@oracle-agent/oracle 0.13.0 → 0.13.1

package/README.md

@@ -1,23 +1,535 @@
-# @oracle-agent/oracle
+# Oracle
 
-**This package is a pointer, not the product.**
+## Quickstart (standalone CLI)
 
-Oracle is distributed to [Locals Only](https://opensea.io/collection/locals-only-hyperevm) holders.
-Versions `<=0.12.0` on this registry are deprecated and unmaintained.
+```bash
+# Oracle is distributed to Locals Only holders. Prove ownership at the gate,
+# then install the artifact it returns:
+oracle gate status                                  # if you already have a build
+curl -fL -o oracle.tgz "$ORACLE_GATE_LINK" && npm i -g ./oracle.tgz
+# Node >= 20.19
+oracle --version
+oracle auth login claude               # or codex / grok
+oracle                                  # native Oracle chat
+oracle doctor                           # verify local posture
+```
+
+Prefer an API key instead? `oracle auth api-key openrouter` accepts hidden
+interactive input. `oracle auth status` reports providers without printing
+credentials. Linux, Windows, and macOS apps are in beta.
+
+
+**Prepare-only multichain agent control plane.** Policy-bounded intents; your wallet signs.
+
+Specialist agent profiles, real protocol intents, self-custody by default,
+receipts or it didn't happen.
+
+Built for [Hermes](https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent), the
+open-source agent runtime from [Nous Research](https://nousresearch.com).
+Oracle runs native chat directly — no external agent required.
+`oracle chat` starts the Oracle-native agent loop directly.
+
+Hermes remains available as an optional delegate: `ORACLE_CHAT_BACKEND=hermes oracle chat`.
+
+Oracle can run standalone model auth directly with API keys or Claude, Codex,
+and Grok OAuth. OAuth credentials use the OS keychain when available, with a
+private `0600` local fallback when keychain storage is unavailable.
+
+This package is **prepare-only**: it never takes a private key and never
+broadcasts. The owner-operated signer/executor is private infrastructure, is
+not published on npm, and is not part of holder onboarding. Never paste a seed,
+private key, vault passphrase, or signer token into Oracle chat.
+
+---
+
+## Start safely
+
+1. Install the public CLI and authenticate a model provider as shown above.
+2. Run `oracle chain list`, then `oracle chain use <name>`.
+3. Use reads, research, quotes, simulations, and unsigned preparation.
+4. Review every prepared artifact in the wallet that will sign it.
+5. Treat only a confirmed transaction hash plus receipt as execution.
+
+Hermes is optional. To add its isolated runtime, specialist profiles, and local
+read plane later:
+
+```bash
+oracle bootstrap
+oracle init --apply        # writes profiles + local HMAC attestation config; no wallet key
+oracle data serve          # loopback only: 127.0.0.1:8787
+oracle doctor
+```
+
+Library users can prepare directly:
 
-## Get a build
+```js
+import { data } from "@oracle-agent/oracle";
+const prepared = await data.call("hl-perps", "prepareOrder", {
+  /* coin, side, size, owner wallet address */
+});
+// Oracle stops here. The user's wallet reviews, signs, and submits.
+```
+
+See [SETUP.md](SETUP.md) for clean installation and troubleshooting,
+[docs/holder-beta.md](docs/holder-beta.md) for the Locals-only launch gate, and
+[docs/buzz-integration.md](docs/buzz-integration.md) for the Buzz HTTP contract.
+
+---
+
+## What Oracle is
+
+Most "AI crypto agent" projects give a model a hot wallet and hope. Oracle does
+the opposite: the model *proposes*, the owner *authorizes*, and the policy layer
+decides what may even be asked.
+
+Three properties define it:
+
+1. **Self-custody by default.** The public package never accepts your private
+   key. It builds unsigned transactions and typed-data intents; your wallet
+   signs them.
+2. **Bound grants.** A grant is a signed, scoped, expiring permission: max
+   value, chain, venue, destination allowlist, TTL. Oracle canonicalizes it,
+   renders it for review, and refuses to prepare anything outside it. Runtime
+   enforcement is the wallet's or smart account's job — this package never
+   signs, so it cannot be the thing that stops a transaction.
+3. **Receipts or it didn't happen.** A claim without a transaction hash, a
+   receipt, and a balance delta is not a result.
+
+Default posture is `DISARMED`.
