@optimystic/db-p2p 0.21.0 → 0.22.0

package/dist/src/libp2p-node-base.js

@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ import { seedOwnedBlocksFromStorage } from './owned-block-seed.js';
 import { clusterMember } from './cluster/cluster-repo.js';
 import { createReconcileBlock } from './cluster/reconcile-block.js';
 import { resolveClusterPolicy } from './cluster/cluster-policy.js';
+import { assertClusterSizeCoupling } from './cluster/cluster-size-coupling.js';
 import { createCommitCertStore, makeClusterCommitCertExtractor } from './cluster/commit-cert.js';
 import { coordinatorRepo } from './repo/coordinator-repo.js';
 import { Libp2pKeyPeerNetwork } from './libp2p-key-network.js';
@@ -177,6 +178,15 @@ export async function createLibp2pNodeBase(options, defaults) {
         // the store first keeps origination correct regardless of the caller sink (`put` never throws).
         ? (actionId, cert) => { certStore.put(actionId, cert); options.onCommitCertificate?.(actionId, cert); }
         : options.onCommitCertificate;
+    // Every cluster-policy default lives in `cluster/cluster-policy.ts` — including WHY the admission
+    // gate and the repair corroboration floor resolve the one operator field
+    // (`clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize`) to different values when it is absent. Resolved ONCE, here,
+    // before anything that reads a cluster size is constructed: `networkManagerService` below,
+    // `Libp2pKeyPeerNetwork`, and the spread-on-churn monitor init must all read `consensusConfig.clusterSize`
+    // rather than `options.clusterSize` directly, or they can each apply their own fallback default and
+    // silently disagree (ticket bug-cluster-size-resolution-single-source). `assertClusterSizeCoupling`
+    // below is the fail-fast backstop if a future edit reintroduces that split.
+    const consensusConfig = resolveClusterPolicy(options);
     const libp2pOptions = {
         start: false,
         privateKey: nodePrivateKey,
@@ -328,7 +338,7 @@ export async function createLibp2pNodeBase(options, defaults) {
             },
             networkManager: (components) => {
                 const svcFactory = networkManagerService({
-                    clusterSize: options.clusterSize ?? 10,
+                    clusterSize: consensusConfig.clusterSize,
                     expectedRemotes: (options.bootstrapNodes?.length ?? 0) > 0,
                     allowClusterDownsize: options.clusterPolicy?.allowDownsize ?? true,
                     clusterSizeTolerance: options.clusterPolicy?.sizeTolerance ?? 0.5
@@ -388,585 +398,596 @@ export async function createLibp2pNodeBase(options, defaults) {
     // handler is live with a resolvable node from its first request.
     wired.repo.setLibp2p(node);
     await node.start();
-    // Initialize peer reputation service
-    const reputation = new PeerReputationService();
-    // Initialize cluster coordination components
-    const networkMode = (options.bootstrapNodes?.length ?? 0) > 0 ? 'joining' : 'forming';
-    // Network-namespaced protocol prefix, threaded into the key network so coordinator/
-    // cohort selection is scoped to peers that serve THIS network's cluster/repo protocol.
-    // A peer that only belongs to another network sharing the same physical nodes/
-    // bootstraps registers a different (network-namespaced) identify protocol, so it is
-    // never selected and can't drag this network's super-majority below quorum.
-    const protocolPrefix = `/optimystic/${options.networkName}`;
-    const keyNetwork = new Libp2pKeyPeerNetwork(node, options.clusterSize, undefined, networkMode, options.persistence, reputation, protocolPrefix);
-    await keyNetwork.initFromPersistedState();
-    const createClusterClient = (peerId) => ClusterClient.create(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
-    // Inject reputation into NetworkManagerService. Load-bearing and non-optional: the service is
-    // unconditionally present, so a throw is a real wiring bug. Unlike the pre-start injections above
-    // the node has already started here, so stop it before rethrowing rather than leaking a started
-    // node + open transports (mirrors the cohortTopic hard-fail blocks below).
+    // Everything from here to the `return` runs against an ALREADY STARTED node (open transports,
+    // listening addresses, running services). A rejection out of that span used to hand the caller an
+    // error and no handle, leaving the node running with its listener port still bound — unrecoverable
+    // for the caller and enough to block the port for the next start attempt. So the whole post-start
+    // body rolls back: see the `catch` at the bottom of this function.
     try {
+        // Initialize peer reputation service
+        const reputation = new PeerReputationService();
+        // Initialize cluster coordination components
+        const networkMode = (options.bootstrapNodes?.length ?? 0) > 0 ? 'joining' : 'forming';
+        // Network-namespaced protocol prefix, threaded into the key network so coordinator/
+        // cohort selection is scoped to peers that serve THIS network's cluster/repo protocol.
+        // A peer that only belongs to another network sharing the same physical nodes/
+        // bootstraps registers a different (network-namespaced) identify protocol, so it is
+        // never selected and can't drag this network's super-majority below quorum.
+        const protocolPrefix = `/optimystic/${options.networkName}`;
+        const keyNetwork = new Libp2pKeyPeerNetwork(node, consensusConfig.clusterSize, undefined, networkMode, options.persistence, reputation, protocolPrefix);
+        await keyNetwork.initFromPersistedState();
+        const createClusterClient = (peerId) => ClusterClient.create(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
+        // Inject reputation into NetworkManagerService. Load-bearing and non-optional: the service is
+        // unconditionally present, so a throw is a real wiring bug. The node has already started here, but
+        // no ad-hoc stop is needed: the post-start rollback `catch` at the bottom of this function stops it.
         wired.networkManager.setReputation(reputation);
-    }
-    catch (err) {
-        await node.stop();
-        throw err;
-    }
-    // Create partition detector and get FRET service
-    const partitionDetector = new PartitionDetector();
-    const fretSvc = node.services?.fret;
-    // Every cluster-policy default lives in `cluster/cluster-policy.ts` — including WHY the admission
-    // gate and the repair corroboration floor resolve the one operator field
-    // (`clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize`) to different values when it is absent. Extracted so those
-    // defaults can be asserted without booting a node.
-    const consensusConfig = resolveClusterPolicy(options);
-    // Fetch a block archive from one cohort peer over the sync protocol, bounded by a
-    // per-peer timeout so an unreachable peer can't stall reconciliation. Mirrors the
-    // SyncClient query in `clusterLatestCallback`, but returns the full archive (which
-    // carries the materialized block) rather than only the latest ActionRev.
-    const fetchArchiveFromPeer = async (peerIdStr, blockId) => {
-        let peerId;
-        try {
-            peerId = peerIdFromString(peerIdStr);
-        }
-        catch {
-            return undefined;
-        }
-        if (peerId.equals(node.peerId))
-            return undefined;
-        const syncClient = new SyncClient(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
-        try {
-            const response = await Promise.race([
-                syncClient.requestBlock({ blockId, rev: undefined }),
-                new Promise(resolve => { setTimeout(() => resolve({ success: false }), 1000).unref(); })
-            ]);
-            return response.success ? response.archive : undefined;
-        }
-        catch {
-            // Peer unreachable / no data — caller falls back to the next cohort peer.
-            return undefined;
-        }
-    };
-    // Active reconciliation for a block this member committed without a materializable base
-    // (cohort drift, or a refused `missing-base-revision` commit). See `reconcile-block.ts` for
-    // the corroboration rules — in particular why both quorums are capped by how many peers
-    // could answer at all, which is what lets a genuinely two-node cohort heal.
-    // NOTE: this and the CoordinatorRepo below must cap against the SAME
-    // repairCorroborationClusterSize, or the two restoration paths disagree about how much trust a
-    // lone peer gets. Safe today because both read the one `resolveClusterPolicy` result above; if
-    // either ever resolves its own value, add a fail-fast coupling check like
-    // `assertSuperMajorityCoupling` rather than relying on proximity.
-    const reconcileBlock = createReconcileBlock({
-        selfPeerId: node.peerId.toString(),
-        fetchArchive: fetchArchiveFromPeer,
-        saveReplicatedBlock: (blockId, block, source) => storageRepo.saveReplicatedBlock(blockId, block, source),
-        simpleMajorityThreshold: consensusConfig.simpleMajorityThreshold,
-        repairCorroborationClusterSize: consensusConfig.repairCorroborationClusterSize,
-        reputation
-    });
-    // Member-side membership derivation for the admission gate: independently re-derive this block's
-    // responsible cluster from the SAME source the coordinator uses (IKeyNetwork.findCluster), plus FRET's
-    // network-size confidence. A member gates a coordinator-declared peer set against this view before
-    // voting, so a self-shrunk minority-partition set cannot be voted into super-majority (see cluster-repo
-    // admitMembership). No FRET ⇒ confidence 0 ⇒ the gate fails closed for any downsize.
-    const deriveExpectedCluster = async (blockId) => {
-        const peers = await keyNetwork.findCluster(new TextEncoder().encode(blockId));
-        let confidence = 0;
-        if (fretSvc) {
+        // Create partition detector and get FRET service
+        const partitionDetector = new PartitionDetector();
+        const fretSvc = node.services?.fret;
+        // Fetch a block archive from one cohort peer over the sync protocol, bounded by a
+        // per-peer timeout so an unreachable peer can't stall reconciliation. Mirrors the
+        // SyncClient query in `clusterLatestCallback`, but returns the full archive (which
+        // carries the materialized block) rather than only the latest ActionRev.
+        const fetchArchiveFromPeer = async (peerIdStr, blockId) => {
+            let peerId;
             try {
-                confidence = fretSvc.getNetworkSizeEstimate().confidence;
+                peerId = peerIdFromString(peerIdStr);
             }
             catch {
-                // Leave confidence 0 → fail closed for downsizing.
+                return undefined;
             }
-        }
-        return { peers: peers ?? {}, confidence };
-    };
-    clusterImpl = clusterMember({
-        storageRepo,
-        peerNetwork: keyNetwork,
-        peerId: node.peerId,
-        privateKey: nodePrivateKey,
-        protocolPrefix,
-        partitionDetector,
-        fretService: fretSvc,
-        validator: options.validator,
-        reputation,
-        consensusConfig,
-        stateStore: options.transactionStateStore,
-        reconcileBlock,
-        onCommitCertificate,
-        deriveExpectedCluster
-        // `recomputeArbitratorSet` (invalidation layer-2) is intentionally NOT wired here yet: a live FRET
-        // recompute needs a churn-tolerance window so it does not false-reject legitimate certificates from
-        // late-joiners (a liveness regression). Until that is tuned against live topology — and the
-        // cohort-topic membership-cert trust anchor (layer 3) lands — invalidation verification runs on the
-        // challenger-bound set + membership + dedup (layer 1) and LOGS the residual anchoring gap. See
-        // `verifyInvalidationCertificate` and `tickets/plan/cohort-topic-membership-cert-trust-anchoring.md`.
-    });
-    const coordinatorRepoFactory = coordinatorRepo(keyNetwork, createClusterClient, {
-        // clusterSize is now part of consensusConfig (member + coordinator share one reference).
-        ...consensusConfig
-    }, fretSvc, reputation, options.transactionStateStore);
-    // Create callback for querying cluster peers for their latest block revision. Three-way
-    // contract (see ClusterLatestCallback): an ActionRev is the peer's claim, a resolved
-    // `undefined` is the peer answering "I hold nothing", and a REJECTION is silence — the
-    // coordinator counts it as "did not answer" and refuses to report an authoritative absent
-    // over it. Transport errors must therefore propagate, not collapse into `undefined` (that
-    // collapse let a slow two-node cohort report a missing block as authoritatively absent —
-    // ticket cluster-read-consult-cannot-report-unreachable).
-    const clusterLatestCallback = async (peerId, blockId, context) => {
-        // Self-read short-circuit: dialling self via SyncClient is a round trip
-        // with no remote on the other end, and on nodes without listen addresses
-        // (solo WebSocket-only, bare-RN, etc.) the self-dial can hang the dial
-        // queue. Read directly from the local storage repo instead. The catch stays:
-        // a local storage error is not a cohort peer being unreachable, and the
-        // coordinator ignores a self rejection anyway.
-        if (peerId.equals(node.peerId)) {
+            if (peerId.equals(node.peerId))
+                return undefined;
+            const syncClient = new SyncClient(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
             try {
-                const result = await storageRepo.get({ blockIds: [blockId], context });
-                return result[blockId]?.state?.latest;
+                const response = await Promise.race([
+                    syncClient.requestBlock({ blockId, rev: undefined }),
+                    new Promise(resolve => { setTimeout(() => resolve({ success: false }), 1000).unref(); })
+                ]);
+                return response.success ? response.archive : undefined;
             }
             catch {
+                // Peer unreachable / no data — caller falls back to the next cohort peer.
                 return undefined;
             }
-        }
-        const syncClient = new SyncClient(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
-        // No try/catch: a dial or protocol failure rejects through to the coordinator, whose
-        // per-peer deadline also bounds a hung request — slowness needs no race here.
