@openzeppelin/miden-multisig-client 0.16.1 → 0.17.0-rc.1

package/src/transaction/updateProcedureThreshold.ts

@@ -10,16 +10,11 @@ import {
   Word,
   Word as WordType,
 } from '@miden-sdk/miden-sdk';
-import {
-  MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM,
-  MULTISIG_MASM,
-} from '../account/masm/auth.js';
 import { getProcedureRoot, type ProcedureName } from '../procedures.js';
 import { compileTxScript } from '../raw-client.js';
 import { normalizeHexWord } from '../utils/encoding.js';
 import { randomWord } from '../utils/random.js';
 import type { MidenClientSignatureOptions, SignatureOptions } from './options.js';
-import type { SignatureScheme } from '../types.js';
 
 function buildProcedureThresholdFelts(procedure: ProcedureName, threshold: number): Felt[] {
   const procedureRoot = WordType.fromHex(normalizeHexWord(getProcedureRoot(procedure)));
@@ -32,48 +27,39 @@ function buildProcedureThresholdFelts(procedure: ProcedureName, threshold: numbe
   ];
 }
 
-function buildProcedureThresholdAdvice(
-  procedure: ProcedureName,
-  threshold: number,
-): { configHash: Word; payload: FeltArray } {
-  // `Poseidon2.hashElements` consumes (frees) its `FeltArray` by value, so the
-  // advice payload must be a freshly built one — reusing the hashed array
-  // surfaces as "null pointer passed to rust" at the later `advice.insert`.
-  const configHash = Poseidon2.hashElements(
+/**
+ * `set_procedure_threshold` reads its `[proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]` inputs from the operand stack
+ * (pushed by the script), so no advice-map entry is attached; this hash is returned only for
+ * caller bookkeeping.
+ */
+function buildProcedureThresholdConfigHash(procedure: ProcedureName, threshold: number): Word {
+  return Poseidon2.hashElements(
     new FeltArray(buildProcedureThresholdFelts(procedure, threshold)),
   );
-  const payload = new FeltArray(buildProcedureThresholdFelts(procedure, threshold));
-  return { configHash, payload };
 }
 
 async function buildUpdateProcedureThresholdScript(
   client: MidenClient | WasmWebClient,
   procedure: ProcedureName,
   threshold: number,
-  signatureScheme: SignatureScheme,
   midenRpcEndpoint?: string,
 ): Promise<TransactionScript> {
-  const multisigMasm = signatureScheme === 'ecdsa' ? MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM : MULTISIG_MASM;
   const procedureRoot = normalizeHexWord(getProcedureRoot(procedure));
 
   const scriptSource = `
-use oz_multisig::multisig
+use miden::standards::auth::multisig
 
-begin
+@transaction_script
+pub proc main
     push.${procedureRoot}
     push.${threshold}
-    call.multisig::update_procedure_threshold
+    call.multisig::set_procedure_threshold
     dropw
     drop
 end
   `;
 
-  return compileTxScript(
-    client,
-    scriptSource,
-    [{ namespace: 'oz_multisig::multisig', code: multisigMasm }],
-    midenRpcEndpoint,
-  );
+  return compileTxScript(client, scriptSource, [], midenRpcEndpoint);
 }
 
 export function buildUpdateProcedureThresholdTransactionRequest(
@@ -94,14 +80,12 @@ export async function buildUpdateProcedureThresholdTransactionRequest(
   threshold: number,
   options: SignatureOptions = {},
 ): Promise<{ request: TransactionRequest; salt: Word; configHash: Word }> {
-  const signatureScheme = options.signatureScheme ?? 'falcon';
-  const { configHash } = buildProcedureThresholdAdvice(procedure, threshold);
+  const configHash = buildProcedureThresholdConfigHash(procedure, threshold);
 
   const script = await buildUpdateProcedureThresholdScript(
     client,
     procedure,
     threshold,
-    signatureScheme,
     options.midenRpcEndpoint,
   );
   const authSaltHex = options.salt ? options.salt.toHex() : randomWord().toHex();

package/src/transaction/updateSigners.ts

@@ -11,66 +11,66 @@ import {
   Word,
   Word as WordType,
 } from '@miden-sdk/miden-sdk';
-import {
-  MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM,
-  MULTISIG_MASM,
-} from '../account/masm/auth.js';
 import { compileTxScript } from '../raw-client.js';
 import { normalizeHexWord } from '../utils/encoding.js';
 import { randomWord } from '../utils/random.js';
+import { authSchemeId } from '../utils/signature.js';
 import type { MidenClientSignatureOptions, SignatureOptions } from './options.js';
 import type { SignatureScheme } from '../types.js';
 
-function buildMultisigConfigFelts(threshold: number, signerCommitments: string[]): Felt[] {
+function buildMultisigConfigFelts(
+  threshold: number,
+  signerCommitments: string[],
+  signatureScheme: SignatureScheme,
+): Felt[] {
   const numApprovers = signerCommitments.length;
+  const schemeId = authSchemeId(signatureScheme);
   const felts: Felt[] = [
     new Felt(BigInt(threshold)),
     new Felt(BigInt(numApprovers)),
     new Felt(0n),
     new Felt(0n),
   ];
+  // Interleave [PUB_KEY, SCHEME_ID] per approver, in reverse index order.
   for (const commitment of [...signerCommitments].reverse()) {
     const word = WordType.fromHex(normalizeHexWord(commitment));
     felts.push(...word.toFelts());
+    felts.push(new Felt(BigInt(schemeId)), new Felt(0n), new Felt(0n), new Felt(0n));
   }
   return felts;
 }
 