 
-Visit **https://oracle.demi.la**, prove your wallet holds a Locals Only NFT, and install
-the artifact the gate returns:
+## Why it's different
+
+The differentiators are **policy, custody, and receipts** — not a smarter chat
+loop.
+
+| | Typical agent | Oracle |
+|---|---|---|
+| Custody | house wallet holds keys | user signs, no house custody |
+| Authority | prompt-level "be careful" | signed grant: chain, spend, targets, TTL — enforced by your wallet, not by us |
+| Destinations | whatever the model emits | reviewed per-chain allowlist, fail-closed |
+| Slippage | fixed % | live guard recomputed per leg, hard 100 bps cap |
+| Proof | model says "done" | hash + verified successful on-chain receipt + expected balance delta or it failed |
+| Surface | swap only | swaps, bridges, perps, vaults, yield, NFTs, intents |
+
+## Architecture
 
 ```
-curl -fL -o oracle.tgz "<link-from-gate>" && npm i -g ./oracle.tgz
+        you
+         |
+       Task
+         |
+      oracle            <- routes, never authorizes custody
+         |
+  +------+------+------+------+------+------+------+
+  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |
+ poly   hyper  robin  solana bitcoin stable protocol
+ market liquid hood                         builder
 ```
 
-Prefer no terminal? The desktop app is at https://oracle.demi.la/downloads/
+Each lane is a Hermes **profile**: its own system prompt, skills, memory, and
+sessions. The `oracle` lane routes intent to the right specialist. Adding a lane
+is adding a directory.
+
+Three planes, and the boundary between them is mechanically enforced:
+
+- **Data plane** (public) — read/quote across chains and protocols. No keys.
+- **Policy plane** (public) — destination allowlists, slippage guards, route and
+  vault attestations, grant schema. Holds no keys; constrains what a signer may
+  be asked to do.
+- **Exec plane** (private, optional) — signing and broadcast live only in
+  separately operated owner infrastructure. It is not published on npm, not in
+  this artifact, and not available to holder installs.
+
+`test/custody-boundary.test.mjs` walks the import graph and fails if any public
+module reaches wallet key material or a house signer. The split is a test, not a
+promise.
+
+## Coverage
+
+**11 EVM chains** built in: Ethereum, Optimism, BNB, Polygon, Stable, HyperEVM,
+Abstract, Robinhood Chain, Base, Arbitrum, Avalanche. Plus Solana and Bitcoin L1
+lanes. Solana covers Jupiter quote/prepare, SPL account research, live
+simulation of the prepared swap, and Magic Eden NFT reads with unsigned
+buy/list/mint tickets. Bitcoin covers Esplora fee/UTXO reads, Ordinals/runes
+research, Satflow PSBT intents, and inscription PSBT preparation. Hyperliquid
+adds HyperCore HYPE staking: validator reads plus EIP-712 stake, delegate,
+undelegate, and unstake preparation. User wallets sign.
+
+**Any other EVM chain is config, not code:**
+
+```js
+import { registerCustomChain } from "@oracle-agent/oracle/scanner";
+
+registerCustomChain({
+  key: "mychain",
+  chainId: 7777,
+  name: "My Chain",
+  rpcEnv: ["MYCHAIN_RPC_URL"],
+  nativeCurrency: { symbol: "MYC", decimals: 18 },
+});
+```
+
+That chain immediately has block reads, balances, on-chain token resolution, log
+scanning, and structural risk checks. See
+[`docs/adding-a-chain.md`](docs/adding-a-chain.md).
+
+```bash
+oracle-scan chains                    # coverage matrix
+oracle-scan token base 0x8335...2913  # on-chain identity
+oracle-scan pools base 0x4200...0006  # pools ranked by liquidity
+oracle-scan risk  base 0x8335...2913  # structural checks + sell simulation
+oracle-scan sell  base 0x8335...2913  # round trip: can you actually exit?
+```
+
+**8 of 11 chains ship verified venues**: Ethereum, Optimism, BNB, Polygon, Base,
+Arbitrum, Avalanche, and Robinhood Chain. They have all 10 capabilities including
+live quotes, round-trip sell simulation, and unsigned swap preparation. The remaining
+three (Stable, HyperEVM, Abstract) are at 7 and **fail-closed for routing value** until
+someone verifies a venue: read and research work, moving money does not. That is a safe
+default, not a gap.