-        const response = await syncClient.requestBlock({ blockId, rev: undefined });
-        if (response.success && response.archive) {
-            const revisions = Object.keys(response.archive.revisions).map(Number);
-            if (revisions.length > 0) {
-                const maxRev = Math.max(...revisions);
-                const revisionData = response.archive.revisions[maxRev];
-                if (revisionData?.action) {
-                    return { actionId: revisionData.action.actionId, rev: maxRev };
+        };
+        // Active reconciliation for a block this member committed without a materializable base
+        // (cohort drift, or a refused `missing-base-revision` commit). See `reconcile-block.ts` for
+        // the corroboration rules — in particular why both quorums are capped by how many peers
+        // could answer at all, which is what lets a genuinely two-node cohort heal.
+        // NOTE: this and the CoordinatorRepo below must cap against the SAME
+        // repairCorroborationClusterSize, or the two restoration paths disagree about how much trust a
+        // lone peer gets. Safe today because both read the one `resolveClusterPolicy` result above; if
+        // either ever resolves its own value, add a fail-fast coupling check like
+        // `assertSuperMajorityCoupling` rather than relying on proximity.
+        const reconcileBlock = createReconcileBlock({
+            selfPeerId: node.peerId.toString(),
+            fetchArchive: fetchArchiveFromPeer,
+            saveReplicatedBlock: (blockId, block, source) => storageRepo.saveReplicatedBlock(blockId, block, source),
+            simpleMajorityThreshold: consensusConfig.simpleMajorityThreshold,
+            repairCorroborationClusterSize: consensusConfig.repairCorroborationClusterSize,
+            reputation
+        });
+        // Member-side membership derivation for the admission gate: independently re-derive this block's
+        // responsible cluster from the SAME source the coordinator uses (IKeyNetwork.findCluster), plus FRET's
+        // network-size confidence. A member gates a coordinator-declared peer set against this view before
+        // voting, so a self-shrunk minority-partition set cannot be voted into super-majority (see cluster-repo
+        // admitMembership). No FRET ⇒ confidence 0 ⇒ the gate fails closed for any downsize.
+        const deriveExpectedCluster = async (blockId) => {
+            const peers = await keyNetwork.findCluster(new TextEncoder().encode(blockId));
+            let confidence = 0;
+            if (fretSvc) {
+                try {
+                    confidence = fretSvc.getNetworkSizeEstimate().confidence;
+                }
+                catch {
+                    // Leave confidence 0 → fail closed for downsizing.
                 }
             }
-        }
-        // The peer DID answer, without data: `success:false` is the sync service's "Block not
-        // found in local storage", and an archive with no usable revisions holds nothing either
-        // way. Both are absent claims, not silence.
-        return undefined;
-    };
-    coordinatedRepo = coordinatorRepoFactory({
-        storageRepo,
-        localCluster: clusterImpl,
-        localPeerId: node.peerId,
-        clusterLatestCallback,
-        // Read-driven acquisition shares the commit path's reconcile callback verbatim: same bounded
-        // archive fetch, same (rev, actionId) and content quorums, same monotonic saveReplicatedBlock
-        // funnel. `clusterLatestCallback` alone can only tell the reader WHICH revision the cohort
-        // holds; this is what moves the bytes. Only reached once a corroborated revision exists, so a
-        // genuinely absent block still costs no archive fetch.
-        acquireBlockFromCohort: reconcileBlock
-    });
-    // Fail-fast coupling: the cluster member (what accepts a super-majority as sufficient) and the
-    // coordinator (what declares a transaction committed on that super-majority) MUST run the same
-    // threshold, or the node would come up able to disagree with itself mid-consensus. Both are fed from
-    // the single `consensusConfig` above; this asserts on their RESOLVED values so any future drift throws
-    // HERE at construction. See `assertSuperMajorityCoupling`.
-    assertSuperMajorityCoupling(clusterImpl, coordinatedRepo);
-    // Recover persisted transaction state before accepting new requests
-    if (options.transactionStateStore) {
-        await clusterImpl.recoverTransactions();
-        await coordinatedRepo.recoverTransactions();
-    }
-    // --- Shared owned-block set for the resilience monitors ---
-    // SpreadOnChurnMonitor (sender) and RebalanceMonitor (responsibility tracker) both act on "the
-    // blocks this node physically holds". They share ONE Set so the two can never drift: a single
-    // owned-block feed populates it, and the rebalance responsibility-loss signal evicts from it
-    // (in the rebalance block below). Both monitors take this exact instance via deps.trackedBlocks.
-    const networkManager = node.services?.networkManager;
-    const ownedBlocks = new Set();
-    // Single owned-block feed: every block this node commits OR receives as a replica fires
-    // storageRepo.onAnyCollectionChange. Subscribe to storageRepo DIRECTLY (not
-    // node.blockChangeNotifier): the cohort-topic activation block below may replace
-    // blockChangeNotifier with a decorating bridge, but storageRepo keeps emitting on its own
-    // surface regardless of that opt-in. NOTE: this feed does NOT re-emit blocks already durable
-    // from a previous run; those are seeded once at startup by the storage-enumeration scan wired
-    // below (seedOwnedBlocksFromStorage), so a restarted node protects on-disk data without waiting
-    // for each block to be touched again. Registered lazily the first time a
-    // monitor that reads ownedBlocks is wired, so when BOTH monitors are disabled no subscription
-    // leaks; torn down exactly once in the stop wrapper below.
-    let offOwnedBlockFeed;
-    const ensureOwnedBlockFeed = () => {
-        if (offOwnedBlockFeed)
-            return;
-        offOwnedBlockFeed = storageRepo.onAnyCollectionChange((e) => {
-            for (const blockId of e.blockIds)
-                ownedBlocks.add(blockId);
+            return { peers: peers ?? {}, confidence };
+        };
+        clusterImpl = clusterMember({
+            storageRepo,
+            peerNetwork: keyNetwork,
+            peerId: node.peerId,
+            privateKey: nodePrivateKey,
+            protocolPrefix,
+            partitionDetector,
+            fretService: fretSvc,
+            validator: options.validator,
+            reputation,
+            consensusConfig,
+            stateStore: options.transactionStateStore,
+            reconcileBlock,
+            onCommitCertificate,
+            deriveExpectedCluster
+            // `recomputeArbitratorSet` (invalidation layer-2) is intentionally NOT wired here yet: a live FRET
+            // recompute needs a churn-tolerance window so it does not false-reject legitimate certificates from
+            // late-joiners (a liveness regression). Until that is tuned against live topology — and the
+            // cohort-topic membership-cert trust anchor (layer 3) lands — invalidation verification runs on the
+            // challenger-bound set + membership + dedup (layer 1) and LOGS the residual anchoring gap. See
+            // `verifyInvalidationCertificate` and `tickets/plan/cohort-topic-membership-cert-trust-anchoring.md`.
         });
-    };
-    // Single owned-block-feed teardown. Registered up front (before either monitor's own stop
-    // wrapper) so it runs regardless of WHICH monitor subscribed the feed - including the
-    // spread-disabled / rebalance-only case. Idempotent: offOwnedBlockFeed is undefined-guarded.
-    {
-        const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
-        node.stop = async () => {
-            try {
-                offOwnedBlockFeed?.();
+        // Cleanup cluster member intervals on node stop. Installed HERE, immediately after clusterImpl
+        // exists, rather than further down: the post-start rollback only unwinds resources whose stop
+        // wrapper is already installed at the moment of the throw, so a wrapper trailing its resource by
+        // hundreds of lines leaves those intervals running on a failed startup. Same reasoning as the
+        // owned-block-feed wrapper below.
+        {
+            const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+            node.stop = async () => {
+                try {
+                    clusterImpl.dispose();
+                }
+                finally {
+                    // Never let a dispose failure strand the transports — same try/finally shape every
+                    // other wrapper in this chain uses.
+                    await previousStop();
+                }
+            };
+        }
+        const coordinatorRepoFactory = coordinatorRepo(keyNetwork, createClusterClient, {
+            // clusterSize is now part of consensusConfig (member + coordinator share one reference).
+            ...consensusConfig
+        }, fretSvc, reputation, options.transactionStateStore);
+        // Create callback for querying cluster peers for their latest block revision. Three-way
+        // contract (see ClusterLatestCallback): an ActionRev is the peer's claim, a resolved
+        // `undefined` is the peer answering "I hold nothing", and a REJECTION is silence — the
+        // coordinator counts it as "did not answer" and refuses to report an authoritative absent
+        // over it. Transport errors must therefore propagate, not collapse into `undefined` (that
+        // collapse let a slow two-node cohort report a missing block as authoritatively absent —
+        // ticket cluster-read-consult-cannot-report-unreachable).
+        const clusterLatestCallback = async (peerId, blockId, context) => {
+            // Self-read short-circuit: dialling self via SyncClient is a round trip
+            // with no remote on the other end, and on nodes without listen addresses
+            // (solo WebSocket-only, bare-RN, etc.) the self-dial can hang the dial
+            // queue. Read directly from the local storage repo instead. The catch stays:
+            // a local storage error is not a cohort peer being unreachable, and the
+            // coordinator ignores a self rejection anyway.
+            if (peerId.equals(node.peerId)) {
+                try {
+                    const result = await storageRepo.get({ blockIds: [blockId], context });
+                    return result[blockId]?.state?.latest;
+                }
+                catch {
+                    return undefined;
+                }
             }
-            finally {
-                await previousStop();
+            const syncClient = new SyncClient(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
+            // No try/catch: a dial or protocol failure rejects through to the coordinator, whose
+            // per-peer deadline also bounds a hung request — slowness needs no race here.
+            const response = await syncClient.requestBlock({ blockId, rev: undefined });
+            if (response.success && response.archive) {
+                const revisions = Object.keys(response.archive.revisions).map(Number);
+                if (revisions.length > 0) {
+                    const maxRev = Math.max(...revisions);
+                    const revisionData = response.archive.revisions[maxRev];
+                    if (revisionData?.action) {
+                        return { actionId: revisionData.action.actionId, rev: maxRev };
+                    }
+                }
             }
+            // The peer DID answer, without data: `success:false` is the sync service's "Block not
+            // found in local storage", and an archive with no usable revisions holds nothing either
+            // way. Both are absent claims, not silence.
+            return undefined;
         };
-    }
-    // --- Churn-resilient spread: drive SpreadOnChurnMonitor on a live node ---
-    // Nothing previously activated the SENDING side of the churn-resilient spread protocol on a
-    // real node. Here we init + start the monitor (sharing ownedBlocks) and ensure the single
-    // owned-block feed is live, so a debounced connection:close re-pushes the node's blocks to
-    // expansion-cohort peers (the receiver durably persists each push via saveReplicatedBlock).
-    let spreadMonitor;
-    if (networkManager && (options.spreadOnChurn?.enabled ?? true) !== false) {
-        try {
-            spreadMonitor = networkManager.initSpreadOnChurnMonitor(partitionDetector, storageRepo, keyNetwork, options.clusterSize ?? 10, protocolPrefix, ownedBlocks, options.spreadOnChurn);
-            await spreadMonitor.start();
-            ensureOwnedBlockFeed();
+        coordinatedRepo = coordinatorRepoFactory({
+            storageRepo,
+            localCluster: clusterImpl,
+            localPeerId: node.peerId,
+            clusterLatestCallback,
+            // Read-driven acquisition shares the commit path's reconcile callback verbatim: same bounded
+            // archive fetch, same (rev, actionId) and content quorums, same monotonic saveReplicatedBlock
+            // funnel. `clusterLatestCallback` alone can only tell the reader WHICH revision the cohort
+            // holds; this is what moves the bytes. Only reached once a corroborated revision exists, so a
+            // genuinely absent block still costs no archive fetch.
+            acquireBlockFromCohort: reconcileBlock
+        });
+        // Fail-fast coupling: the cluster member (what accepts a super-majority as sufficient) and the
+        // coordinator (what declares a transaction committed on that super-majority) MUST run the same
+        // threshold, or the node would come up able to disagree with itself mid-consensus. Both are fed from
+        // the single `consensusConfig` above; this asserts on their RESOLVED values so any future drift throws
+        // HERE at construction. See `assertSuperMajorityCoupling`.
+        assertSuperMajorityCoupling(clusterImpl, coordinatedRepo);
+        // Recover persisted transaction state before accepting new requests
+        if (options.transactionStateStore) {
+            await clusterImpl.recoverTransactions();
+            await coordinatedRepo.recoverTransactions();
         }
-        catch (err) {
-            // Spread is a resilience optimization, not a correctness requirement - a wiring
-            // failure (e.g. FRET briefly unavailable) must NOT hard-fail node startup, unlike the
-            // operator-opted-in cohortTopic block. Log and continue with spread inert.
-            (node.logger?.forComponent?.('db-p2p:spread-on-churn'))?.('init failed: %o', err);
+        // --- Shared owned-block set for the resilience monitors ---
+        // SpreadOnChurnMonitor (sender) and RebalanceMonitor (responsibility tracker) both act on "the
+        // blocks this node physically holds". They share ONE Set so the two can never drift: a single
+        // owned-block feed populates it, and the rebalance responsibility-loss signal evicts from it
+        // (in the rebalance block below). Both monitors take this exact instance via deps.trackedBlocks.
