@openzeppelin/miden-multisig-client 0.12.6 → 0.12.7

package/src/account/builder.ts

@@ -1,9 +1,3 @@
-/**
- * Account builder for creating multisig accounts with PSM authentication.
- *
- * This module provides functionality to create multisig accounts.
- */
-
 import {
   AccountBuilder,
   AccountComponent,
@@ -13,37 +7,33 @@ import {
 } from '@demox-labs/miden-sdk';
 import type { MultisigConfig, CreateAccountResult } from '../types.js';
 import { buildMultisigStorageSlots, buildPsmStorageSlots } from './storage.js';
-import { MULTISIG_MASM, PSM_MASM } from './masm.js';
+import { MULTISIG_MASM, MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM, PSM_MASM, PSM_ECDSA_MASM } from './masm.js';
 
-/**
- * Creates a multisig account with PSM authentication.
- *
- * @param webClient - Initialized Miden WebClient
- * @param config - Multisig configuration
- * @returns The created account and seed
- */
 export async function createMultisigAccount(
   webClient: WebClient,
   config: MultisigConfig
 ): Promise<CreateAccountResult> {
   validateMultisigConfig(config);
 
+  const signatureScheme = config.signatureScheme ?? 'falcon';
   const multisigSlots = buildMultisigStorageSlots(config);
   const psmSlots = buildPsmStorageSlots(config);
 
   const psmBuilder = webClient.createScriptBuilder();
+  const psmMasm = signatureScheme === 'ecdsa' ? PSM_ECDSA_MASM : PSM_MASM;
   const psmComponent = AccountComponent
-    .compile(PSM_MASM, psmBuilder, psmSlots)
+    .compile(psmMasm, psmBuilder, psmSlots)
     .withSupportsAllTypes();
 
+  const multisigMasm = signatureScheme === 'ecdsa' ? MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM : MULTISIG_MASM;
+  const psmLibraryPath = signatureScheme === 'ecdsa' ? 'openzeppelin::psm_ecdsa' : 'openzeppelin::psm';
   const multisigBuilder = webClient.createScriptBuilder();
-  const psmLib = multisigBuilder.buildLibrary('openzeppelin::psm', PSM_MASM);
+  const psmLib = multisigBuilder.buildLibrary(psmLibraryPath, psmMasm);
   multisigBuilder.linkStaticLibrary(psmLib);
   const multisigComponent = AccountComponent
-    .compile(MULTISIG_MASM, multisigBuilder, multisigSlots)
+    .compile(multisigMasm, multisigBuilder, multisigSlots)
     .withSupportsAllTypes();
 
-  // Generate random seed
   const seed = new Uint8Array(32);
   crypto.getRandomValues(seed);
 
@@ -68,12 +58,6 @@ export async function createMultisigAccount(
   };
 }
 
-/**
- * Validates a multisig configuration.
- *
- * @param config - The configuration to validate
- * @throws Error if configuration is invalid
- */
 export function validateMultisigConfig(config: MultisigConfig): void {
   if (config.threshold === 0) {
     throw new Error('threshold must be greater than 0');
@@ -81,6 +65,16 @@ export function validateMultisigConfig(config: MultisigConfig): void {
   if (config.signerCommitments.length === 0) {
     throw new Error('at least one signer commitment is required');
   }
+  for (const commitment of config.signerCommitments) {
+    const stripped = commitment.startsWith('0x') || commitment.startsWith('0X')
+      ? commitment.slice(2)
+      : commitment;
+    if (stripped.length > 64) {
+      throw new Error(
+        `signerCommitments must be 32-byte commitment hex (64 chars), got ${stripped.length} chars`
+      );
+    }
+  }
   if (config.threshold > config.signerCommitments.length) {
     throw new Error(
       `threshold (${config.threshold}) cannot exceed number of signers (${config.signerCommitments.length})`
@@ -90,7 +84,6 @@ export function validateMultisigConfig(config: MultisigConfig): void {
     throw new Error('PSM commitment is required');
   }
 
-  // Validate procedure thresholds if provided
   if (config.procedureThresholds) {
     const seen = new Set<string>();
     for (const pt of config.procedureThresholds) {

package/src/account/masm.ts

@@ -1,5 +1,3 @@
-// Embedded MASM constants - content from masm/*.masm files
-
 export const MULTISIG_MASM = `# Multi-Signature RPO Falcon 512 Authentication Component
 #
 # This component provides multi-signature authentication for accounts.
@@ -425,6 +423,432 @@ pub proc auth_tx_rpo_falcon512_multisig.1(salt: BeWord)
 end
 `;
 
