@openwop/openwop-conformance 2.0.12 → 2.1.1

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,100 @@
 # `@openwop/openwop-conformance` Changelog
 
+## [2.1.1] — 2026-09-11 — `v2-run-list` is now actually selected
+
+`scenario-majors.json` regenerated (517 files, v2 74): 2.1.0 packaged the
+scenario but its registry row was missing, so `--target-major 2` never
+selected it and every 2.1.0 run reported 73 files. The corpus gate now runs
+`generate-scenario-majors.mjs --check`. No scenario prose changed.
+
+## [2.1.0] — 2026-09-11 — the run-list scenario (RFC 0182)
+
+New scenario `v2-run-list` (target major 2, gated on the `runList` family —
+`inapplicable` on a host that does not advertise it), three legs:
+
+- `openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped` (one requirement, five assertions) — two runs the caller just created appear in its unfiltered list, every page validates against `run-list-response.schema.json` (so a bare `runId` fails the shape leg), no page exceeds the advertised `maxPageSize`, and every `runId` carries the caller's tenant segment — the segment of the ids the host minted for this credential moments earlier.
+- `…cursor-refused` — a cursor the host did not mint is `400 validation_error`.
+- `…filter-exact` — when `runList.filters` names `workflowId`, the filtered list contains only that workflow and still contains the run just created.
+
+The 2.0.13 receiver fix (below) ships in this release; 2.0.13 itself was never
+tagged. The pinned `@openwop/spec-artifacts` peer moves to `2.1.0`.
+
+## [2.0.13] — 2026-09-10 — three webhook scenarios could not be witnessed off-process
+
+`webhook-signed-delivery`, `replay-fanout-suppression` and
+`v2-webhook-durable-delivery` each stand up their own HTTP receiver and hand the
+host under test a URL to POST to. All three hard-coded `127.0.0.1` in the two
+places that matter, so a host running anywhere but *this process* was told to
+deliver to its own loopback.
+
+MEASURED 2026-09-09 on a container lane whose harness doubles (compat provider,
+OIDC issuer) were reachable via `--add-host host.docker.internal:host-gateway`,
+from inside the container:
+
+```
+"msg":"webhook delivery failed","url":"http://127.0.0.1:55469/",
+"detail":"fetch failed (connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:55469)"
+```
+
+Two independent blockers, both this suite's, neither the operator's: the
+receiver **advertised** `127.0.0.1`, and it **bound loopback-only**, so no
+external name could have reached it either. The lane was configured correctly.
+The host signs webhooks correctly. The scenarios recorded a plain `fail` while
+being unwitnessable — which is a false accusation, and the mirror of a gate that
+cannot fail: a scenario whose pass condition cannot be satisfied in the posture
+it is run in.
+
+**Fix.** New `receiverBinding()` in `lib/webhook-receiver.ts`, used by all three.
+It is a no-op by default: with `OPENWOP_CONFORMANCE_HARNESS_HOST` unset it
+returns `{ bind: '127.0.0.1', advertise: '127.0.0.1' }`, byte-for-byte today's
+behaviour, and **no receiver's bind widens for an in-process run**. Only when an
+operator sets that variable — declaring that the host under test is somewhere
+`127.0.0.1` does not name this process, and naming how it reaches this machine —
+does the receiver bind `0.0.0.0` and advertise that name. The variable already
+carried exactly this meaning for host-side harness doubles; the suite's own
+receivers simply never consulted it.
+
+**No SSRF gate is relaxed.** `host.docker.internal` is still a private address
+over plain `http`, so the three gates in `webhook-signed-delivery`'s docblock
+apply unchanged and a host must still opt in (or front the receiver with
+`OPENWOP_WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_URL`, which waives nothing) to witness the row. All
+this changes is that the packet now has somewhere to go.
+
+### Second defect, same program: a fixed grace instead of a wait
+
+With the address correct, `webhook-signed-delivery` still failed — now in 549ms,
+with `expected 0 to be greater than 0`. It slept a fixed `setTimeout(500)`
+"for fire-and-forget delivery to land". That assumes delivery is synchronous-ish
+with run completion, which is true of a host that POSTs inline and false of one
+doing what `webhooks.md` §"Delivery" asks for: a durable queue with retries,
+drained by a worker on its own cadence. The reference host polls every 1000ms,
+so the sleep expired before the worker's first tick. **The more durable a host's
+delivery machinery, the more exposed it was here** — and this scenario is
+typically the only automated oracle a host has on delivery header NAMES, so the
+cost of the race was not a checkmark.
+
+Replaced with a bounded wait: poll every 250ms until a delivery for this run
+arrives or a 12s deadline passes. It still FAILS and never soft-skips; the
+failure now means "did not deliver within 12s" rather than "did not deliver
+within one arbitrary tick of an unrelated clock". The deadline is sized to sit
+inside the 30s per-test budget alongside the existing 10s terminal poll, so a
+genuinely slow host fails on the requirement message rather than on a bare
+vitest timeout.
+
+MEASURED end-to-end on the container lane, same image, three runs: **2 failed →
+(address fixed) 1 failed, `replay-fanout-suppression` green → (wait fixed) 0
+failed, both green.**
+
+**Self-tests pin the call sites, not just the helper** — a helper that is
+correct and unused is precisely the defect being fixed, and a unit test on
+`receiverBinding()` alone stays green through a full revert of all three
+scenarios. Sabotage-verified with disjoint red sets: reverting either the bind
+or the advertise of any one scenario reds exactly that scenario's case, and each
+helper branch reds only its own. The bounded wait is pinned the same way and for
+a sharper reason — two consecutive container runs disagreed about the 500ms
+sleep (0 deliveries at 549ms, then 1 at 318ms), so a behavioural test for it
+would itself be a coin flip and could not be trusted to go red on a revert.
+
 ## [2.0.12] — 2026-09-10 — corpus peer moves with RFC 0181; no scenario change
 
 No scenario, assertion or CLI change. The pinned `@openwop/spec-artifacts` peer

package/README.md

@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ Exit code is non-zero on any failed assertion. `--certify` distinguishes: `0`
 
