@openzeppelin/miden-multisig-client 0.13.0 → 0.13.2

package/dist/account/masm/auth.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1395 @@
+// This file is generated by scripts/generate-masm.mjs from the MASM contract sources.
+// Do not edit it by hand.
+export const MULTISIG_MASM = `# Multi-Signature RPO Falcon 512 Authentication Core Library
+#
+# This library provides the reusable multisig procedures used by account wrappers.
+
+use miden::protocol::active_account
+use miden::protocol::native_account
+use miden::standards::auth
+
+type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
+
+# CONSTANTS
+# =================================================================================================
+
+# Auth Request Constants
+
+# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
+const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
+
+# Storage Layout Constants
+#
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |
+# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |    (map)     |       (map)       |
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+# |              0                |    1     |      2       |         3         |
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and
+# number of approvers are stored as:
+# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].
+# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.
+const THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::threshold_config")
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.
+# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY
+const PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::signer_public_keys")
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.
+# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]
+const EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::executed_transactions")
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.
+# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]
+const PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::procedure_thresholds")
+
+# Executed Transaction Flag Constant
+const IS_EXECUTED_FLAG=[1, 0, 0, 0]
+
+# ERRORS
+const ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED="failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed"
+
+const ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold"
+
+const ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers or threshold must not be zero"
+
+const ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32="procedure threshold must be a u32 value"
+
+const ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32="number of approvers and procedure threshold must be u32"
+
+const ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS="procedure threshold exceeds number of approvers"
+
+# MULTISIG PROCEDURES
+# =================================================================================================
+
+#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.
+#!
+#! Inputs:  [MSG]
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - the same transaction has already been executed
+pub proc assert_new_tx(msg: BeWord)
+    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG
+    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]
+
+    swapw
+    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
+
+    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [txs_slot_prefix, txs_slot_suffix, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
+
+    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed]]
+
+    drop drop drop
+    # => [is_executed]
+
+    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.
+#!
+#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer
+#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and
+#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.
+#!
+#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update
+#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update
+proc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)
+    dup.1 dup.1
+    u32assert2 u32lt
+    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+    while.true
+        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        sub.1
+        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dup
+        # => [i-1, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        push.0.0.0
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        padw swapw
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        exec.native_account::set_map_item
+        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dropw
+        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dup.1 dup.1
+        u32lt
+        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+    end
+
+    drop drop
+    # => []
+end
+
+proc get_threshold_and_num_approvers
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
+    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
+    # => [0, 0, num_approvers, threshold]
+
+    drop drop
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold]
+
+    swap
+    # => [threshold, num_approvers]
+end
+
+proc assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers(num_approvers: u32)
+    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
+    # => [num_procedures, num_approvers]
+
+    dup neq.0
+    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, num_approvers]
+    while.true
+        sub.1 dup
+        # => [proc_index, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root
+        # => [PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
+        # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        drop drop drop
+        # => [proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        dup.2
+        # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        u32assert2.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32
+        u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS
+        # => [proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [should_continue, proc_index, num_approvers]
+    end
+
+    drop drop
+    # => []
+end
+
+# Internal storage helper used by the public \`update_procedure_threshold\`
+# entrypoint after it receives direct stack arguments.
+proc set_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: BeWord)
+    exec.get_threshold_and_num_approvers
+    # => [threshold, num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    drop
+    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    dup.1 swap
+    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    u32assert2.err=ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32
+    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS
+    # => [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    push.0.0.0
+    swapw
+    # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]
+
+    push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [OLD_VALUE]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
+#!   Advice map: {
+#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]
+#!   }
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector
+#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]
+#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer
+#!
+#! Locals:
+#! 0: new_num_of_approvers
+#! 1: init_num_of_approvers
+@locals(2)
+pub proc update_signers_and_threshold(multisig_config_hash: BeWord)
+    adv.push_mapval
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
+
+    adv_loadw
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # store new_num_of_approvers for later
+    dup.2 loc_store.0
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    dup.3 dup.3
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers
+    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    dup.3 dup.3
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero
+    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [num_approvers, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # store init_num_of_approvers for later
+    drop drop loc_store.1 drop
+    # => [pad(12)]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [num_approvers]
+
+    dup neq.0
+    while.true
+        sub.1
+        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dup push.0.0.0
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        padw adv_loadw
+        # => [PUB_KEY, [0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        swapw
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        exec.native_account::set_map_item
+        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dropw
+        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]
+    end
+    # => [pad(13)]
+
+    drop
+    # => [pad(12)]
+
+    # compare initial vs current multisig config
+
+    # load init_num_of_approvers & new_num_of_approvers
+    loc_load.0 loc_load.1
+    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping
+    # => [pad(12)]
+end
+
+#! Update or clear the threshold override for a specific procedure.