-function buildMultisigConfigAdvice(
+export function buildMultisigConfigAdvice(
   threshold: number,
   signerCommitments: string[],
+  signatureScheme: SignatureScheme,
 ): { configHash: Word; payload: FeltArray } {
-  // `Poseidon2.hashElements` consumes (frees) its `FeltArray` by value, so the
-  // advice payload must be a freshly built one — reusing the hashed array
-  // surfaces as "null pointer passed to rust" at the later `advice.insert`.
+  // `Poseidon2.hashElements` consumes (frees) its `FeltArray` by value, so the advice payload
+  // must be a separately built array — reusing the hashed array surfaces as "null pointer
+  // passed to rust" at the later `advice.insert`.
   const configHash = Poseidon2.hashElements(
-    new FeltArray(buildMultisigConfigFelts(threshold, signerCommitments)),
+    new FeltArray(buildMultisigConfigFelts(threshold, signerCommitments, signatureScheme)),
+  );
+  const payload = new FeltArray(
+    buildMultisigConfigFelts(threshold, signerCommitments, signatureScheme),
   );
-  const payload = new FeltArray(buildMultisigConfigFelts(threshold, signerCommitments));
   return { configHash, payload };
 }
 
 async function buildUpdateSignersScript(
   client: MidenClient | WasmWebClient,
-  signatureScheme: SignatureScheme,
   midenRpcEndpoint?: string,
 ): Promise<TransactionScript> {
-  const multisigMasm = signatureScheme === 'ecdsa' ? MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM : MULTISIG_MASM;
-
   const scriptSource = `
-use oz_multisig::multisig
+use miden::standards::auth::multisig
 
-begin
+@transaction_script
+pub proc main
     call.multisig::update_signers_and_threshold
 end
   `;
 
-  return compileTxScript(
-    client,
-    scriptSource,
-    [{ namespace: 'oz_multisig::multisig', code: multisigMasm }],
-    midenRpcEndpoint,
-  );
+  return compileTxScript(client, scriptSource, [], midenRpcEndpoint);
 }
 
 export function buildUpdateSignersTransactionRequest(
@@ -92,20 +92,28 @@ export async function buildUpdateSignersTransactionRequest(
   options: SignatureOptions = {},
 ): Promise<{ request: TransactionRequest; salt: Word; configHash: Word }> {
   const signatureScheme = options.signatureScheme ?? 'falcon';
-  const { configHash: configHashForAdvice, payload } = buildMultisigConfigAdvice(threshold, signerCommitments);
+  const { configHash: configHashForAdvice, payload } = buildMultisigConfigAdvice(
+    threshold,
+    signerCommitments,
+    signatureScheme,
+  );
 
-  const { configHash: configHashForScript } = buildMultisigConfigAdvice(threshold, signerCommitments);
+  const { configHash: configHashForScript } = buildMultisigConfigAdvice(
+    threshold,
+    signerCommitments,
+    signatureScheme,
+  );
 
-  const { configHash: configHashForReturn } = buildMultisigConfigAdvice(threshold, signerCommitments);
+  const { configHash: configHashForReturn } = buildMultisigConfigAdvice(
+    threshold,
+    signerCommitments,
+    signatureScheme,
+  );
 
   const advice = new AdviceMap();
   advice.insert(configHashForAdvice, payload);
 
-  const script = await buildUpdateSignersScript(
-    client,
-    signatureScheme,
-    options.midenRpcEndpoint,
-  );
+  const script = await buildUpdateSignersScript(client, options.midenRpcEndpoint);
 
   const authSaltHex = options.salt ? options.salt.toHex() : randomWord().toHex();
 

package/src/transaction.ts

@@ -1,13 +1,20 @@
 export {
   buildConsumeNotesTransactionRequest,
 } from './transaction/consumeNotes.js';
-export { executeForSummary } from './transaction/summary.js';
+export {
+  chainAnchorFromBase64,
+  chainAnchorToBase64,
+  executeForSummary,
+  executeForSummaryAt,
+  summarySalt,
+} from './transaction/summary.js';
 export {
   buildP2idNoteFromMetadata,
   buildP2idTransactionRequest,
   parseP2idNoteType,
   p2idNoteTypeToMetadata,
   type P2idTransactionOptions,
+  type P2ideHeightOptions,
 } from './transaction/p2id.js';
 export {
   buildUpdateGuardianTransactionRequest,

package/src/types/proposal.ts

@@ -37,6 +37,14 @@ interface BaseProposalMetadata {
   description: string;
   saltHex?: string;
   requiredSignatures?: number;
+  /**
+   * Base64-serialized Miden `ChainAnchor` pinning the reference block the
+   * proposal's transaction summary was built at. Required to verify or
+   * execute the proposal: since protocol 0.16 the signed summary binds the
+   * reference block commitment, so it only reproduces when re-executed at
+   * that block.
+   */
+  chainAnchor?: string;
 }
 
 export interface UpdateSignersProposalMetadata extends BaseProposalMetadata {
@@ -89,6 +97,31 @@ export function isP2idNoteVisibility(value: string): value is P2idNoteVisibility
   return value === 'public' || value === 'private';
 }
 
+/** Maximum P2IDE block height: heights are `u32` on-chain (`BlockNumber`). */
+export const MAX_P2IDE_BLOCK_HEIGHT = 0xffff_ffff;
+
+/**
+ * Validates a P2IDE reclaim/timelock height (issue #366). Heights are `u32`
+ * block numbers; `0` is rejected because it is the on-chain encoding for "no
+ * constraint", so accepting it would silently build an unconstrained note.
+ * An invalid value throws rather than being dropped, which would rebuild a
+ * note that could never match the signed tx_summary commitment.
+ */
+export function parseP2ideHeight(
+  field: 'reclaimHeight' | 'timelockHeight',
+  value: number | undefined,
+): number | undefined {
+  if (value === undefined) {
+    return undefined;
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(value) || value < 1 || value > MAX_P2IDE_BLOCK_HEIGHT) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `unsupported ${field} '${value}': expected an integer between 1 and ${MAX_P2IDE_BLOCK_HEIGHT}`,
+    );
+  }
+  return value;
+}
+
 export interface P2IdProposalMetadata extends BaseProposalMetadata {
   proposalType: 'p2id';
   recipientId: string;
@@ -96,14 +129,20 @@ export interface P2IdProposalMetadata extends BaseProposalMetadata {
   amount: string;
   /** Visibility of the created note. Absent on the wire => 'public' (pre-#322 proposals). */
   noteType?: P2idNoteVisibility;
+  /**
+   * Absolute block height at which the sender may reclaim the note (issue
+   * #366). Presence of either height means the proposal creates a P2IDE note
+   * instead of a plain P2ID note; both absent => plain P2ID (pre-#366
+   * proposals).
+   */
+  reclaimHeight?: number;
+  /** Absolute block height before which the note cannot be consumed. */
+  timelockHeight?: number;
 }
 