+export const MULTISIG_ECDSA_MASM = `# Multi-Signature ECDSA secp256k1 Authentication Component
+#
+# This component provides multi-signature authentication for accounts using
+# ECDSA secp256k1 (k256/keccak) signatures instead of RPO Falcon 512.
+# It integrates with the PSM component for optional PSM signature verification.
+
+use miden::active_account
+use miden::native_account
+use miden::auth
+use openzeppelin::psm_ecdsa
+
+# Type definitions for v0.12 syntax
+type BeWord = struct @bigendian { a: felt, b: felt, c: felt, d: felt }
+
+# CONSTANTS
+# =================================================================================================
+
+# Auth Request Constants
+
+# The event emitted when a signature is not found for a required signer.
+const AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT = event("miden::auth::unauthorized")
+
+# Storage Layout Constants
+#
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+# | THRESHOLD & APPROVERS CONFIG  | PUB KEYS | EXECUTED TXS |  PROC THRESHOLDS  |
+# |           (slot)              |   (map)  |    (map)     |       (map)       |
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+# |              0                |    1     |      2       |         3         |
+# +-------------------------------+----------+--------------+-------------------+
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where the default signature threshold and
+# number of approvers are stored as:
+# [default_threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0].
+# The threshold is guaranteed to be less than or equal to num_approvers.
+const THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT = 0
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where the public keys map is stored.
+# Map entries: [key_index, 0, 0, 0] => APPROVER_PUBLIC_KEY
+const PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT = 1
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where executed transactions are stored.
+# Map entries: transaction_message => [is_executed, 0, 0, 0]
+const EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT = 2
+
+# The slot in this component's storage layout where procedure thresholds are stored.
+# Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]
+const PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT = 3
+
+# Executed Transaction Flag Constant
+const IS_EXECUTED_FLAG = [1, 0, 0, 0]
+
+# ERRORS
+const ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED = "failed to approve multisig transaction as it was already executed"
+
+const ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG = "number of approvers must be equal to or greater than threshold"
+
+const ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG = "number of approvers or threshold must not be zero"
+
+# MULTISIG PROCEDURES
+# =================================================================================================
+
+#! Check if transaction has already been executed and add it to executed transactions for replay protection.
+#!
+#! Inputs:  [MSG]
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - the same transaction has already been executed
+proc assert_new_tx(msg: BeWord)
+    push.IS_EXECUTED_FLAG
+    # => [[0, 0, 0, is_executed], MSG]
+
+    swapw
+    # => [MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
+
+    push.EXECUTED_TXS_SLOT
+    # => [index, MSG, IS_EXECUTED_FLAG]
+
+    # Set the key value pair in the map to mark transaction as executed
+    exec.native_account::set_map_item
+    # => [OLD_MAP_ROOT, [0, 0, 0, is_executed]]
+
+    dropw drop drop drop
+    # => [is_executed]
+
+    assertz.err=ERR_TX_ALREADY_EXECUTED
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Remove old approver public keys from the approver public key mapping.
+#!
+#! This procedure cleans up the storage by removing public keys of approvers that are no longer
+#! part of the multisig configuration. This procedure assumes that init_num_of_approvers and
+#! new_num_of_approvers are u32 values.
+#!
+#! Inputs: [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
+#! Outputs: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - init_num_of_approvers is the original number of approvers before the update
+#! - new_num_of_approvers is the new number of approvers after the update
+proc cleanup_pubkey_mapping(init_num_of_approvers: u32, new_num_of_approvers: u32)
+    dup.1 dup.1
+    u32assert2 u32lt
+    # => [should_loop, i = init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+    while.true
+        # => [i, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        sub.1
+        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dup
+        # => [i-1, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        push.0.0.0
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        padw swapw
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT
+        # => [pub_key_slot_idx, [0, 0, 0, i-1], EMPTY_WORD, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        exec.native_account::set_map_item
+        # => [OLD_MAP_ROOT, OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dropw dropw
+        # => [i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+
+        dup.1 dup.1
+        u32lt
+        # => [should_loop, i-1, new_num_of_approvers]
+    end
+
+    drop drop
+    # => []
+end
+
+#! Update threshold config and add / remove approvers
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
