@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.151.0 → 1.152.0

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Files changed (10) hide show
  1. package/CHANGELOG.md +7 -0
  2. package/coverage.md +1 -1
  3. package/dist/cli.js +7 -1
  4. package/package.json +1 -1
  5. package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json +2 -2
  6. package/schemas/README.md +1 -1
  7. package/schemas/conformance-certification-bundle.schema.json +1 -1
  8. package/src/cli.ts +9 -1
  9. package/src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts +45 -1
  10. package/src/scenarios/auth-saml-profile.test.ts +7 -39
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,12 @@
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  # `@openwop/openwop-conformance` Changelog
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+ ## [1.152.0] — 2026-09-02 — v2 charter Phase 0: `--certify` defaults to bundle v2; the RFC 0050 reference suite leaves the scenario file
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+
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+ No new scenario file. Two packed changes:
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+
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+ - **`--certify` emits certification bundle v2 by default** (RFC 0148). `--bundle-version 1` still works through the RFC 0148 migration window (ends 2026-11-10) and prints a deprecation notice; the v1 schema file stays in the package so v1 bundles remain parseable, and is removed at v2.0 (`spec/v1/deprecations.json`).
8
+ - **The RFC 0050 §A synthetic-IdP reference suite moved** from `scenarios/auth-saml-profile.test.ts` to `src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts` (RFC 0163 gap G5): it proves the bundled fixture, not a host, and inside a scenario file it recorded an `executed-pass` in every host bundle (certification gap G8). The scenario keeps its host-facing legs; `coverage.md` grades it `host-pending` on the opt-in host-ACS leg. Hosts whose bundles previously counted this file as a pass will see it become `skipped`/`inapplicable` unless they opt into the seam — that is the honest reading.
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+
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  ## [1.151.0] — 2026-09-02 — RFC 0164: the subject-link scenarios gate on the profile pair; the opted-out shape fails
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  No new scenario file. `auth-subject-link.test.ts` and `auth-subject-link-key-class.test.ts` re-gate every leg on the host advertising **both** `openwop-auth-saml` and `openwop-auth-scim`, not on `capabilities.auth.subjectLinking`, which RFC 0164 makes a derived advertisement. The RFC 0159 advertisement block gains a leg: both profiles advertised ⇒ `subjectLinking === true` and `subjectLinkKey ∈ {opaque-idp, configured-immutable}`, else `executed-fail` citing RFC 0164 §A.3. That is the shape a combined host that opted out used to present, and it used to read `inapplicable` — a host shipping the leaver bypass was invisible to the suite. `src/lib/capabilities-auth-subject-link.test.ts` pins the new schema conditional (both profiles with the flag absent, `false`, or without a key are rejected; with `true` + a class accepted; profile order irrelevant; single-profile hosts unaffected). `capabilities.schema.json` composes the RFC 0163 and RFC 0164 conditionals under `allOf`; `coverage.md` rows re-worded. No production host advertises both profiles, so no host's recorded evidence changes.
package/coverage.md CHANGED
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ The scenario groups in the table below (one row per group; count the rows — th
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115
  | `cross-workspace-isolation.test.ts` | RFC 0048 §C/§D (`auth.md` §Identity claims, `rest-endpoints.md` `run_forbidden`) | A (owner-echo shape if a sample run is readable; §D isolation MUST-NOT via optional `POST /v1/host/sample/identity/cross-workspace-read` seam — cross-workspace read fails closed with `run_forbidden`/`not_found`) | `host-pending` | Behavioral probe soft-skips on 404; no host advertises run ownership yet (RFC 0048 `Draft`). |
116
116
  | `authorization-roles-shape.test.ts` | `capabilities.authorization` (RFC 0049 §A, `auth.md` §"Role-based authorization") | A (advertisement shape always — `supported` boolean; `failClosed` const true; every `roles[].role` non-empty + `scopes` array) | `host-pending` | Always runs; asserts the block is absent or well-formed. |
117
117
