@orangecheck/agent-core 1.0.1 → 1.2.0

package/dist/types.d.mts

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ interface RevocationCanonicalInput {
     reason: string;
     signed_at: string;
 }
-type AgentErrorCode = 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION' | 'E_MALFORMED' | 'E_BAD_ID' | 'E_BAD_SIG' | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR' | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID' | 'E_EXPIRED' | 'E_REVOKED' | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH' | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH' | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW' | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED' | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP' | 'E_NO_BOND' | 'E_BOND_UNMET' | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED' | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED' | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED' | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE' | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE';
+type AgentErrorCode = 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION' | 'E_MALFORMED' | 'E_BAD_ID' | 'E_BAD_SIG' | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR' | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID' | 'E_EXPIRED' | 'E_REVOKED' | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH' | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH' | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW' | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED' | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP' | 'E_NO_BOND' | 'E_BOND_UNMET' | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED' | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED' | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED' | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE' | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE' | 'E_BAD_FEDERATION_DESCRIPTOR' | 'E_THRESHOLD_MISMATCH' | 'E_THRESHOLD_NOT_MET' | 'E_UNKNOWN_GUARDIAN' | 'E_DUPLICATE_GUARDIAN';
 interface VerifyOk<T> {
     ok: true;
     envelope: T;

package/dist/types.d.ts

@@ -153,7 +153,7 @@ interface RevocationCanonicalInput {
     reason: string;
     signed_at: string;
 }
-type AgentErrorCode = 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION' | 'E_MALFORMED' | 'E_BAD_ID' | 'E_BAD_SIG' | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR' | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID' | 'E_EXPIRED' | 'E_REVOKED' | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH' | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH' | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW' | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED' | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP' | 'E_NO_BOND' | 'E_BOND_UNMET' | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED' | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED' | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED' | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE' | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE';
+type AgentErrorCode = 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION' | 'E_MALFORMED' | 'E_BAD_ID' | 'E_BAD_SIG' | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR' | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID' | 'E_EXPIRED' | 'E_REVOKED' | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH' | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH' | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW' | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED' | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP' | 'E_NO_BOND' | 'E_BOND_UNMET' | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED' | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED' | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED' | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED' | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED' | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE' | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE' | 'E_BAD_FEDERATION_DESCRIPTOR' | 'E_THRESHOLD_MISMATCH' | 'E_THRESHOLD_NOT_MET' | 'E_UNKNOWN_GUARDIAN' | 'E_DUPLICATE_GUARDIAN';
 interface VerifyOk<T> {
     ok: true;
     envelope: T;

package/dist/types.js.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAEO,IAAM,gBAAA,GAAmB","file":"types.js","sourcesContent":["// Wire types for OC Agent v1 envelopes. See SPEC.md §4, §5, §9.\n\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\nexport type EnvelopeKind =\n    | 'agent-delegation'\n    | 'agent-action'\n    | 'agent-revocation'\n    | 'agent-subdelegation';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Shared building blocks\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActorRef {\n    /** mainnet Bitcoin address (P2WPKH, P2TR, or P2PKH). */\n    address: string;\n    alg: 'bip322';\n}\n\nexport interface Signature {\n    alg: 'bip322';\n    pubkey: string; // equals the producing actor's address\n    value: string; // base64 BIP-322 signature over hex(id)\n}\n\nexport type RevocationHolder = 'principal' | 'agent';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Delegation (SPEC §4)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DelegationBond {\n    /** Non-negative sats declared as bonded at issuance time. */\n    sats: number;\n    /** SHA-256 hex of the OrangeCheck canonical message signed by principal.address. */\n    attestation_id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationRevocationRef {\n    /** Who MAY publish a revocation. Default [\"principal\"]. */\n    holders: RevocationHolder[];\n    /** Optional Nostr-addressable pointer to a published revocation. Non-cryptographic. */\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * v1.2 private-scope mode: a wholesale OC Lock v2 LockEnvelope wrapping the\n * canonical scope list as its payload. We re-import the LockEnvelope type\n * structurally rather than depending on the @orangecheck/lock-core type — agent-\n * core's type surface stays loose so verifiers can be authored in either an\n * agent-only or full-family setup.\n */\nexport interface ScopesEncryptedEnvelope {\n    v: 2;\n    kind: 'identity';\n    id: string;\n    alg: { kem: 'x25519'; aead: 'aes-256-gcm'; kdf: 'hkdf-sha256' };\n    from: { address: string; attestation_id?: string };\n    recipients: Array<{\n        address: string;\n        device_id: string;\n        device_pk: string;\n        eph_pk: string;\n        wrapped_key: string;\n        nonce_kek: string;\n    }>;\n    ciphertext: string;\n    nonce_ct: string;\n    hint?: string;\n    created_at: string;\n    expires_at: string | null;\n    payment: unknown | null;\n    sig: { alg: 'bip322'; pubkey: string; value: string };\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-delegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: sorted lexicographically in the canonical\n     * message; stored in sorted order on the envelope too.