@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.136.4 → 1.136.6

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "1.136.4",
+  "version": "1.136.6",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",

package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
   "_comment": "Provenance of this vendored schemas/ copy. See conformance/README.md \u00a7\"Resolving the contract\". Compare against the stamp in your installed @openwop/openwop-conformance to detect a stale hand-copied contract.",
-  "suiteVersion": "1.136.4",
-  "corpusCommit": "abb3c77ccf7f952fbaa66b06463964fa9dd3ad36"
+  "suiteVersion": "1.136.6",
+  "corpusCommit": "8f907101a7f1b6b630c0d1f2271b6e60d1e7c8fe"
 }

package/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts

@@ -306,6 +306,26 @@ export function expandChain(chain: WorkflowChain, ctx: ExpansionContext): Expand
 // If it is gated on an advertised capability, it goes below.
 // ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 
+// ─── Begin the MIRRORED COMPENSATION pass ───────────────────────────────────
+//
+// SP-01 (2026-08-18): this pass is a SECOND byte-mirrored region, gated by
+// `scripts/check-workflow-chain-expansion-sync.mjs` alongside the core above.
+//
+// It sits below "End of the MIRRORED CORE" because it composes on the core's
+// OUTPUT rather than editing it — but unlike the capability-gated surfaces that
+// follow (RFC 0124 deferred parameters, RFC 0133 sub-chains, which a host that
+// does not advertise them MUST REFUSE rather than implement), carrying a
+// chain's compensation declaration is UNCONDITIONAL: `compensation.md`
+// §"Workflow policy" makes the declaration descriptive, so a host that does not
+// advertise `capabilities.compensation` still MUST carry it verbatim and refuse
+// only a chain-level POLICY (`capability_required`). Unconditional ⇒ genuinely
+// mirrorable ⇒ gated. RFC 0157's own commit claimed this pass was already
+// "CI-gated against the reference host"; it was not — the gate stopped at the
+// core sentinel — so the mirror never received it. Anything added between the
+// two sentinels below MUST be mirrored in the reference host — that is the
+// whole RFC 0157 unit: the types, the two error classes, the helpers, and
+// `carryCompensation` / `expandChainWithCompensation`.
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // RFC 0157 (RFC 0013 revision × RFC 0151 §B) — chain fragments carry
 // compensation.
@@ -525,6 +545,8 @@ export function expandChainWithCompensation(
   return { ...expanded, nodes: carried.nodes, settingsCompensation: carried.settingsCompensation };
 }
 
+// ─── End of the MIRRORED COMPENSATION pass ──────────────────────────────────
+
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 // RFC 0124 (WCP4) — Portable per-run parameter deferral.
 //

package/src/scenarios/idempotency.test.ts

@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
 import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
 import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
 import { isFixtureAdvertised } from '../lib/fixtures.js';
+import { readErrorCode } from '../lib/error-envelope.js';
 
 const WORKFLOW_ID = 'conformance-idempotent';
 const SKIP_NO_FIXTURE = !isFixtureAdvertised(WORKFLOW_ID);
@@ -85,5 +86,44 @@ describe.skipIf(SKIP_NO_FIXTURE)('idempotency: same key + different body conflic
       'idempotency.md §Layer 1',
       'same Idempotency-Key with a different body MUST return 409',
     )).toBe(409);
+
+    // SP-03 (2026-08-18): the code, not just the status. `idempotency.md`
+    // named NO mismatch error until v1.5, and implementations diverged exactly
+    // as an unnamed error invites: `grpc-transport.md` mapped BOTH
+    // `idempotency_key_conflict` and `idempotency_key_mismatch` in one row, the
+    // published TypeScript SDK's `HTTP_ERROR_CODES` carried
+    // `idempotency_key_mismatch`, the SQLite reference host emitted
+    // `idempotency_key_conflict`, and a tier-1 host emitted
+    // `idempotency_key_replay_mismatch` — a spelling in no corpus artifact at
+    // all. This leg asserted the status alone, so every one of them passed.
+    //
+    // `idempotency_key_mismatch` is canonical (idempotency.md §"Record shape,
+    // digest, and lease"): the only spelling already in more than one shipped
+    // artifact. The two legacy spellings are TOLERATED here through the first
+    // minor after 2026-11-10 so a converging host is not red on a rename it is
+    // mid-flight on — the same deprecation shape S22 used for the error
+    // envelope. Remove the tolerance then; the canonical assertion stays.
+    const code = readErrorCode(conflict.json);
+    const LEGACY = ['idempotency_key_conflict', 'idempotency_key_replay_mismatch'];
+    expect(
+      code === 'idempotency_key_mismatch' || LEGACY.includes(code ?? ''),
+      driver.describe(
+        'idempotency.md §"Record shape, digest, and lease"',
+        `a different request digest under the same scoped key MUST fail with the canonical ` +
+          `\`idempotency_key_mismatch\` (legacy \`${LEGACY.join('` / `')}\` tolerated through the ` +
+          `first minor after 2026-11-10); got \`${code ?? '<none>'}\``,
+      ),
+    ).toBe(true);
+
+    // …and MUST NOT hand back the first run's body. Answering a question the
+    // caller did not ask is the read half of the same confusion.
+    const conflictRunId = (conflict.json as { runId?: unknown } | undefined)?.runId;
+    expect(
+      conflictRunId,
+      driver.describe(
+        'idempotency.md §"Record shape, digest, and lease"',
+        'a digest mismatch MUST NOT return the cached body (no runId on the 409)',
+      ),
+    ).toBeUndefined();
   });
 });

