@openwop/openwop 1.1.2 → 1.1.3

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
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+ /**
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+ * envelopeDirective — RFC 0030 §A `reasoning`-field prompt directive synthesis.
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+ *
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+ * Hosts that advertise `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported: true`
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+ * with `promptDirective: "advisory"` or `"mandatory"` inject a system-prompt
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+ * directive instructing the model to populate the OPTIONAL `reasoning` field
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+ * on envelope payload schemas that carry it. The directive is informational
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+ * — hosts MUST NOT reject envelopes where `reasoning` is absent regardless
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+ * of `promptDirective` strength (RFC 0030 §A).
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+ *
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+ * The directive fires only when the envelope's `responseSchema` declares a
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+ * top-level `reasoning` property. Schemas without `reasoning` (e.g.,
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+ * `schema.response` per RFC 0030 §A) do NOT receive the directive.
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+ *
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+ * Honest separation of concerns:
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+ * - This module decides WHEN to inject (schema has `reasoning`).
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+ * - The caller decides WHETHER to inject (read `promptDirective` from
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+ * the host's discovery advertisement).
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+ * - The model decides whether to ACTUALLY populate the field (the spec
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+ * forbids rejecting envelopes where `reasoning` is absent).
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+ *
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+ * **Operational note on `"mandatory"`** (per RFC 0030 §A 2026-05-21
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+ * amendment). Strict-output models may honor the mandatory wording
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+ * literally and refuse mid-emission when reasoning would be vacuous.
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+ * Hosts SHOULD prefer `"advisory"` unless empirical testing against the
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+ * active model class confirms `"mandatory"` doesn't trigger refusals.
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+ *
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+ * @see RFCS/0030-envelope-reasoning-and-tier-one-subset.md §A
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+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"Reasoning field (normative)"
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+ */
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+ /**
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+ * The strength of the host's `reasoning`-directive prompt injection.
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+ *
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+ * `"off"` — no directive injected. Caller skips this module entirely.
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+ * `"advisory"` — directive is suggestive ("populate `reasoning` with your
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+ * analytical process if the schema permits it"). The
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+ * spec-recommended default per RFC 0030 §C.
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+ * `"mandatory"` — directive is firm ("you MUST populate `reasoning` before
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+ * emitting the structured fields"). Hosts SHOULD prefer
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+ * `"advisory"` unless model-class-specific testing shows
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+ * `"mandatory"` is safe.
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+ *
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+ * Both `"advisory"` and `"mandatory"` are prompt-injection postures, NOT
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+ * wire-level refusal contracts — the host accepts envelopes regardless of
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+ * whether `reasoning` is populated (RFC 0030 §A normative MUST NOT).
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+ */
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+ export type ReasoningDirectiveStrength = 'off' | 'advisory' | 'mandatory';
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+ /**
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+ * Build the directive string to append to the system prompt, OR `null` if
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+ * the schema does not declare a top-level `reasoning` property.
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+ *
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+ * Callers append the returned string to the existing system prompt with a
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+ * separating newline. When `strength === 'off'`, callers SHOULD short-circuit
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+ * before invoking this helper (returning `null` here is treated as "no
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+ * applicable schema," not "directive disabled").
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+ *
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+ * The helper inspects only the top-level `properties.reasoning` slot.
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+ * Nested `reasoning` fields (e.g., inside an `anyOf` branch's payload) are
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+ * not auto-detected — vendor-kind authors who want per-branch directives
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+ * synthesize their own.
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+ *
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+ * @example
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+ * ```ts
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+ * import { buildReasoningDirective } from '@openwop/openwop';
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+ *
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+ * const directive = buildReasoningDirective(
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+ * { type: 'object', properties: { reasoning: { type: 'string' }, ... } },
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+ * 'advisory',
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+ * );
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+ * // directive is a string ~80 words; null when schema lacks `reasoning`
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+ * const systemPrompt = [originalSystemPrompt, schemaHint, directive]
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+ * .filter((s): s is string => Boolean(s))
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+ * .join('\n\n');
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+ * ```
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+ */
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+ export declare function buildReasoningDirective(responseSchema: unknown, strength: ReasoningDirectiveStrength): string | null;
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=envelope-directive.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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+ {"version":3,"file":"envelope-directive.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/envelope-directive.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AAEH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAeG;AACH,MAAM,MAAM,0BAA0B,GAAG,KAAK,GAAG,UAAU,GAAG,WAAW,CAAC;AAE1E;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,wBAAgB,uBAAuB,CACrC,cAAc,EAAE,OAAO,EACvB,QAAQ,EAAE,0BAA0B,GACnC,MAAM,GAAG,IAAI,CA6Bf"}
@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
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+ /**
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+ * envelopeDirective — RFC 0030 §A `reasoning`-field prompt directive synthesis.
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+ *
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+ * Hosts that advertise `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported: true`
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+ * with `promptDirective: "advisory"` or `"mandatory"` inject a system-prompt
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+ * directive instructing the model to populate the OPTIONAL `reasoning` field
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+ * on envelope payload schemas that carry it. The directive is informational
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+ * — hosts MUST NOT reject envelopes where `reasoning` is absent regardless
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+ * of `promptDirective` strength (RFC 0030 §A).
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+ *
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+ * The directive fires only when the envelope's `responseSchema` declares a
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+ * top-level `reasoning` property. Schemas without `reasoning` (e.g.,
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+ * `schema.response` per RFC 0030 §A) do NOT receive the directive.
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+ *
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+ * Honest separation of concerns:
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+ * - This module decides WHEN to inject (schema has `reasoning`).
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+ * - The caller decides WHETHER to inject (read `promptDirective` from
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+ * the host's discovery advertisement).
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+ * - The model decides whether to ACTUALLY populate the field (the spec
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+ * forbids rejecting envelopes where `reasoning` is absent).
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+ *
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+ * **Operational note on `"mandatory"`** (per RFC 0030 §A 2026-05-21
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+ * amendment). Strict-output models may honor the mandatory wording
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+ * literally and refuse mid-emission when reasoning would be vacuous.
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+ * Hosts SHOULD prefer `"advisory"` unless empirical testing against the
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+ * active model class confirms `"mandatory"` doesn't trigger refusals.
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+ *
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+ * @see RFCS/0030-envelope-reasoning-and-tier-one-subset.md §A
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+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"Reasoning field (normative)"
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+ */
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+ /**
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+ * Build the directive string to append to the system prompt, OR `null` if
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+ * the schema does not declare a top-level `reasoning` property.
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+ *
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+ * Callers append the returned string to the existing system prompt with a
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+ * separating newline. When `strength === 'off'`, callers SHOULD short-circuit
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+ * before invoking this helper (returning `null` here is treated as "no
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+ * applicable schema," not "directive disabled").
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+ *
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+ * The helper inspects only the top-level `properties.reasoning` slot.
