@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.25.0 → 1.26.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -1,5 +1,19 @@
 # `@openwop/openwop-conformance` Changelog
 
+## [1.26.0] — 2026-06-15 — RFC 0102 A2UI surface scenarios
+
+Ships the public conformance scenarios + the core payload schema for **RFC 0102 — A2UI agent-authored interface surfaces** (the core, advertised envelope kind `ui.a2ui-surface`), landed in openwop#716 (`e2b3a99b`). Minor bump per the scenario-add rule (5 net-new scenario files; suite 344 → 349). The vendored `schemas/envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json` ships byte-identical to the corpus so adopting hosts can validate inbound surfaces with zero drift.
+
+### Added — RFC 0102 A2UI agent-authored interface surfaces (count 344 → 349)
+
+- **`a2ui-surface-shape.test.ts`** (NEW; always-on server-free) — Ajv2020 validation of the closed `ui.a2ui-surface` payload schema: a positive surface (closed day-1 catalog + a confined `resume`/`exchange` action) validates; an out-of-catalog component, an extra/script-bearing property, a missing `catalogVersion`/`surface`, an unenumerated `catalogVersion`, and an `action.target` outside `enum["resume","exchange"]` (or carrying an arbitrary URL) each fail. The structural half of `a2ui-action-confinement` and the enabling precondition for the render-side `a2ui-surface-no-code-exec` / `a2ui-surface-no-network-egress` reference-app probes.
+- **`a2ui-surface-degrades.test.ts`** (NEW) — `ui.a2ui-surface` is an optional/advertised kind, not a MUST-recognize universal kind; an unadvertised kind is `gated` (run survives, N6), never crashing the run. HTTP leg via `/v1/host/sample/envelope/accept`, soft-skips on 404.
+- **`a2ui-surface-version-refusal.test.ts`** (NEW) — the enumerated `catalogVersion` rejects an unadvertised version (→ `unknown_schema_version`); the surface schema carries no external `$ref` (self-contained for replay).
+- **`a2ui-surface-replay.test.ts`** (NEW) — all schema `$ref`s are internal, so a stored surface `:fork`/replays deterministically; same-`correlationId` + divergent `type` → `envelope_correlation_conflict`.
+- **`a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval.test.ts`** (NEW) — a `meta.contentTrust:'untrusted'` surface is trust-gated and MUST NOT advance an approval interrupt (composition of `untrusted_content_blocks_approval`).
+
+The four behavioral legs soft-skip on 404 (host-pending; the `openwop-app` reference renderer is the render-side probe). New core schema `schemas/envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json` vendored into the tarball; five SECURITY invariants added to the corpus (`a2ui-surface-no-code-exec`, `a2ui-action-confinement`, `a2ui-surface-no-network-egress`, `a2ui-surface-no-secret-rendering`, `a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval`).
+
 ## [1.25.0] — 2026-06-14 — RFC 0099/0100 conformance scenarios
 
 Ships the public conformance scenarios for the RFC 0099 / RFC 0100 spec floor landed in openwop#705 (`b1678801`). Those scenario files were merged to the repo **after** `1.24.0` was published to npm, so `1.24.0` does not contain them; this bump republishes the suite at content parity with the corpus so 0099/0100 hosts can run conformance. (Versions `1.23.0` and `1.24.0` were RFC 0095 connection-packs and RFC 0096/0097/0098 floor bumps respectively; their CHANGELOG entries were omitted at the time.)

package/README.md

@@ -92,7 +92,7 @@ Exit code is non-zero on any failed assertion.
 
