@oracle-agent/oracle 0.11.0 → 0.12.0

package/src/public-control/bundler-client.mjs

@@ -1,357 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle Control — ERC-4337 bundler/paymaster runtime submit path (Slice H).
-//
-// Takes a USER-SIGNED UserOperation (produced off this infrastructure — the
-// user's own wallet signs it, never Oracle) and submits it to an ERC-4337
-// bundler via an INJECTED client. This module never talks to a real network
-// itself: every RPC call goes through a caller-supplied `bundlerClient` /
-// `paymasterClient`, duck-typed to the viem/permissionless BundlerClient
-// action shape ({ sendUserOperation, waitForUserOperationReceipt,
-// estimateUserOperationGas }) or a thin equivalent. Tests inject a fully
-// offline mock; production code injects a real viem/permissionless client.
-//
-// Hard boundaries (same posture as aa-adapter.mjs / connect-agent.mjs):
-//   - This module holds no keys and requests no signature. It only forwards
-//     an ALREADY-SIGNED userOp (or, for estimateAndFill/applyPaymaster, an
-//     unsigned userOp being prepared BEFORE the user signs it) to an
-//     injected client's methods.
-//   - submitUserOperation refuses an unsigned userOp outright — a missing or
-//     placeholder ("0x") signature must never reach a bundler.
-//   - submitUserOperation/estimateAndFill/applyPaymaster all refuse an
-//     entryPoint that does not match ENTRYPOINT_V07 (imported from
-//     aa-adapter.mjs, the single source of truth for the deployed EntryPoint
-//     address this codebase targets) unless the caller explicitly overrides
-//     it, and even then the value must still be a valid checksummed address
-//     — this stops an accidental/mismatched EntryPoint submit.
-//   - Before any payload is handed to an injected client, it is rebuilt from
-//     an explicit field allowlist (canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit) and then
-//     recursively scanned by assertNoSecretPayload() for anything shaped
-//     like a private key, mnemonic, bearer token, keystore path, or signer
-//     URL. Fail closed: throws before the call is ever made.
-//   - Imports ONLY from ./aa-adapter.mjs (ENTRYPOINT_V07, buildUserOperation)
-//     and viem/node builtins. NEVER from the private executor stack
-//     (get-signer.mjs, keystore.mjs, exec-policy.mjs, local-signer/*,
-//     adapters/*, mint-capability.mjs) — this module must never be wired to
-//     private operator wallet, and never makes a live network call of its own.
-
-import { isAddress, isHex, getAddress } from "viem";
-
-import { ENTRYPOINT_V07, buildUserOperation } from "./aa-adapter.mjs";
-
-// Re-exported for convenience so callers of this module don't need a second
-// import from aa-adapter just to read the default EntryPoint constant.
-export { ENTRYPOINT_V07 };
-
-function fail(message) {
-  throw new Error(`bundler-client: ${message}`);
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// No-secret invariant (fail closed) — scoped to what a bundler/paymaster
-// payload could plausibly carry. Mirrors the posture of
-// public-api/connect-agent.mjs's assertNoSecretMaterial without importing
-// across slices.
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-export class SecretLeakError extends Error {
-  constructor(path, rule) {
-    super(`secret material must never appear in a bundler/paymaster payload (at ${path}, rule: ${rule})`);
-    this.name = "SecretLeakError";
-    this.path = path;
-    this.rule = rule;
-  }
-}
-
-const FORBIDDEN_KEY_RE =
-  /(private[_-]?key|secret|bearer|keystore|mnemonic|seed[_-]?phrase|passphrase|password|api[_-]?key|access[_-]?token|auth[_-]?token|session[_-]?token|signer[_-]?url)/i;
-
-const FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES = Object.freeze([
-  // 32-byte hex — the shape of a raw EVM private key / session secret.
