@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.13.0 → 1.15.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,27 @@
 
 _No unreleased changes._
 
+## [1.15.0] — 2026-06-01 — RFC 0080 memory degraded-projection behavioral gate
+
+Standalone conformance minor — a scenario addition published via the `openwop-conformance/v1.15.0` per-package tag (PUBLISHING.md §"CI automation"; only the `publish-conformance` job runs), NOT a coordinated spec-corpus release. `EXPECTED_CONFORMANCE_VERSION` advances to `1.15.0` in lockstep. The steward prerequisite that lets MyndHyve run the RFC 0080 §C degraded-projection scenario non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true` to graduate `memory` from `Active` to `Accepted`. The normative surface (the `memory.{search,retention,writable}` dimensions + the `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` inventory fields) already shipped — this release is the gated test surface only. The companion RFC 0068 gated scenarios (`memory-consolidation-idempotent` + `commitment-fired`) shipped in 1.14.0; this release additionally documents their two host seams in `host-sample-test-seams.md`.
+
+### Added — RFC 0080 behavioral scenario
+
+- **`memory-degraded-projection.test.ts`** (`behaviorGate('openwop-memory-degraded', …)`, gated on `agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + `memory.supported`) — the RFC 0080 §C degraded-projection iff-contract on the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents`: a degraded inventory entry MUST carry `memoryDegraded:true` + a non-empty, unique `degradedMemoryDimensions[]` drawn from the closed §A-name enum (`read`/`write`/`search`/`long-term-durability`/`compaction`/`attribution`/`replay-snapshot`/`retention`); a non-degraded entry MUST NOT carry a non-empty list; the inventory is non-empty; the degraded branch runs non-vacuously when `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_AGENT_ID` names a known-degraded agent. Black-box on the normative path — no POST seam. This is the RFC 0080 → Accepted bar.
+
+Additive + capability-gated; existing v1.0-only hosts pass unchanged. No new schemas (the `memory.{search,retention,writable}` dimensions + the `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` inventory fields shipped at `Draft → Active`). Also documents the two RFC 0068 conformance seams (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `.../commitment/fire`) in `host-sample-test-seams.md` — the 0068 gated scenarios (`memory-consolidation-idempotent` + `commitment-fired`) already shipped in 1.14.0.
+
+## [1.14.0] — 2026-06-01 — RFC 0078 tool-catalog + RFC 0079 egress-policy behavioral gates
+
+Standalone conformance minor — a scenario addition published via the `openwop-conformance/v1.14.0` per-package tag (PUBLISHING.md §"CI automation"; only the `publish-conformance` job runs), NOT a coordinated spec-corpus release. `EXPECTED_CONFORMANCE_VERSION` advances to `1.14.0` in lockstep. Four gated behavioral scenarios + two `src/lib/` helpers, the steward prerequisite to graduating `toolCatalog` (RFC 0078) and `httpClient.egressPolicy` (RFC 0079) from `Active` to `Accepted` on a non-steward host (MyndHyve). All additive + capability-gated; existing v1.0-only hosts pass unchanged. The normative surface (`GET /v1/tools` + `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}`, the `tool.session.*`/`egress.decided` events + the `tool-descriptor`/`credential-provenance` schemas) already shipped — this release is the gated test surface only.
+
+- **`tool-catalog-projection.test.ts`** (`behaviorGate('openwop-tool-catalog', …)`, gated on `toolCatalog.supported`) — the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/tools` list (each `ToolDescriptor` schema-valid against `tool-descriptor.schema.json`, `source`/`safetyTier` in the closed vocab, content-free), `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}` round-trip + unknown-id 404, 401-unauthenticated, and the §F-2 cross-principal non-disclosure (`OPENWOP_CROSS_PRINCIPAL_TOOL_ID` → 404). Black-box on the normative path — no POST seam.
+- **`tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts`** (`behaviorGate('openwop-tool-session-lifecycle', …)`, gated on `toolCatalog.sessionLifecycle`) — the §D bracket via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/tools/session-run` seam + the test event-log seam: `tool.session.opened` before the first RFC 0064 call event → `tool.session.closed` after the last, one shared `sessionId`, each carrying a `toolId`, `closed.outcome` in the closed enum, both content-free (SR-1).
+- **`egress-audience-binding.test.ts`** (KEYSTONE — `behaviorGate('openwop-egress-audience-binding', …)`, gated on `httpClient.egressPolicy.supported`) — the §C confused-deputy MUST via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/egress/decide` seam: an out-of-audience egress is `denied`/`downgraded` with `reason:"out-of-audience"` and the credential is NOT attached; a provenance-unevaluable egress fails closed (`denied` + `reason:"provenance-unevaluable"`). The behavioral leg of the `egress-credential-audience-bound` invariant, which graduates reference-impl → protocol tier when this passes against a host (at flip).
+- **`egress-decision-content-free.test.ts`** (`behaviorGate('openwop-egress-decision-content-free', …)`) — the SR-1 secret non-leak: a `canary` credential's sentinel never surfaces in the decision, the `egress.decided` payload carries no forbidden content key, and `reason` stays in the CLOSED vocabulary (no blocked-destination spill).
+
+New lib helpers `src/lib/toolCatalog.ts` + `src/lib/egressPolicy.ts`; two new seams in `host-sample-test-seams.md` §"Open seams". No new schemas (`tool-descriptor.schema.json` + `credential-provenance.schema.json` + the `toolSession*`/`egressDecided` payload `$defs` shipped earlier); the `egress-credential-audience-bound` invariant graduates tiers at flip, not here. SDK `tools.*` methods deferred. The normative `GET /v1/tools` OpenAPI endpoints (`listTools`/`getTool`) land with this batch.
+
 ## [1.13.0] — 2026-05-31 — RFC 0081 eval-suite + RFC 0082 deployment behavioral gates
 
 Standalone conformance minor — a scenario addition published via the `openwop-conformance/v1.13.0` per-package tag (PUBLISHING.md §"CI automation"; only the `publish-conformance` job runs), NOT a coordinated spec-corpus release. `EXPECTED_CONFORMANCE_VERSION` advances to `1.13.0` in lockstep. All additive + capability-gated; existing v1.0-only hosts pass unchanged. Ships the two gated behavioral scenarios RFC 0081 + RFC 0082 each name in their §Conformance but deferred at `Draft → Active` — the steward prerequisite to graduating `agents.evalSuite` (RFC 0081) and `agents.deployment` (RFC 0082) from `Active` to `Accepted` on a non-steward host (MyndHyve). The normative surface (the `mode:"eval"` discriminator + `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary`, the `GET`/`POST /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` endpoints + the `channel` binding, the `eval.*`/`deployment.*` events, and the SDK helpers) already shipped — this release is the gated test surface only.

package/README.md

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Exit code is non-zero on any failed assertion.
 