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: []
+#! Invocation: call
+pub proc update_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: BeWord)
+    exec.set_procedure_threshold
+end
+
+# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure
+# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no
+# overrides apply.
+#
+#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]
+#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]
+@locals(1)
+proc compute_transaction_threshold(default_threshold: u32) -> u32
+    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
+    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
+    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction
+    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map
+    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold
+    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
+
+    # store default_threshold for later
+    loc_store.0
+    # => []
+
+    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
+    push.0
+    # => [transaction_threshold]
+
+    # get the number of account procedures
+    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
+    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
+
+    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
+    dup neq.0
+    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
+    while.true
+        sub.1 dup
+        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i
+        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw
+        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction
+        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called
+        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure
+        if.true
+            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
+            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_prefix, PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_suffix, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure
+            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]
+            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
+            # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            drop drop drop dup dup.3
+            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            u32assert2.err="transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32"
+            u32gt
+            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold
+            movup.2 movdn.3
+            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
+            cdrop
+            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
+            swap
+            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]
+        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure
+        else
+            dropw
+            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+        end
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+    end
+
+    drop
+    # => [transaction_threshold]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
+
+    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
+    dup.1 eq.0
+    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
+
+    cdrop
+    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]
+end
+
+#! Authenticate a transaction using the Falcon signature scheme with multi-signature support.
+#!
+#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:
+#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed
+#! 2. Verifying signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys
+#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met
+#! 4. Returning the transaction summary commitment for higher-level wrappers.
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [SALT]
+#!   Advice map: {
+#!     h(SIG_0, MSG): SIG_0,
+#!     h(SIG_1, MSG): SIG_1,
+#!     h(SIG_n, MSG): SIG_n
+#!   }
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent
+#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction
+#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.
+#! - SIG_i is the signature from the i-th signer.
+#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.
+#! - h(SIG_i, MSG) is the hash of the signature and message used as the advice map key.
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
+#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
+#!
+#! Invocation: exec
+@locals(1)
+pub proc auth_tx(salt: BeWord) -> BeWord
+    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop
+    # => [SALT]
+
+    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------
+
+    exec.auth::create_tx_summary
+    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider
+    exec.auth::adv_insert_hqword
+    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed
+    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------
+
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
+    # => [0, 0, num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    drop drop
+    # => [num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    swap movdn.5
+    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    exec.::miden::standards::auth::falcon512_rpo::verify_signatures
+    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------
+
+    movup.5
+    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    exec.compute_transaction_threshold
+    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    u32assert2 u32lt
+    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.
+    if.true
+        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
+        push.0 assert.err="insufficient number of signatures"
+    end
+
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+end
+`;
+export const MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM = `# Multi-Signature ECDSA secp256k1 Authentication Core Library
+#
+# This library provides the reusable multisig procedures used by account wrappers.
+
+use miden::protocol::active_account
+use miden::protocol::native_account
+use miden::standards::auth
+type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
+
+# CONSTANTS
+# =================================================================================================
+
+# Auth Request Constants
+
+# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
+const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
+
+# Storage Layout Constants
+#
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |
+# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |    (map)     |       (map)       |
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+# |              0                |    1     |      2       |         3         |
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and
+# number of approvers are stored as:
+# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].
+# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.
+const THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::threshold_config")
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.
+# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY
+const PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::signer_public_keys")
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.
+# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]
+const EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::executed_transactions")
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.
+# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]
+const PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::multisig::procedure_thresholds")
+
+# Executed Transaction Flag Constant
+const IS_EXECUTED_FLAG=[1, 0, 0, 0]
+
+# ERRORS
+const ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED="failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed"
+
+const ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold"
+
+const ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG="number of approvers or threshold must not be zero"
+
+const ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32="procedure threshold must be a u32 value"
+
+const ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32="number of approvers and procedure threshold must be u32"
+
+const ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS="procedure threshold exceeds number of approvers"
+
+# MULTISIG PROCEDURES
+# =================================================================================================
+
+#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.
