@optimystic/db-p2p 0.17.0 → 0.19.0

package/readme.md

@@ -353,6 +353,26 @@ const node = await createLibp2pNode({
 Omitting it is the default and leaves behavior unchanged. See
 [internals](../../docs/internals.md) § Inbound Stream Authorization for the full contract.
 
+**Announcing a different address than you bind (optional).** A node behind a NAT, port forward,
+reverse proxy or DNS front binds one address but is reachable at another. `announceAddrs` advertises
+the reachable address *instead of* whatever the transports report; `appendAnnounceAddrs` advertises
+it *in addition to* them:
+
+```typescript
+const node = await createLibp2pNode({
+  networkName: 'my-net',
+  bootstrapNodes: ['...'],
+  listenAddrs: ['/ip4/0.0.0.0/tcp/4001'],       // what the process binds
+  announceAddrs: ['/dns4/mynode.example.com/tcp/4001']  // what peers are told
+});
+```
+
+`announceAddrs` replaces the advertised set **entirely** — observed and relayed addresses are
+dropped from it, and `appendAnnounceAddrs` is ignored while it is non-empty. Use
+`appendAnnounceAddrs` alone when the automatically discovered addresses are still worth advertising.
+Both are straight passthroughs to libp2p's `addresses.announce` / `addresses.appendAnnounce`; an
+empty array means "unset".
+
 ## Usage Examples
 
 ### Setting Up a Coordinator Node

package/src/cluster/block-transfer-service.ts

@@ -69,6 +69,12 @@ export interface BlockTransferServiceInit extends InboundStreamAuthorizationInit
 export interface BlockTransferServiceComponents {
 	registrar: { handle: (...args: any[]) => Promise<void>; unhandle: (...args: any[]) => Promise<void> };
 	repo: IBlockReplicaStore;
+	/**
+	 * Optional libp2p component logger. Supplied by the node factory so authorization denials
+	 * land on the same `logger.forComponent(...).error` sink as the repo/cluster/sync services;
+	 * without it they fall back to this module's `debug` logger.
+	 */
+	logger?: { forComponent: (name: string) => { error: (message: string, ...args: unknown[]) => void } };
 }
 
 /**
@@ -92,7 +98,9 @@ export class BlockTransferService implements Startable {
 		this.protocol = buildBlockTransferProtocol(init.protocolPrefix ?? '');
 		this.repo = components.repo;
 		this.registrar = components.registrar;
-		this.authorization = createInboundStreamAuthorization(init, this.protocol, (msg, ...args) => log(msg, ...args));
+		const componentLog = components.logger?.forComponent('db-p2p:block-transfer');
+		this.authorization = createInboundStreamAuthorization(init, this.protocol,
+			componentLog ? (msg, ...args) => componentLog.error(msg, ...args) : (msg, ...args) => log(msg, ...args));
 	}
 