 ## What's Covered
 
-The current suite has 516 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`.
+The current suite has 517 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`.
 - 2026-09-03 (suite `1.157.0 -> 1.158.0`, gap G17): NEW `idempotency-concurrent-claim.test.ts` — drives the new `host-sample-test-seams.md` §25 concurrent duplicate-delivery seam for the RFC 0150 §B / `idempotency.md` §"Concurrent duplicates (Layer 2)" atomic-claim MUST, which is unconditional and had no witness of any kind. Asserts every executor mints the SAME `logicalInvocationId` **before** asserting `delivered === 1` — without the identity check a host passes by minting different ids and never colliding, one effect because nothing raced. Not profile-gated and so not opt-out-able (the obligation is unconditional); an unmounted seam records `blocked`, which is not certifiable. Graduates `layer2-invocation-claim-atomic` reference-impl -> protocol.
 - 2026-08-19 (suite `1.137.0 → 1.138.0`): NEW `durability-poison-exhaustion.test.ts` — RFC 0158 §C.8, the FIRST row of that RFC's conformance table to land. Asserts what `failure-path.test.ts` cannot: not just that deterministically failing work reaches terminal, but that attempts STOP — counted on the log, re-counted after a scaled quiet window, asserted unchanged. A host still redelivering records more. Seam-gated on the existing event-log seam (`blocked` = unobservable, not unmet) and outside every profile floor.
 - 2026-08-19 (suite `1.136.15 → 1.137.0`): NEW `replay-fanout-suppression.test.ts` — capability-gated on `webhooks.supported`, **outside every profile floor**; witnesses `replay.md` §"Host-initiated fan-out is an external effect", which was the largest normative MUST NOT on the replay surface with no scenario and no SECURITY invariant. Three legs in ONE `it` against ONE receiver and ONE subscription — a positive control, the MUST NOT, and a `branch` boundary leg — because "no delivery arrived" passes identically when delivery never worked, so absence is asserted only after presence is proven on that exact wiring. A host with an SSRF guard correctly refuses the loopback receiver and records `blocked`: **unobservable, not unmet.**
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ Server-required (added in 1.7.0):
 | ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | **Redaction** | [`capabilities.md`](../spec/v1/capabilities.md) §"Secrets" + NFR-7 + §"aiProviders" | Vendor-neutral assertions that the server doesn't leak secret material. Three scenario groups: (a) discovery shape contract — `secrets` + `aiProviders` advertisements are well-formed regardless of `secrets.supported`; when `supported === true`, scopes MUST be non-empty + `resolution === 'host-managed'`; `byok ⊆ supported`. (b) bearer-token redaction — invalid Bearer canary in `Authorization` header is not echoed in the 401 response body. (c) credentialRef echo control — gated on `secrets.supported === true`; canary planted in `configurable.ai.credentialRef` MUST NOT appear in any RunEvent payload (poll-based capture; transport-agnostic). Uses runtime-built canary fixtures (`lib/canaries.ts`) that defeat static secret scanners. 6 scenarios. |
 
-Current source tree: 516 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
+Current source tree: 517 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
 
 ## Remaining Gaps
 

package/dist/spec-artifacts.lock.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
   "package": "@openwop/spec-artifacts",
-  "version": "2.0.12",
-  "stampSha256": "7a7976826e3c61cfc4a2fa64d4c2a4cd9497310e9ade635e65cfc39546726b86"
+  "version": "2.1.1",
+  "stampSha256": "56096f568434959a37779224c6692ec660bf6576b1093a5c2a4aac9c219b683d"
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "2.0.12",
+  "version": "2.1.1",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
@@ -56,6 +56,6 @@
     "@openwop/spec-artifacts": "file:../spec-artifacts"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
-    "@openwop/spec-artifacts": "2.0.12"
+    "@openwop/spec-artifacts": "2.1.1"
   }
 }

package/requirements.json

@@ -2,11 +2,11 @@
   "$comment": "GENERATED by conformance/scripts/generate-requirement-registry.mjs — do not edit. One record per it()/test() in src/scenarios. Ids: openwop.it.<file-stem>.<title-slug>[~n] (src/lib/requirement-ids.ts). A record with id null has an interpolated title; its run-time row is keyed by the rendered title and maps here by file+line only. Renamed ids need a row in requirement-aliases.json.",
   "generatedFrom": "src/scenarios/*.test.ts",
   "counts": {
-    "files": 565,
-    "tests": 2153,
-    "withStableId": 2153,
+    "files": 566,
+    "tests": 2156,
+    "withStableId": 2156,
     "interpolatedTitles": 0,
-    "explicitIds": 2108
+    "explicitIds": 2111
   },
   "records": [
     {
@@ -21615,7 +21615,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.replay-fanout-suppression.delivers-for-a-live-run-suppresses-for-a-replay-fork-and-delivers-again-for-a-br",
       "file": "replay-fanout-suppression.test.ts",
-      "line": 158,
+      "line": 159,
       "title": "delivers for a live run, suppresses for a replay fork, and delivers again for a branch fork",
       "explicitId": "openwop.it.replay-fanout-suppression.delivers-for-a-live-run-suppresses-for-a-replay-fork-and-delivers-again-for-a-br",
       "citations": [
@@ -28335,6 +28335,77 @@
         }
       ]
     },
+    {
+      "id": "openwop.it.v2-run-list.two-runs-the-caller-just-created-appear-every-id-is-bound-to-the-caller-s-tenant",
+      "file": "v2-run-list.test.ts",
+      "line": 62,
+      "title": "two runs the caller just created appear, every id is bound to the caller's tenant, and no page exceeds maxPageSize",
+      "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped",
+      "citations": [
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/capabilities.md § runList",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        },
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/runs.md §List",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        },
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/runs.md §List",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        },
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/runs.md §List",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        },
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/identity.md §5",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "openwop.it.v2-run-list.a-cursor-the-host-did-not-mint-is-refused-400-validation-error",
+      "file": "v2-run-list.test.ts",
+      "line": 84,
+      "title": "a cursor the host did not mint is refused 400 validation_error",
+      "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.cursor-refused",
+      "citations": [
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/runs.md §List",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        },
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/errors.md",
+          "requirement": "the refusal MUST carry validation_error"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    {
+      "id": "openwop.it.v2-run-list.when-the-filters-facet-names-workflowid-a-filtered-list-contains-only-that-workf",
+      "file": "v2-run-list.test.ts",
+      "line": 93,
+      "title": "when the filters facet names workflowId, a filtered list contains only that workflow",
+      "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.filter-exact",
+      "citations": [
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/runs.md §List",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        },
+        {
+          "section": "spec/v2/core/runs.md §List",
+          "requirement": null,
+          "interpolated": true
+        }
+      ]
+    },
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.v2-run-options-limits.more-than-100-tags-a-tag-over-256-characters-and-an-unknown-root-key-are-each-re",
       "file": "v2-run-options-limits.test.ts",
@@ -28910,7 +28981,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.v2-webhook-durable-delivery.a-failed-attempt-is-retried-and-the-event-is-delivered-at-least-once",
       "file": "v2-webhook-durable-delivery.test.ts",
-      "line": 232,
+      "line": 233,
       "title": "a failed attempt is retried and the event is delivered at least once",
       "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0173.webhook-durable-delivery",
       "citations": [
@@ -28941,7 +29012,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.v2-webhook-durable-delivery.an-exhausted-delivery-is-dead-lettered-never-dropped",
       "file": "v2-webhook-durable-delivery.test.ts",
-      "line": 313,
+      "line": 314,
       "title": "an exhausted delivery is dead-lettered, never dropped",
       "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0173.webhook-durable-delivery.dead-letter",
       "citations": [
@@ -29746,7 +29817,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.webhook-signed-delivery.host-posts-run-events-to-subscriber-with-valid-x-openwop-signature",
       "file": "webhook-signed-delivery.test.ts",
-      "line": 165,
+      "line": 169,
       "title": "host POSTs run events to subscriber with valid X-openwop-Signature",
       "explicitId": "openwop.it.webhook-signed-delivery.host-posts-run-events-to-subscriber-with-valid-x-openwop-signature",
       "citations": [
@@ -29797,7 +29868,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.webhook-signed-delivery.control-with-a-tunnel-wired-the-host-still-refuses-the-loopback-receiver",
       "file": "webhook-signed-delivery.test.ts",
-      "line": 379,
+      "line": 410,
       "title": "control: with a tunnel wired, the host still refuses the loopback receiver",
       "explicitId": "openwop.it.webhook-signed-delivery.control-with-a-tunnel-wired-the-host-still-refuses-the-loopback-receiver",
       "citations": [