 export interface CustomProposalMetadata extends BaseProposalMetadata {
   proposalType: 'custom';
-  /** Original server-defined proposal label, e.g. "b2agg" (issue #266). Mirrors
-   * Rust `ProposalMetadata.proposal_type`; it is what lets a custom proposal
-   * round-trip back to GUARDIAN/export, so it is required in the domain model.
-   * Any wire-level optionality is resolved in the parser/codec boundary. */
+  /** Original server-defined proposal label, preserved during round trips. */
   rawProposalType: string;
 }
 

package/src/types.ts

@@ -80,7 +80,6 @@ export interface MultisigConfig {
   signerCommitments: string[];
   guardianCommitment: string;
   guardianPublicKey?: string;
-  guardianEnabled?: boolean;
   storageMode?: 'private' | 'public';
   procedureThresholds?: ProcedureThreshold[];
   signatureScheme?: SignatureScheme;

package/src/utils/signature.ts

@@ -1,12 +1,13 @@
 import { AdviceMap, Felt, FeltArray, Poseidon2, Signature, Word } from '@miden-sdk/miden-sdk';
 import * as midenSdk from '@miden-sdk/miden-sdk';
+import { EcdsaFormat } from './ecdsa.js';
 import { hexToBytes, normalizeHexWord } from './encoding.js';
 import type { ProposalSignatureEntry, SignatureScheme } from '../types.js';
 
 export const ECDSA_AUTH_SCHEME_ID = 1;
 export const FALCON_AUTH_SCHEME_ID = 2;
 
-function authSchemeId(scheme: SignatureScheme): number {
+export function authSchemeId(scheme: SignatureScheme): number {
   return scheme === 'ecdsa' ? ECDSA_AUTH_SCHEME_ID : FALCON_AUTH_SCHEME_ID;
 }
 
@@ -21,31 +22,17 @@ export function signatureHexToBytes(
   return withPrefix;
 }
 
-function bytesToPackedU32Felts(bytes: Uint8Array): Felt[] {
-  const felts: Felt[] = [];
-  for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += 4) {
-    let packed = 0;
-    for (let j = 0; j < 4 && i + j < bytes.length; j += 1) {
-      packed |= bytes[i + j] << (j * 8);
-    }
-    felts.push(new Felt(BigInt(packed >>> 0)));
-  }
-  return felts;
-}
-
-function encodeEcdsaSignatureFelts(pubkeyBytes: Uint8Array, sigBytes: Uint8Array): Felt[] {
-  const pkFelts = bytesToPackedU32Felts(pubkeyBytes);
-  const sigFelts = bytesToPackedU32Felts(sigBytes);
-  return [...pkFelts, ...sigFelts];
-  
-}
-
+/**
+ * `toPreparedSignature` is the SDK binding for the Rust
+ * `Signature::to_encoded_signature`, so both Falcon and ECDSA advice payloads
+ * come from upstream rather than being packed here. For ECDSA it emits
+ * `QX[8] || QY[8] || SIG_R[8] || SIG_S[8]` and recovers the public key from the
+ * message, which is why the signature must carry its recovery byte.
+ */
 export function buildSignatureAdviceEntry(
   pubkeyCommitment: Word,
   message: Word,
   signature: Signature,
-  ecdsaPubkeyHex?: string,
-  ecdsaSigHex?: string,
 ): { key: Word; values: Felt[] } {
   const elements = new FeltArray([
     ...pubkeyCommitment.toFelts(),
@@ -53,16 +40,31 @@ export function buildSignatureAdviceEntry(
   ]);
   const key = Poseidon2.hashElements(elements);
 
-  let values: Felt[];
-  if (ecdsaPubkeyHex && ecdsaSigHex) {
-    const pkBytes = hexToBytes(ecdsaPubkeyHex);
-    const sigBytes = hexToBytes(ecdsaSigHex);
-    values = encodeEcdsaSignatureFelts(pkBytes, sigBytes);
-  } else {
-    values = signature.toPreparedSignature(message);
+  return { key, values: signature.toPreparedSignature(message) };
+}
+
+/** Rejects unrecoverable ECDSA signatures before entering WASM. */
+export function assertEcdsaSignatureRecoverable(
+  signatureHex: string,
+  messageHex: string,
+  expectedPublicKeyHex: string,
+): void {
+  let recovered: string;
+  try {
+    recovered = EcdsaFormat.recoverCompressedPublicKeyHex(
+      hexToBytes(messageHex),
+      hexToBytes(signatureHex),
+    );
+  } catch (error) {
+    throw new Error(`ECDSA signature does not recover a public key: ${String(error)}`);
   }
 
-  return { key, values };
+  const expected = EcdsaFormat.compressPublicKey(expectedPublicKeyHex);
+  if (recovered.toLowerCase() !== expected.toLowerCase()) {
+    throw new Error(
+      `ECDSA signature recovers public key ${recovered}, which does not match the expected ${expected}`,
+    );
+  }
 }
 
 export function tryComputeEcdsaCommitmentHex(pubkeyHex: string): string | null {
@@ -87,41 +89,6 @@ export function tryComputeCommitmentHex(
   }
 }
 
-export function verifyEcdsaCommitment(
-  pubkeyHex: string,
-  expectedCommitmentHex: string,
-): { match: boolean; computedHex: string; packedFelts: string[]; error?: string } {
-  try {
-    const bytes = hexToBytes(pubkeyHex);
-    const packedU32Values: number[] = [];
-    for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i += 4) {
-      let packed = 0;
-      for (let j = 0; j < 4 && i + j < bytes.length; j += 1) {
-        packed |= bytes[i + j] << (j * 8);
-      }
-      packedU32Values.push(packed >>> 0);
-    }
-
-    const packedFelts = bytesToPackedU32Felts(bytes);
-    const feltArray = new FeltArray(packedFelts);
-    const computed = Poseidon2.hashElements(feltArray);
-    const computedHex = normalizeHexWord(computed.toHex());
-    const expectedNorm = normalizeHexWord(expectedCommitmentHex);
-    return {
-      match: computedHex === expectedNorm,
-      computedHex,
-      packedFelts: packedU32Values.map((value) => value.toString()),
-    };
-  } catch (error) {
-    return {
-      match: false,
-      computedHex: `ERROR: ${error}`,
-      packedFelts: [],
-      error: String(error),
-    };
-  }
-}
-
 export function mergeSignatureAdviceMaps(
   advice: AdviceMap,
   entries: Array<{ key: Word; values: Felt[] }>,

package/src/utils/word.ts

@@ -15,6 +15,23 @@ export function wordElementToBigInt(word: Word, index: number): bigint {
   return index < elements.length ? elements[index] : 0n;
 }
 
