@oracle-agent/oracle 0.14.1 → 0.16.0

package/src/public-api/http.mjs

@@ -1,707 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle Public HTTP surface (Slice G) — secret-free BFF over the public
-// read/assemble contract.
-//
-// Hard boundaries for this file:
-//   - Imports ONLY the public API/peer modules (connect-agent, grants,
-//     policy-schema, oracle-env). NEVER the private executor stack
-//     (get-signer, keystore, exec-policy, local-signer/*, adapters/*,
-//     exec-server, mint-capability).
-//   - NEVER signs anything and NEVER holds key material. Every payload this
-//     server emits is unsigned public data; the user signs client-side.
-//   - Fail-closed no-secret invariant: EVERY response body is recursively
-//     scanned with assertNoSecretMaterial() before it is written to the
-//     socket. If the scan throws, the body is dropped and the client gets
-//     500 { error: "secret-leak-blocked" } instead. The model proposes,
-//     the owner authorizes.
-//   - No auth secrets in code: this plane serves public reads/assembly only,
-//     binds to loopback by default, and carries no bearer/token logic.
-
-import { createServer } from "node:http";
-import { readFileSync, existsSync } from "node:fs";
-import { dirname, join, normalize, sep } from "node:path";
-import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
-
-import {
-  buildConnectRequest,
-  assembleUnsignedGrant,
-  assertNoSecretMaterial,
-  assertSerializedNoSecrets,
-  SecretLeakError,
-} from "./connect-agent.mjs";
-import { listActiveGrants, getGrant } from "./grants.mjs";
-import { GrantValidationError } from "../public-control/policy-schema.mjs";
-import { approvalsScan } from "../data/providers/approvals.mjs";
-import { portfolioBalance } from "../data/providers/portfolio.mjs";
-import { nftInventory } from "../data/providers/nft-portfolio.mjs";
-import { env } from "../oracle-env.mjs";
-
-const pkg = JSON.parse(
-  readFileSync(new URL("../../package.json", import.meta.url), "utf8")
-);
-
-export const PUBLIC_PLANE = "public";
-export const DEFAULT_HOST = "127.0.0.1";
-export const DEFAULT_PORT = 8799;
-export const VERSION = pkg.version;
-
-const LOOPBACK_HOSTS = new Set(["127.0.0.1", "localhost", "::1"]);
-
-const ROOT_DIR = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "../..");
-const CONSOLE_DIR = join(ROOT_DIR, "public", "oracle-console");
-
-/** Allowlisted console static files only — no directory listing / traversal. */
-const STATIC_FILES = Object.freeze({
-  "/": { file: "index.html", type: "text/html; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/index.html": { file: "index.html", type: "text/html; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/app.js": { file: "app.js", type: "application/javascript; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/styles.css": { file: "styles.css", type: "text/css; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/oracle-console": { file: "index.html", type: "text/html; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/oracle-console/": { file: "index.html", type: "text/html; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/oracle-console/index.html": { file: "index.html", type: "text/html; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/oracle-console/app.js": { file: "app.js", type: "application/javascript; charset=utf-8" },
-  "/oracle-console/styles.css": { file: "styles.css", type: "text/css; charset=utf-8" },
-});
-
-/** Refuse absurd bodies before parsing (fail closed, cheap DoS guard). */
-const MAX_BODY_BYTES = 1_000_000;
-
-class HttpError extends Error {
-  constructor(status, code, message) {
-    super(message || code);
-    this.status = status;
-    this.code = code;
-  }
-}
-
-/**
- * Write a JSON response. The no-secret invariant runs HERE, on every body,
- * immediately before the bytes hit the socket.
- *
- * Two layers, in order:
- *   1. assertNoSecretMaterial() walks the object graph (precise path in the
- *      error, catches forbidden key names on real properties).
