@oracle-agent/oracle 0.11.0 → 0.13.0

package/src/auto-slippage.mjs

@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
-// Chain-agnostic bounded automatic slippage policy.
-// Slippage protects fresh quote -> inclusion movement only. Protocol fee and
-// modeled price impact already live in quoteAmountOut and must not be counted a
-// second time. Every executable swap route hard-stops at 100 bps.
-//
-// AUTHENTICATION: the guard is HMAC-signed with the same attestation secret the
-// route/vault/gmx attestations use. Quotes may attach an unsigned bound when no
-// secret is configured (read/prepare UX). Sign and broadcast ALWAYS require a
-// verified signature (requireSigned / enforceTxPolicy) — an unsigned guard is
-// self-attested and must never authorize a swap.
-
-import { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
-import { resolveAttestationSecret } from "./attestation-secret.mjs";
-import { assertFreshWindow } from "./fresh-window.mjs";
-
-export const AUTO_SLIPPAGE_MAX_BPS = 100;
-export const AUTO_SLIPPAGE_DEFAULT_TTL_MS = 20_000;
-
-function canonicalJson(value) {
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) return `[${value.map(canonicalJson).join(",")}]`;
-  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
-    return `{${Object.keys(value)
-      .sort()
-      .map((k) => `${JSON.stringify(k)}:${canonicalJson(value[k])}`)
-      .join(",")}}`;
-  }
-  return JSON.stringify(value ?? null);
-}
-
-function slippageSecret(secret, { required = false } = {}) {
-  try {
-    return resolveAttestationSecret(secret, "ORACLE_ROUTE_ATTESTATION_SECRET", "MAD_ROUTE_ATTESTATION_SECRET");
-  } catch (error) {
-    if (required) throw error;
-    return null;
-  }
-}
-
-function unsigned(guard) {
-  const { signature: _sig, ...rest } = guard;
-  return rest;
-}
-
-/** Sign a guard so it cannot be forged or re-attached to a different swap. */
-export function signAutoSlippageGuard(guard, { secret } = {}) {
-  const key = slippageSecret(secret);
-  if (!key) return guard;
-  return { ...guard, signature: createHmac("sha256", key).update(canonicalJson(unsigned(guard))).digest("hex") };
-}
-
-function calldataDigest(data) {
-  const hex = String(data || "").toLowerCase();
-  if (!/^0x[0-9a-f]+$/.test(hex) || hex.length < 10 || hex.length % 2 !== 0) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage calldata must be even-length hex with a selector");
-  }
-  return createHash("sha256").update(Buffer.from(hex.slice(2), "hex")).digest("hex");
-}
-
-export function bindAutoSlippageGuardToCall(guard, { chainId, venue, data, secret } = {}) {
-  if (!guard || guard.mode !== "auto") throw new Error("bounded auto-slippage guard required");
-  if (Number(guard.chainId) !== Number(chainId)) throw new Error("auto-slippage guard chain mismatch");
-  if (String(guard.venue).toLowerCase() !== String(venue || "").toLowerCase()) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage guard venue mismatch");
-  }
-  return signAutoSlippageGuard(
-    { ...unsigned(guard), calldataHash: calldataDigest(data) },
-    { secret },
-  );
-}
-
-function sameSignature(a, b) {
-  const x = Buffer.from(String(a ?? ""), "utf8");
-  const y = Buffer.from(String(b ?? ""), "utf8");
-  if (x.length !== y.length || x.length === 0) return false;
-  return timingSafeEqual(x, y);
-}
-
-function finite(value, fallback = 0) {
-  const n = Number(value);
-  return Number.isFinite(n) ? n : fallback;
-}
-
-function integerCap(value) {
-  const n = value == null ? AUTO_SLIPPAGE_MAX_BPS : Number(value);
-  if (!Number.isInteger(n) || n < 0) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage cap must be a non-negative integer bps value");
-  }
-  return Math.min(n, AUTO_SLIPPAGE_MAX_BPS);
-}
-
-export function resolveAutoSlippage({
-  liquidityUsd,
-  priceChange5m = 0,
-  quoteAgeMs = 0,