package/scenario-majors.json

@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 {
   "$comment": "GENERATED by conformance/scripts/generate-scenario-majors.mjs (RFC 0168 §D.3). Do not edit; add a file to BOTH_MAJORS in the generator to target both majors.",
   "counts": {
-    "files": 516,
+    "files": 517,
     "v1": 445,
-    "v2": 73
+    "v2": 74
   },
   "majors": {
     "a2a-1-0-agent-card.test.ts": [
@@ -1406,6 +1406,9 @@
     "v2-run-fork-refusals.test.ts": [
       2
     ],
+    "v2-run-list.test.ts": [
+      2
+    ],
     "v2-run-options-limits.test.ts": [
       2
     ],

package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 {
   "_comment": "Provenance of @openwop/spec-artifacts (RFC 0168 §D.2). files: SHA-256 per file; the conformance suite compares the installed peer against dist/spec-artifacts.lock.json at start.",
   "package": "@openwop/spec-artifacts",
-  "version": "2.0.12",
-  "corpusTag": "v2.0.12",
+  "version": "2.1.1",
+  "corpusTag": "v2.1.1",
   "files": {
     "api/.redocly.lint-ignore.yaml": "bf5a8350b88a72fa43f59605ed8d903ed24b6cfccda5e45509c9f6ed9ee4e712",
     "api/asyncapi.yaml": "d5ecb9ee6114582be3b1f662c84bfac9ae96dae7bacb853e461168f70a8e1c7d",
     "api/grpc/openwop.proto": "c3e72bb17cba514ee98feb6434e6c9b6ea6795bfd086489ec69fd882dd1ad977",
     "api/openapi.yaml": "39081c59fb696159806b0f2f9a42e7e9ff830d622fcf2ad4159b21357580a955",
     "api/redocly.yaml": "b0604c89b2ca6d5076ec25725c539dad44a741a811fe524439ee6daef8baa09f",
-    "api/seams-v2.yaml": "f6da331643d0cc8bd182d50a42a0c84b0ad649c5622b6bcb7958abea4e3db884",
-    "api/v2/asyncapi.yaml": "ea69ad935eb5013d7d5cf40693bbc8612c0dc538e213507846ac89bf7b91e76f",
-    "api/v2/openapi.yaml": "699df6886f386ff4505237293ab8a7a3d26884f875232626ebd0d51641cd2604",
+    "api/seams-v2.yaml": "8582c6105ed590b90bb3e9b8b0dca8a6b830dc7d027e5ec8bad000d4a90ee831",
+    "api/v2/asyncapi.yaml": "43a8cc8d71396a56a2d81b629f970c86fd3b8d93606cdd0e7463a860edb5625d",
+    "api/v2/openapi.yaml": "b5fe97ce54c18c99e3c13548fc10b554c93ee892d275ce1ee4e2f1caad571c79",
     "api/v2/redocly.yaml": "1e66b60e6118ad11a823bb620678be464d99dfe50a40e3e6f93ec9429b88b34c",
     "schemas/README.md": "0c0b737ffcf8f30e7d2809cec8a498232de710f41443212922ad8337cdde0b51",
     "schemas/a2a-task-state.schema.json": "c9365918f993f943b4b619d42551eb066a1ed33a08d895d51b395432a5b1f1bc",
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@
     "schemas/v2/artifact-type-pack-manifest.schema.json": "85630d1b760d0b41cf5a6fad2acfada39abaf7f0befd95cc4334e1e883e9615d",
     "schemas/v2/audit-verify-result.schema.json": "a748dfadb5155adfde8a91045e76b0db6695005fe559035d71670fdd55edb3ba",
     "schemas/v2/budget-policy.schema.json": "c7449daeb6e1d95e7a047b8c2814d3d54748697c27046972834874867d9b5f4c",
-    "schemas/v2/capabilities.schema.json": "0d9ca9e3f89a826a1247d295aa4b762e92d550daa5d835d3269f2a1bf1f4faaf",
+    "schemas/v2/capabilities.schema.json": "7b9c3853c4792f8242babfd70d6336a2ec365d4702944701e833ee5d45445ff5",
     "schemas/v2/certification-bundle.schema.json": "d2cbc5cadddff13630a528dc9673162f582c035c6a6663ca02c1ac53e8fec40c",
     "schemas/v2/channel-presence-payload.schema.json": "9475d46f358d21c19126e78204987a5633979917a2293653354ef5c5e044d54e",
     "schemas/v2/channel-written-payload.schema.json": "ccecff3c71a3275ad8db035ac0e04db25e6f8d23cf091ddbcd5a60d1be1cbb6b",
@@ -171,6 +171,7 @@
     "schemas/v2/run-diff-response.schema.json": "8bdb2045c274580038bd74781f7d062f5049839797c164a89de4ed89edc53a74",
     "schemas/v2/run-event-payloads.schema.json": "1d3ccffc4e506d3109c17990e01976ba935e61672562684b9635743d56af3f57",
     "schemas/v2/run-event.schema.json": "1a9946374af9323b71635d00fed22abe02c300fa2cf3ae3e9c30f3e553e408ec",
+    "schemas/v2/run-list-response.schema.json": "c2dbc34768dcf64528914a213aa3cb55952e8e3e90a64b04a9423b2a19749d38",
     "schemas/v2/run-options.schema.json": "f0e9f494d80086c2ed2cf9fe87df54e5b4e66601699c4a1089f4edbc7ba58867",
