@orangecheck/agent-core 2.7.0 → 2.7.1

package/README.md

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ if (!result.ok) throw new Error(result.code + ': ' + result.message);
 - `verifyAction({ action, delegation, revocations | skipRevocationCheck, verifyBip322, now?, maxSkewMs?, verifyOtsAnchor?, content?, resolveAnchorBlockHeight?, scopeMode? })` — the live check, as of `now` (default: the current time). Every link of the chain must be in force at `now`, a revocation in effect at or before `now` refuses the action (`E_REVOKED`), and `signed_at` must lie within `maxSkewMs` of `now` (default 120 s; else `E_STALE`). The result's `asOf` is `{ basis: 'now', now }`.
 - `verifyActionAsOfSignedAt({ … })` — an audit of a past action, as of its own `signed_at`. The agent chooses that time, so `asOf.anchored` says whether a verified OTS anchor fixes it. Never use it to decide whether to act now.
 - `createReplayGuard(maxSkewMs?)` — `firstUse(action, now?)` is true once per action id. It keeps each id until `signed_at + maxSkewMs`, as long as the action could pass `verifyAction`. One process only; across instances keep the same record in a shared store. Replay is the caller's to stop: `verifyAction` keeps no state.
-- `verifyRevocation({ envelope, delegation, verifyBip322 })` — the principal may always revoke; `revocation.holders` can only add the agent
+- `verifyRevocation({ envelope, delegation, verifyBip322 })` — the principal and the agent may always revoke; `revocation.holders` is informational
 - `verifyOtsAnchor(proofB64, blockHeight, blockHash, envelopeId)` — an anchor orders an action against a revocation only when this returns true
 - `verifyFederationRevocation({ envelope, delegation, verifyBip322 })`
 

package/dist/index.js

@@ -801,11 +801,11 @@ async function verifyRevocation(input) {
   if (env.delegation_id !== d.id) {
     return err("E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH", `revocation.delegation_id (${env.delegation_id}) != delegation.id (${d.id})`);
   }
-  const holders = d.revocation?.holders ?? ["principal"];
-  const holderAddrs = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set([d.principal.address]);
-  if (Array.isArray(holders) && holders.includes("agent")) holderAddrs.add(d.agent.address);
-  if (!holderAddrs.has(env.signer.address)) {
-    return err("E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED", `revocation signer ${env.signer.address} not in delegation holders`);
+  if (env.signer.address !== d.principal.address && env.signer.address !== d.agent.address) {
+    return err(
+      "E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED",
+      `revocation signer ${env.signer.address} is neither the principal nor the agent`
+    );
   }
   const canonInput = {
     address: env.signer.address,
@@ -1188,10 +1188,6 @@ async function verifyRevocationOf(d, rev, input) {
     });
   }
   const v1 = rev;
-  const holders = d.revocation?.holders ?? ["principal"];
-  if (!Array.isArray(holders) || !holders.includes("agent")) {
-    return fail("E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED", "only the federation may revoke this delegation");
-  }
   if (v1.kind !== "agent-revocation" || v1.signer?.address !== d.agent.address) {
     return fail("E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED", "a single-address revocation must be signed by the agent");
   }