 ## What's Covered
 
-The current suite has 344 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-06-14 (RFCs 0099/0100 — external-event trigger ingestion + async/durable A2A tasks) added one new scenario (`trigger-ingestion.test.ts`) and extended `a2a-task-roundtrip.test.ts` with the RFC 0100 async subtests: `trigger-ingestion.test.ts` (RFC 0099 — always-on `TriggerEvent` / `TriggerSubscriptionRegistration` schema legs incl. the §F.1 per-source one-of, the `AttachmentRef.ref`-only rule + raw-URL rejection backing `trigger-ingestion-ssrf`, and the content-free `trigger.delivery.attempted` shape backing `trigger-ingestion-content-redaction`; plus a capability-gated behavioral leg on `triggerBridge.ingestion` driving the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/ingest` seam for SSRF refusal + header-redaction), and the `a2a-task-roundtrip.test.ts` additions (RFC 0100 — always-on `A2ATaskState` + `capabilities.a2a` shape legs incl. the lowercase-hyphen state enum, the `PushConfig` `url`-required + truncated-`tokenFingerprint` rule backing `a2a-push-egress-ssrf`, the no-inline-inputs `additionalProperties:false` SR-1 check; plus capability-gated durable-`tasks/get`-after-disconnect and push-SSRF behavioral legs on `a2a.durableTasks` / `a2a.pushNotifications` via the `/v1/host/sample/a2a/tasks/*` seam). 2026-06-13 (RFCs 0096/0097/0098 — reviewable learning, standing goals, agent-platform portability) added three always-on-plus-gated scenarios: `proposal-reviewable-learning.test.ts` (RFC 0096 — the `agents.proposals` shape + the `Proposal` round-trip incl. the dropped `rule` kind + the content-free `proposal.{created,activated}` events, plus a gated apply-without-scope→403 leg; backs `proposal-inert-until-applied` + `proposal-no-resynthesis`), `goal-standing-continuation.test.ts` (RFC 0097 — the `agents.goals` shape + the `Goal` round-trip + the content-free `goal.{evaluated,closed}` events, plus gated bounded-termination→422 + judge-only-completion legs; backs `goal-continuation-bounded` + `goal-completion-judge-only`), and `export-bundle-portability.test.ts` (RFC 0098 — the `portability` shape incl. the `import⇒dryRun` if/then + the `ExportBundle` round-trip rejecting every credential-named field + the content-free `import.applied` event, plus a gated literal-credential-import→422 leg; backs `export-bundle-no-credential-material`). 2026-06-11 (RFCs 0093/0094 — protocol hardening + wire-shape reconciliation) added five: `version-fold.test.ts` (the `version-negotiation.md` §`X-Force-Engine-Version` cross-version matrix through the previously-orphaned `conformance-version-fold` fixture — closes catalog gap F5; soft-skips when `Capabilities.testing.forceEngineVersionRange` is unadvertised), `stream-text-fixture.test.ts` (the `stream-modes.md` §`messages` fold through the deterministic `stream-text` mock provider + the previously-orphaned `conformance-stream-text` fixture — closes catalog gap F1), `i18n-negotiation.test.ts` (gated on `capabilities.i18n` via `behaviorGate('openwop-i18n', …)` — an unsupported or malformed `Accept-Language` never 400s, `Content-Language` reflects the locale actually used, and error `code` strings stay the canonical English tokens), `grpc-transport.test.ts` (gated on `capabilities.grpc` via `behaviorGate('openwop-grpc-transport', …)` — advertisement-shape only per `grpc-transport.md` §Field semantics: `service` MUST be `openwop.v1.Engine`, the `tls` enum, `grpcs?://` endpoint URIs, `supportedTransports` includes `grpc` when exposed, production claimants require `tls: "required"`; no gRPC dialing), and `webhook-tenant-isolation.test.ts` (RFC 0093 §A.3 — backs the new protocol-tier `webhook-cross-tenant-isolation` invariant; a two-tenant proof through the `/v1/host/sample/test/surface` seam plus black-box registration-surface scoping). `spec-corpus-validity.test.ts` also gained the RFC 0094 §A satisfiability probe: canonical `createRun` bodies MUST pass the composed request schema (closed via `unevaluatedProperties: false` at the composition site, never inside an `allOf` branch) and an undeclared property MUST fail. 2026-06-07 (RFCs 0090/0091/0092 — verifier turn + convergence, multimodal perception input, agent capability requirements) added six: the always-on, server-free shape probes `agent-verifier-shape.test.ts`, `aiproviders-input-shape.test.ts`, `agent-requires-capabilities-shape.test.ts`, plus the capability-gated **behavioral** legs `agent-capability-degraded-projection.test.ts` (RFC 0092 §B — the `degraded[]` projection on `GET /v1/agents`, black-box, non-vacuous via `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_CAPABILITY_AGENT_ID`), `callai-multimodal.test.ts` (RFC 0091 §A/§B — advertised modality accepted / unadvertised → `unsupported_modality`, via the `POST /v1/host/sample/ai/call` seam), and `verifier-gating.test.ts` (RFC 0090 §B — a `fail` verdict blocks commit, via the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/verify-run` seam). The three behavioral legs soft-skip by default and hard-fail under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true` — the Active→Accepted reference-host proof for each RFC. 2026-06-02 (RFC 0082 §B — deployment channel resolve-and-pin, production-path coverage) added `agent-channel-dispatch.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` + the seeded `conformance-agent-channel-dispatch` fixture + advertised `replay` mode via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-channel-dispatch', …)` — proves the §B pin from a REAL run graph, complementing `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` Leg 4's host-sample seam: a canonical `POST /v1/runs` of a node binding `agent.channel:"stable"` MUST record `resolvedChannel` + `resolvedAgentVersion` on `agent.invocation.started` (RFC 0077), a `:fork{mode:"replay"}` MUST re-read that recorded version, and the seam-guarded Leg 3 MOVES the channel then asserts a replay STILL carries the original pin — never re-resolving a moved channel; soft-skips by default, hard-fails under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true` — the production-path proof of the §B contract). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-platform-aggregate-evidence.test.ts` (capability-gated on a host CLAIMING `openwop-agent-platform` in its live discovery `profiles[]` via `behaviorGate('openwop-agent-platform', …)` — the §C/§D honest-advertisement rule on the live `/.well-known/openwop`: the claim MUST satisfy the §B floor predicate (`isAgentPlatformPartial` → `partial`/`full`, never `none`), backed by the per-capability evidence not the profile string; `OPENWOP_AGENT_PLATFORM_TIER=full` forces the non-vacuous full bar — all governance terms + tenant installScope + all 16 §D terms; server-requiring, the always-on §B/§D derivation legs stay in `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` — the RFC 0085 → Accepted bar). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `budget-enforcement.test.ts` (capability-gated on `budget.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-budget-enforcement', …)` — the §C/§D enforcement via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/budget/run` seam + the test event-log seam: a `hard-cost-exhaust` run emits the strict-ordered `budget.reserved → budget.consumed → budget.threshold.crossed{percent} → budget.exhausted → cap.breached{kind:"budget-cost"} → run.failed{error:"budget_exhausted"}` chain; a `model-denied` run is refused `budget_model_denied` BEFORE the provider call (fail-closed); an `advisory` host emits the `budget.*` events without stopping; every `budget.*` payload content-free backing `budget-no-pricing-leak`; new lib helper `src/lib/budgetPolicy.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0084 → Accepted bar). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + `memory.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-memory-degraded', …)` — the §C degraded-projection iff-contract on the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents`: a degraded inventory entry MUST carry `memoryDegraded:true` + a non-empty, unique `degradedMemoryDimensions[]` from the closed §A-name enum, a non-degraded entry MUST NOT, the inventory is non-empty, and the degraded branch runs non-vacuously when `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_AGENT_ID` names a known-degraded agent; black-box, no POST seam — the RFC 0080 → Accepted bar). This batch also documents the two RFC 0068 conformance seams (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `.../commitment/fire`) in `host-sample-test-seams.md` (the 0068 gated scenarios shipped in 1.14.0). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0034 — collector-side BYOK-canary inspection) added `otel-collector-canary-inspection.test.ts` (always-on server-free: stands up a real `OtelCollector`, POSTs synthetic OTLP/HTTP-JSON traces + metrics through its actual ingest path, and proves the new `findCanaryLeakage()` inspector catches a canary embedded in a span attribute / resource attribute / span name / metric data-point attribute while reporting ZERO hits on a redacted payload and never matching an empty canary — the non-vacuous proof that the conformance collector now inspects what the host's OTLP exporter ACTUALLY shipped over the wire, closing the `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` / `-debug-bundle-otel` collector-seam gap; the live capability-gated complement is the new collector-export describe block in `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts`). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0035 — sandbox wall-clock timeout, the 7th-of-8 graduation) added `sandbox-wasm-timeout.test.ts` (worker-driven server-free: `probeTimeout` in `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts` spawns a worker thread running the committed `misbehaving-timeout.wasm` + a main-thread kill-timer — the thread preemption a same-thread probe can't do — asserting `sandbox_timeout` with a well-behaved positive control; graduates `node-pack-sandbox-timeout` reference-impl→protocol, so 7 of 8 `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants are now protocol-tier, only the JS-specific `no-eval` permanently exempt). 2026-05-31 (audit-response black-box / graduation batch) added three more: `sandbox-wasm-isolation.test.ts` (RFC 0035 — drives the committed `fixtures/wasm-sandbox/*.wasm` through `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts`: escape/capability-gate via static `WebAssembly.Module.imports()`, an OOB-store memory trap, double-instantiate isolation; 10/10; graduates 6 `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants reference-impl→protocol), `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation-blackbox.test.ts` (RFC 0059 — two-credential black-box on the normative §C `/v1/host/workspace/files` endpoints: owner A writes, a second-tenant credential fails closed; no seam), and `prompt-resolution-chain-event.test.ts` (RFC 0029 — reads the durable `agent.promptResolved.chain[]` precedence record via the normative `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/events/poll`; no seam) — each the production-path proof that graduates its surface into the `openwop-core-standard` floor. 2026-05-31 (RFC 0088 — the `openwop-core-standard` Core Standard Profile, the audit-response Core Candidate target) added `core-standard-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation probe: `isCoreStandard` derives the §B floor — `openwop-core` ∧ `openwop-interrupts` ∧ (`openwop-stream-sse` ∨ `openwop-stream-poll`) — a bare `openwop-core` host without interrupts is excluded, a host with no event transport fails, and the annex is absent from `deriveProfiles` because it composes rather than redefines). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)` — the §E promotion contract via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log seam across four legs: `promote` (authorize RFC 0049 → approvalGate RFC 0051 → eval-verify RFC 0081 → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`), `unauthorized` (fail-closed — `allowed:false`, no `deployment.promoted`, the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`), `eval-gate-unmet` (`eval_gate_unmet` denial, §E-3), and `channel-pin` (the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` recorded-fact on `agent.invocation.started`); new lib helper `src/lib/agentDeployment.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)` — the §B `mode:"eval"` projection via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (count == `eval.completed.taskCount`), the content-free `eval.scored` legs (`score` ∈ 0..1) backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid `EvalSummary` round-trip with `passedCount <= taskCount`; new lib helper `src/lib/agentEval.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger bridge, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` derived from the live discovery doc — the §C delivery model via the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` seam + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free; the always-on shape stays in `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts`; new lib helper `src/lib/triggerBridge.ts`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added two capability-gated behavioral scenarios (both gated on `agents.orgChart.supported`, black-box on the normative `/v1/agents/org-chart` surface — no new POST seam): `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` (the `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — departments form an acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree, members reference `host:<id>` roster entries — + the §D responsibility roll-up via `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) and `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` (the behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field on any member/department/responsibility-view object; the structural leg stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`, and the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier per the `agent-manifest-runtime` no-host-hook precedent). 2026-05-31 (RFCs 0086 + 0077 — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four capability-gated behavioral scenarios so a non-steward host can be mechanically certified non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`: `agent-roster-attribution.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B/§C; gated on `agents.roster.supported` — the normative `GET /v1/agents/roster` read shape + `total==roster.length`, the §C `roster.run.initiated`-before-`agent.invocation.started` ordering, the content-free payload backing `roster-attribution-no-content`, the durable work-item `triggerSubscriptionId`, and the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ROSTER_ID`), `agent-live-invocation-bracket.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §E; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — `agent.invocation.started`-first / `agent.invocation.completed`-last bracket, matching `invocationId`, `source`/`outcome` closed enums, content-free), `agent-live-structured-output.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §B step 6; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.structuredOutput` — a result violating `handoff.returnSchemaRef` fails the invocation `outcome:"failed"` rather than shipping as completed), and `agent-live-allowlist-enforced.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §F-1 / RFC 0002 §A14; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — a tool outside `toolAllowlist` is not callable); all four drive the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/roster/fire` + `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/live-invoke` seams plus the test event-log seam and soft-skip on 404 (these are the RFC 0086 / 0077 Active→Accepted bars). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, Draft -> Active) added `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.orgChart` shape + the `AgentOrgChart` round-trip + the non-`host:` member negative + the **§B structural non-authority guarantee** — the schema rejects a `scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` field on a member (`additionalProperties:false`), and a member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}` — backing the protocol-tier `org-position-no-authority-escalation` invariant; no new RunEventType). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0086 — standing agent roster, Draft -> Active) added `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.roster` shape + the `AgentRosterEntry` round-trip + the `host:` `rosterId` + `agentRef` version-XOR-channel negatives + the content-free `roster.run.initiated` negatives backing the protocol-tier `roster-attribution-no-content` invariant + the additive `roster` inventory projection + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, Draft -> Active) added `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.deployment` shape + the `AgentDeployment` record round-trip + the `AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version` `not`-clause + the four `deployment.*` payloads + the content-free negatives backing the protocol-tier `deployment-event-no-content-leak` invariant). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, Draft -> Active) added `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation of the operational-annex `none`/`partial`/`full` status: all-floor ⇒ partial, missing-flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, missing-tenant-scope ⇒ partial-not-full per the honest-advertisement rule, eval/deploy/budget-are-advisory-not-hard-terms, + the `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, Draft -> Active) added `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trip + the §A orthogonality guard — a wall-time field is rejected (it's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) — + threshold/onExhaustion negatives + the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads + the four `cap.breached{budget-*}` kinds + RunEventType-enum membership + the no-pricing-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `budget-no-pricing-leak` invariant + the `capabilities.budget`/`limits.maxBudget*` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger + channel bridge, Draft -> Active) added `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trip + missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property negatives + the four-state vocab + the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads incl. closed `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership + the `triggerBridge`/`webhooks.durable` capability shape + the `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile derivation incl. the no-dead-letter-sink negative). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0079 — credential provenance + egress policy, Draft -> Active) added `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trip + `audiences:[]`/missing-`credentialId`/unknown-property negatives + the no-secret-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `egress-decision-no-secret-leak` invariant + the content-free `egress.decided` record incl. the `decision` enum + RunEventType-enum membership + the `httpClient.egressPolicy` shape; the behavioral `egress-credential-audience-bound` confused-deputy MUST is reference-impl tier, deferred to a host). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0078 — portable tool catalog, Draft -> Active) added `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trip + the §C-1 `exec` ⇒ `host-extension` cross-field MUST (RFC 0069) + the `safetyTier`-required negative + `additionalProperties:false`, the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payload $defs incl. the closed `outcome` enum + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, Draft -> Active) added `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimension shapes + malformed-instance negatives — `retention.ttl` non-boolean, out-of-enum `search.modes`, unknown property under `additionalProperties:false` — the `agent-inventory-response` `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` closed-enum fields, and the `openwop-memory` derivation surfacing for read/write + long-term hosts while withholding from `writable:false`). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, Draft -> Active) added `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` shape + the `AgentEvalSuite`/`EvalSummary` schema round-trips + the three `eval.{started,scored,completed}` payloads + the content-free negatives — a task entry with a `taskOutput` body, a `safetyFinding` with an `excerpt` — backing the new `eval-summary-no-content-leak` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch` live-run audit) added `safefetch-live-audit.test.ts` (`behaviorGate('openwop-safefetch-live-audit', …)`, gated on `httpClient.safeFetch` + `toolHooks.prePostEvents`) — asserts the audit-when-both MUST against the **durable run event log** via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch-run` open seam + the test event-log seam, closing the seam-vs-production gap (a production `createSafeFetch()` with no audit hooks passes the inline `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` but FAILS this under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`); this is the RFC 0076 §B → Accepted bar; run seam soft-skips on 404 (host-pending). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0066 — `x-openwop-form` picker UX hints, Draft → Active) added `x-openwop-form-pack-manifest.test.ts` (always-on server-free: an annotated `configSchema` stays a valid 2020-12 schema + the advisory hints don't change what it accepts, each §A annotation matches the shape, an unknown `kind` validates for forward-compat, 3 negatives — missing/non-string `kind`, non-string `dependsOn`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch`) added `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` (seam-gated: SSRF block / DNS-rebinding / `Connection: upgrade` refusal / tool-hooks audit-when-both, via `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch`; advertisement contract stays in `http-client-ssrf.test.ts`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §A — pack `runtime.requires[]` install gate) added two: `runtime-requires-shape.test.ts` (server-free closed-vocabulary validation — the 8 tokens validate, a raw builtin name is rejected, empty-array≡omission, `uniqueItems`) + `runtime-requires-install-gate.test.ts` (seam-gated install-grant / install-refuse → `pack_runtime_requirement_unmet` / non-sandbox SHOULD-projection, soft-skip on 404 via `POST /v1/host/sample/packs/install-gate`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0047 — `host.oauth` authorization-code roundtrip) added `oauth-authorization-code-roundtrip.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.oauth.supported` + `grants` including `authorization_code`; drives the `POST /v1/host/sample/oauth/authorize-code-roundtrip` seam against the one canonical synthetic provider in `fixtures/oauth-providers/synthetic.json` (soft-skip on 404, Tier-2 host-pending), asserting a successful grant returns a credential REFERENCE (token persisted as a `host.credentials` entry) and that the authorization code / state / PKCE verifier / acquired access+refresh tokens never appear on any run-visible surface (RFC 0047 §C + §C.2 / `credential-payload-redaction`). Closes the RFC 0047 Tier-2 gap (capability-shape + redaction scenarios existed; the actual authorization-code dance was unexercised). 2026-05-26 (RFC 0070 — agent-manifest runtime) added `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts`; 2026-05-26 (RFC 0071 — artifact-type + chat card packs) added six: `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` + `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` (server-free) + `artifact-type-pack-install.test.ts` + `artifact-type-store-without-render.test.ts` + `chat-card-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` (server-free) + `chat-card-pack-execution.test.ts` (capability-gated, host-pending). 2026-05-26 (RFCs 0067 / 0068 / 0069 — spec-gap Draft cohort) added five scenarios: `byok-auth-modes.test.ts` (RFC 0067; always-on schema-shape of `aiProviders.authModes` + a discovery-gated §B auth-mode-contract cross-field check), `memory-consolidation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0068; always-on shape of `agents.memoryConsolidation`/`agents.commitments` + the `agent.memory.consolidated`/`commitment.fired` payload $defs), `memory-consolidation-idempotent.test.ts` + `commitment-fired.test.ts` (RFC 0068; capability-gated behavioral, soft-skip on the documented `/v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `/commitment/fire` seams), and `exec-not-protocol-tier.test.ts` (RFC 0069; always-on server-free structural assertion that the protocol corpus defines no `core.*`/`openwop.*` exec-class primitive — backs the `exec-must-not-be-protocol-tier` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0061 — stateful agent-loop lifecycle, executionModel.version 5) added four `agent-loop-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-version5-shape` (always-on; validates `executionModel.statefulResume`/`transcriptWindow` + the 1–5 version ceiling) plus `-iteration-monotonic` (gated on `version >= 5`; `runOrchestrator.decided.iteration` increments 1,2,3… exactly once per turn), `-workspace-snapshot` (gated additionally on `host.workspace.supported`; a turn-i workspace write is invisible to turn i, visible to turn i+1), and `-stateful-resume` (gated on `statefulResume`; a mid-loop suspend resumes at the same iteration without resetting the counter) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented agent-loop seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agentloop/run`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0059 — host.workspace M2, reference-host enforcement) added two `workspace-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-behavior` (capability-gated CRUD round-trip / `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` / `workspace_too_large` / §D run-start snapshot, all via the real `/v1/host/workspace/files` §C endpoints) and `-cross-tenant-isolation` (WCT-1 — drives the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op` seam to assert a file owned by one `{tenant, workspace}` is unreadable, on both `get` and `list`, under a different owner; backs the new `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` SECURITY invariant). The in-memory reference host now advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` and honors §C/§D/§E end-to-end. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0062 — memory.distillation "dreams") added five `distillation-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.memory.distillation` block + the additive `distillation` sub-object on `memory.compacted`) plus `-token-budget` (within budget `tokensUsed ≤ tokenBudget`; an un-meetable budget → `token_budget_exceeded` with no partial archive), `-stable-archive` (same sources + budget ⇒ byte-stable archive checksum), `-index-roundtrip` (gated additionally on `indexEmitted`; the `MEMORY-INDEX.json` workspace file is retrievable + `workspace.updated` fired), and `-secret-carryforward` (SR-1: a redacted source secret never appears in the archive) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented memory-distillation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/distill`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0063 — core.subWorkflow.outputAttestation) added four `subrun-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-attestation-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.agents.subRunAttestation` flag) plus `-checksum-stable` (the child output checksum is the byte-stable, key-order-invariant RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 digest), `-approval-gate` (`requireApproval` → `accept` merges, `reject` does not), and `-approval-fail-closed` (no `accept`/`edit-accept` → no merge; backs the deferred `subrun-merge-approval-fail-closed` invariant) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented sub-run attestation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/subrun/attest`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0064 — host.toolHooks) added five `tool-hooks-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.toolHooks` block + the optional content-free fields on `agentToolCalled` / `agentToolReturned`) plus `-content-free` (gated on `prePostEvents`), `-authorization-fail-closed` (gated on `perToolAuthorization`), `-rate-limit` (gated on `perToolRateLimit`), and `-secret-redaction` (gated on `prePostEvents` + the SR-1 `argsHash` redaction rule) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented tool-hooks invoke seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/toolhooks/invoke`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0060 — host.heartbeat) added four `heartbeat-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-capability-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.heartbeat` block) plus `-fires-once-per-tick`, `-idempotent-no-spam`, and `-runtime-bound` (gated on `capabilities.heartbeat.supported` + the host heartbeat tick seam; soft-skip until a host wires it). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0057 — memory write-attribution) added five `memory-attribution-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on advertisement check on `capabilities.memory.attribution`), plus `-no-content`, `-tenant-scoped`, `-emits-on-write`, and `-replay-stable` (gated on `capabilities.memory.attribution.emitsWriteEvents`) verifying the content-free `memory.written` RunEvent, its two SECURITY invariants (`memory-attribution-no-content` + `memory-attribution-tenant-scoped`), and the §D replay rule that a `replay`-mode fork MUST NOT regenerate `memoryId`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0078 portable tool catalog + RFC 0079 credential provenance / egress policy — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four: `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (capability-gated on `toolCatalog.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-tool-catalog', …)` — the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/tools` list with each `ToolDescriptor` schema-valid + `source`/`safetyTier` in the closed vocab + content-free, `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}` round-trip + unknown-id 404, 401-unauthenticated, and the §F-2 cross-principal non-disclosure; black-box, no POST seam), `tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts` (gated on `toolCatalog.sessionLifecycle` — the §D `tool.session.opened`-before / `tool.session.closed`-after bracket over the RFC 0064 call events via the `POST /v1/host/sample/tools/session-run` seam, one shared `sessionId`, content-free), `egress-audience-binding.test.ts` (KEYSTONE — gated on `httpClient.egressPolicy.supported`; the §C confused-deputy MUST via `POST /v1/host/sample/egress/decide`: an out-of-audience egress is denied/downgraded with the credential NOT attached, a provenance-unevaluable egress fails closed — the behavioral leg of `egress-credential-audience-bound`), and `egress-decision-content-free.test.ts` (the SR-1 canary — the credential value never surfaces in `egress.decided` and `reason` stays in the CLOSED vocabulary). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
