@openwop/openwop-conformance 2.0.0 → 2.0.2

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,26 @@
 # `@openwop/openwop-conformance` Changelog
 
+## [2.0.2] — 2026-09-06 — 2.0.1's own fix could not run: the derived wait exceeded the harness timeout that governs it
+
+A regression in 2.0.1, measured by the host that reported the defect 2.0.1 fixed. On a 2.0.1 re-cut one row moved, the wrong way: `0173.webhook-durable-delivery.dead-letter` went `executed-pass` → `executed-fail`.
+
+2.0.1 widened the retry wait to a 90 s cap and left both `it()` blocks on the harness default (`vitest.config.ts` `testTimeout: 30_000`, no per-test override). **A wait longer than the timeout that governs it can never elapse** — the test dies at 30 s with "Test timed out in 30000ms". The dead-letter leg is worse than one wait: `waitTerminal` plus **two** sequential `retryWaitMs` waits, up to 191 s inside a 30 s budget. And it took a passing row with it — `dead-letter` passed at rc.67 by observing `attempts.length > 1` inside the old 20 s window, and 2.0.1 moved that leg onto `retryWaitMs` too.
+
+Both `it()` blocks now take a timeout **derived from the wait constant** — `RETRY_WAIT_CAP_MS + WAIT_SLACK_MS`, and twice the cap for the two-wait leg — rather than a second literal, so a later change to the wait carries its own budget.
+
+The shape is the defect 2.0.1 fixed, displaced one layer: 2.0.1 stopped the scenario blaming a host for a deadline *the scenario* chose, then let *the harness* choose a shorter one silently, on exactly the durable hosts the widening was written to help.
+
+## [2.0.1] — 2026-09-05 — the webhook durability scenario read the wrong carrier and imposed its own deadline
+
+Two defects in `v2-webhook-durable-delivery`, both reported by a host running against 2.0.0.
+
+**It read the v1 carrier.** `advertisedRetryPolicy()` read `triggerBridge.retryPolicy` and its docstring claimed that was "the only v2 carrier". `spec/v2/facets/webhooks.schema.json` says the opposite in as many words — *"retryPolicy is the v2 carrier of the delivery obligation (was triggerBridge.retryPolicy at v1)"* — so a host correctly advertising the **v2** carrier had its policy read as `null`, and a host on the v1 field was measured against a **different subsystem's** budget. The reporting host advertises 8 on its trigger bridge and enforces 5 on webhook delivery, and could not be honest about both under one borrowed field. Now reads `webhooks.retryPolicy` first and falls back to `triggerBridge.retryPolicy` for the v1 overlap the schema preserves.
+
+**It imposed a 20-second deadline and blamed the host for missing it.** A host whose first backoff is slower than 20 s was recorded `executed-fail` on a core-standard floor row *for being durable*: the retry lands at t+30 s, the window closed at t+20 s, and the assertion said "a 500 MUST be retried" about a host that retried. The wait now derives from the advertised policy — 20 s floor unchanged when nothing is advertised, widening to a 90 s cap for `fixed`/`exponential`. The cap is deliberate: unbounded waiting would let a host that never retries hold the suite open instead of failing.
+
+This is rc.67's poll-cursor defect one file over, and **deterministic rather than flaky** — the instrument's own window, attributed to the host. A scenario must not blame a host for a deadline the scenario chose.
+
+
 ## [2.0.0] — 2026-09-05 — openwop v2
 
 The v2 major. `@openwop/openwop-conformance@2.0.0` and `@openwop/spec-artifacts@2.0.0` are one release under two names — conformance pins the contract package to an exact version, so install both.

package/dist/spec-artifacts.lock.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
   "package": "@openwop/spec-artifacts",
-  "version": "2.0.0",
-  "stampSha256": "e4fcd1ca67750794f3735dfc78bd89672a73a35b57c96d5601272ca038700f3c"
+  "version": "2.0.2",
+  "stampSha256": "ae8640bf298cdf8a4efd624f16424ed1feba41be0f3f919f859bf5a5bbe0432f"
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "2.0.0",
+  "version": "2.0.2",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",
@@ -52,10 +52,10 @@
   },
   "devDependencies": {
     "typescript": "^5.6.0",
-    "@types/node": "^22.0.0",
+    "@types/node": "^22.0.1",
     "@openwop/spec-artifacts": "file:../spec-artifacts"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
-    "@openwop/spec-artifacts": "2.0.0"
+    "@openwop/spec-artifacts": "2.0.2"
   }
 }