-  { rule: "raw-32-byte-hex-key", re: /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{64}$/ },
-  { rule: "bearer-token", re: /bearer\s+[A-Za-z0-9._~+/=-]+/i },
-  { rule: "pem-private-key", re: /-----BEGIN[A-Z ]*PRIVATE KEY-----/ },
-  { rule: "keystore-path", re: /keystore/i },
-  { rule: "signer-url", re: /https?:\/\/\S*sign/i },
-  { rule: "authorization-header", re: /authorization\s*:/i },
-]);
-
-/**
- * Recursively scan a value for anything shaped like secret material. Throws
- * SecretLeakError on the first hit — fail closed. Note: this intentionally
- * does NOT flag `signature` as a forbidden key (unlike connect-agent's
- * variant) — a signed userOp's `signature` field is a public, submittable
- * ECDSA/contract signature, not a secret, and this module's whole job is to
- * submit it.
- */
-export function assertNoSecretPayload(value, path = "$", seen = new Set()) {
-  if (value == null) return value;
-  if (typeof value === "string") {
-    for (const { rule, re } of FORBIDDEN_VALUE_RULES) {
-      if (re.test(value)) throw new SecretLeakError(path, rule);
-    }
-    return value;
-  }
-  if (typeof value !== "object") return value;
-  if (seen.has(value)) return value;
-  seen.add(value);
-
-  if (ArrayBuffer.isView(value) || value instanceof ArrayBuffer) return value;
-  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
-    value.forEach((v, i) => assertNoSecretPayload(v, `${path}[${i}]`, seen));
-    return value;
-  }
-  for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
-    if (FORBIDDEN_KEY_RE.test(k)) {
-      throw new SecretLeakError(`${path}.${k}`, "forbidden-key-name");
-    }
-    assertNoSecretPayload(v, `${path}.${k}`, seen);
-  }
-  return value;
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Helpers
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/** Explicit field allowlist for an ERC-4337 v0.7 UserOperation, matching the
- *  exact shape aa-adapter.buildUserOperation() returns. Rebuilding from this
- *  allowlist (rather than spreading the caller's object) means any stray
- *  extra property on a hand-built/tampered userOp — however it got there —
- *  is dropped before it can ever reach an injected client. */
-const USEROP_FIELDS = [
-  "sender",
-  "nonce",
-  "factory",
-  "factoryData",
-  "callData",
-  "callGasLimit",
-  "verificationGasLimit",
-  "preVerificationGas",
-  "maxFeePerGas",
-  "maxPriorityFeePerGas",
-  "paymaster",
-  "paymasterVerificationGasLimit",
-  "paymasterPostOpGasLimit",
-  "paymasterData",
-  "signature",
-];
-
-function canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit(userOp) {
-  if (!userOp || typeof userOp !== "object") {
-    fail("userOp must be an object (typically the output of aa-adapter.buildUserOperation)");
-  }
-  const out = {};
-  for (const field of USEROP_FIELDS) out[field] = userOp[field] ?? null;
-  if (typeof out.sender !== "string" || !isAddress(out.sender)) {
-    fail("userOp.sender must be a valid 0x address");
-  }
-  if (typeof out.callData !== "string" || !isHex(out.callData)) {
-    fail("userOp.callData must be 0x-prefixed hex");
-  }
-  return Object.freeze(out);
-}
-
-function requireSignedUserOp(userOp) {
-  const sig = userOp && userOp.signature;
-  if (sig == null || sig === "" || sig === "0x") {
-    fail("refusing to submit a userOp with a missing/placeholder signature — sign it in the user's own wallet first");
-  }
-  if (typeof sig !== "string" || !isHex(sig)) {
-    fail("userOp.signature must be 0x-prefixed hex when present");
-  }
-}
-
-function resolveEntryPoint(entryPoint) {
-  const value = entryPoint ?? ENTRYPOINT_V07;
-  if (typeof value !== "string" || !isAddress(value)) {
-    fail("entryPoint must be a valid 0x address");
-  }
-  const normalized = getAddress(value);
-  if (normalized !== getAddress(ENTRYPOINT_V07)) {
-    fail(
-      `entryPoint ${normalized} does not match the expected EntryPoint ${getAddress(ENTRYPOINT_V07)} ` +
-        "(ENTRYPOINT_V07 from aa-adapter.mjs) — refusing to submit to an unexpected EntryPoint"
-    );
-  }
-  return normalized;
-}
-
-function requireClientMethod(client, methodName, clientLabel) {
-  if (!client || typeof client[methodName] !== "function") {
-    fail(
-      `${clientLabel} must expose an async ${methodName}(...) method (viem/permissionless BundlerClient shape, ` +
-        "or a thin { sendUserOperation, waitForUserOperationReceipt, estimateUserOperationGas } interface) — " +
-        "this module never makes a network call of its own"
-    );
-  }
-}
-
-function toHexIfBigIntLike(value) {