\n     *\n     * v1.2 private mode: this field is OMITTED from the envelope JSON;\n     * `scopes_encrypted` is set instead. After decryption, the recovered\n     * scope list takes this field's place in the in-memory envelope object\n     * for the remainder of verification.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /**\n     * v1.2 private mode (PRIVATE-SCOPE.md §1.1): an OC Lock v2 envelope\n     * wrapping the canonical scope-list bytes as its payload, sealed to one\n     * or more recipients (typically the agent ± named verifiers). MUTUALLY\n     * EXCLUSIVE with `scopes`.\n     */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    bond: DelegationBond | null;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationCanonicalInput {\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    bond_sats: number;\n    /** 64-hex attestation id or the literal string \"none\". */\n    bond_attestation: string;\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Agent-action (SPEC §5) — strict extension of OC Stamp\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActionContent {\n    hash: string; // \"sha256:<64-hex>\"\n    length: number;\n    mime: string;\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionOts {\n    status: 'pending' | 'confirmed';\n    proof: string;\n    calendars: string[];\n    block_height: number | null;\n    block_hash: string | null;\n    upgraded_at: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-action';\n    id: string;\n    content: ActionContent;\n    signer: ActorRef; // agent\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string; // 64-hex\n    scope_exercised: string; // a sub-scope of some granted scope\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionCanonicalInput {\n    address: string; // agent address\n    content_hash: string;\n    content_length: number;\n    content_mime: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    scope_exercised: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Sub-delegation (SUB-DELEGATION.md, v1.1)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface SubdelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-subdelegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    parent_id: string; // 64-hex; the immediate parent envelope's id\n    /** The sub-principal — equal to parent.agent.address. */\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    /** The recipient sub-agent. */\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: each scope MUST be a sub-scope of some scope\n     * on the parent. v1.2 private mode: omitted; `scopes_encrypted` set.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /** v1.2 private mode — same shape as the root delegation field. */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; >= parent.issued_at\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; <= parent.expires_at\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface SubdelegationCanonicalInput {\n    parent_id: string;\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Either a root or a sub envelope; chain links walk up to a root delegation. */\nexport type ChainLink = DelegationEnvelope | SubdelegationEnvelope;\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Revocation (SPEC §9)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface RevocationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-revocation';\n    id: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    signer: ActorRef;\n    /** Short ASCII rationale, <= 128 bytes. Empty string if omitted. */\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface RevocationCanonicalInput {\n    address: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Error codes (SPEC §11)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentErrorCode =\n    | 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION'\n    | 'E_MALFORMED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ID'\n    | 'E_BAD_SIG'\n    | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR'\n    | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID'\n    | 'E_EXPIRED'\n    | 'E_REVOKED'\n    | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW'\n    | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP'\n    | 'E_NO_BOND'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNMET'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED'\n    | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED'\n    | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE'\n    | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE';\n\nexport interface VerifyOk<T> {\n    ok: true;\n    envelope: T;\n    canonicalMessage: string;\n    id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyErr {\n    ok: false;\n    code: AgentErrorCode;\n    message: string;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyDelegationResult = VerifyOk<DelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifyRevocationResult = VerifyOk<RevocationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifySubdelegationResult = VerifyOk<SubdelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\n\nexport interface VerifyActionOkExtra {\n    /** The ROOT delegation rooting the authority chain. */\n    delegation: DelegationEnvelope;\n    /**\n     * The sub-delegation chain `[S_1, …, S_leaf]`. Empty when the action cites\n     * the root directly. The action's authority leaf is\n     * `chain[chain.length - 1] ?? delegation`.\n     */\n    chain: SubdelegationEnvelope[];\n    scopeExercised: string;\n    anchor:\n        | { status: 'none' }\n        | { status: 'pending' }\n        | { status: 'confirmed'; blockHeight: number; blockHash: string; verified: boolean };\n}\n\nexport type VerifyActionResult =\n    | (VerifyOk<ActionEnvelope> & VerifyActionOkExtra)\n    | VerifyErr;\n"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";;;AAEO,IAAM,gBAAA,GAAmB","file":"types.js","sourcesContent":["// Wire types for OC Agent v1 envelopes. See SPEC.md §4, §5, §9.\n\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\nexport type EnvelopeKind =\n    | 'agent-delegation'\n    | 'agent-action'\n    | 'agent-revocation'\n    | 'agent-subdelegation';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Shared building blocks\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActorRef {\n    /** mainnet Bitcoin address (P2WPKH, P2TR, or P2PKH). */\n    address: string;\n    alg: 'bip322';\n}\n\nexport interface Signature {\n    alg: 'bip322';\n    pubkey: string; // equals the producing actor's address\n    value: string; // base64 BIP-322 signature over hex(id)\n}\n\nexport type RevocationHolder = 'principal' | 'agent';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Delegation (SPEC §4)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DelegationBond {\n    /** Non-negative sats declared as bonded at issuance time. */\n    sats: number;\n    /** SHA-256 hex of the OrangeCheck canonical message signed by principal.address. */\n    attestation_id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationRevocationRef {\n    /** Who MAY publish a revocation. Default [\"principal\"]. */\n    holders: RevocationHolder[];\n    /** Optional Nostr-addressable pointer to a published revocation. Non-cryptographic. */\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * v1.2 private-scope mode: a wholesale OC Lock v2 LockEnvelope wrapping the\n * canonical scope list as its payload. We re-import the LockEnvelope type\n * structurally rather than depending on the @orangecheck/lock-core type — agent-\n * core's type surface stays loose so verifiers can be authored in either an\n * agent-only or full-family setup.