-  crossChain = false,
-  requestedCapBps,
-} = {}) {
-  const liquidity = finite(liquidityUsd, 0);
-  const depthPenalty = liquidity > 0
-    ? liquidity >= 250_000
-      ? 5
-      : liquidity >= 100_000
-        ? 10
-        : liquidity >= 50_000
-          ? 20
-          : liquidity >= 10_000
-            ? 40
-            : 70
-    : crossChain
-      ? 30
-      : 10;
-  const volatilityPenalty = Math.min(60, Math.abs(finite(priceChange5m, 0)) * 2);
-  const agePenalty = Math.min(40, Math.floor(Math.max(0, finite(quoteAgeMs, 0)) / 5_000) * 5);
-  const requiredBps = Math.max(25, Math.ceil(20 + depthPenalty + volatilityPenalty + agePenalty));
-  const capBps = integerCap(requestedCapBps);
-  return {
-    mode: "auto",
-    requiredBps,
-    selectedBps: Math.min(requiredBps, capBps),
-    capBps,
-    executable: requiredBps <= capBps,
-  };
-}
-
-export function createAutoSlippageGuard({
-  chainId,
-  venue,
-  quoteAmountOut,
-  liquidityUsd,
-  priceChange5m = 0,
-  quoteAgeMs = 0,
-  crossChain = false,
-  requestedCapBps,
-  quotedAtMs = Date.now(),
-  ttlMs = AUTO_SLIPPAGE_DEFAULT_TTL_MS,
-  secret,
-} = {}) {
-  const quote = BigInt(quoteAmountOut ?? 0);
-  if (quote <= 0n) throw new Error("auto-slippage guard requires positive quoteAmountOut");
-  const selected = resolveAutoSlippage({
-    liquidityUsd,
-    priceChange5m,
-    quoteAgeMs,
-    crossChain,
-    requestedCapBps,
-  });
-  if (!selected.executable) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `auto-slippage requires ${selected.requiredBps} bps above hard/requested cap ${selected.capBps}; route blocked`
-    );
-  }
-  const quoted = Number(quotedAtMs);
-  if (!Number.isFinite(quoted)) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage: quotedAtMs must be a finite number");
-  }
-  const ttl = Math.min(30_000, Math.max(1_000, Number(ttlMs) || AUTO_SLIPPAGE_DEFAULT_TTL_MS));
-  // BigInt division truncates toward zero, so on small quotes the realised
-  // floor can be far looser than the advertised cap: a 90 bps guard on a quote
-  // of 3 produced minAmountOut=2, i.e. 3333 bps of actual permitted slippage.
-  // Round the floor UP so the executed protection is never weaker than stated,
-  // and refuse outright when the quote is too small to express the bound.
-  const numerator = quote * BigInt(10_000 - selected.selectedBps);
-  let minAmountOut = numerator / 10_000n;
-  if (numerator % 10_000n !== 0n) minAmountOut += 1n; // ceil: favour the user
-  if (minAmountOut > quote) minAmountOut = quote;
-  if (quote > 0n && minAmountOut <= 0n) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `auto-slippage: quote ${quote} is too small to express a ${selected.selectedBps} bps floor without rounding to zero`
-    );
-  }
-  // Verify the realised bound actually honours the cap rather than trusting the
-  // arithmetic above.
-  const realisedBps = Number(((quote - minAmountOut) * 10_000n) / (quote === 0n ? 1n : quote));
-  if (realisedBps > selected.capBps) {
-    throw new Error(
-      `auto-slippage: realised floor implies ${realisedBps} bps, above cap ${selected.capBps} — refusing to issue a guard weaker than advertised`
-    );
-  }
-  // Sign on issue so the guard is verifiable later. A secret is mandatory —
-  // unsigned guards are self-attested and rejected at assert time.
-  return signAutoSlippageGuard(
-    {
-      mode: "auto",
-      chainId: Number(chainId),
-      venue: String(venue || "unknown"),
-      quoteAmountOut: quote.toString(),
-      minAmountOut: minAmountOut.toString(),
-      requiredBps: selected.requiredBps,
-      selectedBps: selected.selectedBps,
-      capBps: selected.capBps,
-      quotedAtMs: quoted,
-      expiresAtMs: quoted + ttl,
-    },
-    { secret }
-  );
-}
-
-/**
- * Best-effort extraction of the output floor a swap call actually encodes.
