@oracle-agent/oracle 0.1.0

package/src/router/prepare-route.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,341 @@
+// Prepare the winning route.
+//
+// The gap this closes: the router says "paraswap wins" and the user then has to
+// rebuild that transaction through a completely different path, by hand, hoping they
+// pick the same venue and parameters. That handoff is where the value of a
+// comparison leaks away.
+//
+// Three things make this more than a thin wrapper:
+//
+//   1. QUOTES DECAY. The comparison ran at a past block. Preparing against that
+//      number would carry a stale minOut into a signature -- the exact failure the
+//      guard exists to prevent. So we RE-QUOTE, and if the fresh number is materially
+//      worse we say so rather than quietly preparing a worse trade than the one the
+//      user agreed to.
+//
+//   2. NOT EVERY WINNER IS A TRANSACTION. CoW returns EIP-712 typed data for an
+//      off-chain order; LI.FI/ParaSwap/0x return an unsigned EVM transaction. These
+//      are different artifacts requiring different wallet actions, and collapsing
+//      them into one "prepared" shape would hand someone typed data where they
+//      expected a tx. The artifact kind is explicit and always stated.
+//
+//   3. THE DESTINATION IS THE ATTACK SURFACE. A prepared transaction is a `to` plus
+//      opaque calldata. If that address is wrong, nothing downstream saves you. It is
+//      echoed prominently and checked against the quoting venue.
+//
+// Custody is unchanged: this returns artifacts to sign. It cannot sign or broadcast.
+
+import { bestSwapRoute } from "./index.mjs";
+
+export const ARTIFACT = Object.freeze({
+  /** Unsigned EVM transaction: wallet signs and broadcasts it. */
+  TRANSACTION: "unsigned-transaction",
+  /** EIP-712 payload: wallet signs data; a solver settles on-chain. No broadcast. */
+  TYPED_DATA_ORDER: "typed-data-order",
+});
+
+/**
+ * How much the re-quote may fall below the comparison before we refuse.
+ *
+ * Not zero: prices move between blocks and a hard-zero tolerance would make prepare
+ * fail constantly for no safety benefit. But bounded, because "the route you picked
+ * is now 4% worse" is a decision the user should get to make again.
+ */
+const DEFAULT_DRIFT_TOLERANCE_BPS = 100;
+
+const PREPARERS = {
+  lifi: async ({ chainId, tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn, taker }, opts) => {
+    const { lifiPrepare } = await import("../data/providers/lifi.mjs");
+    const p = await lifiPrepare(
+      { fromChain: chainId, toChain: chainId, fromToken: tokenIn, toToken: tokenOut, fromAmount: amountIn, fromAddress: taker },
+      opts,
+    );
+    return {
+      artifactKind: ARTIFACT.TRANSACTION,
+      transaction: p.transaction,
+      requiresApproval: p.requiresApproval ?? null,
+      amountOut: p.quote?.estimate?.toAmount ?? null,
+      minOut: p.quote?.estimate?.toAmountMin ?? null,
+    };
+  },
+
+  paraswap: async ({ chainId, tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn, taker, decimalsIn, decimalsOut }, opts) => {
+    const { paraswapPrepare } = await import("../data/providers/paraswap.mjs");
+    const p = await paraswapPrepare(
+      { chainId, srcToken: tokenIn, destToken: tokenOut, amount: amountIn, srcDecimals: decimalsIn, destDecimals: decimalsOut, userAddress: taker, side: "SELL" },
+      opts,
+    );
+    return {
+      artifactKind: ARTIFACT.TRANSACTION,
+      transaction: p.transaction,
+      requiresApproval: p.requiresApproval ?? null,
+      amountOut: p.quote?.priceRoute?.destAmount ?? null,
+      minOut: p.quote?.amountOutMinimum ?? null,
+    };
+  },
+
+  "0x": async ({ chainId, tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn, taker }, opts) => {
+    const { zeroxPrepare } = await import("../data/providers/zerox.mjs");
+    const p = await zeroxPrepare(
+      { chainId, sellToken: tokenIn, buyToken: tokenOut, sellAmount: amountIn, taker },
+      opts,
+    );
+    return {
+      artifactKind: ARTIFACT.TRANSACTION,
+      transaction: p.transaction,
+      requiresApproval: p.requiresApproval ?? null,
+      amountOut: p.quote?.buyAmount ?? null,
+      minOut: p.quote?.minBuyAmount ?? null,
+    };
+  },
+
+  cow: async ({ chainId, tokenIn, tokenOut, amountIn, taker }, opts) => {
+    const { cowPrepareOrder } = await import("../data/providers/cowswap.mjs");
+    const p = await cowPrepareOrder(
+      { chainId, sellToken: tokenIn, buyToken: tokenOut, sellAmountBeforeFee: String(amountIn), from: taker },
+      opts,
+    );
+    return {
+      // Deliberately NOT a transaction. The wallet signs typed data and a solver
+      // settles it; there is nothing to broadcast, and treating this as a tx would
+      // produce a confusing failure at signing time.
