@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.4.0 → 1.6.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,65 @@
 # `@openwop/openwop-conformance` Changelog
 
+## [1.6.0] — 2026-05-25
+
+Minor bump per `PUBLISHING.md` §"Versioning alignment" — ships the conformance scenarios for the **MyndHyve protocol-extension cohort (RFCs 0045–0054)** so adopting hosts can pin the released suite, run it against their deployment, and report pass for `Draft → Active → Accepted` graduation (per `RFCS/0001-rfc-process.md` §"Promotion to Accepted"). All additive — every new scenario is capability-gated and soft-skips against a host that doesn't advertise the surface, so existing v1.0-only hosts pass unchanged.
+
+### Added — RFC 0045–0054 cohort scenarios
+
+- **RFC 0045** (connector pack manifest) — `connector-manifest-validity.test.ts` (server-free: §A schema validity of the `connector` block + both ConnectorAuth variants; §B action/trigger typeId-resolution).
+- **RFC 0046** (`host.credentials`) — `credentials-capability-shape.test.ts` (always) + `credential-payload-redaction.test.ts` (gated; SECURITY invariant `credential-payload-redaction` via the `credentials/echo` seam).
+- **RFC 0047** (`host.oauth`) — `oauth-capability-shape.test.ts` + `oauth-connector-redaction.test.ts` (gated; token redaction via the `oauth/connector-echo` seam).
+- **RFC 0048** (identity triple) — `identity-owner-shape.test.ts` (server-free) + `cross-workspace-isolation.test.ts` (gated; fail-closed `run_forbidden` via the `identity/*` seams).
+- **RFC 0049** (RBAC) — `authorization-roles-shape.test.ts` (always) + `authorization-fail-closed.test.ts` (gated; SECURITY invariant `authorization-fail-closed` via the `authorization/decide` seam).
+- **RFC 0050** (SAML / SCIM) — `auth-saml-profile.test.ts` + `auth-scim-profile.test.ts` (advertisement shape always; behavior opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL` / `OPENWOP_TEST_SCIM_URL` + the `auth/saml/validate` + `auth/scim/provision` seams). Now ships a **bundled synthetic SAML IdP harness** (`conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.ts`, `node:crypto` RSA-SHA256, no deps) that mints the 1-positive + 6-negative assertion variants and whose `verify()` implements the RFC 0050 §A MUST list — `auth-saml-profile.test.ts` runs the full negative reference suite **server-free**; a host's real ACS validates the same assertions over the seam.
+- **RFC 0051** (approval gate) — `approval-gate-events.test.ts` (server-free) + `approval-gate-flow.test.ts` (gated; unauthorized-denied + override-audited via the `governance/approval-gate` seam).
+- **RFC 0052** (scheduling) — `scheduling-capability-shape.test.ts` (always) + `scheduling-cron-fires-once.test.ts` (gated; once-per-tick + missed-tick via the `scheduling/tick` seam).
+- **RFC 0053** (dead-letter) — `deadletter-capability-shape.test.ts` (always) + `deadletter-retry-exhaustion.test.ts` (gated; `run.dead_lettered` + fork-eligibility via the `deadletter/exhaust` seam).
+- **RFC 0054** (run diff) — `run-diff-*.test.ts` (landed with the run-diff endpoint).
+
+Two new SECURITY invariants gated in this cohort: `credential-payload-redaction` (0046, also covers 0047 tokens) + `authorization-fail-closed` (0049). New `/v1/host/sample/*` seams are catalogued in `spec/v1/host-sample-test-seams.md` §"Open seams". Suite scenario-file count → 230.
+
+## [1.5.0] — 2026-05-22
+
+Minor bump per `PUBLISHING.md` §"Versioning alignment" — unblocks MyndHyve's RFC 0044 + RFC 0039 Half A co-graduation by shipping the relaxed + RFC-0044-routing assertion logic in `multi-agent-confidence-escalation.test.ts`. No new scenario files; no new fixtures. Behavioral honesty pass on 8 sandbox scenarios + schema additions for the new RFC 0044 capability advertisement.