  | `authorization-fail-closed.test.ts` | `capabilities.authorization` (RFC 0049 §C) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `authorization-fail-closed` | A (advertisement `failClosed===true` always; fail-closed MUST-NOT via optional `POST /v1/host/sample/authorization/decide` seam — an unseeded-role principal resolves `allowed:false`) | `host-pending` | Capability-gated on `authorization.supported`; behavioral probe soft-skips on 404. Scope-match + denial-audited scenarios deferred to a host. |
118
- | `auth-saml-profile.test.ts` | `openwop-auth-saml` (RFC 0050, `auth-profiles.md` §`openwop-auth-saml`) | A+B (profile-advertisement shape always; **1-positive + 6-negative reference suite runs server-free** via the bundled synthetic IdP `conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.ts` — `alg:none`/unsigned/bad-sig/expired/not-yet-valid/wrapping; host-ACS validation opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL` + the `auth/saml/validate` seam) | host-pass (server-free reference) | Synthetic IdP bundled (`node:crypto`, no deps). Host-ACS pass is the remaining graduation gate. |
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+ | `auth-saml-profile.test.ts` | `openwop-auth-saml` (RFC 0050, `auth-profiles.md` §`openwop-auth-saml`) | A+B (profile-advertisement shape always; host-ACS validation opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL` + the `auth/saml/validate` seam. The **1-positive + 6-negative reference suite** against the bundled synthetic IdP `conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.ts` — `alg:none`/unsigned/bad-sig/expired/not-yet-valid/wrapping — moved to `src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts` on 2026-09-02 (RFC 0163 G5): it proves the fixture, so it no longer records a scenario ledger row) | host-pending (host-ACS leg, opt-in) | Synthetic IdP bundled (`node:crypto`, no deps); its self-tests live in `src/lib`. Host-ACS pass over the seam is the witness that credits a host. |
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  | `auth-scim-profile.test.ts` | `openwop-auth-scim` (RFC 0050, `auth-profiles.md` §`openwop-auth-scim`) | B (profile-advertisement shape always; SCIM user/group provisioning → principal/role roundtrip opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_SCIM_URL` + the `auth/scim/provision` seam) | `host-pending` | Behavior opt-in (operator-supplied SCIM endpoint); deactivate ⇒ subsequent-deny assertion deferred to a host. |
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  | `auth-subject-link.test.ts` | `openwop-auth-saml` + `openwop-auth-scim` advertised together (RFC 0159 + RFC 0164, `auth-profiles.md` §Subject linking; `subjectLinking` is derived) | B (advertisement gate always — `subjectLinking:true` only alongside both profiles, AND both profiles ⇒ `subjectLinking:true` + `subjectLinkKey` (RFC 0164 vulnerable-shape leg, `executed-fail` never `inapplicable`); cross-lane leaver deny + mutable-key negative opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL` + `OPENWOP_TEST_SCIM_URL` and the `auth/scim/provision` + `auth/saml/validate` seams) | host-pass (tier-1 in-process witness, openwop-app #3581) | Invariant `subject-link-leaver-deny`. No production host advertises `subjectLinking`. |
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  | `auth-subject-link-key-class.test.ts` | as above (RFC 0163; gated on the profile pair since RFC 0164) | B (`subjectLinkKey` ∈ `{opaque-idp, configured-immutable}` when `subjectLinking:true`, unaided; same-IdP control + cross-IdP collision negative opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL` + `OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL_B` + `OPENWOP_TEST_SCIM_URL`) | host-pass (tier-1 in-process witness, openwop-app #3614) | Invariants `subject-link-key-class-declared`, `subject-link-same-trust-root`. Fixture self-test lives in `src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts`, not here (G8). |
package/dist/cli.js CHANGED
@@ -53,7 +53,10 @@ function parseArgs(argv) {
53
53
  let impl;
54
54
  let implVersion;
55
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  let certify;
56
- let bundleVersion = '1';
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+ // Suite 1.152.0: bundle v2 (RFC 0148) is the default. v1 stays reachable via
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+ // `--bundle-version 1` through the RFC 0148 migration window (ends
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+ // 2026-11-10) and is removed at v2.0 (spec/v1/deprecations.json).