     "schemas/v2/run-orchestrator-decided-event.schema.json": "bb76e15ff72e669f12938684033b55dc567470e1a378e19ffc3fa0e4034ab5a7",
     "schemas/v2/run-snapshot.schema.json": "65a3c82220da2e1a54324665d517dc0e627225f3d37ef75b43bef3fb7e3bac0e",
@@ -199,7 +200,7 @@
     "schemas/workspace-file.schema.json": "464de85c2a068243084ee9c1d969bc7cd5d8f7948574e58450d6493c38a0e1e4",
     "spec/v1/alias-detectors.json": "fee4594ef49953953ffcd0b3813300067d16b3e65ebff2aac722034ac9b3f545",
     "spec/v1/capability-declaration-classes.json": "e7729aed5c4b4e1dd02abab0530f14cc95f5d4070fe51fb139e7f5cccefa00c6",
-    "spec/v1/core-standard-manifest.json": "681b4288007e770595e299aeca2d08419a7696be2d151fb9fd152f49255b25c4",
+    "spec/v1/core-standard-manifest.json": "c1f2002d3a2a77005d8a2ab69cb31c22f6c9dd235da2b4afcb3a0e90612699ba",
     "spec/v1/deprecations.json": "1d5acb69a9b8ccb57275a95605f74aef1d920685f8407c9d382a46b59dc803bb",
     "spec/v1/deprecations.schema.json": "18c87e78bedc210431f795ae44c5b5d202f2f3317850d5cf86867d4f1fa1cdfb",
     "spec/v1/event-codemap.json": "3da60d884157793a360da532a9fcbbfb5285636db325a74cec94b34622186d97",
@@ -211,28 +212,28 @@
     "spec/v1/migrations.schema.json": "886779aa6c22e646db097f5df210adb018a4dd14a7b815465a18c8a7056c8f72",
     "spec/v1/operation-path-manifest.json": "5f5f4e3842669371730ebbd1aace3fb794192615f0018dc144f484ba5db82ac3",
     "spec/v1/spec-gaps.json": "6cc9962c6b969f632e07a78b52a4f61447ff579e2990cbae989866f584a86042",
-    "spec/v2/README.md": "87f3eb080264011032cc273cfc87f434d1e660e43380f0f1f5d753605fffb835",
-    "spec/v2/core/capabilities.md": "8151e42762b8c079b98251cd73231f792c708004c5e9e980b674db7bda491851",
-    "spec/v2/core/conformance.md": "fde584474ed3934b02ff7bb1e5d1c7fbdd05c465f8430a945ff7aa1c3f72401f",
-    "spec/v2/core/connection-packs.md": "72aa432037b004883cb6956f54fa9f1d8bc154c27e7dde54d940864d48885957",
-    "spec/v2/core/errors.md": "0dce8fbff69f3519b775fe4d2fba52bb21d33cb62735c96872bb4b7aed43eb97",
-    "spec/v2/core/events.md": "dfa65dc347e3e8c76067b4014aff10f5dc308f43b2346a9e91277854e7d91e55",
-    "spec/v2/core/form-content-packs.md": "8db449943e5683bcea1bae84d0d2f5268ce1ba63439d949102f3f0811f95b215",
-    "spec/v2/core/headers.md": "90f9ceb993444e5255c562bc1dd2978f030167a3c35cc2c44a99fef0a371f7cb",
-    "spec/v2/core/idempotency.md": "a580258c5c9d6b1adb05b43de90b055f1ce7f79856cdea40f2d02806fd792e77",
-    "spec/v2/core/identity.md": "dd29dc95bb58ef57583f540b03d5d722d2c9f7a7c6e8412fd1d19e64191d1a85",
-    "spec/v2/core/interop.md": "3beb10f9bace3bc650f14e96dcf4927917448950e90e31d9652abe7cb2cf5515",
-    "spec/v2/core/interrupt.md": "8801f6b0b97ba653298aeaffe6957b58e7018bc175b9705e170e69831ef9b273",
-    "spec/v2/core/overview.md": "0e941660227d1526411f30822da128969312aa2d60318fcbcadad497a9aa54d9",
-    "spec/v2/core/packs.md": "ef1dcf9142427f68d781dd8babc35f4b5e0601130a40ac6efc007f7008f1467c",
-    "spec/v2/core/persistence.md": "aa34d7218839d856cfe61e67b0422914013b17f51c5f582a7f92795d0ee7daf7",
-    "spec/v2/core/replay.md": "c2c9d30e9ff04554dc5b6879b66e78e7b748038ffccf2329063981a618111e1c",
-    "spec/v2/core/runs.md": "01f4a979a91fa7a9066b5982d022656464b6c2aba81403a91c521e9e8511d80d",
-    "spec/v2/core/security-defaults.md": "0cd30b1a166d3516182f6ad68c86ea27c11b04ba072cd739cc50b4d5c516c89b",
-    "spec/v2/core/versioning.md": "7e99def44c8149414b9b465cf280f470b1b0db37c37a83e49e8dbeae502dc65c",
-    "spec/v2/core/webhooks.md": "0642953ca6f56fe52bcf5ebceb66badd05234a8476b46bc5c59e01eebfbad8ff",
-    "spec/v2/core/workflow-chain-packs.md": "8ffa8c18c7b721d922f0a506d75fc5c407f1e561b78ebfd92c502bb0efca03b1",
-    "spec/v2/declaration.json": "b99a9cd43228af06e0cc63a170b3e1a7acda3e4ac4f4906a578ac51cee494c23",
+    "spec/v2/README.md": "ade62f23b12c18416669bd46dfa417d46831193184f34f90668e22a98b9ee3f4",
+    "spec/v2/core/capabilities.md": "c5107a4964e487c20bbb5254cfe1f706e0d9ba7e34da9070bc43b50b385e7948",