+#!
+#! Inputs:  [MSG]
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - the same transaction has already been executed
+pub proc assert_new_tx(msg: BeWord)
+    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG
+    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]
+
+    swapw
+    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
+
+    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [txs_slot_prefix, txs_slot_suffix, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
+
+    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed]]
+
+    drop drop drop
+    # => [is_executed]
+
+    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.
+#!
+#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer
+#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and
+#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.
+#!
+#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update
+#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update
+proc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)
+    dup.1 dup.1
+    u32assert2 u32lt
+    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+    while.true
+        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        sub.1
+        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dup
+        # => [i-1, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        push.0.0.0
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        padw swapw
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        exec.native_account::set_map_item
+        # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dropw
+        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dup.1 dup.1
+        u32lt
+        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+    end
+
+    drop drop
+    # => []
+end
+
+proc get_threshold_and_num_approvers
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
+    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
+    # => [0, 0, num_approvers, threshold]
+
+    drop drop
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold]
+
+    swap
+    # => [threshold, num_approvers]
+end
+
+proc assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers(num_approvers: u32)
+    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
+    # => [num_procedures, num_approvers]
+
+    dup neq.0
+    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, num_approvers]
+    while.true
+        sub.1 dup
+        # => [proc_index, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root
+        # => [PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
+        # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        drop drop drop
+        # => [proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        dup.2
+        # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        u32assert2.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32
+        u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS
+        # => [proc_index, num_approvers]
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [should_continue, proc_index, num_approvers]
+    end
+
+    drop drop
+    # => []
+end
+
+# Internal storage helper used by the public \`update_procedure_threshold\`
+# entrypoint after it receives direct stack arguments.
+proc set_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: BeWord)
+    exec.get_threshold_and_num_approvers
+    # => [threshold, num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    drop
+    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    dup.1 swap
+    # => [num_approvers, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    u32assert2.err=ERR_NUM_APPROVERS_OR_PROC_THRESHOLD_NOT_U32
+    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_PROC_THRESHOLD_EXCEEDS_NUM_APPROVERS
+    # => [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+
+    push.0.0.0
+    swapw
+    # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]
+
+    push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [proc_roots_slot_prefix, proc_roots_slot_suffix, PROC_ROOT, PROC_THRESHOLD_WORD]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [OLD_VALUE]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
+#!   Advice map: {
+#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]
+#!   }
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector
+#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]
+#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer
+#!
+#! Locals:
+#! 0: new_num_of_approvers
+#! 1: init_num_of_approvers
+@locals(2)
+pub proc update_signers_and_threshold(multisig_config_hash: BeWord)
+    adv.push_mapval
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
+
+    adv_loadw
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # store new_num_of_approvers for later
+    dup.2 loc_store.0
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    dup.3 dup.3
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers
+    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    dup.3 dup.3
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero
+    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [num_approvers, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.assert_proc_thresholds_lte_num_approvers
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # store init_num_of_approvers for later
+    drop drop loc_store.1 drop
+    # => [pad(12)]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [num_approvers]
+
+    dup neq.0
+    while.true
+        sub.1
+        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dup push.0.0.0
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        padw adv_loadw
+        # => [PUB_KEY, [0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        swapw
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+        # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, [0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        exec.native_account::set_map_item
+        # => [OLD_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dropw
+        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]
+    end
+    # => [pad(13)]
+
+    drop
+    # => [pad(12)]
+
+    # compare initial vs current multisig config
+
+    # load init_num_of_approvers & new_num_of_approvers
+    loc_load.0 loc_load.1
+    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping
+    # => [pad(12)]
+end
+
+#! Update or clear the threshold override for a specific procedure.
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [proc_threshold, PROC_ROOT]
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: []
+#! Invocation: call
+pub proc update_procedure_threshold(proc_threshold: u32, proc_root: BeWord)
+    exec.set_procedure_threshold
+end
+
+# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure
+# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no
+# overrides apply.