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+ let bundleVersion = '2';
57
60
  let maxWorkers = parseMaxWorkers(process.env.OPENWOP_MAX_WORKERS, 'OPENWOP_MAX_WORKERS');
58
61
  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
59
62
  const arg = argv[i] ?? '';
@@ -103,6 +106,9 @@ function parseArgs(argv) {
103
106
  process.exit(2);
104
107
  }
105
108
  bundleVersion = v;
109
+ if (v === '1') {
110
+ process.stderr.write('openwop-conformance: --bundle-version 1 is DEPRECATED (RFC 0148). A v1 bundle ceases to substantiate a new certification after 2026-11-10 and the format is removed at v2.0; omit the flag to emit bundle v2.\n');
111
+ }
106
112
  break;
107
113
  }
108
114
  case '--certify':
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
3
- "version": "1.151.0",
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+ "version": "1.152.0",
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  "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
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  "repository": {
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  "type": "git",
package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
1
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  {
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  "_comment": "Provenance of this vendored schemas/ copy. See conformance/README.md \u00a7\"Resolving the contract\". Compare against the stamp in your installed @openwop/openwop-conformance to detect a stale hand-copied contract.",
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- "suiteVersion": "1.151.0",
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- "corpusCommit": "b1203c4399516184e2ad36aaedfec35331abb175"
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+ "suiteVersion": "1.152.0",
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+ "corpusCommit": "8d02d922ac933096f36fc9e649b6ba574b4f609c"
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  }
package/schemas/README.md CHANGED
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
46
46
  | `connection-pack-manifest.schema.json` | `connection-packs.md` + RFC 0095 | DRAFT — manifest for `kind: "connection"` registry packs (RFC 0095). Peer to the node/workflow-chain/prompt/artifact-type/chat-card pack manifests; disjoint via the `kind` discriminator. Distributes a portable provider definition — auth endpoints, read/write scope groups, exactly-one reach (`mcp`/`openapi`/`integration`) — that the RFC 0045/0047 `provider` string resolves against. Carries NO credential material (`connection-pack-no-credential-material`). |
47
47
  | `frontend-plugin-manifest.schema.json` | `frontend-plugin-packs.md` + RFC 0117 | DRAFT — manifest for `kind: "frontend-plugin"` registry packs (RFC 0117). Peer to the other pack manifests; disjoint via the `kind` discriminator. Distributes a signed, SANDBOXED UI extension — one or more `uiPlugins[]` (a `pluginId`, a `surface`, an opaque `entry` bundle, a closed `hostApi` allowlist). A backend `runtime` member is FORBIDDEN (`not: {}`). Loaded only in a cross-origin sandbox (`frontend-plugin-isolation`). |
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  | `ui-plugin-message.schema.json` | `frontend-plugin-packs.md` + RFC 0117 | DRAFT — the `ui-plugin/1` `postMessage` host-RPC envelope (RFC 0117) between a sandboxed front-end plugin and its host: a plugin→host `request` (closed `method` allowlist), a host→plugin `response` (`ok`+`result` or `ok:false`+`error`), or a host→plugin `event`. Carries the optimistic-concurrency `version` token and the `artifact_conflict` + `currentVersion` shape (`frontend-plugin-rpc-allowlist` / `frontend-plugin-no-byok`). |
49
- | `conformance-certification-bundle.schema.json` | `conformance-certification.md` + RFC 0089 | DRAFT — machine-readable attestation binding a host's claimed profiles to the reproducible run that substantiates them (suite version + per-scenario pass list + host identity/commit + captured discovery document). Out-of-band; a consumer re-derives each claim via the §B binding rule. |
49
+ | `conformance-certification-bundle.schema.json` | `conformance-certification.md` + RFC 0089 | **DEPRECATED** (RFC 0148; `--certify` defaults to bundle v2 since suite 1.152.0; v1 ceases to substantiate a new certification after 2026-11-10; removal scheduled for v2.0 per `spec/v1/deprecations.json`) — machine-readable attestation binding a host's claimed profiles to the reproducible run that substantiates them (suite version + per-scenario pass list + host identity/commit + captured discovery document). Out-of-band; a consumer re-derives each claim via the §B binding rule. |
50
50
  | `conversation-event.schema.json` | `channels-and-reducers.md` + conversation RFC | Multi-turn conversation event shape for orchestrator-driven HITL flows |
51
51
  | `conversation-turn.schema.json` | `channels-and-reducers.md` + conversation RFC | Conversation turn shape for user/agent/system messages |
52
52