 	async start(): Promise<void> {

package/src/cluster/cluster-policy.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,152 @@
+import { DEFAULT_SUPER_MAJORITY_THRESHOLD, type ClusterConsensusConfig } from "@optimystic/db-core";
+
+/**
+ * Resolves the operator-facing cluster knobs (`clusterSize`, `clusterPolicy.*`) into the concrete
+ * numbers the consensus and block-restoration paths run on.
+ *
+ * Extracted from `createLibp2pNodeBase` rather than left inline so the composition root's defaults
+ * are assertable without booting a libp2p node — the layer a real deployment actually uses, and
+ * therefore the layer where a default that relaxed the repair corroboration floor to a single voter
+ * survived unnoticed (see `test/cluster-policy.spec.ts`).
+ *
+ * ## Why two size yardsticks, not one
+ *
+ * One operator field — `clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize`, "the smallest cohort this deployment can
+ * genuinely field" — feeds two consumers whose failure modes point in opposite directions, so its
+ * *default* cannot serve both:
+ *
+ * - **Membership admission gate** (`cluster/cluster-repo.ts`, `admitMembership`) reads it only on its
+ *   fallback path, when this node has no confident network-size estimate. Too small: a
+ *   partition-induced downsize slips past while the node is unconfident. Too large: the node refuses
+ *   legitimate writes — unavailability. It wants a *permissive* default, because an unconfigured
+ *   two-node mesh must still be able to transact. It gets {@link minAbsoluteClusterSize} (2).
+ * - **Repair corroboration floor** (`corroboratorCapacity` in `cluster/quorum-restore.ts`, called by
+ *   `CoordinatorRepo.queryClusterForLatest` and `createReconcileBlock`) reads it on *every* repair,
+ *   unconditionally. Too small: a shrunken — and always unauthenticated — cohort view buys a lone
+ *   peer full trust. Too large: a block stays unrepaired, degraded rather than dead. It wants a
+ *   *strict* default. It gets {@link ResolvedClusterPolicy.repairCorroborationClusterSize}, which
+ *   falls back to `clusterSize` (the configured replication factor).
+ *
+ * A single explicit `clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize` still sets BOTH — an operator declaring their
+ * real cohort size means it for both consumers. Only the unconfigured case diverges.
+ *
+ * So a genuine two-node mesh needs exactly one setting to self-repair: either
+ * `clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize: 2` (which does not lower the replication factor) or an honest
+ * `clusterSize: 2`. Writes and voting still work with zero configuration.
+ *
+ * ## Future
+ *
+ * Deriving the yardstick from observation (the largest peer group this node has ever seen for the
+ * key) would remove the trade entirely and subsume both values. Filed as backlog
+ * `feat-admission-floor-from-observed-cohort-high-water-mark`; do not build it here.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * Absolute floor below which no cohort is safe, whatever the size references say. Named rather than
+ * inlined because the admission gate's `assumedClusterSize` defaults to exactly this value — the two
+ * must not drift.
+ */
+export const minAbsoluteClusterSize = 2;
+
+/**
+ * The operator-facing cluster knobs. `NodeOptions` (`libp2p-node-base.ts`) intersects this rather
+ * than restating it, so a knob added here is one `resolveClusterPolicy` is guaranteed to see — a
+ * second declaration would compile fine and be silently dropped.
+ */
+export interface ClusterPolicyOptions {
+	/**
+	 * Desired cluster size per key (default 10) — the replication factor / target cohort breadth
+	 * the coordinator aims for. NOT a statement about how many peers actually exist, so the
+	 * membership admission gate is never measured against it (see `cluster/cluster-repo.ts`).
+	 *
+	 * The read-repair/reconcile corroboration floor DOES fall back to it when
+	 * `clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize` is absent — the strict direction, so an unconfigured node
+	 * cannot have its floor talked down by a shrunken cohort view. A deployment that genuinely runs
+	 * fewer peers than this should declare `clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize`.
+	 */
+	clusterSize?: number;
+	clusterPolicy?: {
+		allowDownsize?: boolean;
+		/** Acceptable relative difference (e.g. 0.5 = +/-50%). */
+		sizeTolerance?: number;
+		/** Fraction of peers needed for super-majority (default {@link DEFAULT_SUPER_MAJORITY_THRESHOLD}). */
+		superMajorityThreshold?: number;
+		/**
+		 * Opt in to transacting below the safe cluster-size floor when FRET has no confident
+		 * network-size estimate — the membership-admission and coordinator small-cluster gates both