+        const networkManager = node.services?.networkManager;
+        // See the comment above `consensusConfig` for why every cluster-size consumer must read the SAME
+        // resolved value. This throws at construction (rather than letting a node come up mismatched) if a
+        // future edit gives `keyNetwork` or `networkManager` their own fallback again.
+        assertClusterSizeCoupling(consensusConfig.clusterSize, { keyNetwork, networkManager });
+        const ownedBlocks = new Set();
+        // Single owned-block feed: every block this node commits OR receives as a replica fires
+        // storageRepo.onAnyCollectionChange. Subscribe to storageRepo DIRECTLY (not
+        // node.blockChangeNotifier): the cohort-topic activation block below may replace
+        // blockChangeNotifier with a decorating bridge, but storageRepo keeps emitting on its own
+        // surface regardless of that opt-in. NOTE: this feed does NOT re-emit blocks already durable
+        // from a previous run; those are seeded once at startup by the storage-enumeration scan wired
+        // below (seedOwnedBlocksFromStorage), so a restarted node protects on-disk data without waiting
+        // for each block to be touched again. Registered lazily the first time a
+        // monitor that reads ownedBlocks is wired, so when BOTH monitors are disabled no subscription
+        // leaks; torn down exactly once in the stop wrapper below.
+        let offOwnedBlockFeed;
+        const ensureOwnedBlockFeed = () => {
+            if (offOwnedBlockFeed)
+                return;
+            offOwnedBlockFeed = storageRepo.onAnyCollectionChange((e) => {
+                for (const blockId of e.blockIds)
+                    ownedBlocks.add(blockId);
+            });
+        };
+        // Single owned-block-feed teardown. Registered up front (before either monitor's own stop
+        // wrapper) so it runs regardless of WHICH monitor subscribed the feed - including the
+        // spread-disabled / rebalance-only case. Idempotent: offOwnedBlockFeed is undefined-guarded.
+        {
+            const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+            node.stop = async () => {
+                try {
+                    offOwnedBlockFeed?.();
+                }
+                finally {
+                    await previousStop();
+                }
+            };
         }
-    }
-    // Expose for tests/diagnostics (mirrors node.keyNetwork / node.reputation).
-    node.spreadOnChurnMonitor = spreadMonitor;
-    // Disposal: stop the spread monitor deterministically before the transports close. Composes
-    // with the arachnode / clusterMember / cohort-topic stop wrappers (each calls its captured
-    // previousStop last). Idempotent (SpreadOnChurnMonitor.stop early-returns when not running), so
-    // a double node.stop() does not throw. The owned-block feed teardown is the separate up-front
-    // wrapper above (shared across both monitors).
-    {
-        const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
-        node.stop = async () => {
+        // --- Churn-resilient spread: drive SpreadOnChurnMonitor on a live node ---
+        // Nothing previously activated the SENDING side of the churn-resilient spread protocol on a
+        // real node. Here we init + start the monitor (sharing ownedBlocks) and ensure the single
+        // owned-block feed is live, so a debounced connection:close re-pushes the node's blocks to
+        // expansion-cohort peers (the receiver durably persists each push via saveReplicatedBlock).
+        let spreadMonitor;
+        if (networkManager && (options.spreadOnChurn?.enabled ?? true) !== false) {
             try {
-                if (spreadMonitor)
-                    await spreadMonitor.stop();
+                spreadMonitor = networkManager.initSpreadOnChurnMonitor(partitionDetector, storageRepo, keyNetwork, consensusConfig.clusterSize, protocolPrefix, ownedBlocks, options.spreadOnChurn);
+                await spreadMonitor.start();
+                ensureOwnedBlockFeed();
             }
-            finally {
-                await previousStop();
+            catch (err) {
+                // Spread is a resilience optimization, not a correctness requirement - a wiring
+                // failure (e.g. FRET briefly unavailable) must NOT hard-fail node startup, unlike the
+                // operator-opted-in cohortTopic block. Log and continue with spread inert.
+                (node.logger?.forComponent?.('db-p2p:spread-on-churn'))?.('init failed: %o', err);
             }
-        };
-    }
-    // Initialize Arachnode ring membership and restoration
-    const enableArachnode = options.arachnode?.enableRingZulu ?? true;
-    if (enableArachnode) {
-        const log = node.logger?.forComponent?.('db-p2p:arachnode');
-        const fret = node.services?.fret;
-        if (fret) {
-            const fretAdapter = new ArachnodeFretAdapter(fret, node.peerId.toString());
-            // Blocks whose shed range has been RELEASED (Phase C of a ring shift, or a confirmed
-            // rebalance release). This is the GC-eligibility signal the future storage sweep
-            // (`st-storage-sweep-archival-and-capacity-estimate`) must consult: a block's local bytes may
-            // be reclaimed ONLY once it appears here, so an unconfirmed / still-served range is never
-            // swept. Populated strictly after replication is confirmed. See
-            // docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Part 2 (Local bytes vs. tracking).
-            // NOTE: no sweep consumes this set yet; it is the coordinated eligibility handoff the sweep
-            // ticket will read. Until then it grows unbounded — bound it when the sweep lands.
-            const gcEligible = new Set();
-            node.gcEligibleBlocks = gcEligible;
-            // The ring-shift state machine (advertise→confirm→release). Wired inside the rebalance block
-            // below (it needs the BlockTransferCoordinator confirmer + the cohort-size floor); left
-            // undefined when the rebalance reaction is not wired, in which case ring shifts stay inert —
-            // a move-out is unsafe without the confirm/release path.
-            let ringShift;
-            const storageMonitor = new StorageMonitor(rawStorage, options.arachnode?.storage ?? {});
-            const ringSelector = new RingSelector(fretAdapter, storageMonitor, {
-                minCapacity: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
-                thresholds: {
-                    moveOut: 0.85,
-                    moveIn: 0.40
-                },
-                // Damping so the ring decision cannot thrash near a boundary
-                // (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Part 1).
-                smoothingAlpha: 0.2,
-                deadband: 0.5,
-                minDwellMs: 10 * 60 * 1000
-            });
-            // Determine and announce ring membership
-            const peerId = node.peerId.toString();
-            const arachnodeInfo = await ringSelector.createArachnodeInfo(peerId);
-            fretAdapter.setArachnodeInfo(arachnodeInfo);
-            log?.('Announced Arachnode membership: Ring %d', arachnodeInfo.ringDepth);
-            // Setup restoration coordinator with FRET adapter
-            const restorationCoordinatorV2 = new RestorationCoordinator(fretAdapter, { connect: (pid, protocol) => node.dialProtocol(pid, [protocol]) }, `/optimystic/${options.networkName}`, node.peerId.toString());
-            // Update restore callback to use new coordinator
-            const newRestoreCallback = async (blockId, rev) => {
-                return await restorationCoordinatorV2.restore(blockId, rev);
-            };
-            // Replace the restore callback (this is a bit hacky, but works for now)
-            storageRepo.createBlockStorage = (blockId) => new BlockStorage(blockId, rawStorage, newRestoreCallback);
-            // --- Rebalance reaction: drive RebalanceMonitor + react via BlockTransferCoordinator ---
-            // Nothing previously activated the rebalance path on a real node: initRebalanceMonitor was
-            // never called, the monitor was never start()ed, and BlockTransferCoordinator (the
-            // pull-gained / push-lost reaction primitive) was never constructed in src. This block lives
-            // inside the arachnode `if (fret)` gate because both dependencies only exist here — the
-            // fretAdapter and the RestorationCoordinator. When arachnode is disabled or FRET is absent the
-            // rebalance path stays inert (acceptable: rebalance is a resilience optimization). A wiring
-            // failure here is non-fatal (log + continue), unlike the operator-opted-in cohortTopic block.
-            if (networkManager && (options.rebalance?.enabled ?? true) !== false) {
+        }
+        // Expose for tests/diagnostics (mirrors node.keyNetwork / node.reputation).
+        node.spreadOnChurnMonitor = spreadMonitor;
+        // Disposal: stop the spread monitor deterministically before the transports close. Composes
+        // with the arachnode / clusterMember / cohort-topic stop wrappers (each calls its captured
+        // previousStop last). Idempotent (SpreadOnChurnMonitor.stop early-returns when not running), so
+        // a double node.stop() does not throw. The owned-block feed teardown is the separate up-front
+        // wrapper above (shared across both monitors).
+        {
+            const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+            node.stop = async () => {
                 try {
-                    // repo → the LOCAL storageRepo (not repoProxy/coordinatedRepo): a pulled/pushed replica
-                    // must land in / be read from this node's own storage, same reasoning as the
-                    // blockTransfer service handler registration. protocolPrefix (/optimystic/<networkName>)
-                    // MUST match the prefix the node registers its block-transfer handler under, or every
-                    // lost-block push dials the wrong protocol and fails to connect.
-                    const coordinator = new BlockTransferCoordinator(storageRepo, keyNetwork, restorationCoordinatorV2, partitionDetector, protocolPrefix);
-                    const rebalanceMonitor = networkManager.initRebalanceMonitor(partitionDetector, fretAdapter, ownedBlocks, options.rebalance);
-                    await rebalanceMonitor.start();
-                    // onRebalance fires synchronously from the monitor's debounced check; the coordinator's
-                    // reaction (pull gained / push lost, each partition-guarded) is async, so hop it off the
-                    // handler rather than blocking the monitor's emit loop. handleRebalanceEvent can REJECT
-                    // (e.g. RestorationCoordinator.restore() throws while pulling a gained block) and a bare
-                    // `void` would surface that as an unhandled rejection (process-fatal on Node >=15); the
-                    // reaction is a resilience optimization, so swallow + log instead.
-                    //
-                    // ALONGSIDE dispatching to the coordinator, drive the shared owned-block set off this
-                    // authoritative responsibility signal. A GAINED block is added immediately so it is
-                    // tracked even before its next commit/replica touches the feed.
-                    //
-                    // A LOST block is NO LONGER released synchronously: doing so stopped spreading a block
-                    // whose push to the new owners might fail, drop it below the replication floor, and let a
-                    // later sweep reclaim it (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Why the current code violates
-                    // it #2). Instead the release is GATED on confirmation — the coordinator returns the lost
-                    // blocks it confirmed replicated to ≥ floor new owners, and ONLY those are untracked
-                    // (authoritative eviction from the shared set — complements spread's lazy self-prune) and
-                    // marked GC-eligible. A lost block whose push failed / was partition-skipped stays
-                    // tracked and served, and is retried on the next rebalance.
-                    //
-                    // Best-effort iteration safety: this eviction can mutate ownedBlocks while
-                    // SpreadOnChurnMonitor (or this monitor) is mid for...of over the same Set inside an
-                    // async loop. Adding/deleting a Set entry during iteration does not throw in JS — entries
-                    // are visited best-effort — which is acceptable for a resilience mechanism, so we
-                    // document it here rather than add locking.
-                    rebalanceMonitor.onRebalance((event) => {
-                        for (const blockId of event.gained)
-                            ownedBlocks.add(blockId);
-                        coordinator.handleRebalanceEvent(event).then((result) => {
-                            for (const blockId of result.released) {
-                                rebalanceMonitor.untrackBlock(blockId); // also evicts from the shared ownedBlocks set
-                                gcEligible.add(blockId); // confirmed replicated → safe to sweep
-                            }
-                        }).catch((err) => {
-                            log?.('rebalance reaction failed: %o', err);
-                        });
-                    });
-                    // Ring-shift handoff (advertise→confirm→release). It needs the confirmer (this
-                    // coordinator) and the cohort-size floor (this monitor), so it is wired here. The
-                    // `onRelease` callback runs Phase C's local effect: stop serving/spreading the shed
-                    // range and mark it GC-eligible — the same authoritative eviction the confirmed-rebalance
-                    // release performs.
-                    ringShift = new RingShiftCoordinator({
-                        fretAdapter,
-                        ringSelector,
-                        fret,
-                        partitionDetector,
-                        confirmer: coordinator,
-                        ownedBlocks,
-                        selfPeerId: peerId,
-                        getFloor: () => rebalanceMonitor.getCohortSize(),
-                        onRelease: (blockIds) => {
-                            for (const blockId of blockIds) {
-                                rebalanceMonitor.untrackBlock(blockId);
-                                gcEligible.add(blockId);
-                            }
-                        }
-                    });
-                    // Reconcile any stale `moving` advertisement left by a crash mid-handoff (no-op unless
-                    // arachnode metadata survived a restart still marked `moving`).
-                    ringShift.reconcileOnStart();
-                    // Feed owned blocks via the SINGLE shared feed (idempotent — already live if the spread
-                    // block above wired it). Both monitors read the same ownedBlocks set this populates.
-                    ensureOwnedBlockFeed();
-                    // Expose for tests/diagnostics (mirrors node.spreadOnChurnMonitor).