-  if (value == null) return value;
-  if (typeof value === "string") return value;
-  if (typeof value === "bigint") return `0x${value.toString(16)}`;
-  if (typeof value === "number" && Number.isSafeInteger(value)) return `0x${BigInt(value).toString(16)}`;
-  fail("gas/fee field returned by client must be a 0x-hex string, bigint, or safe integer");
-}
-
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-// Public contract
-// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
-/**
- * Submit an already user-signed UserOperation to an ERC-4337 bundler via an
- * injected client. This is the only function in this module that is allowed
- * to move a userOp onto a bundler's mempool, and it refuses to do so unless
- * the userOp actually carries a real signature.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.userOp  a signed UserOperation (signature != "0x")
- * @param {object} params.bundlerClient  injected client exposing async
- *   sendUserOperation({ userOperation, entryPoint }) -> userOpHash
- * @param {string} [params.entryPoint]  defaults to ENTRYPOINT_V07; refused
- *   if it does not resolve to ENTRYPOINT_V07
- * @returns {Promise<string>} userOpHash returned by the bundler client
- */
-export async function submitUserOperation(_params = {}) {
-  throw new Error("bundler-client.submitUserOperation refused: @oracle-agent/oracle is prepare-only. Submit UserOps from the user wallet or local operator.");
-}
-
-
-/**
- * Fill gas fields on an UNSIGNED (pre-signature) UserOperation via an
- * injected bundler client's estimateUserOperationGas. Never submits
- * anything and never requires a signature — this runs BEFORE the user
- * signs, so it can supply real gas numbers to sign over. Returns a new
- * frozen userOp; the input is never mutated.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.userOp  unsigned or placeholder-gas UserOperation
- *   (typically straight out of aa-adapter.buildUserOperation)
- * @param {object} params.bundlerClient  injected client exposing async
- *   estimateUserOperationGas({ userOperation, entryPoint }) -> gas fields
- * @param {string} [params.entryPoint]  defaults to ENTRYPOINT_V07
- * @returns {Promise<object>} frozen userOp with gas fields filled from the
- *   client's estimate (falls back to the input's own values for any field
- *   the client did not return)
- */
-export async function estimateAndFill(params = {}) {
-  const { userOp, bundlerClient, entryPoint } = params;
-  const payload = canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit(userOp);
-  const resolvedEntryPoint = resolveEntryPoint(entryPoint);
-  requireClientMethod(bundlerClient, "estimateUserOperationGas", "bundlerClient");
-
-  assertNoSecretPayload(payload);
-  const estimate = await bundlerClient.estimateUserOperationGas({
-    userOperation: payload,
-    entryPoint: resolvedEntryPoint,
-  });
-  if (!estimate || typeof estimate !== "object") {
-    fail("bundlerClient.estimateUserOperationGas must resolve to a gas-fields object");
-  }
-
-  const filled = {
-    ...payload,
-    callGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.callGasLimit ?? payload.callGasLimit),
-    verificationGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.verificationGasLimit ?? payload.verificationGasLimit),
-    preVerificationGas: toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.preVerificationGas ?? payload.preVerificationGas),
-  };
-  if (payload.paymaster != null) {
-    if (estimate.paymasterVerificationGasLimit != null) {
-      filled.paymasterVerificationGasLimit = toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.paymasterVerificationGasLimit);
-    }
-    if (estimate.paymasterPostOpGasLimit != null) {
-      filled.paymasterPostOpGasLimit = toHexIfBigIntLike(estimate.paymasterPostOpGasLimit);
-    }
-  }
-
-  return Object.freeze(assertNoSecretPayload(filled));
-}
-
-/**
- * Attach (or explicitly omit) paymaster sponsorship on an UNSIGNED
- * UserOperation via an injected paymasterClient. If `paymasterClient` is
- * absent/null, this is a no-op that returns the self-funded path — the
- * userOp is returned with its paymaster fields explicitly nulled out, never
- * left ambiguous. This module never holds paymaster credentials; whatever
- * auth the paymaster needs lives inside the injected client, off this file.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {object} params.userOp  unsigned UserOperation
- * @param {object} [params.paymasterClient]  injected client exposing async
- *   getPaymasterData({ userOperation, entryPoint }) -> paymaster fields.
