@orbinum/sdk 0.17.0 → 0.19.0

package/dist/index.d.mts

@@ -105,6 +105,18 @@ declare class SubstrateClient {
     private constructor();
     private _dynamicBuilder;
     private _extDecoder;
+    private _inflightTxCount;
+    /**
+     * `true` while any submitted transaction is still waiting for finalization.
+     * Connection managers use this to defer destroying the client — killing the
+     * WS mid-submit rejects the pending tx with "Client destroyed" even though
+     * it may still land on-chain.
+     *
+     * Only covers promise-based submits (`submit`, `submitUnsignedAndWatch`,
+     * `signAndSubmit`); observable-based `submitAndWatch` callers are not tracked.
+     */
+    get hasInflightTx(): boolean;
+    private trackTx;
     /**
      * Connects to the Orbinum node via WebSocket.
      * Throws if the node does not respond within `timeoutMs`.
@@ -285,14 +297,25 @@ declare class EvmClient {
     }): Promise<bigint>;
     /** Returns a transaction receipt by hash, or `null` if the transaction has not been mined yet. */
     getTransactionReceipt(txHash: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>;
+    /**
+     * Fetches a transaction by hash, or `null` when the node no longer knows it
+     * (never mined and evicted from the pool). Unlike `request`, a `null`
+     * result is a valid answer here, not an error.
+     */
+    getTransactionByHash(txHash: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>;
     /**
      * Polls `eth_getTransactionReceipt` until the transaction is included in a block.
      *
+     * After `timeoutMs`, the tx-pool is consulted: a tx no longer known to the
+     * node is reported as dropped (safe to retry), while a tx still in the pool
+     * gets an extended grace window (up to 4× `timeoutMs`) before a "still
+     * pending" error — it may confirm later, so callers must NOT blindly retry.
+     *
      * @param txHash - The transaction hash to wait for.
      * @param intervalMs - Polling interval in milliseconds (default: 500).
      * @param timeoutMs - Maximum time to wait in milliseconds (default: 60_000).
      * @returns The transaction receipt once mined.
-     * @throws If the transaction is not mined within `timeoutMs` or if it reverted (`status == 0x0`).
+     * @throws If the transaction dropped, is still pending after the grace window, or reverted (`status == 0x0`).
      */
     waitForReceipt(txHash: string, intervalMs?: number, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
 }
@@ -1776,6 +1799,7 @@ declare class OrbinumClientProvider {
     private _reconnectTimer;
     private _stableTimer;
     private _reconnectAttempt;
+    private _probeFailures;
     private _listeners;
     /** Creates a new provider with the given configuration. Does not connect automatically — call `connect()` to initiate. */
     constructor(config: ClientProviderConfig);
@@ -1806,6 +1830,21 @@ declare class OrbinumClientProvider {
      * On failure: destroys any orphaned client and transitions to `'disconnected'`.
      */
     private attemptConnect;
+    /**
+     * Consecutive failed probes required before the client is torn down. A
+     * single missed probe is routine (throttled background tab, node busy
+     * verifying a ZK proof, transient network blip) — destroying the client on
+     * it rejects every in-flight request with "Client destroyed" even though
+     * the tx may still land on-chain.
+     */
+    private static readonly PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD;
+    /**
+     * With a tx awaiting finalization, tolerate more missed probes: an unsigned
+     * private_transfer/unshield makes the node CPU-bound on proof verification,
+     * which is exactly when probes time out — tearing down then kills the very
+     * tx being processed.
+     */
+    private static readonly PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD_INFLIGHT;
     /** Starts the periodic heartbeat loop. Replaces any existing timer. */
     private startHeartbeat;
     /** Clears the heartbeat interval timer if active. */
@@ -2318,36 +2357,152 @@ declare const BABYJUB_SUBORDER = 27360303589799094027808007181571593860768139721
  */
 declare function randomBlinding(): bigint;
 
+/**
+ * SpendingKeyRequest
+ *
+ * What the user signs to derive their Orbinum spending key, per platform.
+ *
+ * These builders produce the *request* (typed data or message string). Turning a
+ * signature into key material lives in `PrivacyKeys` — the split keeps the
+ * platform-specific presentation away from the platform-agnostic KDF.
+ *
+ * SECURITY MODEL
+ *
+ * The signature seeds the spending key, so a deterministic signature over a
+ * fixed, public string is a bearer token: any dapp the user connects to can
+ * request the same string, obtain a byte-identical signature (ECDSA personal_sign
+ * is deterministic, RFC-6979) and reconstruct the spending key, viewing key and
+ * vault key. That is the v1 flaw these builders exist to close.
+ *
+ * The defense has two independent layers:
+ *
+ *   1. Message layer (here) — bind the signature to a domain the user can see.
+ *      EVM uses EIP-712, whose domain the wallet renders. Substrate has no
+ *      EIP-712, so the warning travels inside the signed text instead. NOTE this
+ *      layer is about VISIBILITY, not impossibility: nothing stops a hostile
+ *      origin from requesting the same payload, and no wallet verifies that
+ *      `verifyingContract` matches the requesting origin.
+ *   2. Derivation layer (`PrivacyKeys`) — the HKDF `info` carries the version, so
+ *      v1 and v2 are disjoint identities even given identical signature bytes.
+ *      This is the layer that holds when layer 1 fails (e.g. a wallet that
+ *      truncates the warning text).
+ *
+ * DETERMINISM IS MANDATORY. No builder may add a nonce, timestamp or challenge:
+ * the digest must stay a pure function of (chainId, address). A signature that
+ * varies per session yields a different spending key each time, which makes
+ * already-shielded notes unspendable — surfacing as an opaque Merkle constraint
+ * failure during witness generation.
+ */
+/**
+ * EIP-712 `verifyingContract` for spending-key derivation: the shielded pool
+ * precompile, i.e. the component that actually custodies shielded funds and so
+ * the semantically correct domain anchor.
+ *
+ * WARNING: this value is part of the EIP-712 digest. Changing it changes every
+ * derived spending key and orphans every existing note. It is a protocol
+ * constant, not a config knob — which is why it is re-exported from the single
+ * `PRECOMPILE_ADDR` source rather than written out a second time.
+ */
+declare const SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT: "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000801";
+/**
+ * Shown to the user inside the wallet prompt. Wallets render EIP-712 message
+ * fields (and Substrate raw text) verbatim, so this is the one surface a hostile
+ * origin can neither suppress nor reword.
+ */
+declare const SPENDING_KEY_WARNING: string;
+/** EIP-712 payload for `eth_signTypedData_v4`. */
+interface SpendingKeyTypedData {
+    domain: {
+        name: string;
+        version: string;
+        chainId: number;
+        verifyingContract: string;
+    };
+    types: {
+        SpendingKeyDerivation: ReadonlyArray<{
+            name: string;
+            type: string;
+        }>;
+    };
+    primaryType: 'SpendingKeyDerivation';
+    message: {
+        warning: string;
+        account: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * EIP-712 typed data the user signs to derive their spending key (EVM route).
+ * Pass the result to `eth_signTypedData_v4`.
+ *
+ * @param chainId Chain the identity belongs to; part of the domain separator.
+ * @param address Signer address. Lowercased so checksum casing cannot fork the
+ *                identity into two distinct keys for the same account.
+ */
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyTypedData(chainId: number, address: string): SpendingKeyTypedData;
+/**
+ * Message the user signs on signers without EIP-712 (Substrate: sr25519 via VRF,
+ * ed25519 via signRaw).
+ *
+ * Substrate wallets render the raw string, so the warning leads the text — it is
+ * the only channel a malicious extension cannot rewrite. Its protection is
+ * therefore conditional on the wallet not truncating the message; when it does,
+ * only the HKDF domain separation in `PrivacyKeys` still applies.
+ */
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2(chainId: number, address: string): string;
+/**
+ * @deprecated INSECURE — v1 derivation. Signs a fixed public string via
+ * `personal_sign`, so any dapp can request it and, because the signature is
+ * deterministic, reconstruct the user's spending key, viewing key and vault key.
+ *
+ * Retained ONLY so existing v1 notes can be swept into a v2 identity. Never call
+ * it on a connect/login path. Use {@link deriveSpendingKeyTypedData} (EVM) or
+ * {@link deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2} (Substrate) instead.
+ */
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId: number, address: string): string;
+
 /**
  * PrivacyKeys
  *
- * Pure cryptographic derivation functions for the Orbinum shielded pool identity.
- * These are protocol-level operations — independent of storage, UI, or session.
+ * Pure cryptographic derivation for the Orbinum shielded pool identity: turns a
+ * wallet signature into key material, and key material into the public values
+ * that make up a privacy address. Protocol-level only — no storage, UI or
+ * session concerns. What the user *signs* to produce that signature lives in
+ * `SpendingKeyRequest`.
+ *
+ * Full derivation chain:
  *
- * Derivation scheme (ECDH viewing key — v2):
- *   viewingSecretKey (ivsk) = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=spendingKey_bytes, info="orbinum-ivk-v1") → 32 bytes
- *   ivsk_scalar             = BigInt(ivsk_BE) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER  (clamped to [1, ∞))
- *   viewingPublicKey (ivk)  = BJJ_mul(Base8, ivsk_scalar)  →  packPoint([Ax, Ay])  → 32-byte bigint stored LE
- *   ownerPk                 = BabyJubJub Ax from (spendingKey * Base8)  → bigint
+ *   signature ──HKDF(info="orbinum-sk-{version}:{chainId}:{address}")──► masterBytes (32B)
+ *                                                                            │
+ *          ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+ *          ▼                                                                 ▼
+ *   spendingKey = BigInt(masterBytes) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER            vaultKey (see vault/)
+ *          │                                     = HKDF(masterBytes, "orbinum-vault-key-v1")
+ *          ├──► ownerPk = BJJ_mul(Base8, spendingKey).Ax                    (public)
+ *          │
+ *          └──► ivsk = HKDF(LE32(spendingKey), info="orbinum-ivk-v1")       (secret)
+ *                 └──► ivk = packPoint(BJJ_mul(Base8, ivsk_scalar))         (public)
  *
- * Spending key derivation (from wallet signature):
- *   message     = "orbinum-spending-key-v1\n${chainId}\n${address.toLowerCase()}"
- *   skBytes     = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sig_bytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-v1:${chainId}:${address}")
- *   spendingKey = BigInt(skBytes_as_big_endian) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER  (if 0 → 1)
+ * VERSIONING: the HKDF `info` carries the identity version, so v1 and v2 are
+ * cryptographically disjoint even given identical signature bytes. This is the
+ * layer that still separates the identities when the message-level defense fails
+ * — see the security model in `SpendingKeyRequest`.
