@optimystic/db-p2p 0.24.2 → 0.25.0

package/dist/src/cluster/commit-proof.js

@@ -0,0 +1,263 @@
+import { canonicalBlockHash, clusterVoteVerificationPayload, computeClusterCommitHash, computeClusterMessageHash, computeClusterPromiseHash, membershipDigestFromIds } from "@optimystic/db-core";
+import { peerIdFromString } from "@libp2p/peer-id";
+import { publicKeyFromRaw } from "@libp2p/crypto/keys";
+import { fromString as uint8ArrayFromString } from "uint8arrays/from-string";
+/**
+ * Project a consensus-committed {@link ClusterRecord} into a {@link BlockCommitProof}. A cheap
+ * projection — no hashing, no signature work; the record's maps are carried by reference (the
+ * storage layer JSON-snapshots on save). Returns `undefined` for a v1 / unversioned record: its
+ * hashes bind no peer set, so its signer list is unbound and it can never be certified (the caller
+ * logs the skip).
+ */
+export function buildBlockCommitProof(record) {
+    if (record.membershipVersion !== 2 || typeof record.membershipDigest !== 'string') {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return {
+        v: 1,
+        messageHash: record.messageHash,
+        message: record.message,
+        promises: record.promises,
+        commits: record.commits,
+        membershipVersion: 2,
+        membershipDigest: record.membershipDigest,
+        peerIds: Object.keys(record.peers).sort()
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Verify that `proof` certifies the CLAIM — `claim.blockId` at `claim.rev` under `claim.actionId` —
+ * without needing the block bytes. Pure and total on hostile input: never throws; every failure is a
+ * distinguishable {@link ProofFailure}.
+ *
+ * Mirrors the outcome discipline of `ClusterMember.verifySignature`: a malformed or unbound signer is
+ * a verification failure that must NEVER be turned into a reputation penalty, because the identity
+ * behind it was not proven. Callers deciding attributability must key off the reason values, and
+ * treat `unknown-signer` / `non-ed25519-signer` / `malformed-signature` / `malformed-proof` as
+ * non-attributable.
+ *
+ * **Why both thresholds.** The commit-round vote is cast blind — a member signs the commit whenever
+ * the approve-promises reach super-majority, regardless of its own promise vote. The promise-round
+ * approvals are the votes that carry "I validated this message, including its content digest".
+ * Requiring only the commit approvals would count signatures that attest to nothing; requiring only
+ * the promises would accept a record the cohort never actually committed. Require both.
+ *
+ * The claim step (a `{ commit }` op whose `blockIds`/`actionId`/`rev` all match) is what stops
+ * replay: a genuine proof for rev 5 presented for rev 9, or for a different block id, dies there.
+ *
+ * ## What a passing verdict does NOT prove — two caller obligations
+ *
+ * 1. **The signers are not bound to the block.** A verdict says "the cohort in `proof.peerIds`
+ *    agreed", never "that is the cohort responsible for `claim.blockId`". Any attacker who controls
+ *    N keys can stand up their own N-peer cohort, sign a commit for any block id at any revision,
+ *    and produce a proof that verifies here. Nothing offline can close this: a block's cohort is
+ *    chosen by live placement and rotates over history, so `peerIds` cannot be checked against a
+ *    fixed expected set. A caller accepting proofs from untrusted peers MUST corroborate the cohort
+ *    separately (overlap with the block's currently-derived cohort, or a membership anchor — see
+ *    `feat-cluster-membership-threshold-cert-anchoring`). Both repair paths do this via
+ *    `cluster/certified-claims.ts`, whose layer 2 logs the overlap and surfaces the unanchored
+ *    residual; the anchor itself is still open.
+ * 2. **Cost is attacker-chosen.** This performs one Ed25519 verify per approve vote and hashes the
+ *    whole message; nothing here caps `peerIds`, the vote maps, or the message. A caller reading a
+ *    proof off the wire must bound its size and cohort count BEFORE calling.
+ */
+export async function verifyBlockCommitProofClaim(proof, claim, thresholds) {
+    try {
+        if (proof === null || typeof proof !== 'object') {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed-proof' };
+        }
+        // A version this verifier does not implement is never half-verified. `membershipVersion !== 2`
+        // means the signer list is unbound (v1 / unversioned history) — never certifiable.
