@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.152.0 → 1.154.0

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Files changed (57) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +17 -0
  2. package/README.md +9 -0
  3. package/dist/cli.js +7 -2
  4. package/dist/lib/requirement-ids.js +100 -0
  5. package/dist/lib/scenario-disposition.js +22 -0
  6. package/package.json +33 -2
  7. package/requirement-aliases.json +4 -0
  8. package/requirements.json +23554 -0
  9. package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json +99 -3
  10. package/src/cli.ts +7 -5
  11. package/src/global-setup.ts +13 -0
  12. package/src/lib/corpus-stamp.ts +125 -0
  13. package/src/lib/requirement-ids.ts +111 -0
  14. package/src/lib/scenario-disposition.ts +22 -0
  15. package/src/setup.ts +84 -5
  16. package/src/lib/capabilities-auth-subject-link.test.ts +0 -103
  17. package/src/lib/fork-availability.test.ts +0 -69
  18. package/src/lib/global-setup.test.ts +0 -76
  19. package/src/lib/grpc-framing.test.ts +0 -96
  20. package/src/lib/oidc-issuer.test.ts +0 -328
  21. package/src/lib/otel-collector-grpc.test.ts +0 -191
  22. package/src/lib/otel-collector.test.ts +0 -303
  23. package/src/lib/otlp-protobuf.test.ts +0 -461
  24. package/src/lib/polling.test.ts +0 -80
  25. package/src/lib/requirement-ledger.test.ts +0 -75
  26. package/src/lib/risk-disposition.test.ts +0 -91
  27. package/src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts +0 -127
  28. package/src/lib/spec-coherence-registry.test.ts +0 -155
  29. package/src/lib/webhook-receiver.test.ts +0 -144
  30. package/src/scenarios/artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts +0 -126
  31. package/src/scenarios/artifact-type-legacy-ids.test.ts +0 -124
  32. package/src/scenarios/capability-example-root-layout.test.ts +0 -272
  33. package/src/scenarios/certification-floor-enforcement.test.ts +0 -204
  34. package/src/scenarios/chain-subchain-unsupported-refused.test.ts +0 -70
  35. package/src/scenarios/compensation-profile.test.ts +0 -340
  36. package/src/scenarios/core-manifest-and-extension-registry.test.ts +0 -250
  37. package/src/scenarios/discovery-canonical-family-no-shadow.test.ts +0 -219
  38. package/src/scenarios/edge-condition-truthy-falsy.test.ts +0 -108
  39. package/src/scenarios/effect-identity-composition.test.ts +0 -129
  40. package/src/scenarios/effect-identity-cross-scope.test.ts +0 -82
  41. package/src/scenarios/error-envelope-canonical-shape.test.ts +0 -64
  42. package/src/scenarios/form-content-packs.test.ts +0 -415
  43. package/src/scenarios/multi-region-effect-vocabulary.test.ts +0 -175
  44. package/src/scenarios/normative-example-extraction.test.ts +0 -242
  45. package/src/scenarios/openapi-asyncapi-sdk-parity.test.ts +0 -309
  46. package/src/scenarios/pack-manifest-extensions.test.ts +0 -203
  47. package/src/scenarios/protocol-version-grammar.test.ts +0 -119
  48. package/src/scenarios/registry-declarative-kinds.test.ts +0 -121
  49. package/src/scenarios/rfc-0147-self-audit.test.ts +0 -104
  50. package/src/scenarios/rfc-lifecycle-coherence.test.ts +0 -215
  51. package/src/scenarios/semantic-digest-v2.test.ts +0 -128
  52. package/src/scenarios/spec-corpus-validity.test.ts +0 -1727
  53. package/src/scenarios/spec-section-citations.test.ts +0 -132
  54. package/src/scenarios/tool-result-trust-monotone.test.ts +0 -168
  55. package/src/scenarios/versioned-composition-profiles.test.ts +0 -201
  56. package/src/scenarios/workflow-chain-internal-flag.test.ts +0 -84
  57. package/src/scenarios/workload-identity-profile.test.ts +0 -184
@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
1
- /**
2
- * spec-section-citations — server-free. A citation of the form
3
- * `<doc>.md §"<Section>"` MUST resolve to a heading that exists in that doc.
4
- *
5
- * SP-04 (2026-08-18): `storage-adapters.md §"Claim acquisition"` was cited by
6
- * FOUR artifacts — `production-profile.md` §Durability, RFC 0009's
7
- * scenario-citation table, and the docstrings of `staleClaim.test.ts` and
8
- * `restart-during-run.test.ts` — and the section did not exist. Nothing was
9
- * checking, so a normative `MUST` ("Storage adapters MUST satisfy
10
- * `storage-adapters.md` lease and event-log invariants") pointed at nothing for
11
- * the life of RFC 0009.