+/**
+ * True when every element of the word is zero. The SDK's storage-map reads
+ * return `Word::empty()` for a key with no entry (`StorageMap::get` is
+ * `unwrap_or_default()` in miden-protocol), so readers use this to detect
+ * absent entries.
+ */
+export function isEmptyWord(word: Word): boolean {
+  const elements: BigUint64Array | bigint[] =
+    typeof word.toU64s === 'function' ? word.toU64s() : word.toFelts().map(f => f.asInt());
+  for (const element of elements) {
+    if (element !== 0n) {
+      return false;
+    }
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
 export function wordToBytes(word: { toFelts: () => Array<{ asInt: () => bigint }> }): Uint8Array {
   const felts = word.toFelts();
   const buf = new Uint8Array(32);

package/dist/account/masm/auth.d.ts

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-export declare const MULTISIG_MASM = "# Multi-Signature RPO Falcon 512 Authentication Core Library\n#\n# This library provides the reusable multisig procedures used by account wrappers.\n\nuse miden::protocol::active_account\nuse miden::protocol::auth::AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\nuse miden::protocol::native_account\nuse miden::standards::auth\n\n# CONSTANTS\n# =================================================================================================\n\n# Auth Request Constants\n\n# Storage Layout Constants\n#\n# +-------------------------------+----------+------------+--------------+-------------------+\n# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | SCHEME IDS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |\n# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |   (map)    |    (map)     |       (map)       |\n# +-------------------------------+----------+------------+--------------+-------------------+\n# |              0                |    1     |      2     |      3       |         4         |\n# +-------------------------------+----------+------------+--------------+-------------------+\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and\n# number of approvers are stored as:\n# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].\n# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.\nconst THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::threshold_config\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.\n# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY\nconst PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::signer_public_keys\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where signer scheme IDs are stored.\n# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => [scheme_id, 0, 0, 0]\nconst APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::signer_scheme_ids\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.\n# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]\nconst EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::executed_transactions\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.\n# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]\nconst PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::procedure_thresholds\")\n\n# Executed Transaction Flag Constant\nconst IS_EXECUTED_FLAG=[1, 0, 0, 0]\nconst FALCON_512_POSEIDON2_SCHEME_WORD=[2, 0, 0, 0]\n\n# ERRORS\nconst ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED=\"failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed\"\n\nconst ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG=\"number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold\"\n\nconst ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG=\"number of approvers or threshold must not be zero\"\n\nconst ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32=\"procedure threshold must be a u32 value\"\n\nconst ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32=\"number of approvers and procedure threshold must be u32\"\n\nconst ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS=\"procedure threshold exceeds number of approvers\"\n\n# MULTISIG PROCEDURES\n# =================================================================================================\n\n#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.\n#!\n#! Inputs:  [MSG]\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Panics if:\n#! - the same transaction has already been executed\npub proc assert_new_tx(msg: word)\n    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG\n    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]\n\n    swapw\n    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]\n\n    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [txs_slot_prefix, txs_slot_suffix, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]\n\n    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed]]\n\n    drop drop drop\n    # => [is_executed]\n\n    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.\n#!\n#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer\n#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and\n#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.\n#!\n#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Where:\n#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update\n#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update\nproc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)\n    dup.1 dup.1\n    u32assert2 u32lt\n    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n    while.true\n        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        sub.1\n        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        padw swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        padw swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        push.APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [scheme_slot_prefix, scheme_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dup.1 dup.1\n        u32lt\n        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n    end\n\n    drop drop\n    # => []\nend\n\nproc create_approver_map_key\n    push.0.0.0 movup.3\n    # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY]\nend\n\nproc get_threshold_and_num_approvers\n    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]\n    exec.active_account::get_initial_item\n    # => [threshold, num_approvers]\n\n    movup.2 drop movup.2 drop\n    # => [threshold, num_approvers]\nend\n\nproc assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers(num_approvers: u32)\n    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures\n    # => [num_procedures, num_approvers]\n\n    dup neq.0\n    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, num_approvers]\n    while.true\n        sub.1 dup\n        # => [proc_index, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root\n        # => [PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        exec.active_account::get_map_item\n        # => [[proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0], proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        movdn.3 drop drop drop\n        # => [proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        dup.2\n        # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        u32assert2.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32\n        u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS\n        # => [proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        dup neq.0\n        # => [should_continue, proc_index, num_approvers]\n    end\n\n    drop drop\n    # => []\nend\n\n# Internal storage helper used by the public `update_procedure_threshold`\n# entrypoint after it receives direct stack arguments.\nproc set_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: word)\n    exec.get_threshold_and_num_approvers\n    # => [threshold, num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    drop\n    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    dup.1 swap\n    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    u32assert2.err=ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32\n    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS\n    # => [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    push.0.0.0\n    movup.3\n    swapw\n    # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]\n\n    push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [OLD_VALUE]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers\n#!\n#! Inputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]\n#!   Advice map: {\n#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]\n#!   }\n#! Outputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n#!\n#! Where:\n#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector\n#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]\n#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer\n#!\n#! Locals:\n#! 0: new_num_of_approvers\n#! 