- *   2. assertSerializedNoSecrets() scans the ACTUAL JSON bytes we are about to
- *      write. This is the authoritative check: toJSON(), getters, symbol keys
- *      and non-enumerable properties can all put a value on the wire that the
- *      graph walk never visited.
- *
- * If either throws, the original body is never serialized to the client; a
- * fixed 500 secret-leak-blocked envelope is sent instead.
- */
-function send(res, status, body) {
-  let payloadStatus = status;
-  let json;
-  try {
-    assertNoSecretMaterial(body);
-    json = assertSerializedNoSecrets(body);
-  } catch {
-    payloadStatus = 500;
-    json = JSON.stringify({ error: "secret-leak-blocked" });
-  }
-  res.writeHead(payloadStatus, {
-    "content-type": "application/json; charset=utf-8",
-    "cache-control": "no-store",
-    "x-oracle-plane": PUBLIC_PLANE,
-    "x-oracle-unsigned": "true",
-  });
-  res.end(json);
-}
-
-function readJsonBody(req) {
-  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
-    const chunks = [];
-    let size = 0;
-    req.on("data", (chunk) => {
-      size += chunk.length;
-      if (size > MAX_BODY_BYTES) {
-        reject(new HttpError(413, "payload-too-large", "request body too large"));
-        req.destroy();
-        return;
-      }
-      chunks.push(chunk);
-    });
-    req.on("end", () => {
-      const raw = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8").trim();
-      if (raw === "") return resolve({});
-      try {
-        resolve(JSON.parse(raw));
-      } catch {
-        reject(new HttpError(400, "invalid-json", "request body must be valid JSON"));
-      }
-    });
-    req.on("error", () => reject(new HttpError(400, "bad-request", "request stream error")));
-  });
-}
-
-function asPlainObject(v, code) {
-  if (v == null) return {};
-  if (typeof v !== "object" || Array.isArray(v)) {
-    throw new HttpError(400, code, `${code} must be a JSON object`);
-  }
-  return v;
-}
-
-function normalizeHost(host) {
-  return String(host || "").trim().toLowerCase().replace(/^\[|\]$/g, "");
-}
-
-function assertLoopbackBindHost(host) {
-  const normalized = normalizeHost(host);
-  if (!LOOPBACK_HOSTS.has(normalized)) {
-    throw new TypeError(`oracle-public only binds loopback hosts; got ${String(host)}`);
-  }
-  return normalized === "::1" ? "::1" : String(host).trim();
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Route handlers — each returns { status, body }; errors are thrown.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-function handleHealth() {
-  return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, plane: PUBLIC_PLANE, version: VERSION } };
-}
-
-function serverTimeOptions(clientOpts) {
-  return {
-    ...clientOpts,
-    allowWildcardActions: false,
-    now: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
-  };
-}
-
-function handleConnectRequest(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  // Accept either { input, opts } or the raw grant fields as the body itself.
-  // Caller opts.now is deliberately overwritten by serverTimeOptions().
-  const input = b.input !== undefined ? asPlainObject(b.input, "input") : b;
-  const opts = serverTimeOptions(asPlainObject(b.opts, "opts"));
-  const rawInput = input === b ? (({ opts: _drop, ...rest }) => rest)(b) : input;
-  return { status: 200, body: buildConnectRequest(rawInput, opts) };
-}
-
-function handleConnectAssemble(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  const input =
-    b.request !== undefined
-      ? asPlainObject(b.request, "request")
-      : b.input !== undefined
-        ? asPlainObject(b.input, "input")
-        : b;
-  const opts = serverTimeOptions(asPlainObject(b.opts, "opts"));
-  const rawInput = input === b ? (({ opts: _drop, ...rest }) => rest)(b) : input;
-  return { status: 200, body: assembleUnsignedGrant(rawInput, opts) };
-}
-
-function handleGrantsActive(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  const opts = serverTimeOptions(asPlainObject(b.opts, "opts"));
-  const grants = listActiveGrants(b.store ?? [], opts);
-  return { status: 200, body: { ok: true, count: grants.length, grants } };
-}
-
-function handleGrantsGet(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  const opts = serverTimeOptions(asPlainObject(b.opts, "opts"));
-  const found = getGrant(b.store ?? [], b.id, opts);
-  if (found == null) {
-    return { status: 404, body: { error: "grant-not-found" } };
-  }
-  return { status: 200, body: found };
-}
-
-/**
- * Public runtime config for the browser console.