12
- *
13
- * Scope is deliberately narrow. A corpus-wide sweep of this citation form finds
14
- * ~1400 citations and ~260 that do not resolve under a heading-only matcher —
15
- * a mix of genuinely dangling anchors and legitimate informal references to
16
- * table rows and capability keys rather than headings. Triaging those is its own
17
- * work item; gating the whole corpus on an untriaged sweep would either fail
18
- * immediately or need an allowlist so large it would stop meaning anything.
19
- * So this pins the docs whose section citations are load-bearing for the
20
- * durability contract, and grows as other docs are triaged.
21
- *
22
- * @see spec/v1/storage-adapters.md §"Claim acquisition"
23
- * @see spec/v1/production-profile.md §Durability
24
- */
25
-
26
- import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
27
- import { readFileSync, readdirSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
28
- import { join } from 'node:path';
29
- import { V1_DIR, SCENARIOS_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
30
-
31
- /** Docs whose `§"Section"` citations are checked. Add a doc once its citations are triaged. */
32
- const CHECKED_DOCS = ['storage-adapters.md', 'production-profile.md'] as const;
33
-
34
- /** `<doc>.md §"Quoted Section"` or `<doc>.md §BareToken`. */
35
- const CITATION = /([A-Za-z0-9._-]+)\.md\s*§\s*(?:"([^"\n]+)"|([A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9.-]*))/g;
36
-
37
- /**
38
- * Strip decoration, a leading `§` (headings in this corpus carry their own), and
39
- * trailing sentence punctuation — a docstring legitimately ends a sentence
40
- * inside the quotes (`… §"Claim acquisition."`) and still names that section.
41
- */
42
- const normalize = (t: string): string =>
43
- t
44
- .replace(/[`*_"]/g, '')
45
- .replace(/^§\s*/, '')
46
- .replace(/[.,;:]+$/, '')
47
- .trim()
48
- .toLowerCase();
49
-
50
- /** A heading matches its full text, or its lead token before an em-dash / period. */
51
- function headingKeys(raw: string): string[] {
52
- const h = normalize(raw);
53
- const keys = new Set<string>([h]);
54
- const dash = h.split(/\s+[—–-]\s+/)[0]?.trim();
55
- if (dash) keys.add(dash);
56
- const dot = h.split(/\.\s+/)[0]?.trim();
57
- if (dot) keys.add(dot);
58
- return [...keys];
59
- }
60
-
61
- function walk(dir: string, keep: (n: string) => boolean, out: string[] = []): string[] {
62
- for (const e of readdirSync(dir, { withFileTypes: true })) {
63
- const p = join(dir, e.name);
64
- if (e.isDirectory()) walk(p, keep, out);
65
- else if (keep(e.name)) out.push(p);
66
- }
67
- return out;
68
- }
69
-
70
- describe.skipIf(V1_DIR === null)('spec-section-citations (SP-04)', () => {
71
- it('every cited section of a checked doc exists as a heading in that doc', () => {
72
- const v1 = V1_DIR as string;
73
- // `V1_DIR` is `<repo>/spec/v1` in a checkout; RFCS/ sits two levels up.
74
- // Both are absent from the published tarball, which is why the whole file
75
- // is `skipIf(V1_DIR === null)`.
76
- const rfcsDir = join(v1, '..', '..', 'RFCS');
77
-
78
- const sources = [
79
- ...walk(v1, (n) => n.endsWith('.md')),
80
- ...(existsSync(rfcsDir) ? walk(rfcsDir, (n) => n.endsWith('.md')) : []),
81
- ...(SCENARIOS_DIR !== null ? walk(SCENARIOS_DIR, (n) => n.endsWith('.test.ts')) : []),
82
- ];
83
-
84
- const headings = new Map<string, Set<string>>();
85
- for (const doc of CHECKED_DOCS) {
86
- const text = readFileSync(join(v1, doc), 'utf8');
87
- const keys = new Set<string>();
88
- for (const m of text.matchAll(/^#{1,6}\s+(.+?)\s*$/gm)) {
89
- for (const k of headingKeys(m[1] ?? '')) keys.add(k);
90
- }
91
- headings.set(doc, keys);
92
- }
93
-
94
- const dangling: string[] = [];
95
- let checked = 0;
96
- for (const src of sources) {
97
- const text = readFileSync(src, 'utf8');
98
- for (const m of text.matchAll(CITATION)) {
99
- const doc = `${m[1]}.md`;
100
- const keys = headings.get(doc);
101
- if (!keys) continue;
102
- const section = (m[2] ?? m[3] ?? '').trim();
103
- if (!section) continue;
104
- checked++;
105
- const want = normalize(section);
106
- // A MULTI-WORD citation must match a heading key exactly: prefix
107
- // matching would let `§"Claim acquisition"` be satisfied by a heading
108
- // named `Claim acquisition considered harmful`, which is how a renamed
109
- // section slips past a gate like this (caught while sabotage-testing
110
- // this very leg). A single-token citation — `§B`, `§C.2`,
111
- // `§host.aiProviders` — legitimately prefixes a longer heading
112
- // (`## §B — Channel resolution …`), so prefix matching stays for those.