+The current suite has 349 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-06-15 (RFC 0102 — A2UI agent-authored interface surfaces) added five: `a2ui-surface-shape.test.ts` (server-free Ajv2020 — the closed core `ui.a2ui-surface` payload validates, while an out-of-catalog component / extra script-bearing property / unenumerated `catalogVersion` / `action.target` outside `enum["resume","exchange"]` each fail; the structural half of `a2ui-action-confinement` and the enabling precondition for the render-side `a2ui-surface-no-code-exec` / `a2ui-surface-no-network-egress` reference-app probes), `a2ui-surface-degrades.test.ts` (the kind is optional/advertised, not a MUST-recognize universal kind, and an unadvertised kind is gated — N6 — never crashing the run), `a2ui-surface-version-refusal.test.ts` (the enumerated `catalogVersion` rejects an unadvertised version → `unknown_schema_version`, and the surface schema carries no external `$ref`), `a2ui-surface-replay.test.ts` (all `$ref`s internal so a stored surface `:fork`/replays deterministically; same-`correlationId` + divergent `type` → `envelope_correlation_conflict`), and `a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval.test.ts` (a `meta.contentTrust:'untrusted'` surface is trust-gated and MUST NOT advance an approval interrupt — composition of `untrusted_content_blocks_approval`). The four behavioral legs soft-skip on 404 (host-pending; the `openwop-app` reference renderer is the render-side probe). 2026-06-14 (RFCs 0099/0100 — external-event trigger ingestion + async/durable A2A tasks) added one new scenario (`trigger-ingestion.test.ts`) and extended `a2a-task-roundtrip.test.ts` with the RFC 0100 async subtests: `trigger-ingestion.test.ts` (RFC 0099 — always-on `TriggerEvent` / `TriggerSubscriptionRegistration` schema legs incl. the §F.1 per-source one-of, the `AttachmentRef.ref`-only rule + raw-URL rejection backing `trigger-ingestion-ssrf`, and the content-free `trigger.delivery.attempted` shape backing `trigger-ingestion-content-redaction`; plus a capability-gated behavioral leg on `triggerBridge.ingestion` driving the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/ingest` seam for SSRF refusal + header-redaction), and the `a2a-task-roundtrip.test.ts` additions (RFC 0100 — always-on `A2ATaskState` + `capabilities.a2a` shape legs incl. the lowercase-hyphen state enum, the `PushConfig` `url`-required + truncated-`tokenFingerprint` rule backing `a2a-push-egress-ssrf`, the no-inline-inputs `additionalProperties:false` SR-1 check; plus capability-gated durable-`tasks/get`-after-disconnect and push-SSRF behavioral legs on `a2a.durableTasks` / `a2a.pushNotifications` via the `/v1/host/sample/a2a/tasks/*` seam). 2026-06-13 (RFCs 0096/0097/0098 — reviewable learning, standing goals, agent-platform portability) added three always-on-plus-gated scenarios: `proposal-reviewable-learning.test.ts` (RFC 0096 — the `agents.proposals` shape + the `Proposal` round-trip incl. the dropped `rule` kind + the content-free `proposal.{created,activated}` events, plus a gated apply-without-scope→403 leg; backs `proposal-inert-until-applied` + `proposal-no-resynthesis`), `goal-standing-continuation.test.ts` (RFC 0097 — the `agents.goals` shape + the `Goal` round-trip + the content-free `goal.{evaluated,closed}` events, plus gated bounded-termination→422 + judge-only-completion legs; backs `goal-continuation-bounded` + `goal-completion-judge-only`), and `export-bundle-portability.test.ts` (RFC 0098 — the `portability` shape incl. the `import⇒dryRun` if/then + the `ExportBundle` round-trip rejecting every credential-named field + the content-free `import.applied` event, plus a gated literal-credential-import→422 leg; backs `export-bundle-no-credential-material`). 2026-06-11 (RFCs 0093/0094 — protocol hardening + wire-shape reconciliation) added five: `version-fold.test.ts` (the `version-negotiation.md` §`X-Force-Engine-Version` cross-version matrix through the previously-orphaned `conformance-version-fold` fixture — closes catalog gap F5; soft-skips when `Capabilities.testing.forceEngineVersionRange` is unadvertised), `stream-text-fixture.test.ts` (the `stream-modes.md` §`messages` fold through the deterministic `stream-text` mock provider + the previously-orphaned `conformance-stream-text` fixture — closes catalog gap F1), `i18n-negotiation.test.ts` (gated on `capabilities.i18n` via `behaviorGate('openwop-i18n', …)` — an unsupported or malformed `Accept-Language` never 400s, `Content-Language` reflects the locale actually used, and error `code` strings stay the canonical English tokens), `grpc-transport.test.ts` (gated on `capabilities.grpc` via `behaviorGate('openwop-grpc-transport', …)` — advertisement-shape only per `grpc-transport.md` §Field semantics: `service` MUST be `openwop.v1.Engine`, the `tls` enum, `grpcs?://` endpoint URIs, `supportedTransports` includes `grpc` when exposed, production claimants require `tls: "required"`; no gRPC dialing), and `webhook-tenant-isolation.test.ts` (RFC 0093 §A.3 — backs the new protocol-tier `webhook-cross-tenant-isolation` invariant; a two-tenant proof through the `/v1/host/sample/test/surface` seam plus black-box registration-surface scoping). `spec-corpus-validity.test.ts` also gained the RFC 0094 §A satisfiability probe: canonical `createRun` bodies MUST pass the composed request schema (closed via `unevaluatedProperties: false` at the composition site, never inside an `allOf` branch) and an undeclared property MUST fail. 2026-06-07 (RFCs 0090/0091/0092 — verifier turn + convergence, multimodal perception input, agent capability requirements) added six: the always-on, server-free shape probes `agent-verifier-shape.test.ts`, `aiproviders-input-shape.test.ts`, `agent-requires-capabilities-shape.test.ts`, plus the capability-gated **behavioral** legs `agent-capability-degraded-projection.test.ts` (RFC 0092 §B — the `degraded[]` projection on `GET /v1/agents`, black-box, non-vacuous via `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_CAPABILITY_AGENT_ID`), `callai-multimodal.test.ts` (RFC 0091 §A/§B — advertised modality accepted / unadvertised → `unsupported_modality`, via the `POST /v1/host/sample/ai/call` seam), and `verifier-gating.test.ts` (RFC 0090 §B — a `fail` verdict blocks commit, via the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/verify-run` seam). The three behavioral legs soft-skip by default and hard-fail under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true` — the Active→Accepted reference-host proof for each RFC. 2026-06-02 (RFC 0082 §B — deployment channel resolve-and-pin, production-path coverage) added `agent-channel-dispatch.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` + the seeded `conformance-agent-channel-dispatch` fixture + advertised `replay` mode via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-channel-dispatch', …)` — proves the §B pin from a REAL run graph, complementing `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` Leg 4's host-sample seam: a canonical `POST /v1/runs` of a node binding `agent.channel:"stable"` MUST record `resolvedChannel` + `resolvedAgentVersion` on `agent.invocation.started` (RFC 0077), a `:fork{mode:"replay"}` MUST re-read that recorded version, and the seam-guarded Leg 3 MOVES the channel then asserts a replay STILL carries the original pin — never re-resolving a moved channel; soft-skips by default, hard-fails under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true` — the production-path proof of the §B contract). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-platform-aggregate-evidence.test.ts` (capability-gated on a host CLAIMING `openwop-agent-platform` in its live discovery `profiles[]` via `behaviorGate('openwop-agent-platform', …)` — the §C/§D honest-advertisement rule on the live `/.well-known/openwop`: the claim MUST satisfy the §B floor predicate (`isAgentPlatformPartial` → `partial`/`full`, never `none`), backed by the per-capability evidence not the profile string; `OPENWOP_AGENT_PLATFORM_TIER=full` forces the non-vacuous full bar — all governance terms + tenant installScope + all 16 §D terms; server-requiring, the always-on §B/§D derivation legs stay in `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` — the RFC 0085 → Accepted bar). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `budget-enforcement.test.ts` (capability-gated on `budget.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-budget-enforcement', …)` — the §C/§D enforcement via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/budget/run` seam + the test event-log seam: a `hard-cost-exhaust` run emits the strict-ordered `budget.reserved → budget.consumed → budget.threshold.crossed{percent} → budget.exhausted → cap.breached{kind:"budget-cost"} → run.failed{error:"budget_exhausted"}` chain; a `model-denied` run is refused `budget_model_denied` BEFORE the provider call (fail-closed); an `advisory` host emits the `budget.*` events without stopping; every `budget.*` payload content-free backing `budget-no-pricing-leak`; new lib helper `src/lib/budgetPolicy.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0084 → Accepted bar). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + `memory.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-memory-degraded', …)` — the §C degraded-projection iff-contract on the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents`: a degraded inventory entry MUST carry `memoryDegraded:true` + a non-empty, unique `degradedMemoryDimensions[]` from the closed §A-name enum, a non-degraded entry MUST NOT, the inventory is non-empty, and the degraded branch runs non-vacuously when `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_AGENT_ID` names a known-degraded agent; black-box, no POST seam — the RFC 0080 → Accepted bar). This batch also documents the two RFC 0068 conformance seams (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `.../commitment/fire`) in `host-sample-test-seams.md` (the 0068 gated scenarios shipped in 1.14.0). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0034 — collector-side BYOK-canary inspection) added `otel-collector-canary-inspection.test.ts` (always-on server-free: stands up a real `OtelCollector`, POSTs synthetic OTLP/HTTP-JSON traces + metrics through its actual ingest path, and proves the new `findCanaryLeakage()` inspector catches a canary embedded in a span attribute / resource attribute / span name / metric data-point attribute while reporting ZERO hits on a redacted payload and never matching an empty canary — the non-vacuous proof that the conformance collector now inspects what the host's OTLP exporter ACTUALLY shipped over the wire, closing the `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` / `-debug-bundle-otel` collector-seam gap; the live capability-gated complement is the new collector-export describe block in `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts`). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0035 — sandbox wall-clock timeout, the 7th-of-8 graduation) added `sandbox-wasm-timeout.test.ts` (worker-driven server-free: `probeTimeout` in `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts` spawns a worker thread running the committed `misbehaving-timeout.wasm` + a main-thread kill-timer — the thread preemption a same-thread probe can't do — asserting `sandbox_timeout` with a well-behaved positive control; graduates `node-pack-sandbox-timeout` reference-impl→protocol, so 7 of 8 `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants are now protocol-tier, only the JS-specific `no-eval` permanently exempt). 2026-05-31 (audit-response black-box / graduation batch) added three more: `sandbox-wasm-isolation.test.ts` (RFC 0035 — drives the committed `fixtures/wasm-sandbox/*.wasm` through `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts`: escape/capability-gate via static `WebAssembly.Module.imports()`, an OOB-store memory trap, double-instantiate isolation; 10/10; graduates 6 `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants reference-impl→protocol), `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation-blackbox.test.ts` (RFC 0059 — two-credential black-box on the normative §C `/v1/host/workspace/files` endpoints: owner A writes, a second-tenant credential fails closed; no seam), and `prompt-resolution-chain-event.test.ts` (RFC 0029 — reads the durable `agent.promptResolved.chain[]` precedence record via the normative `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/events/poll`; no seam) — each the production-path proof that graduates its surface into the `openwop-core-standard` floor. 2026-05-31 (RFC 0088 — the `openwop-core-standard` Core Standard Profile, the audit-response Core Candidate target) added `core-standard-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation probe: `isCoreStandard` derives the §B floor — `openwop-core` ∧ `openwop-interrupts` ∧ (`openwop-stream-sse` ∨ `openwop-stream-poll`) — a bare `openwop-core` host without interrupts is excluded, a host with no event transport fails, and the annex is absent from `deriveProfiles` because it composes rather than redefines). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)` — the §E promotion contract via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log seam across four legs: `promote` (authorize RFC 0049 → approvalGate RFC 0051 → eval-verify RFC 0081 → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`), `unauthorized` (fail-closed — `allowed:false`, no `deployment.promoted`, the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`), `eval-gate-unmet` (`eval_gate_unmet` denial, §E-3), and `channel-pin` (the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` recorded-fact on `agent.invocation.started`); new lib helper `src/lib/agentDeployment.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)` — the §B `mode:"eval"` projection via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (count == `eval.completed.taskCount`), the content-free `eval.scored` legs (`score` ∈ 0..1) backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid `EvalSummary` round-trip with `passedCount <= taskCount`; new lib helper `src/lib/agentEval.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger bridge, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` derived from the live discovery doc — the §C delivery model via the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` seam + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free; the always-on shape stays in `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts`; new lib helper `src/lib/triggerBridge.ts`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added two capability-gated behavioral scenarios (both gated on `agents.orgChart.supported`, black-box on the normative `/v1/agents/org-chart` surface — no new POST seam): `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` (the `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — departments form an acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree, members reference `host:<id>` roster entries — + the §D responsibility roll-up via `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) and `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` (the behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field on any member/department/responsibility-view object; the structural leg stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`, and the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier per the `agent-manifest-runtime` no-host-hook precedent). 2026-05-31 (RFCs 0086 + 0077 — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four capability-gated behavioral scenarios so a non-steward host can be mechanically certified non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`: `agent-roster-attribution.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B/§C; gated on `agents.roster.supported` — the normative `GET /v1/agents/roster` read shape + `total==roster.length`, the §C `roster.run.initiated`-before-`agent.invocation.started` ordering, the content-free payload backing `roster-attribution-no-content`, the durable work-item `triggerSubscriptionId`, and the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ROSTER_ID`), `agent-live-invocation-bracket.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §E; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — `agent.invocation.started`-first / `agent.invocation.completed`-last bracket, matching `invocationId`, `source`/`outcome` closed enums, content-free), `agent-live-structured-output.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §B step 6; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.structuredOutput` — a result violating `handoff.returnSchemaRef` fails the invocation `outcome:"failed"` rather than shipping as completed), and `agent-live-allowlist-enforced.