+
+### Changed — RFC 0044 interrupt-kind routing in `multi-agent-confidence-escalation.test.ts`
+
+Previously the scenario asserted `expect(terminal.status).toBe('waiting-clarification')` — strict equality on the clarify-kind escalation path, which rejected even RFC 0039 §A's own escalate-approval path (→ `waiting-approval`). v1.5.0 ships the relaxed + RFC-0044-routing logic landed in upstream commits `f03d01d` (relaxation to accept both canonical statuses) + `641d088` (RFC 0044 vendor-kind routing):
+
+- **Canonical kind advertised** (`clarification` / `approval`) → strict `expect(terminal.status).toBe('waiting-clarification' | 'waiting-approval')`.
+- **Vendor kind advertised** (`x-host-<host>-<kind>` per `host-extensions.md` §"Canonical prefixes") → `expect(terminal.status.startsWith('waiting-')).toBe(true)`; the host's `interrupt.md` mapping determines the suffix.
+- **No advertisement** → fall back to the canonical either-status check (preserves the `f03d01d` relaxation).
+
+This unblocks MyndHyve's `confidenceEscalationInterruptKind: 'x-host-myndhyve-low-confidence'` advertisement (their entrenched `interrupt.kind: 'low-confidence'` → `waiting-approval` mapping) without forcing a cross-cutting rename of `LOW_CONFIDENCE_SUSPEND_REASON` + `mockAgent.node` + `escalationThreshold.ts` + downstream UI consumers. See RFC 0044 §B (`RFCS/0044-confidence-escalation-interrupt-kind-advertisement.md`) for the normative contract.
+
+### Changed — Sandbox scenarios converted vacuous `expect(true).toBe(true)` to `it.todo` (honesty pass)
+
+The 8 `sandbox-*.test.ts` scenarios in v1.4.0 carried `expect(true).toBe(true)` tautology assertions for their behavioral legs. v1.5.0 converts them to `it.todo()` per upstream commit `5864a2f`:
+
+- `sandbox-no-host-process-escape.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-no-network-escape.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-no-host-fs-escape.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-no-host-env-leak.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-timeout-cap.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-memory-cap.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-no-cross-pack-mutation.test.ts`
+- `sandbox-capability-gate-respected.test.ts`
+
+Test reporters now surface 8 todos instead of 8 vacuous passes. The advertisement-shape probes (in `sandbox-no-host-fs-escape`, `sandbox-memory-cap`, `sandbox-timeout-cap`) still run real discovery-doc assertions when capabilities are advertised. Behavioral assertions light up when a sandbox-executing reference host wires the seam.
+
+### Changed — `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` (vendored): adds `multiAgent.executionModel.confidenceEscalationInterruptKind`
+
+Per RFC 0044 §A. The optional field accepts the canonical literal `"clarification"` / `"approval"` OR a vendor extension matching `^x-host-[a-z][a-z0-9-]*-[a-z][a-z0-9-]*$` per `host-extensions.md` §"Canonical prefixes". Required for the routing logic above; absent advertisement falls back to the canonical-status check.
+
+### No new scenario files
+
+Scenario file count unchanged at 205 (the v1.4.0 baseline). All changes are behavior modifications to existing files.
+
+### Known limits — unchanged from v1.4.0
+
+The 6 `it.todo` behavioral assertions across RFC 0034 OTel-seam-gated, RFC 0040 traceparent-propagation, RFC 0041 refusal-divergence + observable-sequence scenarios remain. The 8 sandbox `it.todo` assertions are new in v1.5.0 (replacing the v1.4.0 vacuous-pass shapes).
+
 ## [1.4.0] — 2026-05-22
 
