@openwop/openwop-conformance 1.12.0 → 1.13.0

package/CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,18 @@
 
 _No unreleased changes._
 
+## [1.13.0] — 2026-05-31 — RFC 0081 eval-suite + RFC 0082 deployment behavioral gates
+
+Standalone conformance minor — a scenario addition published via the `openwop-conformance/v1.13.0` per-package tag (PUBLISHING.md §"CI automation"; only the `publish-conformance` job runs), NOT a coordinated spec-corpus release. `EXPECTED_CONFORMANCE_VERSION` advances to `1.13.0` in lockstep. All additive + capability-gated; existing v1.0-only hosts pass unchanged. Ships the two gated behavioral scenarios RFC 0081 + RFC 0082 each name in their §Conformance but deferred at `Draft → Active` — the steward prerequisite to graduating `agents.evalSuite` (RFC 0081) and `agents.deployment` (RFC 0082) from `Active` to `Accepted` on a non-steward host (MyndHyve). The normative surface (the `mode:"eval"` discriminator + `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary`, the `GET`/`POST /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` endpoints + the `channel` binding, the `eval.*`/`deployment.*` events, and the SDK helpers) already shipped — this release is the gated test surface only.
+
+### Added — RFC 0081 behavioral scenario
+
+- **`agent-eval-run.test.ts`** (`behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)`, gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported`) — drives the §B `mode:"eval"` projection via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam and asserts the §C ordering (`eval.started` first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed` once, count == `eval.completed.taskCount`), the content-free `eval.scored` legs (`score` ∈ 0..1, `passed` boolean, no task-output/rubric/completion — backing the protocol-tier `eval-summary-no-content-leak` invariant), and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` returning a schema-valid `EvalSummary` with `passedCount <= taskCount`. The normative eval-summary read runs black-box. **This is the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar.** New lib helper `src/lib/agentEval.ts`; new seam in `host-sample-test-seams.md` §"Open seams". No new schemas (`agent-eval-suite.schema.json` + `eval-summary.schema.json` + the three `eval.*` payload $defs shipped at `Draft → Active`); no new SECURITY invariant.
+
+### Added — RFC 0082 behavioral scenario
+
+- **`agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts`** (`behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)`, gated on `agents.deployment.supported`) — drives the §E promotion contract via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log seam across four legs: `promote` (authorize RFC 0049 `deploy:promote` → RFC 0051 approvalGate → RFC 0081 eval-verify → a content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the returned record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`); `unauthorized` (a principal without `deploy:promote` fails closed — `allowed:false`, NO `deployment.promoted`, the behavioral leg of the `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant, which graduates reference-impl → protocol tier when this passes against a host); `eval-gate-unmet` (a promote whose `evalRunId` has `EvalSummary.passed:false` is denied `eval_gate_unmet` with NO `deployment.promoted`, §E-3); and `channel-pin` (a `@channel`-bound run records `resolvedAgentVersion` on `agent.invocation.started`, the §B recorded fact a replay re-reads). The normative `GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` read runs black-box. **This is the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar.** New lib helper `src/lib/agentDeployment.ts`; new seam in `host-sample-test-seams.md` §"Open seams". No new schemas (`agent-deployment.schema.json` + `agent-deployment-transition.schema.json` + the four `deployment.*` payload $defs shipped at `Draft → Active`); no new SECURITY invariant.
+
 ## [1.12.0] — 2026-05-31 — RFC 0087 org-chart + RFC 0083 trigger-bridge behavioral gates
 
 Standalone conformance minor — a scenario addition published via the `openwop-conformance/v1.12.0` per-package tag (PUBLISHING.md §"CI automation"; only the `publish-conformance` job runs), NOT a coordinated spec-corpus release. `EXPECTED_CONFORMANCE_VERSION` advances to `1.12.0` in lockstep. All additive + capability/profile/seam-gated; existing v1.0-only hosts pass unchanged. Ships the three gated behavioral scenarios RFC 0087 + RFC 0083 each name in their §Conformance but deferred at `Draft → Active` — the steward prerequisite to graduating `agents.orgChart` (RFC 0087) and `triggerBridge` (RFC 0083) from `Active` to `Accepted` on a non-steward host (MyndHyve).

package/README.md

@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ Exit code is non-zero on any failed assertion.
 