-                    node.rebalanceMonitor = rebalanceMonitor;
-                    node.blockTransferCoordinator = coordinator;
-                    node.ringShiftCoordinator = ringShift;
-                    // Disposal: stop the monitor before transports close. Composes with the other stop
-                    // wrappers (each calls its captured previousStop last). Idempotent — RebalanceMonitor.stop()
-                    // early-returns when not running (NetworkManagerService.stop() also stops it). The shared
-                    // owned-block feed teardown is the separate up-front wrapper (not duplicated here).
-                    const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
-                    node.stop = async () => {
-                        try {
-                            await rebalanceMonitor.stop();
-                        }
-                        finally {
-                            await previousStop();
-                        }
-                    };
+                    if (spreadMonitor)
+                        await spreadMonitor.stop();
                 }
-                catch (err) {
-                    // Rebalance is a resilience optimization, not a correctness requirement - a wiring
-                    // failure (e.g. FRET briefly unavailable) must NOT hard-fail node startup.
-                    log?.('rebalance wiring init failed: %o', err);
+                finally {
+                    await previousStop();
                 }
-            }
-            // Monitor capacity and adjust ring periodically. The damped `shouldTransition()` decides
-            // WHETHER/where to move (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Part 1); the RingShiftCoordinator
-            // carries the move out through the advertise→confirm→release handoff (§ Part 2) so a shift
-            // never drops a key below its replication floor. The old unilateral `setArachnodeInfo` flip —
-            // which changed advertised responsibility instantly with no data handoff — is gone.
-            //
-            // Ring shifts run ONLY when `ringShift` is wired (i.e. the rebalance reaction is enabled): a
-            // move-out is unsafe without the confirm/release path, so a node with the rebalance reaction
-            // disabled stays at its bootstrap ring rather than flipping unsafely.
-            const monitorInterval = setInterval(async () => {
-                if (!ringShift)
-                    return;
-                const transition = await ringSelector.shouldTransition();
-                if (transition.shouldMove && transition.direction && transition.newRingDepth !== undefined) {
-                    log?.('Ring transition needed: moving %s to Ring %d', transition.direction, transition.newRingDepth);
+            };
+        }
+        // Initialize Arachnode ring membership and restoration
+        const enableArachnode = options.arachnode?.enableRingZulu ?? true;
+        if (enableArachnode) {
+            const log = node.logger?.forComponent?.('db-p2p:arachnode');
+            const fret = node.services?.fret;
+            if (fret) {
+                const fretAdapter = new ArachnodeFretAdapter(fret, node.peerId.toString());
+                // Blocks whose shed range has been RELEASED (Phase C of a ring shift, or a confirmed
+                // rebalance release). This is the GC-eligibility signal the future storage sweep
+                // (`st-storage-sweep-archival-and-capacity-estimate`) must consult: a block's local bytes may
+                // be reclaimed ONLY once it appears here, so an unconfirmed / still-served range is never
+                // swept. Populated strictly after replication is confirmed. See
+                // docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Part 2 (Local bytes vs. tracking).
+                // NOTE: no sweep consumes this set yet; it is the coordinated eligibility handoff the sweep
+                // ticket will read. Until then it grows unbounded — bound it when the sweep lands.
+                const gcEligible = new Set();
+                node.gcEligibleBlocks = gcEligible;
+                // The ring-shift state machine (advertise→confirm→release). Wired inside the rebalance block
+                // below (it needs the BlockTransferCoordinator confirmer + the cohort-size floor); left
+                // undefined when the rebalance reaction is not wired, in which case ring shifts stay inert —
+                // a move-out is unsafe without the confirm/release path.
+                let ringShift;
+                const storageMonitor = new StorageMonitor(rawStorage, options.arachnode?.storage ?? {});
+                const ringSelector = new RingSelector(fretAdapter, storageMonitor, {
+                    minCapacity: 100 * 1024 * 1024,
+                    thresholds: {
+                        moveOut: 0.85,
+                        moveIn: 0.40
+                    },
+                    // Damping so the ring decision cannot thrash near a boundary
+                    // (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Part 1).
+                    smoothingAlpha: 0.2,
+                    deadband: 0.5,
+                    minDwellMs: 10 * 60 * 1000
+                });
+                // Determine and announce ring membership
+                const peerId = node.peerId.toString();
+                const arachnodeInfo = await ringSelector.createArachnodeInfo(peerId);
+                fretAdapter.setArachnodeInfo(arachnodeInfo);
+                log?.('Announced Arachnode membership: Ring %d', arachnodeInfo.ringDepth);
+                // Setup restoration coordinator with FRET adapter
+                const restorationCoordinatorV2 = new RestorationCoordinator(fretAdapter, { connect: (pid, protocol) => node.dialProtocol(pid, [protocol]) }, `/optimystic/${options.networkName}`, node.peerId.toString());
+                // Update restore callback to use new coordinator
+                const newRestoreCallback = async (blockId, rev) => {
+                    return await restorationCoordinatorV2.restore(blockId, rev);
+                };
+                // Replace the restore callback (this is a bit hacky, but works for now)
+                storageRepo.createBlockStorage = (blockId) => new BlockStorage(blockId, rawStorage, newRestoreCallback);
+                // --- Rebalance reaction: drive RebalanceMonitor + react via BlockTransferCoordinator ---
+                // Nothing previously activated the rebalance path on a real node: initRebalanceMonitor was
+                // never called, the monitor was never start()ed, and BlockTransferCoordinator (the
+                // pull-gained / push-lost reaction primitive) was never constructed in src. This block lives
+                // inside the arachnode `if (fret)` gate because both dependencies only exist here — the
+                // fretAdapter and the RestorationCoordinator. When arachnode is disabled or FRET is absent the
+                // rebalance path stays inert (acceptable: rebalance is a resilience optimization). A wiring
+                // failure here is non-fatal (log + continue), unlike the operator-opted-in cohortTopic block.
+                if (networkManager && (options.rebalance?.enabled ?? true) !== false) {
                     try {
-                        const outcome = await ringShift.executeShift({
-                            direction: transition.direction,
-                            newRingDepth: transition.newRingDepth
+                        // repo → the LOCAL storageRepo (not repoProxy/coordinatedRepo): a pulled/pushed replica
+                        // must land in / be read from this node's own storage, same reasoning as the
+                        // blockTransfer service handler registration. protocolPrefix (/optimystic/<networkName>)
+                        // MUST match the prefix the node registers its block-transfer handler under, or every
+                        // lost-block push dials the wrong protocol and fails to connect.
+                        const coordinator = new BlockTransferCoordinator(storageRepo, keyNetwork, restorationCoordinatorV2, partitionDetector, protocolPrefix);
+                        const rebalanceMonitor = networkManager.initRebalanceMonitor(partitionDetector, fretAdapter, ownedBlocks, options.rebalance);
+                        await rebalanceMonitor.start();
+                        // onRebalance fires synchronously from the monitor's debounced check; the coordinator's
+                        // reaction (pull gained / push lost, each partition-guarded) is async, so hop it off the
+                        // handler rather than blocking the monitor's emit loop. handleRebalanceEvent can REJECT
+                        // (e.g. RestorationCoordinator.restore() throws while pulling a gained block) and a bare
+                        // `void` would surface that as an unhandled rejection (process-fatal on Node >=15); the
+                        // reaction is a resilience optimization, so swallow + log instead.
+                        //
+                        // ALONGSIDE dispatching to the coordinator, drive the shared owned-block set off this
+                        // authoritative responsibility signal. A GAINED block is added immediately so it is
+                        // tracked even before its next commit/replica touches the feed.
+                        //
+                        // A LOST block is NO LONGER released synchronously: doing so stopped spreading a block
+                        // whose push to the new owners might fail, drop it below the replication floor, and let a
+                        // later sweep reclaim it (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Why the current code violates
+                        // it #2). Instead the release is GATED on confirmation — the coordinator returns the lost
+                        // blocks it confirmed replicated to ≥ floor new owners, and ONLY those are untracked
+                        // (authoritative eviction from the shared set — complements spread's lazy self-prune) and
+                        // marked GC-eligible. A lost block whose push failed / was partition-skipped stays
+                        // tracked and served, and is retried on the next rebalance.
+                        //
+                        // Best-effort iteration safety: this eviction can mutate ownedBlocks while
+                        // SpreadOnChurnMonitor (or this monitor) is mid for...of over the same Set inside an
+                        // async loop. Adding/deleting a Set entry during iteration does not throw in JS — entries
+                        // are visited best-effort — which is acceptable for a resilience mechanism, so we
+                        // document it here rather than add locking.
+                        rebalanceMonitor.onRebalance((event) => {
+                            for (const blockId of event.gained)
+                                ownedBlocks.add(blockId);
+                            coordinator.handleRebalanceEvent(event).then((result) => {
+                                for (const blockId of result.released) {
+                                    rebalanceMonitor.untrackBlock(blockId); // also evicts from the shared ownedBlocks set
+                                    gcEligible.add(blockId); // confirmed replicated → safe to sweep
+                                }
+                            }).catch((err) => {
+                                log?.('rebalance reaction failed: %o', err);
+                            });
+                        });
+                        // Ring-shift handoff (advertise→confirm→release). It needs the confirmer (this
+                        // coordinator) and the cohort-size floor (this monitor), so it is wired here. The
+                        // `onRelease` callback runs Phase C's local effect: stop serving/spreading the shed
+                        // range and mark it GC-eligible — the same authoritative eviction the confirmed-rebalance
+                        // release performs.
+                        ringShift = new RingShiftCoordinator({
+                            fretAdapter,
+                            ringSelector,
+                            fret,
+                            partitionDetector,
+                            confirmer: coordinator,
+                            ownedBlocks,
+                            selfPeerId: peerId,
+                            getFloor: () => rebalanceMonitor.getCohortSize(),
+                            onRelease: (blockIds) => {
+                                for (const blockId of blockIds) {
+                                    rebalanceMonitor.untrackBlock(blockId);
+                                    gcEligible.add(blockId);
+                                }
+                            }
                         });
-                        log?.('Ring shift outcome: %o', outcome);
+                        // Reconcile any stale `moving` advertisement left by a crash mid-handoff (no-op unless
+                        // arachnode metadata survived a restart still marked `moving`).
+                        ringShift.reconcileOnStart();
+                        // Feed owned blocks via the SINGLE shared feed (idempotent — already live if the spread
+                        // block above wired it). Both monitors read the same ownedBlocks set this populates.
+                        ensureOwnedBlockFeed();
+                        // Expose for tests/diagnostics (mirrors node.spreadOnChurnMonitor).
+                        node.rebalanceMonitor = rebalanceMonitor;
+                        node.blockTransferCoordinator = coordinator;
+                        node.ringShiftCoordinator = ringShift;
+                        // Disposal: stop the monitor before transports close. Composes with the other stop
+                        // wrappers (each calls its captured previousStop last). Idempotent — RebalanceMonitor.stop()
+                        // early-returns when not running (NetworkManagerService.stop() also stops it). The shared
+                        // owned-block feed teardown is the separate up-front wrapper (not duplicated here).
+                        const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+                        node.stop = async () => {
+                            try {
+                                await rebalanceMonitor.stop();
+                            }
+                            finally {
+                                await previousStop();
+                            }
+                        };
                     }
                     catch (err) {
-                        log?.('Ring shift failed: %o', err);
-                    }
-                    finally {
-                        // Measure the minimum dwell from the SETTLED shift (completed or rolled back), not
-                        // just the trigger stamped inside shouldTransition (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md §1.3).
-                        ringSelector.recordShiftSettled();
+                        // Rebalance is a resilience optimization, not a correctness requirement - a wiring
+                        // failure (e.g. FRET briefly unavailable) must NOT hard-fail node startup.
+                        log?.('rebalance wiring init failed: %o', err);
                     }
                 }
-            }, 60_000);
-            // Cleanup on node stop
-            const originalStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+                // Monitor capacity and adjust ring periodically. The damped `shouldTransition()` decides
+                // WHETHER/where to move (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md § Part 1); the RingShiftCoordinator
+                // carries the move out through the advertise→confirm→release handoff (§ Part 2) so a shift
+                // never drops a key below its replication floor. The old unilateral `setArachnodeInfo` flip —
+                // which changed advertised responsibility instantly with no data handoff — is gone.
+                //
+                // Ring shifts run ONLY when `ringShift` is wired (i.e. the rebalance reaction is enabled): a
+                // move-out is unsafe without the confirm/release path, so a node with the rebalance reaction
+                // disabled stays at its bootstrap ring rather than flipping unsafely.
+                const monitorInterval = setInterval(async () => {
+                    if (!ringShift)
+                        return;
+                    const transition = await ringSelector.shouldTransition();
+                    if (transition.shouldMove && transition.direction && transition.newRingDepth !== undefined) {
+                        log?.('Ring transition needed: moving %s to Ring %d', transition.direction, transition.newRingDepth);
+                        try {
+                            const outcome = await ringShift.executeShift({
+                                direction: transition.direction,
+                                newRingDepth: transition.newRingDepth
+                            });
+                            log?.('Ring shift outcome: %o', outcome);
+                        }
+                        catch (err) {
+                            log?.('Ring shift failed: %o', err);
+                        }
+                        finally {
+                            // Measure the minimum dwell from the SETTLED shift (completed or rolled back), not
+                            // just the trigger stamped inside shouldTransition (docs/arachnode-ring-handoff.md §1.3).