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+ * Nested `reasoning` fields (e.g., inside an `anyOf` branch's payload) are
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+ * not auto-detected — vendor-kind authors who want per-branch directives
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+ * synthesize their own.
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+ *
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+ * @example
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+ * ```ts
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+ * import { buildReasoningDirective } from '@openwop/openwop';
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+ *
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+ * const directive = buildReasoningDirective(
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+ * { type: 'object', properties: { reasoning: { type: 'string' }, ... } },
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+ * 'advisory',
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+ * );
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+ * // directive is a string ~80 words; null when schema lacks `reasoning`
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+ * const systemPrompt = [originalSystemPrompt, schemaHint, directive]
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+ * .filter((s): s is string => Boolean(s))
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+ * .join('\n\n');
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+ * ```
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+ */
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+ export function buildReasoningDirective(responseSchema, strength) {
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+ if (strength === 'off')
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+ return null;
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+ if (!responseSchema || typeof responseSchema !== 'object')
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+ return null;
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+ const schema = responseSchema;
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+ const properties = schema.properties;
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+ if (!properties || typeof properties !== 'object')
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+ return null;
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+ const reasoningProp = properties.reasoning;
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+ if (!reasoningProp || typeof reasoningProp !== 'object')
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+ return null;
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+ if (strength === 'mandatory') {
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+ return [
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+ 'BEFORE emitting the structured fields, populate the `reasoning` property with your analytical',
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+ 'process — explain how you derived each structured field, what assumptions you made, and what',
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+ 'risks or alternative interpretations you considered. The `reasoning` field is REQUIRED in your',
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+ 'output; do not skip it. (Note: the host accepts envelopes where `reasoning` is absent per',
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+ 'RFC 0030 §A, but for this dispatch the host expects it populated.)',
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+ ].join(' ');
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+ }
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+ // strength === 'advisory'
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+ return [
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+ 'If your response schema declares a `reasoning` property, populate it as the first field with',
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+ 'your analytical process — explain how you derived each structured field. Per Tam et al. (arXiv',
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+ "2408.02442), models constrained to strict JSON output suffer reasoning-quality collapse when",
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+ 'no reasoning slot exists; use this field to think before emitting the structured payload. The',
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+ 'host accepts envelopes where `reasoning` is absent — populate it when it improves clarity.',
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+ ].join(' ');
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+ }
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+ //# sourceMappingURL=envelope-directive.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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+ {"version":3,"file":"envelope-directive.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/envelope-directive.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA6BG;AAoBH;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA2BG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,uBAAuB,CACrC,cAAuB,EACvB,QAAoC;IAEpC,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,KAAK;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IACpC,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,IAAI,OAAO,cAAc,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAEvE,MAAM,MAAM,GAAG,cAA0C,CAAC;IAC1D,MAAM,UAAU,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;IACrC,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,IAAI,OAAO,UAAU,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAE/D,MAAM,aAAa,GAAI,UAAsC,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC;IACxE,IAAI,CAAC,aAAa,IAAI,OAAO,aAAa,KAAK,QAAQ;QAAE,OAAO,IAAI,CAAC;IAErE,IAAI,QAAQ,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,CAAC;QAC7B,OAAO;YACL,+FAA+F;YAC/F,8FAA8F;YAC9F,gGAAgG;YAChG,2FAA2F;YAC3F,oEAAoE;SACrE,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;IACd,CAAC;IAED,0BAA0B;IAC1B,OAAO;QACL,8FAA8F;QAC9F,gGAAgG;QAChG,8FAA8F;QAC9F,+FAA+F;QAC/F,4FAA4F;KAC7F,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC;AACd,CAAC"}
package/dist/index.d.ts CHANGED
@@ -26,4 +26,8 @@ export type { VerifyWebhookSignatureOptions, VerifyWebhookOutcome, } from './web
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  export { RegistryClient } from './registry-helpers.js';
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  export type { RegistryClientOptions, RegistryDiscovery, RegistryIndex, RegistryIndexEntry, RegistryPackMetadata, RegistryVersionManifest, } from './registry-helpers.js';
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  export type { AIEnvelope, AIEnvelopeErrorPayload, ClarificationRequestPayload, EnvelopeContract, EnvelopeContractRefusal, EnvelopeContractsCapability, EnvelopeMeta, EnvelopeOutcome, EnvelopeStrictness, PartialInfo, SchemaRequestPayload, SchemaResponsePayload, ValidationDetail, } from './types.js';
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+ export { buildReasoningDirective } from './envelope-directive.js';
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+ export type { ReasoningDirectiveStrength } from './envelope-directive.js';
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+ export { parseRefusal } from './parse-refusal.js';
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+ export type { RefusalProvider, RefusalSignal } from './parse-refusal.js';
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  //# sourceMappingURL=index.d.ts.map
@@ -1 +1 @@
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+ {"version":3,"file":"index.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/index.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;;;;;;;;GAUG;AAEH,OAAO,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AAC5C,YAAY,EAAE,oBAAoB,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,MAAM,aAAa,CAAC;AACzE,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AACtC,YAAY,EACV,kBAAkB,EAClB,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,sBAAsB,EACtB,YAAY,EACZ,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,cAAc,EACd,eAAe,EACf,WAAW,EACX,kBAAkB,EAClB,sBAAsB,EACtB,uBAAuB,EACvB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,eAAe,EACf,gBAAgB,EAChB,kBAAkB,EAClB,+BAA+B,EAC/B,uBAAuB,EACvB,wBAAwB,EACxB,gBAAgB,EAChB,iBAAiB,EACjB,eAAe,EACf,WAAW,EACX,WAAW,EACX,SAAS,EACT,UAAU,EACV,aAAa,EACb,oBAAoB,EACpB,0BAA0B,EAC1B,sBAAsB,EACtB,wBAAwB,EACxB,mBAAmB,EACnB,mBAAmB,EAEnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,kBAAkB,EAClB,mBAAmB,EACnB,UAAU,EACV,SAAS,EACT,cAAc,EACd,cAAc,EACd,mBAAmB,EACnB,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AACpB,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AACxC,YAAY,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,UAAU,CAAC;AAIzE,OAAO,EACL,eAAe,EACf,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,mBAAmB,EACnB,cAAc,EACd,cAAc,EACd,yBAAyB,GAC1B,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAC5B,YAAY,EACV,uBAAuB,EACvB,WAAW,GACZ,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAK5B,OAAO,EACL,mBAAmB,EACnB,qBAAqB,EACrB,mBAAmB,EACnB,gBAAgB,EAChB,eAAe,EACf,eAAe,EACf,cAAc,GACf,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC1B,YAAY,EACV,eAAe,EACf,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,YAAY,EACZ,QAAQ,GACT,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAM1B,OAAO,EACL,4BAA4B,EAC5B,sBAAsB,GACvB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAC/B,YAAY,EAAE,wBAAwB,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAMtE,OAAO,EACL,wCAAwC,EACxC,sBAAsB,EACtB,mBAAmB,GACpB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAC9B,YAAY,EACV,6BAA6B,EAC7B,oBAAoB,GACrB,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAK9B,OAAO,EAAE,cAAc,EAAE,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AACvD,YAAY,EACV,qBAAqB,EACrB,iBAAiB,EACjB,aAAa,EACb,kBAAkB,EAClB,oBAAoB,EACpB,uBAAuB,GACxB,MAAM,uBAAuB,CAAC;AAI/B,YAAY,EACV,UAAU,EACV,sBAAsB,EACtB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,gBAAgB,EAChB,uBAAuB,EACvB,2BAA2B,EAC3B,YAAY,EACZ,eAAe,EACf,kBAAkB,EAClB,WAAW,EACX,oBAAoB,EACpB,qBAAqB,EACrB,gBAAgB,GACjB,MAAM,YAAY,CAAC;AAQpB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAClE,YAAY,EAAE,0BAA0B,EAAE,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAW1E,OAAO,EAAE,YAAY,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC;AAClD,YAAY,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,oBAAoB,CAAC"}
package/dist/index.js CHANGED
@@ -33,4 +33,21 @@ export { DEFAULT_WEBHOOK_FRESHNESS_WINDOW_SECONDS, verifyWebhookSignature, signW
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  // typed client for the public node-pack registry at packs.openwop.dev
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  // per spec/v1/registry-operations.md.