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §F-1 / RFC 0002 §A14; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — a tool outside `toolAllowlist` is not callable); all four drive the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/roster/fire` + `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/live-invoke` seams plus the test event-log seam and soft-skip on 404 (these are the RFC 0086 / 0077 Active→Accepted bars). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, Draft -> Active) added `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.orgChart` shape + the `AgentOrgChart` round-trip + the non-`host:` member negative + the **§B structural non-authority guarantee** — the schema rejects a `scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` field on a member (`additionalProperties:false`), and a member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}` — backing the protocol-tier `org-position-no-authority-escalation` invariant; no new RunEventType). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0086 — standing agent roster, Draft -> Active) added `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.roster` shape + the `AgentRosterEntry` round-trip + the `host:` `rosterId` + `agentRef` version-XOR-channel negatives + the content-free `roster.run.initiated` negatives backing the protocol-tier `roster-attribution-no-content` invariant + the additive `roster` inventory projection + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, Draft -> Active) added `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.deployment` shape + the `AgentDeployment` record round-trip + the `AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version` `not`-clause + the four `deployment.*` payloads + the content-free negatives backing the protocol-tier `deployment-event-no-content-leak` invariant). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, Draft -> Active) added `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation of the operational-annex `none`/`partial`/`full` status: all-floor ⇒ partial, missing-flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, missing-tenant-scope ⇒ partial-not-full per the honest-advertisement rule, eval/deploy/budget-are-advisory-not-hard-terms, + the `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, Draft -> Active) added `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trip + the §A orthogonality guard — a wall-time field is rejected (it's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) — + threshold/onExhaustion negatives + the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads + the four `cap.breached{budget-*}` kinds + RunEventType-enum membership + the no-pricing-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `budget-no-pricing-leak` invariant + the `capabilities.budget`/`limits.maxBudget*` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger + channel bridge, Draft -> Active) added `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trip + missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property negatives + the four-state vocab + the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads incl. closed `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership + the `triggerBridge`/`webhooks.durable` capability shape + the `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile derivation incl. the no-dead-letter-sink negative). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0079 — credential provenance + egress policy, Draft -> Active) added `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trip + `audiences:[]`/missing-`credentialId`/unknown-property negatives + the no-secret-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `egress-decision-no-secret-leak` invariant + the content-free `egress.decided` record incl. the `decision` enum + RunEventType-enum membership + the `httpClient.egressPolicy` shape; the behavioral `egress-credential-audience-bound` confused-deputy MUST is reference-impl tier, deferred to a host). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0078 — portable tool catalog, Draft -> Active) added `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trip + the §C-1 `exec` ⇒ `host-extension` cross-field MUST (RFC 0069) + the `safetyTier`-required negative + `additionalProperties:false`, the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payload $defs incl. the closed `outcome` enum + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, Draft -> Active) added `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimension shapes + malformed-instance negatives — `retention.ttl` non-boolean, out-of-enum `search.modes`, unknown property under `additionalProperties:false` — the `agent-inventory-response` `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` closed-enum fields, and the `openwop-memory` derivation surfacing for read/write + long-term hosts while withholding from `writable:false`). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, Draft -> Active) added `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` shape + the `AgentEvalSuite`/`EvalSummary` schema round-trips + the three `eval.{started,scored,completed}` payloads + the content-free negatives — a task entry with a `taskOutput` body, a `safetyFinding` with an `excerpt` — backing the new `eval-summary-no-content-leak` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch` live-run audit) added `safefetch-live-audit.test.ts` (`behaviorGate('openwop-safefetch-live-audit', …)`, gated on `httpClient.safeFetch` + `toolHooks.prePostEvents`) — asserts the audit-when-both MUST against the **durable run event log** via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch-run` open seam + the test event-log seam, closing the seam-vs-production gap (a production `createSafeFetch()` with no audit hooks passes the inline `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` but FAILS this under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`); this is the RFC 0076 §B → Accepted bar; run seam soft-skips on 404 (host-pending). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0066 — `x-openwop-form` picker UX hints, Draft → Active) added `x-openwop-form-pack-manifest.test.ts` (always-on server-free: an annotated `configSchema` stays a valid 2020-12 schema + the advisory hints don't change what it accepts, each §A annotation matches the shape, an unknown `kind` validates for forward-compat, 3 negatives — missing/non-string `kind`, non-string `dependsOn`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch`) added `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` (seam-gated: SSRF block / DNS-rebinding / `Connection: upgrade` refusal / tool-hooks audit-when-both, via `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch`; advertisement contract stays in `http-client-ssrf.test.ts`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §A — pack `runtime.requires[]` install gate) added two: `runtime-requires-shape.test.ts` (server-free closed-vocabulary validation — the 8 tokens validate, a raw builtin name is rejected, empty-array≡omission, `uniqueItems`) + `runtime-requires-install-gate.test.ts` (seam-gated install-grant / install-refuse → `pack_runtime_requirement_unmet` / non-sandbox SHOULD-projection, soft-skip on 404 via `POST /v1/host/sample/packs/install-gate`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0047 — `host.oauth` authorization-code roundtrip) added `oauth-authorization-code-roundtrip.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.oauth.supported` + `grants` including `authorization_code`; drives the `POST /v1/host/sample/oauth/authorize-code-roundtrip` seam against the one canonical synthetic provider in `fixtures/oauth-providers/synthetic.json` (soft-skip on 404, Tier-2 host-pending), asserting a successful grant returns a credential REFERENCE (token persisted as a `host.credentials` entry) and that the authorization code / state / PKCE verifier / acquired access+refresh tokens never appear on any run-visible surface (RFC 0047 §C + §C.2 / `credential-payload-redaction`). Closes the RFC 0047 Tier-2 gap (capability-shape + redaction scenarios existed; the actual authorization-code dance was unexercised). 2026-05-26 (RFC 0070 — agent-manifest runtime) added `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts`; 2026-05-26 (RFC 0071 — artifact-type + chat card packs) added six: `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` + `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` (server-free) + `artifact-type-pack-install.test.ts` + `artifact-type-store-without-render.test.ts` + `chat-card-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` (server-free) + `chat-card-pack-execution.test.ts` (capability-gated, host-pending). 2026-05-26 (RFCs 0067 / 0068 / 0069 — spec-gap Draft cohort) added five scenarios: `byok-auth-modes.test.ts` (RFC 0067; always-on schema-shape of `aiProviders.authModes` + a discovery-gated §B auth-mode-contract cross-field check), `memory-consolidation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0068; always-on shape of `agents.memoryConsolidation`/`agents.commitments` + the `agent.memory.consolidated`/`commitment.fired` payload $defs), `memory-consolidation-idempotent.test.ts` + `commitment-fired.test.ts` (RFC 0068; capability-gated behavioral, soft-skip on the documented `/v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `/commitment/fire` seams), and `exec-not-protocol-tier.test.ts` (RFC 0069; always-on server-free structural assertion that the protocol corpus defines no `core.*`/`openwop.*` exec-class primitive — backs the `exec-must-not-be-protocol-tier` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0061 — stateful agent-loop lifecycle, executionModel.version 5) added four `agent-loop-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-version5-shape` (always-on; validates `executionModel.statefulResume`/`transcriptWindow` + the 1–5 version ceiling) plus `-iteration-monotonic` (gated on `version >= 5`; `runOrchestrator.decided.iteration` increments 1,2,3… exactly once per turn), `-workspace-snapshot` (gated additionally on `host.workspace.supported`; a turn-i workspace write is invisible to turn i, visible to turn i+1), and `-stateful-resume` (gated on `statefulResume`; a mid-loop suspend resumes at the same iteration without resetting the counter) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented agent-loop seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agentloop/run`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0059 — host.workspace M2, reference-host enforcement) added two `workspace-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-behavior` (capability-gated CRUD round-trip / `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` / `workspace_too_large` / §D run-start snapshot, all via the real `/v1/host/workspace/files` §C endpoints) and `-cross-tenant-isolation` (WCT-1 — drives the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op` seam to assert a file owned by one `{tenant, workspace}` is unreadable, on both `get` and `list`, under a different owner; backs the new `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` SECURITY invariant). The in-memory reference host now advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` and honors §C/§D/§E end-to-end. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0062 — memory.distillation "dreams") added five `distillation-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.memory.distillation` block + the additive `distillation` sub-object on `memory.compacted`) plus `-token-budget` (within budget `tokensUsed ≤ tokenBudget`; an un-meetable budget → `token_budget_exceeded` with no partial archive), `-stable-archive` (same sources + budget ⇒ byte-stable archive checksum), `-index-roundtrip` (gated additionally on `indexEmitted`; the `MEMORY-INDEX.json` workspace file is retrievable + `workspace.updated` fired), and `-secret-carryforward` (SR-1: a redacted source secret never appears in the archive) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented memory-distillation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/distill`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0063 — core.subWorkflow.outputAttestation) added four `subrun-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-attestation-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.agents.subRunAttestation` flag) plus `-checksum-stable` (the child output checksum is the byte-stable, key-order-invariant RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 digest), `-approval-gate` (`requireApproval` → `accept` merges, `reject` does not), and `-approval-fail-closed` (no `accept`/`edit-accept` → no merge; backs the deferred `subrun-merge-approval-fail-closed` invariant) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented sub-run attestation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/subrun/attest`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0064 — host.toolHooks) added five `tool-hooks-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.toolHooks` block + the optional content-free fields on `agentToolCalled` / `agentToolReturned`) plus `-content-free` (gated on `prePostEvents`), `-authorization-fail-closed` (gated on `perToolAuthorization`), `-rate-limit` (gated on `perToolRateLimit`), and `-secret-redaction` (gated on `prePostEvents` + the SR-1 `argsHash` redaction rule) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented tool-hooks invoke seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/toolhooks/invoke`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0060 — host.heartbeat) added four `heartbeat-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-capability-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.heartbeat` block) plus `-fires-once-per-tick`, `-idempotent-no-spam`, and `-runtime-bound` (gated on `capabilities.heartbeat.supported` + the host heartbeat tick seam; soft-skip until a host wires it). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0057 — memory write-attribution) added five `memory-attribution-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on advertisement check on `capabilities.memory.attribution`), plus `-no-content`, `-tenant-scoped`, `-emits-on-write`, and `-replay-stable` (gated on `capabilities.memory.attribution.emitsWriteEvents`) verifying the content-free `memory.written` RunEvent, its two SECURITY invariants (`memory-attribution-no-content` + `memory-attribution-tenant-scoped`), and the §D replay rule that a `replay`-mode fork MUST NOT regenerate `memoryId`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0078 portable tool catalog + RFC 0079 credential provenance / egress policy — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four: `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (capability-gated on `toolCatalog.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-tool-catalog', …)` — the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/tools` list with each `ToolDescriptor` schema-valid + `source`/`safetyTier` in the closed vocab + content-free, `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}` round-trip + unknown-id 404, 401-unauthenticated, and the §F-2 cross-principal non-disclosure; black-box, no POST seam), `tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts` (gated on `toolCatalog.sessionLifecycle` — the §D `tool.session.opened`-before / `tool.session.closed`-after bracket over the RFC 0064 call events via the `POST /v1/host/sample/tools/session-run` seam, one shared `sessionId`, content-free), `egress-audience-binding.test.ts` (KEYSTONE — gated on `httpClient.egressPolicy.supported`; the §C confused-deputy MUST via `POST /v1/host/sample/egress/decide`: an out-of-audience egress is denied/downgraded with the credential NOT attached, a provenance-unevaluable egress fails closed — the behavioral leg of `egress-credential-audience-bound`), and `egress-decision-content-free.test.ts` (the SR-1 canary — the credential value never surfaces in `egress.decided` and `reason` stays in the CLOSED vocabulary). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
 