 ## What's Covered
 
-The current suite has 310 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-05-31 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)` — the §E promotion contract via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log seam across four legs: `promote` (authorize RFC 0049 → approvalGate RFC 0051 → eval-verify RFC 0081 → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`), `unauthorized` (fail-closed — `allowed:false`, no `deployment.promoted`, the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`), `eval-gate-unmet` (`eval_gate_unmet` denial, §E-3), and `channel-pin` (the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` recorded-fact on `agent.invocation.started`); new lib helper `src/lib/agentDeployment.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)` — the §B `mode:"eval"` projection via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (count == `eval.completed.taskCount`), the content-free `eval.scored` legs (`score` ∈ 0..1) backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid `EvalSummary` round-trip with `passedCount <= taskCount`; new lib helper `src/lib/agentEval.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger bridge, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` derived from the live discovery doc — the §C delivery model via the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` seam + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free; the always-on shape stays in `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts`; new lib helper `src/lib/triggerBridge.ts`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added two capability-gated behavioral scenarios (both gated on `agents.orgChart.supported`, black-box on the normative `/v1/agents/org-chart` surface — no new POST seam): `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` (the `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — departments form an acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree, members reference `host:<id>` roster entries — + the §D responsibility roll-up via `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) and `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` (the behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field on any member/department/responsibility-view object; the structural leg stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`, and the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier per the `agent-manifest-runtime` no-host-hook precedent). 2026-05-31 (RFCs 0086 + 0077 — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four capability-gated behavioral scenarios so a non-steward host can be mechanically certified non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`: `agent-roster-attribution.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B/§C; gated on `agents.roster.supported` — the normative `GET /v1/agents/roster` read shape + `total==roster.length`, the §C `roster.run.initiated`-before-`agent.invocation.started` ordering, the content-free payload backing `roster-attribution-no-content`, the durable work-item `triggerSubscriptionId`, and the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ROSTER_ID`), `agent-live-invocation-bracket.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §E; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — `agent.invocation.started`-first / `agent.invocation.completed`-last bracket, matching `invocationId`, `source`/`outcome` closed enums, content-free), `agent-live-structured-output.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §B step 6; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.structuredOutput` — a result violating `handoff.returnSchemaRef` fails the invocation `outcome:"failed"` rather than shipping as completed), and `agent-live-allowlist-enforced.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §F-1 / RFC 0002 §A14; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — a tool outside `toolAllowlist` is not callable); all four drive the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/roster/fire` + `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/live-invoke` seams plus the test event-log seam and soft-skip on 404 (these are the RFC 0086 / 0077 Active→Accepted bars). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, Draft -> Active) added `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.orgChart` shape + the `AgentOrgChart` round-trip + the non-`host:` member negative + the **§B structural non-authority guarantee** — the schema rejects a `scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` field on a member (`additionalProperties:false`), and a member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}` — backing the protocol-tier `org-position-no-authority-escalation` invariant; no new RunEventType). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0086 — standing agent roster, Draft -> Active) added `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.roster` shape + the `AgentRosterEntry` round-trip + the `host:` `rosterId` + `agentRef` version-XOR-channel negatives + the content-free `roster.run.initiated` negatives backing the protocol-tier `roster-attribution-no-content` invariant + the additive `roster` inventory projection + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, Draft -> Active) added `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.deployment` shape + the `AgentDeployment` record round-trip + the `AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version` `not`-clause + the four `deployment.*` payloads + the content-free negatives backing the protocol-tier `deployment-event-no-content-leak` invariant). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, Draft -> Active) added `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation of the operational-annex `none`/`partial`/`full` status: all-floor ⇒ partial, missing-flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, missing-tenant-scope ⇒ partial-not-full per the honest-advertisement rule, eval/deploy/budget-are-advisory-not-hard-terms, + the `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, Draft -> Active) added `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trip + the §A orthogonality guard — a wall-time field is rejected (it's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) — + threshold/onExhaustion negatives + the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads + the four `cap.breached{budget-*}` kinds + RunEventType-enum membership + the no-pricing-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `budget-no-pricing-leak` invariant + the `capabilities.budget`/`limits.maxBudget*` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger + channel bridge, Draft -> Active) added `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trip + missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property negatives + the four-state vocab + the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads incl. closed `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership + the `triggerBridge`/`webhooks.durable` capability shape + the `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile derivation incl. the no-dead-letter-sink negative). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0079 — credential provenance + egress policy, Draft -> Active) added `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trip + `audiences:[]`/missing-`credentialId`/unknown-property negatives + the no-secret-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `egress-decision-no-secret-leak` invariant + the content-free `egress.decided` record incl. the `decision` enum + RunEventType-enum membership + the `httpClient.egressPolicy` shape; the behavioral `egress-credential-audience-bound` confused-deputy MUST is reference-impl tier, deferred to a host). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0078 — portable tool catalog, Draft -> Active) added `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trip + the §C-1 `exec` ⇒ `host-extension` cross-field MUST (RFC 0069) + the `safetyTier`-required negative + `additionalProperties:false`, the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payload $defs incl. the closed `outcome` enum + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, Draft -> Active) added `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimension shapes + malformed-instance negatives — `retention.ttl` non-boolean, out-of-enum `search.modes`, unknown property under `additionalProperties:false` — the `agent-inventory-response` `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` closed-enum fields, and the `openwop-memory` derivation surfacing for read/write + long-term hosts while withholding from `writable:false`). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, Draft -> Active) added `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` shape + the `AgentEvalSuite`/`EvalSummary` schema round-trips + the three `eval.{started,scored,completed}` payloads + the content-free negatives — a task entry with a `taskOutput` body, a `safetyFinding` with an `excerpt` — backing the new `eval-summary-no-content-leak` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch` live-run audit) added `safefetch-live-audit.test.ts` (`behaviorGate('openwop-safefetch-live-audit', …)`, gated on `httpClient.safeFetch` + `toolHooks.prePostEvents`) — asserts the audit-when-both MUST against the **durable run event log** via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch-run` open seam + the test event-log seam, closing the seam-vs-production gap (a production `createSafeFetch()` with no audit hooks passes the inline `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` but FAILS this under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`); this is the RFC 0076 §B → Accepted bar; run seam soft-skips on 404 (host-pending). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0066 — `x-openwop-form` picker UX hints, Draft → Active) added `x-openwop-form-pack-manifest.test.ts` (always-on server-free: an annotated `configSchema` stays a valid 2020-12 schema + the advisory hints don't change what it accepts, each §A annotation matches the shape, an unknown `kind` validates for forward-compat, 3 negatives — missing/non-string `kind`, non-string `dependsOn`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch`) added `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` (seam-gated: SSRF block / DNS-rebinding / `Connection: upgrade` refusal / tool-hooks audit-when-both, via `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch`; advertisement contract stays in `http-client-ssrf.test.ts`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §A — pack `runtime.requires[]` install gate) added two: `runtime-requires-shape.test.ts` (server-free closed-vocabulary validation — the 8 tokens validate, a raw builtin name is rejected, empty-array≡omission, `uniqueItems`) + `runtime-requires-install-gate.test.ts` (seam-gated install-grant / install-refuse → `pack_runtime_requirement_unmet` / non-sandbox SHOULD-projection, soft-skip on 404 via `POST /v1/host/sample/packs/install-gate`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0047 — `host.oauth` authorization-code roundtrip) added `oauth-authorization-code-roundtrip.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.oauth.supported` + `grants` including `authorization_code`; drives the `POST /v1/host/sample/oauth/authorize-code-roundtrip` seam against the one canonical synthetic provider in `fixtures/oauth-providers/synthetic.json` (soft-skip on 404, Tier-2 host-pending), asserting a successful grant returns a credential REFERENCE (token persisted as a `host.credentials` entry) and that the authorization code / state / PKCE verifier / acquired access+refresh tokens never appear on any run-visible surface (RFC 0047 §C + §C.2 / `credential-payload-redaction`). Closes the RFC 0047 Tier-2 gap (capability-shape + redaction scenarios existed; the actual authorization-code dance was unexercised). 2026-05-26 (RFC 0070 — agent-manifest runtime) added `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts`; 2026-05-26 (RFC 0071 — artifact-type + chat card packs) added six: `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` + `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` (server-free) + `artifact-type-pack-install.test.ts` + `artifact-type-store-without-render.test.ts` + `chat-card-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` (server-free) + `chat-card-pack-execution.test.ts` (capability-gated, host-pending). 2026-05-26 (RFCs 0067 / 0068 / 0069 — spec-gap Draft cohort) added five scenarios: `byok-auth-modes.test.ts` (RFC 0067; always-on schema-shape of `aiProviders.authModes` + a discovery-gated §B auth-mode-contract cross-field check), `memory-consolidation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0068; always-on shape of `agents.memoryConsolidation`/`agents.commitments` + the `agent.memory.consolidated`/`commitment.fired` payload $defs), `memory-consolidation-idempotent.test.ts` + `commitment-fired.test.ts` (RFC 0068; capability-gated behavioral, soft-skip on the documented `/v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `/commitment/fire` seams), and `exec-not-protocol-tier.test.ts` (RFC 0069; always-on server-free structural assertion that the protocol corpus defines no `core.*`/`openwop.*` exec-class primitive — backs the `exec-must-not-be-protocol-tier` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0061 — stateful agent-loop lifecycle, executionModel.version 5) added four `agent-loop-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-version5-shape` (always-on; validates `executionModel.statefulResume`/`transcriptWindow` + the 1–5 version ceiling) plus `-iteration-monotonic` (gated on `version >= 5`; `runOrchestrator.decided.iteration` increments 1,2,3… exactly once per turn), `-workspace-snapshot` (gated additionally on `host.workspace.supported`; a turn-i workspace write is invisible to turn i, visible to turn i+1), and `-stateful-resume` (gated on `statefulResume`; a mid-loop suspend resumes at the same iteration without resetting the counter) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented agent-loop seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agentloop/run`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0059 — host.workspace M2, reference-host enforcement) added two `workspace-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-behavior` (capability-gated CRUD round-trip / `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` / `workspace_too_large` / §D run-start snapshot, all via the real `/v1/host/workspace/files` §C endpoints) and `-cross-tenant-isolation` (WCT-1 — drives the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op` seam to assert a file owned by one `{tenant, workspace}` is unreadable, on both `get` and `list`, under a different owner; backs the new `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` SECURITY invariant). The in-memory reference host now advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` and honors §C/§D/§E end-to-end. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0062 — memory.distillation "dreams") added five `distillation-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.memory.distillation` block + the additive `distillation` sub-object on `memory.compacted`) plus `-token-budget` (within budget `tokensUsed ≤ tokenBudget`; an un-meetable budget → `token_budget_exceeded` with no partial archive), `-stable-archive` (same sources + budget ⇒ byte-stable archive checksum), `-index-roundtrip` (gated additionally on `indexEmitted`; the `MEMORY-INDEX.json` workspace file is retrievable + `workspace.updated` fired), and `-secret-carryforward` (SR-1: a redacted source secret never appears in the archive) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented memory-distillation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/distill`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0063 — core.subWorkflow.outputAttestation) added four `subrun-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-attestation-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.agents.subRunAttestation` flag) plus `-checksum-stable` (the child output checksum is the byte-stable, key-order-invariant RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 digest), `-approval-gate` (`requireApproval` → `accept` merges, `reject` does not), and `-approval-fail-closed` (no `accept`/`edit-accept` → no merge; backs the deferred `subrun-merge-approval-fail-closed` invariant) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented sub-run attestation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/subrun/attest`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0064 — host.toolHooks) added five `tool-hooks-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.toolHooks` block + the optional content-free fields on `agentToolCalled` / `agentToolReturned`) plus `-content-free` (gated on `prePostEvents`), `-authorization-fail-closed` (gated on `perToolAuthorization`), `-rate-limit` (gated on `perToolRateLimit`), and `-secret-redaction` (gated on `prePostEvents` + the SR-1 `argsHash` redaction rule) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented tool-hooks invoke seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/toolhooks/invoke`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0060 — host.heartbeat) added four `heartbeat-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-capability-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.heartbeat` block) plus `-fires-once-per-tick`, `-idempotent-no-spam`, and `-runtime-bound` (gated on `capabilities.heartbeat.supported` + the host heartbeat tick seam; soft-skip until a host wires it). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0057 — memory write-attribution) added five `memory-attribution-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on advertisement check on `capabilities.memory.attribution`), plus `-no-content`, `-tenant-scoped`, `-emits-on-write`, and `-replay-stable` (gated on `capabilities.memory.attribution.emitsWriteEvents`) verifying the content-free `memory.written` RunEvent, its two SECURITY invariants (`memory-attribution-no-content` + `memory-attribution-tenant-scoped`), and the §D replay rule that a `replay`-mode fork MUST NOT regenerate `memoryId`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
+The current suite has 321 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-06-01 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + `memory.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-memory-degraded', …)` — the §C degraded-projection iff-contract on the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents`: a degraded inventory entry MUST carry `memoryDegraded:true` + a non-empty, unique `degradedMemoryDimensions[]` from the closed §A-name enum, a non-degraded entry MUST NOT, the inventory is non-empty, and the degraded branch runs non-vacuously when `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_AGENT_ID` names a known-degraded agent; black-box, no POST seam — the RFC 0080 → Accepted bar). This batch also documents the two RFC 0068 conformance seams (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `.../commitment/fire`) in `host-sample-test-seams.md` (the 0068 gated scenarios shipped in 1.14.0). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0034 — collector-side BYOK-canary inspection) added `otel-collector-canary-inspection.test.ts` (always-on server-free: stands up a real `OtelCollector`, POSTs synthetic OTLP/HTTP-JSON traces + metrics through its actual ingest path, and proves the new `findCanaryLeakage()` inspector catches a canary embedded in a span attribute / resource attribute / span name / metric data-point attribute while reporting ZERO hits on a redacted payload and never matching an empty canary — the non-vacuous proof that the conformance collector now inspects what the host's OTLP exporter ACTUALLY shipped over the wire, closing the `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` / `-debug-bundle-otel` collector-seam gap; the live capability-gated complement is the new collector-export describe block in `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts`). 2026-06-01 (RFC 0035 — sandbox wall-clock timeout, the 7th-of-8 graduation) added `sandbox-wasm-timeout.test.ts` (worker-driven server-free: `probeTimeout` in `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts` spawns a worker thread running the committed `misbehaving-timeout.wasm` + a main-thread kill-timer — the thread preemption a same-thread probe can't do — asserting `sandbox_timeout` with a well-behaved positive control; graduates `node-pack-sandbox-timeout` reference-impl→protocol, so 7 of 8 `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants are now protocol-tier, only the JS-specific `no-eval` permanently exempt). 2026-05-31 (audit-response black-box / graduation batch) added three more: `sandbox-wasm-isolation.test.ts` (RFC 0035 — drives the committed `fixtures/wasm-sandbox/*.wasm` through `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts`: escape/capability-gate via static `WebAssembly.Module.imports()`, an OOB-store memory trap, double-instantiate isolation; 10/10; graduates 6 `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants reference-impl→protocol), `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation-blackbox.test.ts` (RFC 0059 — two-credential black-box on the normative §C `/v1/host/workspace/files` endpoints: owner A writes, a second-tenant credential fails closed; no seam), and `prompt-resolution-chain-event.test.ts` (RFC 0029 — reads the durable `agent.promptResolved.chain[]` precedence record via the normative `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/events/poll`; no seam) — each the production-path proof that graduates its surface into the `openwop-core-standard` floor. 2026-05-31 (RFC 0088 — the `openwop-core-standard` Core Standard Profile, the audit-response Core Candidate target) added `core-standard-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation probe: `isCoreStandard` derives the §B floor — `openwop-core` ∧ `openwop-interrupts` ∧ (`openwop-stream-sse` ∨ `openwop-stream-poll`) — a bare `openwop-core` host without interrupts is excluded, a host with no event transport fails, and the annex is absent from `deriveProfiles` because it composes rather than redefines). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)` — the §E promotion contract via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log seam across four legs: `promote` (authorize RFC 0049 → approvalGate RFC 0051 → eval-verify RFC 0081 → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`), `unauthorized` (fail-closed — `allowed:false`, no `deployment.promoted`, the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`), `eval-gate-unmet` (`eval_gate_unmet` denial, §E-3), and `channel-pin` (the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` recorded-fact on `agent.invocation.started`); new lib helper `src/lib/agentDeployment.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)` — the §B `mode:"eval"` projection via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (count == `eval.completed.taskCount`), the content-free `eval.scored` legs (`score` ∈ 0..1) backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid `EvalSummary` round-trip with `passedCount <= taskCount`; new lib helper `src/lib/agentEval.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger bridge, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` derived from the live discovery doc — the §C delivery model via the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` seam + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free; the always-on shape stays in `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts`; new lib helper `src/lib/triggerBridge.ts`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added two capability-gated behavioral scenarios (both gated on `agents.orgChart.supported`, black-box on the normative `/v1/agents/org-chart` surface — no new POST seam): `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` (the `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — departments form an acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree, members reference `host:<id>` roster entries — + the §D responsibility roll-up via `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) and `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` (the behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field on any member/department/responsibility-view object; the structural leg stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`, and the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier per the `agent-manifest-runtime` no-host-hook precedent). 2026-05-31 (RFCs 0086 + 0077 — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four capability-gated behavioral scenarios so a non-steward host can be mechanically certified non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`: `agent-roster-attribution.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B/§C; gated on `agents.roster.supported` — the normative `GET /v1/agents/roster` read shape + `total==roster.length`, the §C `roster.run.initiated`-before-`agent.invocation.started` ordering, the content-free payload backing `roster-attribution-no-content`, the durable work-item `triggerSubscriptionId`, and the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ROSTER_ID`), `agent-live-invocation-bracket.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §E; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — `agent.invocation.started`-first / `agent.invocation.completed`-last bracket, matching `invocationId`, `source`/`outcome` closed enums, content-free), `agent-live-structured-output.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §B step 6; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.structuredOutput` — a result violating `handoff.returnSchemaRef` fails the invocation `outcome:"failed"` rather than shipping as completed), and `agent-live-allowlist-enforced.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §F-1 / RFC 0002 §A14; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — a tool outside `toolAllowlist` is not callable); all four drive the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/roster/fire` + `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/live-invoke` seams plus the test event-log seam and soft-skip on 404 (these are the RFC 0086 / 0077 Active→Accepted bars). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, Draft -> Active) added `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.orgChart` shape + the `AgentOrgChart` round-trip + the non-`host:` member negative + the **§B structural non-authority guarantee** — the schema rejects a `scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` field on a member (`additionalProperties:false`), and a member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}` — backing the protocol-tier `org-position-no-authority-escalation` invariant; no new RunEventType). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0086 — standing agent roster, Draft -> Active) added `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.roster` shape + the `AgentRosterEntry` round-trip + the `host:` `rosterId` + `agentRef` version-XOR-channel negatives + the content-free `roster.run.initiated` negatives backing the protocol-tier `roster-attribution-no-content` invariant + the additive `roster` inventory projection + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, Draft -> Active) added `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.deployment` shape + the `AgentDeployment` record round-trip + the `AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version` `not`-clause + the four `deployment.*` payloads + the content-free negatives backing the protocol-tier `deployment-event-no-content-leak` invariant). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, Draft -> Active) added `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation of the operational-annex `none`/`partial`/`full` status: all-floor ⇒ partial, missing-flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, missing-tenant-scope ⇒ partial-not-full per the honest-advertisement rule, eval/deploy/budget-are-advisory-not-hard-terms, + the `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, Draft -> Active) added `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trip + the §A orthogonality guard — a wall-time field is rejected (it's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) — + threshold/onExhaustion negatives + the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads + the four `cap.breached{budget-*}` kinds + RunEventType-enum membership + the no-pricing-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `budget-no-pricing-leak` invariant + the `capabilities.budget`/`limits.maxBudget*` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger + channel bridge, Draft -> Active) added `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trip + missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property negatives + the four-state vocab + the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads incl. closed `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership + the `triggerBridge`/`webhooks.durable` capability shape + the `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile derivation incl. the no-dead-letter-sink negative). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0079 — credential provenance + egress policy, Draft -> Active) added `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trip + `audiences:[]`/missing-`credentialId`/unknown-property negatives + the no-secret-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `egress-decision-no-secret-leak` invariant + the content-free `egress.decided` record incl. the `decision` enum + RunEventType-enum membership + the `httpClient.egressPolicy` shape; the behavioral `egress-credential-audience-bound` confused-deputy MUST is reference-impl tier, deferred to a host). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0078 — portable tool catalog, Draft -> Active) added `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trip + the §C-1 `exec` ⇒ `host-extension` cross-field MUST (RFC 0069) + the `safetyTier`-required negative + `additionalProperties:false`, the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payload $defs incl. the closed `outcome` enum + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, Draft -> Active) added `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimension shapes + malformed-instance negatives — `retention.ttl` non-boolean, out-of-enum `search.modes`, unknown property under `additionalProperties:false` — the `agent-inventory-response` `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` closed-enum fields, and the `openwop-memory` derivation surfacing for read/write + long-term hosts while withholding from `writable:false`). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, Draft -> Active) added `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` shape + the `AgentEvalSuite`/`EvalSummary` schema round-trips + the three `eval.{started,scored,completed}` payloads + the content-free negatives — a task entry with a `taskOutput` body, a `safetyFinding` with an `excerpt` — backing the new `eval-summary-no-content-leak` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch` live-run audit) added `safefetch-live-audit.test.ts` (`behaviorGate('openwop-safefetch-live-audit', …)`, gated on `httpClient.safeFetch` + `toolHooks.prePostEvents`) — asserts the audit-when-both MUST against the **durable run event log** via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch-run` open seam + the test event-log seam, closing the seam-vs-production gap (a production `createSafeFetch()` with no audit hooks passes the inline `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` but FAILS this under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`); this is the RFC 0076 §B → Accepted bar; run seam soft-skips on 404 (host-pending). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0066 — `x-openwop-form` picker UX hints, Draft → Active) added `x-openwop-form-pack-manifest.test.ts` (always-on server-free: an annotated `configSchema` stays a valid 2020-12 schema + the advisory hints don't change what it accepts, each §A annotation matches the shape, an unknown `kind` validates for forward-compat, 3 negatives — missing/non-string `kind`, non-string `dependsOn`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch`) added `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` (seam-gated: SSRF block / DNS-rebinding / `Connection: upgrade` refusal / tool-hooks audit-when-both, via `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch`; advertisement contract stays in `http-client-ssrf.test.ts`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §A — pack `runtime.requires[]` install gate) added two: `runtime-requires-shape.test.ts` (server-free closed-vocabulary validation — the 8 tokens validate, a raw builtin name is rejected, empty-array≡omission, `uniqueItems`) + `runtime-requires-install-gate.test.ts` (seam-gated install-grant / install-refuse → `pack_runtime_requirement_unmet` / non-sandbox SHOULD-projection, soft-skip on 404 via `POST /v1/host/sample/packs/install-gate`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0047 — `host.oauth` authorization-code roundtrip) added `oauth-authorization-code-roundtrip.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.oauth.supported` + `grants` including `authorization_code`; drives the `POST /v1/host/sample/oauth/authorize-code-roundtrip` seam against the one canonical synthetic provider in `fixtures/oauth-providers/synthetic.json` (soft-skip on 404, Tier-2 host-pending), asserting a successful grant returns a credential REFERENCE (token persisted as a `host.credentials` entry) and that the authorization code / state / PKCE verifier / acquired access+refresh tokens never appear on any run-visible surface (RFC 0047 §C + §C.2 / `credential-payload-redaction`). Closes the RFC 0047 Tier-2 gap (capability-shape + redaction scenarios existed; the actual authorization-code dance was unexercised). 2026-05-26 (RFC 0070 — agent-manifest runtime) added `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts`; 2026-05-26 (RFC 0071 — artifact-type + chat card packs) added six: `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` + `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` (server-free) + `artifact-type-pack-install.test.ts` + `artifact-type-store-without-render.test.ts` + `chat-card-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` (server-free) + `chat-card-pack-execution.test.ts` (capability-gated, host-pending). 2026-05-26 (RFCs 0067 / 0068 / 0069 — spec-gap Draft cohort) added five scenarios: `byok-auth-modes.test.ts` (RFC 0067; always-on schema-shape of `aiProviders.authModes` + a discovery-gated §B auth-mode-contract cross-field check), `memory-consolidation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0068; always-on shape of `agents.memoryConsolidation`/`agents.commitments` + the `agent.memory.consolidated`/`commitment.fired` payload $defs), `memory-consolidation-idempotent.test.ts` + `commitment-fired.test.ts` (RFC 0068; capability-gated behavioral, soft-skip on the documented `/v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `/commitment/fire` seams), and `exec-not-protocol-tier.test.ts` (RFC 0069; always-on server-free structural assertion that the protocol corpus defines no `core.*`/`openwop.*` exec-class primitive — backs the `exec-must-not-be-protocol-tier` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0061 — stateful agent-loop lifecycle, executionModel.version 5) added four `agent-loop-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-version5-shape` (always-on; validates `executionModel.statefulResume`/`transcriptWindow` + the 1–5 version ceiling) plus `-iteration-monotonic` (gated on `version >= 5`; `runOrchestrator.decided.iteration` increments 1,2,3… exactly once per turn), `-workspace-snapshot` (gated additionally on `host.workspace.supported`; a turn-i workspace write is invisible to turn i, visible to turn i+1), and `-stateful-resume` (gated on `statefulResume`; a mid-loop suspend resumes at the same iteration without resetting the counter) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented agent-loop seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agentloop/run`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0059 — host.workspace M2, reference-host enforcement) added two `workspace-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-behavior` (capability-gated CRUD round-trip / `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` / `workspace_too_large` / §D run-start snapshot, all via the real `/v1/host/workspace/files` §C endpoints) and `-cross-tenant-isolation` (WCT-1 — drives the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op` seam to assert a file owned by one `{tenant, workspace}` is unreadable, on both `get` and `list`, under a different owner; backs the new `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` SECURITY invariant). The in-memory reference host now advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` and honors §C/§D/§E end-to-end. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0062 — memory.distillation "dreams") added five `distillation-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.memory.distillation` block + the additive `distillation` sub-object on `memory.compacted`) plus `-token-budget` (within budget `tokensUsed ≤ tokenBudget`; an un-meetable budget → `token_budget_exceeded` with no partial archive), `-stable-archive` (same sources + budget ⇒ byte-stable archive checksum), `-index-roundtrip` (gated additionally on `indexEmitted`; the `MEMORY-INDEX.json` workspace file is retrievable + `workspace.updated` fired), and `-secret-carryforward` (SR-1: a redacted source secret never appears in the archive) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented memory-distillation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/distill`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0063 — core.subWorkflow.outputAttestation) added four `subrun-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-attestation-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.agents.subRunAttestation` flag) plus `-checksum-stable` (the child output checksum is the byte-stable, key-order-invariant RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 digest), `-approval-gate` (`requireApproval` → `accept` merges, `reject` does not), and `-approval-fail-closed` (no `accept`/`edit-accept` → no merge; backs the deferred `subrun-merge-approval-fail-closed` invariant) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented sub-run attestation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/subrun/attest`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0064 — host.toolHooks) added five `tool-hooks-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.toolHooks` block + the optional content-free fields on `agentToolCalled` / `agentToolReturned`) plus `-content-free` (gated on `prePostEvents`), `-authorization-fail-closed` (gated on `perToolAuthorization`), `-rate-limit` (gated on `perToolRateLimit`), and `-secret-redaction` (gated on `prePostEvents` + the SR-1 `argsHash` redaction rule) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented tool-hooks invoke seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/toolhooks/invoke`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0060 — host.heartbeat) added four `heartbeat-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-capability-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.heartbeat` block) plus `-fires-once-per-tick`, `-idempotent-no-spam`, and `-runtime-bound` (gated on `capabilities.heartbeat.supported` + the host heartbeat tick seam; soft-skip until a host wires it). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0057 — memory write-attribution) added five `memory-attribution-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on advertisement check on `capabilities.memory.attribution`), plus `-no-content`, `-tenant-scoped`, `-emits-on-write`, and `-replay-stable` (gated on `capabilities.memory.attribution.emitsWriteEvents`) verifying the content-free `memory.written` RunEvent, its two SECURITY invariants (`memory-attribution-no-content` + `memory-attribution-tenant-scoped`), and the §D replay rule that a `replay`-mode fork MUST NOT regenerate `memoryId`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0078 portable tool catalog + RFC 0079 credential provenance / egress policy — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four: `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (capability-gated on `toolCatalog.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-tool-catalog', …)` — the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/tools` list with each `ToolDescriptor` schema-valid + `source`/`safetyTier` in the closed vocab + content-free, `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}` round-trip + unknown-id 404, 401-unauthenticated, and the §F-2 cross-principal non-disclosure; black-box, no POST seam), `tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts` (gated on `toolCatalog.sessionLifecycle` — the §D `tool.session.opened`-before / `tool.session.closed`-after bracket over the RFC 0064 call events via the `POST /v1/host/sample/tools/session-run` seam, one shared `sessionId`, content-free), `egress-audience-binding.test.ts` (KEYSTONE — gated on `httpClient.egressPolicy.supported`; the §C confused-deputy MUST via `POST /v1/host/sample/egress/decide`: an out-of-audience egress is denied/downgraded with the credential NOT attached, a provenance-unevaluable egress fails closed — the behavioral leg of `egress-credential-audience-bound`), and `egress-decision-content-free.test.ts` (the SR-1 canary — the credential value never surfaces in `egress.decided` and `reason` stays in the CLOSED vocabulary). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
 
