@oracle-agent/oracle 0.13.1 → 0.14.1

package/src/router/proposal.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+// Oracle Router proposal model.
+//
+// Pure, dependency-free. A "proposal" is an advisory object: a labeled
+// suggestion for what Oracle Control *could* do, carrying no authority of its
+// own. This module MUST NEVER be able to produce an object that authorizes,
+// signs, or broadcasts anything, and MUST NEVER accept or echo back secrets
+// (bearer tokens, private/session keys, passphrases, keystore paths, etc.).
+//
+// Enforcement is defense-in-depth, in this order:
+//   1. Reject: any dangerous field anywhere in the input throws immediately.
+//   2. Strip: the emitted proposal is built from an explicit field allowlist
+//      only (nothing "extra" from the input can leak through even if step 1
+//      had a gap).
+//   3. Pin: every proposal carries fixed, non-overridable advisory markers
+//      (mode: "proposal", authorized: false, signed: false, broadcast: false)
+//      that the caller cannot set to anything else.
+//   4. Freeze: the returned proposal (and its nested plain objects/arrays)
+//      is deep-frozen so downstream code cannot mutate it into something
+//      that looks authorized.
+
+import { classifyRisk } from "./risk-classifier.mjs";
+
+// Case-insensitive key patterns that must never appear anywhere in a
+// proposal request or its emitted output. Deliberately broad: it is safer to
+// over-reject an oddly named benign field than to under-reject a secret.
+export const DANGEROUS_FIELD_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
+  /priv(ate)?[-_ ]?key/i,
+  /seed[-_ ]?phrase/i,
+  /mnemonic/i,
+  /api[-_ ]?key/i,
+  /api[-_ ]?secret/i,
+  /bearer/i,
+  /session[-_ ]?key/i,
+  /session[-_ ]?secret/i,
+  /session[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /keystore/i,
+  /passphrase/i,
+  /^password$/i,
+  /secret/i,
+  /signature/i,
+  /signed[-_ ]?tx/i,
+  /raw[-_ ]?tx/i,
+  /broadcast/i,
+  /authoriz/i,
+  /^grant$/i,
+  /grant[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /credential/i,
+  /house[-_ ]?wallet/i,
+  /executor[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /access[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /^token$/i,
+  /^sig$/i,
+  /wallet[-_ ]?key/i,
+]);
+
+// Exact key names the router itself emits as PINNED, hardcoded-false/fixed
+// advisory markers (see createProposal below). These key names happen to
+// match the dangerous-field patterns above (e.g. "authorized" contains
+// "authoriz", "canAccessSecrets" contains "secret") precisely BECAUSE they
+// exist to make the proposal's non-authority explicit and readable. They are
+// only ever assigned literal constants by this module, never taken from
+// caller input, so allowing them past the OUTPUT-side scan is safe. This
+// allowlist is NEVER applied when scanning untrusted caller input.
+const PINNED_SAFE_OUTPUT_KEYS = new Set([
+  "mode",
+  "advisoryOnly",
+  "authorized",
+  "signed",
+  "broadcast",
+  "requiresHumanConfirmation",
+  "grantsPermissions",
+  "capabilities",
+  "canClassifyRisk",
+  "canExplain",
+  "canSimulate",
+  "canSign",
+  "canBroadcast",
+  "canAuthorize",
+  "canMintCapability",
+  "canAccessSecrets",
+]);
+
+function isDangerousKey(key, { allowPinnedSafe = false } = {}) {
+  const k = String(key);
+  if (allowPinnedSafe && PINNED_SAFE_OUTPUT_KEYS.has(k)) return false;
+  return DANGEROUS_FIELD_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(k));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Recursively scan a value for keys matching DANGEROUS_FIELD_PATTERNS.
+ * Returns a list of dotted paths where a dangerous key was found. Pure,
+ * read-only -- never mutates the input.
+ *
+ * @param {*} value
+ * @param {string} [pathPrefix]
+ * @param {object} [opts]
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.allowPinnedSafe] when true, exempts this module's own
+ *   fixed advisory-marker key names (see PINNED_SAFE_OUTPUT_KEYS). Only ever
+ *   pass this when scanning output THIS module constructed itself -- never
+ *   when scanning caller-supplied input.