- *
- * Returns null when the selector is unknown — this binds the common router
- * shapes without pretending to be a universal ABI decoder. A null result means
- * "cannot verify from calldata", not "verified safe": the venue allowlist and
- * the guard's own bounds still apply.
- */
-function encodedMinOut(data) {
-  const hex = String(data || "");
-  if (!/^0x[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex) || hex.length < 10 || hex.length % 2 !== 0) return null;
-  const selector = hex.slice(0, 10).toLowerCase();
-  const words = [];
-  for (let i = 10; i + 64 <= hex.length; i += 64) words.push(hex.slice(i, i + 64));
-  const word = (i) => (words[i] == null ? null : BigInt("0x" + words[i]));
-
-  switch (selector) {
-    // Uniswap V3 SwapRouter — exactInputSingle with deadline:
-    //   (tokenIn,tokenOut,fee,recipient,deadline,amountIn,amountOutMinimum,
-    //    sqrtPriceLimitX96) — all static, so amountOutMinimum is word 6.
-    case "0x414bf389":
-      return word(6);
-    // SwapRouter02 — SAME name, NO deadline member:
-    //   (tokenIn,tokenOut,fee,recipient,amountIn,amountOutMinimum,
-    //    sqrtPriceLimitX96) — amountOutMinimum shifts to word 5.
-    // Treating this as the 8-member shape reads sqrtPriceLimitX96 instead.
-    case "0x04e45aaf":
-      return word(5);
-    // exactInput((bytes path,address recipient,uint256 deadline,
-    //   uint256 amountIn,uint256 amountOutMinimum))
-    //
-    // The struct's FIRST member is dynamic (bytes path), so the struct itself
-    // is encoded behind an offset and its members live in a tail:
-    //   head[0]           = offset to the struct
-    //   tail[0] (word 1)  = offset to path
-    //   tail[1] (word 2)  = recipient
-    //   tail[2] (word 3)  = deadline
-    //   tail[3] (word 4)  = amountIn
-    //   tail[4] (word 5)  = amountOutMinimum   <-- the real output floor
-    //
-    // Reading word 4 here checked amountIn, which an attacker simply sets to
-    // the guard's expected value while leaving amountOutMinimum at 0. Follow
-    // the offset instead of assuming a fixed layout.
-    case "0xc04b8d59": {
-      const structOffset = word(0);
-      if (structOffset == null) return null;
-      // Offsets are byte counts from the start of the argument block.
-      const base = Number(structOffset) / 32;
-      if (!Number.isInteger(base) || base < 0) return null;
-      return word(base + 4);
-    }
-    // SwapRouter02 exactInput((bytes path,address recipient,uint256 amountIn,
-    //   uint256 amountOutMinimum)) — no deadline, so the floor is tail word 3.
-    case "0xb858183f": {
-      const structOffset = word(0);
-      if (structOffset == null) return null;
-      const base = Number(structOffset) / 32;
-      if (!Number.isInteger(base) || base < 0) return null;
-      return word(base + 3);
-    }
-    // Aerodrome Slipstream exactInputSingle with tickSpacing and deadline
-    case "0xa026383e":
-      return word(6);
-    // V2 swapExactTokensForTokens(amountIn, amountOutMin, path, to, deadline)
-    case "0x38ed1739":
-    case "0x5c11d795": // ...SupportingFeeOnTransferTokens
-      return word(1);
-    // V2 swapExactETHForTokens(amountOutMin, path, to, deadline)
-    case "0x7ff36ab5":
-    case "0xb6f9de95":
-      return word(0);
-    // V2 swapExactTokensForETH(amountIn, amountOutMin, path, to, deadline)
-    case "0x18cbafe5":
-    case "0x791ac947":
-      return word(1);
-    default:
-      return null;
-  }
-}
-
-
-export function assertAutoSlippageGuard(
-  guard,
-  { nowMs = Date.now(), chainId, venue, secret, tx, requireSigned = false } = {},
-) {
-  if (!guard || guard.mode !== "auto") {
-    throw new Error("bounded auto-slippage guard required");
-  }
-
-  // Verify authenticity FIRST when signing/broadcasting. Quotes may attach an
-  // unsigned bound for display; the policy gate always passes requireSigned=true.