113
- const hit = keys.has(want)
114
- || (!want.includes(' ') && [...keys].some((k) => k.startsWith(want)));
115
- if (!hit) dangling.push(`${src.split('/').slice(-2).join('/')} → ${doc} §"${section}"`);
116
- }
117
- }
118
-
119
- // Non-vacuity: these docs ARE cited. A zero here means the matcher stopped
120
- // matching, not that the corpus got clean — the failure mode this file exists
121
- // to prevent, one level up.
122
- expect(
123
- checked,
124
- 'spec-section-citations: no citations of the checked docs were found — the matcher is broken, not the corpus clean',
125
- ).toBeGreaterThan(0);
126
-
127
- expect(
128
- dangling,
129
- `dangling section citations (the cited heading does not exist):\n ${dangling.join('\n ')}`,
130
- ).toEqual([]);
131
- });
132
- });
@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
1
- /**
2
- * tool-result-trust-monotone — RFC 0143, the general rule the corpus's ~ten
3
- * point-invariants instance.
4
- *
5
- * The threat model fences ~ten specific untrusted-content ingresses into the
6
- * prompt (user input, RAG, artifacts, MCP, node-pack output, runner, card
7
- * inputs, form-content, voice), each with its own MUST. It never stated the
8
- * general rule: **a tool result is content entering model context, untrusted
9
- * unless the host has a named basis for trust, and trust is the MEET of a
10
- * composed segment's inputs — never raised by any transformation.** Absent that
11
- * rule the FRMD-F1-1 laundering path (untrusted → tool → "result" → prompt,
12
- * tag dropped in transit) is unforbidden in general, and nothing catches the
13
- * NEXT ingress shipped without a fence.
14
- *
15
- * Always-on, server-free, three parts:
16
- *
17
- * PART 1 — COMPLETENESS (load-bearing). Every content-ingress surface the
18
- * threat model's §4 STRIDE table names cites a fencing invariant that
19
- * actually EXISTS in SECURITY/invariants.yaml — no dangling reference — AND a
20
- * curated floor of prompt-ingress surfaces each resolves to a real invariant.
21
- * A new ingress added to §4 without a trust invariant reds this. The
22
- * general-rule analog of RFC 0138's "every manifest admits the hatch"; the
23
- * thing the point-invariants alone cannot provide.
24
- *
25
- * PART 2 — the MEET is stated normatively. The new §2a states monotone
26
- * composition, untrusted-by-default with "a tool ran" NOT a basis,
27
- * no-laundering-through-storage, both blessed strategies, and the isolation
28
- * carve-out. Prose-pinned: the schema cannot express "MUST be the meet."
29
- *
30
- * PART 3 — the instances name the general rule. ai-envelope.md §"Trust
31
- * boundary" cross-references §2a, so the MCP/A2A special case is anchored to
32
- * the general rule and cannot drift into contradicting it.
33
- *
34
- * WHAT THIS DOES NOT COVER — host behavior. Dynamic propagation through the
35
- * durable-store hop (strategy a) is witnessed by the reference host (memory
36
- * lane), not here; and the completeness leg is only as complete as §4 (an
37
- * ingress that exists in a host but was never added to §4 is invisible —
38
- * RFC 0143 unresolved-question 1).
39
- *
40
- * @see RFCS/0143-tool-result-trust-propagation.md
41
- * @see SECURITY/threat-model-prompt-injection.md §2a, §4, §5
42
- * @see spec/v1/ai-envelope.md §"Trust boundary"
43
- */
44
-
45
- import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
46
- import { readFileSync, existsSync } from 'node:fs';
47
- import { dirname, join } from 'node:path';
48
- import { SCHEMAS_DIR, V1_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
49
-
50
- // Repo root = parent of schemas/ (the canonical anchor other scenarios use).