 ## What's Covered
 
-The current suite has 308 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-05-31 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger bridge, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` derived from the live discovery doc — the §C delivery model via the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` seam + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free; the always-on shape stays in `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts`; new lib helper `src/lib/triggerBridge.ts`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added two capability-gated behavioral scenarios (both gated on `agents.orgChart.supported`, black-box on the normative `/v1/agents/org-chart` surface — no new POST seam): `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` (the `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — departments form an acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree, members reference `host:<id>` roster entries — + the §D responsibility roll-up via `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) and `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` (the behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field on any member/department/responsibility-view object; the structural leg stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`, and the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier per the `agent-manifest-runtime` no-host-hook precedent). 2026-05-31 (RFCs 0086 + 0077 — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four capability-gated behavioral scenarios so a non-steward host can be mechanically certified non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`: `agent-roster-attribution.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B/§C; gated on `agents.roster.supported` — the normative `GET /v1/agents/roster` read shape + `total==roster.length`, the §C `roster.run.initiated`-before-`agent.invocation.started` ordering, the content-free payload backing `roster-attribution-no-content`, the durable work-item `triggerSubscriptionId`, and the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ROSTER_ID`), `agent-live-invocation-bracket.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §E; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — `agent.invocation.started`-first / `agent.invocation.completed`-last bracket, matching `invocationId`, `source`/`outcome` closed enums, content-free), `agent-live-structured-output.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §B step 6; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.structuredOutput` — a result violating `handoff.returnSchemaRef` fails the invocation `outcome:"failed"` rather than shipping as completed), and `agent-live-allowlist-enforced.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §F-1 / RFC 0002 §A14; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — a tool outside `toolAllowlist` is not callable); all four drive the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/roster/fire` + `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/live-invoke` seams plus the test event-log seam and soft-skip on 404 (these are the RFC 0086 / 0077 Active→Accepted bars). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, Draft -> Active) added `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.orgChart` shape + the `AgentOrgChart` round-trip + the non-`host:` member negative + the **§B structural non-authority guarantee** — the schema rejects a `scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` field on a member (`additionalProperties:false`), and a member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}` — backing the protocol-tier `org-position-no-authority-escalation` invariant; no new RunEventType). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0086 — standing agent roster, Draft -> Active) added `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.roster` shape + the `AgentRosterEntry` round-trip + the `host:` `rosterId` + `agentRef` version-XOR-channel negatives + the content-free `roster.run.initiated` negatives backing the protocol-tier `roster-attribution-no-content` invariant + the additive `roster` inventory projection + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, Draft -> Active) added `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.deployment` shape + the `AgentDeployment` record round-trip + the `AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version` `not`-clause + the four `deployment.*` payloads + the content-free negatives backing the protocol-tier `deployment-event-no-content-leak` invariant). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, Draft -> Active) added `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation of the operational-annex `none`/`partial`/`full` status: all-floor ⇒ partial, missing-flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, missing-tenant-scope ⇒ partial-not-full per the honest-advertisement rule, eval/deploy/budget-are-advisory-not-hard-terms, + the `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, Draft -> Active) added `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trip + the §A orthogonality guard — a wall-time field is rejected (it's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) — + threshold/onExhaustion negatives + the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads + the four `cap.breached{budget-*}` kinds + RunEventType-enum membership + the no-pricing-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `budget-no-pricing-leak` invariant + the `capabilities.budget`/`limits.maxBudget*` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger + channel bridge, Draft -> Active) added `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trip + missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property negatives + the four-state vocab + the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads incl. closed `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership + the `triggerBridge`/`webhooks.durable` capability shape + the `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile derivation incl. the no-dead-letter-sink negative). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0079 — credential provenance + egress policy, Draft -> Active) added `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trip + `audiences:[]`/missing-`credentialId`/unknown-property negatives + the no-secret-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `egress-decision-no-secret-leak` invariant + the content-free `egress.decided` record incl. the `decision` enum + RunEventType-enum membership + the `httpClient.egressPolicy` shape; the behavioral `egress-credential-audience-bound` confused-deputy MUST is reference-impl tier, deferred to a host). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0078 — portable tool catalog, Draft -> Active) added `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trip + the §C-1 `exec` ⇒ `host-extension` cross-field MUST (RFC 0069) + the `safetyTier`-required negative + `additionalProperties:false`, the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payload $defs incl. the closed `outcome` enum + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, Draft -> Active) added `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimension shapes + malformed-instance negatives — `retention.ttl` non-boolean, out-of-enum `search.modes`, unknown property under `additionalProperties:false` — the `agent-inventory-response` `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` closed-enum fields, and the `openwop-memory` derivation surfacing for read/write + long-term hosts while withholding from `writable:false`). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, Draft -> Active) added `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` shape + the `AgentEvalSuite`/`EvalSummary` schema round-trips + the three `eval.{started,scored,completed}` payloads + the content-free negatives — a task entry with a `taskOutput` body, a `safetyFinding` with an `excerpt` — backing the new `eval-summary-no-content-leak` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch` live-run audit) added `safefetch-live-audit.test.ts` (`behaviorGate('openwop-safefetch-live-audit', …)`, gated on `httpClient.safeFetch` + `toolHooks.prePostEvents`) — asserts the audit-when-both MUST against the **durable run event log** via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch-run` open seam + the test event-log seam, closing the seam-vs-production gap (a production `createSafeFetch()` with no audit hooks passes the inline `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` but FAILS this under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`); this is the RFC 0076 §B → Accepted bar; run seam soft-skips on 404 (host-pending). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0066 — `x-openwop-form` picker UX hints, Draft → Active) added `x-openwop-form-pack-manifest.test.ts` (always-on server-free: an annotated `configSchema` stays a valid 2020-12 schema + the advisory hints don't change what it accepts, each §A annotation matches the shape, an unknown `kind` validates for forward-compat, 3 negatives — missing/non-string `kind`, non-string `dependsOn`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch`) added `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` (seam-gated: SSRF block / DNS-rebinding / `Connection: upgrade` refusal / tool-hooks audit-when-both, via `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch`; advertisement contract stays in `http-client-ssrf.test.ts`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §A — pack `runtime.requires[]` install gate) added two: `runtime-requires-shape.test.ts` (server-free closed-vocabulary validation — the 8 tokens validate, a raw builtin name is rejected, empty-array≡omission, `uniqueItems`) + `runtime-requires-install-gate.test.ts` (seam-gated install-grant / install-refuse → `pack_runtime_requirement_unmet` / non-sandbox SHOULD-projection, soft-skip on 404 via `POST /v1/host/sample/packs/install-gate`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0047 — `host.oauth` authorization-code roundtrip) added `oauth-authorization-code-roundtrip.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.oauth.supported` + `grants` including `authorization_code`; drives the `POST /v1/host/sample/oauth/authorize-code-roundtrip` seam against the one canonical synthetic provider in `fixtures/oauth-providers/synthetic.json` (soft-skip on 404, Tier-2 host-pending), asserting a successful grant returns a credential REFERENCE (token persisted as a `host.credentials` entry) and that the authorization code / state / PKCE verifier / acquired access+refresh tokens never appear on any run-visible surface (RFC 0047 §C + §C.2 / `credential-payload-redaction`). Closes the RFC 0047 Tier-2 gap (capability-shape + redaction scenarios existed; the actual authorization-code dance was unexercised). 2026-05-26 (RFC 0070 — agent-manifest runtime) added `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts`; 2026-05-26 (RFC 0071 — artifact-type + chat card packs) added six: `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` + `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` (server-free) + `artifact-type-pack-install.test.ts` + `artifact-type-store-without-render.test.ts` + `chat-card-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` (server-free) + `chat-card-pack-execution.test.ts` (capability-gated, host-pending). 2026-05-26 (RFCs 0067 / 0068 / 0069 — spec-gap Draft cohort) added five scenarios: `byok-auth-modes.test.ts` (RFC 0067; always-on schema-shape of `aiProviders.authModes` + a discovery-gated §B auth-mode-contract cross-field check), `memory-consolidation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0068; always-on shape of `agents.memoryConsolidation`/`agents.commitments` + the `agent.memory.consolidated`/`commitment.fired` payload $defs), `memory-consolidation-idempotent.test.ts` + `commitment-fired.test.ts` (RFC 0068; capability-gated behavioral, soft-skip on the documented `/v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `/commitment/fire` seams), and `exec-not-protocol-tier.test.ts` (RFC 0069; always-on server-free structural assertion that the protocol corpus defines no `core.*`/`openwop.*` exec-class primitive — backs the `exec-must-not-be-protocol-tier` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0061 — stateful agent-loop lifecycle, executionModel.version 5) added four `agent-loop-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-version5-shape` (always-on; validates `executionModel.statefulResume`/`transcriptWindow` + the 1–5 version ceiling) plus `-iteration-monotonic` (gated on `version >= 5`; `runOrchestrator.decided.iteration` increments 1,2,3… exactly once per turn), `-workspace-snapshot` (gated additionally on `host.workspace.supported`; a turn-i workspace write is invisible to turn i, visible to turn i+1), and `-stateful-resume` (gated on `statefulResume`; a mid-loop suspend resumes at the same iteration without resetting the counter) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented agent-loop seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agentloop/run`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0059 — host.workspace M2, reference-host enforcement) added two `workspace-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-behavior` (capability-gated CRUD round-trip / `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` / `workspace_too_large` / §D run-start snapshot, all via the real `/v1/host/workspace/files` §C endpoints) and `-cross-tenant-isolation` (WCT-1 — drives the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op` seam to assert a file owned by one `{tenant, workspace}` is unreadable, on both `get` and `list`, under a different owner; backs the new `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` SECURITY invariant). The in-memory reference host now advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` and honors §C/§D/§E end-to-end. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0062 — memory.distillation "dreams") added five `distillation-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.memory.distillation` block + the additive `distillation` sub-object on `memory.compacted`) plus `-token-budget` (within budget `tokensUsed ≤ tokenBudget`; an un-meetable budget → `token_budget_exceeded` with no partial archive), `-stable-archive` (same sources + budget ⇒ byte-stable archive checksum), `-index-roundtrip` (gated additionally on `indexEmitted`; the `MEMORY-INDEX.json` workspace file is retrievable + `workspace.updated` fired), and `-secret-carryforward` (SR-1: a redacted source secret never appears in the archive) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented memory-distillation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/distill`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0063 — core.subWorkflow.outputAttestation) added four `subrun-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-attestation-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.agents.subRunAttestation` flag) plus `-checksum-stable` (the child output checksum is the byte-stable, key-order-invariant RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 digest), `-approval-gate` (`requireApproval` → `accept` merges, `reject` does not), and `-approval-fail-closed` (no `accept`/`edit-accept` → no merge; backs the deferred `subrun-merge-approval-fail-closed` invariant) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented sub-run attestation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/subrun/attest`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0064 — host.toolHooks) added five `tool-hooks-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.toolHooks` block + the optional content-free fields on `agentToolCalled` / `agentToolReturned`) plus `-content-free` (gated on `prePostEvents`), `-authorization-fail-closed` (gated on `perToolAuthorization`), `-rate-limit` (gated on `perToolRateLimit`), and `-secret-redaction` (gated on `prePostEvents` + the SR-1 `argsHash` redaction rule) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented tool-hooks invoke seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/toolhooks/invoke`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0060 — host.heartbeat) added four `heartbeat-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-capability-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.heartbeat` block) plus `-fires-once-per-tick`, `-idempotent-no-spam`, and `-runtime-bound` (gated on `capabilities.heartbeat.supported` + the host heartbeat tick seam; soft-skip until a host wires it). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0057 — memory write-attribution) added five `memory-attribution-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on advertisement check on `capabilities.memory.attribution`), plus `-no-content`, `-tenant-scoped`, `-emits-on-write`, and `-replay-stable` (gated on `capabilities.memory.attribution.emitsWriteEvents`) verifying the content-free `memory.written` RunEvent, its two SECURITY invariants (`memory-attribution-no-content` + `memory-attribution-tenant-scoped`), and the §D replay rule that a `replay`-mode fork MUST NOT regenerate `memoryId`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
