@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.8.2 → 0.9.0

package/dist/vault/upsert/0.2/payload.d.ts

@@ -279,16 +279,1290 @@ export type Payload = VaultUpsertPayload;
 export declare const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.2#response";
 /** Stable alias for this specification's success-response payload shape. */
 export type Response = VaultUpsertResponsePayload;
+/**
+ * This specification's payload schema, as a value.
+ *
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 item 2 is performed against this. It is shipped as data
+ * rather than only as a `.json` file because TypeScript types are erased
+ * at runtime: without a schema a consumer has nothing to validate, and
+ * every REQUIRED payload member is optional in practice. Cross-file
+ * `$ref`s are already inlined, so it needs no resolver.
+ */
+export declare const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
+    readonly $schema: "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema";
+    readonly $id: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.2";
+    readonly title: "Vault Upsert — payload";
+    readonly description: "Create a new vault entry or update an existing one. The secret material — if present — rides inside a pluggable cipher envelope (see `vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope`), so the Trust Task carries ciphertext and an authenticator, not plaintext. Updates may be partial: any populated metadata field replaces the current value; omitted fields are left untouched; explicit null clears the field (per `clearFields`). Optimistic-concurrency check via `expectedVersion`.";
+    readonly type: "object";
+    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+    readonly required: readonly ["contextId", "targets", "label", "secretKind"];
+    readonly properties: {
+        readonly id: {
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly minLength: 1;
+            readonly description: "Entry id. Omit to create; supply to update. Maintainers MAY accept consumer-supplied ids on create (recommended: ULID) or MAY assign their own and return the assigned id in the response.";
+        };
+        readonly expectedVersion: {
+            readonly type: "integer";
+            readonly minimum: 0;
+            readonly description: "When updating, the consumer's last-observed `version` for the entry. The maintainer rejects with `vault/upsert:version_conflict` if the current version differs. Omit on create.";
+        };
+        readonly contextId: {
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly minLength: 1;
+            readonly description: "Trust context the entry belongs to. Cannot be changed by upsert; to move an entry between contexts the consumer MUST delete and recreate.";
+        };
+        readonly targets: {
+            readonly type: "array";
+            readonly minItems: 1;
+            readonly items: {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SiteTarget";
+            };
+        };
+        readonly label: {
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly minLength: 1;
+        };
+        readonly secretKind: {
+            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SecretKind";
+        };
+        readonly tags: {
+            readonly type: "array";
+            readonly items: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly minLength: 1;
+                readonly maxLength: 64;
+            };
+            readonly uniqueItems: true;
+        };
+        readonly notes: {
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly maxLength: 4096;
+        };
+        readonly favicon: {
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly format: "uri";
+        };
+        readonly selectors: {
+            readonly type: "array";
+            readonly items: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly minLength: 1;
+            };
+            readonly uniqueItems: true;
+        };
+        readonly customFieldNames: {
+            readonly type: "array";
+            readonly items: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly minLength: 1;
+                readonly maxLength: 128;
+            };
+            readonly uniqueItems: true;
+        };
+        readonly expiresAt: {
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly format: "date-time";
+        };
+        readonly sealedSecret: {
+            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SealedEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "Pluggable cipher envelope (discriminated by `envelope`) whose cleartext is a JCS-canonical JSON conforming to `vault/_shared/0.1/vault-secret#/$defs/VaultSecret`. The supported envelope kinds are listed in the SealedEnvelope shared schema; M2A consumers reject any kind they don't implement with `vault/upsert:envelope_unsupported`. REQUIRED on create unless `secretKind` is `didSelfIssued` or `didcommPeer` (those carry only references to maintainer-internal key ids and have no extra secret bytes). On update, omit if the secret material is unchanged; populate if the secret is being rotated.";
+        };
+        readonly clearFields: {
+            readonly type: "array";
+            readonly items: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly enum: readonly ["notes", "favicon", "expiresAt", "tags", "selectors", "customFieldNames"];
+            };
+            readonly uniqueItems: true;
+            readonly description: "List of metadata fields to explicitly clear on this upsert. Distinguishes \"don't touch\" (field omitted from payload) from \"clear\" (field listed here).";
+        };
+        readonly ext: {
+            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+        };
+    };
+    readonly $defs: {
+        readonly Response: {
+            readonly $anchor: "response";
+            readonly title: "Vault Upsert — response payload";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["entry"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly entry: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/VaultEntry";
+                };
+                readonly created: {
+                    readonly type: "boolean";
+                    readonly description: "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one.";
+                };
+                readonly ext: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly Ext: {
+            readonly title: "Ext";
+            readonly description: "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly minProperties: 1;
+            readonly additionalProperties: true;
+            readonly propertyNames: {
+                readonly pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$";
+            };
+        };
+        readonly VaultEntry: {
+            readonly title: "VaultEntry";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["id", "contextId", "targets", "label", "secretKind", "createdAt", "updatedAt", "version"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly id: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality.";
+                };
+                readonly contextId: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side.";
+                };
+                readonly targets: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly minItems: 1;
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SiteTarget";
+                    };
+                    readonly description: "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level).";
+                };
+                readonly label: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not.";
+                };
+                readonly secretKind: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SecretKind";
+                    readonly description: "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind.";
+                };
+                readonly tags: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly maxLength: 64;
+                    };
+                    readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                    readonly description: "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not.";
+                };
+                readonly notes: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly maxLength: 4096;
+                    readonly description: "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1.";