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  export { RegistryClient } from './registry-helpers.js';
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+ // RFC 0030 §A `reasoning` field prompt-directive helper. Hosts that
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+ // advertise `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported: true` use this
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+ // to synthesize the system-prompt fragment that instructs the model to
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+ // populate the OPTIONAL `reasoning` field. See `envelope-directive.ts`
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+ // for the operational note on `"mandatory"` strength (provider-side
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+ // refusal risk per the 2026-05-21 RFC 0030 amendment).
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+ export { buildReasoningDirective } from './envelope-directive.js';
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+ // RFC 0032 §B.3 + RFC 0033 §D refusal detection helper. Normalizes
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+ // per-provider safety-stop signals (Anthropic `stop_reason: "refusal"`,
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+ // OpenAI `message.refusal` + `finish_reason: "content_filter"`, Gemini
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+ // `finishReason: "SAFETY"` + `promptFeedback.blockReason: "SAFETY"`)
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+ // to a canonical `{ refusalText, safetyCategory?, provider }` shape.
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+ // Hosts route the non-null return through `envelope.refusal` emission
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+ // + the `envelope_refusal` terminal error code (RFC 0033 §F).
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+ // **SECURITY:** Pass `refusalText` through the BYOK redaction harness
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+ // BEFORE persistence — this helper does NOT redact.
52
+ export { parseRefusal } from './parse-refusal.js';
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  //# sourceMappingURL=index.js.map
package/dist/index.js.map CHANGED
@@ -1 +1 @@
1
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@@ -0,0 +1,114 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * parseRefusal — normalize per-provider LLM safety-stop signals to the
3
+ * canonical RFC 0032 §B.3 refusal shape.
4
+ *
5
+ * The three Tier-1 vendors (Anthropic / OpenAI / Google Gemini) surface
6
+ * refusals through different fields:
7
+ *
8
+ * - **Anthropic Messages API**: `stop_reason: "refusal"` (their 2025
9
+ * release) OR `stop_reason: "end_turn"` accompanied by safety-stop
10
+ * markers in the content. Refusal text MAY be inline in the
11
+ * `content[]` array's text blocks.
12
+ * - **OpenAI Chat Completions**: `choices[0].finish_reason:
13
+ * "content_filter"` OR `choices[0].message.refusal: <string>` (the
14
+ * refusal-text field added in their structured-output release).
15
+ * - **Google Gemini**: `candidates[0].finishReason: "SAFETY"` OR
16
+ * `promptFeedback.blockReason: "SAFETY"` (input-side block).
17
+ *
18
+ * Without normalization, every host re-implements this detection. This
19
+ * helper consolidates the per-vendor shape-detection and returns a
20
+ * canonical `RefusalSignal | null` — null when the response is a
21
+ * normal completion (no refusal detected).
22
+ *
23
+ * Per RFC 0032 §B.3 + RFC 0033 §D, hosts MUST NOT retry on refusal
24
+ * (circumvention concern). Callers route the non-null return through
25
+ * `envelope.refusal` emission + the `envelope_refusal` terminal error
26
+ * code (per RFC 0033 §F).
27
+ *
28
+ * Per SECURITY/invariants.yaml §envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak,
29
+ * `refusalText` MUST be passed through the host's BYOK redaction
30
+ * harness BEFORE persistence — this helper does NOT redact; the
31
+ * caller is responsible for SR-1 carry-forward.
32
+ *
33
+ * @see RFCS/0032-envelope-reliability-events.md §B.3
34
+ * @see RFCS/0033-envelope-completion-contract.md §D + §F
35
+ * @see SECURITY/invariants.yaml §envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak
36
+ */
37
+ /**
38
+ * Provider identifier for the matched shape. `"unknown"` is reserved
39
+ * for refusals matched on heuristic signals without a definitive
40
+ * vendor-shape match.
41
+ */
42
+ export type RefusalProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'unknown';
43
+ /**
44
+ * Canonical refusal signal. All three Tier-1 vendor shapes normalize
45
+ * to this form. `null` from `parseRefusal()` means "no refusal detected"
46
+ * (a normal completion); a non-null `RefusalSignal` means the caller
47
+ * SHOULD route through the RFC 0032 §B.3 refusal-emission path.
48
+ */
49
+ export interface RefusalSignal {
50
+ /**
51
+ * The provider's refusal text, when surfaced. MAY be `null` even for
52
+ * detected refusals — Anthropic + Gemini frequently refuse without
53
+ * inline text (the safety filter is opaque to the model). OpenAI's
54
+ * `message.refusal` field is the most consistent source of human-
55
+ * readable refusal text.
56
+ *
57
+ * **SECURITY:** When non-null, `refusalText` MAY contain prompt
58
+ * content that triggered the safety filter. Callers MUST pass it
59
+ * through their BYOK + prompt-content redaction harness BEFORE
60
+ * persistence (per `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` SECURITY
61
+ * invariant).
62
+ */
63
+ refusalText: string | null;
64
+ /**
65
+ * Provider-specific safety-category identifier, when surfaced.
66
+ * Examples: Gemini's safety-rating categories
67
+ * (`HARM_CATEGORY_HARASSMENT`, etc.), OpenAI's content-filter category,
68
+ * Anthropic's policy-violation tag. Hosts MAY echo this on the
69
+ * `envelope.refusal.safetyCategory` event field for downstream
70
+ * observability.