+                            ringSelector.recordShiftSettled();
+                        }
+                    }
+                }, 60_000);
+                // Cleanup on node stop
+                const originalStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+                node.stop = async () => {
+                    clearInterval(monitorInterval);
+                    await originalStop();
+                };
+            }
+            else {
+                log?.('FRET service not available, Arachnode disabled');
+            }
+        }
+        // --- Seed the shared owned-block set from already-durable storage ---
+        // Blocks durable from a previous run are otherwise untracked until next touched (see the
+        // onAnyCollectionChange comment above where ownedBlocks is declared). Placed here, AFTER both
+        // monitor-wiring blocks (spread ~line 862, rebalance ~line 974) have had their chance to call
+        // ensureOwnedBlockFeed():
+        //   - Gate on offOwnedBlockFeed: only seed when a monitor actually consumes ownedBlocks; if both
+        //     are disabled the set is unused and the scan (plus the background task) is wasted work.
+        //   - Feed-before-scan ordering is load-bearing: because the feed is already live, a block
+        //     committed/replicated DURING the scan is caught by the feed; Set.add is idempotent so the
+        //     overlap is harmless. Scanning before subscribing would drop a block committed in the gap.
+        //   - Fire-and-forget so a large store never blocks startup; the .catch keeps a scan rejection
+        //     from becoming an unhandled rejection.
+        //   - Cancellable: a stop wrapper flips seedStopping so the scan loop breaks against a
+        //     stopping/closing backend rather than running the enumeration to completion.
+        // NOTE: a concurrent rebalance release can untrackBlock (delete from ownedBlocks) a confirmed-
+        // released block while this scan is still running, and the scan could then re-add that id. Benign
+        // transient: the block is still in the metadata store (no sweep reclaims metadata yet), so a
+        // re-added released block is simply re-evaluated and re-released on the next rebalance tick. Right
+        // after a restart, responsibility-loss detection lags this fast metadata scan, so the window is
+        // small. Accepted rather than synchronized.
+        if (offOwnedBlockFeed && typeof rawStorage.listBlockIds === 'function') {
+            let seedStopping = false;
+            const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
             node.stop = async () => {
-                clearInterval(monitorInterval);
-                await originalStop();
+                seedStopping = true;
+                await previousStop();
             };
+            void seedOwnedBlocksFromStorage(rawStorage, ownedBlocks, () => seedStopping)
+                .catch((err) => (node.logger?.forComponent?.('db-p2p:owned-block-seed'))?.('seed failed: %o', err));
         }
-        else {
-            log?.('FRET service not available, Arachnode disabled');
+        // [dispute-subsystem-dormant] The DisputeService object is constructed below so tests and
+        // getDisputeStatus() work, but it is unreachable from the live network path:
+        //   - No inbound handler: disputeProtocolService is NOT in the services map above.
+        //   - onInvalidation is deliberately unset: maybeInvalidate() is a no-op on live nodes.
+        //   - revalidate is deliberately unset: handleChallenge always votes inconclusive on live nodes.
+        // Full activation requires arbitrator-set anchoring before a forged synthetic cohort can pass resolution.
+        // Gate: tickets/backlog/hardening/invalidation-live-wiring-requires-arbitrator-set-anchoring
+        // Wiring plan: tickets/backlog/feat-dispute-subsystem-live-activation
+        // Initialize dispute service if enabled
+        let disputeServiceInstance;
+        if (options.dispute?.disputeEnabled) {
+            const createDisputeClient = (peerId) => DisputeClient.create(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
+            disputeServiceInstance = new DisputeService({
+                peerId: node.peerId,
+                privateKey: nodePrivateKey,
+                peerNetwork: keyNetwork,
+                createDisputeClient,
+                reputation,
+                validator: options.validator,
+                config: options.dispute,
+                selectArbitrators: async (blockId, excludePeers, count, round, epoch) => {
+                    const { hashKey: fretHashKey } = await import('p2p-fret');
+                    const fret = node.services?.fret;
+                    if (!fret)
+                        return [];
+                    // Dispersed sampling: draw `count` peers from coordinates spread across the whole keyspace
+                    // (hash(blockId ‖ round ‖ epoch ‖ i)) rather than the block's XOR neighborhood, so an attacker
+                    // who owns the block's locale does not thereby own the arbitrators. `assembleCohort` already
+                    // filters to known members; excluding the original cluster + self keeps arbitrators independent.
+                    const excludeSet = new Set(excludePeers);
+                    // NOTE: adding the local node's own id to `exclude` makes the draw node-relative. Cross-node
+                    // determinism (the verifiable-recompute property) holds today only because the dissent
+                    // coordinator running this is itself a member of the original cluster, so `self` is already in
+                    // `excludePeers` — the add is a no-op and every honest node excludes the identical set. When a
+                    // verify-path recompute lands, it MUST reconstruct `exclude` from the challenger's identity
+                    // (`proof.challengerPeerId`) + original cluster, never the verifier's own id, or re-derivation diverges.
+                    excludeSet.add(node.peerId.toString());
+                    const picks = await sampleArbitrators({ blockId: new TextEncoder().encode(blockId), round, epoch, count, exclude: excludeSet }, (coord, wants) => fret.assembleCohort(coord, wants), fretHashKey);
+                    return picks.map(pid => peerIdFromString(pid));
+                },
+            });
         }
-    }
-    // --- Seed the shared owned-block set from already-durable storage ---
-    // Blocks durable from a previous run are otherwise untracked until next touched (see the
-    // onAnyCollectionChange comment above where ownedBlocks is declared). Placed here, AFTER both
-    // monitor-wiring blocks (spread ~line 862, rebalance ~line 974) have had their chance to call
-    // ensureOwnedBlockFeed():
-    //   - Gate on offOwnedBlockFeed: only seed when a monitor actually consumes ownedBlocks; if both
-    //     are disabled the set is unused and the scan (plus the background task) is wasted work.
-    //   - Feed-before-scan ordering is load-bearing: because the feed is already live, a block
-    //     committed/replicated DURING the scan is caught by the feed; Set.add is idempotent so the
-    //     overlap is harmless. Scanning before subscribing would drop a block committed in the gap.
-    //   - Fire-and-forget so a large store never blocks startup; the .catch keeps a scan rejection
-    //     from becoming an unhandled rejection.
-    //   - Cancellable: a stop wrapper flips seedStopping so the scan loop breaks against a
-    //     stopping/closing backend rather than running the enumeration to completion.
-    // NOTE: a concurrent rebalance release can untrackBlock (delete from ownedBlocks) a confirmed-
-    // released block while this scan is still running, and the scan could then re-add that id. Benign
-    // transient: the block is still in the metadata store (no sweep reclaims metadata yet), so a
-    // re-added released block is simply re-evaluated and re-released on the next rebalance tick. Right
-    // after a restart, responsibility-loss detection lags this fast metadata scan, so the window is
-    // small. Accepted rather than synchronized.
-    if (offOwnedBlockFeed && typeof rawStorage.listBlockIds === 'function') {
-        let seedStopping = false;
-        const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
-        node.stop = async () => {
-            seedStopping = true;
-            await previousStop();
-        };
-        void seedOwnedBlocksFromStorage(rawStorage, ownedBlocks, () => seedStopping)
-            .catch((err) => (node.logger?.forComponent?.('db-p2p:owned-block-seed'))?.('seed failed: %o', err));
-    }
-    // [dispute-subsystem-dormant] The DisputeService object is constructed below so tests and
-    // getDisputeStatus() work, but it is unreachable from the live network path:
-    //   - No inbound handler: disputeProtocolService is NOT in the services map above.
-    //   - onInvalidation is deliberately unset: maybeInvalidate() is a no-op on live nodes.
-    //   - revalidate is deliberately unset: handleChallenge always votes inconclusive on live nodes.
-    // Full activation requires arbitrator-set anchoring before a forged synthetic cohort can pass resolution.
-    // Gate: tickets/backlog/hardening/invalidation-live-wiring-requires-arbitrator-set-anchoring
-    // Wiring plan: tickets/backlog/feat-dispute-subsystem-live-activation
-    // Initialize dispute service if enabled
-    let disputeServiceInstance;
-    if (options.dispute?.disputeEnabled) {
-        const createDisputeClient = (peerId) => DisputeClient.create(peerId, keyNetwork, protocolPrefix);
-        disputeServiceInstance = new DisputeService({
-            peerId: node.peerId,
-            privateKey: nodePrivateKey,
-            peerNetwork: keyNetwork,
-            createDisputeClient,
+        // The host-facing attachment surface, declared once in `optimystic-node.ts` and written here
+        // through ONE object literal so every field is type-checked AND a field added to
+        // `OptimysticNodeAttachments` but never assigned here is a compile error rather than an
+        // `undefined` a host reads as present. Keeping it typed is load-bearing: when
+        // `node.keyNetwork` was reachable only through a cast, three hosts found it easier to build a
+        // SECOND Libp2pKeyPeerNetwork from constructor defaults — a different cohort width and no
+        // network-membership filter than this node's own consensus path uses for the same key
+        // (ticket bug-second-key-network-built-with-defaults).
+        const attachments = {
+            coordinatedRepo,
+            storageRepo,
+            // The StorageRepo is the single commit funnel for both the coordinated and
+            // direct paths, so it is the node's per-collection change-notifier origin. This is the
+            // default; the cohort-topic activation block below REPLACES it with the origination-decorating
+            // bridge notifier when the substrate is enabled.
+            blockChangeNotifier: storageRepo,
+            keyNetwork,
             reputation,
-            validator: options.validator,
-            config: options.dispute,
-            selectArbitrators: async (blockId, excludePeers, count, round, epoch) => {
-                const { hashKey: fretHashKey } = await import('p2p-fret');
-                const fret = node.services?.fret;
-                if (!fret)
-                    return [];
-                // Dispersed sampling: draw `count` peers from coordinates spread across the whole keyspace
-                // (hash(blockId ‖ round ‖ epoch ‖ i)) rather than the block's XOR neighborhood, so an attacker
-                // who owns the block's locale does not thereby own the arbitrators. `assembleCohort` already
-                // filters to known members; excluding the original cluster + self keeps arbitrators independent.
-                const excludeSet = new Set(excludePeers);
-                // NOTE: adding the local node's own id to `exclude` makes the draw node-relative. Cross-node
-                // determinism (the verifiable-recompute property) holds today only because the dissent
-                // coordinator running this is itself a member of the original cluster, so `self` is already in
-                // `excludePeers` — the add is a no-op and every honest node excludes the identical set. When a
-                // verify-path recompute lands, it MUST reconstruct `exclude` from the challenger's identity
-                // (`proof.challengerPeerId`) + original cluster, never the verifier's own id, or re-derivation diverges.
-                excludeSet.add(node.peerId.toString());
-                const picks = await sampleArbitrators({ blockId: new TextEncoder().encode(blockId), round, epoch, count, exclude: excludeSet }, (coord, wants) => fret.assembleCohort(coord, wants), fretHashKey);
-                return picks.map(pid => peerIdFromString(pid));
-            },
-        });
-    }
-    // Cleanup cluster member intervals on node stop
-    {
-        const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
-        node.stop = async () => {
-            clusterImpl.dispose();
-            await previousStop();
+            disputeService: disputeServiceInstance,
+            // The node's libp2p Ed25519 identity key. Exposed on the same attachment surface as
+            // coordinatedRepo/keyNetwork so a host can bind a client-transaction signer to it (the Quereus
+            // collection-factory's getSigner reuses this via signPeer). libp2p does not surface the private
+            // key on its public `Libp2p` interface, so this attachment is the sanctioned in-process handle.
+            // Ed25519 by construction (options.privateKey defaults to generateKeyPair('Ed25519')).
+            peerPrivateKey: nodePrivateKey,
         };
-    }
-    // Expose coordinated repo and storage for external use
-    node.coordinatedRepo = coordinatedRepo;
-    node.storageRepo = storageRepo;
-    // The StorageRepo is the single commit funnel for both the coordinated and
-    // direct paths, so it is the node's per-collection change-notifier origin. This is the
-    // default; the cohort-topic activation block below REPLACES it with the origination-decorating
-    // bridge notifier when the substrate is enabled.
-    node.blockChangeNotifier = storageRepo;
-    node.keyNetwork = keyNetwork;
-    node.reputation = reputation;
-    node.disputeService = disputeServiceInstance;
-    // The node's libp2p Ed25519 identity key. Exposed on the same `(node as any).*` surface as
-    // coordinatedRepo/keyNetwork so a host can bind a client-transaction signer to it (the Quereus
-    // collection-factory's getSigner reuses this via signPeer). libp2p does not surface the private
-    // key on its public `Libp2p` interface, so this attachment is the sanctioned in-process handle.