- *
- * Advertises which wallet-connection modes this deployment supports so the frontend
- * does not have to guess or hardcode. Two modes, both self-custodial:
- *
- *   injected  EIP-1193 / EIP-6963 browser wallet (MetaMask, Rabby, ...)
- *   privy     embedded/social login, still user-held keys
- *
- * A Privy APP ID is a PUBLIC client identifier -- it is designed to ship in
- * frontend bundles. The app SECRET is server-side and must never appear here, which
- * is why only the id is read and the send() path runs a secret scan over every
- * response body regardless.
- *
- * Absent env means the mode is simply unavailable. Reporting it as disabled is
- * honest; inventing a default app id would produce a broken login flow.
- */
-function handleConfig() {
-  const privyAppId = (process.env.ORACLE_PRIVY_APP_ID || process.env.PRIVY_APP_ID || "").trim();
-  const privyEnabled = privyAppId.length > 0;
-  // Injected wallets need no server config, so this deployment can always offer it.
-  const injectedEnabled = true;
-
-  const modes = [];
-  if (privyEnabled) modes.push("privy");
-  if (injectedEnabled) modes.push("injected");
-
-  return {
-    status: 200,
-    body: {
-      ok: true,
-      plane: PUBLIC_PLANE,
-      version: VERSION,
-      custody: {
-        // Stated explicitly: no deployment of the public plane ever holds keys.
-        selfCustodial: true,
-        signer: "user-wallet",
-        privyEnabled,
-        injectedEnabled,
-        modes,
-      },
-      privy: {
-        // Public client id only. Never the app secret.
-        appId: privyAppId || null,
-      },
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Read-only ERC-20 approval review.
- *
- * Log-derived and range-scoped by construction, so the response carries its
- * own scan range and never implies completeness. Revoking is a separate
- * prepare-only surface whose output the user's wallet signs.
- */
-/**
- * Read-only approval review.
- *
- * Amplification-aware: a single request fans out to many upstream RPC calls, so
- * the chain list is capped here as well as rate-limited at the dispatcher. An
- * uncapped `chainIds` array would let one request cost as much as many.
- */
-const MAX_CHAINS_PER_REQUEST = 12;
-
-async function handleApprovals(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  const owner = typeof b.owner === "string" ? b.owner : null;
-  if (!owner) throw new HttpError(400, "owner-required", "owner must be an EVM address");
-  const requested = Array.isArray(b.chainIds) ? b.chainIds.map(Number).filter(Number.isFinite) : undefined;
-  if (requested && requested.length > MAX_CHAINS_PER_REQUEST) {
-    throw new HttpError(
-      400,
-      "too-many-chains",
-      `at most ${MAX_CHAINS_PER_REQUEST} chainIds per request`,
-    );
-  }
-  const chainIds = requested;
-
-  const result = await approvalsScan({ owner, chainIds }, {});
-  return {
-    status: 200,
-    body: {
-      ok: true,
-      owner: result.owner,
-      scannedRange: result.scannedRange,
-      approvals: result.approvals,
-      scans: result.scans,
-      warnings: result.warnings,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * Accept either a bare EVM address string or the multi-family object the app
- * sends ({ evm, solana, bitcoin, hyperliquid }). Returns null when no usable
- * EVM address is present; callers reject rather than fall back to the env.
- */
-const PUBLIC_SOL_RE = /^[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{32,44}$/;
-const PUBLIC_BTC_RE = /^([13][1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]{25,34}|bc1[ac-hj-np-z02-9]{11,71})$/i;
-
-// Optional side-addresses. Invalid input returns null rather than throwing:
-// a malformed BTC address must not deny someone their EVM balances.