+      artifactKind: ARTIFACT.TYPED_DATA_ORDER,
+      typedData: p.typedData,
+      // The relayer is what needs the ERC-20 allowance for CoW, NOT the settlement
+      // contract. Approving the wrong one produces an order that can never fill.
+      requiresApproval: {
+        token: tokenIn,
+        spender: p.vaultRelayer,
+        amount: String(amountIn),
+        note: "CoW pulls funds via the vault relayer, not the settlement contract",
+      },
+      settlement: p.settlement,
+      amountOut: p.quote?.quote?.buyAmount ?? null,
+      minOut: null,
+      submission: "sign the typed data, then submit the order to the CoW API",
+    };
+  },
+};
+
+export function supportedPreparers() {
+  return Object.keys(PREPARERS);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Addresses that are fine for QUOTING but must never reach a prepare call.
+ *
+ * The quote placeholder exists so aggregators that demand a `from` will price a route
+ * for an anonymous caller. Passing it to prepare is a category error: you would be
+ * building a transaction for the burn address.
+ *
+ * Some venues catch this and some do not, which is the dangerous part. ParaSwap
+ * rejects it with "userAddress must be a valid address" (verified live), while other
+ * venues will happily build a transaction addressed to nobody. Relying on the venue
+ * to notice is relying on the least careful one.
+ */
+const NON_TAKER_ADDRESSES = new Set(
+  [
+    "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000",
+    "0x000000000000000000000000000000000000dead",
+    "0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000001",
+    "0x00000000000000000000000000000000000a1ce5",
+  ].map((a) => a.toLowerCase()),
+);
+
+const ADDRESS_RE = /^0x[0-9a-fA-F]{40}$/;
+
+/**
+ * Compare routes, then prepare the winner.
+ *
+ * @param {object} p same shape as bestSwapRoute, plus:
+ * @param {string} [p.source] force a specific source instead of the winner
+ * @param {number} [p.driftToleranceBps]
+ */
+export async function prepareBestRoute(p, opts = {}) {
+  const { taker } = p;
+  if (!taker) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "prepareBestRoute requires taker: a prepared transaction is built FOR an " +
+        "address, and the quote-only placeholder must never end up in one",
+    );
+  }
+  if (!ADDRESS_RE.test(taker)) {
+    throw new Error(`taker must be a valid 20-byte address, got "${taker}"`);
+  }
+  if (NON_TAKER_ADDRESSES.has(taker.toLowerCase())) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `taker "${taker}" is a placeholder/burn address. It is valid for quoting but ` +
+        "not for preparing -- that would build a transaction for an address nobody " +
+        "controls. Pass the real wallet that will sign.",
+    );
+  }
+
+  const comparison = await bestSwapRoute(p, opts);
+  if (!comparison.best) {
+    return { ok: false, reason: "no source returned a usable route", comparison };
+  }
+
+  // Honour an explicit override, but never silently: picking a non-winner is a
+  // legitimate choice (a user may distrust a venue) and it should be visible.
+  const chosenSource = p.source || comparison.best.source;
+  const chosen = comparison.routes.find((r) => r.source === chosenSource);
+  if (!chosen) {
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason: `source "${chosenSource}" did not return a usable route`,
+      comparison,
+    };
+  }
+
+  const prepare = PREPARERS[chosenSource];
+  if (!prepare) {
+    // Honest failure beats a fabricated transaction. Name the fallback.
+    const alt = comparison.routes.find((r) => PREPARERS[r.source] && r.source !== chosenSource);
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason:
+        `${chosenSource} won the comparison but has no prepare path in this build. ` +
+        (alt
+          ? `Next preparable route is ${alt.source}; pass source:"${alt.source}" to use it.`
+          : "No route in this comparison can be prepared."),
+      comparison,
+      winner: chosenSource,
+    };
+  }
+
+  let prepared;
+  try {
+    prepared = await prepare(p, opts);
+  } catch (err) {
+    // Read the API's actual complaint, not just the HTTP status line.