+		 * fail closed without it. Default false. Turn on only for single-node / local dev meshes that
+		 * knowingly run undersized.
+		 */
+		allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster?: boolean;
+		/**
+		 * The smallest cohort this deployment can genuinely field — normally the number of nodes you
+		 * actually run, capped at `clusterSize`. Two consumers read it: the membership admission gate,
+		 * on its fallback path when the node has no confident network-size estimate; and the
+		 * read-repair/reconcile corroboration floor (`corroboratorCapacity`), unconditionally.
+		 *
+		 * Declaring it sets BOTH. Leaving it unset does NOT — see the module doc for why the two
+		 * defaults point in opposite directions. A large deployment should still set this to its real
+		 * cohort size, otherwise the admission gate cannot police a partition-induced downsize while
+		 * its size estimate is unconfident; a genuine two-node mesh needs it (or an honest
+		 * `clusterSize: 2`) to self-repair.
+		 */
+		assumedClusterSize?: number;
+	};
+}
+
+/** Everything a node's consensus + restoration paths need, with every default already applied. */
+export type ResolvedClusterPolicy = ClusterConsensusConfig & {
+	/** Replication factor / target cohort breadth. Always concrete after resolution. */
+	clusterSize: number;
+	/**
+	 * Yardstick the repair corroboration floor measures a (possibly shrunken, always unauthenticated)
+	 * cohort view against — see `corroboratorCapacity` in `cluster/quorum-restore.ts`.
+	 *
+	 * Deliberately distinct from {@link ClusterConsensusConfig.assumedClusterSize}, which the
+	 * membership admission gate reads: the two share an operator field but not a default, because
+	 * over- and under-stating them cost opposite things. See the module doc.
+	 */
+	repairCorroborationClusterSize: number;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Apply every cluster-policy default a node needs. Pure — same options in, same numbers out — so the
+ * composition root's behavior is unit-testable (`test/cluster-policy.spec.ts`).
+ */
+export function resolveClusterPolicy(options: ClusterPolicyOptions): ResolvedClusterPolicy {
+	// undefined here means "the operator said nothing", which is the only case where the two
+	// yardsticks below diverge.
+	//
+	// NOTE: a declared value is passed through unvalidated. The admission gate floors a degenerate one
+	// (0, negative, NaN, Infinity) itself — see `cluster-repo.admissionFloor` and its specs — but
+	// `corroboratorCapacity` does not: NaN there makes every quorum comparison false, so repair
+	// silently declines forever. Fail-safe, and unreachable through the reference-peer CLI (which
+	// rejects non-positive integers). If another composition root starts accepting unvalidated config,
+	// clamp here rather than in each consumer.
+	const declaredCohortSize = options.clusterPolicy?.assumedClusterSize;
+	const clusterSize = options.clusterSize ?? 10;
+
+	return {
+		superMajorityThreshold: options.clusterPolicy?.superMajorityThreshold ?? DEFAULT_SUPER_MAJORITY_THRESHOLD,
+		simpleMajorityThreshold: 0.51,
+		minAbsoluteClusterSize,
+		allowClusterDownsize: options.clusterPolicy?.allowDownsize ?? true,
+		clusterSizeTolerance: options.clusterPolicy?.sizeTolerance ?? 0.5,
+		// Fail closed by default (an undersized cluster with no confident network-size estimate is
+		// rejected); embedders running knowingly-small meshes opt in through clusterPolicy.
+		allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster: options.clusterPolicy?.allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster ?? false,
+		partitionDetectionWindow: 60000,
+		// Replication factor / target cohort breadth — what the coordinator aims for when selecting a
+		// cohort. Deliberately NOT the membership admission gate's yardstick: it says nothing about how
+		// many peers actually exist, so an unconfigured small mesh would refuse every write.
+		clusterSize,
+		// Membership admission gate, fallback path only (no confident network-size estimate). Defaults
+		// permissive so a two- or three-node mesh transacts unconfigured; the cost of that default is
+		// bounded to the gate, since the repair floor no longer reads this field.
+		assumedClusterSize: declaredCohortSize ?? minAbsoluteClusterSize,
+		// Repair corroboration floor, every repair. Defaults strict — to the replication factor — so an
+		// unconfigured node cannot have its floor talked down to a single voter by a shrunken cohort
+		// view. A genuinely small mesh declares its size (either field) to regain self-repair.
+		repairCorroborationClusterSize: declaredCohortSize ?? clusterSize
+	};
+}