1: init_num_of_approvers\n@locals(2)\npub proc update_signers_and_threshold(multisig_config_hash: word)\n    adv.push_mapval\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]\n\n    adv_loadw\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # store new_num_of_approvers for later\n    dup.1 loc_store.0\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    dup dup.2\n    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers\n    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    dup dup.2\n    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero\n    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    loc_load.0\n    # => [num_approvers, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    exec.assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_item\n    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # store init_num_of_approvers for later\n    drop loc_store.1 drop drop\n    # => [pad(12)]\n\n    loc_load.0\n    # => [num_approvers]\n\n    dup neq.0\n    while.true\n        sub.1\n        # => [i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        padw adv_loadw\n        # => [PUB_KEY, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        push.FALCON_512_POSEIDON2_SCHEME_WORD\n        # => [SCHEME_ID_WORD, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, [2, 0, 0, 0], i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        push.APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [scheme_slot_prefix, scheme_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, [2, 0, 0, 0], i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dup neq.0\n        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]\n    end\n    # => [pad(13)]\n\n    drop\n    # => [pad(12)]\n\n    loc_load.0 loc_load.1\n    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]\n\n    dup.1 dup.1\n    u32assert2 u32lt\n    # => [should_cleanup, init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]\n\n    if.true\n        exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping\n        # => [pad(12)]\n    else\n        drop drop\n        # => [pad(12)]\n    end\nend\n\n#! Update or clear the threshold override for a specific procedure.\n#!\n#! Inputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n#! Outputs:\n#!   Operand stack: []\n#! Invocation: call\npub proc update_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: word)\n    exec.set_procedure_threshold\nend\n\n# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure\n# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no\n# overrides apply.\n#\n#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]\n#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]\n@locals(1)\nproc compute_transaction_threshold(default_threshold: u32) -> u32\n    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0\n    # 2. iterate through all account procedures\n    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction\n    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map\n    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold\n    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold\n\n    # store default_threshold for later\n    loc_store.0\n    # => []\n\n    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0\n    push.0\n    # => [transaction_threshold]\n\n    # get the number of account procedures\n    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures\n    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]\n\n    # 2. iterate through all account procedures\n    dup neq.0\n    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]\n    while.true\n        sub.1 dup\n        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i\n        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw\n        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction\n        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called\n        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure\n        if.true\n            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]\n            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_prefix, PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_suffix, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure\n            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]\n            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item\n            # => [[proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            movdn.3 drop drop drop dup dup.3\n            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            u32assert2.err=\"transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32\"\n            u32gt\n            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold\n            movup.2 movdn.3\n            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]\n            cdrop\n            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]\n            swap\n            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]\n        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure\n        else\n            dropw\n            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n        end\n\n        dup neq.0\n        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n    end\n\n    drop\n    # => [transaction_threshold]\n\n    loc_load.0\n    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]\n\n    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold\n    dup.1 eq.0\n    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]\n\n    cdrop\n    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]\nend\n\n#! Authenticate a transaction using the Falcon signature scheme with multi-signature support.\n#!\n#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:\n#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed\n#! 2. Verifying signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys\n#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met\n#! 4. Returning the transaction summary commitment for higher-level wrappers.\n#!\n#! Inputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [SALT]\n#!   Advice map: {\n#!     h(SIG_0, MSG): SIG_0,\n#!     h(SIG_1, MSG): SIG_1,\n#!     h(SIG_n, MSG): SIG_n\n#!   }\n#! Outputs:\n#!   Operand stack: []\n#!\n#! Where:\n#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent\n#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction\n#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.\n#! - SIG_i is the signature from the i-th signer.\n#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.\n#! - h(SIG_i, MSG) is the hash of the signature and message used as the advice map key.\n#!\n#! Panics if:\n#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).\n#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).\n#!\n#! Invocation: exec\n@locals(1)\npub proc auth_tx(salt: word)\n    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop\n    # => [SALT]\n\n    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------\n\n    exec.auth::create_tx_summary\n    # => [ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, SALT]\n\n    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider\n    adv.insert_hqword\n    # => [ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, SALT]\n\n    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed\n    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary\n    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------\n\n    exec.get_threshold_and_num_approvers\n    # => [default_threshold, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    movdn.5\n    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    push.APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [scheme_id_slot_prefix, scheme_id_slot_suffix, pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    exec.::miden::standards::auth::signature::verify_signatures\n    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------\n\n    movup.5\n    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    exec.compute_transaction_threshold\n    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    u32assert2 u32lt\n    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.\n    if.true\n        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\n        push.0 assert.err=\"insufficient number of signatures\"\n    end\n\n    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\nend\n";
-export declare const MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM = "# Multi-Signature ECDSA secp256k1 Authentication Core Library\n#\n# This library provides the reusable multisig procedures used by account wrappers.\n\nuse miden::protocol::active_account\nuse miden::protocol::auth::AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\nuse miden::protocol::native_account\nuse miden::standards::auth\n\n# CONSTANTS\n# =================================================================================================\n\n# Auth Request Constants\n\n# Storage Layout Constants\n#\n# +-------------------------------+----------+------------+--------------+-------------------+\n# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | SCHEME IDS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |\n# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |   (map)    |    (map)     |       (map)       |\n# +-------------------------------+----------+------------+--------------+-------------------+\n# |              0                |    1     |      2     |      3       |         4         |\n# +-------------------------------+----------+------------+--------------+-------------------+\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and\n# number of approvers are stored as:\n# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].\n# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.\nconst THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::threshold_config\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.\n# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY\nconst PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::signer_public_keys\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where signer scheme IDs are stored.\n# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => [scheme_id, 0, 0, 0]\nconst APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::signer_scheme_ids\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.\n# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]\nconst EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::executed_transactions\")\n\n# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.