+#!   Advice map: {
+#!     MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH => [CONFIG, PUB_KEY_N, PUB_KEY_N-1, ..., PUB_KEY_0]
+#!   }
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH is the hash of the threshold and new public key vector
+#! - MULTISIG_CONFIG is [threshold, num_approvers, 0, 0]
+#! - PUB_KEY_i is the public key of the i-th signer
+#!
+#! Locals:
+#! 0: new_num_of_approvers
+#! 1: init_num_of_approvers
+pub proc update_signers_and_threshold.2(multisig_config_hash: BeWord)
+    adv.push_mapval
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG_HASH, pad(12)]
+
+    adv_loadw
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # store new_num_of_approvers for later
+    dup.2 loc_store.0
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    dup.3 dup.3
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # make sure that the threshold is smaller than the number of approvers
+    u32assert2.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    u32gt assertz.err=ERR_MALFORMED_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    dup.3 dup.3
+    # => [num_approvers, threshold, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # make sure that threshold or num_approvers are not zero
+    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    eq.0 assertz.err=ERR_ZERO_IN_MULTISIG_CONFIG
+    # => [MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT
+    # => [slot, MULTISIG_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.native_account::set_item
+    # => [OLD_THRESHOLD_CONFIG, pad(12)]
+
+    # store init_num_of_approvers for later
+    drop drop loc_store.1 drop
+    # => [pad(12)]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [num_approvers]
+
+    dup neq.0
+    while.true
+        sub.1
+        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dup push.0.0.0
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        padw adv_loadw
+        # => [PUB_KEY, [0, 0, 0, i-1], i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        swapw
+        # => [[0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT
+        # => [pub_key_slot_idx, [0, 0, 0, i-1], PUB_KEY, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        exec.native_account::set_map_item
+        # => [OLD_MAP_ROOT, OLD_MAP_VALUE, i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dropw dropw
+        # => [i-1, pad(12)]
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [is_non_zero, i-1, pad(12)]
+    end
+    # => [pad(13)]
+
+    drop
+    # => [pad(12)]
+
+    # compare initial vs current multisig config
+
+    # load init_num_of_approvers & new_num_of_approvers
+    loc_load.0 loc_load.1
+    # => [init_num_of_approvers, new_num_of_approvers, pad(12)]
+
+    exec.cleanup_pubkey_mapping
+    # => [pad(12)]
+end
+
+# Computes the effective transaction threshold based on called procedures and per-procedure
+# overrides stored in PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT. Falls back to default_threshold if no
+# overrides apply.
+#
+#! Inputs:  [default_threshold]
+#! Outputs: [transaction_threshold]
+proc compute_transaction_threshold.1(default_threshold: u32) -> u32
+    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
+    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
+    #   a. check if the procedure was called during the transaction
+    #   b. if called, get the override threshold of that procedure from the config map
+    #   c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, set transaction_threshold = proc_threshold
+    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
+
+    # store default_threshold for later
+    loc_store.0
+    # => []
+
+    # 1. initialize transaction_threshold = 0
+    push.0
+    # => [transaction_threshold]
+
+    # get the number of account procedures
+    exec.active_account::get_num_procedures
+    # => [num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
+
+    # 2. iterate through all account procedures
+    dup neq.0
+    # => [should_continue, num_procedures, transaction_threshold]
+    while.true
+        sub.1 dup
+        # => [num_procedures-1, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # get procedure root of the procedure with index i
+        exec.active_account::get_procedure_root dupw
+        # => [PROC_ROOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # 2a. check if this procedure has been called in the transaction
+        exec.native_account::was_procedure_called
+        # => [was_called, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+        # if it has been called, get the override threshold of that procedure
+        if.true
+            # => [PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            push.PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT
+            # => [PROC_THRESHOLD_ROOTS_SLOT, PROC_ROOT, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            # 2b. get the override proc_threshold of that procedure
+            # if the procedure has no override threshold, the returned map item will be [0, 0, 0, 0]
+            exec.active_account::get_initial_map_item
+            # => [[0, 0, 0, proc_threshold], num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            drop drop drop dup dup.3
+            # => [transaction_threshold, proc_threshold, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+