+    //
+    // httpJson throws `HTTP 400 POST <url>` and attaches the parsed response to
+    // err.body. Matching only err.message would classify every venue rejection as a
+    // generic "provider-error", which is how a fixable user-side problem ("you have
+    // not approved yet") gets reported as an opaque failure.
+    const detail =
+      typeof err?.body === "string"
+        ? err.body
+        : err?.body
+          ? JSON.stringify(err.body)
+          : "";
+    const msg = [String(err?.message || err), detail].filter(Boolean).join(" :: ");
+
+    // Translate the two failures that will confuse people most.
+    //
+    // Several venues validate on-chain state before building calldata:
+    //   * "Not enough WETH balance"   -- the taker does not hold the input token
+    //   * "Not enough WETH allowance" -- the approval does not exist YET
+    //
+    // The allowance case is the important one, and it is a genuine ordering
+    // constraint rather than a bug: ParaSwap will not build swap calldata until the
+    // TokenTransferProxy is already approved. So the honest flow is approve first,
+    // then prepare -- which is exactly why requiresApproval is a separate step in
+    // this API instead of being bundled into one "just sign this" blob.
+    //
+    // Reporting the raw HTTP 400 would read as "the router is broken" when the user
+    // simply has not approved yet.
+    const allowanceIssue = /allowance/i.test(msg);
+    const balanceIssue = !allowanceIssue && /not enough|insufficient|balance/i.test(msg);
+
+    let reason;
+    let failureKind;
+    if (allowanceIssue) {
+      failureKind = "approval-required-first";
+      reason =
+        `${chosenSource} will not build swap calldata until the token approval ` +
+        `exists on-chain. Approve the spender first, then prepare again. ` +
+        `Underlying: ${msg}`;
+    } else if (balanceIssue) {
+      failureKind = "taker-not-funded";
+      reason =
+        `${chosenSource} refused to build the transaction: ${msg}. This venue ` +
+        `verifies the taker holds the input token. Quoting works for any address; ` +
+        `preparing needs the real funded wallet.`;
+    } else {
+      failureKind = "provider-error";
+      reason = `${chosenSource} prepare failed: ${msg}`;
+    }
+
+    // Name a preparable alternative so a blocked winner is not a dead end.
+    const alt = comparison.routes.find(
+      (r) => PREPARERS[r.source] && r.source !== chosenSource,
+    );
+
+    return {
+      ok: false,
+      reason,
+      failureKind,
+      ...(alt ? { alternative: alt.source } : {}),
+      comparison,
+    };
+  }
+
+  // Drift check. The comparison is already stale; this is the number that will
+  // actually be signed against.
+  const tolerance = p.driftToleranceBps ?? DEFAULT_DRIFT_TOLERANCE_BPS;
+  let driftBps = null;
+  let driftWarning = null;
+  if (prepared.amountOut != null && chosen.grossOut != null) {
+    try {
+      const then = BigInt(chosen.grossOut);
+      const now = BigInt(prepared.amountOut);
+      if (then > 0n) {
+        driftBps = Number(((now - then) * 10_000n) / then);
+        if (driftBps < -tolerance) {
+          driftWarning =
+            `route moved ${(driftBps / 100).toFixed(2)}% against you between the ` +
+            `comparison and this prepare (tolerance ${(tolerance / 100).toFixed(2)}%). ` +
+            "The ranking may no longer hold -- re-run the comparison before signing.";
+        }
+      }
+    } catch {
+      /* leave null rather than invent a drift figure */
+    }
+  }
+
+  const runnersUp = comparison.routes
+    .filter((r) => r.source !== chosenSource)
+    .map((r) => ({ source: r.source, netOut: r.netOut, gasUsd: r.gasUsd }));
+
+  return {
+    ok: true,
+    chosen: {
+      source: chosenSource,
+      wasWinner: chosenSource === comparison.best.source,
+      netOut: chosen.netOut,
+      grossOut: chosen.grossOut,
+      gasUsd: chosen.gasUsd,
+    },
+    ...prepared,
+    unsigned: true,
+    signedBy: "user-wallet",
+    // The single most security-relevant field: where value goes.