  *
- * IMPORTANT: must reduce mod BABYJUB_SUBORDER (not BN254_R). circomlib's BabyPbk uses
- * Num2Bits(253) which asserts spending_key < 2^253. BABYJUB_SUBORDER < 2^252 satisfies
- * this. BN254_R ≈ 2^254.8 does not — ~34% of values would exceed 2^253 at runtime.
+ * MODULUS: reduce mod BABYJUB_SUBORDER, never BN254_R. circomlib's BabyPbk uses
+ * Num2Bits(253), asserting spending_key < 2^253. BABYJUB_SUBORDER < 2^252
+ * satisfies it; BN254_R ≈ 2^254.8 does not — ~34% of values would fail at runtime.
  */
+/** Identity version. `v1` is the legacy personal_sign scheme, kept for sweeping only. */
+type KeyVersion = 'v1' | 'v2';
 /**
- * Returns the message string the user must sign with their wallet to derive
- * a deterministic Orbinum spending key.
+ * Shortest signature any supported signer produces: sr25519 VRF output is 32
+ * bytes, ed25519 is 64, ECDSA `personal_sign` is 65. Anything shorter is not a
+ * signature, so it must never reach the KDF.
  */
-declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId: number, address: string): string;
+declare const MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 32;
 /**
  * Derives the 32-byte master key bytes from a wallet signature.
  *
- * masterBytes = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-v1:{chainId}:{address}")
+ * masterBytes = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-{version}:{chainId}:{address}")
  *
  * These bytes are the stable root for ALL derived keys:
  *   - spendingKey (circuit scalar) = BigInt(masterBytes) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER
@@ -2357,12 +2512,19 @@ declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId: number, address: string): str
  * Separating masterBytes from the circuit scalar means the viewingSecretKey and
  * vault key are STABLE across any future change to the modulus — they never
  * depend on which prime field the circuit uses.
+ *
+ * The version is folded into the HKDF `info`, so v1 and v2 stay disjoint even if
+ * the underlying signature bytes were somehow identical.
+ *
+ * @param version Defaults to 'v2'. Pass 'v1' only from the legacy sweep flow.
+ * @throws If the signature is not valid hex, or carries less entropy than the
+ *         shortest real signing scheme (see {@link MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES}).
  */
-declare function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+declare function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string, version?: KeyVersion): Promise<Uint8Array>;
 /**
  * Derives an Orbinum spending key from a wallet signature.
  *
- * Uses HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-v1:{chainId}:{address}")
+ * Uses HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-{version}:{chainId}:{address}")
  * and reduces the resulting 32-byte value modulo BABYJUB_SUBORDER.
  *
  * IMPORTANT: viewingSecretKey and vaultKey must be derived from masterBytes (via
@@ -2372,9 +2534,12 @@ declare function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, add
  * @param signatureHex  0x-prefixed or bare hex of the wallet signature.
  * @param chainId       Chain ID used when building the signing message.
  * @param address       Signer address (EVM or SS58) used in the signing message.
+ * @param version       Defaults to 'v2'. Pass 'v1' only from the legacy sweep flow.
  * @returns bigint in [1, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)
+ * @throws If the signature is not valid hex or is shorter than
+ *         {@link MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES} — see `deriveMasterKeyBytes`.
  */
-declare function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string): Promise<bigint>;
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string, version?: KeyVersion): Promise<bigint>;
 /**
  * Derive a 32-byte viewing secret key (ivsk) from the spending key.
  *   ivsk = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=bigintTo32Le(spendingKey), info="orbinum-ivk-v1")
@@ -4269,4 +4434,4 @@ interface ExtrinsicFailedData {
     dispatch_info: DispatchInfo;
 }
 
-export { type AccountListing, type AccountMappedData, type AccountMappedEvent, type AccountMappingCall, type AccountMappingEvent, AccountMappingModule, AccountMappingPrecompile, type AccountMetadata, type AccountUnmappedEvent, type ActiveVersionSetEvent, type AddChainLinkArgs, type AddChainLinkParams, type AddSupportedChainArgs, type AliasFullIdentity, type AliasInfo, type AliasListedForSaleEvent, type AliasOnSaleData, type AliasRegisteredData, type AliasRegisteredEvent, type AliasReleasedEvent, type AliasSaleCancelledEvent, type AliasSoldData, type AliasSoldEvent, type AliasTransferredData, type AliasTransferredEvent, type AssetRegisteredEvent, type AssetUnverifiedEvent, type AssetVerifiedEvent, BABYJUB_SUBORDER, BN254_R, type BatchRegisterVerificationKeysArgs, type BatchVerificationKeysRegisteredEvent, type BlockInfo, type BuyAliasArgs, type Bytes32, CURRENT_CIRCUIT_VERSION, type ChainInfo, type ChainLink, type ChainLinkAddedEvent, type ChainLinkRemovedEvent, CircuitId, CircuitId as CircuitIdType, CircuitVersionResolver, type ClaimShieldedFeesParams, type ClientProviderConfig, type CommitmentsInsertedEvent, type CommitmentsInsertedEventData, type ConnectionStatus, CryptoPrecompiles, type DecodedAddChainLinkArgs, type DecodedBatchArgs, type DecodedDispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedEthereumTransactArgs, type DecodedEvmCallArgs, type DecodedPrecompile, type DecodedPrivateTransferArgs, type DecodedPutAliasForSaleArgs, type DecodedRegisterAliasArgs, type DecodedRemarkArgs, type DecodedRevealPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedSetAccountMetadataArgs, type DecodedShieldArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchOperation, type DecodedSudoArgs, type DecodedTransferAllArgs, type DecodedTransferArgs, type DecodedTransferKeepAliveArgs, type DecodedUnshieldArgs, type DecryptedMemo, type DispatchAsLinkedAccountArgs, type DispatchAsLinkedParams, type DispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DispatchError, type DispatchInfo, type DynamicBuilder, ENCRYPTED_MEMO_SIZE, EncryptedMemo, type EncryptedNoteRecord, type EndowedEventData, type EthereumExecutedData, type EventData, type EventPhase, type EventRecord, type EvmAddressInfo, type EvmBlock, EvmClient, type EvmExecutedData, type EvmExitReason, EvmExplorer, type EvmLog, type EvmSigner, type EvmTransaction, type EvmTxRequest, type EvmTxSummary, type ExtrinsicDecoder, type ExtrinsicFailedData, type ExtrinsicSuccessData, type FeeClaimProofInputs, type FormatOptions, KNOWN_PRECOMPILES, type KnownPrecompileInfo, type ListingInfo, type MerkleRootUpdatedData, type MerkleRootUpdatedEvent, type MerkleTreeInfo, type MetadataUpdatedEvent, NoteBuilder, type NoteDisclosure, type NoteInput, type NoteStatusUpdate, type NullifiersSpentEvent, type NullifiersSpentEventData, OrbinumClient, type OrbinumClientConfig, OrbinumClientProvider, PRECOMPILE_ADDR, PrivacyKeyManager, type PrivacyMerkleProof, PrivacyModule, type PrivateChainLinkAddedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRemovedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRevealedEvent, type PrivateLink, type PrivateLinkDispatchExecutedEvent, type PrivateTransferArgs, type PrivateTransferInput, type PrivateTransferOutput, type PrivateTransferParams, type PrivateTransferProofInputs, type ProofVerificationFailedEvent, type ProofVerifiedEvent, type ProxyCallExecutedEvent, type PutAliasOnSaleArgs, type PutOnSaleParams, type RawBlock, type RawBlockHeader, type RawTransferInput, type RawTransferOutput, type RegisterAliasArgs, type RegisterAssetArgs, type RegisterPrivateLinkArgs, type RegisterVerificationKeyArgs, type RelayerInfo, RelayerStatusModule, type RemoveChainLinkArgs, type RemovePrivateLinkArgs, type RemoveSupportedChainArgs, type RemoveVerificationKeyArgs, type ReservedEventData, type ResolvedAlias, type ResolvedSpendVersion, type RevealPrivateLinkArgs, type RpcV2MerkleProof, type RpcV2NullifierStatus, type RpcV2PoolAssetBalance, type RpcV2PoolStats, SLIP0044_NAMESPACE, type ScanCommitment, type SelfEphWindowEntry, type SetAccountMetadataArgs, type SetActiveVersionArgs, type SetMetadataParams, type ShieldArgs, type ShieldBatchArgs, type ShieldBatchItem, type ShieldBatchParams, type ShieldOperation, type ShieldParams, type ShieldedEvent, type ShieldedEventData, type ShieldedPoolCall, type ShieldedPoolEvent, ShieldedPoolModule, ShieldedPoolPrecompile, SignatureScheme, type StatusChangeEvent, type StatusListener, SubstrateClient, type SupportedChain, type SupportedChainAddedEvent, type SupportedChainRemovedEvent, type SystemHealth, type TokenInfo, type TokenTransfer, type TransferAliasArgs, type TransferEventData, type TransferInputNote, type TransferOutputNote, type TryDecryptOptions, type TxResult, type UnsafeTxOptions, type UnshieldArgs, type UnshieldParams, type UnshieldProofInputs, type UnshieldedEvent, type UnshieldedEventData, type UnverifyAssetArgs, VaultLockedError, type VerificationKeyRegisteredEvent, type VerificationKeyRemovedEvent, type VerifyAssetArgs, type VerifyProofArgs, type VkEntry, type ZkNote, type ZkVerifierCall, type ZkVerifierCircuitVersionInfo, type ZkVerifierEvent, type ZkVerifierHistoricalVersion, ZkVerifierModule, type ZkVerifierVersionStats, type ZkVerifierVkHash, accountIdHexToSs58, addressToAccountIdHex, applyNoteStatus, bigintTo32Be, bigintTo32Le, bigintTo32LeArr, blindTag, buildDummyTransferInput, bytesToBigintLE, computeNoteCommitment, computeNullifier, computePathIndices, createNoteDisclosureKey, decodeNoteDisclosureKey, decodePrecompileCalldata, decryptJson, decryptNoteRecord, deriveMasterKeyBytes, deriveOwnerPk, deriveSelfEphSk, deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature, deriveSpendingKeyMessage, deriveStealthOwnerPk, deriveStealthSk, deriveVaultBlindKey, deriveVaultKey, deriveViewTag, deriveViewingPublicKey, deriveViewingSecretKey, encryptJson, encryptNote, ensureHexPrefix, evmAddressToAccountId, evmToImplicitSubstrate, evmToMappedAccountHex, evmToSubstrate, formatBalance, formatORB, fromBase64, fromHex, generateFeeClaimProof, generateTransferProof, generateUnshieldProof, getPrecompileLabel, hexToBigint, hexToNumber, implicitSubstrateToEvm, isEvmAddress, isImplicitEvmAccount, isSs58, isSubstrateAddress, isUnifiedAddress, leHexToBigint, mapExtrinsicArgs, mapZkEventData, normalizeEvmAddress, noteBlindTag, randomBlinding, recoverOwnerPkPoint, selectNotes, selfEphWindow, shortHash, substrateSs58ToAccountIdHex, substrateToEvm, toBase64, toHex, toTxResult, truncateMiddle, tryDecryptNote, tryDecryptNoteVerbose, vaultReplacer, vaultReviver };