\n */\nexport interface ScopesEncryptedEnvelope {\n    v: 2;\n    kind: 'identity';\n    id: string;\n    alg: { kem: 'x25519'; aead: 'aes-256-gcm'; kdf: 'hkdf-sha256' };\n    from: { address: string; attestation_id?: string };\n    recipients: Array<{\n        address: string;\n        device_id: string;\n        device_pk: string;\n        eph_pk: string;\n        wrapped_key: string;\n        nonce_kek: string;\n    }>;\n    ciphertext: string;\n    nonce_ct: string;\n    hint?: string;\n    created_at: string;\n    expires_at: string | null;\n    payment: unknown | null;\n    sig: { alg: 'bip322'; pubkey: string; value: string };\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-delegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: sorted lexicographically in the canonical\n     * message; stored in sorted order on the envelope too.\n     *\n     * v1.2 private mode: this field is OMITTED from the envelope JSON;\n     * `scopes_encrypted` is set instead. After decryption, the recovered\n     * scope list takes this field's place in the in-memory envelope object\n     * for the remainder of verification.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /**\n     * v1.2 private mode (PRIVATE-SCOPE.md §1.1): an OC Lock v2 envelope\n     * wrapping the canonical scope-list bytes as its payload, sealed to one\n     * or more recipients (typically the agent ± named verifiers). MUTUALLY\n     * EXCLUSIVE with `scopes`.\n     */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    bond: DelegationBond | null;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationCanonicalInput {\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    bond_sats: number;\n    /** 64-hex attestation id or the literal string \"none\". */\n    bond_attestation: string;\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Agent-action (SPEC §5) — strict extension of OC Stamp\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActionContent {\n    hash: string; // \"sha256:<64-hex>\"\n    length: number;\n    mime: string;\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionOts {\n    status: 'pending' | 'confirmed';\n    proof: string;\n    calendars: string[];\n    block_height: number | null;\n    block_hash: string | null;\n    upgraded_at: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-action';\n    id: string;\n    content: ActionContent;\n    signer: ActorRef; // agent\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string; // 64-hex\n    scope_exercised: string; // a sub-scope of some granted scope\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionCanonicalInput {\n    address: string; // agent address\n    content_hash: string;\n    content_length: number;\n    content_mime: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    scope_exercised: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Sub-delegation (SUB-DELEGATION.md, v1.1)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface SubdelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-subdelegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    parent_id: string; // 64-hex; the immediate parent envelope's id\n    /** The sub-principal — equal to parent.agent.address. */\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    /** The recipient sub-agent. */\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: each scope MUST be a sub-scope of some scope\n     * on the parent. v1.2 private mode: omitted; `scopes_encrypted` set.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /** v1.2 private mode — same shape as the root delegation field. */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; >= parent.issued_at\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; <= parent.expires_at\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface SubdelegationCanonicalInput {\n    parent_id: string;\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Either a root or a sub envelope; chain links walk up to a root delegation. */\nexport type ChainLink = DelegationEnvelope | SubdelegationEnvelope;\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Revocation (SPEC §9)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface RevocationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-revocation';\n    id: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    signer: ActorRef;\n    /** Short ASCII rationale, <= 128 bytes. Empty string if omitted. */\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface RevocationCanonicalInput {\n    address: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Error codes (SPEC §11)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentErrorCode =\n    | 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION'\n    | 'E_MALFORMED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ID'\n    | 'E_BAD_SIG'\n    | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR'\n    | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID'\n    | 'E_EXPIRED'\n    | 'E_REVOKED'\n    | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW'\n    | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP'\n    | 'E_NO_BOND'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNMET'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED'\n    | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED'\n    | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE'\n    | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE'\n    // v1.2 federation principal (FEDERATION.md §3.3)\n    | 'E_BAD_FEDERATION_DESCRIPTOR'\n    | 'E_THRESHOLD_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_THRESHOLD_NOT_MET'\n    | 'E_UNKNOWN_GUARDIAN'\n    | 'E_DUPLICATE_GUARDIAN';\n\nexport interface VerifyOk<T> {\n    ok: true;\n    envelope: T;\n    canonicalMessage: string;\n    id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyErr {\n    ok: false;\n    code: AgentErrorCode;\n    message: string;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyDelegationResult = VerifyOk<DelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifyRevocationResult = VerifyOk<RevocationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifySubdelegationResult = VerifyOk<SubdelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\n\nexport interface VerifyActionOkExtra {\n    /** The ROOT delegation rooting the authority chain. */\n    delegation: DelegationEnvelope;\n    /**\n     * The sub-delegation chain `[S_1, …, S_leaf]`. Empty when the action cites\n     * the root directly. The action's authority leaf is\n     * `chain[chain.length - 1] ?? delegation`.\n     */\n    chain: SubdelegationEnvelope[];\n    scopeExercised: string;\n    anchor:\n        | { status: 'none' }\n        | { status: 'pending' }\n        | { status: 'confirmed'; blockHeight: number; blockHash: string; verified: boolean };\n}\n\nexport type VerifyActionResult =\n    | (VerifyOk<ActionEnvelope> & VerifyActionOkExtra)\n    | VerifyErr;\n"]}

