returned the AST alongside the source, which nothing had
+  asked for: a 477-byte policy came back as a 19 KB response. The AST is now
+  behind `includeAst`.
+- The server did nothing when it was reached through a symbolic link. Its
+  entry-point check compared `import.meta.url` with `process.argv[1]` as
+  strings, and Node resolves symlinks for a module's own URL while leaving
+  `argv[1]` as it was invoked, so the two differed and neither the CLI flags nor
+  the transport ran: the process started and exited in silence. npm's `bin`
+  entry is a symlink on macOS and Linux. The comparison is now between real
+  paths, so how the file was reached no longer matters.
+- `rego_explain_undefined` had nothing to say about a policy written with
+  `default allow := false`. A default gives the query a value, so it is never
+  undefined and the tool returned that value and stopped, skipping the
+  per-clause analysis it exists for. A query whose value came from a default
+  and from nothing else is now analysed, and `queryResult` reports `default`.
+- Clauses of a multi-clause rule were not told apart in the trace. OPA leaves
+  `Node.location` unset on trace events, so the row comparison meant to
+  distinguish them always fell through to matching on the rule name, and every
+  clause looked present in the trace as soon as one was. Those clauses were
+  never evaluated standalone: each came back with every condition
+  `unevaluable` and no blocking condition. The event's own location is now
+  used.
+- `rego_lint`, `rego_fix` and `rego_security_audit` ignored the linted project's
+  own `.regal/config.yaml`, and applied any configuration sitting above the
+  server's working directory to every call instead. Regal discovers its
+  configuration by walking up from its own working directory rather than from
+  the files it is given, and it was spawned without one, so it inherited the
+  server's, which for a stdio server is wherever the client launched it. Rules a
+  project had turned off were reported anyway, and inline source, which belongs
+  to no project, picked up whatever happened to be above the server. Regal now
+  runs in the directory of what it is linting, and inline source runs in its own
+  temp directory. An explicit `configFile` still takes precedence.
+
+Configuration and environment:
+
+- An empty or blank environment variable was treated as a real value.
+  `OPA_BINARY=""`, which is what a shell leaves behind when it expands an
+  unset variable, is not the literal default `opa`, so binary resolution
+  skipped the bundled build and every `rego_*` call tried to spawn nothing.
+  Blank now means unset for every variable the server reads, and values are
+  trimmed.
+- `OPA_MCP_TIMEOUT_MS` and `OPA_MCP_HTTP_TIMEOUT_MS` accepted values Node
+  cannot represent. A timer of 2147483648 ms or more is clamped to 1 ms with
+  only a process warning, so a large value set to mean "effectively no
+  timeout" timed out every subprocess and every HTTP call immediately. Values
+  above 2147483647 are now refused at startup with a message saying why.
+- An `install-id` file that existed but held no id was a permanent trap. The
+  read found no id, the exclusive create failed because the file was there, and
+  the fallback read found no id again, on every run for the life of the machine.
+  The file is now rewritten when it holds no usable id; a brand-new file is
+  still created exclusively so two first runs cannot both claim it. A file can
+  end up empty after a crash or a full disk during the first run.
+- The test suites no longer emit telemetry pings.
+
+### Added
+
+- `opa_bundle_sign` accepts `outputDir` for archives, the directory that
+  receives `.signatures.json`. A directory bundle is always signed in place,
+  since OPA only reads the signature from inside the bundle.
+- `opa_bundle_verify` accepts `v0Compatible` for bundles written in Rego v0,
+  which otherwise fail to load after the signature has been checked.
+- The five OPA data tools accept `segments`, an array of literal key segments,
+  for keys that contain both a dot and a slash and so cannot be written as a
+  path string. `opa_put_data`, `opa_patch_data` and `opa_delete_data` return the
+  resolved `segments` alongside the `path` that was supplied.
+- `opa_exec` output gains `hint`, present when every input left the decision
+  undefined. That is the expected outcome when no rule matched and also what a
+  decision naming nothing looks like, and the per-file results do not
+  distinguish them.