+export { type AccountListing, type AccountMappedData, type AccountMappedEvent, type AccountMappingCall, type AccountMappingEvent, AccountMappingModule, AccountMappingPrecompile, type AccountMetadata, type AccountUnmappedEvent, type ActiveVersionSetEvent, type AddChainLinkArgs, type AddChainLinkParams, type AddSupportedChainArgs, type AliasFullIdentity, type AliasInfo, type AliasListedForSaleEvent, type AliasOnSaleData, type AliasRegisteredData, type AliasRegisteredEvent, type AliasReleasedEvent, type AliasSaleCancelledEvent, type AliasSoldData, type AliasSoldEvent, type AliasTransferredData, type AliasTransferredEvent, type AssetRegisteredEvent, type AssetUnverifiedEvent, type AssetVerifiedEvent, BABYJUB_SUBORDER, BN254_R, type BatchRegisterVerificationKeysArgs, type BatchVerificationKeysRegisteredEvent, type BlockInfo, type BuyAliasArgs, type Bytes32, CURRENT_CIRCUIT_VERSION, type ChainInfo, type ChainLink, type ChainLinkAddedEvent, type ChainLinkRemovedEvent, CircuitId, CircuitId as CircuitIdType, CircuitVersionResolver, type ClaimShieldedFeesParams, type ClientProviderConfig, type CommitmentsInsertedEvent, type CommitmentsInsertedEventData, type ConnectionStatus, CryptoPrecompiles, type DecodedAddChainLinkArgs, type DecodedBatchArgs, type DecodedDispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedEthereumTransactArgs, type DecodedEvmCallArgs, type DecodedPrecompile, type DecodedPrivateTransferArgs, type DecodedPutAliasForSaleArgs, type DecodedRegisterAliasArgs, type DecodedRemarkArgs, type DecodedRevealPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedSetAccountMetadataArgs, type DecodedShieldArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchOperation, type DecodedSudoArgs, type DecodedTransferAllArgs, type DecodedTransferArgs, type DecodedTransferKeepAliveArgs, type DecodedUnshieldArgs, type DecryptedMemo, type DispatchAsLinkedAccountArgs, type DispatchAsLinkedParams, type DispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DispatchError, type DispatchInfo, type DynamicBuilder, ENCRYPTED_MEMO_SIZE, EncryptedMemo, type EncryptedNoteRecord, type EndowedEventData, type EthereumExecutedData, type EventData, type EventPhase, type EventRecord, type EvmAddressInfo, type EvmBlock, EvmClient, type EvmExecutedData, type EvmExitReason, EvmExplorer, type EvmLog, type EvmSigner, type EvmTransaction, type EvmTxRequest, type EvmTxSummary, type ExtrinsicDecoder, type ExtrinsicFailedData, type ExtrinsicSuccessData, type FeeClaimProofInputs, type FormatOptions, KNOWN_PRECOMPILES, type KeyVersion, type KnownPrecompileInfo, type ListingInfo, MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES, type MerkleRootUpdatedData, type MerkleRootUpdatedEvent, type MerkleTreeInfo, type MetadataUpdatedEvent, NoteBuilder, type NoteDisclosure, type NoteInput, type NoteStatusUpdate, type NullifiersSpentEvent, type NullifiersSpentEventData, OrbinumClient, type OrbinumClientConfig, OrbinumClientProvider, PRECOMPILE_ADDR, PrivacyKeyManager, type PrivacyMerkleProof, PrivacyModule, type PrivateChainLinkAddedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRemovedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRevealedEvent, type PrivateLink, type PrivateLinkDispatchExecutedEvent, type PrivateTransferArgs, type PrivateTransferInput, type PrivateTransferOutput, type PrivateTransferParams, type PrivateTransferProofInputs, type ProofVerificationFailedEvent, type ProofVerifiedEvent, type ProxyCallExecutedEvent, type PutAliasOnSaleArgs, type PutOnSaleParams, type RawBlock, type RawBlockHeader, type RawTransferInput, type RawTransferOutput, type RegisterAliasArgs, type RegisterAssetArgs, type RegisterPrivateLinkArgs, type RegisterVerificationKeyArgs, type RelayerInfo, RelayerStatusModule, type RemoveChainLinkArgs, type RemovePrivateLinkArgs, type RemoveSupportedChainArgs, type RemoveVerificationKeyArgs, type ReservedEventData, type ResolvedAlias, type ResolvedSpendVersion, type RevealPrivateLinkArgs, type RpcV2MerkleProof, type RpcV2NullifierStatus, type RpcV2PoolAssetBalance, type RpcV2PoolStats, SLIP0044_NAMESPACE, SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT, SPENDING_KEY_WARNING, type ScanCommitment, type SelfEphWindowEntry, type SetAccountMetadataArgs, type SetActiveVersionArgs, type SetMetadataParams, type ShieldArgs, type ShieldBatchArgs, type ShieldBatchItem, type ShieldBatchParams, type ShieldOperation, type ShieldParams, type ShieldedEvent, type ShieldedEventData, type ShieldedPoolCall, type ShieldedPoolEvent, ShieldedPoolModule, ShieldedPoolPrecompile, SignatureScheme, type SpendingKeyTypedData, type StatusChangeEvent, type StatusListener, SubstrateClient, type SupportedChain, type SupportedChainAddedEvent, type SupportedChainRemovedEvent, type SystemHealth, type TokenInfo, type TokenTransfer, type TransferAliasArgs, type TransferEventData, type TransferInputNote, type TransferOutputNote, type TryDecryptOptions, type TxResult, type UnsafeTxOptions, type UnshieldArgs, type UnshieldParams, type UnshieldProofInputs, type UnshieldedEvent, type UnshieldedEventData, type UnverifyAssetArgs, VaultLockedError, type VerificationKeyRegisteredEvent, type VerificationKeyRemovedEvent, type VerifyAssetArgs, type VerifyProofArgs, type VkEntry, type ZkNote, type ZkVerifierCall, type ZkVerifierCircuitVersionInfo, type ZkVerifierEvent, type ZkVerifierHistoricalVersion, ZkVerifierModule, type ZkVerifierVersionStats, type ZkVerifierVkHash, accountIdHexToSs58, addressToAccountIdHex, applyNoteStatus, bigintTo32Be, bigintTo32Le, bigintTo32LeArr, blindTag, buildDummyTransferInput, bytesToBigintLE, computeNoteCommitment, computeNullifier, computePathIndices, createNoteDisclosureKey, decodeNoteDisclosureKey, decodePrecompileCalldata, decryptJson, decryptNoteRecord, deriveMasterKeyBytes, deriveOwnerPk, deriveSelfEphSk, deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature, deriveSpendingKeyMessage, deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2, deriveSpendingKeyTypedData, deriveStealthOwnerPk, deriveStealthSk, deriveVaultBlindKey, deriveVaultKey, deriveViewTag, deriveViewingPublicKey, deriveViewingSecretKey, encryptJson, encryptNote, ensureHexPrefix, evmAddressToAccountId, evmToImplicitSubstrate, evmToMappedAccountHex, evmToSubstrate, formatBalance, formatORB, fromBase64, fromHex, generateFeeClaimProof, generateTransferProof, generateUnshieldProof, getPrecompileLabel, hexToBigint, hexToNumber, implicitSubstrateToEvm, isEvmAddress, isImplicitEvmAccount, isSs58, isSubstrateAddress, isUnifiedAddress, leHexToBigint, mapExtrinsicArgs, mapZkEventData, normalizeEvmAddress, noteBlindTag, randomBlinding, recoverOwnerPkPoint, selectNotes, selfEphWindow, shortHash, substrateSs58ToAccountIdHex, substrateToEvm, toBase64, toHex, toTxResult, truncateMiddle, tryDecryptNote, tryDecryptNoteVerbose, vaultReplacer, vaultReviver };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -105,6 +105,18 @@ declare class SubstrateClient {
     private constructor();
     private _dynamicBuilder;
     private _extDecoder;
+    private _inflightTxCount;
+    /**
+     * `true` while any submitted transaction is still waiting for finalization.
+     * Connection managers use this to defer destroying the client — killing the
+     * WS mid-submit rejects the pending tx with "Client destroyed" even though
+     * it may still land on-chain.
+     *
+     * Only covers promise-based submits (`submit`, `submitUnsignedAndWatch`,
+     * `signAndSubmit`); observable-based `submitAndWatch` callers are not tracked.
+     */
+    get hasInflightTx(): boolean;
+    private trackTx;
     /**
      * Connects to the Orbinum node via WebSocket.
      * Throws if the node does not respond within `timeoutMs`.
@@ -285,14 +297,25 @@ declare class EvmClient {
     }): Promise<bigint>;
     /** Returns a transaction receipt by hash, or `null` if the transaction has not been mined yet. */
     getTransactionReceipt(txHash: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>;
+    /**
+     * Fetches a transaction by hash, or `null` when the node no longer knows it
+     * (never mined and evicted from the pool). Unlike `request`, a `null`
+     * result is a valid answer here, not an error.
+     */
+    getTransactionByHash(txHash: string): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null>;
     /**
      * Polls `eth_getTransactionReceipt` until the transaction is included in a block.
      *
+     * After `timeoutMs`, the tx-pool is consulted: a tx no longer known to the
+     * node is reported as dropped (safe to retry), while a tx still in the pool
+     * gets an extended grace window (up to 4× `timeoutMs`) before a "still
+     * pending" error — it may confirm later, so callers must NOT blindly retry.
+     *
      * @param txHash - The transaction hash to wait for.
      * @param intervalMs - Polling interval in milliseconds (default: 500).
      * @param timeoutMs - Maximum time to wait in milliseconds (default: 60_000).
      * @returns The transaction receipt once mined.
-     * @throws If the transaction is not mined within `timeoutMs` or if it reverted (`status == 0x0`).
+     * @throws If the transaction dropped, is still pending after the grace window, or reverted (`status == 0x0`).