+#
+#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]
+#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]
+@locals(1)
+proc compute_transaction_threshold(default_threshold: u32) -> u32
+    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
+    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
+    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction
+    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map
+    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold
+    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
+
+    # store default_threshold for later
+    loc_store.0
+    # => []
+
+    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
+    push.0
+    # => [transaction_threshold]
+
+    # get the number of account procedures
+    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
+    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
+
+    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
+    dup neq.0
+    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
+    while.true
+        sub.1 dup
+        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i
+        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw
+        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction
+        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called
+        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure
+        if.true
+            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT[0..2]
+            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_prefix, PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT_suffix, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure
+            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]
+            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
+            # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            drop drop drop dup dup.3
+            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            u32assert2.err="transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32"
+            u32gt
+            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold
+            movup.2 movdn.3
+            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
+            cdrop
+            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
+            swap
+            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]
+        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure
+        else
+            dropw
+            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+        end
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+    end
+
+    drop
+    # => [transaction_threshold]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
+
+    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
+    dup.1 eq.0
+    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
+
+    cdrop
+    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]
+end
+
+#! Authenticate a transaction using ECDSA secp256k1 with multi-signature support.
+#!
+#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:
+#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed
+#! 2. Verifying ECDSA signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys
+#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met
+#! 4. Returning the transaction summary commitment for higher-level wrappers.
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [SALT]
+#!   Advice map: {
+#!     h(PUB_KEY_0, MSG): SIG_0,
+#!     h(PUB_KEY_1, MSG): SIG_1,
+#!     h(PUB_KEY_n, MSG): SIG_n
+#!   }
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent
+#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction
+#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.
+#! - SIG_i is the ECDSA signature from the i-th signer.
+#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.
+#! - h(PUB_KEY_i, MSG) is the hash of the public key and message used as the advice map key.
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
+#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
+#!
+#! Invocation: exec
+@locals(1)
+pub proc auth_tx(salt: BeWord) -> BeWord
+    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop
+    # => [SALT]
+
+    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------
+
+    exec.auth::create_tx_summary
+    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider
+    exec.auth::adv_insert_hqword
+    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed
+    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------
+
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [config_slot_prefix, config_slot_suffix, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
+    # => [0, 0, num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    drop drop
+    # => [num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    swap movdn.5
+    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    exec.::miden::standards::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures
+    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------
+
+    movup.5
+    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    exec.compute_transaction_threshold
+    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    u32assert2 u32lt
+    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.
+    if.true
+        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
+        push.0 assert.err="insufficient number of signatures"
+    end
+
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+end
+`;
+export const GUARDIAN_MASM = `# Guardian Authentication Component
+#
+# This component provides GUARDIAN signature verification for accounts.
+# It can be used standalone or in conjunction with other auth components like multisig.
+
+use miden::protocol::active_account
+use miden::protocol::native_account
+
+type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
+
+# IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# - The selector in \`GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT\` controls whether the extra GUARDIAN signature
+#   is enforced:
+#     * GUARDIAN_ON  => exactly one valid GUARDIAN signature is required.
+#     * GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature is skipped for that call.
+#
+# - \`verify_guardian_signature\` reads the selector from initial storage state.
+#   This means changes made during the same transaction won't affect the check.
+#
+# - \`enable_guardian\` / \`disable_guardian\` procedures allow explicit control over GUARDIAN state.
+#
+# - \`update_guardian_public_key\`:
+#     * Installs a new GUARDIAN public key in the map at \`GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT\`.
+#     * Does not itself perform any signature checks.
+#     * To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure selector is OFF.
+#
+# Storage Layout
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# +---------------------+---------------+
+# |     DESCRIPTION     |     SLOT      |
+# +---------------------+---------------+
+# | GUARDIAN SELECTOR (word) |       0       |
+# | GUARDIAN PUBLIC KEY MAP  |       1       |
+# +---------------------+---------------+
+#
+# - GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT (0):
+#     * Stores a word that is compared against [1, 0, 0, 0] (GUARDIAN_ON).
+#     * Any value != GUARDIAN_ON is treated as GUARDIAN_OFF.
+#
+# - GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT (1):
+#     * A map from a fixed key [0, 0, 0, 0] to the single GUARDIAN public key:
+#         [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY
+#     * GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY is a RPO Falcon 512 public key represented as a word.