+            u32assert2.err="transaction threshold or procedure threshold are not u32"
+            u32gt
+            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+            # 2c. if proc_threshold > transaction_threshold, update transaction_threshold
+            movup.2 movdn.3
+            # => [is_gt, proc_threshold, transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
+            cdrop
+            # => [updated_transaction_threshold, num_procedures-1]
+            swap
+            # => [num_procedures-1, updated_transaction_threshold]
+        # if it has not been called during this transaction, nothing to do, move to the next procedure
+        else
+            dropw
+            # => [num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+        end
+
+        dup neq.0
+        # => [should_continue, num_procedures-1, transaction_threshold]
+    end
+
+    drop
+    # => [transaction_threshold]
+
+    loc_load.0
+    # => [default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
+
+    # 3. if transaction_threshold == 0 at the end, revert to using default_threshold
+    dup.1 eq.0
+    # => [is_zero, default_threshold, transaction_threshold]
+
+    cdrop
+    # => [effective_transaction_threshold]
+end
+
+#! Authenticate a transaction using ECDSA secp256k1 with multi-signature support.
+#!
+#! This procedure implements multi-signature authentication by:
+#! 1. Computing the transaction summary message that needs to be signed
+#! 2. Verifying ECDSA signatures from multiple required signers against their public keys
+#! 3. Ensuring the minimum threshold of valid signatures is met
+#! 4. Implementing replay protection by tracking executed transactions
+#! 5. Verifying PSM signature if PSM selector is enabled (via PSM component)
+#!
+#! Inputs:
+#!   Operand stack: [SALT]
+#!   Advice map: {
+#!     h(PUB_KEY_0, MSG): SIG_0,
+#!     h(PUB_KEY_1, MSG): SIG_1,
+#!     h(PUB_KEY_n, MSG): SIG_n
+#!   }
+#! Outputs:
+#!   Operand stack: []
+#!
+#! Where:
+#! - SALT is a cryptographically random nonce that enables multiple concurrent
+#!   multisig transactions while maintaining replay protection. Each transaction
+#!   must use a unique SALT value to ensure transaction uniqueness.
+#! - SIG_i is the ECDSA signature from the i-th signer.
+#! - MSG is the transaction message being signed.
+#! - h(PUB_KEY_i, MSG) is the hash of the public key and message used as the advice map key.
+#!
+#! Panics if:
+#! - insufficient number of valid signatures (below threshold).
+#! - the same transaction has already been executed (replay protection).
+#! - PSM signature verification fails (if PSM is enabled).
+#!
+#! Invocation: call
+pub proc auth_tx_ecdsa_multisig.1(salt: BeWord)
+    exec.native_account::incr_nonce drop
+    # => [SALT]
+
+    # ------ Computing transaction summary ------
+
+    exec.auth::create_tx_summary
+    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # to build a tx_summary in the host, we need these four words in the advice provider
+    exec.auth::adv_insert_hqword
+    # => [SALT, OUTPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, INPUT_NOTES_COMMITMENT, ACCOUNT_DELTA_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # the commitment to the tx summary is the message that is signed
+    exec.auth::hash_tx_summary
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # ------ Verifying approver signatures ------
+
+    push.THRESHOLD_CONFIG_SLOT
+    # => [index, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    exec.active_account::get_initial_item
+    # => [0, 0, num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    drop drop
+    # => [num_of_approvers, default_threshold, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    swap movdn.5
+    # => [num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    push.PUBLIC_KEYS_MAP_SLOT
+    # => [pub_key_slot_idx, num_of_approvers, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    exec.::miden::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures
+    # => [num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT, default_threshold]
+
+    # ------ Checking threshold is >= num_verified_signatures ------
+
+    movup.5
+    # => [default_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    exec.compute_transaction_threshold
+    # => [transaction_threshold, num_verified_signatures, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    u32assert2 u32lt
+    # => [is_unauthorized, TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+
+    # If signatures are non-existent the tx will fail here.
+    if.true
+        emit.AUTH_UNAUTHORIZED_EVENT
+        push.0 assert.err="insufficient number of signatures"
+    end
+
+    # ------ Verifying PSM Signature ------
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+    call.psm_ecdsa::verify_psm_signature
+
+    # ------ Writing executed transaction MSG to map ------
+    # => [TX_SUMMARY_COMMITMENT]
+    exec.assert_new_tx
+end
+`;
+
 export const PSM_MASM = `# Private State Manager (PSM) Authentication Component
 #
 # This component provides PSM signature verification for accounts.
@@ -604,3 +1028,10 @@ pub proc verify_psm_signature(msg: BeWord)
     exec.enable_psm
 end
 `;
+
+export const PSM_ECDSA_MASM = PSM_MASM
+  .replaceAll('RPO Falcon 512', 'ECDSA secp256k1')
+  .replace(
+    'exec.::miden::auth::rpo_falcon512::verify_signatures',
+    'exec.::miden::auth::ecdsa_k256_keccak::verify_signatures',
+  );