+                };
+                readonly favicon: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "uri";
+                    readonly description: "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline.";
+                };
+                readonly selectors: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                    };
+                    readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                    readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side.";
+                };
+                readonly customFieldNames: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly maxLength: 128;
+                    };
+                    readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                    readonly description: "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release.";
+                };
+                readonly attachments: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/AttachmentRef";
+                    };
+                    readonly description: "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor.";
+                };
+                readonly expiresAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning.";
+                };
+                readonly breachedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach.";
+                };
+                readonly passwordChangedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings.";
+                };
+                readonly createdAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                };
+                readonly createdBy: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly description: "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry.";
+                };
+                readonly updatedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                };
+                readonly updatedBy: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly description: "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry.";
+                };
+                readonly lastUsedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer.";
+                };
+                readonly version: {
+                    readonly type: "integer";
+                    readonly minimum: 0;
+                    readonly description: "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync.";
+                };
+                readonly principalDid: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret.";
+                };
+                readonly ext: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                    readonly description: "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly AttachmentRef: {
+            readonly title: "AttachmentRef";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["id", "name", "sizeBytes", "sha256"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly id: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism.";
+                };
+                readonly name: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly maxLength: 256;
+                    readonly description: "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\").";
+                };
+                readonly sizeBytes: {
+                    readonly type: "integer";
+                    readonly minimum: 0;
+                    readonly description: "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry.";
+                };
+                readonly sha256: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$";
+                    readonly description: "Hex-encoded SHA-256 of the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption). Lets the consumer verify integrity after fetch.";
+                };
+                readonly contentType: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly description: "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\").";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly SecretKind: {
+            readonly title: "SecretKind";
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly enum: readonly ["password", "passkey", "oauthTokens", "didSelfIssued", "didcommPeer", "bearerToken", "sshKey", "custom"];
+            readonly description: "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation.";
+        };
+        readonly SiteTarget: {
+            readonly title: "SiteTarget";
+            readonly description: "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.";
+            readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                readonly title: "WebOrigin";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "origin"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "webOrigin";
+                    };
+                    readonly origin: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "uri";
+                        readonly description: "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.";
+                    };
+                };
+            }, {
+                readonly title: "Did";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "did"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "did";
+                    };
+                    readonly did: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.";
+                    };
+                };
+            }, {
+                readonly title: "IosApp";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "bundleId"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "iosApp";
+                    };
+                    readonly bundleId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$";
+                        readonly description: "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).";
+                    };
+                    readonly teamId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly pattern: "^[A-Z0-9]+$";
+                        readonly description: "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.";
+                    };
+                };
+            }, {
+                readonly title: "AndroidApp";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "packageName", "sha256CertFingerprints"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "androidApp";
+                    };
+                    readonly packageName: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$";
+                        readonly description: "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\").";
+                    };
+                    readonly sha256CertFingerprints: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly minItems: 1;
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly pattern: "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$";
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).";
+                    };
+                };
+            }];
+        };
+        readonly SealedEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "SealedEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.";
+            readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+            }, {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+            }, {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope";
+            }];
+        };
+        readonly TspMessageEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "TspMessageEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "message"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly envelope: {
+                    readonly const: "tspMessage";
+                };
+                readonly message: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly HpkeArmoredEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "armored", "recipientKeyId"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly envelope: {
+                    readonly const: "hpkeArmored";
+                };
+                readonly armored: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.";
+                };
+                readonly recipientKeyId: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.";
+                };
+                readonly producerAssertion: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly enum: readonly ["didSigned", "attested", "pinnedOnly"];
+                    readonly default: "didSigned";