 Minor bump per `PUBLISHING.md` §"Versioning alignment" — bundles 45 new conformance scenarios + 23 new fixtures landing since the 1.3.0 publish (2026-05-19). Unblocks non-steward host adoption of RFCs 0027 + 0028 + 0029 + 0030 + 0031 + 0032 + 0033 + 0034 + 0035 + 0036 + 0037 + 0039 + 0040 + 0041 against a single suite version.

package/README.md

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Exit code is non-zero on any failed assertion.
 
 ## What's Covered
 
-The current suite has 205 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
+The current suite has 231 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
 
 High-level coverage includes:
 
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ Server-required (added in 1.7.0):
 |---|---|---|
 | **Redaction** | [`capabilities.md`](../spec/v1/capabilities.md) §"Secrets" + NFR-7 + §"aiProviders" | Vendor-neutral assertions that the server doesn't leak secret material. Three scenario groups: (a) discovery shape contract — `secrets` + `aiProviders` advertisements are well-formed regardless of `secrets.supported`; when `supported === true`, scopes MUST be non-empty + `resolution === 'host-managed'`; `byok ⊆ supported`. (b) bearer-token redaction — invalid Bearer canary in `Authorization` header is not echoed in the 401 response body. (c) credentialRef echo control — gated on `secrets.supported === true`; canary planted in `configurable.ai.credentialRef` MUST NOT appear in any RunEvent payload (poll-based capture; transport-agnostic). Uses runtime-built canary fixtures (`lib/canaries.ts`) that defeat static secret scanners. 6 scenarios. |
 
-Current source tree: 205 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
+Current source tree: 231 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
 
 ## Remaining Gaps
 

package/api/asyncapi.yaml

@@ -433,9 +433,14 @@ components:
       summary: |
         Type-erased handler for `debug` mode — discriminate on the
         `type` field per the `RunEventType` enum in the run-event
-        JSON Schema. Includes events filtered out of `updates`:
-        `log.appended`, `variable.changed`, `version.pinned`,
-        `lease.*`, `node.retried`, `replay.diverged`, etc.
+        JSON Schema (the authoritative, exhaustive event list; the
+        named messages above are a curated `updates`-tier subset).
+        Includes events filtered out of `updates`: `log.appended`,
+        `variable.changed`, `version.pinned`, `lease.*`, `node.retried`,
+        `replay.diverged`, `connector.authorized`,
+        `connector.auth_expired` (RFC 0047), `authorization.decided`
+        (RFC 0049), `approval.granted` / `approval.rejected` /
+        `approval.overridden` (RFC 0051), etc.
       contentType: application/json
       payload:
         $ref: '#/components/schemas/RunEventDoc'

package/api/openapi.yaml

@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ tags:
     description: Audit-log integrity verification (gated on the `openwop-audit-log-integrity` profile).
   - name: prompts
     description: Prompt-template library — list, fetch, render, mutate (RFC 0028; gated on `capabilities.prompts.*`).
+  - name: packs-test
+    description: |
+      RFC 0025 (`Draft`). Test-mode mirror of the production `/v1/packs/*` publish/get/delete/sig surface against
+      an isolated catalog. Gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.supported: true` plus the reference impl's
+      `OPENWOP_PACKS_TEST_NAMESPACE_ENABLED=true` env-gate. Lets the conformance suite exercise the documented
+      19-code publish error catalog without `packs:publish` scope on the real registry. Hosts that haven't
+      mounted this surface MUST return `404 Not Found` for every path under `/v1/packs-test/`.
 
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # PATHS
@@ -502,6 +509,54 @@ paths:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
 
+  /v1/runs/{runId}:diff:
+    get:
+      tags: [runs]
+      summary: |
+        RFC 0054 — return a deterministic, replay-aware structured diff of
+        two runs (typically a run and its RFC 0011 fork): `divergedAtSeq` +
+        ordered `eventDiffs[]` + `stateDiff`. The diff is a pure function of
+        the two event logs (see `replay.md` determinism contract). Requires
+        `runs:read` on BOTH runs. Hosts that don't implement it return 404.
+      operationId: diffRun
+      parameters:
+        - $ref: '#/components/parameters/RunId'
+        - name: against
+          in: query
+          required: true
+          description: The other run id to diff `{runId}` against (the `b` run).
+          schema: { type: string }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: |
+            Structured diff of the two runs. `divergedAtSeq: null` + empty
+            `eventDiffs` when the logs are identical.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                $ref: '../schemas/run-diff-response.schema.json'
+        '400':
+          description: Missing or malformed `against` query parameter.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403':
+          description: |
+            Caller lacks `runs:read` on `{runId}` and/or on `against`
+            (`forbidden`); composes with RFC 0048 cross-workspace
+            isolation.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+        '404':
+          description: |
+            Either run doesn't exist, OR the host doesn't implement the diff
+            endpoint and treats the path as absent.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
   /v1/runs/{runId}:pause:
     post:
       tags: [runs]
@@ -1146,6 +1201,209 @@ paths:
               schema:
                 $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json'
 