-  const key = slippageSecret(secret, { required: requireSigned });
-  if (requireSigned && !key) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage attestation secret required for signing or broadcast");
-  }
-  if (key) {
-    const expected = createHmac("sha256", key).update(canonicalJson(unsigned(guard))).digest("hex");
-    if (!sameSignature(guard.signature, expected)) {
-      throw new Error("auto-slippage guard signature mismatch — the guard was not issued by this Oracle");
-    }
-  } else if (guard.signature) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage guard carries a signature but no attestation secret is configured");
-  }
-  const selected = Number(guard.selectedBps);
-  const cap = Number(guard.capBps);
-  if (!Number.isInteger(selected) || selected < 0 || selected > AUTO_SLIPPAGE_MAX_BPS) {
-    throw new Error(`auto-slippage selected tolerance exceeds hard 100 bps cap`);
-  }
-  if (!Number.isInteger(cap) || cap < 0 || cap > AUTO_SLIPPAGE_MAX_BPS || selected > cap) {
-    throw new Error(`auto-slippage cap exceeds hard 100 bps cap`);
-  }
-  // Fail CLOSED on an unusable clock: Number(NaN) > x is false, so a broken or
-  // attacker-influenced clock made an expired quote eternal.
-  try {
-    assertFreshWindow({ expiresAtMs: guard.expiresAtMs, issuedAtMs: guard.quotedAtMs }, nowMs, "auto-slippage quote");
-  } catch (e) {
-    throw new Error(`${e.message}; re-quote before signing`);
-  }
-  if (chainId != null && Number(guard.chainId) !== Number(chainId)) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage guard chain mismatch");
-  }
-  if (venue && String(guard.venue).toLowerCase() !== String(venue).toLowerCase()) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage guard venue mismatch");
-  }
-  const quote = BigInt(guard.quoteAmountOut ?? 0);
-  const minimum = BigInt(guard.minAmountOut ?? 0);
-  if (quote <= 0n || minimum <= 0n) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage guard amounts must be positive");
-  }
-  const protectedFloor = quote * BigInt(10_000 - selected) / 10_000n;
-  if (minimum < protectedFloor) {
-    throw new Error("auto-slippage guard is under-protected relative to its fresh quote");
-  }
-  if (tx?.data && guard.minAmountOut != null) {
-    if (guard.calldataHash != null) {
-      if (String(guard.calldataHash) !== calldataDigest(tx.data)) {
-        throw new Error("auto-slippage guard is not bound to this call: calldata hash mismatch");
-      }
-    } else {
-      const encoded = encodedMinOut(tx.data);
-      if (encoded == null) {
-        const selector = String(tx.data).slice(0, 10);
-        throw new Error(
-          `auto-slippage: cannot verify the output floor encoded by selector ${selector}; ` +
-            "refusing rather than trusting unbound calldata at an allowlisted venue"
-        );
-      }
-      if (encoded !== BigInt(guard.minAmountOut)) {
-        throw new Error(
-          `auto-slippage guard is not bound to this call: guard minAmountOut ${guard.minAmountOut} but calldata encodes ${encoded}`
-        );
-      }
-    }
-  }
-  return true;
-}
-
-export function attachAutoSlippage(result, {
-  chainId,
-  venue,
-  amountOut,
-  liquidityUsd,
-  priceChange5m,
-  crossChain,
-  requestedCapBps,
-  quotedAtMs = Date.now(),
-  ttlMs,
-} = {}) {
-  const autoSlippage = createAutoSlippageGuard({
-    chainId,
-    venue,
-    quoteAmountOut: amountOut,
-    liquidityUsd,
-    priceChange5m,
-    crossChain,
-    requestedCapBps,
-    quotedAtMs,
-    ttlMs,
-  });
-  return { ...result, autoSlippage, amountOutMinimum: autoSlippage.minAmountOut };
-}

package/src/capability-posture.mjs

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle capability posture.
-//
-// THE RULE, stated once, in one place:
-//
-//   A capability is ARMED when the user has supplied the credential it needs.
-//   Nothing executes unless the user asks for that specific action.
-//   Autonomous trading is the sole exception: it stays OFF until explicitly
-//   enabled, because it is the only mode where Oracle acts without a request.