\n# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]\nconst PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::multisig::procedure_thresholds\")\n\n# Executed Transaction Flag Constant\nconst IS_EXECUTED_FLAG=[1, 0, 0, 0]\nconst ECDSA_K256_KECCAK_SCHEME_WORD=[1, 0, 0, 0]\n\n# ERRORS\nconst ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED=\"failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed\"\n\nconst ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG=\"number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold\"\n\nconst ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG=\"number of approvers or threshold must not be zero\"\n\nconst ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32=\"procedure threshold must be a u32 value\"\n\nconst ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32=\"number of approvers and procedure threshold must be u32\"\n\nconst ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS=\"procedure threshold exceeds number of approvers\"\n\n# MULTISIG PROCEDURES\n# =================================================================================================\n\n#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.\n#!\n#! Inputs:  [MSG]\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Panics if:\n#! - the same transaction has already been executed\npub proc assert_new_tx(msg: word)\n    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG\n    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]\n\n    swapw\n    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]\n\n    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [txs_slot_prefix, txs_slot_suffix, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]\n\n    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed]]\n\n    drop drop drop\n    # => [is_executed]\n\n    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.\n#!\n#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer\n#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and\n#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.\n#!\n#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Where:\n#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update\n#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update\nproc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)\n    dup.1 dup.1\n    u32assert2 u32lt\n    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n    while.true\n        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        sub.1\n        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        padw swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        padw swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        push.APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [scheme_slot_prefix, scheme_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n\n        dup.1 dup.1\n        u32lt\n        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]\n    end\n\n    drop drop\n    # => []\nend\n\nproc create_approver_map_key\n    push.0.0.0 movup.3\n    # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY]\nend\n\nproc get_threshold_and_num_approvers\n    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]\n    exec.active_account::get_initial_item\n    # => [threshold, num_approvers]\n\n    movup.2 drop movup.2 drop\n    # => [threshold, num_approvers]\nend\n\nproc assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers(num_approvers: u32)\n    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures\n    # => [num_procedures, num_approvers]\n\n    dup neq.0\n    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, num_approvers]\n    while.true\n        sub.1 dup\n        # => [proc_index, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root\n        # => [PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        exec.active_account::get_map_item\n        # => [[proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0], proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        movdn.3 drop drop drop\n        # => [proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        dup.2\n        # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        u32assert2.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32\n        u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS\n        # => [proc_index, num_approvers]\n\n        dup neq.0\n        # => [should_continue, proc_index, num_approvers]\n    end\n\n    drop drop\n    # => []\nend\n\n# Internal storage helper used by the public `update_procedure_threshold`\n# entrypoint after it receives direct stack arguments.\nproc set_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: word)\n    exec.get_threshold_and_num_approvers\n    # => [threshold, num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    drop\n    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    dup.1 swap\n    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    u32assert2.err=ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32\n    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS\n    # => [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n\n    push.0.0.0\n    movup.3\n    swapw\n    # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]\n\n    push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [OLD_VALUE]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers\n#!\n#! Inputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]\n#!   Advice map: {\n#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]\n#!   }\n#! Outputs:\n#!   Operand stack: []\n#!\n#! Where:\n#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector\n#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]\n#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer\n#!\n#! Locals:\n#! 0: new_num_of_approvers\n#! 1: init_num_of_approvers\n@locals(2)\npub proc update_signers_and_threshold(multisig_config_hash: word)\n    adv.push_mapval\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]\n\n    adv_loadw\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # store new_num_of_approvers for later\n    dup.1 loc_store.0\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    dup dup.2\n    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers\n    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    dup dup.2\n    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero\n    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    loc_load.0\n    # => [num_approvers, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    exec.assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers\n    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_item\n    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]\n\n    # store init_num_of_approvers for later\n    drop loc_store.1 drop drop\n    # => [pad(12)]\n\n    loc_load.0\n    # => [num_approvers]\n\n    dup neq.0\n    while.true\n        sub.1\n        # => [i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        padw adv_loadw\n        # => [PUB_KEY, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dup exec.create_approver_map_key\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        push.ECDSA_K256_KECCAK_SCHEME_WORD\n        # => [SCHEME_ID_WORD, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        swapw\n        # => [APPROVER_MAP_KEY, [1, 0, 0, 0], i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        push.APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT[0..2]\n        # => [scheme_slot_prefix, scheme_slot_suffix, APPROVER_MAP_KEY, [1, 0, 0, 0], i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        exec.native_account::set_map_item\n        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dropw\n        # => [i-1, pad(12)]\n\n        dup neq.0\n        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]\n    end\n    # => [pad(13)]\n\n    drop\n    # => [pad(12)]\n\n    loc_load.0 loc_load.1\n    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]\n\n    dup.1 dup.1\n    u32assert2 u32lt\n    # => [should_cleanup, init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]\n\n    if.true\n        exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping\n        # => [pad(12)]\n    else\n        drop drop\n        # => [pad(12)]\n    end\nend\n\n#! Update or clear the threshold override for a specific procedure.\n#!\n#! Inputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]\n#! Outputs:\n#!   Operand stack: []\n#! Invocation: call\npub proc update_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: word)\n    exec.set_procedure_threshold\nend\n\n# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure\n# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no\n# overrides apply.