+    "spec/v2/core/conformance.md": "622084e3c74c4549087f4d861b1bb98cec201a0c5aec23788d27f53a355fde3b",
+    "spec/v2/core/connection-packs.md": "1d759681e2962f5103228c52c45f24607ed4bb9ae73e30605f690c1d5a59e9ee",
+    "spec/v2/core/errors.md": "74fdb5862f432a831cf0c2eadbe0c8cca6b2660ec578180ae33db54773a1df28",
+    "spec/v2/core/events.md": "defe0969d6ec7c980f415cc0d78b9d065782ac7e5638b12a44aa4895a35d6126",
+    "spec/v2/core/form-content-packs.md": "6ffaae85d4550be48dd53fb6e2959af8aceb35bd87c5343b722885084f197713",
+    "spec/v2/core/headers.md": "412556e1536f7eb05a2bfa8cbcabe3a4bc3e5410ccd46cd1a7295395f175b735",
+    "spec/v2/core/idempotency.md": "b86c352d964aebad532727f314e26ed2177d49de382076fa64d3162e2f56118d",
+    "spec/v2/core/identity.md": "dd5299f9cdf54640870e1fffae11edb820cf6396ea298c4ebd14c649c4bd4a87",
+    "spec/v2/core/interop.md": "d4c404e469e1d9d9be88bc2c939d777e7d7c1d0419b1251c18770f039838a401",
+    "spec/v2/core/interrupt.md": "d872e0652a938594eeb2a19e86cf64e64e29b234f5d9c4fbe2970ab5fb191b9c",
+    "spec/v2/core/overview.md": "69377c90bbb87b6bfe4b8be4f1b65810094b0759c8d4f93ca6df92cc530ea023",
+    "spec/v2/core/packs.md": "e72a7586a61630cdfd342eaf84e989f864b3e199006f5511ef59ea7c1a1c56f7",
+    "spec/v2/core/persistence.md": "2373c2815b25b7b4fe29dfdf3783d3f2f3e637d3abce5085e69f019546302fb6",
+    "spec/v2/core/replay.md": "bd191a2565aa7ad0df9b35a0716f3de53be34b8722f1807c5e5b02859404a9b9",
+    "spec/v2/core/runs.md": "f7a95fc82fda5b7c0c613de6e5edd376bbd6d8ba4c665a500c94eacbe42b86f2",
+    "spec/v2/core/security-defaults.md": "1d38aa03b9d2507f1d4a985333cc57ae7892cecc7356f6342fbd1672e34f638a",
+    "spec/v2/core/versioning.md": "d731782eeabb953919c7c7057340b7f9c2916b6186790e6b04c7d8ea60767189",
+    "spec/v2/core/webhooks.md": "d360da78336afa837bddf515e289e445808bca02e1e4b493f81fa51ce4a545c4",
+    "spec/v2/core/workflow-chain-packs.md": "ef2b07d2d99334eaec0cc370314e2ad2f84ea58deb699e5d92e6e52d6056613f",
+    "spec/v2/declaration.json": "63dd351a87439241bc744ce62fdc498b7621292c11a4ad42c3f41429d72366b9",
     "spec/v2/declaration.schema.json": "eac5f8080bd572f147bd57d0c4ac8ad73b14536d9236222490ae29a33b21e184",
     "spec/v2/errors.json": "f179414a92f30b5dadf26e9e57699649a67324bd7186d5287647d17605d137d3",
     "spec/v2/event-codemap.json": "37869a03cdfd8758b57e6f350641a6ebbd383231cebda51f5473ad85f94ab74c",
@@ -262,14 +263,15 @@
     "spec/v2/facets/interrupt.schema.json": "c76c58c0abd99de619f8c8afad246568f5bc9cce3b7a0d097d16d87eba84be3a",
     "spec/v2/facets/mcp.schema.json": "f56609fe24ba6160ad29ae31aa16043354ff005e5cb6a0f3871c4d226087cc08",
     "spec/v2/facets/replay.schema.json": "0a5aefb0108c708c6794fadd533cf256709704c4f16dbf44cd63fa8980c78018",
+    "spec/v2/facets/runList.schema.json": "6223e1baaebbb9f4faa71bfe968f8d22b4aa88046d0e43e8d5f56409e7f86e90",
     "spec/v2/facets/sandbox.schema.json": "e75f54486d387b2d089791aa93b5093cd1450f1920753a0f97fc23acdfe978ed",
     "spec/v2/facets/webhooks.schema.json": "0b766033ef4b4c6c2ac6f9979a19843ba024d3a1d1576972dcb55aaba52f1b9a",
     "spec/v2/id-field-bindings.json": "d9d1f8e266660b581f11020b9511a65c677e026b1a71ada870682ad77e18555d",
-    "spec/v2/path-manifest.json": "034152e09b1458c66810d4050e20a273b2b9b8fe2d92b66e8b819477de58a1be",
+    "spec/v2/path-manifest.json": "a6f4e652e866889e8bde815874062f62929aee95dc8e58e7152c56adee262163",
     "spec/v2/peer-dependency-aliases.json": "d10299280abee08258502925bc327293ee413e0108cd6e6ec75ff6110653308d",
     "spec/v2/profiles.json": "0636f19fceae625390003a347e70ef4797d84766b5c24ce8a02cea52aadebca4",
-    "spec/v2/release.json": "a9e8f39bdccd099e6b57d0f114997f79177f7dce21b7d764b42e9a25d1aa1101",
+    "spec/v2/release.json": "e67c0ef31e033c4ea9ed379deec2efa294d2ca6ba194913d535b67341a946224",
     "spec/v2/retention-floors.json": "eaf3722d95c79947af1d4269ef85117e126518c588cfcf1a2b21b97269f51624"
   },
-  "corpusCommit": "489c36a5fb4832588dcfbc6d6e736a531a772b6d"
+  "corpusCommit": "fb69952ca7d4331c3744f8a17ffe624a89508050"
 }