 High-level coverage includes:
 
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ Server-required (added in 1.7.0):
 |---|---|---|
 | **Redaction** | [`capabilities.md`](../spec/v1/capabilities.md) §"Secrets" + NFR-7 + §"aiProviders" | Vendor-neutral assertions that the server doesn't leak secret material. Three scenario groups: (a) discovery shape contract — `secrets` + `aiProviders` advertisements are well-formed regardless of `secrets.supported`; when `supported === true`, scopes MUST be non-empty + `resolution === 'host-managed'`; `byok ⊆ supported`. (b) bearer-token redaction — invalid Bearer canary in `Authorization` header is not echoed in the 401 response body. (c) credentialRef echo control — gated on `secrets.supported === true`; canary planted in `configurable.ai.credentialRef` MUST NOT appear in any RunEvent payload (poll-based capture; transport-agnostic). Uses runtime-built canary fixtures (`lib/canaries.ts`) that defeat static secret scanners. 6 scenarios. |
 
-Current source tree: 310 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
+Current source tree: 321 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
 
 ## Remaining Gaps
 

package/api/openapi.yaml

@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ tags:
     description: Run lifecycle — create, read, stream, cancel, fork.
   - name: agents
     description: Manifest-agent inventory (RFC 0072 §A). Read-only; gated on capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime. Dispatch rides the run surface (WorkflowNode.agent + POST /v1/runs).
+  - name: tools
+    description: Portable tool catalog (RFC 0078 §B). Read-only ToolDescriptor projection across tool sources (node-pack / workflow / mcp / connector / host-extension); gated on capabilities.toolCatalog; authorization-scoped per §F-2.
   - name: hitl
     description: Human-in-the-loop interrupts and approvals.
   - name: artifacts
@@ -1018,6 +1020,64 @@ paths:
             application/json:
               schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
 
+  /v1/tools:
+    get:
+      tags: [tools]
+      summary: |
+        RFC 0078 §B — list the portable `ToolDescriptor`s visible to the caller
+        across every tool source (node-pack / workflow / mcp / connector /
+        host-extension). Capability-gated on
+        `capabilities.toolCatalog.supported: true`; hosts that don't advertise
+        it return 404. §F-2 — the projection is authorization-scoped: a
+        principal sees only the tools it may invoke, and a second principal MUST
+        NOT see another principal's tools (non-disclosure). Read-only; each
+        descriptor is content-free of any credential material (SR-1).
+      operationId: listTools
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: The caller's authorized tool catalog.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema:
+                type: array
+                items: { $ref: '../schemas/tool-descriptor.schema.json' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden' }
+        '404':
+          description: Host does not advertise `capabilities.toolCatalog`.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
+  /v1/tools/{toolId}:
+    get:
+      tags: [tools]
+      summary: |
+        RFC 0078 §B — return one `ToolDescriptor` by its stable `toolId`, or 404
+        when no such tool exists, the caller isn't authorized for it (§F-2
+        non-disclosure — a cross-principal tool 404s identically to "not
+        found"), or the host doesn't advertise `capabilities.toolCatalog`.
+      operationId: getTool
+      parameters:
+        - in: path
+          name: toolId
+          required: true
+          schema: { type: string }
+          description: The stable tool id (`ToolDescriptor.toolId`).
+      responses:
+        '200':
+          description: The tool descriptor.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '../schemas/tool-descriptor.schema.json' }
+        '401': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Unauthenticated' }
+        '403': { $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden' }
+        '404':
+          description: No such tool, unauthorized, or capability unadvertised.
+          content:
+            application/json:
+              schema: { $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' }
+
   /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary:
     get:
       tags: [runs]

package/coverage.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # OpenWOP Conformance Coverage Map
 
-> **Status: Living document. Updated 2026-05-30.** This map connects the current scenario files to the protocol surfaces they protect and records the remaining gaps from the protocol deep dive. Scenario names are source-of-truth file names under `conformance/src/scenarios/`.
+> **Status: Living document. Updated 2026-06-01.** This map connects the current scenario files to the protocol surfaces they protect and records the remaining gaps from the protocol deep dive. Scenario names are source-of-truth file names under `conformance/src/scenarios/`.
 
 > **Shape grade vs behavior grade.** Some optional-profile scenarios validate **capability shape** (the host's discovery advertisement is well-formed) without yet exercising **behavior** (the host actually implements the profile end-to-end). The "Current grade" column reflects shape; see §"Capability-gated scenarios: shape vs behavior" below for the dual-grade view and the `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true` strict-mode runner flag.
 