+The current suite has 310 scenario files under `src/scenarios/`. 2026-05-31 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)` — the §E promotion contract via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log seam across four legs: `promote` (authorize RFC 0049 → approvalGate RFC 0051 → eval-verify RFC 0081 → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`), `unauthorized` (fail-closed — `allowed:false`, no `deployment.promoted`, the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`), `eval-gate-unmet` (`eval_gate_unmet` denial, §E-3), and `channel-pin` (the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` recorded-fact on `agent.invocation.started`); new lib helper `src/lib/agentDeployment.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (capability-gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported` via `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)` — the §B `mode:"eval"` projection via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (count == `eval.completed.taskCount`), the content-free `eval.scored` legs (`score` ∈ 0..1) backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid `EvalSummary` round-trip with `passedCount <= taskCount`; new lib helper `src/lib/agentEval.ts`; soft-skips on 404 — the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger bridge, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` derived from the live discovery doc — the §C delivery model via the `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` seam + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free; the always-on shape stays in `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts`; new lib helper `src/lib/triggerBridge.ts`). 2026-05-31 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added two capability-gated behavioral scenarios (both gated on `agents.orgChart.supported`, black-box on the normative `/v1/agents/org-chart` surface — no new POST seam): `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` (the `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — departments form an acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree, members reference `host:<id>` roster entries — + the §D responsibility roll-up via `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) and `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` (the behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field on any member/department/responsibility-view object; the structural leg stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`, and the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier per the `agent-manifest-runtime` no-host-hook precedent). 2026-05-31 (RFCs 0086 + 0077 — the Active→Accepted behavioral gate) added four capability-gated behavioral scenarios so a non-steward host can be mechanically certified non-vacuously under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`: `agent-roster-attribution.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B/§C; gated on `agents.roster.supported` — the normative `GET /v1/agents/roster` read shape + `total==roster.length`, the §C `roster.run.initiated`-before-`agent.invocation.started` ordering, the content-free payload backing `roster-attribution-no-content`, the durable work-item `triggerSubscriptionId`, and the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ROSTER_ID`), `agent-live-invocation-bracket.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §E; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — `agent.invocation.started`-first / `agent.invocation.completed`-last bracket, matching `invocationId`, `source`/`outcome` closed enums, content-free), `agent-live-structured-output.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §B step 6; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.structuredOutput` — a result violating `handoff.returnSchemaRef` fails the invocation `outcome:"failed"` rather than shipping as completed), and `agent-live-allowlist-enforced.test.ts` (RFC 0077 §F-1 / RFC 0002 §A14; gated on `agents.liveRuntime.supported` — a tool outside `toolAllowlist` is not callable); all four drive the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/roster/fire` + `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/live-invoke` seams plus the test event-log seam and soft-skip on 404 (these are the RFC 0086 / 0077 Active→Accepted bars). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0087 — agent org-chart, Draft -> Active) added `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.orgChart` shape + the `AgentOrgChart` round-trip + the non-`host:` member negative + the **§B structural non-authority guarantee** — the schema rejects a `scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` field on a member (`additionalProperties:false`), and a member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}` — backing the protocol-tier `org-position-no-authority-escalation` invariant; no new RunEventType). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0086 — standing agent roster, Draft -> Active) added `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.roster` shape + the `AgentRosterEntry` round-trip + the `host:` `rosterId` + `agentRef` version-XOR-channel negatives + the content-free `roster.run.initiated` negatives backing the protocol-tier `roster-attribution-no-content` invariant + the additive `roster` inventory projection + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0082 — agent deployment lifecycle, Draft -> Active) added `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.deployment` shape + the `AgentDeployment` record round-trip + the `AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version` `not`-clause + the four `deployment.*` payloads + the content-free negatives backing the protocol-tier `deployment-event-no-content-leak` invariant). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0085 — `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile, Draft -> Active) added `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` (always-on server-free derivation of the operational-annex `none`/`partial`/`full` status: all-floor ⇒ partial, missing-flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, missing-tenant-scope ⇒ partial-not-full per the honest-advertisement rule, eval/deploy/budget-are-advisory-not-hard-terms, + the `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0084 — budget, quota + cost policy, Draft -> Active) added `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trip + the §A orthogonality guard — a wall-time field is rejected (it's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) — + threshold/onExhaustion negatives + the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads + the four `cap.breached{budget-*}` kinds + RunEventType-enum membership + the no-pricing-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `budget-no-pricing-leak` invariant + the `capabilities.budget`/`limits.maxBudget*` shape). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0083 — durable trigger + channel bridge, Draft -> Active) added `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trip + missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property negatives + the four-state vocab + the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads incl. closed `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership + the `triggerBridge`/`webhooks.durable` capability shape + the `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile derivation incl. the no-dead-letter-sink negative). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0079 — credential provenance + egress policy, Draft -> Active) added `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trip + `audiences:[]`/missing-`credentialId`/unknown-property negatives + the no-secret-property structural check backing the protocol-tier `egress-decision-no-secret-leak` invariant + the content-free `egress.decided` record incl. the `decision` enum + RunEventType-enum membership + the `httpClient.egressPolicy` shape; the behavioral `egress-credential-audience-bound` confused-deputy MUST is reference-impl tier, deferred to a host). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0078 — portable tool catalog, Draft -> Active) added `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trip + the §C-1 `exec` ⇒ `host-extension` cross-field MUST (RFC 0069) + the `safetyTier`-required negative + `additionalProperties:false`, the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payload $defs incl. the closed `outcome` enum + RunEventType-enum membership). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0080 — agent memory capability reconciliation, Draft -> Active) added `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimension shapes + malformed-instance negatives — `retention.ttl` non-boolean, out-of-enum `search.modes`, unknown property under `additionalProperties:false` — the `agent-inventory-response` `memoryDegraded`/`degradedMemoryDimensions` closed-enum fields, and the `openwop-memory` derivation surfacing for read/write + long-term hosts while withholding from `writable:false`). 2026-05-30 (RFC 0081 — agent evaluation, Draft -> Active) added `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (always-on server-free: the `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` shape + the `AgentEvalSuite`/`EvalSummary` schema round-trips + the three `eval.{started,scored,completed}` payloads + the content-free negatives — a task entry with a `taskOutput` body, a `safetyFinding` with an `excerpt` — backing the new `eval-summary-no-content-leak` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch` live-run audit) added `safefetch-live-audit.test.ts` (`behaviorGate('openwop-safefetch-live-audit', …)`, gated on `httpClient.safeFetch` + `toolHooks.prePostEvents`) — asserts the audit-when-both MUST against the **durable run event log** via the new `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch-run` open seam + the test event-log seam, closing the seam-vs-production gap (a production `createSafeFetch()` with no audit hooks passes the inline `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` but FAILS this under `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`); this is the RFC 0076 §B → Accepted bar; run seam soft-skips on 404 (host-pending). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0066 — `x-openwop-form` picker UX hints, Draft → Active) added `x-openwop-form-pack-manifest.test.ts` (always-on server-free: an annotated `configSchema` stays a valid 2020-12 schema + the advisory hints don't change what it accepts, each §A annotation matches the shape, an unknown `kind` validates for forward-compat, 3 negatives — missing/non-string `kind`, non-string `dependsOn`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §B — `ctx.http.safeFetch`) added `safefetch-behavior.test.ts` (seam-gated: SSRF block / DNS-rebinding / `Connection: upgrade` refusal / tool-hooks audit-when-both, via `POST /v1/host/sample/http/safe-fetch`; advertisement contract stays in `http-client-ssrf.test.ts`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0076 §A — pack `runtime.requires[]` install gate) added two: `runtime-requires-shape.test.ts` (server-free closed-vocabulary validation — the 8 tokens validate, a raw builtin name is rejected, empty-array≡omission, `uniqueItems`) + `runtime-requires-install-gate.test.ts` (seam-gated install-grant / install-refuse → `pack_runtime_requirement_unmet` / non-sandbox SHOULD-projection, soft-skip on 404 via `POST /v1/host/sample/packs/install-gate`). 2026-05-29 (RFC 0047 — `host.oauth` authorization-code roundtrip) added `oauth-authorization-code-roundtrip.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.oauth.supported` + `grants` including `authorization_code`; drives the `POST /v1/host/sample/oauth/authorize-code-roundtrip` seam against the one canonical synthetic provider in `fixtures/oauth-providers/synthetic.json` (soft-skip on 404, Tier-2 host-pending), asserting a successful grant returns a credential REFERENCE (token persisted as a `host.credentials` entry) and that the authorization code / state / PKCE verifier / acquired access+refresh tokens never appear on any run-visible surface (RFC 0047 §C + §C.2 / `credential-payload-redaction`). Closes the RFC 0047 Tier-2 gap (capability-shape + redaction scenarios existed; the actual authorization-code dance was unexercised). 2026-05-26 (RFC 0070 — agent-manifest runtime) added `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts`; 2026-05-26 (RFC 0071 — artifact-type + chat card packs) added six: `artifact-type-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` + `artifact-schema-compile-bounded.test.ts` (server-free) + `artifact-type-pack-install.test.ts` + `artifact-type-store-without-render.test.ts` + `chat-card-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` (server-free) + `chat-card-pack-execution.test.ts` (capability-gated, host-pending). 2026-05-26 (RFCs 0067 / 0068 / 0069 — spec-gap Draft cohort) added five scenarios: `byok-auth-modes.test.ts` (RFC 0067; always-on schema-shape of `aiProviders.authModes` + a discovery-gated §B auth-mode-contract cross-field check), `memory-consolidation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0068; always-on shape of `agents.memoryConsolidation`/`agents.commitments` + the `agent.memory.consolidated`/`commitment.fired` payload $defs), `memory-consolidation-idempotent.test.ts` + `commitment-fired.test.ts` (RFC 0068; capability-gated behavioral, soft-skip on the documented `/v1/host/sample/memory/consolidate` + `/commitment/fire` seams), and `exec-not-protocol-tier.test.ts` (RFC 0069; always-on server-free structural assertion that the protocol corpus defines no `core.*`/`openwop.*` exec-class primitive — backs the `exec-must-not-be-protocol-tier` SECURITY invariant). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0061 — stateful agent-loop lifecycle, executionModel.version 5) added four `agent-loop-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-version5-shape` (always-on; validates `executionModel.statefulResume`/`transcriptWindow` + the 1–5 version ceiling) plus `-iteration-monotonic` (gated on `version >= 5`; `runOrchestrator.decided.iteration` increments 1,2,3… exactly once per turn), `-workspace-snapshot` (gated additionally on `host.workspace.supported`; a turn-i workspace write is invisible to turn i, visible to turn i+1), and `-stateful-resume` (gated on `statefulResume`; a mid-loop suspend resumes at the same iteration without resetting the counter) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented agent-loop seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agentloop/run`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0059 — host.workspace M2, reference-host enforcement) added two `workspace-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-behavior` (capability-gated CRUD round-trip / `If-Match` 409 `workspace_conflict` / `workspace_too_large` / §D run-start snapshot, all via the real `/v1/host/workspace/files` §C endpoints) and `-cross-tenant-isolation` (WCT-1 — drives the documented `POST /v1/host/sample/workspace/op` seam to assert a file owned by one `{tenant, workspace}` is unreadable, on both `get` and `list`, under a different owner; backs the new `workspace-cross-tenant-isolation` SECURITY invariant). The in-memory reference host now advertises `capabilities.workspace.supported` and honors §C/§D/§E end-to-end. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0062 — memory.distillation "dreams") added five `distillation-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.memory.distillation` block + the additive `distillation` sub-object on `memory.compacted`) plus `-token-budget` (within budget `tokensUsed ≤ tokenBudget`; an un-meetable budget → `token_budget_exceeded` with no partial archive), `-stable-archive` (same sources + budget ⇒ byte-stable archive checksum), `-index-roundtrip` (gated additionally on `indexEmitted`; the `MEMORY-INDEX.json` workspace file is retrievable + `workspace.updated` fired), and `-secret-carryforward` (SR-1: a redacted source secret never appears in the archive) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented memory-distillation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/memory/distill`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0063 — core.subWorkflow.outputAttestation) added four `subrun-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-attestation-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.agents.subRunAttestation` flag) plus `-checksum-stable` (the child output checksum is the byte-stable, key-order-invariant RFC 8785 JCS + SHA-256 digest), `-approval-gate` (`requireApproval` → `accept` merges, `reject` does not), and `-approval-fail-closed` (no `accept`/`edit-accept` → no merge; backs the deferred `subrun-merge-approval-fail-closed` invariant) — the three behavioral scenarios drive the documented sub-run attestation seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/subrun/attest`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0064 — host.toolHooks) added five `tool-hooks-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.toolHooks` block + the optional content-free fields on `agentToolCalled` / `agentToolReturned`) plus `-content-free` (gated on `prePostEvents`), `-authorization-fail-closed` (gated on `perToolAuthorization`), `-rate-limit` (gated on `perToolRateLimit`), and `-secret-redaction` (gated on `prePostEvents` + the SR-1 `argsHash` redaction rule) — the four behavioral scenarios drive the documented tool-hooks invoke seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/toolhooks/invoke`) and soft-skip until a host wires it. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0060 — host.heartbeat) added four `heartbeat-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-capability-shape` (always-on; validates the `capabilities.heartbeat` block) plus `-fires-once-per-tick`, `-idempotent-no-spam`, and `-runtime-bound` (gated on `capabilities.heartbeat.supported` + the host heartbeat tick seam; soft-skip until a host wires it). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0057 — memory write-attribution) added five `memory-attribution-*.test.ts` scenarios: `-shape` (always-on advertisement check on `capabilities.memory.attribution`), plus `-no-content`, `-tenant-scoped`, `-emits-on-write`, and `-replay-stable` (gated on `capabilities.memory.attribution.emitsWriteEvents`) verifying the content-free `memory.written` RunEvent, its two SECURITY invariants (`memory-attribution-no-content` + `memory-attribution-tenant-scoped`), and the §D replay rule that a `replay`-mode fork MUST NOT regenerate `memoryId`. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0025 §C point 1 — test-catalog isolation invariant; pairs with the 25 publish-error scenarios in `pack-registry-publish.test.ts`) added `pack-registry-isolation.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.packs.testMode.{supported, isolated}: true`; PUTs a disposable pack into `/v1/packs-test/{name}` and asserts the same `(name, version)` does NOT appear via `GET /v1/packs/{name}` — anchors the test-catalog isolation MUST in RFC 0025 §C. 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 post-promotion T2 — read-side sister scenario for workspace-membership enforcement) added `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` (broader than `mutableLibrary` so read-only hosts that expose `?workspaceId=` are also probed); drives `GET /v1/prompts?workspaceId=<random-non-member>` and interprets the response: 4xx PASS (canonical envelope check on 403); 200 with empty `templates[]` PASS (correct null result for a nonexistent workspace); 200 with non-empty `templates[]` FAIL (cross-tenant leak); 200 without `templates[]` field SKIP (host doesn't expose workspace-scoped reads). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-read-workspace-membership-enforced`. Same-day T1 strengthened `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` to pin `error === "workspace_membership_required"` when the host's refusal status is 403 (other refusal codes unconstrained). 2026-05-25 (RFC 0028 Tier-2 follow-up — workspace-membership enforcement on mutating prompt endpoints, filed in response to a self-disclosed adopter vulnerability) added `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced.test.ts` — capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.mutableLibrary: true`; drives `POST /v1/prompts` with a cryptographically-random non-member `workspaceId` and asserts the host refuses (NOT a 2xx; any 4xx/5xx is acceptable — silent success is the failure mode). Verifies SECURITY invariant `prompt-mutation-workspace-membership-enforced`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0034 §B follow-up — secret-leakage harness against the OTel + debug-bundle seams) added `secret-leakage-otel-attribute.test.ts` — gates on `capabilities.secrets.supported` + `capabilities.observability.testSeams.{otelScrape,debugBundleExport}` AND the `OPENWOP_CANARY_SECRET_VALUE` env (host operator + conformance runner agree on the canary). Drives the existing `openwop-smoke-byok-roundtrip` fixture end-to-end; scrapes both seams after run completion; hard-fails if the canary plaintext appears in any OTel span attribute or debug-bundle field. Verifies SECURITY invariants `secret-leakage-otel-attribute` + `secret-leakage-debug-bundle-otel`. 2026-05-22 (RFC 0041 Phase 4 — replay determinism under nondeterministic models) added three scenarios: `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape probe on `replayDeterminism.refusalDivergenceEmission` + 2 `it.todo` for the dual-direction refusal-divergence case), `replay-observable-sequence-determinism.test.ts` (capability-gated; behavioral assertion soft-skipped until a `conformance-phase4-nondet-tool` fixture ships), `replay-llm-cache-key-portable.test.ts` (intra-host reproducibility + non-recipe-field invariance + Phase 4 advertisement alignment — reuses the existing `POST /v1/host/sample/test/llm-cache-key` seam from the sibling `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts`). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 §A templateKinds-coverage follow-up — paired with `prompt-end-to-end-events.test.ts`) added `prompt-all-four-kinds-events.test.ts` exercising all four `PromptKind` values (`system`, `user`, `schema-hint`, `few-shot`) end-to-end through the reference workflow-engine sample's `local.sample.demo.mock-ai` dispatch path; capability-gated via `behaviorGate('prompts-supported', ...)`. Closes the credibility gap where the host advertised `templateKinds: ["system", "user", "few-shot", "schema-hint"]` but only the system+user pair was actually wired into dispatch. 2026-05-20 (RFCs 0030–0033 — envelope LLM-contract-hardening track) added 15 scenarios across four `Active` RFCs: `envelope-reasoning-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on; asserts the OPTIONAL `reasoning` property on the three universal-kind schemas + the `schema.response` deliberate omission), `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction.test.ts` (RFC 0030, capability-gated on `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning.supported` + `secrets.supported`; 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `envelope-reasoning-secret-redaction`), `envelope-tier-one-subset-static.test.ts` (RFC 0030, always-on for load-bearing rules — no `oneOf` / `allOf` / `not` / `prefixItems` / `propertyNames` anywhere; gated on `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "strict"` for OpenAI-strict-only constraints), `envelope-variant-discriminator-static.test.ts` (RFC 0031, always-on; asserts no `oneOf` + every `anyOf` branch declares a single-string-enum discriminator in `required` on every `schemas/envelopes/*.schema.json`), `model-capability-substituted.test.ts` (RFC 0031, advertisement-shape probe on `capabilities.modelCapabilities.advertised[]` identifier pattern + 5 `it.todo()` placeholders for SECURITY invariant `model-capability-substituted-no-credential-disclosure`), `model-capability-insufficient.test.ts` (RFC 0031, 6 `it.todo()` placeholders for refusal + no-recursive-fallback), `node-module-required-capabilities-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0031 SHOULD-tier authoring-convention; 4 `it.todo()` placeholders), and the six envelope-reliability events from RFC 0032 (`envelope-retry-attempted` carrying the shared advertisement-shape probe enforcing both MUST-tier events in `events[]` per RFC 0032 §C, plus `envelope-retry-exhausted`, `envelope-refusal-shape`, `envelope-truncated`, `envelope-nl-to-format-engaged`, `envelope-recovery-applied` — collectively 39 `it.todo()` placeholders covering retry/refusal/truncation/recovery + SECURITY invariants `envelope-refusal-no-prompt-leak` and `envelope-recovery-no-content-leak`), plus RFC 0033's two scenarios (`envelope-completion-distinguishes-truncation.test.ts` + `envelope-truncation-cap-exhaustion.test.ts` — 12 `it.todo()` placeholders covering the truncation-vs-schema-violation retry-routing distinction + the DoS-bound assertion). Reference workflow-engine sample advertises `capabilities.envelopes.reasoning: { supported: true, promptDirective: "off" }` + `tierOneSubsetCompliance: "warn"` honestly (schemas accept the field; host doesn't yet inject the directive); the other three RFCs' capability blocks defer to reference-host emission code per the staged RFC 0027 §G precedent. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0028 §B Phase B — prompt-pack boot-time install) added `prompt-pack-install.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.endpointsSupported: true`; asserts a host that ran the boot-time pack loader surfaces ≥ 1 pack-source template under `GET /v1/prompts?source=pack` carrying the canonical `meta.source: "pack"` + `meta.packName` + `meta.packVersion` stamps; positively identifies the in-tree `vendor.openwop.prompt-sample` reference pack's `writer-system` template when present). Pairs with the new `host/promptPackLoader.ts` boot-time entry on the reference workflow-engine sample, which scans `examples/packs/*` plus `OPENWOP_PROMPT_PACKS_DIR` and calls `installPackTemplates()` for each `kind: "prompt"` pack found. 2026-05-20 (RFC 0029 Phase C — prompt resolution chain wire shape) added three more scenarios: `prompt-resolution-chain-node-wins.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true`; asserts layer-1 node-config supersedes lower layers per `spec/v1/prompts.md` §"Resolution chain (normative)"), `prompt-resolution-chain-agent-intrinsic.test.ts` (additionally gated on `capabilities.prompts.agentBindings: true`; asserts agent intrinsic `systemPromptRef` wins over `promptOverrides` AND lower layers when the node has no layer-1 ref), `prompt-resolution-chain-fallback-cascade.test.ts` (asserts layer 3 workflow-defaults wins over layer 4 host-defaults; layer 4 host-defaults wins when 1-3 yield null; resolved is null when all four yield null but chain[] still lists every attempted layer). The scenarios drive the host's `POST /v1/host/sample/prompt/resolve` test seam (reference-host implementation deferred to follow-up slice per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-20 (RFC 0027 Phase A — prompt templates wire shape) added three scenarios: `prompt-template-shape.test.ts` (always-on; Ajv compileability + positive/negative round-trip for PromptTemplate + PromptRef + PromptKind), `prompt-composed-secret-redaction.test.ts` (capability-gated on `capabilities.prompts.supported: true` + `observability: "full"`; asserts `[REDACTED:<secretId>]` markers in `prompt.composed` payloads for `source: "secret"` variable bindings per SECURITY/threat-model-secret-leakage.md §SR-1), `prompt-composed-trust-marker.test.ts` (same capability gates; asserts `<UNTRUSTED>...</UNTRUSTED>` wrapping + `contentTrust: "untrusted"` propagation per RFC 0020 §D). Paired with new `fixtures/prompt-templates/` sub-directory + per-fixture schema-validity describe block + future SECURITY invariants `prompt-composed-secret-redaction` and `prompt-composed-trust-marker` (lands alongside reference-host emission per RFC 0021 staging precedent). 2026-05-18 (RFC 0022 `Draft` — runtime variable mapping) added four `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios covering the new mapping surfaces on `core.dispatch` (§A — `dispatch-input-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-output-mapping.test.ts`, `dispatch-cross-worker-handoff.test.ts`) and `core.subWorkflow` (§B — `subworkflow-input-mapping.test.ts`). Gated on `capabilities.agents.dispatchMapping` (dispatch trio) and `capabilities.subWorkflow.inputMapping` (subWorkflow). Promote to live assertions when RFC 0022 reaches `Active` + a reference host advertises the matching flags. 2026-05-17 (RFC 0003 §D handoff-schema enforcement, HV-1) added `agentPackHandoffSchemaValidation.test.ts` — verifies the host validates dispatch payloads against `handoff.taskSchemaRef` AND return payloads against `handoff.returnSchemaRef` per RFC 0003 §D. Paired with the new `agent-pack-handoff-schema-enforcement` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (AI Envelope gap-closure, DRAFT v1.x — `spec/v1/ai-envelope.md`) added 7 advertisement-shape scenarios with `it.todo()` behavioral placeholders gated on `capabilities.envelopeContracts.advertised: true`: `aiEnvelope.universalKinds.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.schemaDrift.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.correlationReplay.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.contractRefusal.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.trustBoundaryPropagation.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.redaction.test.ts`, `aiEnvelope.capBreached.test.ts`. Paired with the new `envelope-redaction-sr-1-carry-forward` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (post-publish hardening, deep audit of `core.openwop.agents`) added `agents-run-tool-allowlist.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.agents@1.0.1` safety-fix that closes `OPENWOP-AUDIT-2026-003` (function-typed `tool.handler` properties rejected at `validateTools()` with `INVALID_TOOL_DECLARATION`; tool-driven runs require `ctx.agentRuntime`; tool-less safe fallback preserved). Paired with the new `agents-run-no-raw-handler` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. Same-day post-publish hardening added `idempotency-key-determinism.test.ts` — server-free scenario locking in the `core.openwop.http@1.1.2` determinism safety-fix (default `composite` mode produces deterministic keys in `(runId, nodeId, payload)`; removed `uuid` mode rejects with `CONFIG_INVALID`; cross-impl vector test lets third-party reimplementations verify wire agreement). Paired with the new `idempotency-key-deterministic` row in `SECURITY/invariants.yaml`. 2026-05-17 (Phase 3 of RFC 0013) added three server-free scenarios exercising the reference workflow-chain expansion library (`conformance/src/lib/workflow-chain-expansion.ts`): `workflow-chain-expansion.test.ts` (parameter substitution + node id collision avoidance + edge rewriting + capability propagation + runtime-invariance contract), `workflow-chain-unresolvable-typeid.test.ts` (rejection with `chain_unresolvable_typeid` when a chain references an unknown typeId), and `workflow-chain-pack-signature-verification.test.ts` (Ed25519 verification recipe reuse from `node-packs.md §Signing`). Earlier that day (Phase 1) added `workflow-chain-pack-manifest-validation.test.ts` — server-free schema-validation scenario covering the new `workflow-chain-pack-manifest.schema.json` (positive sample + two negatives: kind/contents mismatch and invalid `chainId`). Closes RFC 0013 (`Workflow-chain packs`, `Draft`) Phases 1 + 3 alongside the new `spec/v1/workflow-chain-packs.md`, the `Capabilities.workflowChainPacks` block, and the registry build-index/conformance-check `kind` routing from Phase 2. Earlier that day, the suite added 27 `it.todo()` placeholder scenarios paired with RFCs 0014-0020 (host capability surfaces — fs, kvStorage, tableStorage, queueBus, sql/vector/search, blob/cache, mcp.serverMount). These promote to live assertions when each RFC reaches `Active` + the matching capability block lands in `schemas/capabilities.schema.json` + a reference host advertises the capability. Earlier additions include 18 Multi-Agent Shift scenarios (Phases 1-5) added 2026-05-10, the `registry-public.test.ts` public-registry healthcheck added 2026-05-11 (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_PUBLIC_REGISTRY=true`), the `replay-llm-cache-key.test.ts` placeholder added 2026-05-11 (three `it.todo()` cases for the cross-host LLM cache-key recipe per `replay.md` §"LLM cache-key recipe"), the two `production-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11 for the `openwop-production` profile per RFC 0009 (`production-backpressure.test.ts`, `production-retention-expiry.test.ts`), the four `auth-*.test.ts` scenarios added 2026-05-11/12 for the production-auth profiles per RFC 0010 (`auth-api-key-rotation.test.ts`, `auth-oauth2-client-credentials.test.ts`, `auth-oidc-user-bearer.test.ts`, `auth-mtls.test.ts` (opt-in via `OPENWOP_TEST_MTLS=1`)), `replay-retention-expiry.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (capability shape + 410/422 envelope per `replay.md` §"Retention and garbage collection"), `bulk-cancel.test.ts` added 2026-05-12 (Phase B close-out of R1 — `POST /v1/runs:bulk-cancel`), the two Phase H launch-blocker advertisement-contract scenarios added 2026-05-12 (`mcp-toolcall-redaction.test.ts` for the MCP-1 invariant per `host-capabilities.md §host.mcp` + `threat-model-prompt-injection.md §UNTRUSTED`, and `http-client-ssrf.test.ts` for the SSRF + body-size cap advertisement contract on `capabilities.httpClient`), the `wasm-pack-abi-version-rejection.test.ts` Track 7 scenario added 2026-05-12 for the ABI-mismatch positive path via the `vendor.openwop.misbehaving-abi` pack per RFC 0008 §H, the `otel-trace-propagation-subworkflow.test.ts` Track 11 close-out added 2026-05-13 (parent + child run spans share the inbound traceparent's traceId across the `core.subWorkflow` dispatch boundary), and the three RFC 0012 (Memory Compaction Profile, `Active`) scenarios added 2026-05-13/14: `memory-compaction-sr1-carry-forward.test.ts` (load-bearing SR-1 §D), `memory-compaction-event-emitted.test.ts` (canonical §B payload shape), and `memory-compaction-provenance-tag.test.ts` (soft assertion on §C `compacted-from:<id>` convention). All three gate on `capabilities.memory.compaction.supported` + the host's test seam at `/v1/test/memory/{seed,compact}` (Postgres reference host enables both via `OPENWOP_MEMORY_COMPACTION=true OPENWOP_TEST_TRIGGER_COMPACTION=true`). 2026-05-15 (gap-closure CF-3) added `interrupt-token-matrix.test.ts` (malformed / unknown / replay / cross-run-id paths on `GET|POST /v1/interrupts/{token}`). The maintained scenario-to-spec map lives in [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md); this README keeps the operator quickstart and the historical scenario notes below.
 