package/src/cluster/cluster-repo.ts

@@ -117,9 +117,10 @@ export type ExpectedClusterView = {
  * Independently derive this member's own view of a block's responsible cluster. Injected so
  * {@link ClusterMember} stays transport-agnostic — the composition root supplies it from
  * `IKeyNetwork.findCluster` + FRET (mirroring how the coordinator derives the cluster). Absent on nodes
- * that cannot derive a view (no FRET, unit tests): with no derived view AND no configured full-size
- * reference the gate preserves legacy approve behavior, but a configured `clusterSize` still lets the gate
- * fail closed on an unjustified downsize. See {@link ClusterMember} admission gate.
+ * that cannot derive a view (no FRET, unit tests): with no derived view AND no asserted
+ * {@link ClusterConsensusConfig.assumedClusterSize} the gate preserves legacy approve behavior, but an
+ * asserted size still lets the gate fail closed on an unjustified downsize. See {@link ClusterMember}
+ * admission gate.
  */
 export type DeriveExpectedClusterCallback = (blockId: BlockId) => Promise<ExpectedClusterView>;
 
@@ -232,8 +233,8 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 	private readonly minAbsoluteClusterSize: number;
 	private readonly clusterSizeTolerance: number;
 	private readonly membershipAdmissionFraction: number;
-	/** Configured full cluster size, or undefined when unknown (then the gate cannot judge a downsize). */
-	private readonly configuredClusterSize: number | undefined;
+	/** Operator-asserted smallest genuine cohort size, or undefined when unknown. */
+	private readonly assumedClusterSize: number | undefined;
 	private readonly allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster: boolean;
 
 	constructor(
@@ -259,8 +260,17 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 		this.minAbsoluteClusterSize = consensusConfig?.minAbsoluteClusterSize ?? 3;
 		this.clusterSizeTolerance = consensusConfig?.clusterSizeTolerance ?? 0.5;
 		this.membershipAdmissionFraction = consensusConfig?.membershipAdmissionFraction ?? 0.75;
-		this.configuredClusterSize = consensusConfig?.clusterSize;
+		this.assumedClusterSize = consensusConfig?.assumedClusterSize;
 		this.allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster = consensusConfig?.allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster ?? false;
+		// State the resolved gate parameters once, so an operator diagnosing a membership rejection can see
+		// what this node actually resolved. A fact, not a warning: `assumedClusterSize < clusterSize` is the
+		// normal default state, so warning on it would fire for every node and be ignored.
+		log('cluster-member:admission-config', {
+			assumedClusterSize: this.assumedClusterSize,
+			minAbsoluteClusterSize: this.minAbsoluteClusterSize,
+			membershipAdmissionFraction: this.membershipAdmissionFraction,
+			allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster: this.allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster
+		});
 		// Periodically clean up expired transactions (.unref() so tests/short-lived processes can exit)
 		this.expirationInterval = setInterval(() => this.queueExpiredTransactions(), 60000);
 		this.expirationInterval.unref();
@@ -858,12 +868,18 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 	 *     of a peer or two is absorbed, a wholesale-disjoint or half-size set is not.
 	 *
 	 * **Fail-closed posture.** When the member cannot confidently derive `E` (no capability, low FRET
-	 * confidence — exactly what a partition induces), it must refuse any *downsizing* decision: a
-	 * below-full-size `D` is rejected against the configured full `clusterSize`. With NEITHER a confident
-	 * view NOR a configured full size the gate cannot judge a downsize at all, so it preserves the legacy
-	 * approve behavior (backward-compatible for nodes/tests with no derivation wired). `allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster`
-	 * is the explicit opt-in (single-node / local dev knowingly below the safe floor), matching the
-	 * coordinator's `validateSmallCluster` semantics.
+	 * confidence — exactly what a partition induces), it must refuse any *downsizing* decision — but it
+	 * needs a size reference to judge "downsize" against, and it may NOT borrow `clusterSize` for that:
+	 * `clusterSize` is the replication factor (what a cohort should aim for), not a claim about how many
+	 * peers exist, so a small deployment configured with the default 10 would refuse every write. The
+	 * fallback yardstick is instead {@link ClusterConsensusConfig.assumedClusterSize} — the operator's own
+	 * assertion of the smallest cohort this deployment can genuinely field — run through the SAME
+	 * {@link admissionFloor} as the confident path, so the fallback can never be stricter than the measured
+	 * path (it was: it demanded the full configured size, with no fraction and no slack for churn or a peer
+	 * not yet discovered). With NEITHER a confident view NOR an asserted size the gate cannot judge a
+	 * downsize at all, so it preserves the legacy approve behavior (backward-compatible for nodes/tests with
+	 * no derivation wired). `allowUnvalidatedSmallCluster` is the explicit opt-in (single-node / local dev
+	 * knowingly below the safe floor), matching the coordinator's `validateSmallCluster` semantics.
 	 */
 	private async admitMembership(record: ClusterRecord): Promise<{ admit: boolean; reason?: string }> {
 		const ourId = this.peerId.toString();
@@ -894,30 +910,42 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 			&& derivedSize > 0;
 
 		if (!confident) {
-			// Fail closed for downsizing under low/absent confidence. A full-size (or larger) declared set is
-			// still admitted — there is nothing to shrink. Without a configured full-size reference we cannot
-			// tell a downsize from a legitimate small cluster, so we preserve legacy approve behavior.
-			if (this.configuredClusterSize === undefined) {
+			// Fail closed for downsizing under low/absent confidence, measured against the operator's asserted
+			// cohort size rather than the replication factor. With no asserted size the gate cannot tell a
+			// downsize from a legitimately small cluster at all, so it preserves legacy approve behavior.
+			if (this.assumedClusterSize === undefined) {
 				return { admit: true };
 			}
-			if (declared.length >= this.configuredClusterSize) {
+			const floor = this.admissionFloor(this.assumedClusterSize);
+			if (declared.length >= floor) {
 				return { admit: true };
 			}
 			log('cluster-member:admission-reject', {
 				messageHash: record.messageHash,
 				reason: 'low-confidence-downsize',
 				declaredSize: declared.length,
-				configuredClusterSize: this.configuredClusterSize,
+				floor,
+				assumedClusterSize: this.assumedClusterSize,
 				confidence: derived?.confidence
 			});
-			return { admit: false, reason: `${MEMBERSHIP_NOT_ADMITTED}:low-confidence-downsize` };
+			// The numbers ride along in the reason: this rejection is caused by *local* configuration, and
+			// without them a coordinator (or an operator reading a dispute record) has no hint which knob did it.
+			// NOTE: two honest members with different local config now emit *different* reason strings for the
+			// same record. Nothing compares reasons across peers today (`disputeEvidence.rejectReasons` is a
+			// per-peer map, and the signed payload hashes the string each vote carries); if anything ever groups
+			// or dedupes dispute reasons by string equality, group on the `membership-not-admitted:<variant>`
+			// prefix, not the whole string.
+			return {
+				admit: false,
+				reason: `${MEMBERSHIP_NOT_ADMITTED}:low-confidence-downsize (declared=${declared.length}, floor=${floor}, assumedClusterSize=${this.assumedClusterSize})`
+			};
 		}
 