+                    readonly description: "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "jwe"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly envelope: {
+                    readonly const: "didcommAuthcrypt";
+                };
+                readonly jwe: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+    };
+};
+/** As {@link PAYLOAD_SCHEMA}, for the success-response variant. */
+export declare const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
+    readonly $schema: "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema";
+    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Response";
+    readonly $defs: {
+        readonly Response: {
+            readonly $anchor: "response";
+            readonly title: "Vault Upsert — response payload";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["entry"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly entry: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/VaultEntry";
+                };
+                readonly created: {
+                    readonly type: "boolean";
+                    readonly description: "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one.";
+                };
+                readonly ext: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly Ext: {
+            readonly title: "Ext";
+            readonly description: "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly minProperties: 1;
+            readonly additionalProperties: true;
+            readonly propertyNames: {
+                readonly pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$";
+            };
+        };
+        readonly VaultEntry: {
+            readonly title: "VaultEntry";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["id", "contextId", "targets", "label", "secretKind", "createdAt", "updatedAt", "version"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly id: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality.";
+                };
+                readonly contextId: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side.";
+                };
+                readonly targets: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly minItems: 1;
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SiteTarget";
+                    };
+                    readonly description: "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level).";
+                };
+                readonly label: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not.";
+                };
+                readonly secretKind: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SecretKind";
+                    readonly description: "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind.";
+                };
+                readonly tags: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly maxLength: 64;
+                    };
+                    readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                    readonly description: "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not.";
+                };
+                readonly notes: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly maxLength: 4096;
+                    readonly description: "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1.";
+                };
+                readonly favicon: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "uri";
+                    readonly description: "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline.";
+                };
+                readonly selectors: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                    };
+                    readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                    readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side.";
+                };
+                readonly customFieldNames: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly maxLength: 128;
+                    };
+                    readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                    readonly description: "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release.";
+                };
+                readonly attachments: {
+                    readonly type: "array";
+                    readonly items: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/AttachmentRef";
+                    };
+                    readonly description: "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor.";
+                };
+                readonly expiresAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning.";
+                };
+                readonly breachedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach.";
+                };
+                readonly passwordChangedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings.";
+                };
+                readonly createdAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                };
+                readonly createdBy: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly description: "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry.";
+                };
+                readonly updatedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                };
+                readonly updatedBy: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly description: "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry.";
+                };
+                readonly lastUsedAt: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly format: "date-time";
+                    readonly description: "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer.";
+                };
+                readonly version: {
+                    readonly type: "integer";
+                    readonly minimum: 0;
+                    readonly description: "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync.";
+                };
+                readonly principalDid: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret.";
+                };
+                readonly ext: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                    readonly description: "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly AttachmentRef: {
+            readonly title: "AttachmentRef";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["id", "name", "sizeBytes", "sha256"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly id: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism.";
+                };
+                readonly name: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly maxLength: 256;
+                    readonly description: "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\").";
+                };
+                readonly sizeBytes: {
+                    readonly type: "integer";
+                    readonly minimum: 0;
+                    readonly description: "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry.";
+                };
+                readonly sha256: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$";
+                    readonly description: "Hex-encoded SHA-256 of the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption). Lets the consumer verify integrity after fetch.";
+                };
+                readonly contentType: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly description: "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\").";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly SecretKind: {
+            readonly title: "SecretKind";
+            readonly type: "string";
+            readonly enum: readonly ["password", "passkey", "oauthTokens", "didSelfIssued", "didcommPeer", "bearerToken", "sshKey", "custom"];
+            readonly description: "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation.";
+        };
+        readonly SiteTarget: {
+            readonly title: "SiteTarget";
+            readonly description: "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.";
+            readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                readonly title: "WebOrigin";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "origin"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "webOrigin";
+                    };
+                    readonly origin: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "uri";
+                        readonly description: "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.";