- *   Omit for the self-funded path (no paymaster).
- * @param {string} [params.entryPoint]  defaults to ENTRYPOINT_V07
- * @returns {Promise<object>} frozen userOp with paymaster fields set
- */
-export async function applyPaymaster(params = {}) {
-  const { userOp, paymasterClient, entryPoint } = params;
-  const payload = canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit(userOp);
-  const resolvedEntryPoint = resolveEntryPoint(entryPoint);
-
-  if (paymasterClient == null) {
-    // Self-funded path: no paymaster involved, fields explicitly nulled.
-    return Object.freeze({
-      ...payload,
-      paymaster: null,
-      paymasterData: null,
-      paymasterVerificationGasLimit: null,
-      paymasterPostOpGasLimit: null,
-    });
-  }
-
-  requireClientMethod(paymasterClient, "getPaymasterData", "paymasterClient");
-  assertNoSecretPayload(payload);
-  const sponsorship = await paymasterClient.getPaymasterData({
-    userOperation: payload,
-    entryPoint: resolvedEntryPoint,
-  });
-  if (!sponsorship || typeof sponsorship.paymaster !== "string" || !isAddress(sponsorship.paymaster)) {
-    fail("paymasterClient.getPaymasterData must resolve to an object with a valid paymaster address");
-  }
-
-  const filled = {
-    ...payload,
-    paymaster: getAddress(sponsorship.paymaster),
-    paymasterData: sponsorship.paymasterData ?? "0x",
-    paymasterVerificationGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(sponsorship.paymasterVerificationGasLimit ?? 0n),
-    paymasterPostOpGasLimit: toHexIfBigIntLike(sponsorship.paymasterPostOpGasLimit ?? 0n),
-  };
-
-  return Object.freeze(assertNoSecretPayload(filled));
-}
-
-/**
- * Passthrough to an injected bundler client's receipt-polling method. This
- * module adds no retry/timeout logic of its own — that belongs to the
- * injected client (viem/permissionless already implement polling with
- * backoff); this is a thin, testable seam.
- *
- * @param {object} params
- * @param {string} params.hash  userOpHash returned by submitUserOperation
- * @param {object} params.bundlerClient  injected client exposing async
- *   waitForUserOperationReceipt({ hash, ...rest }) -> receipt
- * @param {object} [params.opts]  extra options forwarded verbatim (e.g.
- *   pollingInterval, timeout) — passed through untouched, never inspected
- *   for secrets since this module trusts caller-supplied polling knobs are
- *   not where key material would ever live
- * @returns {Promise<object>} whatever the injected client resolves to
- */
-export async function waitForReceipt(params = {}) {
-  const { hash, bundlerClient, opts = {} } = params;
-  if (typeof hash !== "string" || !isHex(hash)) {
-    fail("hash is required and must be 0x-prefixed hex (the userOpHash from submitUserOperation)");
-  }
-  requireClientMethod(bundlerClient, "waitForUserOperationReceipt", "bundlerClient");
-  return bundlerClient.waitForUserOperationReceipt({ hash, ...opts });
-}
-
-export const _internal = {
-  canonicalizeUserOpForSubmit,
-  requireSignedUserOp,
-  resolveEntryPoint,
-  requireClientMethod,
-  toHexIfBigIntLike,
-};
-
-// Re-exported so callers building a fresh userOp before submit don't need a
-// second import from aa-adapter for the common "build then submit" flow.
-export { buildUserOperation };

package/src/public-control/grant-indexer.mjs

@@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
-// Oracle Control — grant audit + active-permission indexer (Slice F).
-//
-// Deterministic, storage-agnostic reconstruction of grant state from an
-// append-only event log. Oracle Control is DETERMINISTIC AUTHORIZATION: this
-// module never guesses, never consults Oracle Router (advisory), and never
-// keeps its own mutable state. The chain (or whatever emits the event log)
-// is the sole source of truth; this file is a pure projection of that log
-// plus an explicit reference `now`.