+        if (proof.v !== 1 || proof.membershipVersion !== 2) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'legacy-record' };
+        }
+        if (typeof proof.messageHash !== 'string'
+            || typeof proof.membershipDigest !== 'string'
+            || proof.message === null || typeof proof.message !== 'object'
+            || !Array.isArray(proof.message.operations)
+            || !isVoteMap(proof.promises) || !isVoteMap(proof.commits)
+            || !Array.isArray(proof.peerIds) || !proof.peerIds.every(id => typeof id === 'string')) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed-proof' };
+        }
+        // A duplicated id in the denominator list would let one signer count twice against the
+        // threshold. (A JSON-parsed vote map cannot carry duplicate keys, so the array is the one
+        // reachable site for duplication.)
+        const peerSet = new Set(proof.peerIds);
+        if (peerSet.size !== proof.peerIds.length) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'duplicate-signer' };
+        }
+        // The peer list must be the one every signature covers: recompute the membership digest from
+        // it, then the message hash over (message + digest). Tampering with peerIds dies here;
+        // tampering with the message dies on the next check.
+        if (await membershipDigestFromIds(proof.peerIds) !== proof.membershipDigest) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'membership-mismatch' };
+        }
+        if (await computeClusterMessageHash(proof.message, proof.membershipDigest) !== proof.messageHash) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'message-hash-mismatch' };
+        }
+        const promiseHash = await computeClusterPromiseHash(proof.messageHash, proof.message, proof.membershipDigest);
+        const commitHash = await computeClusterCommitHash(proof.messageHash, proof.message, proof.promises, proof.membershipDigest);
+        const promiseRound = await countApprovals(proof.promises, promiseHash, peerSet);
+        if ('reason' in promiseRound) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: promiseRound.reason };
+        }
+        const commitRound = await countApprovals(proof.commits, commitHash, peerSet);
+        if ('reason' in commitRound) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: commitRound.reason };
+        }
+        // Threshold gates. When a threshold fails AND that round skipped a signer outside `peerIds`,
+        // report `unknown-signer` rather than the bare threshold reason — the skipped signature is the
+        // record of why the count came up short.
+        const superMajority = Math.ceil(thresholds.superMajorityThreshold * proof.peerIds.length);
+        if (promiseRound.approves < superMajority) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: promiseRound.sawUnknownSigner ? 'unknown-signer' : 'promise-threshold' };
+        }
+        if (!(commitRound.approves > proof.peerIds.length * thresholds.simpleMajorityThreshold)) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: commitRound.sawUnknownSigner ? 'unknown-signer' : 'commit-threshold' };
+        }
+        const op = findClaimedCommitOp(proof.message, claim);
+        if (!op) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'claim-not-in-message' };
+        }
+        return { ok: true, declaredDigest: op.blockDigests?.[claim.blockId]?.digest };
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'malformed-proof' };
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * Claim verification ({@link verifyBlockCommitProofClaim}) PLUS: the digest the commit op declared
+ * for `claim.blockId` must be present (`no-digest-declared`) and equal `canonicalBlockHash(block)`
+ * (`digest-mismatch`). Total like the claim half; a block shape that `canonicalBlockHash` cannot
+ * digest reads as `digest-mismatch` — the received bytes provably are not the declared content.
+ */
+export async function verifyBlockCommitProofContent(proof, claim, block, thresholds) {
+    const verdict = await verifyBlockCommitProofClaim(proof, claim, thresholds);
+    if (!verdict.ok) {
+        return verdict;
+    }
+    if (typeof verdict.declaredDigest !== 'string') {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'no-digest-declared' };
+    }
+    try {
+        if (await canonicalBlockHash(block) !== verdict.declaredDigest) {
+            return { ok: false, reason: 'digest-mismatch' };
+        }
+    }
+    catch {
+        return { ok: false, reason: 'digest-mismatch' };
+    }
+    return verdict;
+}
+/**
+ * The digest `proof.message`'s commit operation declares for the claimed block, or `undefined`
+ * when the claim resolves no commit op or the op carries no digest for that block id. This is the
+ * SAME op resolution {@link verifyBlockCommitProofClaim}'s claim step uses, so the digest the
+ * storage layer's retention rule compares against (persist only when the local materialization
+ * matches) can never drift from the digest a later verifier extracts.