+
+Every venue address was verified **functionally, not by codesize** — a re-runnable
+prober (`scripts/verify-v3-venues.mjs`) asks each candidate to price a pair with a
+known answer. This matters: the canonical QuoterV2 address also has bytecode on
+Base, but does not price that chain's pairs. A codesize check would have
+allowlisted the wrong contract.
+
+**70 provider modules** in the read/quote catalog, covering **219 unique
+protocols/venues** across EVM, Solana, and Bitcoin (115 EVM + cross-chain, 98
+Solana venues backed by 101 verified Jupiter program IDs, 6 Bitcoin surfaces).
+One module can cover many protocols: the Jupiter module alone routes 98 Solana
+venues, so provider-module count and protocol count are different numbers.
+
+| Class | Providers |
+|---|---|
+| Chain / explorer | EVM JSON-RPC, Blockscout, Solana RPC, Bitcoin Esplora |
+| Market data | DexScreener, GeckoTerminal, DeFiLlama |
+| DEX / aggregator | Uniswap V3/V4, Aerodrome, Curve, Balancer, LI.FI, ParaSwap, Odos, 0x, 1inch, HyperEVM DEXes |
+| Solana | Jupiter (98 venue labels, 101 verified program IDs) |
+| Intents | CoW Protocol, RFQ |
+| Perps / lending / yield | GMX v2, Morpho, Pendle |
+| Bridges | Across, Hop, Relay |
+| Venues | Hyperliquid (core perps + HIP-3 builder dexs + HIP-4 outcomes), Polymarket (read + local CLOB prepare) |
+| NFT | OpenSea, Satflow, Magic Eden (Solana) |
+| Bitcoin | mempool/Esplora, Ordinals, Runes, UniSat, Best-in-Slot, Satflow |
+
+Every provider and every scanner capability declares an honest tier —
+`read-only`, `quote-only`, `prepare`, or `intent`. **API coverage is not execution
+support**, and the catalog says which is which. A chain with no verified venue is
+fail-closed for routing value: read and research work, moving money does not. That
+is a safe default, not a gap.
+
+## Capability pack
+
+Oracle's default pack is deliberately broad but disarmed:
+
+- **Trader** — best-execution route comparison, quote/prepare, simulation, and
+  receipt checks; no set-and-forget custody.
+- **Builder** - chain-family fungible-token and NFT-collection launch plans,
+  protocol, gacha, DEX, and launchpad scaffolds with unsigned deploy/admin actions.
+  Unsupported chain adapters fail closed instead of pretending one deploy fits all.
+- **Analyzer** — token, contract, venue, portfolio, market, and risk research with
+  evidence labels. `/balance` or plain `balance` runs one deterministic snapshot
+  across every configured EVM chain plus Solana, Bitcoin, Hyperliquid, and
+  discoverable NFTs. Profile-local observations power history and SVG value graphs;
+  unavailable values stay null instead of becoming fake zeroes.
+- **On-chain scanner** — chain-config scanners for tokens, pools, launches,
+  risk, exits, and smart-wallet boards.
+- **Meme-token sniper** — fast launch/liquidity monitoring across configured
+  chains, guarded by identity checks, sell-sim/reverse-route proof, caps, and
+  unsigned user-wallet tickets.
+- **Per-chain graphs + Telegram cards** — charted scanner alerts, route cards,
+  meme-launch cards, Hyperliquid HIP-3/HIP-4 cards, and Polymarket cards. User
+  API-key actions activate only when self-hosted keys are configured.
+- **NFT mint gas-war limits** — public mint bots enforce chain-bound gas caps,
+  per-unit fee caps, and optional priority-fee caps before returning unsigned
+  mint transactions. Import `validateNftMintGasWar` from the package root or
+  `@oracle-agent/oracle/nft-gas-war`.
+- **Cross-chain RFQ + tokenized assets** — RFQ/intent venues are compared across
+  supported chains where configured, and tokenized Robinhood-style assets can be
+  bought only after exact contract, venue, route, and sellability checks.
+- **Solana** — SPL accounts, Jupiter quotes, unsigned swap transactions, and
+  simulation.
+- **Bitcoin** — L1 reads, Ordinals/runes, Satflow PSBT intents, and inscription
+  PSBT preparation.