-//
-// Hard boundaries for this file:
-//   - No imports outside src/public-control/policy-schema.mjs (grant identity
-//     + expiry helpers are reused from there, never duplicated).
-//   - No import from the private executor stack, no RPC/chain calls, no I/O.
-//   - Pure functions only: reconstructGrantIndex(events, opts) always returns
-//     the same result for the same (events, opts.now) — same events replayed
-//     after a "restart" (fresh process, no cache, no prior in-memory state)
-//     reconstruct the identical active set. Input array order never matters.
-//   - Audit/output records are built from an explicit field whitelist only.
-//     Unknown/extra properties on raw events (or on a rejected grant payload)
-//     are NEVER copied into output, so a poisoned event can't smuggle a
-//     secret (API key, session key, keystore path, ...) into the index.
-//
-// Event log shape (each entry is a plain object; unknown extra fields are
-// ignored, never echoed):
-//   { type: "grantCreated",   at: <unix seconds>, grant: <raw grant>, grantId?: <string> }
-//   { type: "grantActivated", at: <unix seconds>, grantId: <string> }
-//   { type: "grantRevoked",   at: <unix seconds>, grantId: <string>, reason?: <string> }
-//   { type: "grantExpired",   at: <unix seconds>, grantId: <string> }
-//
-// `grantId` on a grantCreated event is optional: when omitted it is derived
-// from the grant payload itself via policy-schema's grantId() (content
-// addressed identity). When supplied it is cross-checked against the derived
-// id and the event is rejected on mismatch (fail closed, no id spoofing).
-//
-// Status precedence (revocation beats expiry beats activity — mirrors the
-// same precedence used by session-key-model.mjs's sessionStatus): a grant
-// that was revoked and later would also have expired still reports revoked.
-//   REVOKED > EXPIRED > ACTIVE > PENDING > UNKNOWN
-// Only ACTIVE grants are ever included in the `active` set.
-
-import { normalizeGrant, grantId as computeGrantId, isExpired, GrantValidationError } from "./policy-schema.mjs";
-
-export const GRANT_EVENT_TYPES = Object.freeze([
-  "grantCreated",
-  "grantActivated",
-  "grantRevoked",
-  "grantExpired",
-]);
-
-export const GRANT_STATUS = Object.freeze({
-  ACTIVE: "active",
-  PENDING: "pending",
-  REVOKED: "revoked",
-  EXPIRED: "expired",
-  UNKNOWN: "unknown",
-  INVALID: "invalid",
-});
-
-/** Fields ever allowed into an audit/output record. Nothing outside this
- *  whitelist can reach the returned index, no matter what a raw event or
- *  grant payload carries. All of these are public-by-design fields already
- *  enforced by policy-schema.mjs's REQUIRED_FIELDS. */
-const GRANT_SUMMARY_FIELDS = Object.freeze([
-  "chainId",
-  "agentAddress",
-  "accountAddress",
-  "actions",
-  "targets",
-  "maxValueWei",
-  "maxGasWei",
-  "maxSlippageBps",
-  "expiresAt",
-  "nonce",
-  "revocationKey",
-]);
-
-function isPlainObject(v) {
-  return v != null && typeof v === "object" && !Array.isArray(v);
-}
-
-function toUnixSeconds(v) {
-  if (typeof v === "bigint") return Number(v);
-  if (typeof v === "number" && Number.isFinite(v)) return v;
-  if (typeof v === "string" && v.trim() !== "" && Number.isFinite(Number(v.trim()))) {
-    return Number(v.trim());
-  }
-  return null;
-}
-
-function toSafeString(v, maxLen = 512) {
-  if (typeof v !== "string") return null;
-  const s = v.trim();
-  if (!s) return null;
-  return s.length > maxLen ? s.slice(0, maxLen) : s;
-}
-
-function grantSummary(normalizedGrant) {
-  const out = {};
-  for (const field of GRANT_SUMMARY_FIELDS) out[field] = normalizedGrant[field];
-  return out;
-}
-
-/**
- * Parse one raw event into a strictly-whitelisted internal shape. Never
- * throws. Extra/unknown properties on `raw` are silently dropped (this is
- * the point — it's the no-secret-leak boundary for whatever noise a chain
- * indexer/relay might attach to an event object).