+ */
+export function proofDeclaredDigest(proof, claim) {
+    return findClaimedCommitOp(proof.message, claim)?.blockDigests?.[claim.blockId]?.digest;
+}
+/**
+ * Does `proof`'s message actually carry a commit operation for this exact
+ * `(blockId, rev, actionId)`? The claim step of {@link verifyBlockCommitProofClaim} with NO
+ * cryptography — the same {@link findClaimedCommitOp} resolution, so the cheap structural check and
+ * the full verification can never disagree about which op a claim names.
+ *
+ * This is the pairing guard a SERVER uses: a proof is looked up by revision, so attaching one whose
+ * message names a different revision (or block, or action) would be publishing a mis-paired
+ * artifact. It says nothing about signatures or thresholds — a receiver must still verify. Total on
+ * hostile input like its verifying sibling: never throws, `false` on any malformed shape.
+ */
+export function proofClaimsCommit(proof, claim) {
+    try {
+        return findClaimedCommitOp(proof.message, claim) !== undefined;
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/** A plain-object (non-array) map of votes — the shape `promises` / `commits` must have. */
+function isVoteMap(value) {
+    return value !== null && typeof value === 'object' && !Array.isArray(value);
+}
+/**
+ * Count distinct `approve` votes over `hash` from signers inside `peerSet`, verifying each signature
+ * against the Ed25519 key its peer id names. Per-entry rules (the spec's step 5/6):
+ *
+ * - a non-`approve` vote is ignored silently (rejects/conflicts are part of the signed record but
+ *   never count toward approval);
+ * - a signer outside `peerSet` is skipped and noted (`sawUnknownSigner`) — the caller downgrades a
+ *   failed threshold to `unknown-signer`;
+ * - a signer inside `peerSet` whose id is not a valid Ed25519 peer id → immediate
+ *   `non-ed25519-signer` (its key cannot be recovered, so the proof as a whole is unverifiable);
+ * - a signature that is not a string, fails base64url decode, or fails cryptographic verify →
+ *   immediate `malformed-signature`;
+ * - each signer id is counted at most once.
+ */
+async function countApprovals(votes, hash, peerSet) {
+    let approves = 0;
+    let sawUnknownSigner = false;
+    const counted = new Set();
+    for (const [signerId, vote] of Object.entries(votes)) {
+        if (vote === null || typeof vote !== 'object' || vote.type !== 'approve') {
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (!peerSet.has(signerId)) {
+            sawUnknownSigner = true;
+            continue;
+        }
+        if (counted.has(signerId)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        let rawKey;
+        try {
+            const peerId = peerIdFromString(signerId);
+            if (peerId.type !== 'Ed25519' || peerId.publicKey === undefined) {
+                return { reason: 'non-ed25519-signer' };
+            }
+            rawKey = peerId.publicKey.raw;
+        }
+        catch {
+            // An id that does not even parse as a peer id certainly names no Ed25519 key.
+            return { reason: 'non-ed25519-signer' };
+        }
+        try {
+            if (typeof vote.signature !== 'string') {
+                return { reason: 'malformed-signature' };
+            }
+            const sigBytes = uint8ArrayFromString(vote.signature, 'base64url');
+            const payload = clusterVoteVerificationPayload(hash, vote);
+            if (!await publicKeyFromRaw(rawKey).verify(payload, sigBytes)) {
+                return { reason: 'malformed-signature' };
+            }
+        }
+        catch {
+            return { reason: 'malformed-signature' };
+        }
+        counted.add(signerId);
+        approves++;
+    }
+    return { approves, sawUnknownSigner };
+}
+/**
+ * The `{ commit }` operation the claim points at: `blockIds` contains the claimed block and the
+ * op's `actionId` / `rev` equal the claim's. Absent → `claim-not-in-message` (the replay stop).
+ */
+function findClaimedCommitOp(message, claim) {
+    for (const operation of message.operations) {
+        if (operation === null || typeof operation !== 'object' || !('commit' in operation)) {
+            continue;
+        }
+        const commit = operation.commit;
+        if (commit !== null && typeof commit === 'object'
+            && Array.isArray(commit.blockIds)
+            && commit.blockIds.includes(claim.blockId)
+            && commit.actionId === claim.actionId
+            && commit.rev === claim.rev) {
+            return commit;
+        }
+    }
+    return undefined;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=commit-proof.js.map

package/dist/src/cluster/commit-proof.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/cluster/quorum-restore.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
 import type { IBlock } from "@optimystic/db-core";
+import type { BlockCommitProof } from "./commit-proof.js";
 /**
  * Quorum-corroboration helpers shared by the two block-restoration paths:
  *   - read-repair   (`CoordinatorRepo.queryClusterForLatest`)
@@ -9,9 +10,13 @@ import type { IBlock } from "@optimystic/db-core";
  * "max wins" with "highest value corroborated by a quorum of distinct peers".