+
+# CONSTANTS
+# =================================================================================================
+
+# Slot where the GUARDIAN selector flag is stored (using word() for named slot access):
+# - GUARDIAN_ON  => GUARDIAN signature required
+# - GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature skipped
+const GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::guardian::selector")
+
+# Map slot for GUARDIAN public key
+# Uses exactly one GUARDIAN public key at index [0, 0, 0, 0]
+# [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY
+const GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::guardian::public_key")
+
+# Selector flag values
+const GUARDIAN_ON=[1, 0, 0, 0]
+const GUARDIAN_OFF=[0, 0, 0, 0]
+
+# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
+const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
+
+# GUARDIAN PROCEDURES
+# =================================================================================================
+
+#! Enable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to ON.
+#!
+#! Operand stack inputs: []
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_ON (1)
+#! - After this, transactions will require GUARDIAN signature verification
+proc enable_guardian
+    push.GUARDIAN_ON
+    # => [GUARDIAN_ON]
+
+    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_ON]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_ROOT]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Disable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to OFF.
+#!
+#! Operand stack inputs: []
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_OFF (0)
+#! - After this, transactions will NOT require GUARDIAN signature verification
+proc disable_guardian
+    push.GUARDIAN_OFF
+    # => [GUARDIAN_OFF]
+
+    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_OFF]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_ROOT]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Update the GUARDIAN public key.
+#!
+#! Operand stack inputs: []
+#! Advice stack inputs:  [PUB_KEY]
+#!   - PUB_KEY is the new GUARDIAN RPO Falcon 512 public key
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - Stores PUB_KEY into GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT:
+#!      [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY
+#! - To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure
+#!   GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0 (OFF) before calling this.
+pub proc update_guardian_public_key
+    exec.disable_guardian
+    # ------ Update the GUARDIAN public key ------
+    adv_loadw
+    # => [PUB_KEY]
+
+    push.0.0.0.0
+    # => [MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
+    # Note that MAP_KEY is [0, 0, 0, 0] for a single GUARDIAN_KEY
+
+    push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Conditionally verify a "GUARDIAN" signature against a stored public key hash.
+#! The condition is controlled by the selector at GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT.
+#!
+#! Inputs:  [MSG]
+#! Outputs: [MSG]
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - Selector is ON but the provided GUARDIAN signature is invalid or missing.
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - MSG is TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT provided by auth procedure
+#! - If selector is OFF (0), GUARDIAN verification is skipped
+#! - Selector value is read from initial storage state
+pub proc verify_guardian_signature(msg: BeWord) -> BeWord
+    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
+    exec.active_account::get_item
+    drop drop drop
+    # => [selector, MSG]
+
+    push.1 eq
+    if.true
+        push.1
+        push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+        exec.::miden::standards::auth::falcon512_rpo::verify_signatures
+        push.1 neq
+        if.true
+            emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
+            push.0 assert.err="invalid GUARDIAN signature"
+        end
+    end
+    # => [MSG]
+    exec.enable_guardian
+end
+`;
+export const GUARDIAN_ECDSA_MASM = `# Guardian Authentication Component (ECDSA)
+#
+# This component provides GUARDIAN signature verification for accounts using
+# ECDSA secp256k1 (k256/keccak) signatures.
+# It can be used standalone or in conjunction with other auth components like multisig.
+
+use miden::protocol::active_account
+use miden::protocol::native_account
+
+type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
+
+# IMPORTANT SECURITY NOTES
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+# - The selector in \`GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT\` controls whether the extra GUARDIAN signature
+#   is enforced:
+#     * GUARDIAN_ON  => exactly one valid GUARDIAN signature is required.
+#     * GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature is skipped for that call.
+#
+# - \`verify_guardian_signature\` reads the selector from initial storage state.
+#   This means changes made during the same transaction won't affect the check.
+#
+# - \`enable_guardian\` / \`disable_guardian\` procedures allow explicit control over GUARDIAN state.
+#
+# - \`update_guardian_public_key\`:
+#     * Installs a new GUARDIAN public key in the map at \`GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT\`.
+#     * Does not itself perform any signature checks.
+#     * To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure selector is OFF.