      */
     waitForReceipt(txHash: string, intervalMs?: number, timeoutMs?: number): Promise<Record<string, unknown>>;
 }
@@ -1776,6 +1799,7 @@ declare class OrbinumClientProvider {
     private _reconnectTimer;
     private _stableTimer;
     private _reconnectAttempt;
+    private _probeFailures;
     private _listeners;
     /** Creates a new provider with the given configuration. Does not connect automatically — call `connect()` to initiate. */
     constructor(config: ClientProviderConfig);
@@ -1806,6 +1830,21 @@ declare class OrbinumClientProvider {
      * On failure: destroys any orphaned client and transitions to `'disconnected'`.
      */
     private attemptConnect;
+    /**
+     * Consecutive failed probes required before the client is torn down. A
+     * single missed probe is routine (throttled background tab, node busy
+     * verifying a ZK proof, transient network blip) — destroying the client on
+     * it rejects every in-flight request with "Client destroyed" even though
+     * the tx may still land on-chain.
+     */
+    private static readonly PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD;
+    /**
+     * With a tx awaiting finalization, tolerate more missed probes: an unsigned
+     * private_transfer/unshield makes the node CPU-bound on proof verification,
+     * which is exactly when probes time out — tearing down then kills the very
+     * tx being processed.
+     */
+    private static readonly PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD_INFLIGHT;
     /** Starts the periodic heartbeat loop. Replaces any existing timer. */
     private startHeartbeat;
     /** Clears the heartbeat interval timer if active. */
@@ -2318,36 +2357,152 @@ declare const BABYJUB_SUBORDER = 27360303589799094027808007181571593860768139721
  */
 declare function randomBlinding(): bigint;
 
+/**
+ * SpendingKeyRequest
+ *
+ * What the user signs to derive their Orbinum spending key, per platform.
+ *
+ * These builders produce the *request* (typed data or message string). Turning a
+ * signature into key material lives in `PrivacyKeys` — the split keeps the
+ * platform-specific presentation away from the platform-agnostic KDF.
+ *
+ * SECURITY MODEL
+ *
+ * The signature seeds the spending key, so a deterministic signature over a
+ * fixed, public string is a bearer token: any dapp the user connects to can
+ * request the same string, obtain a byte-identical signature (ECDSA personal_sign
+ * is deterministic, RFC-6979) and reconstruct the spending key, viewing key and
+ * vault key. That is the v1 flaw these builders exist to close.
+ *
+ * The defense has two independent layers:
+ *
+ *   1. Message layer (here) — bind the signature to a domain the user can see.
+ *      EVM uses EIP-712, whose domain the wallet renders. Substrate has no
+ *      EIP-712, so the warning travels inside the signed text instead. NOTE this
+ *      layer is about VISIBILITY, not impossibility: nothing stops a hostile
+ *      origin from requesting the same payload, and no wallet verifies that
+ *      `verifyingContract` matches the requesting origin.
+ *   2. Derivation layer (`PrivacyKeys`) — the HKDF `info` carries the version, so
+ *      v1 and v2 are disjoint identities even given identical signature bytes.
+ *      This is the layer that holds when layer 1 fails (e.g. a wallet that
+ *      truncates the warning text).
+ *
+ * DETERMINISM IS MANDATORY. No builder may add a nonce, timestamp or challenge:
+ * the digest must stay a pure function of (chainId, address). A signature that
+ * varies per session yields a different spending key each time, which makes
+ * already-shielded notes unspendable — surfacing as an opaque Merkle constraint
+ * failure during witness generation.
+ */
+/**
+ * EIP-712 `verifyingContract` for spending-key derivation: the shielded pool
+ * precompile, i.e. the component that actually custodies shielded funds and so
+ * the semantically correct domain anchor.
+ *
+ * WARNING: this value is part of the EIP-712 digest. Changing it changes every
+ * derived spending key and orphans every existing note. It is a protocol
+ * constant, not a config knob — which is why it is re-exported from the single
+ * `PRECOMPILE_ADDR` source rather than written out a second time.
+ */
+declare const SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT: "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000801";
+/**
+ * Shown to the user inside the wallet prompt. Wallets render EIP-712 message
+ * fields (and Substrate raw text) verbatim, so this is the one surface a hostile
+ * origin can neither suppress nor reword.
+ */
+declare const SPENDING_KEY_WARNING: string;
+/** EIP-712 payload for `eth_signTypedData_v4`. */
+interface SpendingKeyTypedData {
+    domain: {
+        name: string;
+        version: string;
+        chainId: number;
+        verifyingContract: string;
+    };
+    types: {
+        SpendingKeyDerivation: ReadonlyArray<{
+            name: string;
+            type: string;
+        }>;
+    };
+    primaryType: 'SpendingKeyDerivation';
+    message: {
+        warning: string;
+        account: string;
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * EIP-712 typed data the user signs to derive their spending key (EVM route).
+ * Pass the result to `eth_signTypedData_v4`.
+ *
+ * @param chainId Chain the identity belongs to; part of the domain separator.
+ * @param address Signer address. Lowercased so checksum casing cannot fork the
+ *                identity into two distinct keys for the same account.
+ */
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyTypedData(chainId: number, address: string): SpendingKeyTypedData;
+/**
+ * Message the user signs on signers without EIP-712 (Substrate: sr25519 via VRF,
+ * ed25519 via signRaw).
+ *
+ * Substrate wallets render the raw string, so the warning leads the text — it is
+ * the only channel a malicious extension cannot rewrite. Its protection is
+ * therefore conditional on the wallet not truncating the message; when it does,
+ * only the HKDF domain separation in `PrivacyKeys` still applies.
+ */
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2(chainId: number, address: string): string;
+/**
+ * @deprecated INSECURE — v1 derivation. Signs a fixed public string via
+ * `personal_sign`, so any dapp can request it and, because the signature is
+ * deterministic, reconstruct the user's spending key, viewing key and vault key.
+ *
+ * Retained ONLY so existing v1 notes can be swept into a v2 identity. Never call
+ * it on a connect/login path. Use {@link deriveSpendingKeyTypedData} (EVM) or
+ * {@link deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2} (Substrate) instead.
+ */
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId: number, address: string): string;
+
 /**
  * PrivacyKeys
  *
- * Pure cryptographic derivation functions for the Orbinum shielded pool identity.
- * These are protocol-level operations — independent of storage, UI, or session.
+ * Pure cryptographic derivation for the Orbinum shielded pool identity: turns a
+ * wallet signature into key material, and key material into the public values
+ * that make up a privacy address. Protocol-level only — no storage, UI or
+ * session concerns. What the user *signs* to produce that signature lives in
+ * `SpendingKeyRequest`.
+ *
+ * Full derivation chain:
  *
- * Derivation scheme (ECDH viewing key — v2):
- *   viewingSecretKey (ivsk) = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=spendingKey_bytes, info="orbinum-ivk-v1") → 32 bytes
- *   ivsk_scalar             = BigInt(ivsk_BE) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER  (clamped to [1, ∞))
- *   viewingPublicKey (ivk)  = BJJ_mul(Base8, ivsk_scalar)  →  packPoint([Ax, Ay])  → 32-byte bigint stored LE
- *   ownerPk                 = BabyJubJub Ax from (spendingKey * Base8)  → bigint
+ *   signature ──HKDF(info="orbinum-sk-{version}:{chainId}:{address}")──► masterBytes (32B)
+ *                                                                            │
+ *          ┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
+ *          ▼                                                                 ▼
+ *   spendingKey = BigInt(masterBytes) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER            vaultKey (see vault/)
+ *          │                                     = HKDF(masterBytes, "orbinum-vault-key-v1")
+ *          ├──► ownerPk = BJJ_mul(Base8, spendingKey).Ax                    (public)
+ *          │
+ *          └──► ivsk = HKDF(LE32(spendingKey), info="orbinum-ivk-v1")       (secret)
+ *                 └──► ivk = packPoint(BJJ_mul(Base8, ivsk_scalar))         (public)
  *
- * Spending key derivation (from wallet signature):
- *   message     = "orbinum-spending-key-v1\n${chainId}\n${address.toLowerCase()}"
- *   skBytes     = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sig_bytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-v1:${chainId}:${address}")
- *   spendingKey = BigInt(skBytes_as_big_endian) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER  (if 0 → 1)
+ * VERSIONING: the HKDF `info` carries the identity version, so v1 and v2 are
+ * cryptographically disjoint even given identical signature bytes. This is the
+ * layer that still separates the identities when the message-level defense fails
+ * — see the security model in `SpendingKeyRequest`.
  *
- * IMPORTANT: must reduce mod BABYJUB_SUBORDER (not BN254_R). circomlib's BabyPbk uses
- * Num2Bits(253) which asserts spending_key < 2^253. BABYJUB_SUBORDER < 2^252 satisfies
- * this. BN254_R ≈ 2^254.8 does not — ~34% of values would exceed 2^253 at runtime.
+ * MODULUS: reduce mod BABYJUB_SUBORDER, never BN254_R. circomlib's BabyPbk uses
+ * Num2Bits(253), asserting spending_key < 2^253. BABYJUB_SUBORDER < 2^252
+ * satisfies it; BN254_R ≈ 2^254.8 does not — ~34% of values would fail at runtime.
  */
+/** Identity version. `v1` is the legacy personal_sign scheme, kept for sweeping only. */
+type KeyVersion = 'v1' | 'v2';
 /**
- * Returns the message string the user must sign with their wallet to derive
- * a deterministic Orbinum spending key.
+ * Shortest signature any supported signer produces: sr25519 VRF output is 32
+ * bytes, ed25519 is 64, ECDSA `personal_sign` is 65. Anything shorter is not a
+ * signature, so it must never reach the KDF.
  */
-declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId: number, address: string): string;
+declare const MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 32;
 /**
  * Derives the 32-byte master key bytes from a wallet signature.
  *
- * masterBytes = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-v1:{chainId}:{address}")
+ * masterBytes = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-{version}:{chainId}:{address}")
  *
  * These bytes are the stable root for ALL derived keys:
  *   - spendingKey (circuit scalar) = BigInt(masterBytes) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER
@@ -2357,12 +2512,19 @@ declare function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId: number, address: string): str
  * Separating masterBytes from the circuit scalar means the viewingSecretKey and
  * vault key are STABLE across any future change to the modulus — they never
  * depend on which prime field the circuit uses.
+ *
+ * The version is folded into the HKDF `info`, so v1 and v2 stay disjoint even if
+ * the underlying signature bytes were somehow identical.
+ *
+ * @param version Defaults to 'v2'. Pass 'v1' only from the legacy sweep flow.
+ * @throws If the signature is not valid hex, or carries less entropy than the
+ *         shortest real signing scheme (see {@link MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES}).