+                    };
+                };
+            }, {
+                readonly title: "Did";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "did"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "did";
+                    };
+                    readonly did: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.";
+                    };
+                };
+            }, {
+                readonly title: "IosApp";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "bundleId"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "iosApp";
+                    };
+                    readonly bundleId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$";
+                        readonly description: "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).";
+                    };
+                    readonly teamId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly pattern: "^[A-Z0-9]+$";
+                        readonly description: "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.";
+                    };
+                };
+            }, {
+                readonly title: "AndroidApp";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["kind", "packageName", "sha256CertFingerprints"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly kind: {
+                        readonly const: "androidApp";
+                    };
+                    readonly packageName: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$";
+                        readonly description: "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\").";
+                    };
+                    readonly sha256CertFingerprints: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly minItems: 1;
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly pattern: "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$";
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).";
+                    };
+                };
+            }];
+        };
+        readonly SealedEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "SealedEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.";
+            readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+            }, {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+            }, {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope";
+            }];
+        };
+        readonly TspMessageEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "TspMessageEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "message"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly envelope: {
+                    readonly const: "tspMessage";
+                };
+                readonly message: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly HpkeArmoredEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "armored", "recipientKeyId"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly envelope: {
+                    readonly const: "hpkeArmored";
+                };
+                readonly armored: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.";
+                };
+                readonly recipientKeyId: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.";
+                };
+                readonly producerAssertion: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly enum: readonly ["didSigned", "attested", "pinnedOnly"];
+                    readonly default: "didSigned";
+                    readonly description: "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+        readonly DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope: {
+            readonly title: "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+            readonly description: "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.";
+            readonly type: "object";
+            readonly additionalProperties: false;
+            readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "jwe"];
+            readonly properties: {
+                readonly envelope: {
+                    readonly const: "didcommAuthcrypt";
+                };
+                readonly jwe: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly description: "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.";
+                };
+            };
+        };
+    };
+};
 /**
  * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
  * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
- * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone.
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone, and
+ * item 2 needs the schema this carries.
  */
 export declare const SPEC: {
     readonly typeUri: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.2";
     readonly isBearer: false;
     readonly isProofRequired: true;
     readonly isRecipientRequired: true;
+    readonly payloadSchema: {
+        readonly $schema: "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema";
+        readonly $id: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.2";
+        readonly title: "Vault Upsert — payload";
+        readonly description: "Create a new vault entry or update an existing one. The secret material — if present — rides inside a pluggable cipher envelope (see `vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope`), so the Trust Task carries ciphertext and an authenticator, not plaintext. Updates may be partial: any populated metadata field replaces the current value; omitted fields are left untouched; explicit null clears the field (per `clearFields`). Optimistic-concurrency check via `expectedVersion`.";
+        readonly type: "object";
+        readonly additionalProperties: false;
+        readonly required: readonly ["contextId", "targets", "label", "secretKind"];
+        readonly properties: {
+            readonly id: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly minLength: 1;
+                readonly description: "Entry id. Omit to create; supply to update. Maintainers MAY accept consumer-supplied ids on create (recommended: ULID) or MAY assign their own and return the assigned id in the response.";
+            };
+            readonly expectedVersion: {
+                readonly type: "integer";
+                readonly minimum: 0;
+                readonly description: "When updating, the consumer's last-observed `version` for the entry. The maintainer rejects with `vault/upsert:version_conflict` if the current version differs. Omit on create.";
+            };
+            readonly contextId: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly minLength: 1;
+                readonly description: "Trust context the entry belongs to. Cannot be changed by upsert; to move an entry between contexts the consumer MUST delete and recreate.";
+            };
+            readonly targets: {
+                readonly type: "array";
+                readonly minItems: 1;
+                readonly items: {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SiteTarget";
+                };
+            };
+            readonly label: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly minLength: 1;
+            };
+            readonly secretKind: {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SecretKind";
+            };
+            readonly tags: {
+                readonly type: "array";
+                readonly items: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly maxLength: 64;
+                };
+                readonly uniqueItems: true;
+            };
+            readonly notes: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly maxLength: 4096;
+            };
+            readonly favicon: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly format: "uri";
+            };
+            readonly selectors: {
+                readonly type: "array";
+                readonly items: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                };
+                readonly uniqueItems: true;
+            };
+            readonly customFieldNames: {
+                readonly type: "array";
+                readonly items: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly minLength: 1;
+                    readonly maxLength: 128;
+                };
+                readonly uniqueItems: true;
+            };
+            readonly expiresAt: {
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly format: "date-time";