 High-level coverage includes:
 
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ Server-required (added in 1.7.0):
 |---|---|---|
 | **Redaction** | [`capabilities.md`](../spec/v1/capabilities.md) §"Secrets" + NFR-7 + §"aiProviders" | Vendor-neutral assertions that the server doesn't leak secret material. Three scenario groups: (a) discovery shape contract — `secrets` + `aiProviders` advertisements are well-formed regardless of `secrets.supported`; when `supported === true`, scopes MUST be non-empty + `resolution === 'host-managed'`; `byok ⊆ supported`. (b) bearer-token redaction — invalid Bearer canary in `Authorization` header is not echoed in the 401 response body. (c) credentialRef echo control — gated on `secrets.supported === true`; canary planted in `configurable.ai.credentialRef` MUST NOT appear in any RunEvent payload (poll-based capture; transport-agnostic). Uses runtime-built canary fixtures (`lib/canaries.ts`) that defeat static secret scanners. 6 scenarios. |
 
-Current source tree: 308 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
+Current source tree: 310 scenario files. Use [`coverage.md`](./coverage.md) for current grade/gap tracking.
 
 ## Remaining Gaps
 

package/coverage.md

@@ -51,14 +51,14 @@
 | RFC 0041 §B replay-divergence-at-refusal behavioral (`version: 4`) | `replay-divergence-at-refusal.test.ts` (advertisement-shape + behavioral; 3 assertions PASS against workflow-engine when the `multiAgent.executionModel.version: 4` advertisement is enabled) | A (was `it.todo` until 2026-05-23 when the executor wiring landed — see commit `1fce55a` + `bba3b4a`. Behavioral assertions cover both divergence directions: original=valid + replay=refusal AND original=refusal + replay=valid) | Closes Track #4 of the 2026-05-22 multi-agent behavioral-harness close-out. Reference workflow-engine emits `replay.divergedAtRefusal` event + fails run with `error.code: 'replay_diverged_at_refusal'` when source vs replay envelope kinds differ at the same nodeId. Gated on `OPENWOP_MULTI_AGENT_EXECUTION_MODEL_PHASE_4=true` AND `run.forkMode === 'replay'`. Path-to-Accepted for RFC 0041: non-steward host advertises `multiAgent.executionModel.version: 4` end-to-end. |
 | Agent-manifest runtime floor (RFC 0070 — `capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime`) | `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts` | B (capability-gated; lists ≥1 installed manifest agent + dispatches one with attributed `agent.reasoned`+`agent.decided` events, plus a §F sub-threshold-escalation assertion) | RFC 0070 filed Draft 2026-05-26. Gated on `capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime.supported` + the host dispatch seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agents/{agentId}/dispatch`); soft-skips when either is absent. The reference **workflow-engine** host advertises `manifestRuntime: { supported: true, handoffValidation: true }`, loads pack `agents[]` (RFC 0003 `installAgents`) into an AgentRegistry at boot, and dispatches end-to-end (toolAllowlist-filtered per RFC 0002 §A14, handoff-validated per RFC 0003 §D, confidence-escalating per §F) — see `apps/workflow-engine/backend/typescript/test/agent-dispatch-route.test.ts` (6 HTTP assertions, incl. the normative inventory). **RFC 0072 (`Draft`):** the scenario's inventory leg now drives the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents` (§A) so it runs black-box against any conformant host; the dispatch leg stays on the sample seam (soft-skips off-steward) pending the executor-integration tier. RFC 0072 §C `peerDependenciesMeta` disposition + `degraded[]` are unit-tested in `agent-loader.test.ts`. Path to `Active → Accepted` (RFC 0070): a non-steward host advertises `manifestRuntime` + serves `GET /v1/agents`. |
 | Live manifest dispatch (RFC 0077 — `capabilities.agents.liveRuntime`) | `agent-live-runtime-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0077 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-29 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve T4 co-design). Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.liveRuntime` (+ `supported`/`structuredOutput`/`confidenceEscalation`/`sources` sub-flags) is declared, the `agentInvocationStarted`/`agentInvocationCompleted` payloads validate conforming content-free records + reject malformed ones (`started` missing `source`; `completed` out-of-enum `outcome`), and both event names appear in the RunEventType enum. `liveRuntime` ⊃ `manifestRuntime`. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0077 §Conformance (reference host): the started→completed bracket ordering, `structuredOutput` enforcement, and `toolAllowlist` enforcement gate on `capabilities.agents.liveRuntime.supported` + a live-invoke seam and soft-skip until a host wires it. Path to `Accepted`: a non-steward host advertises `liveRuntime` + emits the invocation pair (net-new MyndHyve T4 work, queued behind §B). |
-| Agent evaluation (RFC 0081 — `capabilities.agents.evalSuite`) | `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `eval-summary-no-content-leak`) | RFC 0081 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` (+ `supported`/`modes` sub-flags) is declared; the `AgentEvalSuite` + `EvalSummary` schemas compile + round-trip a conforming artifact and reject malformed ones (bad `suiteId` infix; `passScore` out of 0..1; out-of-range `aggregateScore`); the `eval.started`/`eval.scored`/`eval.completed` payloads validate content-free records + reject malformed ones; and all three event names appear in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (an `EvalSummary` task entry carrying a `taskOutput` body; a `safetyFinding` carrying an `excerpt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `eval-summary-no-content-leak`. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0081 §Conformance (reference host): `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (the `eval.started`→per-task `eval.scored`→`eval.completed` ordering, the `EvalSummary` round-trip, the `mode: "eval"` 501 on unadvertised hosts) gates on `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` + the eval-run seam and soft-skips until a host wires the eval projection. Path to `Accepted`: a host advertises `evalSuite` + runs a golden/regression suite end-to-end (the `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` endpoint + SDK helper land with it). |
+| Agent evaluation (RFC 0081 — `capabilities.agents.evalSuite`) | `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `eval-summary-no-content-leak`) | RFC 0081 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.evalSuite` (+ `supported`/`modes` sub-flags) is declared; the `AgentEvalSuite` + `EvalSummary` schemas compile + round-trip a conforming artifact and reject malformed ones (bad `suiteId` infix; `passScore` out of 0..1; out-of-range `aggregateScore`); the `eval.started`/`eval.scored`/`eval.completed` payloads validate content-free records + reject malformed ones; and all three event names appear in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (an `EvalSummary` task entry carrying a `taskOutput` body; a `safetyFinding` carrying an `excerpt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `eval-summary-no-content-leak`. **Behavioral scenario authored + gated** (2026-05-31; see §"Capability-gated scenarios"): `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (the `eval.started`→per-task `eval.scored`→`eval.completed` ordering, the content-free `eval.scored` legs, and the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid round-trip) gates on `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` + the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam (`behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)`) and soft-skips until a host wires the eval projection. Path to `Accepted`: a host advertises `evalSuite` + runs a golden/regression suite end-to-end (the `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` endpoint + SDK helper already landed). |
 | Memory capability model (RFC 0080 — `spec/v1/agent-memory.md` §"Memory capability model", `spec/v1/profiles.md` §`openwop-memory`) | `memory-capability-model-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0080 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts the additive `capabilities.memory.{writable,search,retention}` dimensions are declared (existing `supported`/`compaction`/`distillation`/`attribution` untouched), `memory.search`/`memory.retention` validate conforming instances + reject malformed ones (`retention.ttl` non-boolean; out-of-enum `search.modes`; unknown property under `additionalProperties:false`), `agent-inventory-response` declares `memoryDegraded` + the closed-enum `degradedMemoryDimensions` (the eight §A dimension names), and `deriveProfiles` surfaces `openwop-memory` for a read/write + long-term host while withholding it from a `writable:false` host. **Behavioral scenario deferred** per RFC 0080 §Conformance: `memory-degraded-projection.test.ts` (a live `GET /v1/agents` stamping `memoryDegraded` when an agent's `memoryShape` exceeds the host's reconciled model) gates on `agents.manifestRuntime` + `memory` and soft-skips until a reference host computes it. Path to `Accepted`: a host computes the §C degraded projection + the scenario passes against it. |
 | Portable tool catalog (RFC 0078 — `spec/v1/tool-catalog.md`) | `tool-descriptor-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0078 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `tool-descriptor.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `ToolDescriptor` + rejects the malformed (`safetyTier`-required, `additionalProperties:false`), enforces the §C-1/§F-4 cross-field MUST (`safetyTier:"exec"` ⇒ `source:"host-extension"`, RFC 0069 — an `exec`+`node-pack` descriptor is rejected), asserts the `capabilities.toolCatalog` `supported`/`sources`/`sessionLifecycle` shape, and validates the two content-free `tool.session.{opened,closed}` payloads (incl. the closed `outcome` enum) + their RunEventType-enum membership. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0078 §Conformance: `tool-catalog-projection.test.ts` (the authorization-scoped `GET /v1/tools` + `404` non-disclosure) + `tool-session-lifecycle.test.ts` (the `tool.session.*` bracket ordering) gate on `capabilities.toolCatalog.supported` + `sessionLifecycle` and soft-skip until a reference host serves the catalog. Path to `Accepted`: a host projects ≥1 tool source at `GET /v1/tools` + the projection scenario passes. |
 | Credential provenance + egress policy (RFC 0079 — `spec/v1/host-capabilities.md` §"Credential provenance + egress policy") | `egress-provenance-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `egress-decision-no-secret-leak`) | RFC 0079 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (4 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `credential-provenance.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `CredentialProvenance` + rejects `audiences:[]` / missing `credentialId` / unknown property, the descriptor + `egress.decided` declare NO secret-value property (the content-free **`egress-decision-no-secret-leak`** protocol-tier invariant), the `egress.decided` payload validates a content-free record + enforces the `decision` enum + required `decision`/`destination`, and `capabilities.httpClient.egressPolicy` is declared. **The behavioral audience-binding MUST-NOT (`egress-credential-audience-bound`) is reference-impl tier** at Draft→Active — a credential bound to audience A on an egress to B must be `denied`/`downgraded` (never `allowed`-with-credential), fail-closed on unevaluable provenance — and lands in the gated `egress-audience-binding.test.ts` + `egress-decision-content-free.test.ts` (soft-skip until a host wires `egressPolicy` over `safeFetch`). Path to `Accepted`: a reference host enforces §C + the binding scenario passes → `egress-credential-audience-bound` graduates protocol-tier (RFC 0035 precedent). |
 | Durable trigger + channel bridge (RFC 0083 — `spec/v1/trigger-bridge.md`, `spec/v1/profiles.md` §`openwop-trigger-bridge`) | `trigger-bridge-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe) | RFC 0083 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `trigger-subscription.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `TriggerSubscription` + rejects missing-`state`/out-of-enum-`source`/unknown-property, the four-state vocab (`active`/`paused`/`failed`/`dead-lettered`) is stable, the two content-free `trigger.{subscription.state.changed,delivery.attempted}` payloads validate + enforce the `state`/`outcome` enums + RunEventType-enum membership, `capabilities.triggerBridge` + `webhooks.durable` are declared, and `deriveProfiles` surfaces `openwop-trigger-bridge` for bridge+sink+durable-source while withholding it with no dead-letter sink. **Behavioral scenario deferred** per RFC 0083 §Conformance: `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` (dedup → retry → dead-letter → trigger→run causation) is profile-gated on `openwop-trigger-bridge` and soft-skips until a reference host wires durable delivery. Path to `Accepted`: a host wires the state machine + delivery loop + the scenario passes. |
 | Budget, quota + cost policy (RFC 0084 — `spec/v1/budget-policy.md`) | `budget-policy-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `budget-no-pricing-leak`) | RFC 0084 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Always-on shape probe asserts `budget-policy.schema.json` round-trips a conforming `BudgetPolicy` + enforces the §A/§E orthogonality guard (a wall-time field is rejected — that's RFC 0058's `runTimeoutMs`) + threshold/onExhaustion negatives, the four content-free `budget.{reserved,consumed,threshold.crossed,exhausted}` payloads validate + enforce the `dimension`/`scope` enums, the four `cap.breached{budget-tokens,budget-cost,budget-tool-calls,budget-retries}` kinds + the four `budget.*` RunEventType-enum entries are present, the payloads declare no pricing/credential property (the **`budget-no-pricing-leak`** protocol-tier invariant), and `capabilities.budget` + `limits.maxBudget{Tokens,CostUsd}` are declared. **Behavioral scenario deferred** per RFC 0084 §Conformance: `budget-enforcement.test.ts` (accrue → threshold → exhaust → `cap.breached{budget-cost}` → `run.failed{budget_exhausted}`; `budget_model_denied`; advisory no-stop) gates on `budget.supported` + `enforce` and soft-skips until a reference host wires accounting. Path to `Accepted`: a host wires the budget accumulator + the exhaustion stop + the scenario passes. |
 | `openwop-agent-platform` meta-profile (RFC 0085 — `spec/v1/agent-platform-profile.md`, operational annex) | `agent-platform-profile.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free derivation probe) | RFC 0085 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30 (5 UQs resolved via MyndHyve review). Operational annex (NOT a closed `profiles.md` catalog predicate). Always-on derivation probe asserts `isAgentPlatformPartial`/`isAgentPlatformFull`/`agentPlatformStatus` derive `none`/`partial`/`full` correctly: all-floor ⇒ partial, a missing floor flag ⇒ none, the replay-OR-`nondeterminismPolicy.declared` term, floor+governance ⇒ full, a missing governance term (tenant `installScope`) ⇒ partial-not-full (the honest-advertisement rule), and that the eval/deploy/budget platform-plus tier is advisory (a full host without them is still full); plus `capabilities.nondeterminismPolicy.declared` is declared. **Live aggregate-evidence assertion deferred** per RFC 0085 §C: when a host claims `full`, the meta-scenario must assert every required constituent scenario is in its passing set — naturally gated on a reference host reaching partial/full (Postgres is the candidate). Path to `Accepted`: ≥1 host reports `partial`/`full` backed by the aggregate + renders the badge. |
-| Agent deployment lifecycle (RFC 0082 — `capabilities.agents.deployment`) | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `deployment-event-no-content-leak`) | RFC 0082 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.deployment` (+ `supported`/`channels`/`canary`/`rollback`/`states` sub-flags); the `AgentDeployment` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (out-of-enum `state`; `canaryPercent` out of 0..100); the **`AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version`** rule (each alone + neither validate; both rejected by the `not` clause, §A); the four `deployment.*` payloads validate content-free records + reject malformed ones; `agent.invocation.started` carries the additive recorded-fact `resolvedAgentVersion`/`resolvedChannel` (§B channel pin); and all four event names appear in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (a `deployment.promoted` carrying a `manifestBody`; a `deployment.state.changed` carrying a `prompt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `deployment-event-no-content-leak`. The behavioral `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant is `reference-impl` tier until the behavioral scenario lands (then graduates to protocol; RFC 0035 precedent). **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0082 §Conformance (reference host): `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (authz → approvalGate → eval-verify → `deployment.promoted`; the fail-closed denial; the §B replay re-read of `resolvedAgentVersion`) gates on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` + the deployment-store seam and soft-skips until a host wires it. Path to `Accepted`: a host implements the deployment store + canary router + the `POST /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` promotion contract (the endpoint + SDK helper land with it). |
+| Agent deployment lifecycle (RFC 0082 — `capabilities.agents.deployment`) | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `deployment-event-no-content-leak`) | RFC 0082 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.deployment` (+ `supported`/`channels`/`canary`/`rollback`/`states` sub-flags); the `AgentDeployment` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (out-of-enum `state`; `canaryPercent` out of 0..100); the **`AgentRef` `channel` XOR `version`** rule (each alone + neither validate; both rejected by the `not` clause, §A); the four `deployment.*` payloads validate content-free records + reject malformed ones; `agent.invocation.started` carries the additive recorded-fact `resolvedAgentVersion`/`resolvedChannel` (§B channel pin); and all four event names appear in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (a `deployment.promoted` carrying a `manifestBody`; a `deployment.state.changed` carrying a `prompt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `deployment-event-no-content-leak`. The behavioral `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant is `reference-impl` tier until the behavioral scenario lands (then graduates to protocol; RFC 0035 precedent). **Behavioral scenario authored + gated** (2026-05-31; see §"Capability-gated scenarios"): `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (the §E authz → approvalGate → eval-verify → `deployment.promoted` promotion + the record round-trip, the fail-closed denial, the `eval_gate_unmet` denial, and the §B `resolvedAgentVersion` channel pin) gates on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` + the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam (`behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)`) and soft-skips until a host wires it. When it passes against a host, the `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant graduates reference-impl → protocol tier. Path to `Accepted`: a host implements the deployment store + canary router + the `POST /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` promotion contract (the endpoint + SDK helper already landed). |
 | Standing agent roster (RFC 0086 — `capabilities.agents.roster`) | `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `roster-attribution-no-content`) | RFC 0086 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.roster` (+ `supported`/`installScope`/`portfolioTriggerSources` sub-flags); the `AgentRosterEntry` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (a non-`host:` `rosterId`; an `agentRef` carrying BOTH `version` and `channel` — the RFC 0082 §A XOR rule; a missing `rosterId`); the `roster.run.initiated` payload validates a content-free attribution record + requires its ids/persona/triggerSource; the `AgentInventoryEntry` carries the additive optional `roster` portfolio projection (§B); and `roster.run.initiated` appears in the RunEventType enum. The **content-free negatives** (a `roster.run.initiated` carrying a `body`; one carrying a `prompt`) are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `roster-attribution-no-content`. **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0086 §Conformance (reference host): a scheduled portfolio fire emitting `roster.run.initiated` before `agent.invocation.started`; the RFC 0083 work-item causation chain; the replay re-read; the cross-tenant `GET /v1/agents/roster/{id}` 404 — gate on `capabilities.agents.roster.supported` + the roster-store seam and soft-skip until a host wires it (the host-extension at `/v1/host/sample/roster` + board attribution, apps/workflow-engine #368, is the reference demonstration). Path to `Accepted`: a non-steward host advertises `agents.roster` + emits `roster.run.initiated`. |
 | Agent org-chart (RFC 0087 — `capabilities.agents.orgChart`) | `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` | A (always-on, server-free shape probe; doubles as the public test for `org-position-no-authority-escalation`) | RFC 0087 promoted Draft → Active 2026-05-30. Always-on shape probe asserts `capabilities.agents.orgChart` (+ `supported`/`installScope`/`departmentNesting`/`responsibilityView` sub-flags); the `AgentOrgChart` record compiles + round-trips and rejects malformed ones (a non-`host:` member `rosterId`; a chart missing `members`). The **§B structural non-authority guarantee**: the schema **rejects** an authority-bearing field on a member (`scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority` — every object is `additionalProperties:false`), and a conforming member's key set is exactly `{rosterId, departmentId, roleId, reportsTo}`. These are the public test for protocol-tier SECURITY invariant `org-position-no-authority-escalation` (an org edge confers no authority — position describes, never authorizes). NO new RunEventType (the org-chart is structure + a read, not an event surface). **Behavioral scenarios deferred** per RFC 0087 §Conformance (reference host): the live-dispatch refusal of a manager's tool over-reach; an RFC 0049 decision invariant to org position; the cross-tenant `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` 404; the §D responsibility roll-up over live roster portfolios — gate on `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` + the org-store seam and soft-skip until a host wires it (the host-extension at `/v1/host/sample/org-chart`, apps/workflow-engine #371, is the reference demonstration). Path to `Accepted`: a non-steward host advertises `agents.orgChart` + passes the behavioral non-authority scenario. |
 