  */
-declare function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string): Promise<Uint8Array>;
+declare function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string, version?: KeyVersion): Promise<Uint8Array>;
 /**
  * Derives an Orbinum spending key from a wallet signature.
  *
- * Uses HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-v1:{chainId}:{address}")
+ * Uses HKDF-SHA256(ikm=sigBytes, salt=empty, info="orbinum-sk-{version}:{chainId}:{address}")
  * and reduces the resulting 32-byte value modulo BABYJUB_SUBORDER.
  *
  * IMPORTANT: viewingSecretKey and vaultKey must be derived from masterBytes (via
@@ -2372,9 +2534,12 @@ declare function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, add
  * @param signatureHex  0x-prefixed or bare hex of the wallet signature.
  * @param chainId       Chain ID used when building the signing message.
  * @param address       Signer address (EVM or SS58) used in the signing message.
+ * @param version       Defaults to 'v2'. Pass 'v1' only from the legacy sweep flow.
  * @returns bigint in [1, BABYJUB_SUBORDER)
+ * @throws If the signature is not valid hex or is shorter than
+ *         {@link MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES} — see `deriveMasterKeyBytes`.
  */
-declare function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string): Promise<bigint>;
+declare function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex: string, chainId: number, address: string, version?: KeyVersion): Promise<bigint>;
 /**
  * Derive a 32-byte viewing secret key (ivsk) from the spending key.
  *   ivsk = HKDF-SHA256(ikm=bigintTo32Le(spendingKey), info="orbinum-ivk-v1")
@@ -4269,4 +4434,4 @@ interface ExtrinsicFailedData {
     dispatch_info: DispatchInfo;
 }
 
-export { type AccountListing, type AccountMappedData, type AccountMappedEvent, type AccountMappingCall, type AccountMappingEvent, AccountMappingModule, AccountMappingPrecompile, type AccountMetadata, type AccountUnmappedEvent, type ActiveVersionSetEvent, type AddChainLinkArgs, type AddChainLinkParams, type AddSupportedChainArgs, type AliasFullIdentity, type AliasInfo, type AliasListedForSaleEvent, type AliasOnSaleData, type AliasRegisteredData, type AliasRegisteredEvent, type AliasReleasedEvent, type AliasSaleCancelledEvent, type AliasSoldData, type AliasSoldEvent, type AliasTransferredData, type AliasTransferredEvent, type AssetRegisteredEvent, type AssetUnverifiedEvent, type AssetVerifiedEvent, BABYJUB_SUBORDER, BN254_R, type BatchRegisterVerificationKeysArgs, type BatchVerificationKeysRegisteredEvent, type BlockInfo, type BuyAliasArgs, type Bytes32, CURRENT_CIRCUIT_VERSION, type ChainInfo, type ChainLink, type ChainLinkAddedEvent, type ChainLinkRemovedEvent, CircuitId, CircuitId as CircuitIdType, CircuitVersionResolver, type ClaimShieldedFeesParams, type ClientProviderConfig, type CommitmentsInsertedEvent, type CommitmentsInsertedEventData, type ConnectionStatus, CryptoPrecompiles, type DecodedAddChainLinkArgs, type DecodedBatchArgs, type DecodedDispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedEthereumTransactArgs, type DecodedEvmCallArgs, type DecodedPrecompile, type DecodedPrivateTransferArgs, type DecodedPutAliasForSaleArgs, type DecodedRegisterAliasArgs, type DecodedRemarkArgs, type DecodedRevealPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedSetAccountMetadataArgs, type DecodedShieldArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchOperation, type DecodedSudoArgs, type DecodedTransferAllArgs, type DecodedTransferArgs, type DecodedTransferKeepAliveArgs, type DecodedUnshieldArgs, type DecryptedMemo, type DispatchAsLinkedAccountArgs, type DispatchAsLinkedParams, type DispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DispatchError, type DispatchInfo, type DynamicBuilder, ENCRYPTED_MEMO_SIZE, EncryptedMemo, type EncryptedNoteRecord, type EndowedEventData, type EthereumExecutedData, type EventData, type EventPhase, type EventRecord, type EvmAddressInfo, type EvmBlock, EvmClient, type EvmExecutedData, type EvmExitReason, EvmExplorer, type EvmLog, type EvmSigner, type EvmTransaction, type EvmTxRequest, type EvmTxSummary, type ExtrinsicDecoder, type ExtrinsicFailedData, type ExtrinsicSuccessData, type FeeClaimProofInputs, type FormatOptions, KNOWN_PRECOMPILES, type KnownPrecompileInfo, type ListingInfo, type MerkleRootUpdatedData, type MerkleRootUpdatedEvent, type MerkleTreeInfo, type MetadataUpdatedEvent, NoteBuilder, type NoteDisclosure, type NoteInput, type NoteStatusUpdate, type NullifiersSpentEvent, type NullifiersSpentEventData, OrbinumClient, type OrbinumClientConfig, OrbinumClientProvider, PRECOMPILE_ADDR, PrivacyKeyManager, type PrivacyMerkleProof, PrivacyModule, type PrivateChainLinkAddedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRemovedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRevealedEvent, type PrivateLink, type PrivateLinkDispatchExecutedEvent, type PrivateTransferArgs, type PrivateTransferInput, type PrivateTransferOutput, type PrivateTransferParams, type PrivateTransferProofInputs, type ProofVerificationFailedEvent, type ProofVerifiedEvent, type ProxyCallExecutedEvent, type PutAliasOnSaleArgs, type PutOnSaleParams, type RawBlock, type RawBlockHeader, type RawTransferInput, type RawTransferOutput, type RegisterAliasArgs, type RegisterAssetArgs, type RegisterPrivateLinkArgs, type RegisterVerificationKeyArgs, type RelayerInfo, RelayerStatusModule, type RemoveChainLinkArgs, type RemovePrivateLinkArgs, type RemoveSupportedChainArgs, type RemoveVerificationKeyArgs, type ReservedEventData, type ResolvedAlias, type ResolvedSpendVersion, type RevealPrivateLinkArgs, type RpcV2MerkleProof, type RpcV2NullifierStatus, type RpcV2PoolAssetBalance, type RpcV2PoolStats, SLIP0044_NAMESPACE, type ScanCommitment, type SelfEphWindowEntry, type SetAccountMetadataArgs, type SetActiveVersionArgs, type SetMetadataParams, type ShieldArgs, type ShieldBatchArgs, type ShieldBatchItem, type ShieldBatchParams, type ShieldOperation, type ShieldParams, type ShieldedEvent, type ShieldedEventData, type ShieldedPoolCall, type ShieldedPoolEvent, ShieldedPoolModule, ShieldedPoolPrecompile, SignatureScheme, type StatusChangeEvent, type StatusListener, SubstrateClient, type SupportedChain, type SupportedChainAddedEvent, type SupportedChainRemovedEvent, type SystemHealth, type TokenInfo, type TokenTransfer, type TransferAliasArgs, type TransferEventData, type TransferInputNote, type TransferOutputNote, type TryDecryptOptions, type TxResult, type UnsafeTxOptions, type UnshieldArgs, type UnshieldParams, type UnshieldProofInputs, type UnshieldedEvent, type UnshieldedEventData, type UnverifyAssetArgs, VaultLockedError, type VerificationKeyRegisteredEvent, type VerificationKeyRemovedEvent, type VerifyAssetArgs, type VerifyProofArgs, type VkEntry, type ZkNote, type ZkVerifierCall, type ZkVerifierCircuitVersionInfo, type ZkVerifierEvent, type ZkVerifierHistoricalVersion, ZkVerifierModule, type ZkVerifierVersionStats, type ZkVerifierVkHash, accountIdHexToSs58, addressToAccountIdHex, applyNoteStatus, bigintTo32Be, bigintTo32Le, bigintTo32LeArr, blindTag, buildDummyTransferInput, bytesToBigintLE, computeNoteCommitment, computeNullifier, computePathIndices, createNoteDisclosureKey, decodeNoteDisclosureKey, decodePrecompileCalldata, decryptJson, decryptNoteRecord, deriveMasterKeyBytes, deriveOwnerPk, deriveSelfEphSk, deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature, deriveSpendingKeyMessage, deriveStealthOwnerPk, deriveStealthSk, deriveVaultBlindKey, deriveVaultKey, deriveViewTag, deriveViewingPublicKey, deriveViewingSecretKey, encryptJson, encryptNote, ensureHexPrefix, evmAddressToAccountId, evmToImplicitSubstrate, evmToMappedAccountHex, evmToSubstrate, formatBalance, formatORB, fromBase64, fromHex, generateFeeClaimProof, generateTransferProof, generateUnshieldProof, getPrecompileLabel, hexToBigint, hexToNumber, implicitSubstrateToEvm, isEvmAddress, isImplicitEvmAccount, isSs58, isSubstrateAddress, isUnifiedAddress, leHexToBigint, mapExtrinsicArgs, mapZkEventData, normalizeEvmAddress, noteBlindTag, randomBlinding, recoverOwnerPkPoint, selectNotes, selfEphWindow, shortHash, substrateSs58ToAccountIdHex, substrateToEvm, toBase64, toHex, toTxResult, truncateMiddle, tryDecryptNote, tryDecryptNoteVerbose, vaultReplacer, vaultReviver };