@@ -45,19 +45,21 @@
 | Multi-agent confidence-floor escalation (RFC 0039 — `spec/v1/multi-agent-execution.md` §"Confidence escalation", `version: 2`) | `multi-agent-confidence-escalation.test.ts` | B (1 advertisement-shape probe on `confidenceEscalationFloor` + 1 behavioral assertion against the low-confidence fixture) | RFC 0039 filed Draft → promoted Active 2026-05-22 after the confidence-floor half landed end-to-end. Advertisement-shape probe asserts `capabilities.multiAgent.executionModel.confidenceEscalationFloor` (when present) is a number in `[0.5, 1.0]`; values below the spec floor are non-conformant. Behavioral assertion drives the `conformance-multi-agent-confidence-escalation` fixture (supervisor `mockDispatchPlan` carries one decision with `confidence: 0.3`) and asserts: parent reaches `waiting-clarification` (NOT `completed` because no dispatch fired); exactly ONE `core.workflowChain.confidence-escalated` event with `payload.confidence === 0.3`, `payload.floor ∈ [0.5, 1.0]`, `payload.escalationKind ∈ {clarify, escalate}`; causationId chains back to the `runOrchestrator.decided` event; ZERO `core.workflowChain.event` records (the load-bearing distinction from `version: 1` — confidence floor MUST fire BEFORE any dispatch.began). Reference workflow-engine advertises `version: 2` + `confidenceEscalationFloor: 0.5` when both `OPENWOP_MULTI_AGENT_EXECUTION_MODEL=true` AND `OPENWOP_MULTI_AGENT_EXECUTION_MODEL_PHASE_2=true` are set; floor tunable via `OPENWOP_MULTI_AGENT_CONFIDENCE_FLOOR`. Path to `Accepted`: non-steward host advertises `version: 2` + the behavioral assertion passes against it. Memory-lifecycle half of RFC 0039 (MAE-2/3) remains explicit follow-up: `crossChildMemoryConcurrency` capability field is schema-landed but the host's MemoryAdapter doesn't yet implement either contract. |
 | Sandbox execution contract (RFC 0035 — `spec/v1/host-capabilities.md` §"Sandbox execution contract") | `sandbox-no-host-fs-escape.test.ts`, `sandbox-no-host-env-leak.test.ts`, `sandbox-no-network-escape.test.ts`, `sandbox-no-host-process-escape.test.ts`, `sandbox-memory-cap.test.ts`, `sandbox-timeout-cap.test.ts`, `sandbox-capability-gate-respected.test.ts`, `sandbox-no-cross-pack-mutation.test.ts` | C+ (advertisement-shape probes always-on; 8 capability-gated behavioral stubs scaffolded; soft-skip on hosts that don't advertise `capabilities.sandbox.supported`) | RFC 0035 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-21. 8 scenarios, one per `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariant in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Behavioral assertions remain stubbed with `expect(true).toBe(true)` + docstring expected-wire-shape pending the synthetic `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-sandbox` pack + a first sandbox-executing reference host. Path to `Accepted`: first sandbox-executing host advertises + implements the 8 failure-mode invariants + the 8 scenarios pass; at that point the 8 `node-pack-sandbox-*` SECURITY rows graduate from `reference-impl` → `protocol` tier per RFC 0035 §"Acceptance criteria." |
 | Multi-region idempotency + cross-engine append-ordering (RFC 0036 — `spec/v1/idempotency.md` §"`multiRegion` sub-block", `spec/v1/replay.md` §"Cross-region replay") | `multi-region-idempotency.test.ts`, `cross-engine-append-ordering.test.ts`, **`multi-region-idempotency-behavior.test.ts` (2026-05-22)**, **`cross-engine-append-behavior.test.ts` (2026-05-22)** | A (2 categorical-shape probes always-on + 1 granular `multiRegion` shape probe + 1 `crossEngineOrdering` shape probe + 6 multi-region behavioral assertions + 4 cross-engine Lamport-ordering behavioral assertions; all 10 behavioral assertions PASS against the reference workflow-engine when `OPENWOP_TEST_MULTI_REGION_SIMULATOR=true` + `OPENWOP_TEST_CROSS_ENGINE_HARNESS=true` are set) | RFC 0036 §B + §C behavioral close-out landed 2026-05-22 via the new workflow-engine test seams (`POST /v1/host/sample/test/multi-region/simulate-partition` + `POST/GET /v1/host/sample/test/cross-engine/{append,read,reset}`) — see `spec/v1/host-sample-test-seams.md` §6 + §7. The new `multi-region-idempotency-behavior.test.ts` exercises the canonical lex-min convergence rule + order-invariance + 400-on-mismatch; the new `cross-engine-append-behavior.test.ts` exercises Lamport-clock monotonicity + per-engine order preservation + read-determinism. Path to `Accepted`: non-steward host advertises matching capabilities + the behavioral assertions pass against it. |
-| Secret-leakage telemetry / debug-bundle export (RFC 0034 §B — `spec/v1/host-capabilities.md` §"OTel collector test seam") | **`secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` (2026-05-22)** | A− (3 capability-gated probes — OTel span scrape + debug-bundle scrape + advertisement-shape; soft-skips honestly until host advertises `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape, debugBundleExport}` AND `capabilities.secrets.supported` AND `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env is set) | Broadens the existing protocol-tier `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel` SECURITY invariants from envelope-acceptor-narrow (already covered by `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts`) to executor-side-broad. Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the BYOK canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. |
+| Secret-leakage telemetry / debug-bundle export (RFC 0034 §B — `spec/v1/host-capabilities.md` §"OTel collector test seam") | **`secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` (2026-05-22)**, **`otel-collector-canary-inspection.test.ts` (2026-06-01)** | A (host scrape-seam probes + collector-side over-the-wire inspection: `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` scrapes the host seams AND — new — runs `OtelCollector.findCanaryLeakage()` against the live real OTLP export when the collector is active; `otel-collector-canary-inspection.test.ts` is the always-on, server-free proof that the inspector is non-vacuous) | Broadens the existing protocol-tier `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel` SECURITY invariants from envelope-acceptor-narrow (`envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts`) to executor-side-broad. **Collector-seam gap CLOSED 2026-06-01:** `OtelCollector.findCanaryLeakage()` scans every captured span name/attribute/resource-attribute + metric data-point attribute for the BYOK canary, so the conformance collector now inspects what the host's OTLP exporter ACTUALLY shipped over the wire — a host can no longer redact in its scrape seam while leaking on the real export. The always-on scenario stands up a real collector, POSTs synthetic OTLP/HTTP-JSON through the actual ingest path, and proves the inspector catches a planted canary in each surface + reports zero on a redacted payload + never matches an empty canary. Residual is adoption-only (the live assertion soft-skips until a host exports OTLP to the collector). |
 | Experimental capability tier (RFC 0042 — `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` §`multiAgent.executionModel.tier`) | **`experimental-tier-shape.test.ts` (2026-05-22)** | A (6 server-free + helper-routing assertions across §A schema discipline + §D experimentalGate routing; always-on for hosts that advertise tier='experimental' on any capability sub-block; helper-level behavioral probes for the `experimentalGate()` routing under both default + OPENWOP_REQUIRE_EXPERIMENTAL modes) | RFC 0042 (Draft) lands the audit's "Active RFC → carve-out" pattern. Schema diff lands on `multiAgent.executionModel` with optional `tier ∈ {stable, experimental}` + `experimentalUntil` (ISO-8601 sunset) + `if/then` conditional enforcing §B sunset MUST mechanically. New `experimentalGate()` helper in `conformance/src/lib/behavior-gate.ts` routes scenarios under default mode + `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_EXPERIMENTAL=true` strict-mode. |
+| Sandbox WASM-isolation behavioral graduation (RFC 0035 §B) | **`sandbox-wasm-isolation.test.ts` (2026-05-31)** | A (10 always-on server-free assertions against the committed `fixtures/wasm-sandbox/*.wasm` via the suite-local `wasm-sandbox-probe.ts`: `misbehaving-{fs,env,network,process}` → `sandbox_escape_attempt`+`escapeKind` by static `WebAssembly.Module.imports()` gate, `misbehaving-memory` OOB store → `sandbox_memory_exceeded`, un-granted `openwop.*` → `sandbox_capability_denied`, mutable-global double-instantiate → isolated context; all 10 PASS) | **Graduates 6 `node-pack-sandbox-*` SECURITY rows reference-impl → protocol 2026-05-31** (fs-gated / no-env / network-gated / no-process / memory-cap / isolated-context). These hold by construction in any WASM sandbox — a forbidden op can only be a declared import refused before instantiation; the memory bound is engine-enforced. The reference host is `examples/hosts/wasm-sandbox/` (#412). **`node-pack-sandbox-timeout` ALSO graduated `reference-impl → protocol` 2026-06-01** via the worker-driven `sandbox-wasm-timeout.test.ts` (`probeTimeout` spawns a worker + a main-thread kill-timer — the thread preemption a server-free probe can't do; 2/2 non-vacuous incl. a well-behaved positive control) — so **7 of 8** `node-pack-sandbox-*` invariants are now protocol-tier. `node-pack-sandbox-no-eval` is JS-specific + a permanent exemption. RFC 0035 `Active → Accepted` separately needs a **non-steward** sandbox-executing host. |
 | Sandbox MVP behavioral close-out (RFC 0035 §B) | **`sandbox-mvp-behavior.test.ts` (2026-05-22)** | A (10 capability-gated behavioral assertions covering 7 of 8 §B failure-mode invariants — 5 escape kinds + timeout + memory-exceeded + cross-pack-mutation isolation + capability-gate-violation + 2 well-behaved baselines; all 10 PASS against the workflow-engine's node:vm-based sandbox MVP) | Companion to the existing 8 advertisement-shape sandbox scenarios (`sandbox-no-host-fs-escape.test.ts` et al.). Exercises the canonical 4-code error catalog at `spec/v1/host-capabilities.md` §"Error codes" (`sandbox_escape_attempt` + `sandbox_capability_denied` + `sandbox_memory_exceeded` + `sandbox_timeout`) with spec-mandated `details.{escapeKind, requestedCapability, requestedBytes}` populated. Wire-shape per `spec/v1/host-sample-test-seams.md §8`. Production adopters use wasmtime/nsjail behind the same HTTP test-seam contract. |
-| RFC 0041 §B replay-divergence-at-refusal behavioral (`version: 4`) | `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape + behavioral; 3 assertions PASS against workflow-engine when the `multiAgent.executionModel.version: 4` advertisement is enabled) | A (was `it.todo` until 2026-05-23 when the executor wiring landed — see commit `1fce55a` + `bba3b4a`. Behavioral assertions cover both divergence directions: original=valid + replay=refusal AND original=refusal + replay=valid) | Closes Track #4 of the 2026-05-22 multi-agent behavioral-harness close-out. Reference workflow-engine emits `replay.divergedAtRefusal` event + fails run with `error.code: 'replay_diverged_at_refusal'` when source vs replay envelope kinds differ at the same nodeId. Gated on `OPENWOP_MULTI_AGENT_EXECUTION_MODEL_PHASE_4=true` AND `run.forkMode === 'replay'`. Path-to-Accepted for RFC 0041: non-steward host advertises `multiAgent.executionModel.version: 4` end-to-end. |
+| RFC 0041 §B replay-divergence-at-refusal behavioral (`version: 4`) | `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape + behavioral; 3 assertions PASS against workflow-engine when the `multiAgent.executionModel.version: 4` advertisement is enabled) | A (was `it.todo` until 2026-05-23 when the executor wiring landed — see commit `1fce55a` + `bba3b4a`. Behavioral assertions cover both divergence directions: original=valid + replay=refusal AND original=refusal + replay=valid) | Closes Track #4 of the 2026-05-22 multi-agent behavioral-harness close-out. Reference workflow-engine emits `replay.divergedAtRefusal` event + fails run with `error.code: 'replay_diverged_at_refusal'` when source vs replay envelope kinds differ at the same nodeId. Gated on `OPENWOP_MULTI_AGENT_EXECUTION_MODEL_PHASE_4=true` AND `run.forkMode === 'replay'`. Path-to-Accepted for RFC 0041: non-steward host advertises `multiAgent.executionModel.version: 4` end-to-end. **RFC 0041 §C sibling:** `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` is likewise now ACTIVE capability-gated behavioral (2026-06-01 — was an `it.skip` placeholder; the `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture having shipped, it drives a `mode:replay` fork of the nondet fixture and asserts observable event-log prefix byte-equivalence + nondeterministic-node observable-result caching, gated on `replayDeterminism.supported` + `version >= 4`; soft-skips against hosts that haven't wired the pure-replay observable-cache path). |
 | Agent-manifest runtime floor (RFC 0070 — `capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime`) | `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts` | B (capability-gated; lists ≥1 installed manifest agent + dispatches one with attributed `agent.reasoned`+`agent.decided` events, plus a §F sub-threshold-escalation assertion) | RFC 0070 filed Draft 2026-05-26. Gated on `capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + the host dispatch seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agents/{agentId}/dispatch`); soft-skips when either is absent. The reference **workflow-engine** host advertises `manifestRuntime: { supported: true, handoffValidation: true }`, loads pack `agents[]` (RFC 0003 `installAgents`) into an AgentRegistry at boot, and dispatches end-to-end (toolAllowlist-filtered per RFC 0002 §A14, handoff-validated per RFC 0003 §D, confidence-escalating per §F) — see `apps/workflow-engine/backend/typescript/test/agent-dispatch-route.test.ts` (6 HTTP assertions, incl. the normative inventory). **RFC 0072 (`Draft`):** the scenario's inventory leg now drives the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents` (§A) so it runs black-box against any conformant host; the dispatch leg stays on the sample seam (soft-skips off-steward) pending the executor-integration tier. RFC 0072 §C `peerDependenciesMeta` disposition + `degraded[]` are unit-tested in `agent-loader.test.ts`. Path to `Active → Accepted` (RFC 0070): a non-steward host advertises `manifestRuntime` + serves `GET /v1/agents`. |
 | Live manifest dispatch (RFC 0077 — `capabilities.agents.liveRuntime`) | `agent-live-runtime-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0077 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-29 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve T4 co-design). Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.liveRuntime` (+ `supported`/`structuredOutput`/`confidenceEscalation`/`sources` sub-flags) is declared, the `agentInvocationStarted`/`agentInvocationCompleted` payloads validate conforming content-free records + reject malformed ones (`started` missing `source`; `completed` out-of-enum `outcome`), and both event names appear in the RunEventType enum. `liveRuntime` ⊃ `manifestRuntime`. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0077 §Conformance (reference host): the started→completed bracket ordering, `structuredOutput` enforcement, and `toolAllowlist` enforcement gate on `capabilities.agents.liveRuntime.supported` + a live-invoke seam and soft-skip until a host wires it. Path to `Accepted`: a non-steward host advertises `liveRuntime` + emits the invocation pair (net-new MyndHyve T4 work, queued behind §B). |
 | Agent evaluation (RFC 0081 — `capabilities.agents.evalSuite`) | `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `eval-summary-no-content-leak`) | RFC 0081 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` (+ `supported`/`modes` sub-flags) is declared; the `AgentEvalSuite` + `EvalSummary` schemas compile + round-trip a conforming artifact and reject malformed ones (bad `suiteId` infix; `passScore` out of 0..1; out-of-range `aggregateScore`); the `eval.started`/`eval.scored`/`eval.completed` payloads validate content-free records + reject malformed ones; and all three event names appear in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (an `EvalSummary` task entry carrying a `taskOutput` body; a `safetyFinding` carrying an `excerpt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `eval-summary-no-content-leak`. **Behavioral scenario authored + gated** (2026-05-31; see §"Capability-gated scenarios"): `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (the `eval.started`→per-task `eval.scored`→`eval.completed` ordering, the content-free `eval.scored` legs, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid round-trip) gates on `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` + the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam (`behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)`) and soft-skips until a host wires the eval projection. Path to `Accepted`: a host advertises `evalSuite` + runs a golden/regression suite end-to-end (the `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` endpoint + SDK helper already landed). |