package/src/lib/webhook-receiver.ts

@@ -280,3 +280,47 @@ export function resolveRegistrationUrl(localUrl: string): { url: string; tunnell
 
   return { url: raw, tunnelled: true };
 }
+
+/**
+ * Where a scenario's own webhook receiver should LISTEN, and what address the
+ * host under test should be told to POST to.
+ *
+ * Default (variable unset) is `127.0.0.1` for both, which is what every receiver
+ * in this suite hard-coded before this helper existed. That default is
+ * deliberate and must stay: in the ordinary in-process posture the host is in
+ * this very process, loopback is the correct and narrowest binding, and nothing
+ * outside the process has any business reaching a test receiver. This helper
+ * never widens that.
+ *
+ * `OPENWOP_CONFORMANCE_HARNESS_HOST` is the operator declaring the opposite —
+ * that the host under test runs somewhere `127.0.0.1` does not name this
+ * process (a container, a VM, another box) and that the given name is how it
+ * reaches this machine. Only then does the receiver bind `0.0.0.0` and
+ * advertise that name.
+ *
+ * MEASURED 2026-09-09, which is why this exists. A container lane ran the host
+ * as a real image with `--add-host host.docker.internal:host-gateway` and its
+ * compat/OIDC doubles reachable, and `webhook-signed-delivery` plus
+ * `replay-fanout-suppression` still failed. From inside the container:
+ *
+ *     "msg":"webhook delivery failed","url":"http://127.0.0.1:55469/",
+ *     "detail":"fetch failed (connect ECONNREFUSED 127.0.0.1:55469)"
+ *
+ * The address named the CONTAINER's loopback. Two independent blockers, both
+ * this suite's: the receiver advertised `127.0.0.1`, and it bound loopback-only
+ * so no external name could have reached it either. The lane was configured
+ * correctly and the host signs webhooks correctly; the scenarios simply could
+ * not be witnessed, and recorded a plain `fail` while doing it — a false
+ * accusation, and the mirror of a gate that cannot fail.
+ *
+ * This does NOT relax any SSRF gate. `host.docker.internal` is still a private
+ * address over plain `http`, so the three gates in `webhook-signed-delivery`'s
+ * docblock apply unchanged and a host must still opt in (or use
+ * `OPENWOP_WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_URL`, which waives nothing) to witness the row.
+ * All this fixes is that the packet had nowhere to go.
+ */
+export function receiverBinding(): { bind: string; advertise: string } {
+  const advertise = process.env['OPENWOP_CONFORMANCE_HARNESS_HOST']?.trim();
+  if (!advertise) return { bind: '127.0.0.1', advertise: '127.0.0.1' };
+  return { bind: '0.0.0.0', advertise };
+}

package/src/scenarios/replay-fanout-suppression.test.ts

@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ import { forkDeclined } from '../lib/fork-availability.js';
 import { discoveryFamilies, readCapabilityFamily } from '../lib/discovery-capabilities.js';
 import { pollUntilTerminal, scaledTimeoutMs } from '../lib/polling.js';
 import { isFixtureAdvertised } from '../lib/fixtures.js';
-import { discoverOwnedTenant } from '../lib/webhook-receiver.js';
+import { discoverOwnedTenant, receiverBinding } from '../lib/webhook-receiver.js';
 import { recordRequirement } from '../lib/requirement-ledger.js';
 import { requirementIdForFile } from '../lib/scenario-disposition.js';
 import { req } from '../lib/requirement-ids.js';
@@ -118,10 +118,11 @@ async function startReceiver(): Promise<{ server: Server; url: string; received:
       res.end();
     });
   });
-  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve()));
+  const binding = receiverBinding();
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(0, binding.bind, () => resolve()));
   const addr = server.address();
   if (typeof addr !== 'object' || addr === null) throw new Error('receiver address unavailable');
-  return { server, url: `http://127.0.0.1:${addr.port}/`, received };
+  return { server, url: `http://${binding.advertise}:${addr.port}/`, received };
 }
 
 let activeServer: Server | null = null;