+
+Every money-moving path stays prepare/simulate first. Signing and broadcast are
+wallet/grant actions, not model authority. Meme-token sniping defaults to fast
+scan + prepared ticket; blind broadcast requires a separate capped local signer
+loop and explicit opt-in. NFT mint bots must also honor gas-war caps before any
+wallet-signable transaction is returned. RFQ and tokenized-asset routes are
+capability-labeled per chain; unconfigured venues stay unavailable instead of faked.
+
+## Install
+
+```bash
+npm install @oracle-agent/oracle    # Node >= 20.19.0
+```
+
+Or from source, if you want to run the suite:
+
+```bash
+git clone https://github.com/demi-hl/oracle.git
+cd oracle
+npm install
+npm test
+```
+
+**→ [SETUP.md](./SETUP.md) covers public data credentials and the separate
+owner-local source lane.** The short version:
+
+- Reads and quotes need **no keys**.
+- The public package exposes no signer, key vault, or broadcast path.
+- User wallets authorize prepared actions outside the public data plane.
+- Owner-local signing exists only in separately operated private infrastructure;
+  it is not published on npm and is not a holder capability. When installed by
+  the owner, its generic signer exposes six policy-bounded surfaces: `hl`,
+  `poly`, `evm-swap`, `evm-bridge`, `btc`, and `sol`, with explicit caps and
+  fail-closed allowlists.
+
+### Action vocabulary and execution planes
+
+Oracle keeps capability and authorization separate:
+
+- Public Oracle reads, quotes, simulates, and prepares unsigned artifacts.
+- **Path A:** owner/main, browser, smart-account, hardware, or protocol-native
+  wallets sign the prepared artifact. This is the default self-custody path.
+- **Path B:** private owner-local infrastructure may sign on the same host with
+  the owner's key and policy. It is deployment-specific, unavailable to holder
+  installs, and must never expose a vault passphrase or signer credential to the
+  agent process.
+- The generic unattended signer exposes six bounded surfaces: `hl`, `poly`,
+  `evm-swap`, `evm-bridge`, `btc`, `sol`. Each surface decodes its own
+  envelope, enforces its caps, and refuses while its allowlists are empty.
+- Ordinary EVM preparation remains user-wallet signed unless a trusted
+  owner-controlled direct-exec process is explicitly installed and armed.
+- `ORACLE_AUTONOMOUS_TRADING=1` is direct execution for trusted owner-controlled
+  local code only. It is never model/agent authority and should not be framed as
+  equivalent to the `oracle-signer` agent-process path.
+- A deployment may separately install a same-host, owner-gated EVM executor.
+  Oracle must verify that executor before describing bounded EVM execution as
+  available. Missing deployment capability means "unavailable here," not
+  "Oracle can never execute EVM."
+- `watch`, `watch this`, and `ping me` always create `active: true, actionMode: alert_only`.
+- `arm` creates `active: true, actionMode: execute` only for one exact owner-authorized action. It is never inferred from a watch.
+
+The package exports this binding as `@oracle-agent/oracle/action-semantics`. Legacy watch stores can migrate `status: watching|armed` with `migrateLegacyWatchRecord()`; because it is specifically a watch-store migration, both statuses become `alert_only`, never execution authority.
+
+Run the read-only data plane:
+
+```bash
+npm run start:data
+npm run health
+```
+
+Run the public console (wallet connect, grant editor, receipts):
+
+```bash
+npm run start:public
+# http://127.0.0.1:8799/
+```
+
+This is an unauthenticated loopback development server, not a holder gate or a
+public deployment. Keep it off LAN/tailnet/public interfaces and place a tested
+admission gateway in front of any hosted beta.
+
+## Model providers
+
+Oracle is a library. Drive it with Claude, GPT, Gemini, Grok, a local model, or
+a plain script — the tools are ordinary functions plus an MCP server:
+
+```bash
+npx oracle-data         # local read plane on 127.0.0.1:8787
+npx oracle-data-mcp     # MCP stdio server (any MCP client); needs oracle-data up
+```
+
+It is better under [Hermes](https://hermes-agent.nousresearch.com/docs), because
+a trading stack is several workloads with opposite needs and **per-profile
+routing** gives each its own model, tools, and key scope: cheap wide context for
+research, a fast model for execution where latency is money, the strongest model
+for risk review, something small for unattended crons. The research profile can
+hold no signing key at all.