-| Memory capability model (RFC 0080 — `spec/v1/agent-memory.md` §"Memory capability model", `spec/v1/profiles.md` §`openwop-memory`) | `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0080 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimensions are declared (existing `supported`/`compaction`/`distillation`/`attribution` untouched), `memory.search`/`memory.retention` validate conforming instances + reject malformed ones (`retention.ttl` non-boolean; out-of-enum `search.modes`; unknown property under `additionalProperties:false`), `agent-inventory-response` declares `memoryDegraded` + the closed-enum `degradedMemoryDimensions` (the eight §A dimension names), and `deriveProfiles` surfaces `openwop-memory` for a read/write + long-term host while withholding it from a `writable:false` host. **Behavioral scenario deferred** per RFC 0080 §Conformance: `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` (a live `GET /v1/agents` stamping `memoryDegraded` when an agent's `memoryShape` exceeds the host's reconciled model) gates on `agents.manifestRuntime` + `memory` and soft-skips until a reference host computes it. Path to `Accepted`: a host computes the §C degraded projection + the scenario passes against it. |
+| Memory capability model (RFC 0080 — `spec/v1/agent-memory.md` §"Memory capability model", `spec/v1/profiles.md` §`openwop-memory`) | `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0080 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimensions are declared (existing `supported`/`compaction`/`distillation`/`attribution` untouched), `memory.search`/`memory.retention` validate conforming instances + reject malformed ones (`retention.ttl` non-boolean; out-of-enum `search.modes`; unknown property under `additionalProperties:false`), `agent-inventory-response` declares `memoryDegraded` + the closed-enum `degradedMemoryDimensions` (the eight §A dimension names), and `deriveProfiles` surfaces `openwop-memory` for a read/write + long-term host while withholding it from a `writable:false` host. **Behavioral scenario authored** (2026-06-01; see §"Capability-gated scenarios"): `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` (a live `GET /v1/agents` stamping `memoryDegraded` + the closed-enum `degradedMemoryDimensions` when an agent's `memoryShape` exceeds the host's reconciled model) gates on `agents.manifestRuntime` + `memory` via `behaviorGate('openwop-memory-degraded', …)` and soft-skips until a host computes the §C projection. Path to `Accepted`: a host computes the §C degraded projection + the scenario passes against it non-vacuously (MyndHyve `memory`). |
 | Portable tool catalog (RFC 0078 — `spec/v1/tool-catalog.md`) | `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0078 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `ToolDescriptor` + rejects the malformed (`safetyTier`-required, `additionalProperties:false`), enforces the §C-1/§F-4 cross-field MUST (`safetyTier:"exec"` ⇒ `source:"host-extension"`, RFC 0069 — an `exec`+`node-pack` descriptor is rejected), asserts the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and validates the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payloads (incl. the closed `outcome` enum) + their RunEventType-enum membership. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0078 §Conformance: `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (the authorization-scoped `GET /v1/tools` + `404` non-disclosure) + `tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts` (the `tool.session.*` bracket ordering) gate on `capabilities.toolCatalog.supported` + `sessionLifecycle` and soft-skip until a reference host serves the catalog. Path to `Accepted`: a host projects ≥1 tool source at `GET /v1/tools` + the projection scenario passes. |
 | Credential provenance + egress policy (RFC 0079 — `spec/v1/host-capabilities.md` §"Credential provenance + egress policy") | `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `egress-decision-no-secret-leak`) | RFC 0079 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `CredentialProvenance` + rejects `audiences:[]` / missing `credentialId` / unknown property, the descriptor + `egress.decided` declare NO secret-value property (the content-free **`egress-decision-no-secret-leak`** protocol-tier invariant), the `egress.decided` payload validates a content-free record + enforces the `decision` enum + required `decision`/`destination`, and `capabilities.httpClient.egressPolicy` is declared. **The behavioral audience-binding MUST-NOT (`egress-credential-audience-bound`) is reference-impl tier** at Draft→Active — a credential bound to audience A on an egress to B must be `denied`/`downgraded` (never `allowed`-with-credential), fail-closed on unevaluable provenance — and lands in the gated `egress-audience-binding.test.ts` + `egress-decision-content-free.test.ts` (soft-skip until a host wires `egressPolicy` over `safeFetch`). Path to `Accepted`: a reference host enforces §C + the binding scenario passes → `egress-credential-audience-bound` graduates protocol-tier (RFC 0035 precedent). |
 | Durable trigger + channel bridge (RFC 0083 — `spec/v1/trigger-bridge.md`, `spec/v1/profiles.md` §`openwop-trigger-bridge`) | `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0083 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `TriggerSubscription` + rejects missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property, the four-state vocab (`active`/`paused`/`failed`/`dead-lettered`) is stable, the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads validate + enforce the `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership, `capabilities.triggerBridge` + `webhooks.durable` are declared, and `deriveProfiles` surfaces `openwop-trigger-bridge` for bridge+sink+durable-source while withholding it with no dead-letter sink. **Behavioral scenario deferred** per RFC 0083 §Conformance: `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (dedup → retry → dead-letter → trigger→run causation) is profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` and soft-skips until a reference host wires durable delivery. Path to `Accepted`: a host wires the state machine + delivery loop + the scenario passes. |
 | Budget, quota + cost policy (RFC 0084 — `spec/v1/budget-policy.md`) | `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `budget-no-pricing-leak`) | RFC 0084 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `BudgetPolicy` + enforces the §A/§E orthogonality guard (a wall-time field is rejected — that's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) + threshold/onExhaustion negatives, the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads validate + enforce the `dimension`/`scope` enums, the four `cap.breached{budget-tokens,budget-cost,budget-tool-calls,budget-retries}` kinds + the four `budget.*` RunEventType-enum entries are present, the payloads declare no pricing/credential property (the **`budget-no-pricing-leak`** protocol-tier invariant), and `capabilities.budget` + `limits.maxBudget{Tokens,CostUsd}` are declared. **Behavioral scenario deferred** per RFC 0084 §Conformance: `budget-enforcement.test.ts` (accrue → threshold → exhaust → `cap.breached{budget-cost}` → `run.failed{budget_exhausted}`; `budget_model_denied`; advisory no-stop) gates on `budget.supported` + `enforce` and soft-skips until a reference host wires accounting. Path to `Accepted`: a host wires the budget accumulator + the exhaustion stop + the scenario passes. |
 | `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile (RFC 0085 — `spec/v1/agent-platform-profile.md`, operational annex) | `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free derivation probe) | RFC 0085 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Operational annex (NOT a closed `profiles.md` catalog predicate). Always-on derivation probe asserts `isAgentPlatformPartial`/`isAgentPlatformFull`/`agentPlatformStatus` derive `none`/`partial`/`full` correctly: all-floor ⇒ partial, a missing floor flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, a missing governance term (tenant `installScope`) ⇒ partial-not-full (the honest-advertisement rule), and that the eval/deploy/budget platform-plus tier is advisory (a full host without them is still full); plus `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` is declared. **Live aggregate-evidence assertion deferred** per RFC 0085 §C: when a host claims `full`, the meta-scenario must assert every required constituent scenario is in its passing set — naturally gated on a reference host reaching partial/full (Postgres is the candidate). Path to `Accepted`: ≥1 host reports `partial`/`full` backed by the aggregate + renders the badge. |
+| `openwop-core-standard` profile (RFC 0088 — `spec/v1/core-standard-profile.md`, operational annex) | `core-standard-profile.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free derivation probe) | RFC 0088 (`Active` 2026-05-31). Operational annex (NOT a closed `profiles.md` catalog predicate) naming the stable **Core Standard Profile** — the floor of normative MUSTs with black-box production-path conformance. Always-on derivation probe asserts `isCoreStandard` derives the §B floor (`openwop-core` ∧ `openwop-interrupts` ∧ (`openwop-stream-sse` ∨ `openwop-stream-poll`)): core+interrupts+default-transport ⇒ core-standard; a bare `openwop-core` host without `clarification.request` ⇒ NOT core-standard (the floor is stricter than the v1 minimum); a host with no event transport (`supportedTransports:[]`) ⇒ fails; a non-1.x host ⇒ fails; and `openwop-core-standard` is absent from `deriveProfiles` (it composes, it does not redefine). The §C floor scenarios (runs-lifecycle / discovery / auth-401 / event-ordering / failure-path / idempotency / interrupts / webhook-negative / audit-log-verify) are all already black-box production-path. **Live aggregate-evidence assertion deferred** per RFC 0088 §C: a host claiming `openwop-core-standard` must pass every §C floor scenario black-box — already satisfied by MyndHyve + all four reference hosts. Path to `Accepted`: ≥1 host advertises the claim in its `conformance.md`/`INTEROP-MATRIX.md` row backed by the floor scenarios. |
 | Agent deployment lifecycle (RFC 0082 — `capabilities.agents.deployment`) | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `deployment-event-no-content-leak`) | RFC 0082 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.deployment` (+ `supported`/`channels`/`canary`/`rollback`/`states` sub-flags); the `AgentDeployment` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (out-of-enum `state`; `canaryPercent` out of 0..100); the **`AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version`** rule (each alone + neither validate; both rejected by the `not` clause, §A); the four `deployment.*` payloads validate content-free records + reject malformed ones; `agent.invocation.started` carries the additive recorded-fact `resolvedAgentVersion`/`resolvedChannel` (§B channel pin); and all four event names appear in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (a `deployment.promoted` carrying a `manifestBody`; a `deployment.state.changed` carrying a `prompt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `deployment-event-no-content-leak`. The behavioral `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant is `reference-impl` tier until the behavioral scenario lands (then graduates to protocol; RFC 0035 precedent). **Behavioral scenario authored + gated** (2026-05-31; see §"Capability-gated scenarios"): `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (the §E authz → approvalGate → eval-verify → `deployment.promoted` promotion + the record round-trip, the fail-closed denial, the `eval_gate_unmet` denial, and the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` channel pin) gates on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` + the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam (`behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)`) and soft-skips until a host wires it. When it passes against a host, the `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant graduates reference-impl → protocol tier. Path to `Accepted`: a host implements the deployment store + canary router + the `POST /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` promotion contract (the endpoint + SDK helper already landed). |
 | Standing agent roster (RFC 0086 — `capabilities.agents.roster`) | `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `roster-attribution-no-content`) | RFC 0086 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.roster` (+ `supported`/`installScope`/`portfolioTriggerSources` sub-flags); the `AgentRosterEntry` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (a non-`host:` `rosterId`; an `agentRef` carrying BOTH `version` and `channel` — the RFC 0082 §A XOR rule; a missing `rosterId`); the `roster.run.initiated` payload validates a content-free attribution record + requires its ids/persona/triggerSource; the `AgentInventoryEntry` carries the additive optional `roster` portfolio projection (§B); and `roster.run.initiated` appears in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (a `roster.run.initiated` carrying a `body`; one carrying a `prompt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `roster-attribution-no-content`. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0086 §Conformance (reference host): a scheduled portfolio fire emitting `roster.run.initiated` before `agent.invocation.started`; the RFC 0083 work-item causation chain; the replay re-read; the cross-tenant `GET /v1/agents/roster/{id}` 404 — gate on `capabilities.agents.roster.supported` + the roster-store seam and soft-skip until a host wires it (the host-extension at `/v1/host/sample/roster` + board attribution, apps/workflow-engine #368, is the reference demonstration). Path to `Accepted`: a non-steward host advertises `agents.roster` + emits `roster.run.initiated`. |
 | Agent org-chart (RFC 0087 — `capabilities.agents.orgChart`) | `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `org-position-no-authority-escalation`) | RFC 0087 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.orgChart` (+ `supported`/`installScope`/`departmentNesting`/`responsibilityView` sub-flags); the `AgentOrgChart` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (a non-`host:` member `rosterId`; a chart missing `members`). The **§B structural non-authority guarantee**: the schema **rejects** an authority-bearing field on a member (`scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` — every object is `additionalProperties:false`), and a conforming member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}`. These are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `org-position-no-authority-escalation` (an org edge confers no authority — position describes, never authorizes). NO new RunEventType (the org-chart is structure + a read, not an event surface). **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0087 §Conformance (reference host): the live-dispatch refusal of a manager's tool over-reach; an RFC 0049 decision invariant to org position; the cross-tenant `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` 404; the §D responsibility roll-up over live roster portfolios — gate on `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` + the org-store seam and soft-skip until a host wires it (the host-extension at `/v1/host/sample/org-chart`, apps/workflow-engine #371, is the reference demonstration). Path to `Accepted`: a non-steward host advertises `agents.orgChart` + passes the behavioral non-authority scenario. |
@@ -113,6 +115,11 @@ Thirty-one scenario groups validate optional profiles where the host's discovery