-function optionalSolanaAddress(value) {
-  if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
-  const v = value.trim();
-  return PUBLIC_SOL_RE.test(v) ? v : null;
-}
-
-function optionalBitcoinAddress(value) {
-  if (typeof value !== "string") return null;
-  const v = value.trim();
-  return PUBLIC_BTC_RE.test(v) ? v : null;
-}
-
-function ownerEvmAddress(value) {
-  if (typeof value === "string") return value.trim() === "" ? null : value;
-  if (value && typeof value === "object" && !Array.isArray(value)) {
-    const evm = value.evm;
-    if (typeof evm === "string" && evm.trim() !== "") return evm;
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Portfolio balances for a caller-supplied owner.
- *
- * The owner is REQUIRED and never falls back to the environment. The provider
- * resolves ORACLE_EVM_ADDRESS and friends when no address is passed, which on
- * an anonymous public plane would answer a stranger's request with the
- * operator's own wallet. Reject instead.
- *
- * EVM JSON-RPC cannot enumerate wallet tokens without an address indexer, so
- * this returns native balances and reports token/NFT discovery as unavailable
- * per chain rather than presenting an empty list as a complete portfolio.
- */
-async function handlePortfolio(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  const owner = ownerEvmAddress(b.owner);
-  // The provider has supported Solana and Bitcoin all along, but this handler
-  // hardcoded { evm: owner }, so a SOL/BTC wallet could never return a balance
-  // no matter what the caller sent.
-  const solana = optionalSolanaAddress(b.solana);
-  const bitcoin = optionalBitcoinAddress(b.bitcoin);
-  if (!owner && !solana && !bitcoin) {
-    throw new HttpError(400, "owner-required", "owner must be an EVM address (or pass solana/bitcoin)");
-  }
-  const requested = Array.isArray(b.chainIds) ? b.chainIds.map(Number).filter(Number.isFinite) : undefined;
-  if (requested && requested.length > MAX_CHAINS_PER_REQUEST) {
-    throw new HttpError(400, "too-many-chains", `at most ${MAX_CHAINS_PER_REQUEST} chainIds per request`);
-  }
-
-  const result = await portfolioBalance(
-    {
-      addresses: { evm: owner, solana, bitcoin },
-      evmChainIds: requested,
-      includePrices: true,
-      includeTokens: true,
-      includeCollectibles: false,
-    },
-    // Empty env: the provider must not read operator addresses from process.env
-    // on a public request.
-    { env: {} },
-  );
-
-  const rows = [];
-  const chains = [];
-  for (const chain of result.chains || []) {
-    // Non-EVM families carry the same native/status shape; skipping them here
-    // is what made SOL/BTC invisible even when the provider resolved them.
-    if (!["evm", "solana", "bitcoin"].includes(chain.family)) continue;
-    chains.push({
-      chainId: chain.chainId,
-      // Without family the app cannot tell a Solana row from an EVM row: both
-      // carry a chainId and a symbol.
-      family: chain.family,
-      name: chain.name,
-      status: chain.status,
-      error: chain.error ?? null,
-      tokenDiscovery: chain.fungibleTokens?.status ?? "unavailable",
-      tokenDiscoveryReason: chain.fungibleTokens?.reason ?? null,
-    });
-    const native = chain.native;
-    if (chain.status !== "ok" || !native || native.status !== "ok") continue;
-    if (!native.amountRaw || native.amountRaw === "0" || native.amountRaw === "0x0") continue;
-    rows.push({
-      chainId: chain.chainId,
-      family: chain.family,
-      chain: chain.name,
-      symbol: native.symbol,
-      decimals: native.decimals,
-      // `amount` MUST be the raw integer. The app's pricing path runs
-      // decimalAmount(row.amount, row.decimals), which requires /^\d+$/ and
-      // returns null for a human-readable "6.632...". A null there silently
-      // drops the row from every USD total.