+    destination:
+      prepared.artifactKind === ARTIFACT.TRANSACTION
+        ? prepared.transaction?.to ?? null
+        : prepared.settlement ?? null,
+    driftBps,
+    warnings: [
+      ...(driftWarning ? [driftWarning] : []),
+      ...(comparison.warnings || []),
+      ...(prepared.artifactKind === ARTIFACT.TYPED_DATA_ORDER
+        ? [
+            "This is an ORDER to sign, not a transaction to broadcast. Signing it " +
+              "authorizes a solver to settle on your behalf.",
+          ]
+        : []),
+    ],
+    runnersUp,
+    comparison: {
+      rankedOn: comparison.rankedOn,
+      sourcesAnswered: comparison.sourcesAnswered,
+      sourcesTried: comparison.sourcesTried,
+      improvementBps: comparison.improvementBps,
+    },
+    note:
+      "UNSIGNED. Verify the destination address and minOut against a fresh quote " +
+      "immediately before signing -- a quote-time minimum is not a minimum at " +
+      "broadcast time.",
+  };
+}

package/src/router/proposal.mjs

@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
+// Oracle Router proposal model.
+//
+// Pure, dependency-free. A "proposal" is an advisory object: a labeled
+// suggestion for what Oracle Control *could* do, carrying no authority of its
+// own. This module MUST NEVER be able to produce an object that authorizes,
+// signs, or broadcasts anything, and MUST NEVER accept or echo back secrets
+// (bearer tokens, private/session keys, passphrases, keystore paths, etc.).
+//
+// Enforcement is defense-in-depth, in this order:
+//   1. Reject: any dangerous field anywhere in the input throws immediately.
+//   2. Strip: the emitted proposal is built from an explicit field allowlist
+//      only (nothing "extra" from the input can leak through even if step 1
+//      had a gap).
+//   3. Pin: every proposal carries fixed, non-overridable advisory markers
+//      (mode: "proposal", authorized: false, signed: false, broadcast: false)
+//      that the caller cannot set to anything else.
+//   4. Freeze: the returned proposal (and its nested plain objects/arrays)
+//      is deep-frozen so downstream code cannot mutate it into something
+//      that looks authorized.
+
+import { classifyRisk } from "./risk-classifier.mjs";
+
+// Case-insensitive key patterns that must never appear anywhere in a
+// proposal request or its emitted output. Deliberately broad: it is safer to
+// over-reject an oddly named benign field than to under-reject a secret.
+export const DANGEROUS_FIELD_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
+  /priv(ate)?[-_ ]?key/i,
+  /seed[-_ ]?phrase/i,
+  /mnemonic/i,
+  /api[-_ ]?key/i,
+  /api[-_ ]?secret/i,
+  /bearer/i,
+  /session[-_ ]?key/i,
+  /session[-_ ]?secret/i,
+  /session[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /keystore/i,
+  /passphrase/i,
+  /^password$/i,
+  /secret/i,
+  /signature/i,
+  /signed[-_ ]?tx/i,
+  /raw[-_ ]?tx/i,
+  /broadcast/i,
+  /authoriz/i,
+  /^grant$/i,
+  /grant[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /credential/i,
+  /house[-_ ]?wallet/i,
+  /executor[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /access[-_ ]?token/i,
+  /^token$/i,
+  /^sig$/i,
+  /wallet[-_ ]?key/i,
+]);
+
+// Exact key names the router itself emits as PINNED, hardcoded-false/fixed
+// advisory markers (see createProposal below). These key names happen to
+// match the dangerous-field patterns above (e.g. "authorized" contains
+// "authoriz", "canAccessSecrets" contains "secret") precisely BECAUSE they
+// exist to make the proposal's non-authority explicit and readable. They are
+// only ever assigned literal constants by this module, never taken from
+// caller input, so allowing them past the OUTPUT-side scan is safe. This
+// allowlist is NEVER applied when scanning untrusted caller input.
+const PINNED_SAFE_OUTPUT_KEYS = new Set([
+  "mode",
+  "advisoryOnly",
+  "authorized",
+  "signed",
+  "broadcast",
+  "requiresHumanConfirmation",
+  "grantsPermissions",
+  "capabilities",
+  "canClassifyRisk",
+  "canExplain",
+  "canSimulate",
+  "canSign",
+  "canBroadcast",
+  "canAuthorize",
+  "canMintCapability",
+  "canAccessSecrets",
+]);
+
+function isDangerousKey(key, { allowPinnedSafe = false } = {}) {
+  const k = String(key);
+  if (allowPinnedSafe && PINNED_SAFE_OUTPUT_KEYS.has(k)) return false;
+  return DANGEROUS_FIELD_PATTERNS.some((re) => re.test(k));
+}
+
+/**
+ * Recursively scan a value for keys matching DANGEROUS_FIELD_PATTERNS.