 High-level coverage includes:
 
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ Server-required (added in 1.7.0):
 | ------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
 | **Redaction** | [`capabilities.md`](../spec/v1/capabilities.md) §"Secrets" + NFR-7 + §"aiProviders" | Vendor-neutral assertions that the server doesn't leak secret material. Three scenario groups: (a) discovery shape contract — `secrets` + `aiProviders` advertisements are well-formed regardless of `secrets.supported`; when `supported === true`, scopes MUST be non-empty + `resolution === 'host-managed'`; `byok ⊆ supported`. (b) bearer-token redaction — invalid Bearer canary in `Authorization` header is not echoed in the 401 response body. (c) credentialRef echo control — gated on `secrets.supported === true`; canary planted in `configurable.ai.credentialRef` MUST NOT appear in any RunEvent payload (poll-based capture; transport-agnostic). Uses runtime-built canary fixtures (`lib/canaries.ts`) that defeat static secret scanners. 6 scenarios. |
 
-Current source tree: 344 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
+Current source tree: 349 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
 
 ## Remaining Gaps
 

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "1.25.0",
+  "version": "1.26.0",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",

package/schemas/README.md

@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
 | `envelopes/media.image.schema.json` | `ai-envelope.md` §"Media reference payloads" | RFC 0055 §C — optional `media.image` payload; tenant-scoped URL ref or inline base64 below `maxInlineMediaBytes`. |
 | `envelopes/media.audio.schema.json` | `ai-envelope.md` §"Media reference payloads" | RFC 0055 §C — optional `media.audio` payload; URL ref or inline base64 + optional `durationSeconds`. |
 | `envelopes/media.file.schema.json` | `ai-envelope.md` §"Media reference payloads" | RFC 0055 §C — optional `media.file` payload; downloadable asset by URL ref or inline base64 + optional `name`. |
+| `envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json` | `ai-envelope.md` §"A2UI surfaces" | RFC 0102 — optional, advertised `ui.a2ui-surface` payload; closed A2UI component tree (`anyOf` + single-string-enum discriminator) + host-enumerated `catalogVersion`. Core `ui.*` content-primitive family beside `media.*`. |
 | `annotation.schema.json` | `RFCS/0056` + `observability.md` | RFC 0056 (`Draft`) — a non-blocking human/agent quality signal (rating / correction / label / flag) attached to a run, event, or node. A side-resource (not a replayable run-event-log entry); response of `POST/GET /v1/runs/{runId}/annotations` + payload of the `run.annotated` SSE notification. |
 | `annotation-create.schema.json` | `RFCS/0056` | RFC 0056 (`Draft`) — request body for `POST /v1/runs/{runId}/annotations` (host assigns `annotationId`/`createdAt`/`actor`; binds `target.runId` to the path). |
 | `heartbeat-evaluated.schema.json` | `RFCS/0060` + `host-capabilities.md` | RFC 0060 (`Active`) — payload of the heartbeat-scoped `heartbeat.evaluated` AsyncAPI event (`{ heartbeatId, status, changed }`); emitted every tick by a host advertising `capabilities.heartbeat`. Not a run-event-log entry. |

package/schemas/envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json

@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+{
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://openwop.dev/spec/v1/envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json",
+  "title": "UiA2uiSurfacePayload",
+  "description": "Payload for the OPTIONAL, advertised `ui.a2ui-surface` AI Envelope kind (RFC 0102). Carries a declarative A2UI interface surface — a closed component tree the consumer renders with native widgets, routing user actions back to the producing agent WITHOUT executing any agent-supplied code. `ui.*` is a core, un-namespaced content-primitive family beside `media.*` (ai-envelope.md §\"A2UI surfaces\" / §\"Vendor-namespaced kinds\"). Not one of the four MUST-recognize universal kinds; an unrecognizing consumer falls back to store-without-render.",
+  "type": "object",
+  "required": ["catalogVersion", "surface"],
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "properties": {
+    "reasoning": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "description": "OPTIONAL per RFC 0030 §A — the model's reasoning, conventionally the first property of a kind whose payload benefits from multi-step composition."
+    },
+    "catalogVersion": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "enum": ["0.9.1"],
+      "description": "REQUIRED — the A2UI catalog version the surface targets. This enum IS the host's supported-version set (ai-envelope.md §\"A2UI surfaces\"); it is never a free string the producer invents. A consumer MUST refuse an unknown/higher version with `unknown_schema_version`. Pinning the version in the payload keeps `:fork`/replay deterministic after the external A2UI standard ships a breaking version."
+    },
+    "surface": {
+      "$ref": "#/$defs/surface",
+      "description": "REQUIRED — the A2UI surface document: a closed component tree (ai-envelope.md §\"A2UI surfaces\"). Self-contained: renderable from the payload alone, never a live reference into an external catalog."
+    }
+  },
+  "$defs": {
+    "surface": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["components"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "title": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "OPTIONAL display title for the surface."
+        },
+        "components": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "description": "The flat, ordered component list. Each element is one of the host's day-1 catalog components, discriminated by the single-string-enum `component` field. `anyOf` (not `oneOf`) per ai-envelope.md §\"Schema discipline\".",
+          "items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/component" }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "component": {
+      "description": "A single A2UI component. Closed set (day-1 catalog 0.9.1); the `component` discriminator is a single-string-enum per branch.",
+      "anyOf": [
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/heading" },
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/text" },
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/fieldText" },
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/fieldDate" },
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/fieldSelect" },
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/fieldCheckbox" },
+        { "$ref": "#/$defs/actionButton" }
+      ]
+    },
+    "heading": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "text"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["heading"] },
+        "text": { "type": "string" },
+        "level": { "type": "integer", "minimum": 1, "maximum": 6 }
+      }
+    },
+    "text": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "text"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["text"] },
+        "text": { "type": "string" }
+      }
+    },
+    "fieldText": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "id", "label"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["field.text"] },
+        "id": { "type": "string", "description": "Binding key; the collected value is keyed by `id` in the resume value." },
+        "label": { "type": "string" },
+        "placeholder": { "type": "string" },
+        "required": { "type": "boolean" }
+      }
+    },
+    "fieldDate": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "id", "label"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["field.date"] },
+        "id": { "type": "string" },
+        "label": { "type": "string" },
+        "required": { "type": "boolean" }
+      }
+    },
+    "fieldSelect": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "id", "label", "options"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["field.select"] },
+        "id": { "type": "string" },
+        "label": { "type": "string" },
+        "required": { "type": "boolean" },
+        "options": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "minItems": 1,
+          "items": {
+            "type": "object",
+            "required": ["value", "label"],
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "properties": {
+              "value": { "type": "string" },
+              "label": { "type": "string" }
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "fieldCheckbox": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "id", "label"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["field.checkbox"] },
+        "id": { "type": "string" },
+        "label": { "type": "string" },
+        "default": { "type": "boolean" }
+      }
+    },
+    "actionButton": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "required": ["component", "id", "label", "action"],
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "properties": {
+        "component": { "type": "string", "enum": ["action.button"] },
+        "id": { "type": "string" },
+        "label": { "type": "string" },
+        "action": {
+          "type": "object",
+          "required": ["target"],
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "description": "Confined action (ai-envelope.md §\"A2UI surfaces\" rule 2). `target` resolves to exactly one host-allowlisted destination — a run interrupt resume or a conversation exchange — never an arbitrary URL, endpoint, or network egress. Enforced by the `a2ui-action-confinement` + `a2ui-surface-no-network-egress` SECURITY invariants.",
+          "properties": {
+            "target": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "enum": ["resume", "exchange"],
+              "description": "`resume` → the collected field values become the interrupt `resumeValue` (interrupt.md). `exchange` → the values become a conversation exchange message (RFC 0005)."
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