  *
  * NOTE: the quorum here is corroboration-of-a-claim, NOT Sybil-resistant cohort
- * membership. A peer minting fresh keypairs can still cast a vote — proving a
- * voter is a legitimate cohort member requires commit-cert + membership
- * anchoring, deferred to backlog `debt-read-repair-commit-cert-verification`.
+ * membership. A peer minting fresh keypairs can still cast a vote. Selection now
+ * additionally weighs *certified* claims — those whose cohort commit proof a
+ * caller has already verified (`cluster/certified-claims.ts`) and marked via the
+ * injected `certified` flag — so a lone honest holder with a valid proof is
+ * sufficient where uncertified claims still need distinct-peer corroboration.
+ * Verification itself never happens here: both selectors stay pure and
+ * synchronous; verdicts arrive as booleans.
  */
 /** A single peer's self-reported (rev, actionId) for a block. */
 export interface RevClaim {
@@ -19,13 +24,34 @@ export interface RevClaim {
     peerId: string;
     rev: number;
     actionId: string;
+    /**
+     * The cohort commit proof the claiming peer attached, when it had one. Selection never reads
+     * this field: presence proves nothing on its own — the peer chose what to attach. A caller
+     * that verifies it (`certifyClaim` / `certifyContent` in `cluster/certified-claims.ts`, built
+     * on `verifyBlockCommitProofClaim`) records the verdict in {@link certified}, which is what
+     * {@link selectQuorumRev} weighs.
+     */
+    proof?: BlockCommitProof;
+    /**
+     * Injected verdict: the caller verified this claim's cohort commit proof and it certifies this
+     * exact `(rev, actionId)`. A certified claim carries the cohort's signature set as its
+     * corroboration, so {@link selectQuorumRev} can select it without a second peer vouching.
+     * Never set this from the mere presence of {@link proof}.
+     */
+    certified?: boolean;
 }
 /** The (rev, actionId) pair a quorum agreed on, plus the peers that corroborated it. */
 export interface QuorumRev {
     rev: number;
     actionId: string;
-    /** Distinct peer-ids that voted for this exact (rev, actionId). */
+    /**
+     * Distinct peer-ids that voted for this exact (rev, actionId). When {@link certified} is set,
+     * these are the certified claimants at that pair instead — possibly a single peer, whose
+     * corroboration is the proof's signature set rather than other voters.
+     */
     supporters: string[];
+    /** Set when the certified path selected this pair, so callers can log which rule won. */
+    certified?: true;
 }
 /**
  * Votes a claim needs when the cohort is big enough to supply them: a claim must be
@@ -91,15 +117,55 @@ export declare function corroboratorCapacity(cohortPeerCount: number, repairCorr
  *
  * Returns `undefined` when nothing is corroborated — an uncorroborated claim
  * must never drive restoration.
+ *
+ * **Certified claims** (`certified === true`, injected by a caller that verified the claim's
+ * cohort commit proof — see `cluster/certified-claims.ts`) short-circuit the distinct-peer rule,
+ * because the proof's signature set IS the corroboration:
+ *
+ *  - No certified claims → today's corroboration result, unchanged.
+ *  - A corroborated pair at a HIGHER rev than every certified claim wins — corroboration stays a
+ *    legitimate weaker path, so a legacy uncertified tail written after the last proven rev
+ *    remains readable.
+ *  - Otherwise the highest certified rev wins: this covers a certified rev beaten in raw rev only
+ *    by an *uncorroborated* claim (which failed quorum and is no evidence), and the equal-rev
+ *    tie, where the proof outweighs votes.
+ *  - Except: two distinct `actionId`s certified at that top rev is equivocation — the cohort
+ *    provably signed two different actions into one revision — and the whole selection declines
+ *    (`undefined`). Callers distinguish this decline from a plain no-quorum via
+ *    {@link certifiedEquivocation}.