51
- // SECURITY/ is not vendored into the published package layout, so guard reads
52
- // and skip when absent — the same posture as V1_DIR === null.
53
- const REPO_ROOT: string | null = (() => {
54
- const r = dirname(SCHEMAS_DIR);
55
- return existsSync(join(r, 'SECURITY', 'invariants.yaml')) ? r : null;
56
- })();
57
-
58
- const why = (specRef: string, requirement: string): string => `${specRef} — ${requirement}`;
59
-
60
- const TM = REPO_ROOT ? readFileSync(join(REPO_ROOT, 'SECURITY', 'threat-model-prompt-injection.md'), 'utf8') : '';
61
- const INV = REPO_ROOT ? readFileSync(join(REPO_ROOT, 'SECURITY', 'invariants.yaml'), 'utf8') : '';
62
- const ENV = V1_DIR ? readFileSync(join(V1_DIR, 'ai-envelope.md'), 'utf8') : '';
63
-
64
- /** All invariant ids declared in SECURITY/invariants.yaml. */
65
- function declaredInvariants(): Set<string> {
66
- const ids = new Set<string>();
67
- for (const m of INV.matchAll(/^\s*- id:\s*([a-z0-9-]+)\s*$/gim)) ids.add(m[1]);
68
- return ids;
69
- }
70
-
71
- /** Every invariant id CITED in a §4 STRIDE `Invariant` column (backticked, kebab-case). */
72
- function citedInSection4(): string[] {
73
- const start = TM.indexOf('## 4.');
74
- const s4 = start >= 0 ? TM.slice(start, TM.indexOf('\n## 5.')) : '';
75
- const ids = new Set<string>();
76
- // Backticked kebab identifiers that look like invariant ids (contain a hyphen,
77
- // lowercase). Excludes prose backticks like `core.*` (has a dot) and `exec`.
78
- for (const m of s4.matchAll(/`([a-z][a-z0-9]+(?:-[a-z0-9]+)+)`/g)) {
79
- const id = m[1];
80
- if (!id.includes('.') && !id.includes('_')) ids.add(id);
81
- }
82
- return [...ids];
83
- }
84
-
85
- describe('tool-result-trust-monotone: COMPLETENESS — no unfenced ingress (RFC 0143 part 1)', () => {
86
- const declared = declaredInvariants();
87
-
88
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('every invariant the §4 STRIDE table cites actually exists (no dangling fence)', () => {
89
- const cited = citedInSection4();
90
- expect(cited.length, why('threat-model §4', 'the STRIDE table cites fencing invariants')).toBeGreaterThan(5);
91
- // Only assert for ids that ARE invariants (present in the file) OR are
92
- // clearly invariant-shaped; a cited id that resolves to nothing is drift.
93
- const dangling = cited.filter((id) => /injection|trust|untrusted|marker|sandbox|exec|a2ui|voice|runner|pack/.test(id) && !declared.has(id));
94
- expect(
95
- dangling,
96
- why('threat-model §4', `every invariant-shaped id cited in §4 MUST exist in invariants.yaml — dangling: ${dangling.join(', ')}`),
97
- ).toEqual([]);
98
- });
99
-
100
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('the curated floor of prompt-ingress surfaces each has a real fencing invariant', () => {
101
- // The core content-ingress-to-prompt surfaces. If a surface is de-fenced or
102
- // its invariant renamed without updating this floor, the leg reds — this is
103
- // the "next ingress shipped unfenced" guard, scoped to the known set.