\n#\n#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]\n#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]\n@locals(1)\nproc compute_transaction_threshold(default_threshold: u32) -> u32\n    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0\n    # 2. iterate through all account procedures\n    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction\n    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map\n    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold\n    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold\n\n    # store default_threshold for later\n    loc_store.0\n    # => []\n\n    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0\n    push.0\n    # => [transaction_threshold]\n\n    # get the number of account procedures\n    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures\n    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]\n\n    # 2. iterate through all account procedures\n    dup neq.0\n    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]\n    while.true\n        sub.1 dup\n        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i\n        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw\n        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction\n        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called\n        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure\n        if.true\n            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]\n            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_prefix, PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_suffix, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure\n            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]\n            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item\n            # => [[proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            movdn.3 drop drop drop dup dup.3\n            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n\n            u32assert2.err=\"transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32\"\n            u32gt\n            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold\n            movup.2 movdn.3\n            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]\n            cdrop\n            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]\n            swap\n            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]\n        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure\n        else\n            dropw\n            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n        end\n\n        dup neq.0\n        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]\n    end\n\n    drop\n    # => [transaction_threshold]\n\n    loc_load.0\n    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]\n\n    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold\n    dup.1 eq.0\n    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]\n\n    cdrop\n    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]\nend\n\n#! Authenticate a transaction using ECDSA secp256k1 with multi-signature support.\n#!\n#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:\n#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed\n#! 2. Verifying ECDSA signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys\n#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met\n#! 4. Returning the transaction summary commitment for higher-level wrappers.\n#!\n#! Inputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [SALT]\n#!   Advice map: {\n#!     h(PUB_KEY_0, MSG): SIG_0,\n#!     h(PUB_KEY_1, MSG): SIG_1,\n#!     h(PUB_KEY_n, MSG): SIG_n\n#!   }\n#! Outputs:\n#!   Operand stack: [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n#!\n#! Where:\n#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent\n#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction\n#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.\n#! - SIG_i is the ECDSA signature from the i-th signer.\n#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.\n#! - h(PUB_KEY_i, MSG) is the hash of the public key and message used as the advice map key.\n#!\n#! Panics if:\n#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).\n#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).\n#!\n#! Invocation: exec\n@locals(1)\npub proc auth_tx(salt: word)\n    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop\n    # => [SALT]\n\n    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------\n\n    exec.auth::create_tx_summary\n    # => [ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, SALT]\n\n    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider\n    adv.insert_hqword\n    # => [ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, SALT]\n\n    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed\n    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary\n    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------\n\n    exec.get_threshold_and_num_approvers\n    # => [default_threshold, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    movdn.5\n    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    push.APPROVER_SCHEME_ID_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [scheme_id_slot_prefix, scheme_id_slot_suffix, pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    exec.::miden::standards::auth::signature::verify_signatures\n    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]\n\n    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------\n\n    movup.5\n    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    exec.compute_transaction_threshold\n    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    u32assert2 u32lt\n    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\n\n    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.\n    if.true\n        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\n        push.0 assert.err=\"insufficient number of signatures\"\n    end\n\n    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]\nend\n";
-export declare const GUARDIAN_MASM = "# Guardian Authentication Component\n#\n# This component provides GUARDIAN signature verification for accounts.\n# It can be used standalone or in conjunction with other auth components like multisig.\n\nuse miden::protocol::active_account\nuse miden::protocol::auth::AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\nuse miden::protocol::native_account\n\n# IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES\n# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# - The selector in `GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT` controls whether the extra GUARDIAN signature\n#   is enforced:\n#     * GUARDIAN_ON  => exactly one valid GUARDIAN signature is required.\n#     * GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature is skipped for that call.\n#\n# - `verify_guardian_signature` reads the selector from initial storage state.\n#   This means changes made during the same transaction won't affect the check.\n#\n# - `enable_guardian` / `disable_guardian` procedures allow explicit control over GUARDIAN state.\n#\n# - `update_guardian_public_key`:\n#     * Installs a new GUARDIAN public key in the map at `GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT`.\n#     * Does not itself perform any signature checks.\n#     * To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure selector is OFF.\n#\n# Storage Layout\n# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n#\n# +---------------------+---------------+\n# |     DESCRIPTION     |     SLOT      |\n# +---------------------+---------------+\n# | GUARDIAN SELECTOR (word) |       0       |\n# | GUARDIAN PUBLIC KEY MAP  |       1       |\n# | GUARDIAN SCHEME ID MAP   |       2       |\n# +---------------------+---------------+\n#\n# - GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT (0):\n#     * Stores a word that is compared against [1, 0, 0, 0] (GUARDIAN_ON).\n#     * Any value != GUARDIAN_ON is treated as GUARDIAN_OFF.\n#\n# - GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT (1):\n#     * A map from a fixed key [0, 0, 0, 0] to the single GUARDIAN public key:\n#         [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY\n#     * GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY is a Falcon Poseidon2 public key represented as a word.\n\n# CONSTANTS\n# =================================================================================================\n\n# Slot where the GUARDIAN selector flag is stored (using word() for named slot access):\n# - GUARDIAN_ON  => GUARDIAN signature required\n# - GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature skipped\nconst GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::guardian::selector\")\n\n# Map slot for GUARDIAN public key\n# Uses exactly one GUARDIAN public key at index [0, 0, 0, 0]\n# [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY\nconst GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::guardian::public_key\")\n\n# Map slot for GUARDIAN signature scheme IDs\n# Uses exactly one scheme ID entry at index [0, 0, 0, 0]\n# [0, 0, 0, 0] => [scheme_id, 0, 0, 0]\nconst GUARDIAN_SCHEME_ID_MAP_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::guardian::scheme_id\")\n\n# Selector flag values\nconst GUARDIAN_ON=[1, 0, 0, 0]\nconst GUARDIAN_OFF=[0, 0, 0, 0]\nconst FALCON_512_POSEIDON2_SCHEME_WORD=[2, 0, 0, 0]\n\n# GUARDIAN PROCEDURES\n# =================================================================================================\n\n#! Enable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to ON.\n#!\n#! Operand stack inputs: []\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_ON (1)\n#! - After this, transactions will require GUARDIAN signature verification\nproc enable_guardian\n    push.GUARDIAN_ON\n    # => [GUARDIAN_ON]\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_ON]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_item\n    # => [OLD_ROOT]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Disable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to OFF.\n#!\n#! Operand stack inputs: []\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_OFF (0)\n#! - After this, transactions will NOT require GUARDIAN signature verification\nproc disable_guardian\n    push.GUARDIAN_OFF\n    # => [GUARDIAN_OFF]\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_OFF]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_item\n    # => [OLD_ROOT]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Update the GUARDIAN public key.