  */
 export declare function selectQuorumRev(claims: RevClaim[], simpleMajorityThreshold: number, corroboratorCapacity?: number): QuorumRev | undefined;
-/** Canonical sha256 of a block's content, base64url. Same pattern as `ClusterMember.computeCommitHash`. */
-export declare function canonicalBlockHash(block: IBlock): Promise<string>;
-/** One block candidate paired with its serving peer and canonical hash. */
+/**
+ * The conflicting certified set at the top certified rev, when there is one: two-plus distinct
+ * `actionId`s each carrying a verified cohort commit proof for the SAME revision. It deserves a
+ * distinct log line from a plain no-quorum — the cohort (or whoever holds its keys) provably
+ * signed both sides. Selection stays pure, so callers do the logging with what this reports.
+ *
+ * `undefined` when no certified claim exists or the top certified rev names a single action —
+ * conflicts at LOWER certified revs are history already superseded, not equivocation worth
+ * declining over.
+ *
+ * **Ask this only on a decline.** A non-`undefined` result does NOT imply {@link selectQuorumRev}
+ * returned `undefined`: a corroborated pair STRICTLY above the top certified rev still wins, and
+ * the equivocation below it is reported here while selection succeeded. Call it when selection
+ * declined, to say WHY it declined.
+ */
+export declare function certifiedEquivocation(claims: RevClaim[]): {
+    rev: number;
+    actionIds: string[];
+} | undefined;
+/** One block candidate paired with its serving peer and canonical hash
+ * (`canonicalBlockHash` from `@optimystic/db-core`). */
 export interface BlockHashCandidate {
     peerId: string;
     hash: string;
     block: IBlock;
+    /**
+     * Injected verdict: the caller verified a cohort commit proof binding this candidate's CONTENT
+     * (`certifyContent` in `cluster/certified-claims.ts` — the declared digest matched these
+     * bytes), so the cohort's signatures stand in for other peers serving the same hash.
+     */
+    certified?: boolean;
 }
 /**
  * Among candidates already known to corroborate the target `(rev, actionId)`,
@@ -113,16 +179,37 @@ export interface BlockHashCandidate {
  * Omit it to keep the floor at two.
  *
  * **What relaxing this does and does not cost.** Block ids are random 256-bit strings, not
- * content-addressed, so {@link canonicalBlockHash} is a cross-peer *agreement* hash and never a
+ * content-addressed, so `canonicalBlockHash` (db-core) is a cross-peer *agreement* hash and never a
  * check against the requested id — nothing here re-derives an id from received bytes. At capacity
  * one the sole peer's content is therefore taken on its word. That extends no trust the cohort had
  * not already extended: the same peer's `(rev, actionId)` claim is equally uncorroborable at that
  * size, and a two-member cohort has no honest majority to appeal to. Pass a capacity a shrunken
  * view of the network cannot talk down (see {@link corroboratorCapacity}), so only a cohort that is
  * *genuinely* that small reaches this branch.
+ *
+ * **Certified candidates** (`certified === true` — a caller verified a cohort commit proof whose
+ * declared digest matches these exact bytes) short-circuit the hash quorum: exactly one distinct
+ * certified hash → that block wins outright, however many peers served it. Two-plus distinct
+ * certified hashes is certified content equivocation → decline (`undefined`), mirroring the
+ * existing unique-hash-tie decline; callers name that decline via
+ * {@link certifiedContentEquivocation}. No certified candidate → the hash quorum below, unchanged.
  */
 export declare function selectQuorumBlock(candidates: BlockHashCandidate[], simpleMajorityThreshold: number, corroboratorCapacity?: number): {
     block: IBlock;
     hash: string;
 } | undefined;
+/**
+ * The conflicting certified hashes when there are two or more — the content-side sibling of
+ * {@link certifiedEquivocation}, and the reason {@link selectQuorumBlock} declines outright.
+ * Candidates reaching that selector all carry the SAME `(rev, actionId)`, so two certified hashes
+ * mean the cohort's keys signed two different digests into one revision: a provable compromise an
+ * operator must be able to tell apart from the routine "not enough carriers agreed" decline. Both
+ * declines return `undefined`, so without this they log identically.
+ *
+ * `undefined` when fewer than two distinct certified hashes exist — including the ordinary
+ * no-certified-candidate case, where a decline really is a plain content-quorum shortfall.