71
+ */
72
+ safetyCategory?: string;
73
+ /**
74
+ * Which provider's shape was matched. Useful for debugging
75
+ * cross-host integration + for hosts that want to route refusals
76
+ * differently per vendor (e.g., different operator notifications).
77
+ */
78
+ provider: RefusalProvider;
79
+ }
80
+ /**
81
+ * Parse a provider response into a canonical refusal signal.
82
+ *
83
+ * Returns `null` when no refusal is detected (normal completion).
84
+ * Returns a `RefusalSignal` when the response matches one of the
85
+ * three Tier-1 vendors' safety-stop shapes.
86
+ *
87
+ * Detection order: OpenAI → Anthropic → Gemini. Each detector inspects
88
+ * a distinctive top-level field, so cross-vendor false-positives are
89
+ * unlikely. A response that doesn't match any vendor shape returns
90
+ * `null` (hosts that route through novel providers add their own
91
+ * detector + fall back to this for the three known ones).
92
+ *
93
+ * @example
94
+ * ```ts
95
+ * import { parseRefusal } from '@openwop/openwop';
96
+ *
97
+ * const response = await callOpenAI({...});
98
+ * const refusal = parseRefusal(response);
99
+ * if (refusal) {
100
+ * // Route through envelope.refusal emission + envelope_refusal error code.
101
+ * // REMEMBER to redact refusalText through the BYOK harness before
102
+ * // persistence (SECURITY invariant envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak).
103
+ * await emitEnvelopeRefusal({
104
+ * refusalText: redactBYOK(refusal.refusalText),
105
+ * safetyCategory: refusal.safetyCategory,
106
+ * provider: refusal.provider,
107
+ * });
108
+ * throw new EnvelopeRefusalError(...);
109
+ * }
110
+ * // ...normal-completion handling...
111
+ * ```
112
+ */
113
+ export declare function parseRefusal(providerResponse: unknown): RefusalSignal | null;
114
+ //# sourceMappingURL=parse-refusal.d.ts.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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@@ -0,0 +1,216 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * parseRefusal — normalize per-provider LLM safety-stop signals to the
3
+ * canonical RFC 0032 §B.3 refusal shape.
4
+ *
5
+ * The three Tier-1 vendors (Anthropic / OpenAI / Google Gemini) surface
6
+ * refusals through different fields:
7
+ *
8
+ * - **Anthropic Messages API**: `stop_reason: "refusal"` (their 2025
9
+ * release) OR `stop_reason: "end_turn"` accompanied by safety-stop
10
+ * markers in the content. Refusal text MAY be inline in the
11
+ * `content[]` array's text blocks.
12
+ * - **OpenAI Chat Completions**: `choices[0].finish_reason:
13
+ * "content_filter"` OR `choices[0].message.refusal: <string>` (the
14
+ * refusal-text field added in their structured-output release).
15
+ * - **Google Gemini**: `candidates[0].finishReason: "SAFETY"` OR
16
+ * `promptFeedback.blockReason: "SAFETY"` (input-side block).
17
+ *
18
+ * Without normalization, every host re-implements this detection. This
19
+ * helper consolidates the per-vendor shape-detection and returns a
20
+ * canonical `RefusalSignal | null` — null when the response is a
21
+ * normal completion (no refusal detected).
22
+ *
23
+ * Per RFC 0032 §B.3 + RFC 0033 §D, hosts MUST NOT retry on refusal
24
+ * (circumvention concern). Callers route the non-null return through
25
+ * `envelope.refusal` emission + the `envelope_refusal` terminal error
26
+ * code (per RFC 0033 §F).
27
+ *
28
+ * Per SECURITY/invariants.yaml §envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak,
29
+ * `refusalText` MUST be passed through the host's BYOK redaction
30
+ * harness BEFORE persistence — this helper does NOT redact; the
31
+ * caller is responsible for SR-1 carry-forward.
32
+ *
33
+ * @see RFCS/0032-envelope-reliability-events.md §B.3
34
+ * @see RFCS/0033-envelope-completion-contract.md §D + §F
35
+ * @see SECURITY/invariants.yaml §envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak
36
+ */
37
+ /**
38
+ * Try to parse the response as OpenAI Chat Completions output.
39
+ *
40
+ * Detection: top-level `choices` array. Refusal signals:
41
+ * - `choices[0].finish_reason === "content_filter"`
42
+ * - `choices[0].message.refusal` is a non-empty string
43
+ */
44
+ function tryParseOpenAI(response) {
45
+ if (!response || typeof response !== 'object')
46
+ return null;
47
+ const r = response;
48
+ if (!Array.isArray(r.choices) || r.choices.length === 0)
49
+ return null;
50
+ const choice = r.choices[0];
51
+ if (!choice || typeof choice !== 'object')
52
+ return null;
53
+ const finishReason = choice.finish_reason;
54
+ const message = choice.message;
55
+ const refusalField = message && typeof message === 'object' ? message.refusal : undefined;
56
+ // Primary signal: explicit refusal-text field. OpenAI's structured-output
57
+ // release populates this when the safety filter intervenes.
58
+ if (typeof refusalField === 'string' && refusalField.length > 0) {
59
+ return { refusalText: refusalField, provider: 'openai' };
60
+ }
61
+ // Secondary signal: finish_reason. content_filter is the canonical
62
+ // safety-stop value.
63
+ if (finishReason === 'content_filter') {
64
+ const text = message && typeof message === 'object' && typeof message.content === 'string'
65
+ ? message.content
66
+ : null;
67
+ return { refusalText: text, safetyCategory: 'content_filter', provider: 'openai' };
68
+ }
69
+ return null;
70
+ }
71
+ /**
72
+ * Try to parse the response as Anthropic Messages API output.
73
+ *
74
+ * Detection: top-level `stop_reason` field (Anthropic's distinctive
75
+ * marker). Refusal signals:
76
+ * - `stop_reason === "refusal"` (their 2025 release)
77
+ *
78
+ * Anthropic does not surface a distinct safety-category field on
79
+ * refusals; the `refusal` stop_reason is the binary signal.
80
+ */
81
+ function tryParseAnthropic(response) {
82
+ if (!response || typeof response !== 'object')
83
+ return null;
84
+ const r = response;
85
+ if (typeof r.stop_reason !== 'string')
86
+ return null;
87
+ if (r.stop_reason === 'refusal') {
88
+ // Extract refusal text from the content array (Anthropic returns an
89
+ // array of typed blocks; refusal text appears in `text`-type blocks).