-    // Ed25519 by construction (options.privateKey defaults to generateKeyPair('Ed25519')).
-    node.peerPrivateKey = nodePrivateKey;
-    // --- Cohort-topic origination activation (post-node: consumes the fully-assembled node + FRET) ---
-    // This is the only place that is after the node + FRET are assembled (node.start() done, fretSvc
-    // available) yet before any caller can capture `blockChangeNotifier` — the Quereus collection-factory
-    // captures it once, immediately after createLibp2pNode returns, and reuses that reference as
-    // `localChangeNotifier` for every NetworkTransactor it builds. Installing the bridge here makes the
-    // origination path live for ALL collections created on the node.
-    if (cohortEnabled) {
-        // The host needs the full FRET engine surface; node.services.fret is the wrapper (see resolveFretEngine).
-        const fret = resolveFretEngine(fretSvc);
-        if (!fret) {
-            // Operator opted in; degrading silently to the bare notifier would hide misconfiguration.
-            // The node has already started (transports open, FRET running), so tear it down before the
-            // hard-fail rather than leaking a started node + open transports on the rejection.
-            await node.stop();
-            throw new Error('cohortTopic enabled but the FRET service is unavailable on the node');
-        }
-        // A host-construction failure also hard-fails (operator opted in); stop the started node first so
-        // the rejection does not leak open transports / a running FRET service. node.stop() runs the
-        // already-installed arachnode + clusterMember teardown wrappers and closes the node's connections.
-        let host;
-        try {
-            host = await createCohortTopicHost(node, fret, {
+        Object.assign(node, attachments);
+        // --- Cohort-topic origination activation (post-node: consumes the fully-assembled node + FRET) ---
+        // This is the only place that is after the node + FRET are assembled (node.start() done, fretSvc
+        // available) yet before any caller can capture `blockChangeNotifier` — the Quereus collection-factory
+        // captures it once, immediately after createLibp2pNode returns, and reuses that reference as
+        // `localChangeNotifier` for every NetworkTransactor it builds. Installing the bridge here makes the
+        // origination path live for ALL collections created on the node.
+        if (cohortEnabled) {
+            // The host needs the full FRET engine surface; node.services.fret is the wrapper (see resolveFretEngine).
+            const fret = resolveFretEngine(fretSvc);
+            if (!fret) {
+                // Operator opted in; degrading silently to the bare notifier would hide misconfiguration.
+                // (The started node is torn down by the post-start rollback `catch` at the bottom of this function.)
+                throw new Error('cohortTopic enabled but the FRET service is unavailable on the node');
+            }
+            const host = await createCohortTopicHost(node, fret, {
                 ...(options.cohortTopic.host ?? {}),
                 // Wire the node's reputation service in as the production backing for the bootstrap-evidence
                 // referee verifier (the `{ isBanned, getScore }` view `PeerReputationService` satisfies), so a
@@ -985,243 +1006,279 @@ export async function createLibp2pNodeBase(options, defaults) {
                 privateKey: nodePrivateKey, // real k − x threshold signing
                 wantK: cohortWantK,
             });
+            // --- Cohort-topic + reactivity + matchmaking teardown ---
+            // Installed HERE, immediately after `host` exists and BEFORE the ~230 lines of reactivity /
+            // matchmaking wiring below, because the post-start rollback only unwinds resources whose stop
+            // wrapper is already installed at the moment of the throw. With the wrapper at the END of the
+            // block (where it used to live) a throw mid-wiring left the host's gossip timer and cohort-topic
+            // protocol handlers running. The bindings it releases are therefore declared up front and
+            // undefined-guarded — same idiom as `offOwnedBlockFeed` above — so this tears down exactly what
+            // has been created so far, whether that is the host alone or the whole wiring.
+            //
+            // Ordering (load-bearing): release reactivity timers + protocol handlers BEFORE host.stop()
+            // (which clears the cohort gossip timer + unhandles the cohort-topic protocols) BEFORE the node's
+            // transports close (previousStop). Composes with the existing arachnode + clusterMember stop
+            // wrappers (each calls its captured previousStop last). `node.unhandle` on a protocol that was
+            // never registered does not throw — libp2p's registrar deletes each id from its handler map
+            // (a miss is silently ignored) and then re-patches the peer store's advertised protocol list —
+            // so the handler releases need no separate registration flags.
+            const reactivityProtocols = DEFAULT_REACTIVITY_PROTOCOLS;
+            const matchmakingProtocols = DEFAULT_MATCHMAKING_PROTOCOLS;
+            let unsubscribeCohortBridge;
+            let offInboundNotify;
+            let pushStateGossip;
+            let reactivityRotation;
+            {
+                const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
+                node.stop = async () => {
+                    try {
+                        reactivityRotation?.stop();
+                        pushStateGossip?.stop();
+                        offInboundNotify?.();
+                        await node.unhandle(reactivityProtocolList(reactivityProtocols));
+                        await node.unhandle(matchmakingProtocolList(matchmakingProtocols));
+                        unsubscribeCohortBridge?.();
+                        await host.stop();
+                    }
+                    finally {
+                        await previousStop();
+                    }
+                };
+            }
+            // selfIsCohortMember: this node owns the collection's reactivity-topic fan-out iff it is in the
+            // FRET cohort around coord_0(H(currentTailId ‖ "reactivity")). Uses db-core's default hashes
+            // (createReactivityTopicAnchor / createTierAddressing / createRingHash), byte-identical to the
+            // host's internal `new RingHash()` and the subscriber-side anchor, and the SAME cohortWantK as
+            // the host — so the coord + cohort line up across origination and subscription.
+            const selfIsCohortMember = createReactivitySelfMembershipGate({
+                fret,
+                selfPeerId: node.peerId.toString(),
+                wantK: cohortWantK,
+            });
+            unsubscribeCohortBridge = attachCohortChangeBridge(node, {
+                source: storageRepo,
+                service: host.service,
+                selfIsCohortMember,
+                extractCommitCert: makeClusterCommitCertExtractor(certStore),
+            }).unsubscribe;
+            // Expose the host so the reactivity origination wiring (and the activation test) can install
+            // `CohortTopicService.onLocalCommit`.
+            node.cohortTopicHost = host;
+            // --- Reactivity notification transport (origination → fan-out → inbound delivery → push-state gossip) ---
+            // Compose notify + forwarder-host + push-state-gossip onto the cohort-topic host so a committed change
+            // on a tail-cohort member actually reaches subscribers on OTHER nodes over real sockets. The change
+            // bridge above fires `onLocalCommit`; this is what the emitted notifications travel over.
+            // (docs/reactivity.md §Notification origination / §Propagation.) Reactivity reuses the canonical,
+            // network-agnostic protocol IDs, matching the cohort-topic family's production default.
+            const selfPeerId = node.peerId.toString();
+            const reactivityProfile = host.profile; // Edge ⇒ subscriber-only via the policy gate; Core forwards.
+            const reactivityPolicy = reactivityNodePolicy(reactivityProfile);
+            // db-core default anchor + tier addressing, byte-identical to the host's `new RingHash()`, the
+            // origination gate, and the subscriber-side anchor — so coord_0 derivation lines up everywhere.
+            const reactivityAddressing = createTierAddressing(createRingHash());
+            // Reactivity's forwarder cohort sits at coord_0 — TREE tier 0 (peer-independent), distinct from the
+            // CAPACITY tier T3 the verifier/willingness use. `registry.findServing` keys on the engine's tree
+            // depth, so the served reactivity engine is found at tree tier 0, never at 3.
+            const REACTIVITY_FORWARDER_TREE_TIER = 0;
+            // Node-level subscriber registry: a constructed ReactivitySubscriptionManager registers here so a
+            // socket-delivered NotificationV1 reaches it. (The Quereus Database.watch → manager bridge that
+            // CONSTRUCTS managers stays the backlog item optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test.)
+            const reactivitySubscribers = new ReactivitySubscriberRegistry();
+            node.reactivitySubscribers = reactivitySubscribers;
+            // 1. Notify transport — unicast NotificationV1 send + inbound subscribe. selfPeerId guards self-dials.
+            const notify = new Libp2pReactivityNotifyTransport(node, { selfPeerId });
+            // 2. Forwarder host — turns the forward decision into live fan-out over the notify transport.
+            const forwarderHost = new ReactivityForwarderHost({
+                transport: notify,
+                selfPeerId,
+                profile: reactivityProfile,
+                pushStateInit: (topicId, n) => ({
+                    collectionId: n.collectionId,
+                    topicId: bytesToB64url(topicId),
+                    tailIdAtJoin: n.tailId,
+                    deltaMaxBytes: reactivityPolicy.deltaMaxBytes,
+                }),
+                verifierFor: () => createNotificationVerifier({ verifier: host.service.verifier(), tier: Tier.T3 }),
+                directSubscribers: (topicId) => {
+                    // Find the served reactivity engine at TREE tier 0 (see REACTIVITY_FORWARDER_TREE_TIER) and read
+                    // its direct-subscriber records. The adapter filters to reactivity appState and maps participantId
+                    // bytes → dialable peer-id strings (the transport's `peerIdFromString` space) — NOT base64url,
+                    // which would silently fail to dial. `undefined` (no subscriber has registered here yet) ⇒ [].
+                    const engine = host.registry.findServing(topicId, REACTIVITY_FORWARDER_TREE_TIER);
+                    return engine === undefined ? [] : reactivityDirectSubscribers(engine, topicId);
+                },
+                // No childCohorts until cohort-topic-parent-child-link populates PushState.childCohorts (single
+                // tier-0 reach today); wire the resolver anyway. A child cohort's primary is the FRET-nearest member
+                // of its coord, returned as a peer-id string (the dial space).
+                resolveChildPrimary: (ref) => {
+                    const peers = fret.assembleCohort(b64urlToBytes(ref.coord), cohortWantK);
+                    return peers.length > 0 ? peers[0] : undefined;
+                },
+                deliverLocal: (topicId, n) => reactivitySubscribers.deliver(topicId, n),
+            });
+            // Inbound notify frames → forwarder host (subscriber role delivers in-process; forwarder role fans out).
+            // NOTE: the four `register*Handler` helpers below (notify / pushStateGossip / recover /
+            // matchmaking query) all call `node.handle(...)` fire-and-forget (`void`), so a rejected
+            // registration escapes the post-start rollback `catch` as an UNHANDLED rejection instead of
+            // failing node creation. Harmless today — every protocol id here is a fixed constant registered
+            // exactly once, so the only realistic rejection is a duplicate, and that needs a caller to pass
+            // overlapping custom `cohortTopic.host.protocols`. If any of these ids ever becomes
+            // caller-configurable, or a helper grows a registration that can genuinely fail, make them await
+            // their `node.handle` so the failure reaches the rollback.
+            registerNotifyHandler(node, reactivityProtocols.notify, notify);
+            offInboundNotify = notify.onNotification((from, n) => { void forwarderHost.onInbound(from, n); });
+            // 3. Origination emit — install onLocalCommit: a member commit builds a NotificationV1 and ingests it.
+            const origination = new ReactivityOriginationManager({
+                service: host.service,
+                resolveContext: (event) => {
+                    if (event.tailId === undefined) {
+                        return undefined; // tail-less (read-driven promotion) never originates (the gate also returns first)
+                    }
+                    return {
+                        // MUST reuse the gate's `reactivityTailBytes` (utf8), NOT db-core's double-hashing
+                        // blockIdToBytes — else origination derives a different coord than subscribers resolve.
+                        tailId: reactivityTailBytes(event.tailId),
+                        deltaMaxBytes: reactivityPolicy.deltaMaxBytes,
+                        // rotationHint stays undefined on a live node: the successor tail id is not knowable at the
+                        // filling commit (random block ids; gated on 6.5-block-id-derivation). The authoritative,
+                        // observable rotation signal is `event.tailId` CHANGING, which the manager observes via the
+                        // `markRotated` binding below. (The pre-announce remains exercised in the mock-tier harness +
+                        // the design simulator, both of which can synthesize the successor id.)
+                    };
+                },
+                // reactivityNotificationTopicId(n) = reactivityTopicId(b64urlToBytes(n.tailId)); since
+                // n.tailId = b64url(reactivityTailBytes(tail)), this is the SAME topicId the gate assembled coord_0
+                // around and the subscriber/forwarder verifier derives — closing the encoding loop.
+                emit: (n) => { void forwarderHost.ingest(reactivityNotificationTopicId(n), n); },
+                // Observe-rotation: when a collection's tail id changes between commits the OLD tail's reactivity
+                // topic has rotated. Start its drain so the recover serve begins redirecting to the new tree (the
+                // `reactivity-rotation-recover-redirect-drain` markRotated seam). `oldTopicId` is byte-identical to
+                // the topic a subscriber subscribed under (both `reactivityTopicId(reactivityTailBytes(tail))`).