+ */
+export declare function certifiedContentEquivocation(candidates: BlockHashCandidate[]): {
+    hashes: string[];
+} | undefined;
 //# sourceMappingURL=quorum-restore.d.ts.map

package/dist/src/cluster/quorum-restore.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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package/dist/src/cluster/quorum-restore.js

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-import { sha256 } from "multiformats/hashes/sha2";
-import { toString as uint8ArrayToString } from 'uint8arrays';
 /**
  * Votes a claim needs when the cohort is big enough to supply them: a claim must be
  * seconded by a second, independent peer. See {@link quorumSize} for the cap that
@@ -69,6 +67,22 @@ export function corroboratorCapacity(cohortPeerCount, repairCorroborationCluster
  *
  * Returns `undefined` when nothing is corroborated — an uncorroborated claim
  * must never drive restoration.
+ *
+ * **Certified claims** (`certified === true`, injected by a caller that verified the claim's
+ * cohort commit proof — see `cluster/certified-claims.ts`) short-circuit the distinct-peer rule,
+ * because the proof's signature set IS the corroboration:
+ *
+ *  - No certified claims → today's corroboration result, unchanged.
+ *  - A corroborated pair at a HIGHER rev than every certified claim wins — corroboration stays a
+ *    legitimate weaker path, so a legacy uncertified tail written after the last proven rev
+ *    remains readable.
+ *  - Otherwise the highest certified rev wins: this covers a certified rev beaten in raw rev only
+ *    by an *uncorroborated* claim (which failed quorum and is no evidence), and the equal-rev
+ *    tie, where the proof outweighs votes.
+ *  - Except: two distinct `actionId`s certified at that top rev is equivocation — the cohort
+ *    provably signed two different actions into one revision — and the whole selection declines
+ *    (`undefined`). Callers distinguish this decline from a plain no-quorum via
+ *    {@link certifiedEquivocation}.
  */
 export function selectQuorumRev(claims, simpleMajorityThreshold, corroboratorCapacity) {
     if (claims.length === 0)
@@ -99,21 +113,67 @@ export function selectQuorumRev(claims, simpleMajorityThreshold, corroboratorCap
             best = g;
         }
     }
-    return best
+    const corroborated = best
         ? { rev: best.rev, actionId: best.actionId, supporters: [...best.supporters] }
         : undefined;
+    const certified = certifiedGroups(claims);
+    if (!certified)
+        return corroborated;
+    // A corroborated pair strictly above every certified rev wins — a legacy uncertified tail
+    // must stay readable. A merely UNcorroborated higher rev never reaches here (it is not in
+    // `corroborated`), so it cannot outrank a proof.
+    if (corroborated && corroborated.rev > certified.rev)
+        return corroborated;
+    // Two actions provably signed into the same top revision: decline the whole selection rather
+    // than pick a side. Callers log via certifiedEquivocation.
+    if (certified.byAction.size !== 1)
+        return undefined;
+    const [entry] = certified.byAction;
+    const [actionId, supporters] = entry; // size === 1 checked above
+    return { rev: certified.rev, actionId, supporters: [...supporters], certified: true };
 }
-/** Deterministic JSON: sorts object keys so the hash is order-independent. Mirrors `ClusterMember.canonicalJson`. */
-function canonicalJson(value) {
-    return JSON.stringify(value, (_, v) => v && typeof v === 'object' && !Array.isArray(v)
-        ? Object.keys(v).sort().reduce((o, k) => { o[k] = v[k]; return o; }, {})
-        : v);
+/** Certified claims at the top certified rev, keyed by actionId → distinct certified claimants. */
+function certifiedGroups(claims) {
+    let top;
+    for (const c of claims) {
+        if (c.certified === true && (top === undefined || c.rev > top))
+            top = c.rev;
+    }
+    if (top === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    const byAction = new Map();
+    for (const c of claims) {
+        if (c.certified !== true || c.rev !== top)
+            continue;
+        let s = byAction.get(c.actionId);
+        if (!s) {
+            s = new Set();
+            byAction.set(c.actionId, s);
+        }
+        s.add(c.peerId);
+    }
+    return { rev: top, byAction };
 }
-/** Canonical sha256 of a block's content, base64url. Same pattern as `ClusterMember.computeCommitHash`. */
-export async function canonicalBlockHash(block) {
-    const bytes = new TextEncoder().encode(canonicalJson(block));
-    const digest = await sha256.digest(bytes);
-    return uint8ArrayToString(digest.digest, 'base64url');
+/**
+ * The conflicting certified set at the top certified rev, when there is one: two-plus distinct
+ * `actionId`s each carrying a verified cohort commit proof for the SAME revision. It deserves a
+ * distinct log line from a plain no-quorum — the cohort (or whoever holds its keys) provably
+ * signed both sides. Selection stays pure, so callers do the logging with what this reports.