+  # ── Test-mode pack registry namespace (RFC 0025) ─────────────────────────
+  # Mirrors the production /v1/packs/* PUT/GET/DELETE/.sig surface against an
+  # isolated catalog. Conformance scenarios under
+  # `conformance/src/scenarios/pack-registry-publish.test.ts` exercise the
+  # 19-code publish error catalog through this namespace. Hosts that don't
+  # advertise `capabilities.packs.testMode.supported: true` MUST return
+  # 404 for every path below.
+
+  /v1/packs-test/{name}/-/{version}.tgz:
+    parameters:
+      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/PackName'
+      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/PackVersion'
+    put:
+      tags: [packs-test]
+      summary: Publish a pack tarball to the isolated test catalog.
+      description: |
+        Mirror of `PUT /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}.tgz` per
+        `spec/v1/node-packs.md` §"PUT /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}.tgz".
+        Request shape, response shape, status codes, and the 19-code
+        publish error catalog (`invalid_pack_scope`, `invalid_pack_name`,
+        `invalid_version`, `invalid_body`, eight `tarball_*` codes,
+        `invalid_manifest`, `manifest_mismatch` (or the granular
+        `manifest_name_mismatch` / `manifest_version_mismatch` pair),
+        `pack_integrity_failure`, `unsupported_runtime`, `forbidden`,
+        `conflict`/`version_conflict`) MUST be served verbatim. The
+        test catalog MUST be isolated per RFC 0025 §C — a pack PUT'd
+        here MUST NOT appear in `GET /v1/packs/{name}` listings.
+      operationId: putTestPackTarball
+      parameters:
+        - in: header
+          name: X-Pack-Signing-Method
+          required: false
+          schema: { type: string, enum: [sigstore, manual, none] }
+        - in: header
+          name: X-Pack-Sha256
+          required: false
+          schema:
+            type: string
+            pattern: '^sha256-[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$'
+          description: Caller-asserted SHA-256 (server verifies; mismatch surfaces `pack_integrity_failure`).
+      requestBody:
+        required: true
+        description: Gzipped tarball bytes (`application/tar+gzip`, `application/gzip`, `application/x-gzip`, or `application/octet-stream`).
+        content:
+          application/gzip:
+            schema: { type: string, format: binary }
+          application/x-gzip:
+            schema: { type: string, format: binary }
+          application/tar+gzip:
+            schema: { type: string, format: binary }
+          application/octet-stream:
+            schema: { type: string, format: binary }
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Idempotent re-publish — identical sha256 content already published; existing record returned.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/TestPackPublishRecord' }
+        '201':
+          description: New version published to the test catalog.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/TestPackPublishRecord' }
+        '400':
+          description: |
+            One of the 17 spec-documented 400-class publish error codes:
+            URL/scope (`invalid_pack_scope`, `invalid_pack_name`, `invalid_version`),
+            body shape (`invalid_body`),
+            tarball extraction (`tarball_gunzip_failed`, `tarball_too_large`,
+            `tarball_manifest_missing`, `tarball_manifest_too_large`,
+            `tarball_manifest_not_json`, `tarball_entry_missing`,
+            `tarball_entry_too_large`, `tarball_path_traversal`,
+            `tarball_tar_parse_failed`),
+            manifest contents (`invalid_manifest`, `manifest_mismatch` or
+            the granular `manifest_name_mismatch` / `manifest_version_mismatch` pair,
+            `pack_integrity_failure`, `unsupported_runtime`).
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403':
+          description: '`forbidden` — caller lacks `packs:publish` scope or the namespace claim.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '404':
+          description: 'Host does not advertise `capabilities.packs.testMode.supported: true`, or the test-mode env-gate is unset.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '409':
+          description: '`conflict` (or `version_conflict`) — `(name, version)` already published with different content.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+    get:
+      tags: [packs-test]
+      summary: Fetch a published test-catalog tarball.
+      description: 'Mirror of `GET /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}.tgz`. Returns the gzipped tarball bytes with `Content-Type: application/tar+gzip` and an `ETag: "sha256-..."` matching the manifest''s `tarballSha256`.'
+      operationId: getTestPackTarball
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Tarball bytes.
+          content:
+            application/tar+gzip:
+              schema: { type: string, format: binary }
+        '400':
+          description: '`invalid_pack_name` or `invalid_version` — URL params malformed.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403':
+          description: '`forbidden` — caller lacks `packs:read` scope.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '404':
+          description: 'Pack version not found in the test catalog (or host does not advertise `capabilities.packs.testMode.supported: true`).'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+  /v1/packs-test/{name}/-/{version}:
+    parameters:
+      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/PackName'
+      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/PackVersion'
+    delete:
+      tags: [packs-test]
+      summary: Unpublish a test-catalog version (mirrors unpublish-window semantics).
+      description: |
+        Mirror of `DELETE /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}` per
+        `spec/v1/node-packs.md`. Returns `400 unpublish_window_expired`
+        for versions older than the registry's unpublish window
+        (default 72h). Test-mode implementations MAY shorten the
+        window for tractable conformance fixtures but MUST surface
+        the same error code.
+      operationId: deleteTestPackVersion
+      responses:
+        '204':
+          description: Version successfully unpublished from the test catalog.
+        '400':
+          description: '`unpublish_window_expired`, `invalid_pack_name`, or `invalid_version`.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403':
+          description: '`forbidden` — caller lacks `packs:publish` scope.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '404':
+          description: Version doesn't exist in the test catalog, or host does not advertise the test-mode capability.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+
+  /v1/packs-test/{name}/-/{version}.sig:
+    parameters:
+      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/PackName'
+      - $ref: '#/components/parameters/PackVersion'
+    get:
+      tags: [packs-test]
+      summary: Fetch the detached Ed25519 signature for a test-catalog pack.
+      description: |
+        Mirror of `GET /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}.sig`. Returns the
+        signature blob over `pack.json` for this version. MAY 302-redirect
+        to a storage-backend signed URL.
+      operationId: getTestPackSignature
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: Signature blob.
+          content:
+            application/octet-stream:
+              schema: { type: string, format: binary }
+        '302':
+          description: Redirect to a storage-backend signed URL (clients SHOULD follow).
+          headers:
+            Location:
+              schema: { type: string, format: uri }
+        '400':
+          description: '`invalid_pack_name` or `invalid_version` — URL params malformed.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403':
+          description: '`forbidden` — caller lacks `packs:read` scope.'
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+        '404':
+          description: |
+            `signature_not_available` — version is missing, yanked,
+            unsigned at publish time, OR the registry's storage backend
+            is unwired. The four cases are intentionally
+            indistinguishable per spec/v1/node-packs.md §"GET /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}.sig".
+            Also returned when the host does not advertise
+            `capabilities.packs.testMode.supported: true`.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/error-envelope.schema.json' }
+
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # COMPONENTS
 # ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -1189,6 +1447,25 @@ components:
         Duplicate requests return the cached response with header
         `openwop-Idempotent-Replay: true`.
 