+                markRotated: (oldTopicId, redirect, now) => forwarderHost.markRotated(oldTopicId, redirect, now),
+            });
+            origination.install();
+            // 4. PushState gossip — periodic intra-cohort convergence so any member (not just the primary) can
+            // serve a replay/backfill. Rides the host's cohort gossip transport (no second transport).
+            pushStateGossip = new ReactivityPushStateGossipDriver({
+                gossipTransport: host.gossipTransport,
+                liveCollections: () => forwarderHost.livePushStates().map((pushState) => ({
+                    pushState,
+                    cohortCoord: reactivityAddressing.coord0(b64urlToBytes(pushState.topicId)),
+                })),
+                pushStateForGossip: (g) => forwarderHost.pushStateFor(b64urlToBytes(g.topicId)),
+                // Authenticity gate: accept gossip only from a member of the cohort around the frame's reactivity
+                // coord (per-frame peer-sig envelope signing is deferred — reactivity-pushstate-gossip's hardening backlog).
+                isCohortMember: (fromPeerId, g) => fret.assembleCohort(reactivityAddressing.coord0(b64urlToBytes(g.topicId)), cohortWantK).includes(fromPeerId),
+            });
+            registerPushStateGossipHandler(node, reactivityProtocols.pushStateGossip, pushStateGossip);
+            pushStateGossip.start();
+            // 5. Recover RPC — the pull companion to notify (docs/reactivity.md §Backfill RPC / §Resume). A
+            // subscriber that detected a gap, or woke from sleep past the live tail, asks a serving cohort member
+            // "what did I miss?" and is brought current over a real request-reply socket. The SERVE side is live
+            // here: this node answers RecoverRequestV1 frames against its live forwarder PushStates. The OUTBOUND
+            // transport + signers are constructed and exposed for the subscribe factory that CONSTRUCTS managers
+            // (the Quereus Database.watch app-bridge — backlog optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test);
+            // no node-internal manager calls them yet, exactly as the notify subscriber side is constructed against
+            // `reactivitySubscribers` rather than from a watch.
+            //
+            // Node-level sticky cohort-hint cache (keyed by collectionId), shared between the outbound transport's
+            // sticky-primary lookup and a future manager's rotation-invalidation so both see ONE cache. It starts
+            // empty ⇒ the transport falls through to the cohort-walk (any member holding the gossiped PushState
+            // answers); populating the sticky primary is a one-RT optimization, not a correctness need.
+            const reactivityCohortHintCache = createStickyCohortHintCache();
+            // topicId → dialable cohort member peer-id strings: the SAME FRET coord_0 assembly the push-state-gossip
+            // authenticity gate uses (`reactivityAddressing.coord0` → `fret.assembleCohort`), so a recover walk
+            // reaches exactly the cohort that holds the topic's gossiped PushState. `assembleCohort` returns peer-id
+            // strings (the recover dialer's `peerIdFromString` space), matching the notify dial-target space.
+            const resolveReactivityCohort = (topicId) => fret.assembleCohort(reactivityAddressing.coord0(topicId), cohortWantK);
+            // Outbound transport: exposes the db-core BackfillTransport / ResumeTransport seams against this node.
+            // maxBytes is omitted so the dialer + handler default to DEFAULT_STREAM_MAX_BYTES, matching the notify
+            // transport's default (constructed above without an override) — one frame ceiling across the family.
+            const recover = new Libp2pReactivityRecoverTransport({
+                dialer: createLibp2pRecoverDialer(node, reactivityProtocols.recover),
+                selfPeerId,
+                cohortHintCache: reactivityCohortHintCache,
+                resolveCohort: resolveReactivityCohort,
+            });
+            // Inbound serve handler: decode (bounded) → verify the dialing peer's signature → freshness/replay gate →
+            // resolve the live PushState off the forwarder host → serveBackfill/serveResume → reply (no reply on any
+            // failure; the stream aborts and the subscriber walks/chain-reads). One node-level replay guard is shared
+            // across all recover requests — a plain pruned-on-access map, so no new timer to tear down.
+            registerRecoverHandler(node, reactivityProtocols.recover, {
+                pushStateFor: forwarderHost.pushStateFor.bind(forwarderHost),
+                pushStateForCollection: forwarderHost.pushStateForCollection.bind(forwarderHost),
+                replayGuard: createCorrelationReplayGuard(),
+                rotationFor: (req, now) => {
+                    // Drain-window redirect: a recover reaching an OLD (rotated, still-draining) tail is bounced to
+                    // the new tree (reactivity-rotation-recover-redirect-drain). A resume carries the stale topic
+                    // (topicId = reactivityTopicId(latestKnownTailId)); a backfill carries no topic, so resolve the
+                    // collection's current served topic. rotationRedirectFor returns the gate's redirect while
+                    // draining and undefined once drained (then evicting the gate + the old tail's served PushState).
+                    const oldTopicId = req.topicId ?? resolveCurrentServedTopic(forwarderHost, req.collectionId);
+                    return oldTopicId === undefined ? undefined : forwarderHost.rotationRedirectFor(oldTopicId, now);
+                },
+            });
+            // The subscriber's synchronous request signers over the node's Ed25519 key (resolves the recover wiring's
+            // lone design point — see recover-transport.ts §createRecoverRequestSigners). Fed to a manager by the
+            // subscribe factory alongside recover.backfillTransport(topicId, collectionId) /
+            // recover.resumeTransport(topicId, collectionId).
+            const recoverSigners = createRecoverRequestSigners(nodePrivateKey);
+            // Expose the recover seams so the subscribe factory wires backfill/resume RPC + signers + the shared
+            // sticky cache (mirrors `reactivitySubscribers` above).
+            node.reactivityRecover = recover;
+            node.reactivityRecoverSigners = recoverSigners;
+            node.reactivityCohortHintCache = reactivityCohortHintCache;
+            // 6. Rotation re-registration scheduler — the host timer that moves a subscriber to the rotated tree
+            // when its manager surfaces a `RotationNotice` (`reactivity-rotation-rereg-scheduler`). Constructed with
+            // the default unref'd `setTimeout` timer so an idle re-registration never pins the process. The
+            // `reRegister(plan)` MOVE belongs to the subscribe factory that CONSTRUCTS managers (the deferred Quereus
+            // `Database.watch` bridge — backlog optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test): on fire it builds
+            // a fresh `ReactivitySubscriptionManager` under `plan.newTopicId` carrying `plan.lastRevision`, registers
+            // it, and swaps the `ReactivitySubscriberRegistry` entry — registering the NEW-topic handler BEFORE
+            // unregistering the old, so a notification mid-swap is never dropped. Until that factory lands no
+            // node-internal manager drives `schedule()`, so this seam is a logged no-op — exactly as 12.33 exposed
+            // `reactivitySubscribers` / `reactivityRecover` without a live manager constructor.
+            reactivityRotation = new RotationReRegistrationScheduler({
+                reRegister: (plan) => {
+                    reactivityWiringLog("reactivity rotation re-registration fired for successor topic=%s (lastRevision=%d) but no subscribe factory is wired yet — deferred to optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test", bytesToB64url(plan.newTopicId), plan.lastRevision);
+                    return Promise.resolve();
+                },
+            });
+            node.reactivityRotation = reactivityRotation;
+            // --- Matchmaking QueryV1 RPC — cohort serve side (docs/matchmaking.md §Seeker query) ---
+            // The server half of the seeker query transport: a remote seeker dials `/optimystic/matchmaking/1.0.0/query`
+            // and this node answers with its cohort's locally-held provider/seeker registrations, signed by the node
+            // peer key. Matchmaking is layered ABOVE the cohort-topic substrate, so it owns its own protocol family
+            // and is wired here (the composition root) over the host's PUBLIC surface only — mirroring the reactivity
+            // registration above; nothing reaches into host.ts internals. The OUTBOUND seeker walk client is the
+            // prereq follow-on `matchmaking-query-rpc-seeker-walk`; only the serve side is live here.
+            registerMatchmakingQueryHandler(node, matchmakingProtocols.query, {
+                registry: host.registry,
+                // Reuse the reactivity addressing: createTierAddressing(createRingHash()) is byte-identical to the
+                // host's internal addressing for the tier-0 coord (peer- and fanout-independent), and the handler
+                // only ever derives coord_0(topicId).
+                addressing: reactivityAddressing,
+                // Single-member reply signature over the node peer key (same pattern reactivity uses for its signers).
+                sign: async (payload) => bytesToB64url(await signPeer(nodePrivateKey, payload)),
+                // Anti-DoS rate-limit seam (backlog matchmaking-query-rate-limit) intentionally left unwired here:
+                // default-allow. When that ticket lands it passes a `gate: (from, topicId) => boolean` that limits on
+                // the connection's verified `from` peer (NOT the self-asserted query.requesterId).
+            });
         }
-        catch (err) {
+        return node;
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        // Post-start rollback. node.stop() runs whatever teardown wrappers were installed BEFORE the throw
+        // (each wrapper is registered next to the resource it releases, precisely so this unwinds as much as
+        // exists) and closes the transports. A rollback failure must never mask the real startup error, so it
+        // is logged and swallowed; `err` is what the caller sees.
+        try {
             await node.stop();
-            throw err;
         }
-        // selfIsCohortMember: this node owns the collection's reactivity-topic fan-out iff it is in the
-        // FRET cohort around coord_0(H(currentTailId ‖ "reactivity")). Uses db-core's default hashes
-        // (createReactivityTopicAnchor / createTierAddressing / createRingHash), byte-identical to the
-        // host's internal `new RingHash()` and the subscriber-side anchor, and the SAME cohortWantK as
-        // the host — so the coord + cohort line up across origination and subscription.
-        const selfIsCohortMember = createReactivitySelfMembershipGate({
-            fret,
-            selfPeerId: node.peerId.toString(),
-            wantK: cohortWantK,
-        });
-        const { unsubscribe } = attachCohortChangeBridge(node, {
-            source: storageRepo,
-            service: host.service,
-            selfIsCohortMember,
-            extractCommitCert: makeClusterCommitCertExtractor(certStore),
-        });
-        // Expose the host so the reactivity origination wiring (and the activation test) can install
-        // `CohortTopicService.onLocalCommit`.
-        node.cohortTopicHost = host;
-        // --- Reactivity notification transport (origination → fan-out → inbound delivery → push-state gossip) ---
-        // Compose notify + forwarder-host + push-state-gossip onto the cohort-topic host so a committed change
-        // on a tail-cohort member actually reaches subscribers on OTHER nodes over real sockets. The change
-        // bridge above fires `onLocalCommit`; this is what the emitted notifications travel over.
-        // (docs/reactivity.md §Notification origination / §Propagation.) Reactivity reuses the canonical,
-        // network-agnostic protocol IDs, matching the cohort-topic family's production default.
-        const selfPeerId = node.peerId.toString();
-        const reactivityProtocols = DEFAULT_REACTIVITY_PROTOCOLS;
-        const reactivityProfile = host.profile; // Edge ⇒ subscriber-only via the policy gate; Core forwards.
-        const reactivityPolicy = reactivityNodePolicy(reactivityProfile);
-        // db-core default anchor + tier addressing, byte-identical to the host's `new RingHash()`, the
-        // origination gate, and the subscriber-side anchor — so coord_0 derivation lines up everywhere.
-        const reactivityAddressing = createTierAddressing(createRingHash());
-        // Reactivity's forwarder cohort sits at coord_0 — TREE tier 0 (peer-independent), distinct from the
-        // CAPACITY tier T3 the verifier/willingness use. `registry.findServing` keys on the engine's tree
-        // depth, so the served reactivity engine is found at tree tier 0, never at 3.
-        const REACTIVITY_FORWARDER_TREE_TIER = 0;
-        // Node-level subscriber registry: a constructed ReactivitySubscriptionManager registers here so a
-        // socket-delivered NotificationV1 reaches it. (The Quereus Database.watch → manager bridge that
-        // CONSTRUCTS managers stays the backlog item optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test.)
-        const reactivitySubscribers = new ReactivitySubscriberRegistry();
-        node.reactivitySubscribers = reactivitySubscribers;
-        // 1. Notify transport — unicast NotificationV1 send + inbound subscribe. selfPeerId guards self-dials.
-        const notify = new Libp2pReactivityNotifyTransport(node, { selfPeerId });
-        // 2. Forwarder host — turns the forward decision into live fan-out over the notify transport.
-        const forwarderHost = new ReactivityForwarderHost({
-            transport: notify,
-            selfPeerId,
-            profile: reactivityProfile,
-            pushStateInit: (topicId, n) => ({
-                collectionId: n.collectionId,
-                topicId: bytesToB64url(topicId),
-                tailIdAtJoin: n.tailId,
-                deltaMaxBytes: reactivityPolicy.deltaMaxBytes,
-            }),
-            verifierFor: () => createNotificationVerifier({ verifier: host.service.verifier(), tier: Tier.T3 }),
-            directSubscribers: (topicId) => {
-                // Find the served reactivity engine at TREE tier 0 (see REACTIVITY_FORWARDER_TREE_TIER) and read
-                // its direct-subscriber records. The adapter filters to reactivity appState and maps participantId
-                // bytes → dialable peer-id strings (the transport's `peerIdFromString` space) — NOT base64url,
-                // which would silently fail to dial. `undefined` (no subscriber has registered here yet) ⇒ [].