90
+ let refusalText = null;
91
+ if (Array.isArray(r.content)) {
92
+ const textBlocks = [];
93
+ for (const block of r.content) {
94
+ if (block && typeof block === 'object') {
95
+ const b = block;
96
+ if (b.type === 'text' && typeof b.text === 'string') {
97
+ textBlocks.push(b.text);
98
+ }
99
+ }
100
+ }
101
+ if (textBlocks.length > 0)
102
+ refusalText = textBlocks.join('\n');
103
+ }
104
+ return { refusalText, provider: 'anthropic' };
105
+ }
106
+ return null;
107
+ }
108
+ /**
109
+ * Try to parse the response as Google Gemini `generateContent` output.
110
+ *
111
+ * Detection: top-level `candidates` array OR top-level `promptFeedback`
112
+ * object. Refusal signals:
113
+ * - `candidates[0].finishReason === "SAFETY"` (output-side block)
114
+ * - `promptFeedback.blockReason === "SAFETY"` (input-side block)
115
+ *
116
+ * Gemini surfaces safety categories on `safetyRatings[]`; this helper
117
+ * picks the highest-probability HIGH/MEDIUM-tier category as
118
+ * `safetyCategory` when available.
119
+ */
120
+ function tryParseGemini(response) {
121
+ if (!response || typeof response !== 'object')
122
+ return null;
123
+ const r = response;
124
+ // Output-side safety block.
125
+ if (Array.isArray(r.candidates) && r.candidates.length > 0) {
126
+ const candidate = r.candidates[0];
127
+ if (candidate && typeof candidate === 'object' && candidate.finishReason === 'SAFETY') {
128
+ const safetyCategory = extractGeminiHighestRiskCategory(candidate.safetyRatings);
129
+ const result = { refusalText: null, provider: 'google' };
130
+ if (safetyCategory !== undefined)
131
+ result.safetyCategory = safetyCategory;
132
+ return result;
133
+ }
134
+ }
135
+ // Input-side safety block (Gemini rejected the prompt itself).
136
+ if (r.promptFeedback && typeof r.promptFeedback === 'object') {
137
+ const pf = r.promptFeedback;
138
+ if (typeof pf.blockReason === 'string' && pf.blockReason.toUpperCase().includes('SAFETY')) {
139
+ const safetyCategory = extractGeminiHighestRiskCategory(pf.safetyRatings);
140
+ const result = { refusalText: null, provider: 'google' };
141
+ if (safetyCategory !== undefined)
142
+ result.safetyCategory = safetyCategory;
143
+ return result;
144
+ }
145
+ }
146
+ return null;
147
+ }
148
+ /**
149
+ * From a Gemini `safetyRatings[]` array, return the highest-probability
150
+ * non-NEGLIGIBLE category identifier. Returns `undefined` when the
151
+ * array is absent or all ratings are NEGLIGIBLE.
152
+ */
153
+ function extractGeminiHighestRiskCategory(safetyRatings) {
154
+ if (!Array.isArray(safetyRatings))
155
+ return undefined;
156
+ const PROBABILITY_RANK = {
157
+ HIGH: 3,
158
+ MEDIUM: 2,
159
+ LOW: 1,
160
+ NEGLIGIBLE: 0,
161
+ };
162
+ let best = null;
163
+ for (const rating of safetyRatings) {
164
+ if (!rating || typeof rating !== 'object')
165
+ continue;
166
+ const r = rating;
167
+ if (typeof r.category !== 'string' || typeof r.probability !== 'string')
168
+ continue;
169
+ const rank = PROBABILITY_RANK[r.probability.toUpperCase()] ?? 0;
170
+ if (rank === 0)
171
+ continue;
172
+ if (best === null || rank > best.rank) {
173
+ best = { category: r.category, rank };
174
+ }
175
+ }
176
+ return best?.category;
177
+ }
178
+ /**
179
+ * Parse a provider response into a canonical refusal signal.
180
+ *
181
+ * Returns `null` when no refusal is detected (normal completion).
182
+ * Returns a `RefusalSignal` when the response matches one of the
183
+ * three Tier-1 vendors' safety-stop shapes.
184
+ *
185
+ * Detection order: OpenAI → Anthropic → Gemini. Each detector inspects
186
+ * a distinctive top-level field, so cross-vendor false-positives are
187
+ * unlikely. A response that doesn't match any vendor shape returns
188
+ * `null` (hosts that route through novel providers add their own
189
+ * detector + fall back to this for the three known ones).
190
+ *
191
+ * @example
192
+ * ```ts
193
+ * import { parseRefusal } from '@openwop/openwop';
194
+ *
195
+ * const response = await callOpenAI({...});
196
+ * const refusal = parseRefusal(response);
197
+ * if (refusal) {
198
+ * // Route through envelope.refusal emission + envelope_refusal error code.
199
+ * // REMEMBER to redact refusalText through the BYOK harness before
200
+ * // persistence (SECURITY invariant envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak).
201
+ * await emitEnvelopeRefusal({
202
+ * refusalText: redactBYOK(refusal.refusalText),
203
+ * safetyCategory: refusal.safetyCategory,
204
+ * provider: refusal.provider,
205
+ * });
206
+ * throw new EnvelopeRefusalError(...);
207
+ * }
208
+ * // ...normal-completion handling...
209
+ * ```
210
+ */
211
+ export function parseRefusal(providerResponse) {
212
+ return (tryParseOpenAI(providerResponse) ??
213
+ tryParseAnthropic(providerResponse) ??
214
+ tryParseGemini(providerResponse));
215
+ }
216
+ //# sourceMappingURL=parse-refusal.js.map
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
1
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package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@openwop/openwop",
3
- "version": "1.1.2",
3
+ "version": "1.1.3",
4
4
  "description": "Production-ready TypeScript reference SDK for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
5
5
  "repository": {
6
6
  "type": "git",
@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * envelopeDirective — RFC 0030 §A `reasoning`-field prompt directive synthesis.
3
+ *
4
+ * Hosts that advertise `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported: true`
5
+ * with `promptDirective: "advisory"` or `"mandatory"` inject a system-prompt
6
+ * directive instructing the model to populate the OPTIONAL `reasoning` field
7
+ * on envelope payload schemas that carry it. The directive is informational
8
+ * — hosts MUST NOT reject envelopes where `reasoning` is absent regardless
9
+ * of `promptDirective` strength (RFC 0030 §A).
10
+ *
11
+ * The directive fires only when the envelope's `responseSchema` declares a
12
+ * top-level `reasoning` property. Schemas without `reasoning` (e.g.,
13
+ * `schema.response` per RFC 0030 §A) do NOT receive the directive.
14
+ *
15
+ * Honest separation of concerns:
16
+ * - This module decides WHEN to inject (schema has `reasoning`).
17
+ * - The caller decides WHETHER to inject (read `promptDirective` from
18
+ * the host's discovery advertisement).
19
+ * - The model decides whether to ACTUALLY populate the field (the spec
20
+ * forbids rejecting envelopes where `reasoning` is absent).