- *
- * Returns { ok: true, event } or { ok: false, error: { type, at, grantId, message } }.
- */
-function parseEvent(raw, opts) {
-  if (!isPlainObject(raw)) {
-    return { ok: false, error: { type: null, at: null, grantId: null, message: "event must be a plain object" } };
-  }
-
-  const type = typeof raw.type === "string" ? raw.type : null;
-  const at = toUnixSeconds(raw.at);
-  const grantIdHint = typeof raw.grantId === "string" && raw.grantId.trim() ? raw.grantId.trim() : null;
-
-  if (!GRANT_EVENT_TYPES.includes(type)) {
-    return { ok: false, error: { type, at, grantId: grantIdHint, message: `unknown event type "${String(type)}"` } };
-  }
-  if (at == null) {
-    return { ok: false, error: { type, at: null, grantId: grantIdHint, message: "event.at must be a unix-seconds number" } };
-  }
-
-  if (type === "grantCreated") {
-    if (!isPlainObject(raw.grant)) {
-      return { ok: false, error: { type, at, grantId: grantIdHint, message: "grantCreated requires a grant payload" } };
-    }
-    let normalized;
-    try {
-      // Identity + shape validation only — deliberately WITHOUT opts.now, so
-      // a grant that has since expired can still be identified/reconstructed
-      // (liveness is evaluated separately against the caller's `now`).
-      normalized = normalizeGrant(raw.grant, { allowWildcardActions: opts.allowWildcardActions });
-    } catch (e) {
-      const message = e instanceof GrantValidationError ? e.message : String(e?.message || e);
-      return { ok: false, error: { type, at, grantId: grantIdHint, message } };
-    }
-    const derivedId = computeGrantId(raw.grant, { allowWildcardActions: opts.allowWildcardActions });
-    if (grantIdHint && grantIdHint !== derivedId) {
-      return {
-        ok: false,
-        error: { type, at, grantId: grantIdHint, message: "grantId does not match content-derived grant identity (fail closed)" },
-      };
-    }
-    return { ok: true, event: { type, at, grantId: derivedId, grant: normalized } };
-  }
-
-  // grantActivated / grantRevoked / grantExpired all reference an existing
-  // grant purely by id — they never carry grant material.
-  if (!grantIdHint) {
-    return { ok: false, error: { type, at, grantId: null, message: `${type} requires a grantId` } };
-  }
-  const reason = type === "grantRevoked" ? toSafeString(raw.reason) : null;
-  return { ok: true, event: { type, at, grantId: grantIdHint, reason } };
-}
-
-function minOf(list) {
-  return list.length ? list.reduce((a, b) => Math.min(a, b)) : null;
-}
-
-/**
- * Reconstruct the deterministic grant index from a raw event log.
- *
- * @param {object[]} events        raw event log (any order, any origin)
- * @param {object} opts
- * @param {number} opts.now        REQUIRED unix-seconds reference time. All
- *                                 reconstruction is relative to this instant;
- *                                 pass the same `now` to get the same result.
- * @param {boolean} [opts.allowWildcardActions] forwarded to policy-schema.
- *
- * @returns {{
- *   active: object[],       grants currently ACTIVE, sorted by grantId
- *   historical: object[],   everything else (pending/revoked/expired/unknown/invalid), sorted by grantId
- *   all: object[],          active + historical, sorted by grantId
- *   invalidEvents: object[] malformed/rejected raw events (whitelisted fields only)
- * }}
- */
-export function reconstructGrantIndex(events, opts = {}) {
-  const now = toUnixSeconds(opts.now);
-  if (now == null) throw new Error("grant-indexer: opts.now (unix seconds) is required");
-  if (!Array.isArray(events)) throw new Error("grant-indexer: events must be an array");
-
-  const invalidEvents = [];
-  /** grantId -> { created: [], activated: [], revoked: [], expired: [] } */
-  const byId = new Map();
-
-  function bucket(id) {
-    if (!byId.has(id)) {
-      byId.set(id, { created: [], activated: [], revoked: [], expired: [] });
-    }
-    return byId.get(id);
-  }
-
-  for (const raw of events) {
-    const parsed = parseEvent(raw, opts);
-    if (!parsed.ok) {
-      invalidEvents.push(parsed.error);
-      continue;
-    }
-    const ev = parsed.event;
-    // Chain is source of truth for what has already happened: an event dated
-    // after the reconstruction instant hasn't occurred *yet* from this
-    // vantage point, so it is excluded rather than applied early.