+
+Oracle's own pre-release audit ran four model lineages — Grok 4.5, Opus 5,
+Fable 5, GPT-5.6 — and **each found a critical bug the others missed**. One
+model reviewing its own work would have shipped three of them.
+
+
+## Agent profiles
+
+Oracle ships an installable 8-lane mesh for Hermes:
+
+```bash
+oracle-init            # dry run -- shows exactly what it would do
+oracle-init --apply    # create profiles, install SOULs + skills, wire MCP config
+npx oracle-data        # keep running — MCP tools call the local read plane on :8787
+oracle                 # premium boxed TTY on the same oracle profile as messaging
+oracle model           # choose provider/model; persona stays oracle
+oracle chain use hyperliquid
+oracle setup           # telegram / discord / slack messaging
+```
+
+Terminal and configured messaging channels are transports into the same Hermes
+`oracle` profile. When a local operator/MCP is configured, an explicit owner
+trade instruction can execute from either interface. The selected model never
+bypasses signer-owned grants, allowlists, caps, MAC checks, simulation, or
+receipt verification.
+
+Lanes: `oracle` (router), `polymarket-agent`, `hyperliquid-agent`,
+`robinhood-agent`, `solana-agent`, `bitcoin-agent`, `stable-agent`,
+`protocol-builder`, plus `_template` for your own. Details in
+[`docs/profiles.md`](docs/profiles.md).
+
+Every lane installs **DISARMED**. No lane requests a broadcast or signing action —
+only read, simulate, and prepare — and a test enforces that so widening custody
+can't pass review quietly. An existing `SOUL.md` is never overwritten without
+`--force`, and `--force` writes a timestamped backup first.
+
+Oracle does not issue its own model credential. Standalone chat uses the OAuth
+login or API key the user configured; Hermes mode uses whichever provider that
+Hermes installation already supports.
+
+**Why "built for Hermes" and not just "works anywhere":** Oracle's read plane is
+an MCP server, so any MCP client can call it. But the *mesh* — per-lane memory,
+skills, sessions, and separate model choice per specialist — is Hermes profile
+machinery. You can use Oracle from any agent; you get the architecture in the
+diagram above from Hermes.
+
+## Best-execution routing
+
+The highest quote is not the cheapest swap. Oracle ranks on **net received after
+gas and fees**, comparing every available source in parallel:
+
+```bash
+oracle-route swap   base 0x4200...0006 0x8335...2913   # WETH -> USDC
+oracle-route bridge arbitrum base                       # ETH across chains
+```
+
+```
+  source           net out           gross  cost
+* paraswap    1,903.880867    1,903.893053  $0.01
+  cow         1,903.693798    1,903.693798  gasless (solver)
+  lifi        1,894.432632     1,899.20966  $4.78
+```
+
+Sources: **LI.FI, CoW, ParaSwap, 0x, 1inch** for swaps · **LI.FI, Relay, Across**
+for bridges. 0x and 1inch activate when their API key is present; the rest need
+none.
+
+Why net matters:
+
+- **Gas is part of the price.** A route quoting 0.2% more but costing $14 more in
+  gas loses on a $500 swap and wins on a $50k one. The crossover depends on trade
+  size, so any fixed preference is wrong on one side of it.
+- **Intents can beat AMMs.** CoW's solver pays the gas, so a slightly lower gross
+  quote often wins on net — the case naive ranking always gets backwards.
+- **Sources disagree about what they mean.** Some report gas in USD, some in native
+  wei, some not at all. Oracle normalizes, and marks what was measured.
+
+**Unknown cost is never scored as zero.** A source that does not report gas is
+ranked on gross and flagged, because scoring an unknown as free is how the worst
+route wins a comparison. When the top two routes measure cost differently, Oracle
+quotes **no spread at all** rather than a number that compares different things.
+
+Then prepare the winner in one step:
+
+```bash
+oracle-route prepare base <tokenIn> <tokenOut> <yourWallet>
+```
+
+You get back an **unsigned transaction** (LI.FI, ParaSwap, 0x) or **EIP-712 typed
+data** for an off-chain order (CoW). `artifactKind` says which — they need different
+wallet actions, and one is not broadcast at all. Prepare **re-quotes** and reports
+`driftBps` against the comparison, because a minimum computed from a stale quote is
+not a minimum.