+ */
+export function findDangerousFields(value, pathPrefix = "", opts = {}) {
+  const hits = [];
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    value.forEach((item, i) => {
+      hits.push(...findDangerousFields(item, `${pathPrefix}[${i}]`, opts));
+    });
+    return hits;
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      const path = pathPrefix ? `${pathPrefix}.${key}` : key;
+      if (isDangerousKey(key, opts)) hits.push(path);
+      hits.push(...findDangerousFields(val, path, opts));
+    }
+    return hits;
+  }
+  return hits;
+}
+
+/** Throws if `value` contains any dangerous field anywhere, at any depth.
+ *  Pass { allowPinnedSafe: true } ONLY for output this module itself built. */
+export function assertNoDangerousFields(value, label = "proposal input", opts = {}) {
+  const hits = findDangerousFields(value, "", opts);
+  if (hits.length) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `${label} contains disallowed secret/signing/broadcast field(s): ${hits.join(", ")}`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/** Deep-clones plain objects/arrays with any dangerous keys removed. Defense
+ *  in depth only -- createProposal() rejects rather than relying on this to
+ *  silently clean up the input. */
+export function stripDangerousFields(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(stripDangerousFields);
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    const out = {};
+    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      if (isDangerousKey(key)) continue;
+      out[key] = stripDangerousFields(val);
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+function deepFreeze(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    value.forEach(deepFreeze);
+    return Object.freeze(value);
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    for (const v of Object.values(value)) deepFreeze(v);
+    return Object.freeze(value);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+// Fields the router is allowed to read off a proposal request. Anything not
+// in this list is dropped when the proposal is built, regardless of what the
+// caller sent -- this is what makes step 2 (Strip) effective even if a
+// dangerous field used a name the regex list hasn't seen yet.
+const ALLOWED_INPUT_FIELDS = Object.freeze([
+  "kind",
+  "target",
+  "notionalUsd",
+  "chainId",
+  "venue",
+  "destinationKnown",
+  "unlimitedApproval",
+  "crossChain",
+  "note",
+]);
+
+function pickAllowed(input) {
+  const out = {};
+  for (const key of ALLOWED_INPUT_FIELDS) {
+    if (input && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(input, key) && input[key] !== undefined) {
+      out[key] = input[key];
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+let proposalCounter = 0;
+function nextProposalId(nowMs) {
+  proposalCounter += 1;
+  return `proposal-${nowMs}-${proposalCounter}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build an advisory-only proposal object. Never authorizes, signs, or
+ * broadcasts anything; the returned object cannot be mistaken for one that
+ * does because its authority markers are pinned to false/"proposal" and it is
+ * deep-frozen.
+ *
+ * @param {object} input
+ * @param {string} input.kind            see risk-classifier.mjs for recognized kinds
+ * @param {string} [input.target]        human-readable description of the target (e.g. "HL BTC-PERP")
+ * @param {number} [input.notionalUsd]
+ * @param {number} [input.chainId]
+ * @param {string} [input.venue]
+ * @param {boolean} [input.destinationKnown]
+ * @param {boolean} [input.unlimitedApproval]
+ * @param {boolean} [input.crossChain]
+ * @param {string} [input.note]          free-text rationale; itself scanned for dangerous fields if an object is passed by mistake
+ * @param {number} [nowMs]               injectable clock for deterministic tests
+ * @returns {object} frozen proposal
+ */
+export function createProposal(input = {}, nowMs = Date.now()) {
+  if (input === null || typeof input !== "object" || Array.isArray(input)) {
+    throw new Error("proposal input must be a plain object");
+  }
+
+  // Step 1: reject. Scan the FULL raw input (not just the allowlisted
+  // subset) so a caller cannot smuggle a secret in under an allowed key name
+  // collision, nor bury one in an unlisted field and have it silently
+  // dropped without anyone noticing the attempt.
+  assertNoDangerousFields(input, "proposal input");
+
+  const kind = String(input.kind || "").trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!kind) throw new Error("proposal input: kind is required");
+
+  // Step 2: strip / allowlist. Only known-safe fields are read from input.