  | `core-conformance-mock-agent-config.schema.json` | `node-packs.md` + RFC 0023 | Config shape for the conformance-only `core.conformance.mock-agent` typeId — drives `agent.*` event emission on cue (`mockReasoning` / `mockToolCalls` / `mockHandoff` / `mockDecision` / `mockConfidence`). Hosts MUST refuse this typeId for production tenants unless `capabilities.conformance.mockAgent` is advertised. |
package/schemas/conformance-certification-bundle.schema.json CHANGED
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
2
2
  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
3
3
  "$id": "https://openwop.dev/spec/v1/conformance-certification-bundle.schema.json",
4
4
  "title": "OpenWOP Conformance Certification Bundle",
5
- "description": "RFC 0089. A machine-readable attestation binding a host's claimed profiles to the reproducible run that substantiates them: suite version, per-scenario pass list, host identity + commit, and the captured discovery document. An out-of-band artifact emitted by the conformance harness (not a runtime wire message). A consumer MUST re-derive each claimed profile from the embedded `discovery.document` rather than trusting `claimedProfiles` verbatim (RFC 0089 §B).",
5
+ "description": "DEPRECATED (RFC 0148, suite 1.114.0): bundle v1 remains parseable but ceases to substantiate a new certification after 2026-11-10; emit `certification-bundle-v2.schema.json` (the `--certify` default since suite 1.152.0). Scheduled for removal at v2.0 — see spec/v1/deprecations.json. RFC 0089. A machine-readable attestation binding a host's claimed profiles to the reproducible run that substantiates them: suite version, per-scenario pass list, host identity + commit, and the captured discovery document. An out-of-band artifact emitted by the conformance harness (not a runtime wire message). A consumer MUST re-derive each claimed profile from the embedded `discovery.document` rather than trusting `claimedProfiles` verbatim (RFC 0089 §B).",
6
6
  "type": "object",
7
7
  "additionalProperties": false,
8
8
  "required": ["bundleVersion", "generatedAt", "generator", "suite", "host", "discovery", "claimedProfiles", "results"],
package/src/cli.ts CHANGED
@@ -81,7 +81,10 @@ function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): ParsedArgs {
81
81
  let impl: string | undefined;
82
82
  let implVersion: string | undefined;
83
83
  let certify: string | undefined;
84
- let bundleVersion: '1' | '2' = '1';
84
+ // Suite 1.152.0: bundle v2 (RFC 0148) is the default. v1 stays reachable via
85
+ // `--bundle-version 1` through the RFC 0148 migration window (ends
86
+ // 2026-11-10) and is removed at v2.0 (spec/v1/deprecations.json).
87
+ let bundleVersion: '1' | '2' = '2';
85
88
  let maxWorkers: number | undefined = parseMaxWorkers(process.env.OPENWOP_MAX_WORKERS, 'OPENWOP_MAX_WORKERS');
86
89
 
87
90
  for (let i = 0; i < argv.length; i++) {
@@ -132,6 +135,11 @@ function parseArgs(argv: readonly string[]): ParsedArgs {
132
135
  process.exit(2);
133
136
  }
134
137
  bundleVersion = v;
138
+ if (v === '1') {
139
+ process.stderr.write(
140
+ 'openwop-conformance: --bundle-version 1 is DEPRECATED (RFC 0148). A v1 bundle ceases to substantiate a new certification after 2026-11-10 and the format is removed at v2.0; omit the flag to emit bundle v2.\n',
141
+ );
142
+ }
135
143
  break;
136
144
  }
137
145
  case '--certify':
package/src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts CHANGED
@@ -19,10 +19,14 @@
19
19
  *
20
20
  * @see conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.ts
21
21
  * @see RFCS/0163-subject-linking-hardening.md §B
22
+ *
23
+ * The RFC 0050 §A reference suite (1 positive + 6 negative variants against the
24
+ * same fixture) moved here from `scenarios/auth-saml-profile.test.ts` on
25
+ * 2026-09-02 (RFC 0163 gap G5) for the same reason.
22
26
  */
23
27
 
24
28
  import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
25
- import { createSyntheticSamlIdp, DEFAULT_SAML_ENTITY_ID } from './saml-idp.js';
29
+ import { createSyntheticSamlIdp, DEFAULT_SAML_ENTITY_ID, type SamlVariant } from './saml-idp.js';
26
30
 
27
31
  const COLLIDING_SUBJECT = 'idp-op-8f3a';
28
32
 
@@ -81,3 +85,43 @@ describe('saml-idp: two-trust-root fixture (RFC 0163 §B)', () => {
81
85
  expect(idpB.verify(forged).valid, 'the original root MUST NOT verify it either').toBe(false);
82
86
  });
83
87
  });
88
+
89
+ describe('saml-idp: synthetic-IdP reference suite (RFC 0050 §A)', () => {
90
+ // Server-free: the bundled synthetic IdP (conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.ts)
91
+ // mints a valid assertion + the 6 negative variants, and its verify()
92
+ // implements the RFC 0050 §A MUST list. This proves each negative is
93
+ // detectably malformed and gives the suite a reference SAML validator.
94
+ // A host's real ACS validates the SAME assertions over the
95
+ // `auth/saml/validate` seam (scenarios/auth-saml-profile.test.ts, gated on
96
+ // OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL).