 		const expected = Object.keys(derived!.peers ?? {});
 		const kEst = expected.length;
 
 		// Predicate 2: floor derived from the member's OWN confident estimate.
-		const floor = Math.max(this.minAbsoluteClusterSize, Math.ceil(this.membershipAdmissionFraction * kEst));
+		const floor = this.admissionFloor(kEst);
 		if (declared.length < floor) {
 			log('cluster-member:admission-reject', {
 				messageHash: record.messageHash,
@@ -926,7 +954,10 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 				floor,
 				kEst
 			});
-			return { admit: false, reason: `${MEMBERSHIP_NOT_ADMITTED}:below-floor` };
+			return {
+				admit: false,
+				reason: `${MEMBERSHIP_NOT_ADMITTED}:below-floor (declared=${declared.length}, floor=${floor}, kEst=${kEst})`
+			};
 		}
 
 		// Predicate 3: consistency with the derived view within tolerance.
@@ -947,6 +978,27 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 		return { admit: true };
 	}
 
+	/**
+	 * The smallest declared peer set admissible against a cohort-size reference `k`, whether `k` is
+	 * measured (the confident path's `kEst`) or asserted (`assumedClusterSize`). One function so the
+	 * fallback can never be stricter than the measured path — which it was, demanding the full configured
+	 * size with no fraction and no slack. Clamped at `minAbsoluteClusterSize`, so a degenerate `k` of 0, 1
+	 * or negative yields the absolute floor rather than a floor that admits everything. A non-finite scaled
+	 * size (a `NaN` or `Infinity` config value) is likewise treated as no usable reference rather than
+	 * propagating: an unguarded `NaN` floor fails EVERY comparison, which would silently make the node
+	 * reject every unconfident write.
+	 *
+	 * NOTE: partition safety needs `2 · membershipAdmissionFraction · superMajorityThreshold > 1` — each
+	 * side of a split must recruit `fraction · threshold · K` distinct honest members, and two sides cannot
+	 * both find them in one K-peer cluster. At the shipped defaults (0.75 · 0.67) that product is 1.005 —
+	 * true, but with almost no margin. If either default is ever lowered, re-check Theorem 2 in
+	 * `docs/correctness.md` before shipping it.
+	 */
+	private admissionFloor(k: number): number {
+		const scaled = Math.ceil(this.membershipAdmissionFraction * k);
+		return Math.max(this.minAbsoluteClusterSize, Number.isFinite(scaled) ? scaled : 0);
+	}
+
 	/**
 	 * Derive this member's own view of the record's block cluster via the injected capability, or
 	 * `undefined` when it cannot (no capability, no coordinating block id, or a derivation error — all of
@@ -1000,6 +1052,20 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 					const blockResults = await this.storageRepo.get({ blockIds });
 					for (const blockId of blockIds) {
 						const blockResult = blockResults[blockId];
+						if (blockResult?.unavailable !== undefined) {
+							// This member cannot establish the block's revision, so it cannot judge
+							// staleness. Vote reject rather than approve on an answer it knows is a
+							// guess — approving would let a stale pend reach consensus on the strength
+							// of a member that could not check it. (Before StorageRepo caught
+							// materialization faults per block, this read threw out of the promise
+							// handler; rejecting keeps the fail-closed posture with a signed reason.)
+							log('cluster-member:validation-block-unavailable', {
+								messageHash: record.messageHash,
+								blockId,
+								reason: blockResult.unavailable
+							});
+							return { valid: false, reason: `block ${blockId} unavailable (${blockResult.unavailable}): cannot verify revision` };
+						}
 						const latestRev = blockResult?.state?.latest?.rev;
 						if (latestRev !== undefined && latestRev >= pendRequest.rev) {
 							log('cluster-member:validation-stale-revision', {
@@ -1008,6 +1074,13 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 								requestedRev: pendRequest.rev,
 								latestRev
 							});
+							// Deliberately prose-only: this reason is fed to computeSigningPayload, signed,
+							// and carried as Signature.rejectReason, so adding a structured revision here
+							// would change the signed byte layout and the Signature type — every peer would
+							// have to agree on the new format or verification breaks across versions. This
+							// is NOT a StaleFailure producer, so StaleFailure.staleAt does not apply; the
+							// coordinator's own local re-read (CoordinatorRepo.classifyStaleRejection)
+							// supplies that number when it can confirm the revision itself.
 							return { valid: false, reason: `stale revision: block ${blockId} at rev ${latestRev}, requested rev ${pendRequest.rev}` };
 						}
 					}
@@ -1395,7 +1468,12 @@ export class ClusterMember implements ICluster {
 	private async reconcileOneBlock(messageHash: string, blockId: BlockId, committed: ActionRev, cohortPeerIds: string[]): Promise<void> {
 		try {
 			await this.withReconcileTimeout(this.reconcileBlock!(blockId, committed, cohortPeerIds), blockId);
-			log('cluster-member:consensus-commit-reconciled', { messageHash, blockId, rev: committed.rev });
+			// "attempted", not "reconciled": the callback returns void, and a quorum decline is a
+			// normal, non-throwing outcome — so reaching here means the pass ran to completion, NOT
+			// that anything was restored. `reconcile:restored` (reconcile-block.ts) is the line that
+			// says the bytes actually landed; `reconcile:no-rev-quorum` / `reconcile:no-content-quorum`
+			// say they did not.
+			log('cluster-member:consensus-commit-reconcile-attempted', { messageHash, blockId, rev: committed.rev });
 		} catch (err) {
 			log('cluster-member:consensus-commit-reconcile-failed', {
 				messageHash,