package/src/scenarios/v2-run-list.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+/**
+ * RFC 0182 — `run-list` (suite 2.1.0, target major 2; gated on the `runList`
+ * family; `spec/v2/core/runs.md` §List).
+ *
+ * Witness class: witnessable — gated. A host that advertises `runList` MUST
+ * serve `GET /runs` as a tenant-scoped, cursor-paginated list of the caller's
+ * runs: two runs the suite just created appear (§A.2), every `runId` in the
+ * body carries the caller's tenant segment — the segment of the ids the host
+ * minted for this credential moments ago (§A.2), no page exceeds the advertised
+ * `maxPageSize` (§A.3), a cursor the host did not mint is refused
+ * `400 validation_error` (§A.3), and when the `filters` facet names
+ * `workflowId` the filtered list contains only that workflow (§A.4). The body
+ * is validated against `run-list-response.schema.json`, which `$ref`s
+ * `run-snapshot.schema.json` — so a bare id anywhere fails the shape leg
+ * before it fails the tenant leg.
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { driver, type OpenWOPResponse } from '../lib/driver.js';
+import { gateFamily, v2Discovery, v2Validator } from '../lib/v2.js';
+import { readErrorCode } from '../lib/error-envelope.js';
+import { softSkip } from '../lib/soft-skip.js';
+import { req } from '../lib/requirement-ids.js';
+
+const DOC = 'spec/v2/core/runs.md §List';
+const NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID = 'conformance-noop';
+const MAX_PAGES = 50;
+
+async function http(fn: () => Promise<OpenWOPResponse>): Promise<OpenWOPResponse | null> {
+  try { return await fn(); } catch { return null; }
+}
+
+async function createRun(): Promise<{ runId: string } | { reason: string }> {
+  const res = await http(() => driver.post('/runs', { workflowId: NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID }));
+  if (res === null) return { reason: 'POST /runs unreachable (fetch failed)' };
+  const runId = (res.json as { runId?: unknown } | undefined)?.runId;
+  if (res.status !== 201 || typeof runId !== 'string') return { reason: `POST /runs {workflowId: ${NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID}} answered ${res.status} ${readErrorCode(res.json) ?? ''} — the smallest valid create was refused (fixture not seeded?)`.trim() };
+  return { runId };
+}
+
+function tenantOf(runId: string): string { return runId.slice(0, runId.indexOf('/')); }
+
+type Page = { runs?: unknown; nextCursor?: unknown };
+
+/** Walk the list from the first page, collecting run ids, until the last page or MAX_PAGES. */
+async function walk(query: string, maxPageSize: number): Promise<{ ids: string[]; pages: Page[]; reason?: string }> {
+  const ids: string[] = []; const pages: Page[] = []; let cursor: string | undefined;
+  for (let i = 0; i < MAX_PAGES; i++) {
+    const q = `${query}${query ? '&' : '?'}limit=${maxPageSize}${cursor ? `&cursor=${encodeURIComponent(cursor)}` : ''}`;
+    const res = await http(() => driver.get(`/runs${q}`));
+    if (res === null) return { ids, pages, reason: `GET /runs${q} unreachable (fetch failed)` };
+    if (res.status !== 200) return { ids, pages, reason: `GET /runs${q} answered ${res.status} ${readErrorCode(res.json) ?? ''}` };
+    const page = res.json as Page; pages.push(page);
+    for (const r of Array.isArray(page.runs) ? page.runs : []) { const id = (r as { runId?: unknown }).runId; if (typeof id === 'string') ids.push(id); }
+    if (typeof page.nextCursor !== 'string') break;
+    cursor = page.nextCursor;
+  }
+  return { ids, pages };
+}
+
+describe('RFC 0182 — run-list (gated on runList)', () => {
+  it('two runs the caller just created appear, every id is bound to the caller\'s tenant, and no page exceeds maxPageSize', async () => {
+    if (!(await v2Discovery())) return softSkip('blocked', 'v2 discovery unreachable — /.well-known/openwop did not answer 200 with a JSON body under OpenWOP-Version: 2.0');
+    const fam = await gateFamily('runList');
+    if (!fam) return softSkip('inapplicable', 'runList family not advertised — no obligation (gate recorded under openwop.family.runList)');
+    const maxPageSize = typeof fam['maxPageSize'] === 'number' ? fam['maxPageSize'] : NaN;
+    expect(Number.isInteger(maxPageSize) && maxPageSize >= 1, req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped', 'spec/v2/core/capabilities.md § runList', `runList.maxPageSize MUST be an integer ≥ 1 (got ${String(fam['maxPageSize'])})`)).toBe(true);
+    const a = await createRun(); if ('reason' in a) return softSkip('blocked', a.reason);
+    const b = await createRun(); if ('reason' in b) return softSkip('blocked', b.reason);
+    const tenant = tenantOf(a.runId);
+    const walked = await walk('', maxPageSize);
+    if (walked.reason && walked.pages.length === 0) return softSkip('blocked', walked.reason);
+    const validate = v2Validator('run-list-response');
+    for (const page of walked.pages) {
+      const v = validate(page);
+      expect(v.ok, req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped', DOC, `every page MUST validate against run-list-response.schema.json — runs[] of RunSnapshot (bound runId) plus optional nextCursor (${v.errors})`)).toBe(true);
+      expect((page.runs as unknown[]).length <= maxPageSize, req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped', DOC, `a page MUST NOT exceed the advertised runList.maxPageSize (${maxPageSize}); got ${(page.runs as unknown[]).length}`)).toBe(true);
+    }
+    expect(walked.ids.includes(a.runId) && walked.ids.includes(b.runId), req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped', DOC, `a run the caller just created MUST appear in its unfiltered list — created ${a.runId} and ${b.runId}; walked ${walked.ids.length} id(s) over ${walked.pages.length} page(s)${walked.reason ? ` (${walked.reason})` : ''}`)).toBe(true);
+    const foreign = walked.ids.filter((id) => tenantOf(id) !== tenant);
+    expect(foreign, req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.tenant-scoped', 'spec/v2/core/identity.md §5', `every runId in the list MUST carry the caller's tenant segment (${tenant}) — the list is tenant-scoped by construction; found ${foreign.length} other(s): ${foreign.slice(0, 3).join(', ')}`)).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('a cursor the host did not mint is refused 400 validation_error', async () => {
+    if (!(await v2Discovery())) return softSkip('blocked', 'v2 discovery unreachable');
+    if (!(await gateFamily('runList'))) return softSkip('inapplicable', 'runList family not advertised — no obligation (gate recorded under openwop.family.runList)');
+    const res = await http(() => driver.get('/runs?cursor=openwop-conformance-not-a-cursor'));
+    if (res === null) return softSkip('blocked', 'GET /runs?cursor=… unreachable (fetch failed)');
+    expect(res.status, req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.cursor-refused', DOC, `a cursor the host did not mint MUST be refused 400 validation_error; got ${res.status} ${readErrorCode(res.json) ?? ''}`)).toBe(400);
+    expect(readErrorCode(res.json), req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.cursor-refused', 'spec/v2/core/errors.md', 'the refusal MUST carry validation_error')).toBe('validation_error');
+  });
+
+  it('when the filters facet names workflowId, a filtered list contains only that workflow', async () => {
+    if (!(await v2Discovery())) return softSkip('blocked', 'v2 discovery unreachable');
+    const fam = await gateFamily('runList');
+    if (!fam) return softSkip('inapplicable', 'runList family not advertised — no obligation (gate recorded under openwop.family.runList)');
+    const filters = Array.isArray(fam['filters']) ? (fam['filters'] as unknown[]) : [];
+    if (!filters.includes('workflowId')) return softSkip('inapplicable', 'runList.filters does not name workflowId — the filter leg has no obligation');
+    const maxPageSize = typeof fam['maxPageSize'] === 'number' ? fam['maxPageSize'] : 1;
+    const c = await createRun(); if ('reason' in c) return softSkip('blocked', c.reason);
+    const walked = await walk(`?workflowId=${encodeURIComponent(NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID)}`, maxPageSize);
+    if (walked.reason && walked.pages.length === 0) return softSkip('blocked', walked.reason);
+    const others = walked.pages.flatMap((p) => (Array.isArray(p.runs) ? p.runs : [])).filter((r) => (r as { workflowId?: unknown }).workflowId !== NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID);
+    expect(others.length, req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.filter-exact', DOC, `a workflowId filter MUST be exact — every listed run's workflowId MUST equal ${NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID}; found ${others.length} other(s)`)).toBe(0);
+    expect(walked.ids.includes(c.runId), req('openwop.requirement.0182.run-list.filter-exact', DOC, `the filtered list MUST still contain the ${NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID} run the caller just created (${c.runId})`)).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

package/src/scenarios/v2-webhook-durable-delivery.test.ts

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ import { afterEach, describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
 import { createServer, type IncomingMessage, type Server, type ServerResponse } from 'node:http';
 import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
 import { v2Discovery, gateFamily } from '../lib/v2.js';
-import { resolveRegistrationUrl } from '../lib/webhook-receiver.js';
+import { receiverBinding, resolveRegistrationUrl } from '../lib/webhook-receiver.js';
 import { readErrorCode } from '../lib/error-envelope.js';
 import { softSkip } from '../lib/soft-skip.js';
 import { req } from '../lib/requirement-ids.js';
@@ -74,10 +74,11 @@ async function startReceiver(failFirst: number): Promise<{ server: Server; url:
   });
   const pinned = Number(process.env['OPENWOP_WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_PORT'] ?? '');
   const bindPort = Number.isInteger(pinned) && pinned > 0 && pinned < 65536 ? pinned : 0;
-  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(bindPort, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve()));
+  const binding = receiverBinding();
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(bindPort, binding.bind, () => resolve()));
   const addr = server.address();
   if (typeof addr !== 'object' || addr === null) throw new Error('receiver address unavailable');
-  return { server, url: `http://127.0.0.1:${addr.port}/`, attempts };
+  return { server, url: `http://${binding.advertise}:${addr.port}/`, attempts };
 }
 