104
- const FLOOR: Record<string, string[]> = {
105
- 'user input': ['prompt-injection-input-marker'],
106
- 'RAG / knowledge base': ['prompt-injection-kb-marker'],
107
- 'prior artifact': ['prompt-injection-artifact-marker'],
108
- 'MCP tool result': ['prompt-injection-mcp-marker'],
109
- 'node-pack output': ['node-pack-output-untrusted'],
110
- 'self-hosted runner': ['runner-output-untrusted-transport'],
111
- 'chat-card input': ['chat-card-input-trust-boundary'],
112
- 'form-content pack strings': ['form-content-pack-string-trust-boundary'],
113
- 'voice transcript': ['voice-transcript-untrusted'],
114
- 'compose boundary (the meet)': ['prompt-composed-trust-marker'],
115
- };
116
- for (const [surface, inv] of Object.entries(FLOOR)) {
117
- const present = inv.filter((i) => declared.has(i));
118
- expect(
119
- present,
120
- why('threat-model §5 / invariants.yaml', `the "${surface}" ingress MUST retain a fencing invariant (${inv.join(' | ')})`),
121
- ).toEqual(inv);
122
- }
123
- });
124
-
125
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('the general rule itself is a declared invariant', () => {
126
- expect(
127
- declared.has('tool-result-trust-monotone'),
128
- why('invariants.yaml', 'RFC 0143 mints the general monotone-composition invariant the point-invariants instance'),
129
- ).toBe(true);
130
- });
131
- });
132
-
133
- describe('tool-result-trust-monotone: the MEET is stated normatively (RFC 0143 part 2)', () => {
134
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('§2a exists and states monotone composition (the meet)', () => {
135
- expect(/## 2a\. Trust is monotone through composition/i.test(TM), why('threat-model §2a', 'the general-rule section exists')).toBe(true);
136
- expect(
137
- /MUST be the \*\*meet\*\*|MUST be the meet of its inputs/i.test(TM),
138
- why('threat-model §2a', 'a composed segment\'s trust MUST be the MEET of its inputs — one untrusted input taints the segment'),
139
- ).toBe(true);
140
- });
141
-
142
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('"a tool ran" is explicitly NOT a basis for trust', () => {
143
- expect(
144
- /tool having executed and returned is\W{0,4}\s*NOT a basis/i.test(TM),
145
- why('threat-model §2a', 'untrusted-by-default — a tool having run is not a trust basis'),
146
- ).toBe(true);
147
- });
148
-
149
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('no laundering through storage, and both strategies are blessed', () => {
150
- expect(/does not launder it/i.test(TM), why('threat-model §2a', 'persist-then-recall does not launder (closes FRMD-F1-1)')).toBe(true);
151
- expect(/dynamic coarse-grained propagation/i.test(TM) && /static reader classification/i.test(TM), why('threat-model §2a', 'both conforming strategies named')).toBe(true);
152
- expect(/[Vv]alue-granular taint.{0,60}NOT required/i.test(TM), why('threat-model §2a', 'value-granular taint is NOT required — the floor is the coarse meet')).toBe(true);
153
- });
154
-
155
- it.skipIf(REPO_ROOT === null)('the structurally-isolated-reader carve-out is present and narrow', () => {
156
- expect(/structurally isolated/i.test(TM), why('threat-model §2a', 'the isolation carve-out exists so correct sandboxing is not punished')).toBe(true);
157
- expect(/missing.{0,20}`?"?trusted"?`?.{0,40}violat|absence of a trust decision is\W{0,4}\s*`?untrusted`?/i.test(TM), why('threat-model §2a', 'the fail-open (missing ⇒ trusted) default is the violation')).toBe(true);
158
- });
159
- });
160
-
161
- describe('tool-result-trust-monotone: the instances name the general rule (RFC 0143 part 3)', () => {
162
- it.skipIf(V1_DIR === null)('ai-envelope.md §"Trust boundary" cross-references §2a / RFC 0143', () => {
163
- expect(
164
- /named instance.{0,80}(§2a|RFC 0143|monotone-composition)/is.test(ENV),
165
- why('ai-envelope.md §"Trust boundary"', 'the MCP/A2A rule cites the general rule as its instance, so it cannot drift into contradicting it'),
166
- ).toBe(true);
167
- });
168
- });
@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
1
- /**
2
- * RFC 0152 + RFC 0153 — versioned A2A and MCP composition, shape only.
3
- *
4
- * **Stated first, because RFC 0147 §A.5 turns on it:** this file proves the
5
- * discovery schema admits the versioned shapes §A describes and rejects the ones
6
- * it forbids. It contacts no peer. It is therefore **not** evidence that this
7
- * host interoperates with any A2A 1.0 or MCP 2026-07-28 implementation, and
8
- * neither RFC can reach a defensible `Accepted` on it. Both additionally require
9
- * a real upstream peer in CI, which is not a corpus deliverable.
10
- *
11
- * The defect both RFCs address is the same, which is why they land together:
12
- * **`supported: true` with no version is a claim a peer cannot negotiate
13
- * against.** It asserts the host speaks *some* A2A or *some* MCP. Two hosts can
14
- * both advertise it, share no revision, and discover that only when a call
15
- * fails — and the failure surfaces at the peer, not at the handshake that was
16
- * supposed to prevent it. Versioning the advertisement moves the disagreement to
17
- * the one place both sides are looking.
18
- *
19
- * Two shape choices worth keeping:
20
- *
21
- * - **MCP versions are date-patterned, not free strings.** MCP revisions *are*
22
- * dates. Accepting `latest` or `2026-7-28` would let two hosts disagree
23
- * about which revision they share while both validate.