+export { type AccountListing, type AccountMappedData, type AccountMappedEvent, type AccountMappingCall, type AccountMappingEvent, AccountMappingModule, AccountMappingPrecompile, type AccountMetadata, type AccountUnmappedEvent, type ActiveVersionSetEvent, type AddChainLinkArgs, type AddChainLinkParams, type AddSupportedChainArgs, type AliasFullIdentity, type AliasInfo, type AliasListedForSaleEvent, type AliasOnSaleData, type AliasRegisteredData, type AliasRegisteredEvent, type AliasReleasedEvent, type AliasSaleCancelledEvent, type AliasSoldData, type AliasSoldEvent, type AliasTransferredData, type AliasTransferredEvent, type AssetRegisteredEvent, type AssetUnverifiedEvent, type AssetVerifiedEvent, BABYJUB_SUBORDER, BN254_R, type BatchRegisterVerificationKeysArgs, type BatchVerificationKeysRegisteredEvent, type BlockInfo, type BuyAliasArgs, type Bytes32, CURRENT_CIRCUIT_VERSION, type ChainInfo, type ChainLink, type ChainLinkAddedEvent, type ChainLinkRemovedEvent, CircuitId, CircuitId as CircuitIdType, CircuitVersionResolver, type ClaimShieldedFeesParams, type ClientProviderConfig, type CommitmentsInsertedEvent, type CommitmentsInsertedEventData, type ConnectionStatus, CryptoPrecompiles, type DecodedAddChainLinkArgs, type DecodedBatchArgs, type DecodedDispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedEthereumTransactArgs, type DecodedEvmCallArgs, type DecodedPrecompile, type DecodedPrivateTransferArgs, type DecodedPutAliasForSaleArgs, type DecodedRegisterAliasArgs, type DecodedRemarkArgs, type DecodedRevealPrivateLinkArgs, type DecodedSetAccountMetadataArgs, type DecodedShieldArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchArgs, type DecodedShieldBatchOperation, type DecodedSudoArgs, type DecodedTransferAllArgs, type DecodedTransferArgs, type DecodedTransferKeepAliveArgs, type DecodedUnshieldArgs, type DecryptedMemo, type DispatchAsLinkedAccountArgs, type DispatchAsLinkedParams, type DispatchAsPrivateLinkArgs, type DispatchError, type DispatchInfo, type DynamicBuilder, ENCRYPTED_MEMO_SIZE, EncryptedMemo, type EncryptedNoteRecord, type EndowedEventData, type EthereumExecutedData, type EventData, type EventPhase, type EventRecord, type EvmAddressInfo, type EvmBlock, EvmClient, type EvmExecutedData, type EvmExitReason, EvmExplorer, type EvmLog, type EvmSigner, type EvmTransaction, type EvmTxRequest, type EvmTxSummary, type ExtrinsicDecoder, type ExtrinsicFailedData, type ExtrinsicSuccessData, type FeeClaimProofInputs, type FormatOptions, KNOWN_PRECOMPILES, type KeyVersion, type KnownPrecompileInfo, type ListingInfo, MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES, type MerkleRootUpdatedData, type MerkleRootUpdatedEvent, type MerkleTreeInfo, type MetadataUpdatedEvent, NoteBuilder, type NoteDisclosure, type NoteInput, type NoteStatusUpdate, type NullifiersSpentEvent, type NullifiersSpentEventData, OrbinumClient, type OrbinumClientConfig, OrbinumClientProvider, PRECOMPILE_ADDR, PrivacyKeyManager, type PrivacyMerkleProof, PrivacyModule, type PrivateChainLinkAddedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRemovedEvent, type PrivateChainLinkRevealedEvent, type PrivateLink, type PrivateLinkDispatchExecutedEvent, type PrivateTransferArgs, type PrivateTransferInput, type PrivateTransferOutput, type PrivateTransferParams, type PrivateTransferProofInputs, type ProofVerificationFailedEvent, type ProofVerifiedEvent, type ProxyCallExecutedEvent, type PutAliasOnSaleArgs, type PutOnSaleParams, type RawBlock, type RawBlockHeader, type RawTransferInput, type RawTransferOutput, type RegisterAliasArgs, type RegisterAssetArgs, type RegisterPrivateLinkArgs, type RegisterVerificationKeyArgs, type RelayerInfo, RelayerStatusModule, type RemoveChainLinkArgs, type RemovePrivateLinkArgs, type RemoveSupportedChainArgs, type RemoveVerificationKeyArgs, type ReservedEventData, type ResolvedAlias, type ResolvedSpendVersion, type RevealPrivateLinkArgs, type RpcV2MerkleProof, type RpcV2NullifierStatus, type RpcV2PoolAssetBalance, type RpcV2PoolStats, SLIP0044_NAMESPACE, SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT, SPENDING_KEY_WARNING, type ScanCommitment, type SelfEphWindowEntry, type SetAccountMetadataArgs, type SetActiveVersionArgs, type SetMetadataParams, type ShieldArgs, type ShieldBatchArgs, type ShieldBatchItem, type ShieldBatchParams, type ShieldOperation, type ShieldParams, type ShieldedEvent, type ShieldedEventData, type ShieldedPoolCall, type ShieldedPoolEvent, ShieldedPoolModule, ShieldedPoolPrecompile, SignatureScheme, type SpendingKeyTypedData, type StatusChangeEvent, type StatusListener, SubstrateClient, type SupportedChain, type SupportedChainAddedEvent, type SupportedChainRemovedEvent, type SystemHealth, type TokenInfo, type TokenTransfer, type TransferAliasArgs, type TransferEventData, type TransferInputNote, type TransferOutputNote, type TryDecryptOptions, type TxResult, type UnsafeTxOptions, type UnshieldArgs, type UnshieldParams, type UnshieldProofInputs, type UnshieldedEvent, type UnshieldedEventData, type UnverifyAssetArgs, VaultLockedError, type VerificationKeyRegisteredEvent, type VerificationKeyRemovedEvent, type VerifyAssetArgs, type VerifyProofArgs, type VkEntry, type ZkNote, type ZkVerifierCall, type ZkVerifierCircuitVersionInfo, type ZkVerifierEvent, type ZkVerifierHistoricalVersion, ZkVerifierModule, type ZkVerifierVersionStats, type ZkVerifierVkHash, accountIdHexToSs58, addressToAccountIdHex, applyNoteStatus, bigintTo32Be, bigintTo32Le, bigintTo32LeArr, blindTag, buildDummyTransferInput, bytesToBigintLE, computeNoteCommitment, computeNullifier, computePathIndices, createNoteDisclosureKey, decodeNoteDisclosureKey, decodePrecompileCalldata, decryptJson, decryptNoteRecord, deriveMasterKeyBytes, deriveOwnerPk, deriveSelfEphSk, deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature, deriveSpendingKeyMessage, deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2, deriveSpendingKeyTypedData, deriveStealthOwnerPk, deriveStealthSk, deriveVaultBlindKey, deriveVaultKey, deriveViewTag, deriveViewingPublicKey, deriveViewingSecretKey, encryptJson, encryptNote, ensureHexPrefix, evmAddressToAccountId, evmToImplicitSubstrate, evmToMappedAccountHex, evmToSubstrate, formatBalance, formatORB, fromBase64, fromHex, generateFeeClaimProof, generateTransferProof, generateUnshieldProof, getPrecompileLabel, hexToBigint, hexToNumber, implicitSubstrateToEvm, isEvmAddress, isImplicitEvmAccount, isSs58, isSubstrateAddress, isUnifiedAddress, leHexToBigint, mapExtrinsicArgs, mapZkEventData, normalizeEvmAddress, noteBlindTag, randomBlinding, recoverOwnerPkPoint, selectNotes, selfEphWindow, shortHash, substrateSs58ToAccountIdHex, substrateToEvm, toBase64, toHex, toTxResult, truncateMiddle, tryDecryptNote, tryDecryptNoteVerbose, vaultReplacer, vaultReviver };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ __export(index_exports, {
   EvmExplorer: () => EvmExplorer,
   KNOWN_PRECOMPILES: () => KNOWN_PRECOMPILES,
   Keccak256: () => import_substrate_bindings3.Keccak256,
+  MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES: () => MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES,
   NoteBuilder: () => NoteBuilder,
   OrbinumClient: () => OrbinumClient,
   OrbinumClientProvider: () => OrbinumClientProvider,
@@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ __export(index_exports, {
   PrivacyModule: () => PrivacyModule,
   RelayerStatusModule: () => RelayerStatusModule,
   SLIP0044_NAMESPACE: () => SLIP0044_NAMESPACE,
+  SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT: () => SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT,
+  SPENDING_KEY_WARNING: () => SPENDING_KEY_WARNING,
   ShieldedPoolModule: () => ShieldedPoolModule,
   ShieldedPoolPrecompile: () => ShieldedPoolPrecompile,
   SignatureScheme: () => SignatureScheme,
@@ -77,6 +80,8 @@ __export(index_exports, {
   deriveSelfEphSk: () => deriveSelfEphSk,
   deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature: () => deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature,
   deriveSpendingKeyMessage: () => deriveSpendingKeyMessage,
+  deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2: () => deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2,
+  deriveSpendingKeyTypedData: () => deriveSpendingKeyTypedData,
   deriveStealthOwnerPk: () => deriveStealthOwnerPk,
   deriveStealthSk: () => deriveStealthSk,
   deriveVaultBlindKey: () => deriveVaultBlindKey,
@@ -225,6 +230,27 @@ var SubstrateClient = class _SubstrateClient {
   _httpUrl;
   _dynamicBuilder = null;
   _extDecoder = null;
+  _inflightTxCount = 0;
+  /**
+   * `true` while any submitted transaction is still waiting for finalization.
+   * Connection managers use this to defer destroying the client — killing the
+   * WS mid-submit rejects the pending tx with "Client destroyed" even though
+   * it may still land on-chain.
+   *
+   * Only covers promise-based submits (`submit`, `submitUnsignedAndWatch`,
+   * `signAndSubmit`); observable-based `submitAndWatch` callers are not tracked.
+   */
+  get hasInflightTx() {
+    return this._inflightTxCount > 0;
+  }
+  async trackTx(p) {
+    this._inflightTxCount++;
+    try {
+      return await p;
+    } finally {
+      this._inflightTxCount--;
+    }
+  }
   /**
    * Connects to the Orbinum node via WebSocket.
    * Throws if the node does not respond within `timeoutMs`.
@@ -437,7 +463,7 @@ var SubstrateClient = class _SubstrateClient {
    * Submits a pre-signed extrinsic (hex string) and waits for finalization.
    */
   async submit(signedHex) {
-    return this._papi.submit(import_polkadot_api.Binary.fromHex(signedHex));
+    return this.trackTx(this._papi.submit(import_polkadot_api.Binary.fromHex(signedHex)));
   }
   /**
    * Submits a pre-signed extrinsic and returns an Observable of tx lifecycle events.
@@ -452,14 +478,14 @@ var SubstrateClient = class _SubstrateClient {
    * The bare tx bytes are produced by `tx.getBareTx()` from polkadot-api.
    */
   async submitUnsignedAndWatch(bareTx) {
-    return this._papi.submit(bareTx);
+    return this.trackTx(this._papi.submit(bareTx));
   }
   /**
    * Convenience: wrap raw call bytes and sign+submit in one step.
    */
   async signAndSubmit(callData, signer) {
     const tx = await this.txFromCallData(callData);
-    return tx.signAndSubmit(signer);
+    return this.trackTx(tx.signAndSubmit(signer));
   }
   /** Closes the WebSocket connection. */
   destroy() {
@@ -716,17 +742,46 @@ var EvmClient = class {
     }
     return json.result ?? null;
   }
+  /**
+   * Fetches a transaction by hash, or `null` when the node no longer knows it
+   * (never mined and evicted from the pool). Unlike `request`, a `null`
+   * result is a valid answer here, not an error.