package/dist/types.mjs.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"sources":["../src/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAEO,IAAM,gBAAA,GAAmB","file":"types.mjs","sourcesContent":["// Wire types for OC Agent v1 envelopes. See SPEC.md §4, §5, §9.\n\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\nexport type EnvelopeKind =\n    | 'agent-delegation'\n    | 'agent-action'\n    | 'agent-revocation'\n    | 'agent-subdelegation';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Shared building blocks\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActorRef {\n    /** mainnet Bitcoin address (P2WPKH, P2TR, or P2PKH). */\n    address: string;\n    alg: 'bip322';\n}\n\nexport interface Signature {\n    alg: 'bip322';\n    pubkey: string; // equals the producing actor's address\n    value: string; // base64 BIP-322 signature over hex(id)\n}\n\nexport type RevocationHolder = 'principal' | 'agent';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Delegation (SPEC §4)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DelegationBond {\n    /** Non-negative sats declared as bonded at issuance time. */\n    sats: number;\n    /** SHA-256 hex of the OrangeCheck canonical message signed by principal.address. */\n    attestation_id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationRevocationRef {\n    /** Who MAY publish a revocation. Default [\"principal\"]. */\n    holders: RevocationHolder[];\n    /** Optional Nostr-addressable pointer to a published revocation. Non-cryptographic. */\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * v1.2 private-scope mode: a wholesale OC Lock v2 LockEnvelope wrapping the\n * canonical scope list as its payload. We re-import the LockEnvelope type\n * structurally rather than depending on the @orangecheck/lock-core type — agent-\n * core's type surface stays loose so verifiers can be authored in either an\n * agent-only or full-family setup.\n */\nexport interface ScopesEncryptedEnvelope {\n    v: 2;\n    kind: 'identity';\n    id: string;\n    alg: { kem: 'x25519'; aead: 'aes-256-gcm'; kdf: 'hkdf-sha256' };\n    from: { address: string; attestation_id?: string };\n    recipients: Array<{\n        address: string;\n        device_id: string;\n        device_pk: string;\n        eph_pk: string;\n        wrapped_key: string;\n        nonce_kek: string;\n    }>;\n    ciphertext: string;\n    nonce_ct: string;\n    hint?: string;\n    created_at: string;\n    expires_at: string | null;\n    payment: unknown | null;\n    sig: { alg: 'bip322'; pubkey: string; value: string };\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-delegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: sorted lexicographically in the canonical\n     * message; stored in sorted order on the envelope too.\n     *\n     * v1.2 private mode: this field is OMITTED from the envelope JSON;\n     * `scopes_encrypted` is set instead. After decryption, the recovered\n     * scope list takes this field's place in the in-memory envelope object\n     * for the remainder of verification.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /**\n     * v1.2 private mode (PRIVATE-SCOPE.md §1.1): an OC Lock v2 envelope\n     * wrapping the canonical scope-list bytes as its payload, sealed to one\n     * or more recipients (typically the agent ± named verifiers). MUTUALLY\n     * EXCLUSIVE with `scopes`.\n     */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    bond: DelegationBond | null;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationCanonicalInput {\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    bond_sats: number;\n    /** 64-hex attestation id or the literal string \"none\". */\n    bond_attestation: string;\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Agent-action (SPEC §5) — strict extension of OC Stamp\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActionContent {\n    hash: string; // \"sha256:<64-hex>\"\n    length: number;\n    mime: string;\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionOts {\n    status: 'pending' | 'confirmed';\n    proof: string;\n    calendars: string[];\n    block_height: number | null;\n    block_hash: string | null;\n    upgraded_at: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-action';\n    id: string;\n    content: ActionContent;\n    signer: ActorRef; // agent\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string; // 64-hex\n    scope_exercised: string; // a sub-scope of some granted scope\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionCanonicalInput {\n    address: string; // agent address\n    content_hash: string;\n    content_length: number;\n    content_mime: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    scope_exercised: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Sub-delegation (SUB-DELEGATION.md, v1.1)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface SubdelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-subdelegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    parent_id: string; // 64-hex; the immediate parent envelope's id\n    /** The sub-principal — equal to parent.agent.address. */\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    /** The recipient sub-agent. */\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: each scope MUST be a sub-scope of some scope\n     * on the parent. v1.2 private mode: omitted; `scopes_encrypted` set.