+ *
+ * `undefined` when no certified claim exists or the top certified rev names a single action —
+ * conflicts at LOWER certified revs are history already superseded, not equivocation worth
+ * declining over.
+ *
+ * **Ask this only on a decline.** A non-`undefined` result does NOT imply {@link selectQuorumRev}
+ * returned `undefined`: a corroborated pair STRICTLY above the top certified rev still wins, and
+ * the equivocation below it is reported here while selection succeeded. Call it when selection
+ * declined, to say WHY it declined.
+ */
+export function certifiedEquivocation(claims) {
+    const groups = certifiedGroups(claims);
+    if (!groups || groups.byAction.size < 2)
+        return undefined;
+    return { rev: groups.rev, actionIds: [...groups.byAction.keys()] };
 }
 /**
  * Among candidates already known to corroborate the target `(rev, actionId)`,
@@ -127,17 +187,32 @@ export async function canonicalBlockHash(block) {
  * Omit it to keep the floor at two.
  *
  * **What relaxing this does and does not cost.** Block ids are random 256-bit strings, not
- * content-addressed, so {@link canonicalBlockHash} is a cross-peer *agreement* hash and never a
+ * content-addressed, so `canonicalBlockHash` (db-core) is a cross-peer *agreement* hash and never a
  * check against the requested id — nothing here re-derives an id from received bytes. At capacity
  * one the sole peer's content is therefore taken on its word. That extends no trust the cohort had
  * not already extended: the same peer's `(rev, actionId)` claim is equally uncorroborable at that
  * size, and a two-member cohort has no honest majority to appeal to. Pass a capacity a shrunken
  * view of the network cannot talk down (see {@link corroboratorCapacity}), so only a cohort that is
  * *genuinely* that small reaches this branch.
+ *
+ * **Certified candidates** (`certified === true` — a caller verified a cohort commit proof whose
+ * declared digest matches these exact bytes) short-circuit the hash quorum: exactly one distinct
+ * certified hash → that block wins outright, however many peers served it. Two-plus distinct
+ * certified hashes is certified content equivocation → decline (`undefined`), mirroring the
+ * existing unique-hash-tie decline; callers name that decline via
+ * {@link certifiedContentEquivocation}. No certified candidate → the hash quorum below, unchanged.
  */
 export function selectQuorumBlock(candidates, simpleMajorityThreshold, corroboratorCapacity) {
     if (candidates.length === 0)
         return undefined;
+    const certifiedByHash = certifiedHashes(candidates);
+    if (certifiedByHash.size === 1) {
+        const [entry] = certifiedByHash;
+        const [hash, block] = entry;
+        return { block, hash };
+    }
+    if (certifiedByHash.size > 1)
+        return undefined; // certified content equivocation — decline
     // One vote per distinct peer per hash group, matching selectQuorumRev — a peer appearing twice
     // must not be able to second itself into a content quorum.
     const groups = new Map();
@@ -159,4 +234,28 @@ export function selectQuorumBlock(candidates, simpleMajorityThreshold, corrobora
     const [hash, group] = meeting[0];
     return { block: group.block, hash };
 }
+/** Distinct hashes carried by certified candidates → the first block instance serving each. */
+function certifiedHashes(candidates) {
+    const byHash = new Map();
+    for (const c of candidates) {
+        if (c.certified === true && !byHash.has(c.hash))
+            byHash.set(c.hash, c.block);
+    }
+    return byHash;
+}
+/**
+ * The conflicting certified hashes when there are two or more — the content-side sibling of
+ * {@link certifiedEquivocation}, and the reason {@link selectQuorumBlock} declines outright.
+ * Candidates reaching that selector all carry the SAME `(rev, actionId)`, so two certified hashes
+ * mean the cohort's keys signed two different digests into one revision: a provable compromise an
+ * operator must be able to tell apart from the routine "not enough carriers agreed" decline. Both
+ * declines return `undefined`, so without this they log identically.
+ *
+ * `undefined` when fewer than two distinct certified hashes exist — including the ordinary
+ * no-certified-candidate case, where a decline really is a plain content-quorum shortfall.
+ */
+export function certifiedContentEquivocation(candidates) {
+    const byHash = certifiedHashes(candidates);
+    return byHash.size < 2 ? undefined : { hashes: [...byHash.keys()] };
+}
 //# sourceMappingURL=quorum-restore.js.map

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