package/src/account/storage.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import type { MultisigConfig } from '../types.js';
 import { StorageSlot, StorageMap, Word } from '@demox-labs/miden-sdk';
-import { ensureHexPrefix } from '../utils/encoding.js';
+import { normalizeHexWord } from '../utils/encoding.js';
 import { getProcedureRoot } from '../procedures.js';
 
 export class StorageLayoutBuilder {
@@ -19,19 +19,18 @@ export class StorageLayoutBuilder {
     const signersMap = new StorageMap();
     config.signerCommitments.forEach((commitment, index) => {
       const key = new Word(new BigUint64Array([BigInt(index), 0n, 0n, 0n]));
-      const value = Word.fromHex(ensureHexPrefix(commitment));
+      const value = Word.fromHex(normalizeHexWord(commitment));
       signersMap.insert(key, value);
     });
     const slot1 = StorageSlot.map(signersMap);
 
     const slot2 = StorageSlot.map(new StorageMap());
 
-    // Map entries: PROC_ROOT => [proc_threshold, 0, 0, 0]
-    // Use SDK's Word.fromHex to match how account code procedure roots are represented
     const procThresholdMap = new StorageMap();
     if (config.procedureThresholds) {
+      const signatureScheme = config.signatureScheme ?? 'falcon';
       for (const pt of config.procedureThresholds) {
-        const rootHex = getProcedureRoot(pt.procedure);
+        const rootHex = getProcedureRoot(pt.procedure, signatureScheme);
         const key = Word.fromHex(rootHex);
         const value = new Word(new BigUint64Array([BigInt(pt.threshold), 0n, 0n, 0n]));
         procThresholdMap.insert(key, value);
@@ -49,7 +48,7 @@ export class StorageLayoutBuilder {
 
     const psmKeyMap = new StorageMap();
     const zeroKey = new Word(new BigUint64Array([0n, 0n, 0n, 0n]));
-    const psmKey = Word.fromHex(ensureHexPrefix(config.psmCommitment));
+    const psmKey = Word.fromHex(normalizeHexWord(config.psmCommitment));
     psmKeyMap.insert(zeroKey, psmKey);
     const slot1 = StorageSlot.map(psmKeyMap);
 

package/src/client.test.ts

@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ describe('MultisigClient', () => {
     };
 
     mockSigner = {
+      scheme: 'falcon',
       commitment: '0x' + '1'.repeat(64),
       publicKey: '0x' + '2'.repeat(64),
       signAccountIdWithTimestamp: vi.fn().mockReturnValue('0x' + 'a'.repeat(128)),
@@ -174,4 +175,39 @@ describe('MultisigClient', () => {
       ).rejects.toThrow();
     });
   });
+
+  describe('initialize', () => {
+    it('should fetch PSM pubkey and return commitment', async () => {
+      const client = new MultisigClient(webClient);
+
+      mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: true,
+        json: async () => ({
+          commitment: '0x' + 'f'.repeat(64),
+          pubkey: '0x' + 'e'.repeat(64),
+        }),
+      });
+
+      const result = await client.initialize('falcon');
+
+      expect(result.psmCommitment).toBe('0x' + 'f'.repeat(64));
+      expect(result.psmPublicKey).toBe('0x' + 'e'.repeat(64));
+    });
+
+    it('should work without specifying scheme', async () => {
+      const client = new MultisigClient(webClient);
+
+      mockFetch.mockResolvedValueOnce({
+        ok: true,
+        json: async () => ({
+          commitment: '0x' + 'f'.repeat(64),
+        }),
+      });
+
+      const result = await client.initialize();
+
+      expect(result.psmCommitment).toBe('0x' + 'f'.repeat(64));
+      expect(result.psmPublicKey).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+  });
 });