+   */
+  async getTransactionByHash(txHash) {
+    const res = await postJsonWithRetry(
+      this.rpcUrl,
+      JSON.stringify({
+        id: 1,
+        jsonrpc: "2.0",
+        method: "eth_getTransactionByHash",
+        params: [txHash]
+      })
+    );
+    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`EVM HTTP ${res.status}: ${res.statusText}`);
+    const json = await res.json();
+    if (json.error) {
+      throw new Error(`EVM RPC [${json.error.code}]: ${json.error.message}`);
+    }
+    return json.result ?? null;
+  }
   /**
    * Polls `eth_getTransactionReceipt` until the transaction is included in a block.
    *
+   * After `timeoutMs`, the tx-pool is consulted: a tx no longer known to the
+   * node is reported as dropped (safe to retry), while a tx still in the pool
+   * gets an extended grace window (up to 4× `timeoutMs`) before a "still
+   * pending" error — it may confirm later, so callers must NOT blindly retry.
+   *
    * @param txHash - The transaction hash to wait for.
    * @param intervalMs - Polling interval in milliseconds (default: 500).
    * @param timeoutMs - Maximum time to wait in milliseconds (default: 60_000).
    * @returns The transaction receipt once mined.
-   * @throws If the transaction is not mined within `timeoutMs` or if it reverted (`status == 0x0`).
+   * @throws If the transaction dropped, is still pending after the grace window, or reverted (`status == 0x0`).
    */
   async waitForReceipt(txHash, intervalMs = 500, timeoutMs = 6e4) {
-    const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+    const start = Date.now();
+    const hardDeadline = start + timeoutMs * 4;
+    let deadline = start + timeoutMs;
     while (Date.now() < deadline) {
       const receipt = await this.getTransactionReceipt(txHash);
       if (receipt !== null) {
@@ -737,10 +792,7 @@ var EvmClient = class {
           if (!revertDetail) {
             try {
               const blockParam = receipt["blockNumber"] ?? "latest";
-              const rawTx = await this.request(
-                "eth_getTransactionByHash",
-                [txHash]
-              ).catch(() => null);
+              const rawTx = await this.getTransactionByHash(txHash).catch(() => null);
               if (rawTx) {
                 const calldata = rawTx["input"] ?? rawTx["data"];
                 if (calldata) {
@@ -763,8 +815,19 @@ var EvmClient = class {
         return receipt;
       }
       await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, intervalMs));
+      if (Date.now() >= deadline && Date.now() < hardDeadline) {
+        const known = await this.getTransactionByHash(txHash).catch(() => void 0);
+        if (known === null) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Transaction dropped from the tx pool (not mined within ${Date.now() - start}ms): ${txHash}`
+          );
+        }
+        deadline = Math.min(deadline + timeoutMs, hardDeadline);
+      }
     }
-    throw new Error(`Transaction not mined within ${timeoutMs}ms: ${txHash}`);
+    throw new Error(
+      `Transaction still pending after ${Date.now() - start}ms: ${txHash} \u2014 it may still confirm; check the hash on the explorer before retrying`
+    );
   }
 };
 
@@ -3368,7 +3431,7 @@ var DEFAULT_HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT_MS = 4e3;
 var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS = 3e3;
 var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS = 3e4;
 var DEFAULT_STABLE_AFTER_MS = 1e4;
-var OrbinumClientProvider = class {
+var OrbinumClientProvider = class _OrbinumClientProvider {
   config;
   connectTimeoutMs;
   heartbeatIntervalMs;
@@ -3385,6 +3448,7 @@ var OrbinumClientProvider = class {
   _reconnectTimer = null;
   _stableTimer = null;
   _reconnectAttempt = 0;
+  _probeFailures = 0;
   // ─── Events ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   _listeners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   /** Creates a new provider with the given configuration. Does not connect automatically — call `connect()` to initiate. */
@@ -3517,13 +3581,36 @@ var OrbinumClientProvider = class {
     }
   }
   // ─── Heartbeat ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  /**
+   * Consecutive failed probes required before the client is torn down. A
+   * single missed probe is routine (throttled background tab, node busy
+   * verifying a ZK proof, transient network blip) — destroying the client on
+   * it rejects every in-flight request with "Client destroyed" even though
+   * the tx may still land on-chain.
+   */
+  static PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD = 2;
+  /**
+   * With a tx awaiting finalization, tolerate more missed probes: an unsigned
+   * private_transfer/unshield makes the node CPU-bound on proof verification,
+   * which is exactly when probes time out — tearing down then kills the very
+   * tx being processed.
+   */
+  static PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD_INFLIGHT = 6;
   /** Starts the periodic heartbeat loop. Replaces any existing timer. */
   startHeartbeat() {
     this.stopHeartbeat();
+    this._probeFailures = 0;
     this._heartbeatTimer = setInterval(async () => {
       if (this._status !== "connected" || !this._orbinumClient) return;
       const alive = await this.probe();
-      if (!alive && this._status === "connected") {
+      if (this._status !== "connected") return;
+      if (alive) {
+        this._probeFailures = 0;
+        return;
+      }
+      this._probeFailures++;
+      const threshold = this._orbinumClient?.substrate.hasInflightTx ? _OrbinumClientProvider.PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD_INFLIGHT : _OrbinumClientProvider.PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD;
+      if (this._probeFailures >= threshold) {
         this.setStatus("disconnected", "Node is unreachable");
         this.teardownClient();
         this.scheduleReconnect();
@@ -4119,23 +4206,66 @@ function randomBlinding() {
   return n === 0n ? 1n : n % BN254_R;
 }
 
+// src/privacy-keys/SpendingKeyRequest.ts
+var SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT = PRECOMPILE_ADDR.SHIELDED_POOL;
+var SPENDING_KEY_WARNING = "Signing this grants full control of your Orbinum private funds. Only sign on the official Orbinum app.";
+function deriveSpendingKeyTypedData(chainId, address) {
+  return {
+    domain: {
+      name: "Orbinum Shielded Pool",
+      version: "2",
+      chainId,
+      verifyingContract: SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT
+    },
+    types: {
+      SpendingKeyDerivation: [
+        { name: "warning", type: "string" },
+        { name: "account", type: "address" }
+      ]
+    },
+    primaryType: "SpendingKeyDerivation",
+    message: {
+      warning: SPENDING_KEY_WARNING,
+      account: address.toLowerCase()
+    }
+  };
+}
+function deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2(chainId, address) {
+  return `\u26A0 ${SPENDING_KEY_WARNING}
+
+orbinum-spending-key-v2
+${chainId}
+${address.toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId, address) {
+  return `orbinum-spending-key-v1
+${chainId}
+${address.toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+
 // src/privacy-keys/PrivacyKeys.ts
 var import_hkdf2 = require("@noble/hashes/hkdf.js");
 var import_sha24 = require("@noble/hashes/sha2.js");
 var import_baby_jubjub6 = require("@zk-kit/baby-jubjub");
 var IVK_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode("orbinum-ivk-v1");
-function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId, address) {
-  return `orbinum-spending-key-v1
-${chainId}
-${address.toLowerCase()}`;
+var MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 32;
+function assertUsableSignature(sigBytes) {
+  if (sigBytes.length < MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Cannot derive a spending key: signature is ${sigBytes.length} bytes, expected at least ${MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES}. The wallet did not return a signature.`
+    );
+  }
 }
-async function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address) {
+async function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address, version = "v2") {
   const sigBytes = fromHex(signatureHex);
-  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`orbinum-sk-v1:${chainId}:${address.toLowerCase()}`);
+  assertUsableSignature(sigBytes);
+  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(
+    `orbinum-sk-${version}:${chainId}:${address.toLowerCase()}`
+  );
   return (0, import_hkdf2.hkdf)(import_sha24.sha256, sigBytes, new Uint8Array(0), info, 32);
 }
-async function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex, chainId, address) {
-  const masterBytes = await deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address);
+async function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex, chainId, address, version = "v2") {
+  const masterBytes = await deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address, version);
   const skBigint = BigInt(toHex(masterBytes)) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER;
   return skBigint === 0n ? 1n : skBigint;
 }
@@ -5352,6 +5482,7 @@ var import_polkadot_api4 = require("polkadot-api");
   EvmExplorer,
   KNOWN_PRECOMPILES,
   Keccak256,
+  MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES,
   NoteBuilder,
   OrbinumClient,
   OrbinumClientProvider,
@@ -5360,6 +5491,8 @@ var import_polkadot_api4 = require("polkadot-api");
   PrivacyModule,
   RelayerStatusModule,
   SLIP0044_NAMESPACE,
+  SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT,
+  SPENDING_KEY_WARNING,
   ShieldedPoolModule,
   ShieldedPoolPrecompile,
   SignatureScheme,
@@ -5392,6 +5525,8 @@ var import_polkadot_api4 = require("polkadot-api");
   deriveSelfEphSk,
   deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature,
   deriveSpendingKeyMessage,
+  deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2,
+  deriveSpendingKeyTypedData,
   deriveStealthOwnerPk,
   deriveStealthSk,
   deriveVaultBlindKey,

package/dist/index.mjs

@@ -90,6 +90,27 @@ var SubstrateClient = class _SubstrateClient {
   _httpUrl;
   _dynamicBuilder = null;
   _extDecoder = null;
+  _inflightTxCount = 0;
+  /**
+   * `true` while any submitted transaction is still waiting for finalization.
+   * Connection managers use this to defer destroying the client — killing the
+   * WS mid-submit rejects the pending tx with "Client destroyed" even though
+   * it may still land on-chain.
+   *
+   * Only covers promise-based submits (`submit`, `submitUnsignedAndWatch`,
+   * `signAndSubmit`); observable-based `submitAndWatch` callers are not tracked.
+   */
+  get hasInflightTx() {
+    return this._inflightTxCount > 0;
+  }
+  async trackTx(p) {
+    this._inflightTxCount++;
+    try {
+      return await p;
+    } finally {
+      this._inflightTxCount--;
+    }
+  }
   /**
    * Connects to the Orbinum node via WebSocket.
    * Throws if the node does not respond within `timeoutMs`.
@@ -302,7 +323,7 @@ var SubstrateClient = class _SubstrateClient {
    * Submits a pre-signed extrinsic (hex string) and waits for finalization.
    */
   async submit(signedHex) {
-    return this._papi.submit(Binary.fromHex(signedHex));
+    return this.trackTx(this._papi.submit(Binary.fromHex(signedHex)));
   }
   /**
    * Submits a pre-signed extrinsic and returns an Observable of tx lifecycle events.
@@ -317,14 +338,14 @@ var SubstrateClient = class _SubstrateClient {
    * The bare tx bytes are produced by `tx.getBareTx()` from polkadot-api.