+#
+# Storage Layout
+# --------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+#
+# +---------------------+---------------+
+# |     DESCRIPTION     |     SLOT      |
+# +---------------------+---------------+
+# | GUARDIAN SELECTOR (word) |       0       |
+# | GUARDIAN PUBLIC KEY MAP  |       1       |
+# +---------------------+---------------+
+#
+# - GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT (0):
+#     * Stores a word that is compared against [1, 0, 0, 0] (GUARDIAN_ON).
+#     * Any value != GUARDIAN_ON is treated as GUARDIAN_OFF.
+#
+# - GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT (1):
+#     * A map from a fixed key [0, 0, 0, 0] to the single GUARDIAN public key:
+#         [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY
+#     * GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY is an ECDSA secp256k1 public key represented as a word.
+
+# CONSTANTS
+# =================================================================================================
+
+# Slot where the GUARDIAN selector flag is stored (using word() for named slot access):
+# - GUARDIAN_ON  => GUARDIAN signature required
+# - GUARDIAN_OFF => GUARDIAN signature skipped
+const GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::guardian::selector")
+
+# Map slot for GUARDIAN public key
+# Uses exactly one GUARDIAN public key at index [0, 0, 0, 0]
+# [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY
+const GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT=word("openzeppelin::guardian::public_key")
+
+# Selector flag values
+const GUARDIAN_ON=[1, 0, 0, 0]
+const GUARDIAN_OFF=[0, 0, 0, 0]
+
+# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
+const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT=event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
+
+# GUARDIAN PROCEDURES
+# =================================================================================================
+
+#! Enable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to ON.
+#!
+#! Operand stack inputs: []
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_ON (1)
+#! - After this, transactions will require GUARDIAN signature verification
+proc enable_guardian
+    push.GUARDIAN_ON
+    # => [GUARDIAN_ON]
+
+    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_ON]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_ROOT]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Disable GUARDIAN verification by setting the selector to OFF.
+#!
+#! Operand stack inputs: []
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - Sets GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT to GUARDIAN_OFF (0)
+#! - After this, transactions will NOT require GUARDIAN signature verification
+proc disable_guardian
+    push.GUARDIAN_OFF
+    # => [GUARDIAN_OFF]
+
+    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [selector_slot_prefix, selector_slot_suffix, GUARDIAN_OFF]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_ROOT]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Update the GUARDIAN public key.
+#!
+#! Operand stack inputs: []
+#! Advice stack inputs:  [PUB_KEY]
+#!   - PUB_KEY is the new GUARDIAN ECDSA secp256k1 public key
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - Stores PUB_KEY into GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT:
+#!      [0, 0, 0, 0] => GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY
+#! - To update the key without requiring GUARDIAN signature, ensure
+#!   GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT = 0 (OFF) before calling this.
+pub proc update_guardian_public_key
+    exec.disable_guardian
+    # ------ Update the GUARDIAN public key ------
+    adv_loadw
+    # => [PUB_KEY]
+
+    push.0.0.0.0
+    # => [MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
+    # Note that MAP_KEY is [0, 0, 0, 0] for a single GUARDIAN_KEY
+
+    push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+    # => [pub_key_slot_prefix, pub_key_slot_suffix, MAP_KEY, PUB_KEY]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [OLD_MAP_VALUE]
+
+    dropw
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Conditionally verify a "GUARDIAN" signature against a stored public key hash.
+#! The condition is controlled by the selector at GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT.
+#!
+#! Inputs:  [MSG]
+#! Outputs: [MSG]
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - Selector is ON but the provided GUARDIAN signature is invalid or missing.
+#!
+#! Notes:
+#! - MSG is TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT provided by auth procedure
+#! - If selector is OFF (0), GUARDIAN verification is skipped
+#! - Selector value is read from initial storage state
+pub proc verify_guardian_signature(msg: BeWord) -> BeWord
+    push.GUARDIAN_SELECTOR_SLOT[0..2]
+    exec.active_account::get_item
+    drop drop drop
+    # => [selector, MSG]
+
+    push.1 eq
+    if.true
+        push.1
+        push.GUARDIAN_PUBLIC_KEY_MAP_SLOT[0..2]
+        exec.::miden::standards::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures
+        push.1 neq
+        if.true
+            emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
+            push.0 assert.err="invalid GUARDIAN signature"
+        end
+    end
+    # => [MSG]
+    exec.enable_guardian
+end
+`;
+//# sourceMappingURL=auth.js.map