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /** v1.2 private mode — same shape as the root delegation field. */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; >= parent.issued_at\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; <= parent.expires_at\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface SubdelegationCanonicalInput {\n    parent_id: string;\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Either a root or a sub envelope; chain links walk up to a root delegation. */\nexport type ChainLink = DelegationEnvelope | SubdelegationEnvelope;\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Revocation (SPEC §9)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface RevocationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-revocation';\n    id: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    signer: ActorRef;\n    /** Short ASCII rationale, <= 128 bytes. Empty string if omitted. */\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface RevocationCanonicalInput {\n    address: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Error codes (SPEC §11)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentErrorCode =\n    | 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION'\n    | 'E_MALFORMED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ID'\n    | 'E_BAD_SIG'\n    | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR'\n    | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID'\n    | 'E_EXPIRED'\n    | 'E_REVOKED'\n    | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW'\n    | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP'\n    | 'E_NO_BOND'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNMET'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED'\n    | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED'\n    | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE'\n    | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE';\n\nexport interface VerifyOk<T> {\n    ok: true;\n    envelope: T;\n    canonicalMessage: string;\n    id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyErr {\n    ok: false;\n    code: AgentErrorCode;\n    message: string;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyDelegationResult = VerifyOk<DelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifyRevocationResult = VerifyOk<RevocationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifySubdelegationResult = VerifyOk<SubdelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\n\nexport interface VerifyActionOkExtra {\n    /** The ROOT delegation rooting the authority chain. */\n    delegation: DelegationEnvelope;\n    /**\n     * The sub-delegation chain `[S_1, …, S_leaf]`. Empty when the action cites\n     * the root directly. The action's authority leaf is\n     * `chain[chain.length - 1] ?? delegation`.\n     */\n    chain: SubdelegationEnvelope[];\n    scopeExercised: string;\n    anchor:\n        | { status: 'none' }\n        | { status: 'pending' }\n        | { status: 'confirmed'; blockHeight: number; blockHash: string; verified: boolean };\n}\n\nexport type VerifyActionResult =\n    | (VerifyOk<ActionEnvelope> & VerifyActionOkExtra)\n    | VerifyErr;\n"]}
+{"version":3,"sources":["../src/types.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":";AAEO,IAAM,gBAAA,GAAmB","file":"types.mjs","sourcesContent":["// Wire types for OC Agent v1 envelopes. See SPEC.md §4, §5, §9.\n\nexport const ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1 as const;\n\nexport type EnvelopeKind =\n    | 'agent-delegation'\n    | 'agent-action'\n    | 'agent-revocation'\n    | 'agent-subdelegation';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Shared building blocks\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActorRef {\n    /** mainnet Bitcoin address (P2WPKH, P2TR, or P2PKH). */\n    address: string;\n    alg: 'bip322';\n}\n\nexport interface Signature {\n    alg: 'bip322';\n    pubkey: string; // equals the producing actor's address\n    value: string; // base64 BIP-322 signature over hex(id)\n}\n\nexport type RevocationHolder = 'principal' | 'agent';\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Delegation (SPEC §4)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface DelegationBond {\n    /** Non-negative sats declared as bonded at issuance time. */\n    sats: number;\n    /** SHA-256 hex of the OrangeCheck canonical message signed by principal.address. */\n    attestation_id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationRevocationRef {\n    /** Who MAY publish a revocation. Default [\"principal\"]. */\n    holders: RevocationHolder[];\n    /** Optional Nostr-addressable pointer to a published revocation. Non-cryptographic. */\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\n/**\n * v1.2 private-scope mode: a wholesale OC Lock v2 LockEnvelope wrapping the\n * canonical scope list as its payload. We re-import the LockEnvelope type\n * structurally rather than depending on the @orangecheck/lock-core type — agent-\n * core's type surface stays loose so verifiers can be authored in either an\n * agent-only or full-family setup.\n */\nexport interface ScopesEncryptedEnvelope {\n    v: 2;\n    kind: 'identity';\n    id: string;\n    alg: { kem: 'x25519'; aead: 'aes-256-gcm'; kdf: 'hkdf-sha256' };\n    from: { address: string; attestation_id?: string };\n    recipients: Array<{\n        address: string;\n        device_id: string;\n        device_pk: string;\n        eph_pk: string;\n        wrapped_key: string;\n        nonce_kek: string;\n    }>;\n    ciphertext: string;\n    nonce_ct: string;\n    hint?: string;\n    created_at: string;\n    expires_at: string | null;\n    payment: unknown | null;\n    sig: { alg: 'bip322'; pubkey: string; value: string };\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-delegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: sorted lexicographically in the canonical\n     * message; stored in sorted order on the envelope too.\n     *\n     * v1.2 private mode: this field is OMITTED from the envelope JSON;\n     * `scopes_encrypted` is set instead. After decryption, the recovered\n     * scope list takes this field's place in the in-memory envelope object\n     * for the remainder of verification.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /**\n     * v1.2 private mode (PRIVATE-SCOPE.md §1.1): an OC Lock v2 envelope\n     * wrapping the canonical scope-list bytes as its payload, sealed to one\n     * or more recipients (typically the agent ± named verifiers). MUTUALLY\n     * EXCLUSIVE with `scopes`.\n     */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    bond: DelegationBond | null;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface DelegationCanonicalInput {\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    bond_sats: number;\n    /** 64-hex attestation id or the literal string \"none\". */\n    bond_attestation: string;\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Agent-action (SPEC §5) — strict extension of OC Stamp\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface ActionContent {\n    hash: string; // \"sha256:<64-hex>\"\n    length: number;\n    mime: string;\n    ref: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionOts {\n    status: 'pending' | 'confirmed';\n    proof: string;\n    calendars: string[];\n    block_height: number | null;\n    block_hash: string | null;\n    upgraded_at: string | null;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-action';\n    id: string;\n    content: ActionContent;\n    signer: ActorRef; // agent\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string; // 64-hex\n    scope_exercised: string; // a sub-scope of some granted scope\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface ActionCanonicalInput {\n    address: string; // agent address\n    content_hash: string;\n    content_length: number;\n    content_mime: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    scope_exercised: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Sub-delegation (SUB-DELEGATION.md, v1.1)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface SubdelegationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-subdelegation';\n    id: string; // 64-hex sha256(canonical_message)\n    parent_id: string; // 64-hex; the immediate parent envelope's id\n    /** The sub-principal — equal to parent.agent.address. */\n    principal: ActorRef;\n    /** The recipient sub-agent. */\n    agent: ActorRef;\n    /**\n     * v1.0 / v1.1 public mode: each scope MUST be a sub-scope of some scope\n     * on the parent. v1.2 private mode: omitted; `scopes_encrypted` set.