package/src/scenarios/pack-registry-publish.test.ts

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
  */
 
 import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { gzipSync } from 'node:zlib';
 import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
 import { discoveryFamilies } from '../lib/discovery-capabilities.js';
 import { recordRequirement } from '../lib/requirement-ledger.js';
@@ -81,6 +82,14 @@ function freshPackName(scope: string = 'core'): string {
  *  impl PR will likely extend the driver with an octet-stream variant.
  *  The shape-only error-catalog tests below only need the host's first
  *  validation step (URL pattern, body-presence, etc.) to fire. */
+/**
+ * S45 — a VALID gzip stream whose decompressed size (64 MiB of zeros) exceeds
+ * the recommended registry cap (50 MB) while the wire body stays ~64 KB, so no
+ * proxy body limit is reached and the host's own decompressed-bytes cap is the
+ * only thing that can refuse it. Built once per file.
+ */
+const OVERSIZED_GZIP: Buffer = gzipSync(Buffer.alloc(64 * 1024 * 1024, 0));
+
 async function putTest(name: string, version: string, body: unknown, extraHeaders: Record<string, string> = {}) {
   const res = await driver.put(`/v1/packs-test/${encodeURIComponent(name)}/-/${encodeURIComponent(version)}.tgz`, body, {
     headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/octet-stream', ...extraHeaders },
@@ -196,14 +205,29 @@ describe('pack-registry-publish: tarball extraction error catalog (RFC 0025)', (
 
   it('PUT with decompressed bytes exceeding the registry\'s cap MUST return 400 tarball_too_large', async () => {
     if (!(await isTestModeAdvertised())) return;
-    // A real test would build a huge gzip; for shape-only assertion we
-    // send a body large enough that any reasonable cap fires.
-    const big = Buffer.alloc(60 * 1024 * 1024, 0x1f); // 60MB
-    big[0] = 0x1f; big[1] = 0x8b; // gzip magic so it gets past body-shape check
-    const res = await putTest(freshPackName(), '1.0.0', big);
+    // S45 (2026-08-18): the cap is on DECOMPRESSED bytes (node-packs.md
+    // §"Tarball extraction", recommended default 50 MB), so the probe is a
+    // small VALID gzip stream that inflates past it — 64 MiB of zeros gzips
+    // to ~64 KB on the wire. The previous probe was a 60 MB body of fake
+    // gzip magic: a load balancer in front of the host (Cloud Run's front
+    // end caps HTTP/1 bodies at 32 MiB) answered its own HTML 413 before the
+    // host saw the request, the leg blew the 30 s budget on a normal uplink,
+    // and — because `tarball_gunzip_failed` was also accepted — a host with
+    // NO cap at all passed it. Measured by MyndHyve on `api.myndhyve.ai`.
+    // Only `tarball_too_large` is accepted now: a real gzip that inflates to
+    // 64 MiB either trips the cap or reaches the tar layer, and reaching the
+    // tar layer means the cap is absent or above 64 MiB (> the recommended
+    // default) — say so in the run record if that is a deliberate host choice.
+    const res = await putTest(freshPackName(), '1.0.0', OVERSIZED_GZIP);
     if (res.status === 404) return;
-    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
-    expect(['tarball_too_large', 'tarball_gunzip_failed'].includes(errorCode(res.json) ?? '')).toBe(true);
+    expect(
+      res.status,
+      driver.describe('node-packs.md §"Tarball extraction"', 'a valid gzip inflating past the decompressed cap MUST be refused with 400 (a 413 here means a proxy refused the wire body — this probe is ~64 KB on the wire, so that is a host/proxy misconfiguration, not the cap)'),
+    ).toBe(400);
+    expect(
+      errorCode(res.json),
+      driver.describe('node-packs.md §"Tarball extraction"', 'decompressed bytes exceeding the registry cap MUST surface tarball_too_large (recommended default cap 50 MB; this probe inflates to 64 MiB)'),
+    ).toBe('tarball_too_large');
   });
 
   it('PUT with no `pack.json` at the tarball root MUST return 400 tarball_manifest_missing', async () => {

package/src/scenarios/redaction.test.ts

@@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ describe('redaction: 401 response MUST NOT echo invalid Bearer token (NFR-7)', (
       // are observable surfaces and MUST be canary-clean.
       const res = await driver.post(
         '/v1/runs',
-        { workflowId: NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID, tenantId: 'conformance-tenant' },
+        { workflowId: NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID },
         {
           authenticated: false,
           headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${canaryValue}` },
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ describe('redaction: 401 response MUST NOT echo invalid Bearer token (NFR-7)', (
   it('the marker substring alone never appears in a 401 body (universal)', async () => {
     const res = await driver.post(
       '/v1/runs',
-      { workflowId: NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID, tenantId: 'conformance-tenant' },
+      { workflowId: NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID },
       {
         authenticated: false,
         headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${CANARY_MARKER}-direct-marker` },
@@ -204,9 +204,11 @@ describe.skipIf(SKIP_NO_NOOP)('redaction: credentialRef value MUST NOT appear in
     // §configurable echo) — but per capabilities.md §"aiProviders"
     // it MUST NOT appear in any RunEvent payload.
     const c = getCanary('byok-credential-ref');
+    // S46 (2026-08-18): no fabricated `tenantId` — the run belongs to the
+    // credential's own tenant (S41 rule). A tenant-enforcing host answered
+    // 403 to the made-up id and this leg then `return`ed, vacuously.
     const create = await driver.post('/v1/runs', {
       workflowId: NOOP_WORKFLOW_ID,
-      tenantId: 'conformance-tenant',
       configurable: { ai: { credentialRef: c.value } },
     });
     if (create.status !== 201) {