+  const safeInput = pickAllowed(input);
+  safeInput.kind = kind;
+
+  const risk = classifyRisk({
+    kind,
+    notionalUsd: safeInput.notionalUsd,
+    destinationKnown: safeInput.destinationKnown,
+    unlimitedApproval: safeInput.unlimitedApproval,
+    crossChain: safeInput.crossChain,
+  });
+
+  const proposal = {
+    id: nextProposalId(Number(nowMs) || Date.now()),
+    createdAt: new Date(Number(nowMs) || Date.now()).toISOString(),
+
+    kind: safeInput.kind,
+    target: safeInput.target != null ? String(safeInput.target) : null,
+    notionalUsd: safeInput.notionalUsd != null ? Number(safeInput.notionalUsd) : null,
+    chainId: safeInput.chainId != null ? Number(safeInput.chainId) : null,
+    venue: safeInput.venue != null ? String(safeInput.venue) : null,
+    note: safeInput.note != null ? String(safeInput.note) : null,
+
+    risk: {
+      tier: risk.tier,
+      score: risk.score,
+      reasons: risk.reasons,
+    },
+
+    // Step 3: pinned advisory markers. These are NOT derived from input and
+    // cannot be overridden by any input field -- they are literal constants.
+    mode: "proposal",
+    advisoryOnly: true,
+    authorized: false,
+    signed: false,
+    broadcast: false,
+    requiresHumanConfirmation: true,
+    grantsPermissions: false,
+    capabilities: Object.freeze({
+      canClassifyRisk: true,
+      canExplain: true,
+      canSimulate: kind === "simulate",
+      canSign: false,
+      canBroadcast: false,
+      canAuthorize: false,
+      canMintCapability: false,
+      canAccessSecrets: false,
+    }),
+  };
+
+  // Belt-and-suspenders: re-verify the object we are about to hand out
+  // contains no dangerous keys before freezing, in case a future edit to
+  // ALLOWED_INPUT_FIELDS accidentally lets one through. allowPinnedSafe is
+  // required here because this module's own fixed advisory markers (e.g.
+  // "authorized", "broadcast", "canAccessSecrets") intentionally reuse
+  // wording from the dangerous-pattern list to stay self-documenting; they
+  // are hardcoded constants above, never derived from input.
+  assertNoDangerousFields(proposal, "proposal output", { allowPinnedSafe: true });
+
+  return deepFreeze(proposal);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Defense-in-depth guard for anything downstream that receives a proposal
+ * object from the router and wants to double check, before acting on it in
+ * any way, that it really is advisory-only. Throws if the object does not
+ * look like a well-formed, unauthorized proposal.
+ */
+export function assertAdvisoryProposal(proposal) {
+  if (!proposal || typeof proposal !== "object") {
+    throw new Error("proposal required");
+  }
+  if (proposal.mode !== "proposal") throw new Error("proposal: mode must be \"proposal\"");
+  if (proposal.authorized !== false) throw new Error("proposal: authorized must be false");
+  if (proposal.signed !== false) throw new Error("proposal: signed must be false");
+  if (proposal.broadcast !== false) throw new Error("proposal: broadcast must be false");
+  if (proposal.advisoryOnly !== true) throw new Error("proposal: advisoryOnly must be true");
+  if (proposal.grantsPermissions !== false) {
+    throw new Error("proposal: grantsPermissions must be false");
+  }
+  const caps = proposal.capabilities || {};
+  if (caps.canSign || caps.canBroadcast || caps.canAuthorize || caps.canMintCapability || caps.canAccessSecrets) {
+    throw new Error("proposal: capabilities must not grant sign/broadcast/authorize/mint/secret access");
+  }
+  assertNoDangerousFields(proposal, "proposal", { allowPinnedSafe: true });
+  return true;
+}

package/src/router/risk-classifier.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,119 @@
+// Oracle Router risk classifier.
+//
+// Pure, dependency-free, deterministic. No I/O, no network, no chain reads,
+// no imports. The router uses this to LABEL a proposed action's risk tier for
+// advisory purposes only -- the label is context for a human or for Oracle
+// Control, never an authorization decision. Oracle Control independently
+// validates and gates every real action; nothing here grants or implies
+// permission to sign, broadcast, or spend.