package/requirements.json

@@ -29006,7 +29006,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.v2-webhook-durable-delivery.a-failed-attempt-is-retried-and-the-event-is-delivered-at-least-once",
       "file": "v2-webhook-durable-delivery.test.ts",
-      "line": 145,
+      "line": 221,
       "title": "a failed attempt is retried and the event is delivered at least once",
       "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0173.webhook-durable-delivery",
       "citations": [
@@ -29041,7 +29041,7 @@
     {
       "id": "openwop.it.v2-webhook-durable-delivery.an-exhausted-delivery-is-dead-lettered-never-dropped",
       "file": "v2-webhook-durable-delivery.test.ts",
-      "line": 199,
+      "line": 275,
       "title": "an exhausted delivery is dead-lettered, never dropped",
       "explicitId": "openwop.requirement.0173.webhook-durable-delivery.dead-letter",
       "citations": [

package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json

@@ -1,17 +1,17 @@
 {
   "_comment": "Provenance of @openwop/spec-artifacts (RFC 0168 §D.2). files: SHA-256 per file; the conformance suite compares the installed peer against dist/spec-artifacts.lock.json at start.",
   "package": "@openwop/spec-artifacts",
-  "version": "2.0.0",
-  "corpusTag": "v2.0.0",
+  "version": "2.0.2",
+  "corpusTag": "v2.0.2",
   "files": {
     "api/.redocly.lint-ignore.yaml": "bf5a8350b88a72fa43f59605ed8d903ed24b6cfccda5e45509c9f6ed9ee4e712",
     "api/asyncapi.yaml": "d5ecb9ee6114582be3b1f662c84bfac9ae96dae7bacb853e461168f70a8e1c7d",
     "api/grpc/openwop.proto": "c3e72bb17cba514ee98feb6434e6c9b6ea6795bfd086489ec69fd882dd1ad977",
     "api/openapi.yaml": "39081c59fb696159806b0f2f9a42e7e9ff830d622fcf2ad4159b21357580a955",
     "api/redocly.yaml": "b0604c89b2ca6d5076ec25725c539dad44a741a811fe524439ee6daef8baa09f",
-    "api/seams-v2.yaml": "0568c438db8a84b9e51c221f118b660bad9f96722ec5607bce25b2fe1395afa0",
-    "api/v2/asyncapi.yaml": "fe31d75cdee4505900fe206fb5d1bdedbaa7ab6f54fd7ff1c63f14c5a1cd9595",
-    "api/v2/openapi.yaml": "1e33a399c7b29b93e317cab6ba60b891a3b9153e79c0ff907bf253f2c48aa6a6",
+    "api/seams-v2.yaml": "95eccbef6e1f7f51417efe2f307d8950bb520d3b86806bf9d1a316e96aa6b9b5",
+    "api/v2/asyncapi.yaml": "70d1a50b3acdf51763239463efe0336fc80b4eb2f9b4ab50d05860ead0490cf0",
+    "api/v2/openapi.yaml": "e55547a384bb43f8fe21ae93a27dfc7a16df6494f5ae50aca60028968ce039d4",
     "api/v2/redocly.yaml": "1e66b60e6118ad11a823bb620678be464d99dfe50a40e3e6f93ec9429b88b34c",
     "schemas/README.md": "0c0b737ffcf8f30e7d2809cec8a498232de710f41443212922ad8337cdde0b51",
     "schemas/a2a-task-state.schema.json": "c9365918f993f943b4b619d42551eb066a1ed33a08d895d51b395432a5b1f1bc",
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@
     "schemas/workspace-file.schema.json": "464de85c2a068243084ee9c1d969bc7cd5d8f7948574e58450d6493c38a0e1e4",
     "spec/v1/alias-detectors.json": "fee4594ef49953953ffcd0b3813300067d16b3e65ebff2aac722034ac9b3f545",
     "spec/v1/capability-declaration-classes.json": "e7729aed5c4b4e1dd02abab0530f14cc95f5d4070fe51fb139e7f5cccefa00c6",
-    "spec/v1/core-standard-manifest.json": "08eb68a1f07020390cf3a76ce6ac9bec697cd35ba02a0d8618939e39cac87a0a",
+    "spec/v1/core-standard-manifest.json": "1afaf3936e9d13d5fb71a83fe63a81f8bbb18efb7417c60e523cebf63a5060e7",
     "spec/v1/deprecations.json": "1d5acb69a9b8ccb57275a95605f74aef1d920685f8407c9d382a46b59dc803bb",
     "spec/v1/deprecations.schema.json": "18c87e78bedc210431f795ae44c5b5d202f2f3317850d5cf86867d4f1fa1cdfb",
     "spec/v1/event-codemap.json": "3da60d884157793a360da532a9fcbbfb5285636db325a74cec94b34622186d97",
@@ -230,8 +230,8 @@
     "spec/v2/path-manifest.json": "034152e09b1458c66810d4050e20a273b2b9b8fe2d92b66e8b819477de58a1be",
     "spec/v2/peer-dependency-aliases.json": "d10299280abee08258502925bc327293ee413e0108cd6e6ec75ff6110653308d",
     "spec/v2/profiles.json": "0636f19fceae625390003a347e70ef4797d84766b5c24ce8a02cea52aadebca4",
-    "spec/v2/release.json": "517c6d3ccefcc5e76cc8206a580222af2ae51dcca99869db83191e046c461a49",
+    "spec/v2/release.json": "fea7f9b757b226e263b7626d1bfebfb680e7ea853cca86b2426c82435e8fdbd4",
     "spec/v2/retention-floors.json": "eaf3722d95c79947af1d4269ef85117e126518c588cfcf1a2b21b97269f51624"
   },
-  "corpusCommit": "2e5c91a9376498ce8825f97fcb76f2edac0efb4f"
+  "corpusCommit": "7cf764b47ef3b79ddcf5c6e5dfea9f37f9b60a66"
 }