\n     */\n    scopes?: string[];\n    /** v1.2 private mode — same shape as the root delegation field. */\n    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;\n    issued_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; >= parent.issued_at\n    expires_at: string; // ISO 8601 UTC; <= parent.expires_at\n    nonce: string; // 32-hex random\n    revocation: DelegationRevocationRef;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface SubdelegationCanonicalInput {\n    parent_id: string;\n    principal: string;\n    agent: string;\n    scopes: string[]; // pre-canonicalized, pre-sorted\n    issued_at: string;\n    expires_at: string;\n    nonce: string;\n}\n\n/** Either a root or a sub envelope; chain links walk up to a root delegation. */\nexport type ChainLink = DelegationEnvelope | SubdelegationEnvelope;\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Revocation (SPEC §9)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport interface RevocationEnvelope {\n    v: typeof ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n    kind: 'agent-revocation';\n    id: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    signer: ActorRef;\n    /** Short ASCII rationale, <= 128 bytes. Empty string if omitted. */\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n    ots: ActionOts | null;\n    sig: Signature;\n}\n\nexport interface RevocationCanonicalInput {\n    address: string;\n    delegation_id: string;\n    reason: string;\n    signed_at: string;\n}\n\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n// Error codes (SPEC §11)\n// ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────\n\nexport type AgentErrorCode =\n    | 'E_UNSUPPORTED_VERSION'\n    | 'E_MALFORMED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ID'\n    | 'E_BAD_SIG'\n    | 'E_BAD_SCOPE_GRAMMAR'\n    | 'E_NOT_YET_VALID'\n    | 'E_EXPIRED'\n    | 'E_REVOKED'\n    | 'E_DELEGATION_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_AGENT_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_OUT_OF_WINDOW'\n    | 'E_SCOPE_DENIED'\n    | 'E_BAD_ACTION_STAMP'\n    | 'E_NO_BOND'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNMET'\n    | 'E_BOND_UNVERIFIED'\n    | 'E_REVOKER_UNAUTHORIZED'\n    | 'E_CALENDAR_UNREACHABLE'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_DEPTH_EXCEEDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_PRINCIPAL_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_EXPIRES_EXTENDED'\n    | 'E_SUBDELEGATION_SCOPE_ESCALATED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_BOTH_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_NEITHER_PROVIDED'\n    | 'E_SCOPES_UNREADABLE'\n    | 'E_BAD_LOCK_ENVELOPE'\n    // v1.2 federation principal (FEDERATION.md §3.3)\n    | 'E_BAD_FEDERATION_DESCRIPTOR'\n    | 'E_THRESHOLD_MISMATCH'\n    | 'E_THRESHOLD_NOT_MET'\n    | 'E_UNKNOWN_GUARDIAN'\n    | 'E_DUPLICATE_GUARDIAN';\n\nexport interface VerifyOk<T> {\n    ok: true;\n    envelope: T;\n    canonicalMessage: string;\n    id: string;\n}\n\nexport interface VerifyErr {\n    ok: false;\n    code: AgentErrorCode;\n    message: string;\n}\n\nexport type VerifyDelegationResult = VerifyOk<DelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifyRevocationResult = VerifyOk<RevocationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\nexport type VerifySubdelegationResult = VerifyOk<SubdelegationEnvelope> | VerifyErr;\n\nexport interface VerifyActionOkExtra {\n    /** The ROOT delegation rooting the authority chain. */\n    delegation: DelegationEnvelope;\n    /**\n     * The sub-delegation chain `[S_1, …, S_leaf]`. Empty when the action cites\n     * the root directly. The action's authority leaf is\n     * `chain[chain.length - 1] ?? delegation`.\n     */\n    chain: SubdelegationEnvelope[];\n    scopeExercised: string;\n    anchor:\n        | { status: 'none' }\n        | { status: 'pending' }\n        | { status: 'confirmed'; blockHeight: number; blockHash: string; verified: boolean };\n}\n\nexport type VerifyActionResult =\n    | (VerifyOk<ActionEnvelope> & VerifyActionOkExtra)\n    | VerifyErr;\n"]}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@orangecheck/agent-core",
-  "version": "1.0.1",
+  "version": "1.2.0",
   "description": "OC Agent canonical messages, envelope formats (delegation/action/revocation), scope grammar, and verification. See https://github.com/orangecheck/oc-agent-protocol.",
   "keywords": [
     "bitcoin",

package/src/assert-scope.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+
+import { ScopeNotGrantedError, assertScopeGranted } from './assert-scope.js';
+import type { ScopesEncryptedEnvelope } from './types.js';
+
+const SEALED = {
+    v: 1,
+    alg: 'x25519-xchacha20poly1305',
+    recipients: [{ device_id: 'dev1', ct: 'AA' }],
+    ct: 'BB',
+    nonce: 'CC',
+} as unknown as ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;
+
+function reasonOf(fn: () => void): string {
+    try {
+        fn();
+    } catch (e) {
+        return e instanceof ScopeNotGrantedError ? e.reason : `wrong-error:${String(e)}`;
+    }
+    return 'no-throw';
+}
+
+describe('assertScopeGranted', () => {
+    it('permits an exact grant and a sub-scope of one', () => {
+        expect(() =>
+            assertScopeGranted({ scopes: ['mcp:invoke(server=s,tool=t)'] }, 'mcp:invoke(server=s,tool=t)', 'f')
+        ).not.toThrow();
+        expect(() =>
+            assertScopeGranted({ scopes: ['mcp:invoke(server=s)'] }, 'mcp:invoke(server=s,tool=t)', 'f')
+        ).not.toThrow();
+    });
+
+    it('refuses a scope outside the grant', () => {
+        expect(
+            reasonOf(() => assertScopeGranted({ scopes: ['mcp:invoke(server=a)'] }, 'mcp:invoke(server=b)', 'f'))
+        ).toBe('not_subscope');
+    });
+
+    // The whole reason this module exists. Five adapters open-coded
+    // `(scopes ?? []).map(parseScope)`, so a v1.2 private delegation — where
+    // `scopes` is absent BECAUSE it is sealed — reported "not a sub-scope of
+    // any granted scope". The refusal was right; the diagnosis sent the
+    // integrator to audit a scope string that was very possibly correct.