+
+Bridges prepare too:
+
+```bash
+oracle-route prepare-bridge arbitrum base <yourWallet>
+```
+
+Bridge artifacts are always a **list** of transactions — some routes need an approval
+and a deposit signed in order, and signing only the first leaves funds approved but
+not bridged. Both chains are reported, and a transaction whose chain does not match
+the origin is refused. Oracle states plainly that **bridging is not atomic**: the
+origin transaction confirming does not mean funds arrived.
+
+Routing never signs. `taker` must be the real wallet; placeholder addresses are
+rejected, since quoting is anonymous but preparing is not. Signing happens in
+the user's wallet or in a separately operated source-only execution lane.
+
+Individual source failures degrade the comparison by one source instead of breaking
+it — verified in practice when Odos sunset their public API mid-development
+(HTTP 410); the router kept ranking and the provider was marked `unavailable`.
+
+## On-chain equities — Crossbook (HIP-3 / Arcus / RH / Solana / TON)
+
+Tokenized equities span multiple venues. Oracle ranks them the same way as swaps:
+net of known costs, with unknown costs never scored as free.
+
+```bash
+oracle equities venues
+oracle equities quote NVDA --size 1000
+oracle equities quote SPY --size 500 --json
+oracle equities prepare NVDA --recipient 0xYourWallet
+# or: oracle-equities quote NVDA --size 1000
+```
+
+Import surface: `@oracle-agent/oracle/equities` (`bestEquityRoute`, `equityVenues`,
+`prepareEquityRoute`). MCP tools: `equity_venues`, `equity_quote`, `equity_prepare`.
+
+Only Robinhood-chain Uniswap is prepare-tier in v1. HIP-3, Arcus, Solana xStocks,
+and TON ston.fi are quote-only discovery. `bestPreparable` is separate from the
+overall winner so a quote-only mid is never presented as actionable.
+
+## Examples
+
+```bash
+node examples/add-a-chain.mjs             # register an unseen chain, no code
+node examples/research-a-token.mjs        # honest token research on live data
+node examples/oracle-pack-template.mjs    # skeleton for a safe Oracle protocol pack
+```
+
+## MCP
+
+Oracle exposes its read plane over the Model Context Protocol, so any MCP client
+(Hermes, Claude Code, others) can use it:
+
+```bash
+oracle-data-mcp
+```
+
+## Security
+
+- Oracle never receives private keys.
+- The router can propose, simulate, explain, and draft. It cannot authorize.
+- Public modules may not import signer or executor code (enforced by test).
+- Destination allowlists are per-chain and fail-closed: an empty allowlist
+  refuses everything rather than allowing everything.
+- Report vulnerabilities per [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md). Please do not open a
+  public issue for a live exploit.
+
+## What Oracle is not
+
+- Not an autonomous trader. There is no "set and forget."
+- Not custodial. If a design needs your key on our server, that design is wrong.
+- Not a guarantee. Crypto execution carries real risk; read the code you run.
+
+## License
+
+[Business Source License 1.1](LICENSE) — source-available, not open source.
+
+You may read, modify, self-host, and use Oracle freely for internal use,
+evaluation, research, and personal use. What you may not do is offer Oracle,
+or substantially its functionality, to third parties as a competing product
+or hosted service without a commercial license.
+
+Each version converts to **Apache-2.0** on its Change Date (four years after
+release). Versions `0.1.0` through `0.11.0` were published under Apache-2.0
+and remain under those terms.
 
-## Why
+The **Oracle** name and marks are reserved; please don't imply endorsement by
+an official deployment when shipping a fork.
 
-A holder check that runs on your machine can always be switched off. Serving the
-artifact from a server that verifies ownership is the only version of this that means
-anything. Keys and signing never live in the public package either way.
+For commercial licensing, contact the maintainer.

package/SECURITY.md

@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
+# Security Policy
+
+## Reporting a vulnerability
+
+**Do not open a public issue for a live exploit.**
+
+Email **security@demi.la** with:
+
+- what the issue is
+- how to reproduce it
+- the impact you believe it has
+- whether funds are at risk right now
+
+You'll get an acknowledgement within 72 hours. If funds are actively at risk,
+say so in the subject line and we'll treat it as urgent.
+
+Please give us a reasonable window to ship a fix before public disclosure. We
+will credit you unless you'd rather stay anonymous.