package/src/cluster/quorum-restore.ts

@@ -63,6 +63,31 @@ export function quorumSize(
 	return Math.max(floor, Math.floor(simpleMajorityThreshold * responderCount));
 }
 
+/**
+ * The `corroboratorCapacity` to hand {@link quorumSize}: how many peers other than the asking node
+ * could answer for a block at all, given `cohortPeerCount` peers currently visible (self already
+ * excluded) and `repairCorroborationClusterSize` — the cohort size this deployment is measured
+ * against, resolved by `resolveClusterPolicy` in `cluster/cluster-policy.ts`.
+ *
+ * Deliberately the MAX of the two: the corroboration floor may be relaxed only for a cohort that is
+ * *genuinely* small, never for one that merely looks small. Cohort views are unauthenticated — the
+ * read path takes them from `IKeyNetwork.findCluster`, the commit path from a coordinator-declared
+ * peer set — so a partition, a self-shrunk record, or an attacker with routing influence could
+ * otherwise talk the requirement down to a single voter. Measuring against the resolved size keeps a
+ * shrunken view out of the relaxed branch.
+ *
+ * An unconfigured node resolves this to its `clusterSize` (default 10), so the floor of two binds and
+ * a shrunken view gains nothing. The escape hatch for a real two-node deployment is one explicit
+ * operator declaration — `clusterPolicy.assumedClusterSize: 2`, which does NOT also drop the
+ * replication factor, or an honest `clusterSize: 2`.
+ *
+ * Shared by both restoration paths so the two can never drift apart on the rule that decides how
+ * much trust a lone peer gets.
+ */
+export function corroboratorCapacity(cohortPeerCount: number, repairCorroborationClusterSize: number): number {
+	return Math.max(cohortPeerCount, repairCorroborationClusterSize - 1);
+}
+
 /**
  * Select the highest revision corroborated by a quorum of distinct peers.
  *
@@ -80,7 +105,7 @@ export function quorumSize(
  * all — lets a genuinely tiny cohort still converge: a cohort with exactly one other peer
  * cannot produce two corroborators, so requiring two makes divergence permanent rather
  * than making it safe. Pass a capacity that a shrunken view of the network cannot talk
- * down (see `CoordinatorRepo.corroboratorCapacity`), or omit it to keep the floor at two.
+ * down (see {@link corroboratorCapacity}), or omit it to keep the floor at two.
  *
  * Returns `undefined` when nothing is corroborated — an uncorroborated claim
  * must never drive restoration.
@@ -165,8 +190,8 @@ export interface BlockHashCandidate {
  * one the sole peer's content is therefore taken on its word. That extends no trust the cohort had
  * not already extended: the same peer's `(rev, actionId)` claim is equally uncorroborable at that
  * size, and a two-member cohort has no honest majority to appeal to. Pass a capacity a shrunken
- * view of the network cannot talk down (see `CoordinatorRepo.corroboratorCapacity` and
- * `reconcile-block.ts`), so only a cohort that is *genuinely* that small reaches this branch.
+ * view of the network cannot talk down (see {@link corroboratorCapacity}), so only a cohort that is
+ * *genuinely* that small reaches this branch.
  */
 export function selectQuorumBlock(
 	candidates: BlockHashCandidate[],