 | `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` | `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile (RFC 0083 §C/§D, `trigger-bridge.md`; derived from discovery — bridge + dead-letter sink + durable source) | A (the §C delivery model via `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-trigger-bridge', …)`. Profile-gated; seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. Normative `GET /v1/trigger-subscriptions` read runs black-box. **This is the RFC 0083 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `triggerBridge`. |
 | `agent-eval-run.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` (RFC 0081 §B/§C, `agent-evaluation.md`) | A (the §C `mode:"eval"` projection via `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (`count == eval.completed.taskCount`), every `eval.scored` content-free + `score` ∈ 0..1 backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`; plus the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` returning a schema-valid `EvalSummary` with `passedCount <= taskCount` and no per-task output body) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. The normative eval-summary read runs black-box on any `evalSuite` host. **This is the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.evalSuite`. |
 | `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` (RFC 0082 §B/§E, `agent-deployment.md`) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` | A (the §E promotion contract via `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` + the test event-log seam: a `promote` runs authorize (RFC 0049) → approvalGate (RFC 0051) → eval-verify (RFC 0081) → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the returned record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`; an `unauthorized` principal fails closed — `allowed:false`, NO `deployment.promoted` (the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`); an `eval-gate-unmet` promote is denied `eval_gate_unmet` with NO `deployment.promoted` (§E-3); and a `channel-pin` run records `resolvedAgentVersion` on `agent.invocation.started` (§B)) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. The normative `GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` read runs black-box on any `deployment` host. **This is the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar** (the `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant graduates reference-impl → protocol tier when this passes against a host). First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.deployment`. |
+| `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` | `capabilities.toolCatalog.supported` (RFC 0078 §B/§F, `tool-catalog.md`) | A (the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/tools` list — each `ToolDescriptor` schema-valid + `source`/`safetyTier` ∈ the closed vocab + content-free; `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}` round-trip + unknown-id 404; auth-gated 401-unauthenticated; the §F-2 cross-principal non-disclosure via `OPENWOP_CROSS_PRINCIPAL_TOOL_ID` → 404) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-tool-catalog', …)`. Black-box on the normative path (no POST seam); soft-skips on 404 / when the cross-principal env var is unset. **This is part of the RFC 0078 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `toolCatalog`. |
+| `tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts` | `capabilities.toolCatalog.sessionLifecycle` (RFC 0078 §D, `tool-catalog.md`) | A (the §D bracket via `POST /v1/host/sample/tools/session-run` + the test event-log seam: `tool.session.opened` before the first RFC 0064 call event → `tool.session.closed` after the last, one shared `sessionId`, each carrying a `toolId`, `closed.outcome` ∈ {completed,failed,aborted,expired}, both content-free) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-tool-session-lifecycle', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. **Part of the RFC 0078 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `toolCatalog`. |
+| `egress-audience-binding.test.ts` | `capabilities.httpClient.egressPolicy.supported` (RFC 0079 §C, `host-capabilities.md`) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `egress-credential-audience-bound` | A (KEYSTONE — the §C confused-deputy MUST via `POST /v1/host/sample/egress/decide`: an out-of-audience egress is `denied`/`downgraded` with `reason:"out-of-audience"` and the credential is NOT attached (`credentialAttached !== true`); a provenance-unevaluable egress fails closed `denied`+`reason:"provenance-unevaluable"`; decision/reason ∈ the closed enums) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-egress-audience-binding', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. **This is the RFC 0079 → Accepted bar** (the `egress-credential-audience-bound` invariant graduates reference-impl → protocol tier when this passes against a host). First adopter: MyndHyve `httpClient.egressPolicy`. |
+| `egress-decision-content-free.test.ts` | `capabilities.httpClient.egressPolicy.supported` (RFC 0079 §F / SR-1) | A (the secret non-leak — a `canary` credential's sentinel never surfaces in the decision (`canaryLeaked !== true`), the `egress.decided` payload carries no forbidden content key, and `reason` stays in the CLOSED vocabulary so no blocked destination spills into a free-form field) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-egress-decision-content-free', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. **Part of the RFC 0079 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `httpClient.egressPolicy`. |
+| `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + `capabilities.memory.supported` (RFC 0080 §C, `agent-memory.md`) | A (the §C iff-contract on the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents`: a degraded entry MUST carry `memoryDegraded:true` + a non-empty, unique `degradedMemoryDimensions[]` drawn from the closed §A-name enum [read/write/search/long-term-durability/compaction/attribution/replay-snapshot/retention]; a non-degraded entry MUST NOT carry a non-empty list; the inventory is non-empty; the degraded branch runs non-vacuously when `OPENWOP_DEGRADED_AGENT_ID` names a known-degraded agent) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-memory-degraded', …)`. Black-box on the normative path (no POST seam); soft-skips on 404 / when the host computes no degradation. **This is the RFC 0080 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `memory`. |
 | `approval-gate-events.test.ts` | `approval.granted` / `.rejected` / `.overridden` (RFC 0051 §B, `interrupt-profiles.md` §approvalGate) | Server-free (event-payload schema validity: required fields incl. mandatory `overridden.reason`; additionalProperties:false negatives) | host-pass (server-free) | Always runs; no host needed. |
 | `approval-gate-flow.test.ts` | `core.openwop.governance.approvalGate` (RFC 0051 §A) + `capabilities.authorization` (RFC 0049) | A (capability-gated on `authorization.supported`; unauthorized-principal-denied + override-audited via the `governance/approval-gate` seam) | `host-pending` | Behavioral probe soft-skips on 404. Grant/reject-loopback/quorum scenarios deferred until a governance host wires the seam. |
 | `scheduling-capability-shape.test.ts` | `capabilities.scheduling` (RFC 0052 §A, `host-capabilities.md` §host.scheduling) | A (advertisement shape always — `supported` boolean; `cron`/`delayed`/`calendar` booleans; `maxFutureHorizon` ISO-8601 duration) | `host-pending` | Always runs; asserts the block is absent or well-formed. |
@@ -122,6 +129,7 @@ Thirty-one scenario groups validate optional profiles where the host's discovery
 | `workspace-capability-shape.test.ts` | `capabilities.workspace` (RFC 0059 §A, `agent-workspace.md` §"Capability advertisement") + the four workspace operations `listWorkspaceFiles` / `getWorkspaceFile` / `putWorkspaceFile` / `deleteWorkspaceFile` (`/v1/host/workspace/files[/{path}]`) | A (advertisement shape always — `supported` boolean; `maxFileBytes`/`maxFiles`/`maxVersions` integers ≥ 1 when present) | in-memory ✅ | Always runs; asserts the block is absent or well-formed. The in-memory reference host advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` (RFC 0059 M2). |
 | `workspace-behavior.test.ts` | RFC 0059 §C/§D (`agent-workspace.md` §"§C — Endpoints" / §"§D — Run-time exposure") — `/v1/host/workspace/files[/{path}]` | B (capability-gated on `workspace.supported`: CRUD round-trip + `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` with `details.currentVersion` + `workspace_too_large` over `maxFileBytes` + the run-start workspace snapshot on the run snapshot) | in-memory ✅ | Soft-skips when `workspace.supported` is unadvertised. |
 | `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation.test.ts` | RFC 0059 §E WCT-1 (`agent-workspace.md` §"§E — Invariants") + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` | B (capability-gated + seam-gated: a file owned by `{tenant, workspace}` MUST NOT be readable via `get`/`list` under a different owner — drives `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op`) | in-memory ✅ | Public test for the `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` invariant; soft-skips when the seam is unwired (404). |
+| `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation-blackbox.test.ts` | RFC 0059 §E WCT-1 — **BLACK-BOX production path** (`agent-workspace.md` §"§C — Endpoints" + §"§E — Invariants") + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` | A− (drives the NORMATIVE §C `PUT`/`GET /v1/host/workspace/files` with TWO operator credentials — owner A writes a secret, a second-tenant credential fails closed on read (404/403, no content/existence leak) + can't enumerate it, owner A still reads it; **no `/v1/host/sample/*` seam**) | host-pending (multi-tenant) | The production-path proof that replaces the seam (audit item 3) and graduates RFC 0059 **into** the `openwop-core-standard` floor (RFC 0088 §D Lever-2 → floor). Soft-skips without `OPENWOP_TEST_TENANT_B_API_KEY` (a second-tenant credential the suite can't mint) or `workspace.supported`. First adopter: MyndHyve (Firestore path-scoped multi-tenant). |
 | `deadletter-retry-exhaustion.test.ts` | `capabilities.deadLetter` (RFC 0053 §C) + `run.dead_lettered` event | A (retry-exhaustion → `run.dead_lettered` with `attempts` + dead-lettered run fork-eligible, via optional `POST /v1/host/sample/deadletter/exhaust` seam) | `host-pending` | Capability-gated on `deadLetter.supported`; soft-skips on 404. Retention-purge scenario deferred (needs clock seam). |
 | `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` | `artifact-type-pack-manifest.schema.json` (RFC 0071 Phase 1, `artifact-type-packs.md` §"Manifest format") | Server-free (positive + 5 negatives: mixed-kind / empty `artifactTypes` / bad `artifactTypeId` pattern / unknown `rendering.display` / non-conforming `exportFormats`) | host-pass (server-free) | Always runs; no host needed. |
 | `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` | RFC 0071 §"Bounded schema compilation" + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `artifact-schema-compile-bounded` | Server-free (contract-present in corpus + a reference finite bound rejects `$ref`-depth / keyword-count / size bombs, admits benign schemas) | host-pass (server-free floor) | Public test for the `artifact-schema-compile-bounded` invariant. Behavioral form (host rejects an over-bounds pack at registry `PUT` with `pack_validation_failed`) gated on `host.artifactTypes.supported`. |
@@ -142,6 +150,7 @@ Thirty-one scenario groups validate optional profiles where the host's discovery
 | `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` | `prompts-mutable` profile — gates on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true` (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up, post-promotion) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced` | A (advertisement gate + cross-workspace write refusal — drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a random non-member `workspaceId`, asserts any 4xx/5xx; on 403 specifically, additionally pins canonical `error === "workspace_membership_required"` envelope per `rest-endpoints.md` §"Common error codes"; other refusal codes unconstrained) | capability-gated (no reference-host membership backend yet; soft-skips cleanly until a host wires the workspace-member resolver) | Filed 2026-05-25 in response to a MyndHyve self-disclosed Admin-SDK-bypasses-DB-rules vulnerability on revision `00207-vzq`. T1 canonicalization same-day (2026-05-25) added the 403-envelope check. Operator override via `OPENWOP_TEST_NONMEMBER_WORKSPACE_ID`. |
 | `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` | `prompts-supported` profile — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` per MyndHyve relay Option B: read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` reads are NOT exempt from the symmetric authz invariant) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced` | A (advertisement gate + cross-workspace read refusal — drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>`, interprets response: 4xx PASS with canonical envelope check on 403; 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS as correct null result; 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL as cross-tenant leak; 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP via response-shape detection — host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads) | capability-gated (no reference-host workspace-scoped read backend yet; soft-skips cleanly on the response-shape detection) | T2 sister scenario filed 2026-05-25 alongside T1; same threat model as the write scenario but probes the read path. Read paths are NOT exempt from cross-tenant authz — a `GET ?workspaceId=<not-mine>` that returns another workspace's templates is a data leak with the same blast radius as a cross-tenant write. Uses response-shape detection (rather than a new capability field) to self-skip hosts without workspace-scoped reads. Operator override via `OPENWOP_TEST_NONMEMBER_WORKSPACE_ID`. |
 | `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` | `prompts-agent-bindings` profile — gates on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true` (RFC 0029 §A Layer 2) | A (advertisement shape + Layer 2 agent intrinsic / overrides / library-default precedence over Layers 3-4) | host-pass (workflow-engine reference) | Reference host advertises `agentBindings: true` so Layer 2 sub-layers (agent-intrinsic / agent-overrides / agent-library-default) walk per RFC 0029 §B. |
+| `prompt-resolution-chain-event.test.ts` | RFC 0029 — **BLACK-BOX production path** (`spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain"). Gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported` | A− (creates a run from `conformance-prompt-end-to-end`, reads the durable `agent.promptResolved` event via the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/events/poll`, and asserts the precedence record — non-empty `chain[]` of valid layers, ≤1 `applied:true` winner, `resolved` mirroring the applied `source` (else null), full-traversal shape; **no `/v1/host/sample/*` seam**) | host-pass (workflow-engine reference emits `agent.promptResolved` via `bootstrap/nodes.ts`) | The production-path proof that replaces the synchronous-resolver seam (audit item 3) and graduates RFC 0029 **into** the `openwop-core-standard` floor (RFC 0088 §D Lever-2 → floor). Soft-skips without `prompts.supported` or until a host emits the event (RFC 0029 emission staging). The three seam scenarios remain for hosts that haven't wired event emission. |
 | `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts`, `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (two scenarios) | `prompts-observability-full` profile — gates on `prompts.supported + observability: "full"` (RFC 0027 §E + RFC 0020 §D) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` + `prompt-composed-trust-marker` | A (advertisement shape + `[REDACTED:<credentialRef>]` markers for secret-source bindings + `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation) | host-pass (workflow-engine reference) | Reference host advertises `observability: "full"` (sourced from `host/promptHostConfig.ts`). Composition pipeline in `host/promptCompose.ts` enforces SR-1 carry-forward + untrusted-content marker per `SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md` §SR-1. |
 