+ * Returns a list of dotted paths where a dangerous key was found. Pure,
+ * read-only -- never mutates the input.
+ *
+ * @param {*} value
+ * @param {string} [pathPrefix]
+ * @param {object} [opts]
+ * @param {boolean} [opts.allowPinnedSafe] when true, exempts this module's own
+ *   fixed advisory-marker key names (see PINNED_SAFE_OUTPUT_KEYS). Only ever
+ *   pass this when scanning output THIS module constructed itself -- never
+ *   when scanning caller-supplied input.
+ */
+export function findDangerousFields(value, pathPrefix = "", opts = {}) {
+  const hits = [];
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    value.forEach((item, i) => {
+      hits.push(...findDangerousFields(item, `${pathPrefix}[${i}]`, opts));
+    });
+    return hits;
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      const path = pathPrefix ? `${pathPrefix}.${key}` : key;
+      if (isDangerousKey(key, opts)) hits.push(path);
+      hits.push(...findDangerousFields(val, path, opts));
+    }
+    return hits;
+  }
+  return hits;
+}
+
+/** Throws if `value` contains any dangerous field anywhere, at any depth.
+ *  Pass { allowPinnedSafe: true } ONLY for output this module itself built. */
+export function assertNoDangerousFields(value, label = "proposal input", opts = {}) {
+  const hits = findDangerousFields(value, "", opts);
+  if (hits.length) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `${label} contains disallowed secret/signing/broadcast field(s): ${hits.join(", ")}`
+    );
+  }
+}
+
+/** Deep-clones plain objects/arrays with any dangerous keys removed. Defense
+ *  in depth only -- createProposal() rejects rather than relying on this to
+ *  silently clean up the input. */
+export function stripDangerousFields(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) return value.map(stripDangerousFields);
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    const out = {};
+    for (const [key, val] of Object.entries(value)) {
+      if (isDangerousKey(key)) continue;
+      out[key] = stripDangerousFields(val);
+    }
+    return out;
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+function deepFreeze(value) {
+  if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+    value.forEach(deepFreeze);
+    return Object.freeze(value);
+  }
+  if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+    for (const v of Object.values(value)) deepFreeze(v);
+    return Object.freeze(value);
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
+// Fields the router is allowed to read off a proposal request. Anything not
+// in this list is dropped when the proposal is built, regardless of what the
+// caller sent -- this is what makes step 2 (Strip) effective even if a
+// dangerous field used a name the regex list hasn't seen yet.
+const ALLOWED_INPUT_FIELDS = Object.freeze([
+  "kind",
+  "target",
+  "notionalUsd",
+  "chainId",
+  "venue",
+  "destinationKnown",
+  "unlimitedApproval",
+  "crossChain",
+  "note",
+]);
+
+function pickAllowed(input) {
+  const out = {};
+  for (const key of ALLOWED_INPUT_FIELDS) {
+    if (input && Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(input, key) && input[key] !== undefined) {
+      out[key] = input[key];
+    }
+  }
+  return out;
+}
+
+let proposalCounter = 0;
+function nextProposalId(nowMs) {
+  proposalCounter += 1;
+  return `proposal-${nowMs}-${proposalCounter}`;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Build an advisory-only proposal object. Never authorizes, signs, or
+ * broadcasts anything; the returned object cannot be mistaken for one that
+ * does because its authority markers are pinned to false/"proposal" and it is
+ * deep-frozen.
+ *
+ * @param {object} input
+ * @param {string} input.kind            see risk-classifier.mjs for recognized kinds
+ * @param {string} [input.target]        human-readable description of the target (e.g. "HL BTC-PERP")
+ * @param {number} [input.notionalUsd]
+ * @param {number} [input.chainId]
+ * @param {string} [input.venue]
+ * @param {boolean} [input.destinationKnown]
+ * @param {boolean} [input.unlimitedApproval]
+ * @param {boolean} [input.crossChain]
+ * @param {string} [input.note]          free-text rationale; itself scanned for dangerous fields if an object is passed by mistake
+ * @param {number} [nowMs]               injectable clock for deterministic tests
+ * @returns {object} frozen proposal
+ */
+export function createProposal(input = {}, nowMs = Date.now()) {
+  if (input === null || typeof input !== "object" || Array.isArray(input)) {
+    throw new Error("proposal input must be a plain object");
+  }
+
+  // Step 1: reject. Scan the FULL raw input (not just the allowlisted
+  // subset) so a caller cannot smuggle a secret in under an allowed key name
+  // collision, nor bury one in an unlisted field and have it silently
+  // dropped without anyone noticing the attempt.