-//
-// Why this shape:
-//
-//   The old model ("everything disarmed until N env flags are set") punished
-//   the honest self-hoster. Someone who had already handed Oracle a signing key
-//   still could not buy an NFT without hunting down a second, third, and fourth
-//   feature flag. That is not security — it is friction that teaches people to
-//   set ORACLE_*_ENABLED=1 everywhere, which is strictly worse than a coherent
-//   default.
-//
-//   Supplying a key IS the authorization decision. What actually protects the
-//   user is not a flag; it is that every action is USER-INITIATED and bounded
-//   by caps at the moment it runs.
-//
-//   The one thing a key does NOT authorize is Oracle acting on its own. An
-//   agent that trades while you sleep is a different risk class from an agent
-//   that buys the NFT you just named. So AUTONOMOUS trading — and only that —
-//   requires a separate, explicit opt-in.
-
-export const CAPABILITY_TIERS = Object.freeze({
-  READ: "read",
-  PREPARE: "prepare",
-  EXECUTE: "execute",
-  AUTONOMOUS: "autonomous",
-});
-
-/** Credential each capability needs before it can be armed. */
-const CREDENTIAL_FOR = Object.freeze({
-  "evm:prepare": ["ORACLE_EVM_ADDRESS", "EVM_KEYSTORE_FILE", "ORACLE_SIGNER_ADDRESS"],
-  "evm:execute": ["EVM_KEYSTORE_FILE", "ORACLE_KEYSTORE_FILE"],
-  "btc:execute": ["BTC_WIF_FILE", "ORACLE_BTC_WIF_FILE"],
-  "solana:execute": ["SOLANA_KEYPAIR_FILE", "ORACLE_SOLANA_KEYPAIR_FILE"],
-  "nft:buy": [],
-  "nft:mint": [],
-  "cow:submit": [],
-});
-
-function hasAnyEnv(names, env) {
-  return names.some((n) => String(env[n] ?? "").trim() !== "");
-}
-
-/**
- * Is autonomous (unattended) trading enabled?
- *
- * This is the ONLY capability that a present key does not arm, because it is
- * the only one where Oracle initiates value movement without the user asking
- * for that specific action.
- */
-export function autonomousTradingEnabled(env = process.env) {
-  return String(env.ORACLE_AUTONOMOUS_TRADING ?? "").trim() === "1";
-}
-
-/**
- * Decide whether a capability may run.
- *
- * @param {string} capability   e.g. "nft:buy", "btc:execute"
- * @param {object} opts
- * @param {boolean} opts.userInitiated  the user asked for THIS action, now
- * @param {boolean} opts.autonomous     Oracle initiated it on its own
- */
-export function capabilityStatus(capability, { env = process.env, userInitiated = false, autonomous = false } = {}) {
-  const needed = CREDENTIAL_FOR[capability] ?? [];
-  const keyPresent = needed.length === 0 || hasAnyEnv(needed, env);
-
-  if (autonomous && !autonomousTradingEnabled(env)) {
-    return {
-      capability,
-      armed: keyPresent,
-      allowed: false,
-      reason:
-        "autonomous trading is off — set ORACLE_AUTONOMOUS_TRADING=1 to let Oracle act without an explicit request",
-    };
-  }
-
-  if (!keyPresent) {
-    return {
-      capability,
-      armed: false,
-      allowed: false,
-      reason: `no credential configured for ${capability} — set one of: ${needed.join(", ")}`,
-    };
-  }
-
-  if (!userInitiated && !autonomous) {
-    return {
-      capability,
-      armed: true,
-      allowed: false,
-      reason: "armed, but nothing runs until you ask for this action",
-    };
-  }
-
-  return { capability, armed: true, allowed: true, reason: null };
-}
-
-/** Throwing form for call sites that should refuse rather than branch. */
-export function assertCapability(capability, opts = {}) {
-  const status = capabilityStatus(capability, opts);
-  if (!status.allowed) {
-    const err = new Error(`oracle: ${capability} not permitted — ${status.reason}`);
-    err.status = status;
-    throw err;
-  }
-  return status;
-}
-
-/** Human-readable posture for a status surface. */
-export function posture(env = process.env) {
-  const caps = Object.keys(CREDENTIAL_FOR);
-  const armed = caps.filter((c) => capabilityStatus(c, { env, userInitiated: true }).allowed);
-  return {
-    model: "key-present = armed; user-initiated = runs; autonomous = opt-in",
-    armed,
-    autonomousTrading: autonomousTradingEnabled(env) ? "ENABLED" : "off",
-    note: "Nothing executes unless you ask for it. Caps and simulation still apply to every action.",
-  };
-}

package/src/chains.mjs

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-// EVM chain registry — the desk is multi-chain by design (any EVM chain).