 Strict-mode runner usage:
@@ -180,6 +189,8 @@ Every OpenAPI operation should have:
 | `getAgentRosterEntry` | `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B — the `agent-roster-entry` shape); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.roster.supported` | Entry shape covered always-on; the live 200/404 + cross-tenant-404 is deferred to `Active → Accepted`. | Add the live path once a host serves the normative endpoint. |
 | `getAgentOrgChart` | `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0087 §C — the `agent-org-chart` shape + the `org-position-no-authority-escalation` structural test); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` | Chart shape + the no-authority structural guarantee covered always-on; the live `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` 200/404 + tenant-scoping is deferred to `Active → Accepted`. | Add the live path once a host serves the normative endpoint. |
 | `getAgentOrgChartDepartment` | `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0087 §D — the `org-chart-responsibility-view` response shape); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` | Roll-up response shape covered always-on; the live subtree + responsibility roll-up (incl. `?recursive=false`) is deferred to `Active → Accepted`. | Add the live path once a host computes the roll-up over real roster portfolios. |
+| `listTools` | `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0078 §C — the `ToolDescriptor` wire shape + `source`/`safetyTier` vocab + the `exec ⇒ host-extension` cross-field MUST) + the authored behavioral `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (the live `GET /v1/tools` list — each descriptor schema-valid, content-free, auth-gated); capability-gated on `capabilities.toolCatalog.supported` | Descriptor shape covered always-on; the live list is `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts`, `host-pending` until a host advertises `toolCatalog` + serves the normative `/v1/tools` path. SDK `tools.*` methods deferred (the gated scenario drives the raw conformance driver, not the SDK). | First adopter: MyndHyve `toolCatalog`. |
+| `getTool` | `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0078 §C — the single-`ToolDescriptor` shape) + the authored behavioral `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (the live `GET /v1/tools/{toolId}` round-trip + unknown-id 404 + §F-2 cross-principal non-disclosure); capability-gated on `capabilities.toolCatalog.supported` | Single-descriptor shape covered always-on; the live by-id read is `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts`, `host-pending` until a host serves the normative endpoint. | First adopter: MyndHyve `toolCatalog`. |
 | `streamRunEvents` | `stream-modes.test.ts`, `stream-modes-buffer.test.ts`, `stream-modes-mixed.test.ts`, `streamReconnect.test.ts` | Unsupported mode and invalid buffer assertions | Add long-running proxy timeout soak outside fast CI. |
 | `pollRunEvents` | `multi-node-ordering.test.ts`, `version-negotiation.test.ts`, redaction tests | Past-end and validation assertions | Good. Add malformed `lastSequence` if missing. |
 | `cancelRun` | `cancellation.test.ts` | Unknown/terminal idempotency cases partial | Add explicit already-terminal cancel behavior. |