21
+ *
22
+ * **Operational note on `"mandatory"`** (per RFC 0030 §A 2026-05-21
23
+ * amendment). Strict-output models may honor the mandatory wording
24
+ * literally and refuse mid-emission when reasoning would be vacuous.
25
+ * Hosts SHOULD prefer `"advisory"` unless empirical testing against the
26
+ * active model class confirms `"mandatory"` doesn't trigger refusals.
27
+ *
28
+ * @see RFCS/0030-envelope-reasoning-and-tier-one-subset.md §A
29
+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"Reasoning field (normative)"
30
+ */
31
+
32
+ /**
33
+ * The strength of the host's `reasoning`-directive prompt injection.
34
+ *
35
+ * `"off"` — no directive injected. Caller skips this module entirely.
36
+ * `"advisory"` — directive is suggestive ("populate `reasoning` with your
37
+ * analytical process if the schema permits it"). The
38
+ * spec-recommended default per RFC 0030 §C.
39
+ * `"mandatory"` — directive is firm ("you MUST populate `reasoning` before
40
+ * emitting the structured fields"). Hosts SHOULD prefer
41
+ * `"advisory"` unless model-class-specific testing shows
42
+ * `"mandatory"` is safe.
43
+ *
44
+ * Both `"advisory"` and `"mandatory"` are prompt-injection postures, NOT
45
+ * wire-level refusal contracts — the host accepts envelopes regardless of
46
+ * whether `reasoning` is populated (RFC 0030 §A normative MUST NOT).
47
+ */
48
+ export type ReasoningDirectiveStrength = 'off' | 'advisory' | 'mandatory';
49
+
50
+ /**
51
+ * Build the directive string to append to the system prompt, OR `null` if
52
+ * the schema does not declare a top-level `reasoning` property.
53
+ *
54
+ * Callers append the returned string to the existing system prompt with a
55
+ * separating newline. When `strength === 'off'`, callers SHOULD short-circuit
56
+ * before invoking this helper (returning `null` here is treated as "no
57
+ * applicable schema," not "directive disabled").
58
+ *
59
+ * The helper inspects only the top-level `properties.reasoning` slot.
60
+ * Nested `reasoning` fields (e.g., inside an `anyOf` branch's payload) are
61
+ * not auto-detected — vendor-kind authors who want per-branch directives
62
+ * synthesize their own.
63
+ *
64
+ * @example
65
+ * ```ts
66
+ * import { buildReasoningDirective } from '@openwop/openwop';
67
+ *
68
+ * const directive = buildReasoningDirective(
69
+ * { type: 'object', properties: { reasoning: { type: 'string' }, ... } },
70
+ * 'advisory',
71
+ * );
72
+ * // directive is a string ~80 words; null when schema lacks `reasoning`
73
+ * const systemPrompt = [originalSystemPrompt, schemaHint, directive]
74
+ * .filter((s): s is string => Boolean(s))
75
+ * .join('\n\n');
76
+ * ```
77
+ */
78
+ export function buildReasoningDirective(
79
+ responseSchema: unknown,
80
+ strength: ReasoningDirectiveStrength,
81
+ ): string | null {
82
+ if (strength === 'off') return null;
83
+ if (!responseSchema || typeof responseSchema !== 'object') return null;
84
+
85
+ const schema = responseSchema as { properties?: unknown };
86
+ const properties = schema.properties;
87
+ if (!properties || typeof properties !== 'object') return null;
88
+
89
+ const reasoningProp = (properties as { reasoning?: unknown }).reasoning;
90
+ if (!reasoningProp || typeof reasoningProp !== 'object') return null;
91
+
92
+ if (strength === 'mandatory') {
93
+ return [
94
+ 'BEFORE emitting the structured fields, populate the `reasoning` property with your analytical',
95
+ 'process — explain how you derived each structured field, what assumptions you made, and what',
96
+ 'risks or alternative interpretations you considered. The `reasoning` field is REQUIRED in your',
97
+ 'output; do not skip it. (Note: the host accepts envelopes where `reasoning` is absent per',
98
+ 'RFC 0030 §A, but for this dispatch the host expects it populated.)',
99
+ ].join(' ');
100
+ }
101
+
102
+ // strength === 'advisory'
103
+ return [
104
+ 'If your response schema declares a `reasoning` property, populate it as the first field with',
105
+ 'your analytical process — explain how you derived each structured field. Per Tam et al. (arXiv',
106
+ "2408.02442), models constrained to strict JSON output suffer reasoning-quality collapse when",
107
+ 'no reasoning slot exists; use this field to think before emitting the structured payload. The',
108
+ 'host accepts envelopes where `reasoning` is absent — populate it when it improves clarity.',
109
+ ].join(' ');
110
+ }
package/src/index.ts CHANGED
@@ -157,3 +157,24 @@ export type {
157
157
  SchemaResponsePayload,
158
158
  ValidationDetail,
159
159
  } from './types.js';
160
+
161
+ // RFC 0030 §A `reasoning` field prompt-directive helper. Hosts that
162
+ // advertise `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported: true` use this
163
+ // to synthesize the system-prompt fragment that instructs the model to
164
+ // populate the OPTIONAL `reasoning` field. See `envelope-directive.ts`
165
+ // for the operational note on `"mandatory"` strength (provider-side
166
+ // refusal risk per the 2026-05-21 RFC 0030 amendment).
167
+ export { buildReasoningDirective } from './envelope-directive.js';
168
+ export type { ReasoningDirectiveStrength } from './envelope-directive.js';
169
+
170
+ // RFC 0032 §B.3 + RFC 0033 §D refusal detection helper. Normalizes
171
+ // per-provider safety-stop signals (Anthropic `stop_reason: "refusal"`,
172
+ // OpenAI `message.refusal` + `finish_reason: "content_filter"`, Gemini
173
+ // `finishReason: "SAFETY"` + `promptFeedback.blockReason: "SAFETY"`)
174
+ // to a canonical `{ refusalText, safetyCategory?, provider }` shape.
175
+ // Hosts route the non-null return through `envelope.refusal` emission
176
+ // + the `envelope_refusal` terminal error code (RFC 0033 §F).
177
+ // **SECURITY:** Pass `refusalText` through the BYOK redaction harness
178
+ // BEFORE persistence — this helper does NOT redact.
179
+ export { parseRefusal } from './parse-refusal.js';
180
+ export type { RefusalProvider, RefusalSignal } from './parse-refusal.js';
@@ -0,0 +1,311 @@
1
+ /**
2
+ * parseRefusal — normalize per-provider LLM safety-stop signals to the
3
+ * canonical RFC 0032 §B.3 refusal shape.