97
+ const idp = createSyntheticSamlIdp();
98
+
99
+ it('publishes a PEM signing certificate', () => {
100
+ expect(idp.certificatePem).toContain('BEGIN PUBLIC KEY');
101
+ });
102
+
103
+ it('accepts a valid signed, in-window, non-wrapped assertion', () => {
104
+ const r = idp.verify(idp.mint('valid'));
105
+ expect(r.valid, `expected valid; got reason=${r.reason}`).toBe(true);
106
+ });
107
+
108
+ const negatives: ReadonlyArray<[Exclude<SamlVariant, 'valid'>, string]> = [
109
+ ['alg-none', 'alg-none'],
110
+ ['unsigned', 'unsigned'],
111
+ ['bad-signature', 'bad-signature'],
112
+ ['expired', 'expired'],
113
+ ['not-yet-valid', 'not-yet-valid'],
114
+ ['signature-wrapping', 'signature-wrapping'],
115
+ ];
116
+
117
+ for (const [variant, expectedReason] of negatives) {
118
+ it(`rejects the ${variant} assertion (RFC 0050 §A MUST)`, () => {
119
+ const r = idp.verify(idp.mint(variant));
120
+ expect(r.valid, `${variant} MUST be rejected`).toBe(false);
121
+ expect(
122
+ r.reason,
123
+ `${variant} MUST be rejected for the ${expectedReason} reason`,
124
+ ).toBe(expectedReason);
125
+ });
126
+ }
127
+ });
package/src/scenarios/auth-saml-profile.test.ts CHANGED
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
23
23
 
24
24
  import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
25
25
  import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
26
- import { createSyntheticSamlIdp, type SamlVariant } from '../lib/saml-idp.js';
26
+ import { type SamlVariant } from '../lib/saml-idp.js';
27
27
  import { capabilityFamily } from '../lib/discovery-capabilities.js';
28
28
 
29
29
  const SAML_PROFILE = 'openwop-auth-saml';
@@ -117,41 +117,9 @@ describe('auth-saml-profile: assertion validation (RFC 0050 §A — opt-in)', ()
117
117
  }
118
118
  });
119
119
 
120
- describe('category: auth-saml synthetic-IdP reference suite (RFC 0050 §A)', () => {
121
- // Server-free: the bundled synthetic IdP (conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.ts)
122
- // mints a valid assertion + the 6 negative variants, and its verify()
123
- // implements the RFC 0050 §A MUST list. This proves each negative is
124
- // detectably malformed and gives the suite a reference SAML validator.
125
- // A host's real ACS validates the SAME assertions over the
126
- // `auth/saml/validate` seam (gated above on OPENWOP_TEST_SAML_IDP_URL).
127
- const idp = createSyntheticSamlIdp();
128
-
129
- it('publishes a PEM signing certificate', () => {
130
- expect(idp.certificatePem).toContain('BEGIN PUBLIC KEY');
131
- });
132
-
133
- it('accepts a valid signed, in-window, non-wrapped assertion', () => {
134
- const r = idp.verify(idp.mint('valid'));
135
- expect(r.valid, `expected valid; got reason=${r.reason}`).toBe(true);
136
- });
137
-
138
- const negatives: ReadonlyArray<[Exclude<SamlVariant, 'valid'>, string]> = [
139
- ['alg-none', 'alg-none'],
140
- ['unsigned', 'unsigned'],
141
- ['bad-signature', 'bad-signature'],
142
- ['expired', 'expired'],
143
- ['not-yet-valid', 'not-yet-valid'],
144
- ['signature-wrapping', 'signature-wrapping'],
145
- ];
146
-
147
- for (const [variant, expectedReason] of negatives) {
148
- it(`rejects the ${variant} assertion (RFC 0050 §A MUST)`, () => {
149
- const r = idp.verify(idp.mint(variant));
150
- expect(r.valid, `${variant} MUST be rejected`).toBe(false);
151
- expect(
152
- r.reason,
153
- `${variant} MUST be rejected for the ${expectedReason} reason`,
154
- ).toBe(expectedReason);
155
- });
156
- }
157
- });
120
+ // The RFC 0050 §A synthetic-IdP reference suite (1 positive + 6 negatives against
121
+ // the bundled fixture) moved to `conformance/src/lib/saml-idp.test.ts` on
122
+ // 2026-09-02 (RFC 0163 gap G5): it proves the FIXTURE, not a host, and a
123
+ // server-free block inside a scenario file records `executed-pass` in every
124
+ // host bundle (conformance-certification.md gap G8). This file keeps only the
125
+ // host-facing legs above.