 let active: Server | null = null;

package/src/scenarios/webhook-signed-delivery.test.ts

@@ -18,8 +18,11 @@
  *
  * Operator contract — THREE gates, not one (clarified 2026-08-25).
  *
- * The test receiver is `http://127.0.0.1:{port}/`, and `webhooks.md`
- * forbids it three separate times. A host honoring
+ * The test receiver is `http://127.0.0.1:{port}/` — or, where the operator has
+ * declared `OPENWOP_CONFORMANCE_HARNESS_HOST` because the host under test is
+ * off-process, `http://{that name}:{port}/` (see `receiverBinding`). Either
+ * way it is a private address over plain `http`, and `webhooks.md` forbids it
+ * three separate times. A host honoring
  * `OPENWOP_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE=true` (or an equivalent opt-in) MUST
  * relax ALL THREE for this scenario to be witnessable:
  *
@@ -107,7 +110,7 @@ import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
 import { discoveryFamilies } from '../lib/discovery-capabilities.js';
 import { pollUntilTerminal } from '../lib/polling.js';
 import { isFixtureAdvertised } from '../lib/fixtures.js';
-import { discoverOwnedTenant, resolveRegistrationUrl } from '../lib/webhook-receiver.js';
+import { discoverOwnedTenant, receiverBinding, resolveRegistrationUrl } from '../lib/webhook-receiver.js';
 import { req } from '../lib/requirement-ids.js';
 
 interface DeliveredRequest {
@@ -141,10 +144,11 @@ async function startReceiver(): Promise<{ server: Server; url: string; received:
   // pins it so `ngrok http <port>` (or a proxy) has a stable target.
   const pinned = Number(process.env['OPENWOP_WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_PORT'] ?? '');
   const bindPort = Number.isInteger(pinned) && pinned > 0 && pinned < 65536 ? pinned : 0;
-  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(bindPort, '127.0.0.1', () => resolve()));
+  const binding = receiverBinding();
+  await new Promise<void>((resolve) => server.listen(bindPort, binding.bind, () => resolve()));
   const addr = server.address();
   if (typeof addr !== 'object' || addr === null) throw new Error('receiver address unavailable');
-  return { server, url: `http://127.0.0.1:${addr.port}/`, received };
+  return { server, url: `http://${binding.advertise}:${addr.port}/`, received };
 }
 
 let activeServer: Server | null = null;
@@ -254,9 +258,6 @@ describe('webhook-signed-delivery: end-to-end HMAC v1', () => {
     const runId = (create.json as { runId: string }).runId;
     await pollUntilTerminal(runId, { timeoutMs: 10_000 });
 
-    // Allow a small grace period for fire-and-forget delivery to land.
-    await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 500));
-
     // Test-isolation note: when this scenario runs concurrently with
     // other webhook-bearing scenarios against a stateful host, the
     // host's webhook registry fans out EVERY run's events to EVERY
@@ -264,14 +265,43 @@ describe('webhook-signed-delivery: end-to-end HMAC v1', () => {
     // deliveries from other tests' concurrent runs. Filter to events
     // carrying THIS test's runId so the assertion checks the
     // signature shape on a delivery the host emitted for THIS run.
-    const ourDeliveries = receiver.received.filter((d) => {
-      try {
-        const body = JSON.parse(d.body) as { runId?: unknown };
-        return body.runId === runId;
-      } catch {
-        return false;
-      }
-    });
+    const ours = (): DeliveredRequest[] =>
+      receiver.received.filter((d) => {
+        try {
+          const body = JSON.parse(d.body) as { runId?: unknown };
+          return body.runId === runId;
+        } catch {
+          return false;
+        }
+      });
+
+    // WAIT for a delivery, don't sleep a guessed interval for one.
+    //
+    // This was `setTimeout(500)` — a fixed grace "for fire-and-forget delivery
+    // to land". That assumes delivery is synchronous-ish with run completion,
+    // which is true of a host that POSTs inline from its event loop and false
+    // of one that does what `webhooks.md` §"Delivery" actually asks for: a
+    // durable queue with retries, drained by a worker on its own cadence.
+    //
+    // MEASURED 2026-09-09 against a reference host whose delivery worker polls
+    // every 1000ms: with the receiver address finally correct, this assertion
+    // still reported `expected 0 to be greater than 0` after a 549ms test — the
+    // sleep had expired before the worker's first tick. It reads as "the host
+    // does not deliver webhooks" when the host had not yet been asked to. The
+    // more durable a host's delivery machinery, the more exposed it is here.
+    //
+    // A deadline is the honest instrument: it still FAILS, never skips, and the
+    // failure now means "did not deliver within DELIVERY_DEADLINE_MS" rather
+    // than "did not deliver within one arbitrary tick of an unrelated clock".
+    // Sized to stay inside the 30s per-test budget alongside the 10s terminal
+    // poll above, so a slow host fails on THIS assertion's message rather than
+    // on an uninformative vitest timeout.
+    const DELIVERY_DEADLINE_MS = 12_000;
+    const deadline = Date.now() + DELIVERY_DEADLINE_MS;
+    while (ours().length === 0 && Date.now() < deadline) {
+      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, 250));
+    }
+    const ourDeliveries = ours();
     // With a tunnel wired this is the assertion that keeps a mis-wired front
     // from reading as a pass. Registration succeeded, so the host believes it
     // has a subscriber; if nothing arrived HERE, the delivery went somewhere
@@ -284,7 +314,8 @@ describe('webhook-signed-delivery: end-to-end HMAC v1', () => {
           'Registration was accepted, so zero deliveries observed on the local receiver means ' +
           'either the host did not deliver, or OPENWOP_WEBHOOK_RECEIVER_URL does not actually ' +
           'front this process. Both are failures; neither is a skip.'
-        : 'host MUST POST at least one event for THIS run to a registered subscriber after run.completed',
+        : 'host MUST POST at least one event for THIS run to a registered subscriber within '
+          + `${DELIVERY_DEADLINE_MS}ms of run.completed`,
     )).toBeGreaterThan(0);
 
     // Validate the FIRST delivery's signature contract. Other deliveries