4
+ *
5
+ * The three Tier-1 vendors (Anthropic / OpenAI / Google Gemini) surface
6
+ * refusals through different fields:
7
+ *
8
+ * - **Anthropic Messages API**: `stop_reason: "refusal"` (their 2025
9
+ * release) OR `stop_reason: "end_turn"` accompanied by safety-stop
10
+ * markers in the content. Refusal text MAY be inline in the
11
+ * `content[]` array's text blocks.
12
+ * - **OpenAI Chat Completions**: `choices[0].finish_reason:
13
+ * "content_filter"` OR `choices[0].message.refusal: <string>` (the
14
+ * refusal-text field added in their structured-output release).
15
+ * - **Google Gemini**: `candidates[0].finishReason: "SAFETY"` OR
16
+ * `promptFeedback.blockReason: "SAFETY"` (input-side block).
17
+ *
18
+ * Without normalization, every host re-implements this detection. This
19
+ * helper consolidates the per-vendor shape-detection and returns a
20
+ * canonical `RefusalSignal | null` — null when the response is a
21
+ * normal completion (no refusal detected).
22
+ *
23
+ * Per RFC 0032 §B.3 + RFC 0033 §D, hosts MUST NOT retry on refusal
24
+ * (circumvention concern). Callers route the non-null return through
25
+ * `envelope.refusal` emission + the `envelope_refusal` terminal error
26
+ * code (per RFC 0033 §F).
27
+ *
28
+ * Per SECURITY/invariants.yaml §envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak,
29
+ * `refusalText` MUST be passed through the host's BYOK redaction
30
+ * harness BEFORE persistence — this helper does NOT redact; the
31
+ * caller is responsible for SR-1 carry-forward.
32
+ *
33
+ * @see RFCS/0032-envelope-reliability-events.md §B.3
34
+ * @see RFCS/0033-envelope-completion-contract.md §D + §F
35
+ * @see SECURITY/invariants.yaml §envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak
36
+ */
37
+
38
+ /**
39
+ * Provider identifier for the matched shape. `"unknown"` is reserved
40
+ * for refusals matched on heuristic signals without a definitive
41
+ * vendor-shape match.
42
+ */
43
+ export type RefusalProvider = 'anthropic' | 'openai' | 'google' | 'unknown';
44
+
45
+ /**
46
+ * Canonical refusal signal. All three Tier-1 vendor shapes normalize
47
+ * to this form. `null` from `parseRefusal()` means "no refusal detected"
48
+ * (a normal completion); a non-null `RefusalSignal` means the caller
49
+ * SHOULD route through the RFC 0032 §B.3 refusal-emission path.
50
+ */
51
+ export interface RefusalSignal {
52
+ /**
53
+ * The provider's refusal text, when surfaced. MAY be `null` even for
54
+ * detected refusals — Anthropic + Gemini frequently refuse without
55
+ * inline text (the safety filter is opaque to the model). OpenAI's
56
+ * `message.refusal` field is the most consistent source of human-
57
+ * readable refusal text.
58
+ *
59
+ * **SECURITY:** When non-null, `refusalText` MAY contain prompt
60
+ * content that triggered the safety filter. Callers MUST pass it
61
+ * through their BYOK + prompt-content redaction harness BEFORE
62
+ * persistence (per `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` SECURITY
63
+ * invariant).
64
+ */
65
+ refusalText: string | null;
66
+
67
+ /**
68
+ * Provider-specific safety-category identifier, when surfaced.
69
+ * Examples: Gemini's safety-rating categories
70
+ * (`HARM_CATEGORY_HARASSMENT`, etc.), OpenAI's content-filter category,
71
+ * Anthropic's policy-violation tag. Hosts MAY echo this on the
72
+ * `envelope.refusal.safetyCategory` event field for downstream
73
+ * observability.
74
+ */
75
+ safetyCategory?: string;
76
+
77
+ /**
78
+ * Which provider's shape was matched. Useful for debugging
79
+ * cross-host integration + for hosts that want to route refusals
80
+ * differently per vendor (e.g., different operator notifications).
81
+ */
82
+ provider: RefusalProvider;
83
+ }
84
+
85
+ interface OpenAIChoiceMessage {
86
+ refusal?: unknown;
87
+ content?: unknown;
88
+ }
89
+
90
+ interface OpenAIChoice {
91
+ finish_reason?: unknown;
92
+ message?: unknown;
93
+ }
94
+
95
+ interface OpenAIResponse {
96
+ choices?: unknown;
97
+ }
98
+
99
+ interface AnthropicTextBlock {
100
+ type?: unknown;
101
+ text?: unknown;
102
+ }
103
+
104
+ interface AnthropicResponse {
105
+ stop_reason?: unknown;
106
+ content?: unknown;
107
+ }
108
+
109
+ interface GeminiSafetyRating {
110
+ category?: unknown;
111
+ probability?: unknown;
112
+ }
113
+
114
+ interface GeminiCandidate {
115
+ finishReason?: unknown;
116
+ safetyRatings?: unknown;
117
+ content?: unknown;
118
+ }
119
+
120
+ interface GeminiPromptFeedback {
121
+ blockReason?: unknown;
122
+ safetyRatings?: unknown;
123
+ }
124
+
125
+ interface GeminiResponse {
126
+ candidates?: unknown;
127
+ promptFeedback?: unknown;
128
+ }
129
+
130
+ /**
131
+ * Try to parse the response as OpenAI Chat Completions output.
132
+ *
133
+ * Detection: top-level `choices` array. Refusal signals:
134
+ * - `choices[0].finish_reason === "content_filter"`
135
+ * - `choices[0].message.refusal` is a non-empty string
136
+ */
137
+ function tryParseOpenAI(response: unknown): RefusalSignal | null {
138
+ if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return null;
139
+ const r = response as OpenAIResponse;
140
+ if (!Array.isArray(r.choices) || r.choices.length === 0) return null;
141
+ const choice = r.choices[0] as OpenAIChoice;
142
+ if (!choice || typeof choice !== 'object') return null;
143
+
144
+ const finishReason = choice.finish_reason;
145
+ const message = choice.message as OpenAIChoiceMessage | undefined;
146
+ const refusalField = message && typeof message === 'object' ? message.refusal : undefined;
147
+
148
+ // Primary signal: explicit refusal-text field. OpenAI's structured-output
149
+ // release populates this when the safety filter intervenes.
150
+ if (typeof refusalField === 'string' && refusalField.length > 0) {
151
+ return { refusalText: refusalField, provider: 'openai' };
152
+ }
153
+
154
+ // Secondary signal: finish_reason. content_filter is the canonical
155
+ // safety-stop value.
156
+ if (finishReason === 'content_filter') {
157
+ const text =
158
+ message && typeof message === 'object' && typeof message.content === 'string'
159
+ ? message.content
160
+ : null;
161
+ return { refusalText: text, safetyCategory: 'content_filter', provider: 'openai' };
162
+ }
163
+
164
+ return null;
165
+ }
166
+
167
+ /**
168
+ * Try to parse the response as Anthropic Messages API output.