package/src/scenarios/v2-webhook-durable-delivery.test.ts

@@ -117,13 +117,89 @@ async function waitFor(pred: () => boolean, timeoutMs: number): Promise<boolean>
   return pred();
 }
 
-/** The retry policy the host advertises, where it does (`triggerBridge.retryPolicy` is the only v2 carrier; absent ⇒ null). */
+/**
+ * The retry policy the host advertises for WEBHOOK delivery.
+ *
+ * 2.0.1: this read the WRONG FIELD. Its docstring claimed
+ * `triggerBridge.retryPolicy` was "the only v2 carrier", but
+ * `spec/v2/facets/webhooks.schema.json` says the opposite in as many words:
+ * "retryPolicy is the v2 carrier of the delivery obligation (was
+ * triggerBridge.retryPolicy at v1)", and the field's own description adds
+ * "The webhooks family carries it at v2; `triggerBridge.retryPolicy` is the
+ * v1 carrier and stays through the overlap."
+ *
+ * So a host that correctly advertises the v2 carrier had its policy read as
+ * `null`, and a host still on the v1 carrier was measured against a policy
+ * belonging to a DIFFERENT SUBSYSTEM — the trigger-bridge state machine,
+ * whose delivery budget need not equal the webhook one. A tier-1 host
+ * reported exactly that: 8 on the trigger bridge, 5 on webhook delivery,
+ * and no way to be honest about both under a single borrowed field.
+ *
+ * `webhooks.retryPolicy` first, `triggerBridge.retryPolicy` second for the
+ * v1 overlap the schema explicitly preserves.
+ */
 function advertisedRetryPolicy(doc: Record<string, unknown>): { maxAttempts?: number; backoff?: string } | null {
-  const tb = doc['triggerBridge'];
-  const rp = tb && typeof tb === 'object' ? (tb as { retryPolicy?: unknown }).retryPolicy : undefined;
-  return rp && typeof rp === 'object' ? (rp as { maxAttempts?: number; backoff?: string }) : null;
+  const read = (holder: unknown): { maxAttempts?: number; backoff?: string } | null => {
+    const rp = holder && typeof holder === 'object' ? (holder as { retryPolicy?: unknown }).retryPolicy : undefined;
+    return rp && typeof rp === 'object' ? (rp as { maxAttempts?: number; backoff?: string }) : null;
+  };
+  return read(doc['webhooks']) ?? read(doc['triggerBridge']);
 }
 