package/src/scenarios/a2ui-surface-degrades.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+/**
+ * a2ui-surface-degrades — RFC 0102 §A point: graceful degradation.
+ *
+ * A consumer that does NOT advertise `ui.a2ui-surface` and receives one
+ * MUST fall back to store-without-render and MUST NOT fail the run (N6;
+ * `ui.a2ui-surface` is an OPTIONAL advertised kind, not a MUST-recognize
+ * universal kind — precedent `artifact-type-store-without-render`).
+ *
+ * Always-on (server-free): `ui.a2ui-surface` is NOT one of the four
+ * universal kinds, so a non-advertising consumer is entitled to degrade.
+ * Capability-gated (HTTP): posting the kind to a host that does not list it
+ * in `supportedEnvelopes` is gated (run not failed), not accepted.
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0102-a2ui-agent-authored-interface-surfaces.md §A
+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"A2UI surfaces"
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
+
+const HTTP_SKIP = !process.env.OPENWOP_BASE_URL;
+const UNIVERSAL_KINDS = ['clarification.request', 'schema.request', 'schema.response', 'error'];
+
+describe('a2ui-surface-degrades: optional-advertised, not universal (RFC 0102 §A)', () => {
+  it('ui.a2ui-surface is NOT a MUST-recognize universal kind', () => {
+    expect(
+      UNIVERSAL_KINDS.includes('ui.a2ui-surface'),
+      'ai-envelope.md §"A2UI surfaces": ui.a2ui-surface MUST be optional/advertised so an unrecognizing consumer may store-without-render',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe.skipIf(HTTP_SKIP)('a2ui-surface-degrades: unadvertised kind is gated, run survives (RFC 0102 §A)', () => {
+  it('posting ui.a2ui-surface to a host that does not advertise it → gated (not failed)', async () => {
+    const res = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/envelope/accept', {
+      envelope: {
+        type: 'ui.a2ui-surface',
+        schemaVersion: 1,
+        envelopeId: 'env-a2ui-degrade-1',
+        correlationId: 'run-a2ui:node-1:turn-0:deg',
+        payload: { catalogVersion: '0.9.1', surface: { components: [] } },
+        meta: { source: 'ai-generation', ts: '2026-06-15T10:00:00Z' },
+      },
+      hostSupportedEnvelopes: ['clarification.request'], // does not advertise ui.a2ui-surface
+    });
+    if (res.status === 404) return; // seam absent — soft-skip
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = res.json as { status?: string };
+    expect(
+      body.status,
+      driver.describe('RFC 0102 §A (N6)', 'an unadvertised ui.a2ui-surface MUST be gated, never crash the run'),
+    ).toBe('gated');
+  });
+});

package/src/scenarios/a2ui-surface-replay.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+/**
+ * a2ui-surface-replay — RFC 0102 §A.6: replay determinism by correlationId.
+ *
+ * The surface envelope replays by `correlationId` (ai-envelope.md §"Replay
+ * determinism"); on recovery/`:fork` the cached outcome is returned and the
+ * surface is NEVER regenerated. Re-emission with the same correlationId but a
+ * divergent `type` refuses with `envelope_correlation_conflict`. Durable
+ * state is exactly `(surface envelope, submitted resume value)`.
+ *
+ * Always-on (server-free): the surface payload is self-contained (no external
+ * `$ref`), the precondition that makes a stored surface replay deterministically
+ * after the external A2UI catalog ships a breaking version.
+ * Capability-gated (HTTP): same correlationId + different type → conflict.
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0102-a2ui-agent-authored-interface-surfaces.md §A.6
+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"Replay determinism"
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
+import { SCHEMAS_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
+
+const HTTP_SKIP = !process.env.OPENWOP_BASE_URL;
+const schema = JSON.parse(
+  readFileSync(join(SCHEMAS_DIR, 'envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json'), 'utf8'),
+) as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+function refStrings(node: unknown, out: string[]): void {
+  if (!node || typeof node !== 'object') return;
+  if (Array.isArray(node)) {
+    node.forEach((n) => refStrings(n, out));
+    return;
+  }
+  const obj = node as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (typeof obj['$ref'] === 'string') out.push(obj['$ref'] as string);
+  Object.values(obj).forEach((v) => refStrings(v, out));
+}
+
+describe('a2ui-surface-replay: self-contained surface (RFC 0102 §A.6)', () => {
+  it('all $refs are internal (#/...) — surface renders from the payload alone on replay', () => {
+    const refs: string[] = [];
+    refStrings(schema, refs);
+    const external = refs.filter((r) => !r.startsWith('#'));
+    expect(
+      external,
+      'RFC 0102 §A.6: a stored surface MUST be self-contained for deterministic :fork/replay (no live external-catalog ref)',
+    ).toEqual([]);
+  });
+});
+
+describe.skipIf(HTTP_SKIP)('a2ui-surface-replay: correlationId conflict on type divergence (RFC 0102 §A.6)', () => {
+  const base = {
+    schemaVersion: 1,
+    correlationId: 'run-a2ui:node-1:turn-0:rep',
+    payload: { catalogVersion: '0.9.1', surface: { components: [] } },
+    meta: { source: 'ai-generation', ts: '2026-06-15T10:00:00Z' },
+  };
+
+  it('re-emission with same correlationId + different type → envelope_correlation_conflict', async () => {
+    const first = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/envelope/accept', {
+      envelope: { ...base, type: 'ui.a2ui-surface', envelopeId: 'env-a2ui-rep-1' },
+      hostSupportedEnvelopes: ['ui.a2ui-surface', 'clarification.request'],
+    });
+    if (first.status === 404) return; // seam absent — soft-skip
+
+    const conflict = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/envelope/accept', {
+      envelope: {
+        ...base,
+        type: 'clarification.request',
+        envelopeId: 'env-a2ui-rep-2',
+        payload: { questions: [{ id: 'q', question: 'x' }] },
+      },
+      hostSupportedEnvelopes: ['ui.a2ui-surface', 'clarification.request'],
+    });
+    if (conflict.status === 404) return;
+    const body = conflict.json as { status?: string; reason?: string };
+    expect(
+      body.reason ?? '',
+      driver.describe('ai-envelope.md §"Replay determinism"', 'same correlationId + divergent type MUST conflict'),
+    ).toContain('envelope_correlation_conflict');
+  });
+});