169
+ *
170
+ * Detection: top-level `stop_reason` field (Anthropic's distinctive
171
+ * marker). Refusal signals:
172
+ * - `stop_reason === "refusal"` (their 2025 release)
173
+ *
174
+ * Anthropic does not surface a distinct safety-category field on
175
+ * refusals; the `refusal` stop_reason is the binary signal.
176
+ */
177
+ function tryParseAnthropic(response: unknown): RefusalSignal | null {
178
+ if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return null;
179
+ const r = response as AnthropicResponse;
180
+ if (typeof r.stop_reason !== 'string') return null;
181
+
182
+ if (r.stop_reason === 'refusal') {
183
+ // Extract refusal text from the content array (Anthropic returns an
184
+ // array of typed blocks; refusal text appears in `text`-type blocks).
185
+ let refusalText: string | null = null;
186
+ if (Array.isArray(r.content)) {
187
+ const textBlocks: string[] = [];
188
+ for (const block of r.content) {
189
+ if (block && typeof block === 'object') {
190
+ const b = block as AnthropicTextBlock;
191
+ if (b.type === 'text' && typeof b.text === 'string') {
192
+ textBlocks.push(b.text);
193
+ }
194
+ }
195
+ }
196
+ if (textBlocks.length > 0) refusalText = textBlocks.join('\n');
197
+ }
198
+ return { refusalText, provider: 'anthropic' };
199
+ }
200
+
201
+ return null;
202
+ }
203
+
204
+ /**
205
+ * Try to parse the response as Google Gemini `generateContent` output.
206
+ *
207
+ * Detection: top-level `candidates` array OR top-level `promptFeedback`
208
+ * object. Refusal signals:
209
+ * - `candidates[0].finishReason === "SAFETY"` (output-side block)
210
+ * - `promptFeedback.blockReason === "SAFETY"` (input-side block)
211
+ *
212
+ * Gemini surfaces safety categories on `safetyRatings[]`; this helper
213
+ * picks the highest-probability HIGH/MEDIUM-tier category as
214
+ * `safetyCategory` when available.
215
+ */
216
+ function tryParseGemini(response: unknown): RefusalSignal | null {
217
+ if (!response || typeof response !== 'object') return null;
218
+ const r = response as GeminiResponse;
219
+
220
+ // Output-side safety block.
221
+ if (Array.isArray(r.candidates) && r.candidates.length > 0) {
222
+ const candidate = r.candidates[0] as GeminiCandidate;
223
+ if (candidate && typeof candidate === 'object' && candidate.finishReason === 'SAFETY') {
224
+ const safetyCategory = extractGeminiHighestRiskCategory(candidate.safetyRatings);
225
+ const result: RefusalSignal = { refusalText: null, provider: 'google' };
226
+ if (safetyCategory !== undefined) result.safetyCategory = safetyCategory;
227
+ return result;
228
+ }
229
+ }
230
+
231
+ // Input-side safety block (Gemini rejected the prompt itself).
232
+ if (r.promptFeedback && typeof r.promptFeedback === 'object') {
233
+ const pf = r.promptFeedback as GeminiPromptFeedback;
234
+ if (typeof pf.blockReason === 'string' && pf.blockReason.toUpperCase().includes('SAFETY')) {
235
+ const safetyCategory = extractGeminiHighestRiskCategory(pf.safetyRatings);
236
+ const result: RefusalSignal = { refusalText: null, provider: 'google' };
237
+ if (safetyCategory !== undefined) result.safetyCategory = safetyCategory;
238
+ return result;
239
+ }
240
+ }
241
+
242
+ return null;
243
+ }
244
+
245
+ /**
246
+ * From a Gemini `safetyRatings[]` array, return the highest-probability
247
+ * non-NEGLIGIBLE category identifier. Returns `undefined` when the
248
+ * array is absent or all ratings are NEGLIGIBLE.
249
+ */
250
+ function extractGeminiHighestRiskCategory(safetyRatings: unknown): string | undefined {
251
+ if (!Array.isArray(safetyRatings)) return undefined;
252
+ const PROBABILITY_RANK: Record<string, number> = {
253
+ HIGH: 3,
254
+ MEDIUM: 2,
255
+ LOW: 1,
256
+ NEGLIGIBLE: 0,
257
+ };
258
+ let best: { category: string; rank: number } | null = null;
259
+ for (const rating of safetyRatings) {
260
+ if (!rating || typeof rating !== 'object') continue;
261
+ const r = rating as GeminiSafetyRating;
262
+ if (typeof r.category !== 'string' || typeof r.probability !== 'string') continue;
263
+ const rank = PROBABILITY_RANK[r.probability.toUpperCase()] ?? 0;
264
+ if (rank === 0) continue;
265
+ if (best === null || rank > best.rank) {
266
+ best = { category: r.category, rank };
267
+ }
268
+ }
269
+ return best?.category;
270
+ }
271
+
272
+ /**
273
+ * Parse a provider response into a canonical refusal signal.
274
+ *
275
+ * Returns `null` when no refusal is detected (normal completion).
276
+ * Returns a `RefusalSignal` when the response matches one of the
277
+ * three Tier-1 vendors' safety-stop shapes.
278
+ *
279
+ * Detection order: OpenAI → Anthropic → Gemini. Each detector inspects
280
+ * a distinctive top-level field, so cross-vendor false-positives are
281
+ * unlikely. A response that doesn't match any vendor shape returns
282
+ * `null` (hosts that route through novel providers add their own
283
+ * detector + fall back to this for the three known ones).
284
+ *
285
+ * @example
286
+ * ```ts
287
+ * import { parseRefusal } from '@openwop/openwop';
288
+ *
289
+ * const response = await callOpenAI({...});
290
+ * const refusal = parseRefusal(response);
291
+ * if (refusal) {
292
+ * // Route through envelope.refusal emission + envelope_refusal error code.
293
+ * // REMEMBER to redact refusalText through the BYOK harness before
294
+ * // persistence (SECURITY invariant envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak).
295
+ * await emitEnvelopeRefusal({
296
+ * refusalText: redactBYOK(refusal.refusalText),
297
+ * safetyCategory: refusal.safetyCategory,
298
+ * provider: refusal.provider,
299
+ * });
300
+ * throw new EnvelopeRefusalError(...);
301
+ * }
302
+ * // ...normal-completion handling...
303
+ * ```
304
+ */
305
+ export function parseRefusal(providerResponse: unknown): RefusalSignal | null {
306
+ return (
307
+ tryParseOpenAI(providerResponse) ??
308
+ tryParseAnthropic(providerResponse) ??
309
+ tryParseGemini(providerResponse)
310
+ );
311
+ }