package/src/cluster/reconcile-block.ts

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import type { ReconcileBlockCallback } from "./cluster-repo.js";
 import type { IPeerReputation } from "../reputation/types.js";
 import { PenaltyReason } from "../reputation/types.js";
 import {
-	selectQuorumRev, selectQuorumBlock, canonicalBlockHash,
+	selectQuorumRev, selectQuorumBlock, canonicalBlockHash, corroboratorCapacity,
 	type RevClaim, type BlockHashCandidate, type QuorumRev
 } from "./quorum-restore.js";
 import { createLogger } from '../logger.js';
@@ -38,23 +38,32 @@ export interface ReconcileBlockDeps {
 	saveReplicatedBlock: (blockId: BlockId, block: IBlock, source: ActionRev) => Promise<void>;
 	/** Proportional corroboration threshold; the cohort's `simpleMajorityThreshold`. */
 	simpleMajorityThreshold: number;
-	/** Configured full cluster size — the floor for {@link corroboratorCapacity}. */
-	clusterSize: number;
+	/**
+	 * Yardstick the corroboration floor is measured against — the floor for
+	 * {@link corroboratorCapacity}. Required, not optional: unlike the membership admission gate there
+	 * is no "unknown" handling here, so a caller that cannot state an asserted cohort size should pass
+	 * its configured `clusterSize` (the strict direction) rather than a small placeholder. The failure
+	 * mode of overstating it is a block that stays unrepaired — degraded, not dead; of understating it,
+	 * a shrunken cohort view that can relax the floor to a single voter. `resolveClusterPolicy`
+	 * (`cluster/cluster-policy.ts`) resolves it for a real node and defaults it to `clusterSize`.
+	 */
+	repairCorroborationClusterSize: number;
 	/** Best-effort misbehavior reporting; a throwing implementation is swallowed. */
 	reputation?: Pick<IPeerReputation, 'reportPeer'>;
 }
 
 /**
- * How many peers other than this node could answer for the block at all. Mirrors
- * `CoordinatorRepo.corroboratorCapacity` exactly, and for the same reason: the corroboration
- * floor may be relaxed only for a cohort that is *genuinely* small, never for one that merely
- * looks small. `cohortPeerIds` come from the (untrusted) coordinator-declared peer set, so a
- * self-shrunk record could otherwise talk the requirement down to a single voter; taking the MAX
- * against the configured `clusterSize` keeps that shrunken view out of the relaxed branch. The
- * escape hatch for a real two-node deployment is to configure `clusterSize: 2`.
+ * Highest revision an archive covers. Keys arrive as strings off the wire from an untrusted peer,
+ * so a non-numeric one is skipped rather than poisoning the maximum with `NaN`; folding instead of
+ * `Math.max(...keys)` also keeps a wide archive off the argument-count limit.
  */
-function corroboratorCapacity(targets: string[], clusterSize: number): number {
-	return Math.max(targets.length, clusterSize - 1);
+function maxRevision(revisions: BlockArchive['revisions']): number | undefined {
+	let max: number | undefined;
+	for (const key of Object.keys(revisions)) {
+		const rev = Number(key);
+		if (Number.isFinite(rev) && (max === undefined || rev > max)) max = rev;
+	}
+	return max;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -64,16 +73,40 @@ function corroboratorCapacity(targets: string[], clusterSize: number): number {
  */
 function toCandidate(peerId: string, archive: BlockArchive | undefined, committedRev: number): ReconcileCandidate | undefined {
 	if (!archive) return undefined;
-	const revs = Object.keys(archive.revisions).map(Number);
-	if (revs.length === 0) return undefined;
-	const maxRev = Math.max(...revs);
-	if (maxRev < committedRev) return undefined;
+	const maxRev = maxRevision(archive.revisions);
+	if (maxRev === undefined || maxRev < committedRev) return undefined;
 	const data = archive.revisions[maxRev];
 	if (!data?.action) return undefined;
 	return { peerId, rev: maxRev, actionId: data.action.actionId, block: data.block };
 }
 