-    if (ev.at > now) continue;
-
-    const b = bucket(ev.grantId);
-    if (ev.type === "grantCreated") {
-      // Same content-derived id => identical normalized grant; duplicate
-      // creations are idempotent. Keep the earliest-by-time occurrence so
-      // createdAt is stable and order-independent.
-      const existing = b.created[0];
-      if (!existing || ev.at < existing.at) b.created = [ev];
-    } else if (ev.type === "grantActivated") {
-      b.activated.push(ev);
-    } else if (ev.type === "grantRevoked") {
-      b.revoked.push(ev);
-    } else if (ev.type === "grantExpired") {
-      b.expired.push(ev);
-    }
-  }
-
-  const records = [];
-  for (const [id, b] of byId.entries()) {
-    const createdEvent = b.created[0] || null;
-    const createdAt = createdEvent ? createdEvent.at : null;
-    const activatedAt = minOf(b.activated.map((e) => e.at));
-    const revokedAt = minOf(b.revoked.map((e) => e.at));
-    const explicitExpiredAt = minOf(b.expired.map((e) => e.at));
-
-    const grant = createdEvent ? createdEvent.grant : null;
-    const schemaExpired = grant ? isExpired(grant, now) : false;
-    const expiredAt = explicitExpiredAt != null ? explicitExpiredAt : schemaExpired ? grant.expiresAt : null;
-
-    let status;
-    if (!createdEvent) {
-      // Lifecycle events (activated/revoked/expired) referencing a grantId
-      // we never saw a valid grantCreated for. Never active — there is no
-      // grant content to authorize against.
-      status = GRANT_STATUS.UNKNOWN;
-    } else if (b.revoked.length > 0) {
-      status = GRANT_STATUS.REVOKED;
-    } else if (explicitExpiredAt != null || schemaExpired) {
-      status = GRANT_STATUS.EXPIRED;
-    } else if (b.activated.length > 0) {
-      status = GRANT_STATUS.ACTIVE;
-    } else {
-      status = GRANT_STATUS.PENDING;
-    }
-
-    const record = {
-      grantId: id,
-      status,
-      createdAt,
-      activatedAt,
-      revokedAt,
-      expiredAt,
-      reason: b.revoked.length > 0 ? toSafeString(b.revoked.map((e) => e.reason).find(Boolean) || null) : null,
-      grant: grant ? grantSummary(grant) : null,
-    };
-    records.push(record);
-  }
-
-  records.sort((a, b) => (a.grantId < b.grantId ? -1 : a.grantId > b.grantId ? 1 : 0));
-  invalidEvents.sort((a, b) => {
-    const at = (a.at ?? -Infinity) - (b.at ?? -Infinity);
-    if (at !== 0) return at;
-    const ai = a.grantId || "";
-    const bi = b.grantId || "";
-    return ai < bi ? -1 : ai > bi ? 1 : 0;
-  });
-
-  const active = records.filter((r) => r.status === GRANT_STATUS.ACTIVE);
-  const historical = records.filter((r) => r.status !== GRANT_STATUS.ACTIVE);
-
-  return Object.freeze({
-    active: Object.freeze(active),
-    historical: Object.freeze(historical),
-    all: Object.freeze(records),
-    invalidEvents: Object.freeze(invalidEvents),
-  });
-}
-
-/** Convenience: is a single grant id active right now, per the given log? */
-export function isGrantActive(events, grantId, opts = {}) {
-  const { active } = reconstructGrantIndex(events, opts);
-  return active.some((r) => r.grantId === grantId);
-}
-
-/** Convenience: look up one grant's reconstructed record (or null). */
-export function getGrantRecord(events, grantId, opts = {}) {
-  const { all } = reconstructGrantIndex(events, opts);
-  return all.find((r) => r.grantId === grantId) || null;
-}