-// A "venue" (rh/poly/hl) is a product surface; a "chain" is where a tx settles.
-// One agent wallet can sign on ANY EVM chain — same key, different
-// provider/RPC. This registry keeps chainIds first-class so adapters never
-// hardcode a single chain (a real bug we unwound once: an inline chainId===1
-// special case in a mint path).
-
-// Known chains the desk touches today. Extensible: add an entry, nothing else changes.
-export const CHAINS = {
-  robinhood: { chainId: 4663, name: "Robinhood Chain", rpcEnv: ["RH_CHAIN_RPC"], evm: true },
-  ethereum:  { chainId: 1,    name: "Ethereum",        rpcEnv: ["ETH_RPC_URL", "ETHEREUM_RPC_URL", "MAINNET_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  polygon:   { chainId: 137,  name: "Polygon",         rpcEnv: ["POLYGON_RPC_URL", "POLYGON_RPC"], evm: true },
-  arbitrum:  { chainId: 42161, name: "Arbitrum One",   rpcEnv: ["ARBITRUM_RPC_URL", "ARB_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  base:      { chainId: 8453, name: "Base",            rpcEnv: ["BASE_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  hyperevm:  { chainId: 999,  name: "HyperEVM",        rpcEnv: ["HYPEREVM_RPC_URL", "HYPER_EVM_RPC"], evm: true },
-  bsc:       { chainId: 56,   name: "BNB Smart Chain", rpcEnv: ["BSC_RPC_URL", "BNB_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  avalanche: { chainId: 43114, name: "Avalanche C-Chain", rpcEnv: ["AVALANCHE_RPC_URL", "AVAX_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  optimism:  { chainId: 10,   name: "OP Mainnet",       rpcEnv: ["OPTIMISM_RPC_URL", "OP_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  abstract:  { chainId: 2741, name: "Abstract",         rpcEnv: ["ABSTRACT_RPC_URL", "ABS_RPC_URL"], evm: true },
-  // Tether/Bitfinex-linked Stable L1 — gas = USDT0/gUSDT; FEFER-class memes (Dyor)
-  stable:    { chainId: 988,  name: "Stable Mainnet",  rpcEnv: ["STABLE_RPC_URL", "STABLE_RPC"], evm: true },
-};
-
-const BY_ID = new Map(Object.values(CHAINS).map((c) => [c.chainId, c]));
-
-/** Look up a chain by numeric chainId. Returns null if unknown (never throws here). */
-export function chainById(chainId) {
-  return BY_ID.get(Number(chainId)) || null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Register (or override) an EVM chain at runtime so the desk supports ANY EVM
- * chain without a code change. Idempotent.
- * @param {{ key:string, chainId:number, name?:string, rpcEnv?:string[] }} def
- */
-export function registerChain({ key, chainId, name, rpcEnv = [] }) {
-  if (!key) throw new Error("registerChain requires a key");
-  if (!Number.isInteger(Number(chainId))) throw new Error("registerChain requires a numeric chainId");
-  const entry = { chainId: Number(chainId), name: name || key, rpcEnv, evm: true };
-  CHAINS[key] = entry;
-  BY_ID.set(entry.chainId, entry);
-  return entry;
-}
-
-/**
- * Resolve a usable RPC URL for a chainId from the environment, trying each
- * candidate env var in order. Returns null if none set (caller decides if fatal).
- */
-export function rpcUrlFor(chainId, env = process.env) {
-  const c = chainById(chainId);
-  if (!c) return null;
-  for (const name of c.rpcEnv) {
-    const v = (env[name] || "").trim();
-    if (v) return v;
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-/** True if we recognize this chainId as a supported EVM chain. */
-export function isSupportedChain(chainId) {
-  return BY_ID.has(Number(chainId));
-}