+/**
+ * How long to wait for a retry, derived from what the host ADVERTISED.
+ *
+ * 2.0.1: this was a hard 20 s, and a host whose first backoff is deliberately
+ * slower than that was recorded `executed-fail` on a core-standard floor row
+ * for being durable. Measured on a tier-1 host: Cloud Tasks `minBackoff: 30s`,
+ * the retry lands at t+30 s, the window closed at t+20 s, and the assertion
+ * said "a 500 MUST be retried" about a host that retried. 30 s is not an
+ * unusual first backoff.
+ *
+ * That is rc.67's poll-cursor defect one file over and DETERMINISTIC rather
+ * than flaky: the instrument's own window, attributed to the host. A scenario
+ * must not blame a host for a deadline the scenario chose.
+ *
+ * The floor stays 20 s so a host that advertises nothing is measured exactly
+ * as before; an advertised `exponential`/`fixed` backoff widens it to 90 s,
+ * which covers a 30 s first attempt with room for the second. The cap is
+ * deliberate: unbounded waiting would let a host that never retries hold the
+ * suite open instead of failing.
+ */
+const RETRY_WAIT_FLOOR_MS = 20_000;
+const RETRY_WAIT_CAP_MS = 90_000;
+function retryWaitMs(doc: Record<string, unknown>): number {
+  const policy = advertisedRetryPolicy(doc);
+  if (policy === null) return RETRY_WAIT_FLOOR_MS;
+  const backoff = String(policy.backoff ?? '');
+  return backoff === 'exponential' || backoff === 'fixed' ? RETRY_WAIT_CAP_MS : RETRY_WAIT_FLOOR_MS;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The per-test budget, DERIVED from the wait above (suite 2.0.2).
+ *
+ * 2.0.1 raised the derived wait to 90 s and left the `it()` blocks on the
+ * harness default (`vitest.config.ts` `testTimeout: 30_000`). A wait longer
+ * than the timeout that governs it can never elapse: on exactly the durable
+ * hosts the widening was written to help, the test died at 30 s with "Test
+ * timed out in 30000ms" — and took `dead-letter` with it, which had passed at
+ * the old 20 s window. Measured by a host on 2.0.1 (`00337-dgw`): one row moved
+ * `executed-pass -> executed-fail` and it was this one.
+ *
+ * The shape is the defect 2.0.1 itself fixed, one layer out: 2.0.1 stopped the
+ * scenario blaming a host for a deadline the SCENARIO chose, and then let the
+ * HARNESS choose a shorter one silently. So the budget is computed from
+ * `RETRY_WAIT_CAP_MS` rather than written as a second literal — a later change
+ * to the wait carries its own timeout, the way the advert is sourced from the
+ * constant the delivery loop reads. `WAIT_SLACK_MS` covers `waitTerminal`,
+ * registration and the HTTP round trips around the waits.
+ */
+const WAIT_SLACK_MS = 30_000;
+/** One `retryWaitMs` wait (the retry leg). */
+const RETRY_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS = RETRY_WAIT_CAP_MS + WAIT_SLACK_MS;
+/** Two sequential `retryWaitMs` waits (the dead-letter leg: observe a retry, then exhaust). */
+const DEAD_LETTER_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS = RETRY_WAIT_CAP_MS * 2 + WAIT_SLACK_MS;
+
 /** Register the suite receiver; null (with a note) when the host's SSRF guard refuses a loopback URL. */
 async function register(url: string): Promise<{ webhookId: string } | null> {
   const registration = resolveRegistrationUrl(url);
@@ -159,7 +235,7 @@ describe('RFC 0173 §B — webhook-durable-delivery (gated on webhooks)', () =>
     await waitTerminal(runId, 10_000);
 
     const ours = () => receiver.attempts.filter((a) => a.runId === runId);
-    const retried = await waitFor(() => ours().some((a) => a.status === 204), 20_000);
+    const retried = await waitFor(() => ours().some((a) => a.status === 204), retryWaitMs(doc));
     const attempts = ours();
     expect(
       attempts.length,
@@ -194,7 +270,7 @@ describe('RFC 0173 §B — webhook-durable-delivery (gated on webhooks)', () =>
 
     const del = await driver.delete(`/webhooks/${encodeURIComponent(sub.webhookId)}`);
     expect(del.status, req('openwop.requirement.0173.webhook-durable-delivery', 'webhooks.md §Surfaces', 'DELETE /webhooks/{webhookId} MUST answer 204')).toBe(204);
-  });
+  }, RETRY_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
 
   it('an exhausted delivery is dead-lettered, never dropped', async () => {
     const doc = await discovery();
@@ -212,7 +288,7 @@ describe('RFC 0173 §B — webhook-durable-delivery (gated on webhooks)', () =>
     const runId = (create.json as { runId: string }).runId;
     await waitTerminal(runId, 10_000);
     const ours = () => receiver.attempts.filter((a) => a.runId === runId);
-    await waitFor(() => ours().length > 1, 20_000);
+    await waitFor(() => ours().length > 1, retryWaitMs(doc));
     const attempts = ours();
     expect(
       attempts.length,
@@ -221,7 +297,7 @@ describe('RFC 0173 §B — webhook-durable-delivery (gated on webhooks)', () =>
     const policy = advertisedRetryPolicy(doc);
     if (policy?.maxAttempts !== undefined) {
       // Give the policy time to exhaust, then the host MUST stop.
-      await waitFor(() => ours().length >= policy.maxAttempts!, 20_000);
+      await waitFor(() => ours().length >= policy.maxAttempts!, retryWaitMs(doc));
       await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, 1_000));
       expect(
         ours().length,
@@ -234,5 +310,5 @@ describe('RFC 0173 §B — webhook-durable-delivery (gated on webhooks)', () =>
     // (no GET /webhooks/{webhookId}/dead-letters). Without a normative read the
     // routing to the sink is not observable from the suite.
     return softSkip('blocked', 'no normative dead-letter read surface for webhook deliveries in api/v2/openapi.yaml (a GET /webhooks/{webhookId}/dead-letters projection is needed) — exhaustion was observed, routing to the sink was not');
-  });
+  }, DEAD_LETTER_TEST_TIMEOUT_MS);
 });