-                const engine = host.registry.findServing(topicId, REACTIVITY_FORWARDER_TREE_TIER);
-                return engine === undefined ? [] : reactivityDirectSubscribers(engine, topicId);
-            },
-            // No childCohorts until cohort-topic-parent-child-link populates PushState.childCohorts (single
-            // tier-0 reach today); wire the resolver anyway. A child cohort's primary is the FRET-nearest member
-            // of its coord, returned as a peer-id string (the dial space).
-            resolveChildPrimary: (ref) => {
-                const peers = fret.assembleCohort(b64urlToBytes(ref.coord), cohortWantK);
-                return peers.length > 0 ? peers[0] : undefined;
-            },
-            deliverLocal: (topicId, n) => reactivitySubscribers.deliver(topicId, n),
-        });
-        // Inbound notify frames → forwarder host (subscriber role delivers in-process; forwarder role fans out).
-        registerNotifyHandler(node, reactivityProtocols.notify, notify);
-        const offInboundNotify = notify.onNotification((from, n) => { void forwarderHost.onInbound(from, n); });
-        // 3. Origination emit — install onLocalCommit: a member commit builds a NotificationV1 and ingests it.
-        const origination = new ReactivityOriginationManager({
-            service: host.service,
-            resolveContext: (event) => {
-                if (event.tailId === undefined) {
-                    return undefined; // tail-less (read-driven promotion) never originates (the gate also returns first)
-                }
-                return {
-                    // MUST reuse the gate's `reactivityTailBytes` (utf8), NOT db-core's double-hashing
-                    // blockIdToBytes — else origination derives a different coord than subscribers resolve.
-                    tailId: reactivityTailBytes(event.tailId),
-                    deltaMaxBytes: reactivityPolicy.deltaMaxBytes,
-                    // rotationHint stays undefined on a live node: the successor tail id is not knowable at the
-                    // filling commit (random block ids; gated on 6.5-block-id-derivation). The authoritative,
-                    // observable rotation signal is `event.tailId` CHANGING, which the manager observes via the
-                    // `markRotated` binding below. (The pre-announce remains exercised in the mock-tier harness +
-                    // the design simulator, both of which can synthesize the successor id.)
-                };
-            },
-            // reactivityNotificationTopicId(n) = reactivityTopicId(b64urlToBytes(n.tailId)); since
-            // n.tailId = b64url(reactivityTailBytes(tail)), this is the SAME topicId the gate assembled coord_0
-            // around and the subscriber/forwarder verifier derives — closing the encoding loop.
-            emit: (n) => { void forwarderHost.ingest(reactivityNotificationTopicId(n), n); },
-            // Observe-rotation: when a collection's tail id changes between commits the OLD tail's reactivity
-            // topic has rotated. Start its drain so the recover serve begins redirecting to the new tree (the
-            // `reactivity-rotation-recover-redirect-drain` markRotated seam). `oldTopicId` is byte-identical to
-            // the topic a subscriber subscribed under (both `reactivityTopicId(reactivityTailBytes(tail))`).
-            markRotated: (oldTopicId, redirect, now) => forwarderHost.markRotated(oldTopicId, redirect, now),
-        });
-        origination.install();
-        // 4. PushState gossip — periodic intra-cohort convergence so any member (not just the primary) can
-        // serve a replay/backfill. Rides the host's cohort gossip transport (no second transport).
-        const pushStateGossip = new ReactivityPushStateGossipDriver({
-            gossipTransport: host.gossipTransport,
-            liveCollections: () => forwarderHost.livePushStates().map((pushState) => ({
-                pushState,
-                cohortCoord: reactivityAddressing.coord0(b64urlToBytes(pushState.topicId)),
-            })),
-            pushStateForGossip: (g) => forwarderHost.pushStateFor(b64urlToBytes(g.topicId)),
-            // Authenticity gate: accept gossip only from a member of the cohort around the frame's reactivity
-            // coord (per-frame peer-sig envelope signing is deferred — reactivity-pushstate-gossip's hardening backlog).
-            isCohortMember: (fromPeerId, g) => fret.assembleCohort(reactivityAddressing.coord0(b64urlToBytes(g.topicId)), cohortWantK).includes(fromPeerId),
-        });
-        registerPushStateGossipHandler(node, reactivityProtocols.pushStateGossip, pushStateGossip);
-        pushStateGossip.start();
-        // 5. Recover RPC — the pull companion to notify (docs/reactivity.md §Backfill RPC / §Resume). A
-        // subscriber that detected a gap, or woke from sleep past the live tail, asks a serving cohort member
-        // "what did I miss?" and is brought current over a real request-reply socket. The SERVE side is live
-        // here: this node answers RecoverRequestV1 frames against its live forwarder PushStates. The OUTBOUND
-        // transport + signers are constructed and exposed for the subscribe factory that CONSTRUCTS managers
-        // (the Quereus Database.watch app-bridge — backlog optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test);
-        // no node-internal manager calls them yet, exactly as the notify subscriber side is constructed against
-        // `reactivitySubscribers` rather than from a watch.
-        //
-        // Node-level sticky cohort-hint cache (keyed by collectionId), shared between the outbound transport's
-        // sticky-primary lookup and a future manager's rotation-invalidation so both see ONE cache. It starts
-        // empty ⇒ the transport falls through to the cohort-walk (any member holding the gossiped PushState
-        // answers); populating the sticky primary is a one-RT optimization, not a correctness need.
-        const reactivityCohortHintCache = createStickyCohortHintCache();
-        // topicId → dialable cohort member peer-id strings: the SAME FRET coord_0 assembly the push-state-gossip
-        // authenticity gate uses (`reactivityAddressing.coord0` → `fret.assembleCohort`), so a recover walk
-        // reaches exactly the cohort that holds the topic's gossiped PushState. `assembleCohort` returns peer-id
-        // strings (the recover dialer's `peerIdFromString` space), matching the notify dial-target space.
-        const resolveReactivityCohort = (topicId) => fret.assembleCohort(reactivityAddressing.coord0(topicId), cohortWantK);
-        // Outbound transport: exposes the db-core BackfillTransport / ResumeTransport seams against this node.
-        // maxBytes is omitted so the dialer + handler default to DEFAULT_STREAM_MAX_BYTES, matching the notify
-        // transport's default (constructed above without an override) — one frame ceiling across the family.
-        const recover = new Libp2pReactivityRecoverTransport({
-            dialer: createLibp2pRecoverDialer(node, reactivityProtocols.recover),
-            selfPeerId,
-            cohortHintCache: reactivityCohortHintCache,
-            resolveCohort: resolveReactivityCohort,
-        });
-        // Inbound serve handler: decode (bounded) → verify the dialing peer's signature → freshness/replay gate →
-        // resolve the live PushState off the forwarder host → serveBackfill/serveResume → reply (no reply on any
-        // failure; the stream aborts and the subscriber walks/chain-reads). One node-level replay guard is shared
-        // across all recover requests — a plain pruned-on-access map, so no new timer to tear down.
-        registerRecoverHandler(node, reactivityProtocols.recover, {
-            pushStateFor: forwarderHost.pushStateFor.bind(forwarderHost),
-            pushStateForCollection: forwarderHost.pushStateForCollection.bind(forwarderHost),
-            replayGuard: createCorrelationReplayGuard(),
-            rotationFor: (req, now) => {
-                // Drain-window redirect: a recover reaching an OLD (rotated, still-draining) tail is bounced to
-                // the new tree (reactivity-rotation-recover-redirect-drain). A resume carries the stale topic
-                // (topicId = reactivityTopicId(latestKnownTailId)); a backfill carries no topic, so resolve the
-                // collection's current served topic. rotationRedirectFor returns the gate's redirect while
-                // draining and undefined once drained (then evicting the gate + the old tail's served PushState).
-                const oldTopicId = req.topicId ?? resolveCurrentServedTopic(forwarderHost, req.collectionId);
-                return oldTopicId === undefined ? undefined : forwarderHost.rotationRedirectFor(oldTopicId, now);
-            },
-        });
-        // The subscriber's synchronous request signers over the node's Ed25519 key (resolves the recover wiring's
-        // lone design point — see recover-transport.ts §createRecoverRequestSigners). Fed to a manager by the
-        // subscribe factory alongside recover.backfillTransport(topicId, collectionId) /
-        // recover.resumeTransport(topicId, collectionId).
-        const recoverSigners = createRecoverRequestSigners(nodePrivateKey);
-        // Expose the recover seams so the subscribe factory wires backfill/resume RPC + signers + the shared
-        // sticky cache (mirrors `reactivitySubscribers` above).
-        node.reactivityRecover = recover;
-        node.reactivityRecoverSigners = recoverSigners;
-        node.reactivityCohortHintCache = reactivityCohortHintCache;
-        // 6. Rotation re-registration scheduler — the host timer that moves a subscriber to the rotated tree
-        // when its manager surfaces a `RotationNotice` (`reactivity-rotation-rereg-scheduler`). Constructed with
-        // the default unref'd `setTimeout` timer so an idle re-registration never pins the process. The
-        // `reRegister(plan)` MOVE belongs to the subscribe factory that CONSTRUCTS managers (the deferred Quereus
-        // `Database.watch` bridge — backlog optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test): on fire it builds
-        // a fresh `ReactivitySubscriptionManager` under `plan.newTopicId` carrying `plan.lastRevision`, registers
-        // it, and swaps the `ReactivitySubscriberRegistry` entry — registering the NEW-topic handler BEFORE
-        // unregistering the old, so a notification mid-swap is never dropped. Until that factory lands no
-        // node-internal manager drives `schedule()`, so this seam is a logged no-op — exactly as 12.33 exposed
-        // `reactivitySubscribers` / `reactivityRecover` without a live manager constructor.
-        const reactivityRotation = new RotationReRegistrationScheduler({
-            reRegister: (plan) => {
-                reactivityWiringLog("reactivity rotation re-registration fired for successor topic=%s (lastRevision=%d) but no subscribe factory is wired yet — deferred to optimystic-network-reactive-watch-integration-test", bytesToB64url(plan.newTopicId), plan.lastRevision);
-                return Promise.resolve();
-            },
-        });
-        node.reactivityRotation = reactivityRotation;
-        // --- Matchmaking QueryV1 RPC — cohort serve side (docs/matchmaking.md §Seeker query) ---
-        // The server half of the seeker query transport: a remote seeker dials `/optimystic/matchmaking/1.0.0/query`
-        // and this node answers with its cohort's locally-held provider/seeker registrations, signed by the node
-        // peer key. Matchmaking is layered ABOVE the cohort-topic substrate, so it owns its own protocol family
-        // and is wired here (the composition root) over the host's PUBLIC surface only — mirroring the reactivity
-        // registration above; nothing reaches into host.ts internals. The OUTBOUND seeker walk client is the
-        // prereq follow-on `matchmaking-query-rpc-seeker-walk`; only the serve side is live here.
-        const matchmakingProtocols = DEFAULT_MATCHMAKING_PROTOCOLS;
-        registerMatchmakingQueryHandler(node, matchmakingProtocols.query, {
-            registry: host.registry,
-            // Reuse the reactivity addressing: createTierAddressing(createRingHash()) is byte-identical to the
-            // host's internal addressing for the tier-0 coord (peer- and fanout-independent), and the handler
-            // only ever derives coord_0(topicId).
-            addressing: reactivityAddressing,
-            // Single-member reply signature over the node peer key (same pattern reactivity uses for its signers).
-            sign: async (payload) => bytesToB64url(await signPeer(nodePrivateKey, payload)),
-            // Anti-DoS rate-limit seam (backlog matchmaking-query-rate-limit) intentionally left unwired here:
-            // default-allow. When that ticket lands it passes a `gate: (from, topicId) => boolean` that limits on
-            // the connection's verified `from` peer (NOT the self-asserted query.requesterId).
-        });
-        // Teardown: release reactivity timers + protocol handlers BEFORE host.stop() (which clears the cohort
-        // gossip timer + unhandles the cohort-topic protocols) BEFORE the node's transports close (previousStop).
-        // Composes with the existing arachnode + clusterMember stop wrappers (each calls its captured previousStop last).
-        const previousStop = node.stop.bind(node);
-        node.stop = async () => {
-            try {
-                reactivityRotation.stop();
-                pushStateGossip.stop();
-                offInboundNotify();
-                await node.unhandle(reactivityProtocolList(reactivityProtocols));
-                await node.unhandle(matchmakingProtocolList(matchmakingProtocols));
-                unsubscribe();
-                await host.stop();
-            }
-            finally {
-                await previousStop();
-            }
-        };
+        catch (stopErr) {
+            wiringLog('rollback stop failed after startup error: %o', stopErr);
+        }
+        throw err;
     }
-    return node;
 }
 //# sourceMappingURL=libp2p-node-base.js.map