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/isolation-global.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+(module
+  (global $g (mut i32) (i32.const 0))
+  (func (export "bump") (result i32)
+    (global.set $g (i32.add (global.get $g) (i32.const 1)))
+    (global.get $g))
+  (func (export "read") (result i32) (global.get $g)))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-capability-gate.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+(module
+  (import "openwop" "privileged" (func $p (param i32) (result i32)))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (call $p (local.get 0))))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-env.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+(module
+  (import "wasi_snapshot_preview1" "environ_get" (func $e (param i32 i32) (result i32)))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (call $e (i32.const 0) (i32.const 0))))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-fs.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+(module
+  (import "wasi_snapshot_preview1" "fd_read" (func $fd_read (param i32 i32 i32 i32) (result i32)))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (call $fd_read (i32.const 0) (i32.const 0) (i32.const 0) (i32.const 0))))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-memory.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+(module
+  (import "env" "memory" (memory 1))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (i32.store (i32.const 0x7ffffff0) (i32.const 1))
+    (i32.const 0)))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-network.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+(module
+  (import "wasi_snapshot_preview1" "sock_connect" (func $s (param i32 i32) (result i32)))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (call $s (i32.const 0) (i32.const 0))))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-process.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+(module
+  (import "wasi_snapshot_preview1" "proc_raise" (func $p (param i32) (result i32)))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (call $p (i32.const 0))))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/misbehaving-timeout.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+(module
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32)
+    (loop $l (br $l))
+    (i32.const 0)))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/well-behaved-echo.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+(module
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32) local.get 0))

package/fixtures/wasm-sandbox/well-behaved-host-fetch.wat

@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+(module
+  (import "openwop" "fetch" (func $fetch (param i32) (result i32)))
+  (func (export "invoke") (param i32) (result i32) (call $fetch (local.get 0))))

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "1.13.0",
+  "version": "1.15.0",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",