+
+export const RISK_TIERS = Object.freeze(["low", "medium", "high", "critical"]);
+
+// Kinds the router treats as pure read/advisory work (no custody exposure).
+export const READ_ONLY_KINDS = Object.freeze(["read", "quote", "explain", "simulate"]);
+
+// Kinds that describe a draft custody-adjacent action. These are still just
+// labels on a proposal -- classifying something as "swap" does not create a
+// swap, sign anything, or move funds.
+export const CUSTODY_ADJACENT_KINDS = Object.freeze([
+  "approval",
+  "transfer",
+  "swap",
+  "order",
+  "bridge",
+]);
+
+function normalizeKind(kind) {
+  const k = String(kind || "").trim().toLowerCase();
+  return k || "unknown";
+}
+
+// Coarse USD notional bands. Unknown/invalid notional is NOT treated as "low"
+// -- callers must not be able to escape risk scoring by omitting a number.
+function notionalBand(notionalUsd) {
+  if (notionalUsd == null) return null;
+  const n = Number(notionalUsd);
+  if (!Number.isFinite(n) || n < 0) return null;
+  if (n > 100_000) return 3;
+  if (n > 10_000) return 2;
+  if (n > 1_000) return 1;
+  return 0;
+}
+
+function tierFromScore(score) {
+  if (score >= 7) return "critical";
+  if (score >= 4) return "high";
+  if (score >= 2) return "medium";
+  return "low";
+}
+
+/**
+ * Classify the risk tier of a proposed action. Pure function: same input
+ * always produces the same output, and calling it has zero side effects.
+ *
+ * @param {object} [input]
+ * @param {string} [input.kind]               "read" | "quote" | "explain" | "simulate" |
+ *                                             "approval" | "transfer" | "swap" | "order" |
+ *                                             "bridge" | any other string (treated conservatively)
+ * @param {number} [input.notionalUsd]         approximate USD notional, if known
+ * @param {boolean} [input.destinationKnown]   true if destination is a reviewed/allowlisted venue
+ * @param {boolean} [input.unlimitedApproval]  true if the action requests an unbounded/MaxUint256-style approval
+ * @param {boolean} [input.crossChain]         true if the action spans chains (bridge-like)
+ * @returns {{ tier: "low"|"medium"|"high"|"critical", score: number, reasons: readonly string[] }}
+ */
+export function classifyRisk(input = {}) {
+  const kind = normalizeKind(input?.kind);
+  const reasons = [];
+  let score = 0;
+
+  const isReadOnly = READ_ONLY_KINDS.includes(kind);
+  const isCustodyAdjacent = CUSTODY_ADJACENT_KINDS.includes(kind);
+
+  if (isReadOnly) {
+    reasons.push(`kind "${kind}" is read/advisory-only`);
+  } else if (isCustodyAdjacent) {
+    score += 2;
+    reasons.push(`kind "${kind}" is custody-adjacent (+2)`);
+  } else {
+    score += 3;
+    reasons.push(`kind "${kind}" is unrecognized; treated conservatively (+3)`);
+  }
+
+  const band = notionalBand(input?.notionalUsd);
+  if (band != null && band > 0) {
+    score += band;
+    reasons.push(`notional band ${band} (+${band})`);
+  } else if (band == null && !isReadOnly) {
+    score += 1;
+    reasons.push("notional unknown for a non-read action (+1)");
+  }
+
+  if (input?.unlimitedApproval) {
+    score += 3;
+    reasons.push("unlimited/unbounded approval requested (+3)");
+  }
+
+  if (input?.destinationKnown === false) {
+    score += 2;
+    reasons.push("destination not a reviewed/allowlisted venue (+2)");
+  }
+
+  if (input?.crossChain) {
+    score += 1;
+    reasons.push("cross-chain action (+1)");
+  }
+
+  return Object.freeze({
+    tier: tierFromScore(score),
+    score,
+    reasons: Object.freeze(reasons),
+  });
+}
+
+export function isReadOnlyKind(kind) {
+  return READ_ONLY_KINDS.includes(normalizeKind(kind));
+}
+
+export function isCustodyAdjacentKind(kind) {
+  return CUSTODY_ADJACENT_KINDS.includes(normalizeKind(kind));
+}