24
- * - **The MCP feature list is closed.** An unrecognized feature name is
25
- * indistinguishable from a typo, and a peer that silently ignores one has
26
- * negotiated a capability neither side implements.
27
- *
28
- * Server-free.
29
- */
30
-
31
- import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
32
- import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
33
- import { join, resolve as pathResolve } from 'node:path';
34
- import Ajv2020 from 'ajv/dist/2020.js';
35
- import { SCHEMAS_DIR, V1_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
36
-
37
- /**
38
- * Schemas ship inside the package; RFC prose does not. Deriving both from
39
- * `V1_DIR` — null in the published tarball — and casting the null away with
40
- * `as string` is what took this file down at import when installed from npm.
41
- */
42
- const RFCS_DIR = V1_DIR === null ? null : pathResolve(V1_DIR, '..', '..', 'RFCS');
43
-
44
- function caps(): Record<string, unknown> {
45
- return JSON.parse(
46
- readFileSync(join(SCHEMAS_DIR, 'capabilities.schema.json'), 'utf8'),
47
- ) as Record<string, unknown>;
48
- }
49
-
50
- /** Compile one capability family in isolation. */
51
- function familyValidator(family: string) {
52
- const schema = caps() as { properties: Record<string, object> };
53
- const ajv = new Ajv2020({ strict: false, allErrors: true });
54
- return ajv.compile(schema.properties[family] as object);
55
- }
56
-
57
- describe('RFC 0152 §A — A2A versioned discovery', () => {
58
- const validate = familyValidator('a2a');
59
-
60
- /**
61
- * The `a2a` family independently requires `agentCardUrl` (RFC 0100: it must
62
- * GET-resolve credential-less). Every fixture below carries it.
63
- *
64
- * This is not tidiness. Without it the NEGATIVE legs would have failed
65
- * validation for the missing card URL rather than for the version defect they
66
- * name — passing for the wrong reason, which is the vacuity this whole
67
- * program exists to close, committed inside a test written to prevent it.
68
- */
69
- const a2a = (over: Record<string, unknown>) => ({
70
- supported: true,
71
- agentCardUrl: 'https://host.example/.well-known/agent-card.json',
72
- ...over,
73
- });
74
-
75
- it('a versioned advertisement validates', () => {
76
- expect(
77
- validate(a2a({
78
- protocolVersions: ['1.0', '0.3'],
79
- preferredVersion: '1.0',
80
- profiles: ['a2a-1.0', 'a2a-0.3-legacy'],
81
- durableTasks: true,
82
- })),
83
- JSON.stringify(validate.errors),
84
- ).toBe(true);
85
- });
86
-
87
- it('a legacy-only host can say so explicitly', () => {
88
- // The point of naming the legacy profile: a deprecation you can see is one
89
- // you can time-bound. A bare `supported: true` hides the same fact.
90
- expect(
91
- validate(a2a({ protocolVersions: ['0.3'], preferredVersion: '0.3', profiles: ['a2a-0.3-legacy'] })),
92
- JSON.stringify(validate.errors),
93
- ).toBe(true);
94
- });
95
-
96
- it('an empty version list is rejected', () => {
97
- expect(
98
- validate(a2a({ protocolVersions: [] })),
99
- 'RFC 0152 §A: an A2A-capable host MUST advertise a NON-EMPTY `protocolVersions`. An empty ' +
100
- 'array is the bare `supported: true` problem wearing a schema — it validates and tells a ' +
101
- 'peer nothing it can negotiate against.',
102
- ).toBe(false);
103
- });
104
-
105
- it('duplicate versions are rejected', () => {
106
- expect(validate(a2a({ protocolVersions: ['1.0', '1.0'] }))).toBe(false);
107
- });
108
-
109
- it('a malformed version is rejected', () => {
110
- for (const v of ['1', 'v1.0', 'latest', '1.0.0']) {
111
- expect(
112
- validate(a2a({ protocolVersions: [v] })),
113
- `RFC 0152 §A: '${v}' is not an A2A major.minor version`,
114
- ).toBe(false);
115
- }
116
- });
117
-
118
- it('a malformed profile id is rejected', () => {
119
- expect(validate(a2a({ protocolVersions: ['1.0'], profiles: ['a2a-latest'] }))).toBe(false);
120
- expect(validate(a2a({ protocolVersions: ['1.0'], profiles: ['a2a-1.0'] }))).toBe(true);
121
- });
122
- });
123
-
124
- describe('RFC 0153 §A — MCP versioned discovery', () => {
125
- const validate = familyValidator('mcp');
126
-
127
- it('a versioned advertisement validates', () => {
128
- expect(
129
- validate({
130
- supported: true,
131
- protocolVersions: ['2026-07-28', '2025-06-18'],
132
- preferredVersion: '2026-07-28',
133
- profiles: ['mcp-2026-07-28', 'mcp-2025-06-18-legacy'],
134
- features: ['server-discover', 'mrtr', 'cacheable-lists', 'extensions'],
135
- }),
136
- JSON.stringify(validate.errors),
137
- ).toBe(true);
138
- });
139
-
140
- it('the v1.0 baseline `serverUrls` (required by mcp-discoverability when supported:true) validates — path or absolute URL, non-empty, no duplicates', () => {
141
- // S27 (2026-08-17): the schema was `additionalProperties: false` and did not
142
- // list `serverUrls`, while mcp-discoverability.test.ts REQUIRED it — a host
143
- // could not satisfy the scenario and the schema at once. The second sibling
144
- // host measured the contradiction on its own advert.