    */
   async submitUnsignedAndWatch(bareTx) {
-    return this._papi.submit(bareTx);
+    return this.trackTx(this._papi.submit(bareTx));
   }
   /**
    * Convenience: wrap raw call bytes and sign+submit in one step.
    */
   async signAndSubmit(callData, signer) {
     const tx = await this.txFromCallData(callData);
-    return tx.signAndSubmit(signer);
+    return this.trackTx(tx.signAndSubmit(signer));
   }
   /** Closes the WebSocket connection. */
   destroy() {
@@ -581,17 +602,46 @@ var EvmClient = class {
     }
     return json.result ?? null;
   }
+  /**
+   * Fetches a transaction by hash, or `null` when the node no longer knows it
+   * (never mined and evicted from the pool). Unlike `request`, a `null`
+   * result is a valid answer here, not an error.
+   */
+  async getTransactionByHash(txHash) {
+    const res = await postJsonWithRetry(
+      this.rpcUrl,
+      JSON.stringify({
+        id: 1,
+        jsonrpc: "2.0",
+        method: "eth_getTransactionByHash",
+        params: [txHash]
+      })
+    );
+    if (!res.ok) throw new Error(`EVM HTTP ${res.status}: ${res.statusText}`);
+    const json = await res.json();
+    if (json.error) {
+      throw new Error(`EVM RPC [${json.error.code}]: ${json.error.message}`);
+    }
+    return json.result ?? null;
+  }
   /**
    * Polls `eth_getTransactionReceipt` until the transaction is included in a block.
    *
+   * After `timeoutMs`, the tx-pool is consulted: a tx no longer known to the
+   * node is reported as dropped (safe to retry), while a tx still in the pool
+   * gets an extended grace window (up to 4× `timeoutMs`) before a "still
+   * pending" error — it may confirm later, so callers must NOT blindly retry.
+   *
    * @param txHash - The transaction hash to wait for.
    * @param intervalMs - Polling interval in milliseconds (default: 500).
    * @param timeoutMs - Maximum time to wait in milliseconds (default: 60_000).
    * @returns The transaction receipt once mined.
-   * @throws If the transaction is not mined within `timeoutMs` or if it reverted (`status == 0x0`).
+   * @throws If the transaction dropped, is still pending after the grace window, or reverted (`status == 0x0`).
    */
   async waitForReceipt(txHash, intervalMs = 500, timeoutMs = 6e4) {
-    const deadline = Date.now() + timeoutMs;
+    const start = Date.now();
+    const hardDeadline = start + timeoutMs * 4;
+    let deadline = start + timeoutMs;
     while (Date.now() < deadline) {
       const receipt = await this.getTransactionReceipt(txHash);
       if (receipt !== null) {
@@ -602,10 +652,7 @@ var EvmClient = class {
           if (!revertDetail) {
             try {
               const blockParam = receipt["blockNumber"] ?? "latest";
-              const rawTx = await this.request(
-                "eth_getTransactionByHash",
-                [txHash]
-              ).catch(() => null);
+              const rawTx = await this.getTransactionByHash(txHash).catch(() => null);
               if (rawTx) {
                 const calldata = rawTx["input"] ?? rawTx["data"];
                 if (calldata) {
@@ -628,8 +675,19 @@ var EvmClient = class {
         return receipt;
       }
       await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, intervalMs));
+      if (Date.now() >= deadline && Date.now() < hardDeadline) {
+        const known = await this.getTransactionByHash(txHash).catch(() => void 0);
+        if (known === null) {
+          throw new Error(
+            `Transaction dropped from the tx pool (not mined within ${Date.now() - start}ms): ${txHash}`
+          );
+        }
+        deadline = Math.min(deadline + timeoutMs, hardDeadline);
+      }
     }
-    throw new Error(`Transaction not mined within ${timeoutMs}ms: ${txHash}`);
+    throw new Error(
+      `Transaction still pending after ${Date.now() - start}ms: ${txHash} \u2014 it may still confirm; check the hash on the explorer before retrying`
+    );
   }
 };
 
@@ -3236,7 +3294,7 @@ var DEFAULT_HEARTBEAT_TIMEOUT_MS = 4e3;
 var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_BASE_MS = 3e3;
 var DEFAULT_RECONNECT_MAX_MS = 3e4;
 var DEFAULT_STABLE_AFTER_MS = 1e4;
-var OrbinumClientProvider = class {
+var OrbinumClientProvider = class _OrbinumClientProvider {
   config;
   connectTimeoutMs;
   heartbeatIntervalMs;
@@ -3253,6 +3311,7 @@ var OrbinumClientProvider = class {
   _reconnectTimer = null;
   _stableTimer = null;
   _reconnectAttempt = 0;
+  _probeFailures = 0;
   // ─── Events ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
   _listeners = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
   /** Creates a new provider with the given configuration. Does not connect automatically — call `connect()` to initiate. */
@@ -3385,13 +3444,36 @@ var OrbinumClientProvider = class {
     }
   }
   // ─── Heartbeat ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+  /**
+   * Consecutive failed probes required before the client is torn down. A
+   * single missed probe is routine (throttled background tab, node busy
+   * verifying a ZK proof, transient network blip) — destroying the client on
+   * it rejects every in-flight request with "Client destroyed" even though
+   * the tx may still land on-chain.
+   */
+  static PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD = 2;
+  /**
+   * With a tx awaiting finalization, tolerate more missed probes: an unsigned
+   * private_transfer/unshield makes the node CPU-bound on proof verification,
+   * which is exactly when probes time out — tearing down then kills the very
+   * tx being processed.
+   */
+  static PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD_INFLIGHT = 6;
   /** Starts the periodic heartbeat loop. Replaces any existing timer. */
   startHeartbeat() {
     this.stopHeartbeat();
+    this._probeFailures = 0;
     this._heartbeatTimer = setInterval(async () => {
       if (this._status !== "connected" || !this._orbinumClient) return;
       const alive = await this.probe();
-      if (!alive && this._status === "connected") {
+      if (this._status !== "connected") return;
+      if (alive) {
+        this._probeFailures = 0;
+        return;
+      }
+      this._probeFailures++;
+      const threshold = this._orbinumClient?.substrate.hasInflightTx ? _OrbinumClientProvider.PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD_INFLIGHT : _OrbinumClientProvider.PROBE_FAILURE_THRESHOLD;
+      if (this._probeFailures >= threshold) {
         this.setStatus("disconnected", "Node is unreachable");
         this.teardownClient();
         this.scheduleReconnect();
@@ -3987,23 +4069,66 @@ function randomBlinding() {
   return n === 0n ? 1n : n % BN254_R;
 }
 
+// src/privacy-keys/SpendingKeyRequest.ts
+var SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT = PRECOMPILE_ADDR.SHIELDED_POOL;
+var SPENDING_KEY_WARNING = "Signing this grants full control of your Orbinum private funds. Only sign on the official Orbinum app.";
+function deriveSpendingKeyTypedData(chainId, address) {
+  return {
+    domain: {
+      name: "Orbinum Shielded Pool",
+      version: "2",
+      chainId,
+      verifyingContract: SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT
+    },
+    types: {
+      SpendingKeyDerivation: [
+        { name: "warning", type: "string" },
+        { name: "account", type: "address" }
+      ]
+    },
+    primaryType: "SpendingKeyDerivation",
+    message: {
+      warning: SPENDING_KEY_WARNING,
+      account: address.toLowerCase()
+    }
+  };
+}
+function deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2(chainId, address) {
+  return `\u26A0 ${SPENDING_KEY_WARNING}
+
+orbinum-spending-key-v2
+${chainId}
+${address.toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId, address) {
+  return `orbinum-spending-key-v1
+${chainId}
+${address.toLowerCase()}`;
+}
+
 // src/privacy-keys/PrivacyKeys.ts
 import { hkdf as hkdf2 } from "@noble/hashes/hkdf.js";
 import { sha256 as sha2564 } from "@noble/hashes/sha2.js";
 import { mulPointEscalar as mulPointEscalar4, Base8 as Base82, packPoint as packPoint3 } from "@zk-kit/baby-jubjub";
 var IVK_DOMAIN = new TextEncoder().encode("orbinum-ivk-v1");
-function deriveSpendingKeyMessage(chainId, address) {
-  return `orbinum-spending-key-v1
-${chainId}
-${address.toLowerCase()}`;
+var MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES = 32;
+function assertUsableSignature(sigBytes) {
+  if (sigBytes.length < MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `Cannot derive a spending key: signature is ${sigBytes.length} bytes, expected at least ${MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES}. The wallet did not return a signature.`
+    );
+  }
 }
-async function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address) {
+async function deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address, version = "v2") {
   const sigBytes = fromHex(signatureHex);
-  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(`orbinum-sk-v1:${chainId}:${address.toLowerCase()}`);
+  assertUsableSignature(sigBytes);
+  const info = new TextEncoder().encode(
+    `orbinum-sk-${version}:${chainId}:${address.toLowerCase()}`
+  );
   return hkdf2(sha2564, sigBytes, new Uint8Array(0), info, 32);
 }
-async function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex, chainId, address) {
-  const masterBytes = await deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address);
+async function deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature(signatureHex, chainId, address, version = "v2") {
+  const masterBytes = await deriveMasterKeyBytes(signatureHex, chainId, address, version);
   const skBigint = BigInt(toHex(masterBytes)) % BABYJUB_SUBORDER;
   return skBigint === 0n ? 1n : skBigint;
 }
@@ -5242,6 +5367,7 @@ export {
   EvmExplorer,
   KNOWN_PRECOMPILES,
   Keccak256,
+  MIN_SIGNATURE_BYTES,
   NoteBuilder,
   OrbinumClient,
   OrbinumClientProvider,
@@ -5250,6 +5376,8 @@ export {
   PrivacyModule,
   RelayerStatusModule,
   SLIP0044_NAMESPACE,
+  SPENDING_KEY_VERIFYING_CONTRACT,
+  SPENDING_KEY_WARNING,
   ShieldedPoolModule,
   ShieldedPoolPrecompile,
   SignatureScheme,
@@ -5282,6 +5410,8 @@ export {
   deriveSelfEphSk,
   deriveSpendingKeyFromSignature,
   deriveSpendingKeyMessage,
+  deriveSpendingKeyMessageV2,
+  deriveSpendingKeyTypedData,
   deriveStealthOwnerPk,
   deriveStealthSk,
   deriveVaultBlindKey,

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@orbinum/sdk",
-  "version": "0.17.0",
+  "version": "0.19.0",
   "description": "Official TypeScript SDK for Orbinum.",
   "author": "Orbinum",
   "license": "MIT",