package/src/scenarios/a2ui-surface-shape.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+/**
+ * a2ui-surface-shape — RFC 0102 §A wire-shape conformance (server-free).
+ *
+ * Asserts (always-on, Ajv2020, no host required):
+ *   1. `schemas/envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json` compiles under Ajv2020.
+ *   2. A positive surface payload (closed catalog components, advertised
+ *      `catalogVersion`, a confined resume/exchange action) validates.
+ *   3. Negatives fail per the closed schema:
+ *        - missing required `catalogVersion` / `surface`
+ *        - an out-of-catalog component object (additionalProperties:false)
+ *        - a component carrying an extra/script-bearing property
+ *        - a `catalogVersion` the schema does not enumerate
+ *        - an `action.button` whose `action.target` is outside
+ *          `enum["resume","exchange"]` (the structural half of
+ *          `a2ui-action-confinement`), or carries an arbitrary URL field.
+ *
+ * The closed `anyOf` `surface` shape is the enabling precondition for the
+ * render-side invariants `a2ui-surface-no-code-exec` /
+ * `a2ui-surface-no-network-egress` (reference-app probes): a surface that
+ * smuggles a script-bearing field or an unconfined action target fails
+ * validation before it can reach a renderer.
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0102-a2ui-agent-authored-interface-surfaces.md §A
+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"A2UI surfaces"
+ * @see schemas/envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json
+ * @see SECURITY/invariants.yaml (a2ui-action-confinement)
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import Ajv2020 from 'ajv/dist/2020.js';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { SCHEMAS_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
+
+const ajv = new Ajv2020({ strict: false, allErrors: true });
+const schema = JSON.parse(
+  readFileSync(join(SCHEMAS_DIR, 'envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json'), 'utf8'),
+) as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+function positivePayload(): Record<string, unknown> {
+  return {
+    catalogVersion: '0.9.1',
+    surface: {
+      title: 'Schedule the kickoff',
+      components: [
+        { component: 'heading', text: 'Kickoff', level: 2 },
+        { component: 'text', text: 'Pick a date and confirm.' },
+        { component: 'field.text', id: 'name', label: 'Your name', required: true },
+        { component: 'field.date', id: 'when', label: 'Date' },
+        {
+          component: 'field.select',
+          id: 'room',
+          label: 'Room',
+          options: [
+            { value: 'a', label: 'Room A' },
+            { value: 'b', label: 'Room B' },
+          ],
+        },
+        { component: 'field.checkbox', id: 'remind', label: 'Remind me', default: true },
+        { component: 'action.button', id: 'go', label: 'Confirm', action: { target: 'resume' } },
+      ],
+    },
+    reasoning: 'Collect the kickoff details.',
+  };
+}
+
+describe('a2ui-surface-shape: schema compile + round-trip (RFC 0102 §A)', () => {
+  const validate = ajv.compile(schema);
+
+  it('ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json compiles under Ajv2020', () => {
+    expect(
+      validate,
+      'RFC 0102 §A: the core ui.a2ui-surface payload schema MUST compile',
+    ).toBeTypeOf('function');
+  });
+
+  it('accepts a positive surface payload (closed catalog + confined action)', () => {
+    const ok = validate(positivePayload());
+    expect(
+      ok,
+      `RFC 0102 §A: positive surface MUST validate; errors: ${JSON.stringify(validate.errors)}`,
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('accepts an exchange-targeted action (the other confined target)', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    (p.surface as { components: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }).components = [
+      { component: 'action.button', id: 'send', label: 'Send', action: { target: 'exchange' } },
+    ];
+    expect(validate(p)).toBe(true);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a payload missing required `catalogVersion`', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    delete p.catalogVersion;
+    expect(validate(p), 'RFC 0102 §A: `catalogVersion` is REQUIRED').toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a payload missing required `surface`', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    delete p.surface;
+    expect(validate(p), 'RFC 0102 §A: `surface` is REQUIRED').toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a `catalogVersion` the schema does not enumerate (unknown version)', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    p.catalogVersion = '9.9.9';
+    expect(
+      validate(p),
+      'RFC 0102 §A.3: an unadvertised catalogVersion MUST fail the enumerated set',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an out-of-catalog component object (additionalProperties:false)', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    (p.surface as { components: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }).components = [
+      { component: 'iframe', src: 'https://evil.example/x' } as Record<string, unknown>,
+    ];
+    expect(
+      validate(p),
+      'RFC 0102 §A.1: an out-of-catalog component MUST fail the closed anyOf',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects a known component carrying an extra (script-bearing) property', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    (p.surface as { components: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }).components = [
+      { component: 'heading', text: 'Hi', onClick: "fetch('https://evil')" } as Record<string, unknown>,
+    ];
+    expect(
+      validate(p),
+      'RFC 0102 §A.1: additionalProperties:false MUST reject a smuggled code field',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an action whose target is outside enum["resume","exchange"] (action confinement)', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    (p.surface as { components: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }).components = [
+      { component: 'action.button', id: 'x', label: 'X', action: { target: 'http://evil.example' } },
+    ];
+    expect(
+      validate(p),
+      'RFC 0102 §A.4 / SECURITY a2ui-action-confinement: an action target outside resume/exchange MUST be rejected',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('rejects an action carrying an arbitrary URL field (no unconfined egress target)', () => {
+    const p = positivePayload();
+    (p.surface as { components: Array<Record<string, unknown>> }).components = [
+      {
+        component: 'action.button',
+        id: 'x',
+        label: 'X',
+        action: { target: 'resume', url: 'https://evil.example/exfil' } as Record<string, unknown>,
+      },
+    ];
+    expect(
+      validate(p),
+      'RFC 0102 §A.4: action additionalProperties:false MUST reject an arbitrary URL target',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});

package/src/scenarios/a2ui-surface-version-refusal.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+/**
+ * a2ui-surface-version-refusal — RFC 0102 §A.3 (C3): catalog version is a
+ * host-enumerated set, not a free string. A `catalogVersion` the host does
+ * not advertise MUST be refused with `unknown_schema_version`
+ * (ai-envelope.md §"Schema version advertisement"), and the stored surface
+ * MUST be self-contained for deterministic `:fork`/replay.
+ *
+ * Always-on (server-free): the core schema enumerates `catalogVersion`
+ * (closed set), so a non-advertised version fails validation; the schema
+ * carries no external `$ref` (surface is self-contained).
+ * Capability-gated (HTTP): a live host refuses an unadvertised version.
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0102-a2ui-agent-authored-interface-surfaces.md §A.3
+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"A2UI surfaces", §"Schema version advertisement"
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import Ajv2020 from 'ajv/dist/2020.js';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
+import { SCHEMAS_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
+
+const HTTP_SKIP = !process.env.OPENWOP_BASE_URL;
+const schema = JSON.parse(
+  readFileSync(join(SCHEMAS_DIR, 'envelopes/ui.a2ui-surface.schema.json'), 'utf8'),
+) as Record<string, unknown>;
+
+function hasAbsoluteRef(node: unknown): boolean {
+  if (!node || typeof node !== 'object') return false;
+  if (Array.isArray(node)) return node.some(hasAbsoluteRef);
+  const obj = node as Record<string, unknown>;
+  if (typeof obj['$ref'] === 'string' && !(obj['$ref'] as string).startsWith('#')) return true;
+  return Object.values(obj).some(hasAbsoluteRef);
+}
+
+describe('a2ui-surface-version-refusal: enumerated catalogVersion (RFC 0102 §A.3)', () => {
+  const ajv = new Ajv2020({ strict: false, allErrors: true });
+  const validate = ajv.compile(schema);
+
+  it('catalogVersion is a closed enum — an unadvertised version fails validation', () => {
+    const ok = validate({ catalogVersion: '9.9.9', surface: { components: [] } });
+    expect(
+      ok,
+      'RFC 0102 §A.3: a catalogVersion outside the host-enumerated set MUST fail (→ unknown_schema_version at runtime)',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+
+  it('surface payload is self-contained — no external $ref (replay determinism)', () => {
+    expect(
+      hasAbsoluteRef(schema),
+      'RFC 0102 §A.3: the surface MUST be self-contained, never a live external-catalog reference',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe.skipIf(HTTP_SKIP)('a2ui-surface-version-refusal: live host refuses unadvertised version (RFC 0102 §A.3)', () => {
+  it('ui.a2ui-surface with an unadvertised catalogVersion → refused', async () => {
+    const res = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/envelope/accept', {
+      envelope: {
+        type: 'ui.a2ui-surface',
+        schemaVersion: 1,
+        envelopeId: 'env-a2ui-ver-1',
+        correlationId: 'run-a2ui:node-1:turn-0:ver',
+        payload: { catalogVersion: '9.9.9', surface: { components: [] } },
+        meta: { source: 'ai-generation', ts: '2026-06-15T10:00:00Z' },
+      },
+      hostSupportedEnvelopes: ['ui.a2ui-surface'],
+    });
+    if (res.status === 404) return; // seam absent — soft-skip
+    const body = res.json as { status?: string; reason?: string };
+    expect(
+      body.status === 'invalid' || body.status === 'refused',
+      driver.describe('RFC 0102 §A.3', 'an unadvertised catalogVersion MUST be refused'),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+});

package/src/scenarios/a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+/**
+ * a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval — RFC 0102 §A.5: an untrusted-authored
+ * surface MUST NOT advance an approval gate.
+ *
+ * A `ui.a2ui-surface` emitted by a node that consumed untrusted MCP/A2A
+ * content carries `meta.contentTrust: 'untrusted'`; the existing
+ * `untrusted_content_blocks_approval` rule then blocks that surface from
+ * advancing an `approval` interrupt. This is a composition of the existing
+ * untrusted-content rule for the new kind, not a new taint primitive.
+ *
+ * Always-on (server-free): `ui.a2ui-surface` is an advertised (non-universal)
+ * kind, so the envelope trust-boundary machinery (`meta.contentTrust`) applies
+ * to it exactly as to any other envelope — the precondition for the block.
+ * Capability-gated (HTTP): an untrusted surface bound to an approval interrupt
+ * is refused.
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0102-a2ui-agent-authored-interface-surfaces.md §A.5
+ * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"A2UI surfaces", §"Trust boundary"
+ * @see SECURITY/invariants.yaml (a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval, untrusted_content_blocks_approval)
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
+
+const HTTP_SKIP = !process.env.OPENWOP_BASE_URL;
+const UNIVERSAL_KINDS = ['clarification.request', 'schema.request', 'schema.response', 'error'];
+
+describe('a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval: trust machinery applies (RFC 0102 §A.5)', () => {
+  it('ui.a2ui-surface is an advertised kind subject to meta.contentTrust gating (not universal/always-allowed)', () => {
+    expect(
+      UNIVERSAL_KINDS.includes('ui.a2ui-surface'),
+      'ai-envelope.md §"A2UI surfaces" / §"Trust boundary": a ui.a2ui-surface is trust-gated like any advertised envelope, so an untrusted surface is subject to untrusted_content_blocks_approval',
+    ).toBe(false);
+  });
+});
+
+describe.skipIf(HTTP_SKIP)('a2ui-untrusted-blocks-approval: untrusted surface cannot drive an approval (RFC 0102 §A.5)', () => {
+  it('an untrusted-marked ui.a2ui-surface bound to an approval interrupt is refused', async () => {
+    const res = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/envelope/accept', {
+      envelope: {
+        type: 'ui.a2ui-surface',
+        schemaVersion: 1,
+        envelopeId: 'env-a2ui-untrusted-1',
+        correlationId: 'run-a2ui:node-1:turn-0:unt',
+        payload: {
+          catalogVersion: '0.9.1',
+          surface: {
+            components: [
+              { component: 'action.button', id: 'approve', label: 'Approve', action: { target: 'resume' } },
+            ],
+          },
+        },
+        meta: { source: 'ai-generation', ts: '2026-06-15T10:00:00Z', contentTrust: 'untrusted' },
+      },
+      hostSupportedEnvelopes: ['ui.a2ui-surface'],
+      boundInterruptKind: 'approval',
+    });
+    if (res.status === 404) return; // seam absent — soft-skip
+    const body = res.json as { status?: string; reason?: string };
+    expect(
+      body.status === 'blocked' || (body.reason ?? '').includes('untrusted'),
+      driver.describe(
+        'RFC 0102 §A.5',
+        'an untrusted ui.a2ui-surface MUST NOT advance an approval interrupt (untrusted_content_blocks_approval)',
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  });
+});