+  assertNoDangerousFields(input, "proposal input");
+
+  const kind = String(input.kind || "").trim().toLowerCase();
+  if (!kind) throw new Error("proposal input: kind is required");
+
+  // Step 2: strip / allowlist. Only known-safe fields are read from input.
+  const safeInput = pickAllowed(input);
+  safeInput.kind = kind;
+
+  const risk = classifyRisk({
+    kind,
+    notionalUsd: safeInput.notionalUsd,
+    destinationKnown: safeInput.destinationKnown,
+    unlimitedApproval: safeInput.unlimitedApproval,
+    crossChain: safeInput.crossChain,
+  });
+
+  const proposal = {
+    id: nextProposalId(Number(nowMs) || Date.now()),
+    createdAt: new Date(Number(nowMs) || Date.now()).toISOString(),
+
+    kind: safeInput.kind,
+    target: safeInput.target != null ? String(safeInput.target) : null,
+    notionalUsd: safeInput.notionalUsd != null ? Number(safeInput.notionalUsd) : null,
+    chainId: safeInput.chainId != null ? Number(safeInput.chainId) : null,
+    venue: safeInput.venue != null ? String(safeInput.venue) : null,
+    note: safeInput.note != null ? String(safeInput.note) : null,
+
+    risk: {
+      tier: risk.tier,
+      score: risk.score,
+      reasons: risk.reasons,
+    },
+
+    // Step 3: pinned advisory markers. These are NOT derived from input and
+    // cannot be overridden by any input field -- they are literal constants.
+    mode: "proposal",
+    advisoryOnly: true,
+    authorized: false,
+    signed: false,
+    broadcast: false,
+    requiresHumanConfirmation: true,
+    grantsPermissions: false,
+    capabilities: Object.freeze({
+      canClassifyRisk: true,
+      canExplain: true,
+      canSimulate: kind === "simulate",
+      canSign: false,
+      canBroadcast: false,
+      canAuthorize: false,
+      canMintCapability: false,
+      canAccessSecrets: false,
+    }),
+  };
+
+  // Belt-and-suspenders: re-verify the object we are about to hand out
+  // contains no dangerous keys before freezing, in case a future edit to
+  // ALLOWED_INPUT_FIELDS accidentally lets one through. allowPinnedSafe is
+  // required here because this module's own fixed advisory markers (e.g.
+  // "authorized", "broadcast", "canAccessSecrets") intentionally reuse
+  // wording from the dangerous-pattern list to stay self-documenting; they
+  // are hardcoded constants above, never derived from input.
+  assertNoDangerousFields(proposal, "proposal output", { allowPinnedSafe: true });
+
+  return deepFreeze(proposal);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Defense-in-depth guard for anything downstream that receives a proposal
+ * object from the router and wants to double check, before acting on it in
+ * any way, that it really is advisory-only. Throws if the object does not
+ * look like a well-formed, unauthorized proposal.
+ */
+export function assertAdvisoryProposal(proposal) {
+  if (!proposal || typeof proposal !== "object") {
+    throw new Error("proposal required");
+  }
+  if (proposal.mode !== "proposal") throw new Error("proposal: mode must be \"proposal\"");
+  if (proposal.authorized !== false) throw new Error("proposal: authorized must be false");
+  if (proposal.signed !== false) throw new Error("proposal: signed must be false");
+  if (proposal.broadcast !== false) throw new Error("proposal: broadcast must be false");
+  if (proposal.advisoryOnly !== true) throw new Error("proposal: advisoryOnly must be true");
+  if (proposal.grantsPermissions !== false) {
+    throw new Error("proposal: grantsPermissions must be false");
+  }
+  const caps = proposal.capabilities || {};
+  if (caps.canSign || caps.canBroadcast || caps.canAuthorize || caps.canMintCapability || caps.canAccessSecrets) {
+    throw new Error("proposal: capabilities must not grant sign/broadcast/authorize/mint/secret access");
+  }
+  assertNoDangerousFields(proposal, "proposal", { allowPinnedSafe: true });
+  return true;
+}