@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.135.2 → 1.135.4

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "1.135.2",
+  "version": "1.135.4",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",

package/schemas/CORPUS-STAMP.json

@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 {
   "_comment": "Provenance of this vendored schemas/ copy. See conformance/README.md \u00a7\"Resolving the contract\". Compare against the stamp in your installed @openwop/openwop-conformance to detect a stale hand-copied contract.",
-  "suiteVersion": "1.135.2",
-  "corpusCommit": "101bf981f0431710e81a3e7ac108c5b6b49cddd9"
+  "suiteVersion": "1.135.4",
+  "corpusCommit": "d8f9be75925e189b56f9f0da7e3352cfee4d8e84"
 }

package/src/lib/webhook-receiver.ts

@@ -138,11 +138,14 @@ export function signPayload(
 
 /**
  * Discover a tenant the calling bearer provably OWNS, by creating a probe run
- * and reading `owner.tenantId` off its snapshot (RFC 0048). A host that scopes
+ * and reading `owner.tenant` off its snapshot (RFC 0048; `run-snapshot.schema.json`
+ * §owner — the triple is `{ tenant, workspace, principal }`, and `tenantId` was
+ * never the spec name: S29, 2026-08-17, found by the second sibling host, whose
+ * schema-correct `owner.tenant` this helper silently ignored). A host that scopes
  * webhook subscriptions by tenant membership (RFC 0093) 403s a `tenantId` the
  * bearer is not a member of — so a hard-coded tenant is wrong; the only portable
  * owned tenant is the one on a run the bearer just created. Returns `undefined`
- * for a single-tenant host (which omits `owner.tenantId`) or when no probe
+ * for a single-tenant host (which omits `owner`) or when no probe
  * fixture is available — callers then omit `tenantId`, which single-tenant hosts
  * accept. (RFC 0093 / webhooks.md §Register; suite defect fixed 2026-08-09.)
  */
@@ -155,6 +158,8 @@ export async function discoverOwnedTenant(
   const runId = (create.json as { runId?: string } | null)?.runId;
   if (typeof runId !== 'string') return undefined;
   const snap = await driver.get(`/v1/runs/${encodeURIComponent(runId)}`);
-  const owner = (snap.json as { owner?: { tenantId?: unknown } } | null)?.owner;
-  return typeof owner?.tenantId === 'string' ? owner.tenantId : undefined;
+  const owner = (snap.json as { owner?: { tenant?: unknown; tenantId?: unknown } } | null)?.owner;
+  if (typeof owner?.tenant === 'string' && owner.tenant.length > 0) return owner.tenant;
+  // Pre-S29 hosts that copied the suite's misnamed field: tolerated, never asserted.
+  return typeof owner?.tenantId === 'string' && owner.tenantId.length > 0 ? owner.tenantId : undefined;
 }

package/src/scenarios/mcp-current-auth-boundary.test.ts

@@ -35,6 +35,14 @@ async function disco() {
 const REQ = { jsonrpc: '2.0', id: 1, method: 'tools/list', params: { _meta: { [META_V]: '2026-07-28', [META_C]: {} } } };
 const HDR = { 'MCP-Protocol-Version': '2026-07-28', 'Mcp-Method': 'tools/list' };
 
+/** Set-Cookie values from a fetch Headers (Node ≥ 19.7 exposes them un-joined via getSetCookie). */
+function setCookies(h: Headers): string[] {
+  const g = (h as Headers & { getSetCookie?: () => string[] }).getSetCookie;
+  if (typeof g === 'function') return g.call(h);
+  const one = h.get('set-cookie');
+  return one ? [one] : [];
+}
+
 describe.skipIf(!process.env.OPENWOP_BASE_URL)('RFC 0153 §E — mcp-current-auth-boundary (host as server, gated)', () => {
   it('an unauthenticated current-profile request is refused, unless anonymousActor is advertised', async () => {
     const { mcp, anon } = await disco();
@@ -53,5 +61,23 @@ describe.skipIf(!process.env.OPENWOP_BASE_URL)('RFC 0153 §E — mcp-current-aut
       [401, 403],
       driver.describe('mcp-integration.md §E', 'an anonymous MCP principal MUST NOT be the production default for an advertised current profile — refuse (401/403) or advertise anonymousActor'),
     ).toContain(anonymous.status);
+
+    // S30 (2026-08-17, openwop-app H43): a cookie-posture host may MINT an anonymous
+    // session for a credential-less caller and then treat "has a principal" as
+    // "is authenticated". The bare probe above never carries a cookie, so it can
+    // only observe the first request; replay with whatever the host just minted
+    // (from this response or from a credential-less discovery GET) and hold the
+    // same rule — an anonymous SESSION is still an anonymous principal.
+    const minted = [
+      ...setCookies(anonymous.headers),
+      ...setCookies((await driver.get('/.well-known/openwop', { authenticated: false })).headers),
+    ];
+    if (minted.length === 0) return; // host mints no anonymous session; the bare probe was the whole observation
+    const cookie = minted.map((c) => c.split(';')[0]).join('; ');
+    const withSession = await driver.post(await mcpServerMount(), REQ, { headers: { ...HDR, Cookie: cookie }, authenticated: false });
+    expect(
+      [401, 403],
+      driver.describe('mcp-integration.md §E', 'a caller holding only a host-minted anonymous session cookie is still an anonymous principal — refuse (401/403) unless anonymousActor is advertised (S30)'),
+    ).toContain(withSession.status);
   });
 });