-      amount: String(native.amountRaw),
-      amountRaw: String(native.amountRaw),
-      amountFormatted: native.amount,
-      kind: "native",
-    });
-  }
-
-  return {
-    status: 200,
-    body: {
-      ok: true,
-      owner: result.addresses?.evm ?? owner,
-      queriedAt: result.queriedAt,
-      // Nested under `portfolio` because that is the shape the app's data-plane
-      // client already parses (rawRows reads value.portfolio.rows).
-      portfolio: {
-        rows,
-        chains,
-        coverage: result.coverage,
-        // Native-only discovery is a real gap, not a complete picture. Surfaced
-        // so the client renders it instead of implying the wallet is empty.
-        complete: false,
-        incompleteReason:
-          "EVM JSON-RPC returns native balances only; token enumeration requires an address indexer",
-      },
-      warnings: result.warnings,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/**
- * NFT inventory for a caller-supplied owner. Same owner rule as portfolio.
- */
-async function handleNfts(body) {
-  const b = asPlainObject(body, "body");
-  const owner = ownerEvmAddress(b.owner);
-  if (!owner) throw new HttpError(400, "owner-required", "owner must be an EVM address");
-
-  const result = await nftInventory({ addresses: { evm: owner } }, { env: {} });
-  return {
-    status: 200,
-    body: {
-      ok: true,
-      owner,
-      queriedAt: result.queriedAt ?? new Date().toISOString(),
-      // Nested to match the shape the app's client parses: value.nfts.items
-      // plus value.nfts.coverage.
-      nfts: {
-        items: Array.isArray(result.items) ? result.items : [],
-        chains: result.chains ?? [],
-        coverage: {
-          operational: result.ok !== false,
-          complete: result.complete === true,
-          hasGaps: result.complete !== true,
-        },
-      },
-      warnings: result.warnings,
-    },
-  };
-}
-
-/** Direct handler access for tests. Not routed; no auth implications. */
-export const handlePortfolioForTest = handlePortfolio;
-export const handleNftsForTest = handleNfts;
-
-/**
- * Per-IP rate limiting for the unauthenticated public plane.
- *
- * `/public/approvals` fans a single request out to many upstream RPC calls, so
- * an unthrottled loop against it burns the shared public-RPC quota and the
- * service's own capacity. Cheap reads (health, config) get a loose ceiling;
- * anything that amplifies into upstream work gets a strict one.
- *
- * Fixed-window counters in memory: no dependency, no shared state, and a
- * restart simply forgives. Sufficient for accidental hammering and casual
- * abuse; a real edge/WAF is still the answer for a distributed flood.
- */
-const RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
-const RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT = 120;
-/** Routes whose cost is measured in upstream RPC calls, not CPU. */
-const RATE_LIMIT_AMPLIFYING = 10;
-const AMPLIFYING_ROUTES = Object.freeze(
-  new Set(["/public/approvals", "/public/portfolio", "/public/nfts"]),
-);
-const MAX_RATE_ENTRIES = 4096;
-
-const rateBuckets = new Map();
-
-/** Drop all rate-limit state. Exported for tests. */
-export function clearRateLimits() {
-  rateBuckets.clear();
-}
-
-/**
- * Identify the caller.
- *
- * Proxy headers are honoured ONLY when the operator opts in via
- * ORACLE_TRUST_PROXY, because a spoofable X-Forwarded-For would otherwise let
- * any client mint a fresh identity per request and bypass the limit entirely.