+
+## Scope
+
+In scope:
+
+- custody-boundary escapes (public code reaching a signer or key material)
+- destination-allowlist bypasses
+- slippage/minimum-output guard bypasses
+- grant forgery, replay, or scope escalation
+- route/vault/order attestation forgery
+- secret leakage through an API response or log
+- holder-gate bypass, challenge replay, or cross-user data access in an official
+  hosted beta
+- Buzz capability forgery or audit-chain tampering
+
+Out of scope:
+
+- third-party provider outages and their rate limits
+- economic risk inherent to a protocol you chose to trade
+- issues that require the operator's own machine to already be compromised
+- deployment hardening for an operator's separate private execution service
+
+## Threat model
+
+Oracle assumes the language model can be wrong or adversarially steered. The
+model is treated as an untrusted proposer.
+
+Consequences of that assumption, which are the invariants worth attacking:
+
+1. **The public package never holds a key.** Signing happens in the user's
+   wallet. Source-only operator modules are excluded from public entrypoints and
+   the npm artifact.
+2. **Model output is not authorization.** A grant is authorization, and a grant
+   is signed by the owner, scoped, and expiring.
+3. **Destinations are allowlisted per chain and fail closed.** An empty allowlist
+   refuses everything. It never means "allow anything."
+4. **Model-authored metadata is not trusted for routing.** Dynamic execution
+   targets require an attestation minted inside the trusted boundary.
+5. **Guards are recomputed at sign and broadcast time**, not just at quote time,
+   because a stale minimum is not a minimum.
+6. **The shipped public HTTP server is not a holder-authentication service.** It
+   is loopback-only and rate limited, but unauthenticated. A hosted Locals beta
+   needs a separate server-side ownership gate and per-user isolation.
+
+If you find a path where model-authored text becomes an authorized on-chain
+action without an owner signature and a policy check, that is the bug we most
+want to hear about.
+
+## Enforcement in CI
+
+`test/custody-boundary.test.mjs` walks the public import graph, and
+`test/public-release-hardening.test.mjs` inspects the packed npm artifact. The
+build fails if either public surface reaches wallet key material or a house
+signer. The secret scanner also checks current files and Git history. CI runs
+the boundary suite on every push and pull request.
+
+A security claim that isn't enforced by a test is just a comment.
+
+## Hosted and operator boundaries
+
+These are not public-package custody holes. They are operator constraints that
+still apply after the public boundary hardening:
+
+1. **Owner-local signer modules live in private operator infrastructure.** The
+   operator package is not published on npm and is not part of public or holder
+   onboarding. Those modules and credentials must not be restored into this
+   prepare-only package or its npm artifact. CI fails if a pack of *this* repo
+   includes signer or vault paths.
+2. **Prepare helpers that validate executable routes require an attestation
+   secret** (`requireSigned`) so they cannot be used as a softer pre-broadcast
+   gate than `enforceTxPolicy`.
+3. **Live grants have a hard 24-hour ceiling.** Public grant validation with an
+   explicit reference time and provider-neutral session grants reject a longer
+   TTL. Deployments should choose a shorter lifetime whenever possible.
+4. **Execution tool routing fails closed.** Sign, send, submit, and broadcast
+   operations are owner-only. Unknown operations inside a signer/executor
+   namespace also require owner send/execute intent; a new tool name does not
+   silently become guest-accessible.
+5. **Daily spend ledger locks are never reclaimed automatically.** An existing
+   lock refuses broadcast, even when it appears stale. After verifying that no
+   holder is active, an operator must remove a stale lock out of band. This
+   sacrifices unattended recovery to avoid a stale-reclaimer ABA race that can
+   defeat aggregate spend accounting.
+6. **Action records are not chain proof.** `normalizeActionReceipt()` records
+   caller-supplied public facts; `recordAudit()` is a process-local, best-effort
+   file helper. Neither authorizes execution or proves settlement. Report
+   success only after independently verifying the successful chain receipt,
+   expected destination/events, and expected balance delta.
+7. **Repository-host controls are not the custody boundary.** Dependabot alerts
+   may be enabled independently, while branch protection, CodeQL, and hosted
+   secret scanning depend on repository visibility and account tier. Verify the
+   live settings; do not infer them from this document. The local CI boundary,
+   packed-artifact, and secret-scan gates remain mandatory.
+8. **Holder admission is deployment code.** The npm package does not prove
+   Locals ownership or isolate hosted tenants. See
+   [docs/holder-beta.md](docs/holder-beta.md) before exposing any shared surface.