@@ -111,6 +111,8 @@ Thirty-one scenario groups validate optional profiles where the host's discovery
 | `agent-org-chart-scoping.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` (RFC 0087 §A/§C/§D, `agent-org-chart.md`) | A (the normative `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` tree-shape — acyclic `parentDepartmentId` tree + `host:<id>` member rosterIds — + the §D `GET /v1/agents/org-chart/{departmentId}` responsibility roll-up with a deduped `responsibilities[]` union + `recursive=false` shape-stability + the RFC 0074 cross-tenant 404 via `OPENWOP_CROSS_TENANT_ORG_CHART_DEPARTMENT_ID`) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-org-chart-scoping', …)`. Black-box on the normative path (no POST seam); soft-skips on 404 / when the cross-tenant env var is unset. **Part of the RFC 0087 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.orgChart`. |
 | `org-position-no-authority-escalation.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` (RFC 0087 §B) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `org-position-no-authority-escalation` | A (behavioral leg of the protocol-tier invariant — the live org-chart wire carries NO authority-bearing field (`scopes`/`canDispatch`/`permissions`/`authority`/`roleGrants`/`capabilities`) on any member / department / responsibility-view object, proving the host's projector strips position-as-authority at every install scope) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-org-position-no-authority', …)`. Black-box on the normative path; soft-skips on 404. The STRUCTURAL leg (schema rejects an authority field) stays always-on in `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts`; the deeper RFC 0049/0051 authority-invariance legs stay reference-impl tier (a non-normative authz-decide hook would be required — the `agent-manifest-runtime` precedent). **Part of the RFC 0087 → Accepted bar.** |
 | `trigger-bridge-delivery.test.ts` | `openwop-trigger-bridge` profile (RFC 0083 §C/§D, `trigger-bridge.md`; derived from discovery — bridge + dead-letter sink + durable source) | A (the §C delivery model via `POST /v1/host/sample/trigger-bridge/deliver` + the test event-log seam: dedup→effectively-once `trigger.delivery.attempted{delivered}` (§C-1), retry-exhaustion→`{dead-lettered}` + `trigger.subscription.state.changed{toState:dead-lettered}` (§C-2 + RFC 0053), and the delivered run's `run.started.causationId` == the delivery id (§C / RFC 0040); both `trigger.*` events content-free) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-trigger-bridge', …)`. Profile-gated; seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. Normative `GET /v1/trigger-subscriptions` read runs black-box. **This is the RFC 0083 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `triggerBridge`. |
+| `agent-eval-run.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` (RFC 0081 §B/§C, `agent-evaluation.md`) | A (the §C `mode:"eval"` projection via `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` + the test event-log seam: `eval.started`-first → one `eval.scored` per task → `eval.completed`-once ordering (`count == eval.completed.taskCount`), every `eval.scored` content-free + `score` ∈ 0..1 backing `eval-summary-no-content-leak`; plus the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` returning a schema-valid `EvalSummary` with `passedCount <= taskCount` and no per-task output body) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. The normative eval-summary read runs black-box on any `evalSuite` host. **This is the RFC 0081 → Accepted bar.** First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.evalSuite`. |
+| `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` | `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` (RFC 0082 §B/§E, `agent-deployment.md`) + `SECURITY/invariants.yaml` `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` | A (the §E promotion contract via `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` + the test event-log seam: a `promote` runs authorize (RFC 0049) → approvalGate (RFC 0051) → eval-verify (RFC 0081) → content-free `deployment.promoted` with a seven-state `toState` + `toVersion`, the returned record validating `agent-deployment.schema.json`; an `unauthorized` principal fails closed — `allowed:false`, NO `deployment.promoted` (the behavioral leg of `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`); an `eval-gate-unmet` promote is denied `eval_gate_unmet` with NO `deployment.promoted` (§E-3); and a `channel-pin` run records `resolvedAgentVersion` on `agent.invocation.started` (§B)) | `host-pending` | `behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', …)`. Seam-gated; soft-skips on 404. The normative `GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` read runs black-box on any `deployment` host. **This is the RFC 0082 → Accepted bar** (the `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant graduates reference-impl → protocol tier when this passes against a host). First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.deployment`. |
 | `approval-gate-events.test.ts` | `approval.granted` / `.rejected` / `.overridden` (RFC 0051 §B, `interrupt-profiles.md` §approvalGate) | Server-free (event-payload schema validity: required fields incl. mandatory `overridden.reason`; additionalProperties:false negatives) | host-pass (server-free) | Always runs; no host needed. |
 | `approval-gate-flow.test.ts` | `core.openwop.governance.approvalGate` (RFC 0051 §A) + `capabilities.authorization` (RFC 0049) | A (capability-gated on `authorization.supported`; unauthorized-principal-denied + override-audited via the `governance/approval-gate` seam) | `host-pending` | Behavioral probe soft-skips on 404. Grant/reject-loopback/quorum scenarios deferred until a governance host wires the seam. |
 | `scheduling-capability-shape.test.ts` | `capabilities.scheduling` (RFC 0052 §A, `host-capabilities.md` §host.scheduling) | A (advertisement shape always — `supported` boolean; `cron`/`delayed`/`calendar` booleans; `maxFutureHorizon` ISO-8601 duration) | `host-pending` | Always runs; asserts the block is absent or well-formed. |
@@ -171,9 +173,9 @@ Every OpenAPI operation should have:
 | `getRunAncestry` | `cross-host-ancestry-endpoint.test.ts`, `cross-host-causation-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0040 §C); capability-gated on `capabilities.multiAgent.executionModel.crossHostCausation.ancestryEndpointSupported` | Unadvertised-host 404 path + top-level `parent: null` shape covered | Add positive multi-hop traversal once a reference host implements end-to-end cross-host composition. |
 | `listAgents` | `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts` (RFC 0072 §A); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.manifestRuntime.supported` | Normative `GET /v1/agents` inventory leg — lists ≥1 installed manifest agent; soft-skips (404) when unadvertised | Black-box across hosts; dispatch leg via sample seam pending the executor-integration tier. |
 | `getAgent` | `agent-manifest-runtime.test.ts` (RFC 0072 §A) + `agent-dispatch-route.test.ts` (reference host) | One manifest agent's inventory entry + 404 for unknown | Covered against the workflow-engine reference host. |
-| `getEvalSummary` | `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0081 — schema/shape of the returned `EvalSummary`); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` | Wire shape + the content-free invariant covered always-on; the live `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` round-trip is the behavioral `agent-eval-run.test.ts` deferred to `Active → Accepted` (reference host wires the eval projection). | Add the live 200/404/409 path once a host runs a `mode:"eval"` suite end-to-end. |
-| `listAgentDeployments` | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0082 — the `AgentDeployment` record shape the array returns); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` | Record shape covered always-on; the live list is the behavioral `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` deferred to `Active → Accepted` (reference host wires the deployment store). | Add the live 200/404 path once a host implements the deployment store. |
-| `transitionAgentDeployment` | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0082 — the `agent-deployment-transition` request + `deployment.*` event shapes) + `deployment-event-no-content-leak` public test; capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` | Request/record/event shapes + content-free negatives covered always-on; the live authz→gate→eval-verify→`deployment.promoted` path is the behavioral `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` deferred to `Active → Accepted`. | Add the live fail-closed `403` / `eval_gate_unmet` / `no_active_deployment` assertions once a host wires the promotion contract. |
+| `getEvalSummary` | `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0081 — schema/shape of the returned `EvalSummary`) + the now-authored behavioral `agent-eval-run.test.ts` (the live `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` schema-valid round-trip); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.evalSuite.supported` | Wire shape + the content-free invariant covered always-on; the live round-trip is `agent-eval-run.test.ts`, `host-pending` until a host advertises `evalSuite` + wires the `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam. | First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.evalSuite`. |
+| `listAgentDeployments` | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0082 — the `AgentDeployment` record shape the array returns) + the now-authored behavioral `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (the live `GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` black-box read); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` | Record shape covered always-on; the live list is `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts`, `host-pending` until a host advertises `deployment` + wires the deployment-transition seam. | First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.deployment`. |
+| `transitionAgentDeployment` | `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0082 — the `agent-deployment-transition` request + `deployment.*` event shapes) + `deployment-event-no-content-leak` public test + the now-authored behavioral `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts` (the live authz→gate→eval-verify→`deployment.promoted` + fail-closed + `eval_gate_unmet` legs via the seam); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.deployment.supported` | Request/record/event shapes + content-free negatives covered always-on; the live promotion contract is `agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts`, `host-pending` until a host wires the deployment store. | First adopter: MyndHyve `agents.deployment`. |
 | `listAgentRoster` | `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B — the `agent-roster-response` shape); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.roster.supported` | Response shape covered always-on; the live `GET /v1/agents/roster` 200/404 + tenant-scoping is deferred to `Active → Accepted` (reference host serves the normative `/v1/agents/roster`, vs the sample-extension `/v1/host/sample/roster`). | Add the live path once a host serves the normative roster endpoint. |
 | `getAgentRosterEntry` | `agent-roster-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0086 §B — the `agent-roster-entry` shape); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.roster.supported` | Entry shape covered always-on; the live 200/404 + cross-tenant-404 is deferred to `Active → Accepted`. | Add the live path once a host serves the normative endpoint. |
 | `getAgentOrgChart` | `agent-org-chart-shape.test.ts` (RFC 0087 §C — the `agent-org-chart` shape + the `org-position-no-authority-escalation` structural test); capability-gated on `capabilities.agents.orgChart.supported` | Chart shape + the no-authority structural guarantee covered always-on; the live `GET /v1/agents/org-chart` 200/404 + tenant-scoping is deferred to `Active → Accepted`. | Add the live path once a host serves the normative endpoint. |