+- `OPA_MCP_BLOCK_ENV` withholds named variables from `opa`, `regal` and
+  `conftest` even when they are on the built-in allow-list. It is applied last,
+  so it also overrides `OPA_MCP_PASSTHROUGH_ENV` and anything a command passes
+  explicitly. It exists so an operator behind an authenticated proxy can choose
+  to lose proxy support rather than expose those credentials to evaluated
+  policy.
+
+### Changed
+
+- `rego_test` output gains `errored`, `repetitions` (present only when more
+  than one repetition ran; OPA stops repeating at the first run that fails, so
+  this can be lower than the requested `count`) and `caseCounts` (present only
+  when the run had a parameterized test; the top-level counts still follow OPA
+  and treat such a rule as one test however many cases it holds).
+  `rego_test_multiroot` gains `errored` per root and `totalErrored` overall.
+- `opa_list_policies` output gains `count`.
+- `rego_explain_undefined` output: `queryResult` gains `default`, and `value`
+  is populated for it. On a query that is genuinely defined the tool now also
+  runs `opa parse`, which is how it tells a default apart from a rule that
+  matched.
+- `OPA_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS` now refuses a relative entry, as documented. A
+  relative root was resolved against the server's working directory, so for a
+  stdio server the same configuration permitted different directories depending
+  on how the client launched it.
+- `opa-mcp --help` lists `OPA_MCP_MAX_SUBPROCESS_BYTES`,
+  `OPA_MCP_PASSTHROUGH_ENV` and `OPA_MCP_NO_TELEMETRY`, which were documented
+  but absent from the output an invalid-configuration message points at.
+- The 0.4.0 entry below, the README and the source comment all described the
+  child-process allow-list as containing no secret. It carries no cloud or
+  repository credential, but `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY` and `ALL_PROXY` are on
+  it and a proxy URL can embed a username and password, which any evaluated
+  policy can read through `opa.runtime().env`. All three now say so. No
+  behaviour changed; the exposure was there in 0.4.0 as shipped and is
+  unchanged by this correction.
+- Documentation corrected where it did not match the tools: `opa_status`
+  returns `GET /v1/config`, not bundle or decision-log status;
+  `rego_describe_policy` does not report input references, so the two prompts
+  that told the model to use it for that now name `rego_infer_input_schema`;
+  `rego_lint` returns a flat list of violations rather than findings grouped by
+  category; `rego_capabilities` reflects the resolved `opa` binary rather than
+  the bundled one; `rego_explain_decision` returns a structured summary rather
+  than a natural-language explanation, and the extension manifest no longer
+  says the helper tools use AI; the MCPB bundle has no bundled-binary fallback;
+  unit tests run on macOS only on Node 22.
+- Four error codes that nothing returns are no longer listed as codes a caller
+  can expect: `REGAL_VERSION_TOO_OLD`, `DEPENDENCY_CONFLICT`,
+  `VERIFY_INCONCLUSIVE` and `Z3_INIT_ERROR`. They remain reserved in the type.
+  The troubleshooting entry for a Regal minimum-version check that does not
+  exist is removed.
+
+## [0.4.0] - 2026-09-03
+
+### Security
+
+- Policies evaluated through this server no longer receive the server's environment.
+  Rego exposes the environment of the `opa` process through `opa.runtime().env`, and
+  child processes inherited `process.env`, so any evaluated policy could read
+  `OPA_TOKEN`, the `GITHUB_TOKEN` the README asks users to set for
+  `rego_playground_share`, and everything else the operator's client passed in.
+  `rego_eval` accepts inline source, so `OPA_MCP_ALLOWED_PATHS` never applied and no
+  filesystem access was needed; a policy arriving through a README, an issue, or a
+  diff was enough. `conftest_test` was affected the same way, and is the likelier
+  route to third-party policy. Children now get an explicit allow-list.