145
- expect(
146
- validate({ supported: true, serverUrls: ['/v1/host/openwop-app/mcp'], protocolVersions: ['2026-07-28'] }),
147
- JSON.stringify(validate.errors),
148
- ).toBe(true);
149
- expect(
150
- validate({ supported: true, serverUrls: ['https://example.test/canvasApi/v1/mcp'], protocolVersions: ['2024-11-05'], preferredVersion: '2024-11-05' }),
151
- JSON.stringify(validate.errors),
152
- ).toBe(true);
153
- expect(validate({ supported: true, serverUrls: [] }), 'empty serverUrls is the bare `supported: true` problem').toBe(false);
154
- expect(validate({ supported: true, serverUrls: ['/a', '/a'] }), 'duplicates').toBe(false);
155
- expect(validate({ supported: true, serverUrls: [''] }), 'an empty string is not a mount').toBe(false);
156
- });
157
-
158
- it('versions use MCP date form exactly', () => {
159
- // MCP revisions ARE dates. `latest` or a non-padded month would let two
160
- // hosts disagree about which revision they share while both validate.
161
- for (const v of ['latest', '2026-7-28', '2026-07', 'v2026-07-28']) {
162
- expect(
163
- validate({ supported: true, protocolVersions: [v] }),
164
- `RFC 0153 §A: '${v}' is not MCP's date form`,
165
- ).toBe(false);
166
- }
167
- expect(validate({ supported: true, protocolVersions: ['2026-07-28'] })).toBe(true);
168
- });
169
-
170
- it('the feature list is closed', () => {
171
- expect(
172
- validate({ supported: true, protocolVersions: ['2026-07-28'], features: ['server-discover', 'telepathy'] }),
173
- 'RFC 0153 §A: an unrecognized feature name is indistinguishable from a typo, and a peer ' +
174
- 'that silently ignores one has negotiated a capability neither side implements.',
175
- ).toBe(false);
176
- });
177
-
178
- it('an empty version list is rejected', () => {
179
- expect(validate({ supported: true, protocolVersions: [] })).toBe(false);
180
- });
181
- });
182
-
183
- describe.skipIf(RFCS_DIR === null)('RFC 0152 + 0153 — what these do NOT establish', () => {
184
- it('both RFCs keep their upstream-peer acceptance items unticked and annotated', () => {
185
- // RFC 0147 §A.5 forbids `Accepted` on shape-only evidence for a behavioral
186
- // requirement. Schema validity is not interop: nothing here speaks to a
187
- // peer, and both RFCs require a real upstream implementation in CI. This
188
- // leg exists so the suite cannot read as more than it is.
189
- for (const [file, needle] of [
190
- ['0152-a2a-1-0-versioned-composition.md', 'Real upstream A2A 1.0 peer passes in CI.'],
191
- ['0153-mcp-2026-07-28-versioned-composition.md', 'Pinned real MCP current peer passes in CI.'],
192
- ] as const) {
193
- const rfc = readFileSync(join(RFCS_DIR as string, file), 'utf8');
194
- expect(
195
- new RegExp(`- \\[ \\] ${needle.replace(/[.*+?^${}()|[\]\\]/g, '\\$&')}\\s*\\(`).test(rfc),
196
- `${file}: the upstream-peer item MUST remain unticked and annotated — no peer is contacted ` +
197
- 'anywhere in this corpus, and interop is the one thing a schema cannot demonstrate.',
198
- ).toBe(true);
199
- }
200
- });
201
- });
@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
1
- /**
2
- * Workflow-chain gallery visibility — `internal` chains (RFC 0135).