-/** Hash the block bytes of every candidate that both corroborates `selected` and actually carried content. */
+/**
+ * One peer's answer, isolated. `fetchArchive` is contracted to answer `undefined` for an
+ * unreachable peer, but a raw `Promise.all` over the cohort would let a single rejecting fetch
+ * discard the answers every other peer already gave — turning a heal the cohort could complete
+ * into a decline. One peer's failure costs only that peer's vote.
+ */
+async function fetchCandidate(
+	deps: ReconcileBlockDeps,
+	peerId: string,
+	blockId: BlockId,
+	committedRev: number
+): Promise<ReconcileCandidate | undefined> {
+	try {
+		return toCandidate(peerId, await deps.fetchArchive(peerId, blockId), committedRev);
+	} catch (err) {
+		log('reconcile:fetch-error', { blockId, peerId, error: (err as Error).message });
+		return undefined;
+	}
+}
+
+/**
+ * Hash the block bytes of every candidate that both corroborates `selected` and actually carried content.
+ *
+ * NOTE: this canonical-JSON-serializes and sha256s every carrier's whole block on every reconcile.
+ * Negligible at today's cohort widths and block sizes; if blocks grow large or cohorts wide enough
+ * for this to show up on a commit-path profile, hash incrementally at receive time instead.
+ */
 async function hashCarriers(candidates: ReconcileCandidate[], selected: QuorumRev): Promise<BlockHashCandidate[]> {
 	const carriers = candidates.filter(c => c.rev === selected.rev && c.actionId === selected.actionId && c.block);
 	return await Promise.all(
@@ -130,10 +163,10 @@ export function createReconcileBlock(deps: ReconcileBlockDeps): ReconcileBlockCa
 		if (targets.length === 0) return;
 
 		const fetched = await Promise.all(
-			targets.map(async peerId => toCandidate(peerId, await deps.fetchArchive(peerId, blockId), committed.rev))
+			targets.map(peerId => fetchCandidate(deps, peerId, blockId, committed.rev))
 		);
 		const candidates = fetched.filter((c): c is ReconcileCandidate => c !== undefined);
-		const capacity = corroboratorCapacity(targets, deps.clusterSize);
+		const capacity = corroboratorCapacity(targets.length, deps.repairCorroborationClusterSize);
 
 		const revClaims: RevClaim[] = candidates.map(({ peerId, rev, actionId }) => ({ peerId, rev, actionId }));
 		const selected = selectQuorumRev(revClaims, deps.simpleMajorityThreshold, capacity);

package/src/cluster/spread-on-churn.ts

@@ -221,6 +221,14 @@ export class SpreadOnChurnMonitor implements Startable {
 			// Read block data from local storage
 			const result = await this.deps.repo.get({ blockIds: [blockId] })
 			const blockResult = result[blockId]
+			if (blockResult?.unavailable !== undefined) {
+				// The repo could not work out whether it still holds this block (unmaterializable
+				// history / failed restore). Untracking on that answer would silently drop the block
+				// from the spread set on a guess, and only a later re-commit would put it back — so
+				// keep it tracked and let the next sweep (or a heal) settle it.
+				log('unavailable block=%s reason=%s (keeping tracked)', blockId, blockResult.unavailable)
+				continue
+			}
 			if (!blockResult?.block) {
 				// The block has left local storage. No deletion event exists today to evict it
 				// from the tracked set, so prune here. Deleting the current element of a Set mid

package/src/inbound-authorization.ts

@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
  * - **Cost**: the predicate sits in the hot path of every inbound stream, ahead of the work
  *   that stream would do. Embedders are expected to make it cheap — an in-memory set lookup —
  *   and to memoize anything that would otherwise hit storage or the network per stream.
+ *
+ * NOTE: denial is stateless and unthrottled — a denied peer may reopen streams as fast as
+ * libp2p's per-connection `maxInboundStreams` allows, and nothing here records the denial. That
+ * is fine while the predicate is an in-memory lookup. If a denied peer ever shows up as load, the
+ * fix is upstream of this module, not inside it: feed denials into `PeerReputationService`, or
+ * refuse the peer at the connection level with `NodeOptions.connectionGater`.
  */
 
 /**