+  `OPA_MCP_PASSTHROUGH_ENV` opts individual variables back in, and anything named
+  there is readable by evaluated policy by design.
+
+  The allow-list carries no cloud or repository token, but it is not free of
+  credentials: `HTTP_PROXY`, `HTTPS_PROXY` and `ALL_PROXY` are on it, and a proxy
+  URL can embed a username and password, so an operator behind an authenticated
+  corporate proxy is still handing those to evaluated policy. They are on the list
+  because dropping them breaks proxied bundle downloads and `http.send`.
+
+  On Windows, libuv copies a fixed set of variables to every child regardless of what
+  is requested. `USERNAME`, `USERDOMAIN` and `LOGONSERVER` cannot be removed, so they
+  are blanked rather than left to disclose the operating-system user and domain.
+
+### Fixed
+
+- A subprocess that produces very large output no longer takes the server down.
+  stdout and stderr were captured without a size limit, and decoding a capture past
+  V8's maximum string length throws inside an async `close` handler, where no tool's
+  `try`/`catch` can reach it and the process exits. A policy iterating
+  `numbers.range(1, 1000)` under `--explain full` produced 518 MiB in under seven
+  seconds, so the 30-second timeout never applied; `opa` buffers its result and writes
+  it in one burst at exit, which means the runs that complete comfortably are the
+  dangerous ones. Capture is now capped per stream, the child is stopped on overflow,
+  and the tool returns the new `OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE` error code. Configurable with
+  `OPA_MCP_MAX_SUBPROCESS_BYTES`, default 32 MiB.
+
+- `rego_test_multiroot` reports `OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE` and `TIMEOUT` through the same mapper as
+  every other tool. It carried its own copy of the failure ladder, and a run killed for
+  producing too much output reported `OPA_BINARY_NOT_FOUND`, sending the caller after an
+  install problem that did not exist. This is the same defect that was fixed for timeouts in
+  0.3.0, in the one place that did not share the fix.
+
+### Added
+
+- `OPA_MCP_MAX_SUBPROCESS_BYTES` and `OPA_MCP_PASSTHROUGH_ENV` environment variables.
+- `OUTPUT_TOO_LARGE` error code.
+
+
 ## [0.3.0] - 2026-08-05
 
 ### Changed
@@ -983,7 +1364,19 @@ wrappers end-to-end. CI matrix: Ubuntu, macOS, and Windows on Node
 20 and 22, plus CodeQL security scanning and weekly Dependabot updates
 for npm, GitHub Actions, and Docker base images.
 
-[Unreleased]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.12...HEAD
+[Unreleased]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.4.0...HEAD
+[0.4.0]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.3.0...v0.4.0
+[0.3.0]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.2.1...v0.3.0
+[0.2.1]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.2.0...v0.2.1
+[0.2.0]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.20...v0.2.0
+[0.1.20]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.19...v0.1.20
+[0.1.19]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.18...v0.1.19
+[0.1.18]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.17...v0.1.18
+[0.1.17]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.16...v0.1.17
+[0.1.16]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.15...v0.1.16
+[0.1.15]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.14...v0.1.15
+[0.1.14]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.13...v0.1.14
+[0.1.13]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.12...v0.1.13
 [0.1.12]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.11...v0.1.12
 [0.1.11]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.10...v0.1.11
 [0.1.10]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.9...v0.1.10
@@ -994,6 +1387,6 @@ for npm, GitHub Actions, and Docker base images.
 [0.1.5]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.4...v0.1.5
 [0.1.4]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.3...v0.1.4
 [0.1.3]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.2...v0.1.3
-[0.1.2]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/releases/tag/v0.1.2
-[0.1.1]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/releases/tag/v0.1.1
+[0.1.2]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.1...v0.1.2
+[0.1.1]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/compare/v0.1.0...v0.1.1
 [0.1.0]: https://github.com/OrygnsCode/opa-mcp-server/releases/tag/v0.1.0