+    PackName:
+      in: path
+      name: name
+      required: true
+      schema:
+        type: string
+        minLength: 3
+        maxLength: 214
+      description: Reverse-DNS pack name per `spec/v1/node-packs.md` §Naming (e.g. `vendor.acme.salesforce-tools`).
+
+    PackVersion:
+      in: path
+      name: version
+      required: true
+      schema:
+        type: string
+        pattern: '^(0|[1-9]\d*)\.(0|[1-9]\d*)\.(0|[1-9]\d*)(?:-[\w.-]+)?(?:\+[\w.-]+)?$'
+      description: SemVer 2.0.0 version of the pack.
+
   responses:
     Unauthenticated:
       description: Missing or invalid credential.
@@ -1304,3 +1581,31 @@ components:
                 supported:
                   type: array
                   items: { type: string, enum: [values, updates, messages, debug] }
+
+    TestPackPublishRecord:
+      description: |
+        Response body for a successful publish against the test-mode
+        registry namespace (RFC 0025). Mirror of the production publish
+        record returned by `PUT /v1/packs/{name}/-/{version}.tgz`.
+      type: object
+      required: [name, version, tarballSha256, publishedAt]
+      properties:
+        name:
+          type: string
+          description: Reverse-DNS pack name as PUT'd.
+        version:
+          type: string
+          description: SemVer 2.0.0 version as PUT'd.
+        tarballSha256:
+          type: string
+          pattern: '^sha256-[A-Za-z0-9+/=]+$'
+          description: Server-computed SHA-256 over the uploaded tarball bytes.
+        publishedAt:
+          type: string
+          format: date-time
+        signed:
+          type: boolean
+          description: Whether a sibling `.sig` signature blob was persisted.
+        signingMethod:
+          type: string
+          enum: [sigstore, manual, none]