- */
-function clientKey(req) {
-  if (process.env.ORACLE_TRUST_PROXY === "1") {
-    const forwarded = req.headers["x-forwarded-for"];
-    if (typeof forwarded === "string" && forwarded.length > 0) {
-      const first = forwarded.split(",")[0].trim();
-      if (first) return first.slice(0, 64);
-    }
-  }
-  return req.socket?.remoteAddress || "unknown";
-}
-
-function rateLimit(req, routePath) {
-  const limit = AMPLIFYING_ROUTES.has(routePath) ? RATE_LIMIT_AMPLIFYING : RATE_LIMIT_DEFAULT;
-  const now = Date.now();
-  const key = `${clientKey(req)}:${AMPLIFYING_ROUTES.has(routePath) ? "amp" : "std"}`;
-
-  const entry = rateBuckets.get(key);
-  if (!entry || now >= entry.resetAt) {
-    rateBuckets.set(key, { count: 1, resetAt: now + RATE_WINDOW_MS });
-    while (rateBuckets.size > MAX_RATE_ENTRIES) {
-      const oldest = rateBuckets.keys().next();
-      if (oldest.done) break;
-      rateBuckets.delete(oldest.value);
-    }
-    return { allowed: true, limit, remaining: limit - 1, retryAfterSec: 0 };
-  }
-
-  entry.count += 1;
-  if (entry.count > limit) {
-    return {
-      allowed: false,
-      limit,
-      remaining: 0,
-      retryAfterSec: Math.max(1, Math.ceil((entry.resetAt - now) / 1000)),
-    };
-  }
-  return { allowed: true, limit, remaining: limit - entry.count, retryAfterSec: 0 };
-}
-
-const ROUTES = Object.freeze({
-  "GET /public/health": handleHealth,
-  "GET /public/config": handleConfig,
-  "POST /public/connect/request": handleConnectRequest,
-  "POST /public/connect/assemble": handleConnectAssemble,
-  "POST /public/grants/active": handleGrantsActive,
-  "POST /public/grants/get": handleGrantsGet,
-  "POST /public/approvals": handleApprovals,
-  "POST /public/portfolio": handlePortfolio,
-  "POST /public/nfts": handleNfts,
-});
-
-function publicHeaders(extra = {}) {
-  return {
-    "cache-control": "no-store",
-    "x-oracle-plane": PUBLIC_PLANE,
-    "x-oracle-unsigned": "true",
-    ...extra,
-  };
-}
-
-function sendStatic(res, status, contentType, body) {
-  res.writeHead(status, publicHeaders({ "content-type": contentType }));
-  res.end(body);
-}
-
-/**
- * Serve allowlisted Oracle console assets only.
- * Returns true if the request was handled (including 404 for missing file).
- */
-function tryServeStatic(req, res, pathname) {
-  if (req.method !== "GET" && req.method !== "HEAD") return false;
-  // Keep trailing slash variants resolvable via STATIC_FILES keys.
-  const rawPath = pathname === "" ? "/" : pathname;
-  const meta = STATIC_FILES[rawPath] || STATIC_FILES[rawPath.replace(/\/+$/, "") || "/"];
-  if (!meta) return false;
-
-  const abs = normalize(join(CONSOLE_DIR, meta.file));
-  if (!abs.startsWith(CONSOLE_DIR + sep) && abs !== CONSOLE_DIR) {
-    send(res, 404, { error: "not-found", message: "unknown static path" });
-    return true;
-  }
-  if (!existsSync(abs)) {
-    send(res, 404, { error: "not-found", message: `missing static file ${meta.file}` });
-    return true;
-  }
-  const body = readFileSync(abs);
-  // Static HTML/JS/CSS are not JSON secret-scanned the same way as API bodies;
-  // content is repo-authored allowlisted files only.
-  if (req.method === "HEAD") {
-    res.writeHead(200, publicHeaders({
-      "content-type": meta.type,
-      "content-length": String(body.length),
-    }));
-    res.end();
-    return true;
-  }
-  sendStatic(res, 200, meta.type, body);
-  return true;
-}
-
-async function handleRequest(req, res) {
-  const url = new URL(req.url, "http://localhost");
-  // Preserve a single trailing slash only for static console aliases.