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openwop/openwop-conformance",
-  "version": "1.12.0",
+  "version": "1.13.0",
   "description": "Production-ready black-box conformance suite for OpenWOP v1.0 compliant servers.",
   "repository": {
     "type": "git",

package/src/lib/agentDeployment.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/**
+ * Shared helpers for the RFC 0082 `agents.deployment` conformance scenario.
+ * Lives in lib/ (not a `*.test.ts`) so scenarios import it via
+ * `../lib/agentDeployment.js`.
+ *
+ * Two surfaces:
+ *   - the NORMATIVE read (`GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments`, RFC 0082
+ *     §C/§E), exercised black-box; and
+ *   - the host-sample deployment-transition seam
+ *     (`POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition`), used to drive the
+ *     §E promotion contract (authorize → approvalGate → eval-verify →
+ *     `deployment.promoted`), the fail-closed denial, the eval-gate-unmet
+ *     denial, and the §B channel-resolution pin, so the `deployment.*` events +
+ *     the `resolvedAgentVersion` recorded fact can be asserted against the test
+ *     event-log seam. The seam is OPTIONAL — scenarios soft-skip on 404/405
+ *     (the reference deployment store is deferred per RFC 0082 §Conformance).
+ *
+ * Gating uses the `agents.deployment.supported` capability flag from the live
+ * discovery doc (root-first per RFC 0073).
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0082-agent-deployment-lifecycle.md
+ * @see spec/v1/agent-deployment.md
+ */
+import { driver } from './driver.js';
+import { readCapabilityFamily } from './discovery-capabilities.js';
+
+/** Reads `agents.deployment` from discovery (root-first per RFC 0073); null
+ *  when unadvertised. */
+export async function readDeploymentCap(): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
+  const agents = await readCapabilityFamily<{ deployment?: unknown }>('agents');
+  const dep = agents?.deployment;
+  return dep && typeof dep === 'object' ? (dep as Record<string, unknown>) : null;
+}
+
+export interface DeploymentRecord {
+  agentId?: string;
+  version?: string;
+  state?: string;
+  canaryPercent?: number;
+  channels?: string[];
+  [k: string]: unknown;
+}
+
+/** GET the NORMATIVE deployment-record list (RFC 0082 §C/§E
+ *  `GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments`); null when the host doesn't serve it
+ *  (404/405/501). */
+export async function listDeployments(agentId: string): Promise<DeploymentRecord[] | null> {
+  const res = await driver.get(`/v1/agents/${encodeURIComponent(agentId)}/deployments`);
+  if (res.status === 404 || res.status === 405 || res.status === 501) return null;
+  return (res.json as DeploymentRecord[] | undefined) ?? [];
+}
+
+export interface TransitionResult {
+  runId?: string;
+  record?: DeploymentRecord;
+  /** Fail-closed signal: false when the principal lacks the `deploy:*` scope. */
+  allowed?: boolean;
+  /** A denial reason (e.g. `eval_gate_unmet`, `no_active_deployment`). */
+  error?: string;
+  /** §B — the channel→version pin recorded at first resolution. */
+  resolvedAgentVersion?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Drive one deployment transition through the host-sample seam (RFC 0082 §E).
+ * `scenario`:
+ *   - `promote`         — authorize → gate → eval-verify (when `evalRunId` set)
+ *                         → emit `deployment.promoted` (§E).
+ *   - `unauthorized`    — a principal lacking `deploy:promote`; MUST fail closed
+ *                         (`allowed:false`, no `deployment.promoted`) — the
+ *                         `deployment-promotion-fail-closed` invariant.
+ *   - `eval-gate-unmet` — promote with an `evalRunId` whose `EvalSummary.passed`
+ *                         is false; MUST deny with `eval_gate_unmet` (§E-3).
+ *   - `channel-pin`     — start a `@channel`-bound run; the resolved version is
+ *                         recorded as `resolvedAgentVersion` on
+ *                         `agent.invocation.started` (§B).
+ * Returns null when the seam is unwired (404/405).
+ */
+export async function driveDeploymentTransition(
+  body: {
+    scenario: 'promote' | 'unauthorized' | 'eval-gate-unmet' | 'channel-pin';
+    agentId?: string;
+    version?: string;
+    channel?: string;
+    evalRunId?: string;
+  },
+): Promise<TransitionResult | null> {
+  const res = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition', body);
+  if (res.status === 404 || res.status === 405) return null;
+  return (res.json as TransitionResult | undefined) ?? {};
+}
+
+/** The seven-state lifecycle vocabulary (RFC 0082 §C). */
+export const DEPLOYMENT_STATES = [
+  'draft',
+  'test',
+  'staged',
+  'active',
+  'paused',
+  'deprecated',
+  'rolled-back',
+];
+
+/** Content keys a `deployment.*` event / record MUST NEVER carry (SECURITY
+ *  invariant `deployment-event-no-content-leak`, SR-1): manifest body, prompt,
+ *  or credential material. */
+export const DEPLOYMENT_CONTENT_FORBIDDEN = [
+  'manifestBody',
+  'manifest',
+  'prompt',
+  'systemPrompt',
+  'body',
+  'secret',
+  'credentials',
+  'token',
+  'apiKey',
+];

package/src/lib/agentEval.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+/**
+ * Shared helpers for the RFC 0081 `agents.evalSuite` conformance scenario.
+ * Lives in lib/ (not a `*.test.ts`) so scenarios import it via
+ * `../lib/agentEval.js`.
+ *
+ * Two surfaces:
+ *   - the NORMATIVE read (`GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary`, RFC 0081 §C),
+ *     exercised black-box; and
+ *   - the host-sample eval-run seam (`POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run`),
+ *     used to drive the §B `mode:"eval"` projection so the `eval.*` ordering +
+ *     the terminal `EvalSummary` can be asserted against the test event-log
+ *     seam. The seam is OPTIONAL — scenarios soft-skip on 404/405 (the
+ *     reference eval projection is deferred per RFC 0081 §Conformance).
+ *
+ * Gating uses the `agents.evalSuite.supported` capability flag from the live
+ * discovery doc (root-first per RFC 0073).
+ *
+ * @see RFCS/0081-agent-evaluation-and-scorecards.md
+ * @see spec/v1/agent-evaluation.md
+ */
+import { driver } from './driver.js';
+import { readCapabilityFamily } from './discovery-capabilities.js';
+
+/** Reads `agents.evalSuite` from discovery (root-first per RFC 0073); null when
+ *  unadvertised. */
+export async function readEvalSuiteCap(): Promise<Record<string, unknown> | null> {
+  const agents = await readCapabilityFamily<{ evalSuite?: unknown }>('agents');
+  const es = agents?.evalSuite;
+  return es && typeof es === 'object' ? (es as Record<string, unknown>) : null;
+}
+
+export interface EvalRunResult {
+  runId?: string;
+  suiteId?: string;
+  suiteVersion?: string;
+  taskCount?: number;
+  passed?: boolean;
+  aggregateScore?: number;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Drive one `mode:"eval"` projection through the host-sample eval-run seam
+ * (RFC 0081 §B). `body.modes` selects the eval modes (default golden); the host
+ * picks a default agent + a built-in golden suite when `agentId` is omitted.
+ * Returns null when the seam is unwired (404/405).
+ */
+export async function driveEvalRun(
+  body: { agentId?: string; modes?: string[]; taskCount?: number } = {},
+): Promise<EvalRunResult | null> {
+  const res = await driver.post('/v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run', body);
+  if (res.status === 404 || res.status === 405) return null;
+  return (res.json as EvalRunResult | undefined) ?? {};
+}
+
+/** GET the NORMATIVE eval scorecard (RFC 0081 §C
+ *  `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary`); returns `{ status, summary }` so a
+ *  caller can distinguish a 404 (not-an-eval-run / unadvertised) or 409 (still
+ *  running) from a served summary. */
+export async function getEvalSummary(
+  runId: string,
+): Promise<{ status: number; summary: Record<string, unknown> | undefined }> {
+  const res = await driver.get(`/v1/runs/${encodeURIComponent(runId)}/eval-summary`);
+  return { status: res.status, summary: res.json as Record<string, unknown> | undefined };
+}
+
+/** The closed five-mode vocabulary (RFC 0081 §D). */
+export const EVAL_MODES = ['golden', 'rubric', 'adversarial', 'regression', 'live-shadow'];
+
+/** Content keys an `eval.*` event / `EvalSummary` task entry MUST NEVER carry
+ *  (SECURITY invariant `eval-summary-no-content-leak`, SR-1): task output,
+ *  rubric prose, model completion, prompt, or credential material. */
+export const EVAL_CONTENT_FORBIDDEN = [
+  'taskOutput',
+  'output',
+  'rubric',
+  'completion',
+  'prompt',
+  'body',
+  'secret',
+  'credentials',
+  'token',
+  'apiKey',
+];