+    it('names encrypted scopes as such rather than blaming the scope string', () => {
+        const d = { scopes_encrypted: SEALED };
+        expect(reasonOf(() => assertScopeGranted(d, 'mcp:invoke(server=s)', 'f'))).toBe('scopes_encrypted');
+        try {
+            assertScopeGranted(d, 'mcp:invoke(server=s)', 'f');
+        } catch (e) {
+            expect((e as Error).message).toMatch(/decryptPrivateScopes/);
+            expect((e as Error).message).not.toMatch(/not a sub-scope/);
+        }
+    });
+
+    it('treats absent and empty scopes as granting nothing, not everything', () => {
+        expect(reasonOf(() => assertScopeGranted({}, 'x:y', 'f'))).toBe('no_scopes');
+        expect(reasonOf(() => assertScopeGranted({ scopes: [] }, 'x:y', 'f'))).toBe('no_scopes');
+    });
+
+    // A sealed delegation that ALSO carries a scopes array must not be
+    // evaluated against that array: the fields are exclusive per the spec, so
+    // a populated `scopes` alongside `scopes_encrypted` is a malformed
+    // envelope and possibly an attempt to present a benign readable grant
+    // while the real one stays hidden.
+    it('refuses on the sealed field even when a scopes array is also present', () => {
+        expect(
+            reasonOf(() =>
+                assertScopeGranted({ scopes: ['x:y'], scopes_encrypted: SEALED }, 'x:y', 'f')
+            )
+        ).toBe('scopes_encrypted');
+    });
+});

package/src/assert-scope.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
+import { hasPrivateScopes } from './private-scope.js';
+import { isSubScope, parseScope } from './scope.js';
+import type { ScopesEncryptedEnvelope } from './types.js';
+
+/**
+ * The minimum an adapter needs to make the authorization decision. Kept
+ * structural rather than importing `Delegation` so `stampX` helpers can accept
+ * the narrower shapes they already declare.
+ */
+export interface ScopeBearingDelegation {
+    scopes?: string[];
+    scopes_encrypted?: ScopesEncryptedEnvelope;
+}
+
+/** Distinguishes the three reasons a stamp can be refused. */
+export class ScopeNotGrantedError extends Error {
+    readonly reason: 'not_subscope' | 'scopes_encrypted' | 'no_scopes';
+    constructor(reason: ScopeNotGrantedError['reason'], message: string) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = 'ScopeNotGrantedError';
+        this.reason = reason;
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Refuse unless `scopeExercised` is a sub-scope of something the delegation
+ * actually grants. Every `agent-*` adapter's pre-flight check routes here.
+ *
+ * The check itself is unchanged and still fails closed. What this adds is
+ * telling the caller WHICH of three things went wrong, because the five
+ * adapters each open-coded `(delegation.scopes ?? []).map(parseScope)` and so
+ * reported all three as the same thing:
+ *
+ * - **not_subscope** — scopes are readable and this one is not among them.
+ *   The integrator's own mistake, and the only case the old message fit.
+ * - **scopes_encrypted** — v1.2 private mode. `scopes` is absent *because it
+ *   is sealed to a device key*, so the adapter cannot evaluate the request at
+ *   all. `?? []` collapsed this into "not a sub-scope of any granted scope",
+ *   which sends the integrator to audit a scope string that may well be
+ *   correct, when what they need is `decryptPrivateScopes` and to pass the
+ *   recovered list. Refusing is right; misnaming why is not.
+ * - **no_scopes** — neither field present. A delegation granting nothing.
+ *
+ * Fail-closed is not a judgement call here: an over-broad stamp is a signed,
+ * content-addressed authorization artifact that a verifier will accept.
+ */
+export function assertScopeGranted(
+    delegation: ScopeBearingDelegation,
+    scopeExercised: string,
+    fnName: string
+): void {
+    if (hasPrivateScopes(delegation)) {
+        throw new ScopeNotGrantedError(
+            'scopes_encrypted',
+            `${fnName}: this delegation uses v1.2 private scopes — \`scopes_encrypted\` is ` +
+                `set and \`scopes\` is absent, so the granted set cannot be read here. ` +
+                `Decrypt it with decryptPrivateScopes() using a matching device key and pass ` +
+                `the recovered scopes as \`delegation.scopes\`. Refusing to stamp ` +
+                `\`${scopeExercised}\` against an unreadable grant.`
+        );
+    }
+
+    const scopes = delegation.scopes;
+    if (scopes === undefined || scopes.length === 0) {
+        throw new ScopeNotGrantedError(
+            'no_scopes',
+            `${fnName}: delegation grants no scopes, so \`${scopeExercised}\` cannot be ` +
+                `exercised. An absent or empty \`scopes\` means nothing is granted, never everything.`
+        );
+    }
+
+    const exercised = parseScope(scopeExercised);
+    if (!scopes.map(parseScope).some((g) => isSubScope(exercised, g))) {
+        throw new ScopeNotGrantedError(
+            'not_subscope',
+            `${fnName}: scope_exercised (${scopeExercised}) is not a sub-scope of any granted ` +
+                `scope (${scopes.join(', ')})`
+        );
+    }
+}

package/src/federation.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+// Conformance: OC Agent v1.2 federation-principal vectors (FEDERATION.md §9),
+// loaded from oc-agent-protocol/test-vectors/ v18–v26.
+
+import { existsSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { readFile } from 'node:fs/promises';
+import { dirname, resolve } from 'node:path';
+import { fileURLToPath } from 'node:url';
+
+import { describe, expect, it } from 'vitest';
+
+import {
+    computeFederationDescriptorId,
+    federationDescriptorCanonicalMessage,
+    verifyFederationDelegation,
+    verifyFederationRevocation,
+    type FederationDelegationEnvelope,
+    type FederationRevocationEnvelope,
+} from './federation.js';
+import { verifyDelegation } from './verify.js';
+import type { DelegationEnvelope } from './types.js';
+
+const __dirname = dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url));
+const VECTORS_DIR =
+    process.env.OC_AGENT_VECTORS_DIR ??