\n#!\n#! Operand stack inputs: []\n#! Advice stack inputs:  [PUB_KEY]\n#!   - PUB_KEY is the new GUARDIAN RPO Falcon 512 public key\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - Stores PUB_KEY into GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT:\n#!      [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY\n#! - To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure\n#!   GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0 (OFF) before calling this.\npub proc update_guardian_public_key\n    exec.disable_guardian\n    # ------ Update the GUARDIAN public key ------\n    adv_loadw\n    # => [PUB_KEY]\n\n    push.0.0.0.0\n    # => [MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]\n    # Note that MAP_KEY is [0, 0, 0, 0] for a single GUARDIAN_KEY\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\n\n    push.0.0.0.0\n    # => [MAP_KEY]\n\n    push.FALCON_512_POSEIDON2_SCHEME_WORD\n    # => [SCHEME_ID_WORD, MAP_KEY]\n\n    swapw\n    # => [MAP_KEY, SCHEME_ID_WORD]\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_SCHEME_ID_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [scheme_id_slot_prefix, scheme_id_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, SCHEME_ID_WORD]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Conditionally verify a \"GUARDIAN\" signature against a stored public key hash.\n#! The condition is controlled by the selector at GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT.\n#!\n#! Inputs:  [MSG]\n#! Outputs: [MSG]\n#!\n#! Panics if:\n#! - Selector is ON but the provided GUARDIAN signature is invalid or missing.\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - MSG is TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT provided by auth procedure\n#! - If selector is OFF (0), GUARDIAN verification is skipped\n#! - Selector value is read from initial storage state\npub proc verify_guardian_signature(msg: word)\n    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]\n    exec.active_account::get_item\n    drop drop drop\n    # => [selector, MSG]\n\n    push.1 eq\n    if.true\n        push.1\n        push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        push.GUARDIAN_SCHEME_ID_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        exec.::miden::standards::auth::signature::verify_signatures\n        push.1 neq\n        if.true\n            emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\n            push.0 assert.err=\"invalid GUARDIAN signature\"\n        end\n    end\n    # => [MSG]\n    exec.enable_guardian\nend\n";
-export declare const GUARDIAN_ECDSA_MASM = "# Guardian Authentication Component (ECDSA)\n#\n# This component provides GUARDIAN signature verification for accounts using\n# ECDSA secp256k1 (k256/keccak) signatures.\n# It can be used standalone or in conjunction with other auth components like multisig.\n\nuse miden::protocol::active_account\nuse miden::protocol::auth::AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\nuse miden::protocol::native_account\n\n# IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES\n# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n# - The selector in `GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT` controls whether the extra GUARDIAN signature\n#   is enforced:\n#     * GUARDIAN_ON  => exactly one valid GUARDIAN signature is required.\n#     * GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature is skipped for that call.\n#\n# - `verify_guardian_signature` reads the selector from initial storage state.\n#   This means changes made during the same transaction won't affect the check.\n#\n# - `enable_guardian` / `disable_guardian` procedures allow explicit control over GUARDIAN state.\n#\n# - `update_guardian_public_key`:\n#     * Installs a new GUARDIAN public key in the map at `GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT`.\n#     * Does not itself perform any signature checks.\n#     * To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure selector is OFF.\n#\n# Storage Layout\n# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------\n#\n# +---------------------+---------------+\n# |     DESCRIPTION     |     SLOT      |\n# +---------------------+---------------+\n# | GUARDIAN SELECTOR (word) |       0       |\n# | GUARDIAN PUBLIC KEY MAP  |       1       |\n# +---------------------+---------------+\n#\n# - GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT (0):\n#     * Stores a word that is compared against [1, 0, 0, 0] (GUARDIAN_ON).\n#     * Any value != GUARDIAN_ON is treated as GUARDIAN_OFF.\n#\n# - GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT (1):\n#     * A map from a fixed key [0, 0, 0, 0] to the single GUARDIAN public key:\n#         [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY\n#     * GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY is an ECDSA secp256k1 public key represented as a word.\n\n# CONSTANTS\n# =================================================================================================\n\n# Slot where the GUARDIAN selector flag is stored (using word() for named slot access):\n# - GUARDIAN_ON  => GUARDIAN signature required\n# - GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature skipped\nconst GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::guardian::selector\")\n\n# Map slot for GUARDIAN public key\n# Uses exactly one GUARDIAN public key at index [0, 0, 0, 0]\n# [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY\nconst GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::guardian::public_key\")\nconst GUARDIAN_SCHEME_ID_MAP_SLOT=word(\"openzeppelin::guardian::scheme_id\")\n\n# Selector flag values\nconst GUARDIAN_ON=[1, 0, 0, 0]\nconst GUARDIAN_OFF=[0, 0, 0, 0]\nconst ECDSA_K256_KECCAK_SCHEME_WORD=[1, 0, 0, 0]\n\n# GUARDIAN PROCEDURES\n# =================================================================================================\n\n#! Enable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to ON.\n#!\n#! Operand stack inputs: []\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_ON (1)\n#! - After this, transactions will require GUARDIAN signature verification\nproc enable_guardian\n    push.GUARDIAN_ON\n    # => [GUARDIAN_ON]\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_ON]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_item\n    # => [OLD_ROOT]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Disable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to OFF.\n#!\n#! Operand stack inputs: []\n#! Outputs: []\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_OFF (0)\n#! - After this, transactions will NOT require GUARDIAN signature verification\nproc disable_guardian\n    push.GUARDIAN_OFF\n    # => [GUARDIAN_OFF]\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_OFF]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_item\n    # => [OLD_ROOT]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Update the GUARDIAN public key.\n#!\n#! Operand stack inputs: []\n#! Advice stack inputs:  [PUB_KEY]\n#!   - PUB_KEY is the new GUARDIAN ECDSA secp256k1 public key\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - Stores PUB_KEY into GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT:\n#!      [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY\n#! - To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure\n#!   GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0 (OFF) before calling this.\npub proc update_guardian_public_key\n    exec.disable_guardian\n    # ------ Update the GUARDIAN public key ------\n    adv_loadw\n    # => [PUB_KEY]\n\n    push.0.0.0.0\n    # => [MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]\n    # Note that MAP_KEY is [0, 0, 0, 0] for a single GUARDIAN_KEY\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\n\n    push.0.0.0.0\n    # => [MAP_KEY]\n\n    push.ECDSA_K256_KECCAK_SCHEME_WORD\n    # => [SCHEME_ID_WORD, MAP_KEY]\n\n    swapw\n    # => [MAP_KEY, SCHEME_ID_WORD]\n\n    push.GUARDIAN_SCHEME_ID_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n    # => [scheme_id_slot_prefix, scheme_id_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, SCHEME_ID_WORD]\n\n    exec.native_account::set_map_item\n    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]\n\n    dropw\n    # => []\nend\n\n#! Conditionally verify a \"GUARDIAN\" signature against a stored public key hash.\n#! The condition is controlled by the selector at GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT.\n#!\n#! Inputs:  [MSG]\n#! Outputs: [MSG]\n#!\n#! Panics if:\n#! - Selector is ON but the provided GUARDIAN signature is invalid or missing.\n#!\n#! Notes:\n#! - MSG is TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT provided by auth procedure\n#! - If selector is OFF (0), GUARDIAN verification is skipped\n#! - Selector value is read from initial storage state\npub proc verify_guardian_signature(msg: word)\n    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]\n    exec.active_account::get_item\n    drop drop drop\n    # => [selector, MSG]\n\n    push.1 eq\n    if.true\n        push.1\n        push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        push.GUARDIAN_SCHEME_ID_MAP_SLOT[0..2]\n        exec.::miden::standards::auth::signature::verify_signatures\n        push.1 neq\n        if.true\n            emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT\n            push.0 assert.err=\"invalid GUARDIAN signature\"\n        end\n    end\n    # => [MSG]\n    exec.enable_guardian\nend\n";
-//# sourceMappingURL=auth.d.ts.map

package/dist/account/masm/auth.d.ts.map

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