package/src/scenarios/agent-deployment-lifecycle.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+/**
+ * Agent deployment lifecycle — the §E promotion contract + §B channel pin
+ * (RFC 0082) — behavioral.
+ *
+ * Capability-gated on `agents.deployment.supported` (root-first per RFC 0073).
+ * Soft-skips when unadvertised (default) / hard-fails under
+ * `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`. The always-on wire-shape coverage lives in
+ * `agent-deployment-shape.test.ts`; this asserts host BEHAVIOR via the
+ * `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/deployment-transition` seam + the test event-log
+ * seam + the NORMATIVE `GET /v1/agents/{agentId}/deployments` read:
+ *
+ *   1. PROMOTE (§E) — authorize → approvalGate → eval-verify → a content-free
+ *      `deployment.promoted` with `toState` in the seven-state vocabulary; the
+ *      returned record validates against `agent-deployment.schema.json`.
+ *   2. FAIL-CLOSED (§E-1, `deployment-promotion-fail-closed`) — a principal
+ *      lacking `deploy:promote` is denied (`allowed !== true`) and emits NO
+ *      `deployment.promoted`.
+ *   3. EVAL-GATE-UNMET (§E-3) — a promote whose `evalRunId` has `passed:false`
+ *      is denied with `eval_gate_unmet` and emits NO `deployment.promoted`.
+ *   4. CHANNEL PIN (§B) — a `@channel`-bound run records the resolved version as
+ *      `resolvedAgentVersion` on `agent.invocation.started` (the recorded fact a
+ *      replay re-reads rather than re-resolving).
+ *
+ * Each leg soft-skips independently (seam absent / event-log seam absent).
+ *
+ * Spec references:
+ *   - https://github.com/openwop/openwop/blob/main/spec/v1/agent-deployment.md (§B/§E)
+ *   - https://github.com/openwop/openwop/blob/main/RFCS/0082-agent-deployment-lifecycle.md
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import Ajv2020 from 'ajv/dist/2020.js';
+import addFormats from 'ajv-formats';
+import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
+import { behaviorGate } from '../lib/behavior-gate.js';
+import { SCHEMAS_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
+import {
+  readDeploymentCap,
+  driveDeploymentTransition,
+  DEPLOYMENT_STATES,
+  DEPLOYMENT_CONTENT_FORBIDDEN,
+} from '../lib/agentDeployment.js';
+import { queryTestEvents, isEventLogSeamAvailable, resetTestSeam } from '../lib/event-log-query.js';
+
+function loadSchema(name: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  return JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(SCHEMAS_DIR, name), 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+function expectContentFree(payload: Record<string, unknown>, where: string): void {
+  for (const f of DEPLOYMENT_CONTENT_FORBIDDEN) {
+    expect(
+      !(f in payload),
+      driver.describe('RFC 0082 §D (deployment-event-no-content-leak)', `${where} MUST be content-free (no ${f})`),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  }
+}
+
+describe('agent-deployment-lifecycle (RFC 0082 §B/§E)', () => {
+  it('promotes via the eval+RBAC+approval gate, fails closed without scope/eval, and pins the channel version', async () => {
+    const cap = await readDeploymentCap();
+    if (!behaviorGate('openwop-deployment-lifecycle', cap?.supported === true)) return;
+    if (!(await isEventLogSeamAvailable())) return; // event-log seam absent — soft-skip
+
+    const ajv = new Ajv2020({ strict: false, allErrors: true });
+    addFormats(ajv);
+    const validateRecord = ajv.compile(loadSchema('agent-deployment.schema.json'));
+
+    // ---- Leg 1: eval+RBAC+approval-gated promotion (§E) ------------------
+    const promote = await driveDeploymentTransition({ scenario: 'promote' });
+    if (promote === null) return; // deployment seam unwired — soft-skip the whole behavioral suite
+
+    if (promote.record) {
+      expect(
+        validateRecord(promote.record),
+        driver.describe(
+          'agent-deployment.schema.json',
+          `a promoted deployment record MUST validate (${ajv.errorsText(validateRecord.errors)})`,
+        ),
+      ).toBe(true);
+    }
+    if (promote.runId) {
+      const pq = await queryTestEvents(promote.runId, { type: 'deployment.promoted' });
+      if (pq.ok) {
+        for (const e of pq.events) {
+          expectContentFree(e.payload, 'deployment.promoted');
+          expect(
+            typeof e.payload.toState === 'string' && DEPLOYMENT_STATES.includes(e.payload.toState as string),
+            driver.describe('run-event-payloads.schema.json#/$defs/deploymentPromoted', 'toState MUST be in the seven-state vocabulary'),
+          ).toBe(true);
+          expect(
+            typeof e.payload.toVersion === 'string' && (e.payload.toVersion as string).length > 0,
+            driver.describe('agent-deployment.md §D', 'deployment.promoted MUST carry the promoted toVersion'),
+          ).toBe(true);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ---- Leg 2: fail-closed authz (§E-1; deployment-promotion-fail-closed) -
+    const unauth = await driveDeploymentTransition({ scenario: 'unauthorized' });
+    if (unauth && unauth.runId) {
+      expect(
+        unauth.allowed !== true,
+        driver.describe('agent-deployment.md §E-1', 'a principal without deploy:promote MUST be denied (fail-closed)'),
+      ).toBe(true);
+      const uq = await queryTestEvents(unauth.runId, { type: 'deployment.promoted' });
+      if (uq.ok) {
+        expect(
+          uq.events.length === 0,
+          driver.describe('SECURITY invariant deployment-promotion-fail-closed', 'a denied transition MUST emit NO deployment.promoted'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ---- Leg 3: eval-gate-unmet denial (§E-3) ----------------------------
+    const evalUnmet = await driveDeploymentTransition({ scenario: 'eval-gate-unmet' });
+    if (evalUnmet && evalUnmet.runId) {
+      expect(
+        evalUnmet.error === 'eval_gate_unmet' || evalUnmet.allowed !== true,
+        driver.describe('agent-deployment.md §E-3', 'a promote whose eval evidence has passed:false MUST be denied (eval_gate_unmet)'),
+      ).toBe(true);
+      const eq = await queryTestEvents(evalUnmet.runId, { type: 'deployment.promoted' });
+      if (eq.ok) {
+        expect(
+          eq.events.length === 0,
+          driver.describe('agent-deployment.md §E-3', 'an unmet eval gate MUST emit NO deployment.promoted'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+    }
+
+    // ---- Leg 4: channel-resolution pin (§B) ------------------------------
+    const pin = await driveDeploymentTransition({ scenario: 'channel-pin', channel: 'stable' });
+    if (pin && pin.runId) {
+      const iq = await queryTestEvents(pin.runId, { type: 'agent.invocation.started' });
+      if (iq.ok && iq.events.length > 0) {
+        const started = iq.events.sort((a, b) => a.sequence - b.sequence)[0]!;
+        expect(
+          typeof started.payload.resolvedAgentVersion === 'string' && (started.payload.resolvedAgentVersion as string).length > 0,
+          driver.describe('agent-deployment.md §B', 'a @channel-bound run MUST record resolvedAgentVersion on agent.invocation.started (the recorded fact a replay re-reads)'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+    }
+
+    await resetTestSeam();
+  });
+});

package/src/scenarios/agent-eval-run.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/**
+ * Agent eval-run — the `mode:"eval"` projection (RFC 0081 §B/§C) — behavioral.
+ *
+ * Capability-gated on `agents.evalSuite.supported` (root-first per RFC 0073).
+ * Soft-skips when unadvertised (default) / hard-fails under
+ * `OPENWOP_REQUIRE_BEHAVIOR=true`. The always-on wire-shape coverage lives in
+ * `agent-eval-suite-shape.test.ts`; this asserts host BEHAVIOR via the
+ * `POST /v1/host/sample/agents/eval-run` seam + the test event-log seam + the
+ * NORMATIVE `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` read:
+ *
+ *   1. ORDERING (§C) — an eval run emits `eval.started` FIRST, one `eval.scored`
+ *      per task, then `eval.completed` once (count == eval.completed.taskCount).
+ *   2. CONTENT-FREE (SR-1 / `eval-summary-no-content-leak`) — every `eval.scored`
+ *      carries scores / ids / scalars ONLY (never task output / rubric / prose);
+ *      `score` ∈ 0..1; `passed` is a boolean.
+ *   3. NORMATIVE SUMMARY (§C) — `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary` returns a
+ *      schema-valid `EvalSummary` whose `passedCount <= taskCount` and whose
+ *      task entries carry no output body.
+ *
+ * Each leg soft-skips independently (seam absent / event-log seam absent).
+ *
+ * Spec references:
+ *   - https://github.com/openwop/openwop/blob/main/spec/v1/agent-evaluation.md (§B/§C)
+ *   - https://github.com/openwop/openwop/blob/main/RFCS/0081-agent-evaluation-and-scorecards.md
+ */
+
+import { describe, it, expect } from 'vitest';
+import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs';
+import { join } from 'node:path';
+import Ajv2020 from 'ajv/dist/2020.js';
+import addFormats from 'ajv-formats';
+import { driver } from '../lib/driver.js';
+import { behaviorGate } from '../lib/behavior-gate.js';
+import { SCHEMAS_DIR } from '../lib/paths.js';
+import {
+  readEvalSuiteCap,
+  driveEvalRun,
+  getEvalSummary,
+  EVAL_CONTENT_FORBIDDEN,
+} from '../lib/agentEval.js';
+import { queryTestEvents, isEventLogSeamAvailable, resetTestSeam } from '../lib/event-log-query.js';
+
+function loadSchema(name: string): Record<string, unknown> {
+  return JSON.parse(readFileSync(join(SCHEMAS_DIR, name), 'utf8')) as Record<string, unknown>;
+}
+
+function expectContentFree(payload: Record<string, unknown>, where: string): void {
+  for (const f of EVAL_CONTENT_FORBIDDEN) {
+    expect(
+      !(f in payload),
+      driver.describe('RFC 0081 §C (eval-summary-no-content-leak)', `${where} MUST be content-free (no ${f})`),
+    ).toBe(true);
+  }
+}
+
+describe('agent-eval-run (RFC 0081 §B/§C)', () => {
+  it('emits eval.started → per-task eval.scored → eval.completed and serves a content-free EvalSummary', async () => {
+    const cap = await readEvalSuiteCap();
+    if (!behaviorGate('openwop-eval-run', cap?.supported === true)) return;
+    if (!(await isEventLogSeamAvailable())) return; // event-log seam absent — soft-skip
+
+    const run = await driveEvalRun({ modes: ['golden'] });
+    if (run === null) return; // eval-run seam unwired — soft-skip the whole behavioral suite
+    if (!run.runId) return;
+
+    // ---- Legs 1+2: eval.* ordering + content-free (§C) -------------------
+    const startedQ = await queryTestEvents(run.runId, { type: 'eval.started' });
+    const scoredQ = await queryTestEvents(run.runId, { type: 'eval.scored' });
+    const completedQ = await queryTestEvents(run.runId, { type: 'eval.completed' });
+
+    if (startedQ.ok && scoredQ.ok && startedQ.events.length > 0) {
+      const started = startedQ.events.sort((a, b) => a.sequence - b.sequence)[0]!;
+
+      // eval.started precedes every eval.scored (§C ordering).
+      for (const s of scoredQ.events) {
+        expect(
+          started.sequence < s.sequence,
+          driver.describe('agent-evaluation.md §C', 'eval.started MUST precede every eval.scored'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+
+      if (completedQ.ok && completedQ.events.length > 0) {
+        const completed = completedQ.events.sort((a, b) => a.sequence - b.sequence)[completedQ.events.length - 1]!;
+        for (const s of scoredQ.events) {
+          expect(
+            s.sequence < completed.sequence,
+            driver.describe('agent-evaluation.md §C', 'every eval.scored MUST precede eval.completed'),
+          ).toBe(true);
+        }
+        // eval.scored is emitted once per task (count == eval.completed.taskCount).
+        if (typeof completed.payload.taskCount === 'number') {
+          expect(
+            scoredQ.events.length === completed.payload.taskCount,
+            driver.describe('agent-evaluation.md §C', 'one eval.scored per task (count == eval.completed.taskCount)'),
+          ).toBe(true);
+        }
+        expectContentFree(completed.payload, 'eval.completed');
+      }
+
+      // each eval.scored content-free + score ∈ 0..1, passed boolean.
+      for (const s of scoredQ.events) {
+        expectContentFree(s.payload, 'eval.scored');
+        expect(
+          typeof s.payload.score === 'number' && (s.payload.score as number) >= 0 && (s.payload.score as number) <= 1,
+          driver.describe('run-event-payloads.schema.json#/$defs/evalScored', 'eval.scored.score MUST be in 0..1'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+        expect(
+          typeof s.payload.passed === 'boolean',
+          driver.describe('run-event-payloads.schema.json#/$defs/evalScored', 'eval.scored.passed MUST be a boolean'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+      expectContentFree(started.payload, 'eval.started');
+    }
+
+    // ---- Leg 3: NORMATIVE EvalSummary read (§C) --------------------------
+    const { status, summary } = await getEvalSummary(run.runId);
+    if (status === 200 && summary) {
+      const ajv = new Ajv2020({ strict: false, allErrors: true });
+      addFormats(ajv);
+      const validate = ajv.compile(loadSchema('eval-summary.schema.json'));
+      expect(
+        validate(summary),
+        driver.describe(
+          'eval-summary.schema.json',
+          `GET /v1/runs/{runId}/eval-summary MUST return a schema-valid EvalSummary (${ajv.errorsText(validate.errors)})`,
+        ),
+      ).toBe(true);
+
+      const tasks = (summary.tasks as Array<Record<string, unknown>> | undefined) ?? [];
+      const passedCount = summary.passedCount as number | undefined;
+      const taskCount = summary.taskCount as number | undefined;
+      if (typeof passedCount === 'number' && typeof taskCount === 'number') {
+        expect(
+          passedCount <= taskCount,
+          driver.describe('agent-evaluation.md §C', 'EvalSummary.passedCount MUST NOT exceed taskCount'),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      }
+      for (const t of tasks) {
+        expectContentFree(t, 'EvalSummary.tasks[]');
+      }
+    }
+
+    await resetTestSeam();
+  });
+});