+    resolve(__dirname, '..', '..', '..', 'oc-agent-protocol', 'test-vectors');
+
+async function load(name: string): Promise<any> {
+    return JSON.parse(await readFile(resolve(VECTORS_DIR, name), 'utf8'));
+}
+
+const opts = { skipSignatureVerification: true, skipTemporalCheck: true } as const;
+
+// FEDERATION.md + its v18–v26 vectors live on the oc-agent-protocol
+// `spec/federation-v1.2` DRAFT branch (not yet merged to main). When the spec
+// checkout doesn't have them (e.g. CI clones spec main), skip these conformance
+// tests rather than failing — the implementation is still type-checked + built.
+const HAVE_FED_VECTORS = existsSync(resolve(VECTORS_DIR, 'v18-federation-descriptor-3of5.json'));
+const d = HAVE_FED_VECTORS ? describe : describe.skip;
+
+if (!HAVE_FED_VECTORS) {
+    describe('federation conformance', () => {
+        it.skip('skipped — federation vectors absent (draft spec branch not present)', () => {});
+    });
+}
+
+d('federation descriptor (v18)', () => {
+    it('canonical message + descriptor_id reconstruct byte-identical', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v18-federation-descriptor-3of5.json');
+        const descriptor = {
+            v: 1 as const,
+            kind: 'agent-federation' as const,
+            threshold: v.inputs.threshold,
+            guardians: v.inputs.guardians,
+        };
+        expect(federationDescriptorCanonicalMessage(descriptor)).toBe(
+            v.expected.canonical_message
+        );
+        expect(computeFederationDescriptorId(descriptor)).toBe(v.expected.descriptor_id);
+    });
+});
+
+d('federation delegation vectors (v19–v24, v26)', () => {
+    const cases: Array<[string, 'valid' | 'invalid']> = [
+        ['v19-federation-delegation-3of5-valid.json', 'valid'],
+        ['v20-federation-delegation-2of5-below-threshold.json', 'invalid'],
+        ['v21-federation-delegation-duplicate-guardian.json', 'invalid'],
+        ['v22-federation-delegation-unknown-guardian.json', 'invalid'],
+        ['v23-federation-delegation-descriptor-id-mismatch.json', 'invalid'],
+        ['v24-federation-delegation-threshold-mismatch.json', 'invalid'],
+        ['v26-federation-singleaddress-baseline-unchanged.json', 'valid'],
+    ];
+
+    for (const [file, verdict] of cases) {
+        it(`${file} → verifier returns ${verdict}`, async () => {
+            const v = await load(file);
+            const env = v.expected.envelope;
+            const result =
+                env.principal?.alg === 'federation'
+                    ? await verifyFederationDelegation({
+                          envelope: env as FederationDelegationEnvelope,
+                          ...opts,
+                      })
+                    : await verifyDelegation({
+                          envelope: env as DelegationEnvelope,
+                          skipSignatureVerification: true,
+                          skipTemporalCheck: true,
+                      });
+            expect(result.ok).toBe(verdict === 'valid');
+            if (verdict === 'valid' && result.ok) {
+                expect(result.id).toBe(env.id);
+            }
+        });
+    }
+});
+
+d('federation revocation (v25)', () => {
+    it('3-of-5 threshold met → valid', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v25-federation-revocation-3of5-valid.json');
+        const result = await verifyFederationRevocation({
+            envelope: v.expected.envelope as FederationRevocationEnvelope,
+            skipSignatureVerification: true,
+        });
+        expect(result.ok).toBe(true);
+        if (result.ok) expect(result.id).toBe(v.expected.envelope.id);
+    });
+});
+
+d('federation reject reasons (each invalid case fails for its named reason)', () => {
+    it('below threshold → E_THRESHOLD_NOT_MET', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v20-federation-delegation-2of5-below-threshold.json');
+        const r = await verifyFederationDelegation({ envelope: v.expected.envelope, ...opts });
+        expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+        if (!r.ok) expect(r.code).toBe('E_THRESHOLD_NOT_MET');
+    });
+    it('duplicate guardian → E_DUPLICATE_GUARDIAN', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v21-federation-delegation-duplicate-guardian.json');
+        const r = await verifyFederationDelegation({ envelope: v.expected.envelope, ...opts });
+        expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+        if (!r.ok) expect(r.code).toBe('E_DUPLICATE_GUARDIAN');
+    });
+    it('unknown guardian → E_UNKNOWN_GUARDIAN', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v22-federation-delegation-unknown-guardian.json');
+        const r = await verifyFederationDelegation({ envelope: v.expected.envelope, ...opts });
+        expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+        if (!r.ok) expect(r.code).toBe('E_UNKNOWN_GUARDIAN');
+    });
+    it('descriptor_id mismatch → E_BAD_FEDERATION_DESCRIPTOR', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v23-federation-delegation-descriptor-id-mismatch.json');
+        const r = await verifyFederationDelegation({ envelope: v.expected.envelope, ...opts });
+        expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+        if (!r.ok) expect(r.code).toBe('E_BAD_FEDERATION_DESCRIPTOR');
+    });
+    it('threshold mismatch → E_THRESHOLD_MISMATCH', async () => {
+        const v = await load('v24-federation-delegation-threshold-mismatch.json');
+        const r = await verifyFederationDelegation({ envelope: v.expected.envelope, ...opts });
+        expect(r.ok).toBe(false);
+        if (!r.ok) expect(r.code).toBe('E_THRESHOLD_MISMATCH');
+    });
+});