-  let pathname = url.pathname || "/";
-  if (pathname.length > 1 && pathname.endsWith("/") && pathname !== "/oracle-console/") {
-    pathname = pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "");
-  }
-  if (pathname === "") pathname = "/";
-  const routePath = pathname.replace(/\/+$/, "") || "/";
-  const key = `${req.method} ${routePath}`;
-  const handler = ROUTES[key];
-
-  try {
-    if (!handler) {
-      if (tryServeStatic(req, res, pathname)) return;
-      const pathKnown = Object.keys(ROUTES).some((k) => k.endsWith(` ${routePath}`));
-      if (pathKnown) throw new HttpError(405, "method-not-allowed", `unsupported method for ${routePath}`);
-      throw new HttpError(404, "not-found", `unknown route ${routePath}`);
-    }
-    const gate = rateLimit(req, routePath);
-    if (!gate.allowed) {
-      res.writeHead(429, publicHeaders({
-        "content-type": "application/json",
-        "retry-after": String(gate.retryAfterSec),
-        "x-ratelimit-limit": String(gate.limit),
-        "x-ratelimit-remaining": "0",
-      }));
-      res.end(JSON.stringify({
-        error: "rate-limited",
-        message: `too many requests for ${routePath}; retry in ${gate.retryAfterSec}s`,
-      }));
-      return;
-    }
-
-    const body = req.method === "GET" || req.method === "HEAD" ? undefined : await readJsonBody(req);
-    // Handlers may be sync or async; await normalizes both so a rejected
-    // promise lands in this try/catch instead of escaping as an unhandled
-    // rejection with the socket left open.
-    const out = await handler(body);
-    send(res, out.status, out.body);
-  } catch (err) {
-    if (err instanceof SecretLeakError) {
-      // Never echo the leak path/rule detail either — fixed envelope only.
-      send(res, 500, { error: "secret-leak-blocked" });
-      return;
-    }
-    if (err instanceof GrantValidationError) {
-      send(res, 400, {
-        error: "invalid-grant",
-        errors: err.errors.map((e) => ({ field: e.field, message: e.message })),
-      });
-      return;
-    }
-    if (err instanceof HttpError) {
-      send(res, err.status, { error: err.code, message: err.message });
-      return;
-    }
-    if (err instanceof TypeError) {
-      send(res, 400, { error: "bad-request", message: err.message });
-      return;
-    }
-    // Unknown failure: fixed envelope, no internal detail leaves the server.
-    send(res, 500, { error: "internal-error" });
-  }
-}
-
-/** Build (but do not bind) the public HTTP server. */
-export function createPublicServer() {
-  return createServer((req, res) => {
-    handleRequest(req, res).catch(() => {
-      try {
-        send(res, 500, { error: "internal-error" });
-      } catch {
-        /* socket already gone */
-      }
-    });
-  });
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolve host/port: explicit args > ORACLE_PUBLIC_HOST/PORT env (via
- * oracle-env's env() helper) > loopback 127.0.0.1:8799 default.
- * Non-loopback binds fail closed; this plane has no remote peer/origin guard.
- */
-export function resolvePublicBind({ host, port } = {}) {
-  const h = assertLoopbackBindHost(host ?? env("ORACLE_PUBLIC_HOST", "MAD_PUBLIC_HOST", DEFAULT_HOST));
-  const rawPort = port ?? env("ORACLE_PUBLIC_PORT", "MAD_PUBLIC_PORT", String(DEFAULT_PORT));
-  const p = Number(rawPort);
-  if (!Number.isInteger(p) || p < 0 || p > 65535) {
-    throw new TypeError(`invalid public port: ${String(rawPort)}`);
-  }
-  return { host: h, port: p };
-}
-
-/** Create + bind the public server. Returns the node:http server instance. */
-export function startPublicServer(bind = {}) {
-  const { host, port } = resolvePublicBind(bind);
-  const server = createPublicServer();
-  server.listen(port, host);
-  return server;
-}