3
- *
4
- * Server-free corpus legs (always-on): the manifest schema's §WorkflowChain carries
5
- * a boolean `internal` property; a chain declaring `internal: true` validates; a
6
- * non-boolean `internal` is rejected; the spec documents the MUST-omit-from-default-
7
- * gallery rule and the not-an-authorization-boundary rule.
8
- *
9
- * The gallery-omission behavior itself is host-catalog presentation with no
10
- * normative wire listing endpoint, so it is witnessed at the reference host (host
11
- * regression test), not over the wire — see RFC 0135 §Conformance.
12
- *
13
- * @see spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md §"Chain visibility (RFC 0135)"
14
- * @see schemas/workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json §WorkflowChain
15
- * @see RFCS/0135-workflow-chain-internal-visibility.md
16
- */
17
-
18
- import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
19
- import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
20
- import { join } from 'node:path';
21
- import Ajv2020 from 'ajv/dist/2020.js';
22
- import addFormats from 'ajv-formats';
23
- import { SCHEMAS_DIR, V1_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
24
-
25
- const cite = (section: string, requirement: string): string => `${section} — ${requirement}`;
26
- const MANIFEST = join(SCHEMAS_DIR, 'workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json');
27
- // S38 (2026-08-17): `spec/` is NOT in the published package (`files`), so a path built
28
- // from SCHEMAS_DIR/../spec ENOENTs for every npm consumer — five always-on legs reddened
29
- // MyndHyve's bundle for a reason that had nothing to do with the host. Prose legs are
30
- // repo-layout only: `null` in the published layout and skipped, never thrown.
31
- const CHAIN_DOC: string | null = V1_DIR === null ? null : join(V1_DIR, 'workflow-chain-packs.md');
32
-
33
- function packWith(internal: unknown): Record<string, unknown> {
34
- return {
35
- name: 'vendor.acme.factory',
36
- version: '1.0.0',
37
- kind: 'workflow-chain',
38
- engines: { openwop: '^1' },
39
- chains: [
40
- {
41
- chainId: 'acme.child-batch',
42
- version: '1.0.0',
43
- label: 'Child Batch (Factory child)',
44
- description: 'Composition-only child fragment; composed by acme.factory.',
45
- ...(internal !== undefined ? { internal } : {}),
46
- parameters: {},
47
- dag: { nodes: [{ id: 'build', typeId: 'core.ai.callPrompt', config: {} }] },
48
- },
49
- ],
50
- };
51
- }
52
-
53
- describe('workflow-chain-internal-flag §A: corpus (RFC 0135, always-on)', () => {
54
- it('the manifest §WorkflowChain declares a boolean `internal` property', () => {
55
- const schema = JSON.parse(readFileSync(MANIFEST, 'utf8')) as {
56
- $defs?: Record<string, { properties?: Record<string, { type?: string }> }>;
57
- };
58
- const internal = schema.$defs?.WorkflowChain?.properties?.internal;
59
- expect(internal, cite('§WorkflowChain', 'internal property present')).toBeTruthy();
60
- expect(internal?.type, cite('§WorkflowChain', 'internal is boolean')).toBe('boolean');
61
- });
62
-
63
- it('a chain declaring internal: true validates; a non-boolean internal is rejected', () => {
64
- const ajv = new Ajv2020({ allErrors: true, strict: false });
65
- addFormats(ajv);
66
- const validate = ajv.compile(JSON.parse(readFileSync(MANIFEST, 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>);
67
- expect(validate(packWith(true)), cite('§WorkflowChain', `internal:true validates: ${ajv.errorsText(validate.errors)}`)).toBe(true);
68
- expect(validate(packWith(undefined)), cite('§WorkflowChain', 'absent internal stays valid (absent ⇒ false)')).toBe(true);
69
- expect(validate(packWith('yes')), cite('§WorkflowChain', 'non-boolean internal rejected')).toBe(false);
70
- });
71
-
72
- it.skipIf(CHAIN_DOC === null)('the spec documents the MUST-omit-from-default-gallery + not-an-authz-boundary rules', () => {
73
- const doc = readFileSync(CHAIN_DOC as string, 'utf8');
74
- expect(doc.includes('Chain visibility (RFC 0135)'), cite('§Chain visibility', 'section present')).toBe(true);
75
- expect(
76
- /internal[\s\S]{0,600}MUST omit/i.test(doc),
77
- cite('§Chain visibility', 'documents MUST omit from default listing'),
78
- ).toBe(true);
79
- expect(
80
- /NOT an authorization boundary/i.test(doc),
81
- cite('§Chain visibility', 'documents internal is not an authz boundary'),
82
- ).toBe(true);
83
- });
84
- });