+            };
+            readonly sealedSecret: {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SealedEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "Pluggable cipher envelope (discriminated by `envelope`) whose cleartext is a JCS-canonical JSON conforming to `vault/_shared/0.1/vault-secret#/$defs/VaultSecret`. The supported envelope kinds are listed in the SealedEnvelope shared schema; M2A consumers reject any kind they don't implement with `vault/upsert:envelope_unsupported`. REQUIRED on create unless `secretKind` is `didSelfIssued` or `didcommPeer` (those carry only references to maintainer-internal key ids and have no extra secret bytes). On update, omit if the secret material is unchanged; populate if the secret is being rotated.";
+            };
+            readonly clearFields: {
+                readonly type: "array";
+                readonly items: {
+                    readonly type: "string";
+                    readonly enum: readonly ["notes", "favicon", "expiresAt", "tags", "selectors", "customFieldNames"];
+                };
+                readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                readonly description: "List of metadata fields to explicitly clear on this upsert. Distinguishes \"don't touch\" (field omitted from payload) from \"clear\" (field listed here).";
+            };
+            readonly ext: {
+                readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+            };
+        };
+        readonly $defs: {
+            readonly Response: {
+                readonly $anchor: "response";
+                readonly title: "Vault Upsert — response payload";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["entry"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly entry: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/VaultEntry";
+                    };
+                    readonly created: {
+                        readonly type: "boolean";
+                        readonly description: "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one.";
+                    };
+                    readonly ext: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly Ext: {
+                readonly title: "Ext";
+                readonly description: "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly minProperties: 1;
+                readonly additionalProperties: true;
+                readonly propertyNames: {
+                    readonly pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$";
+                };
+            };
+            readonly VaultEntry: {
+                readonly title: "VaultEntry";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["id", "contextId", "targets", "label", "secretKind", "createdAt", "updatedAt", "version"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly id: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality.";
+                    };
+                    readonly contextId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side.";
+                    };
+                    readonly targets: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly minItems: 1;
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SiteTarget";
+                        };
+                        readonly description: "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level).";
+                    };
+                    readonly label: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not.";
+                    };
+                    readonly secretKind: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SecretKind";
+                        readonly description: "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind.";
+                    };
+                    readonly tags: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly maxLength: 64;
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not.";
+                    };
+                    readonly notes: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly maxLength: 4096;
+                        readonly description: "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1.";
+                    };
+                    readonly favicon: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "uri";
+                        readonly description: "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline.";
+                    };
+                    readonly selectors: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side.";
+                    };
+                    readonly customFieldNames: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly maxLength: 128;
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release.";
+                    };
+                    readonly attachments: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/AttachmentRef";
+                        };
+                        readonly description: "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor.";
+                    };
+                    readonly expiresAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning.";
+                    };
+                    readonly breachedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach.";
+                    };
+                    readonly passwordChangedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings.";
+                    };
+                    readonly createdAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                    };
+                    readonly createdBy: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly description: "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry.";
+                    };
+                    readonly updatedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                    };
+                    readonly updatedBy: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly description: "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry.";
+                    };
+                    readonly lastUsedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer.";
+                    };
+                    readonly version: {
+                        readonly type: "integer";
+                        readonly minimum: 0;
+                        readonly description: "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync.";
+                    };
+                    readonly principalDid: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret.";
+                    };
+                    readonly ext: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                        readonly description: "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly AttachmentRef: {
+                readonly title: "AttachmentRef";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["id", "name", "sizeBytes", "sha256"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly id: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism.";
+                    };
+                    readonly name: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly maxLength: 256;
+                        readonly description: "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\").";
+                    };
+                    readonly sizeBytes: {
+                        readonly type: "integer";
+                        readonly minimum: 0;
+                        readonly description: "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry.";
+                    };
+                    readonly sha256: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$";
+                        readonly description: "Hex-encoded SHA-256 of the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption). Lets the consumer verify integrity after fetch.";
+                    };
+                    readonly contentType: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly description: "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\").";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly SecretKind: {
+                readonly title: "SecretKind";
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly enum: readonly ["password", "passkey", "oauthTokens", "didSelfIssued", "didcommPeer", "bearerToken", "sshKey", "custom"];
+                readonly description: "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation.";
+            };
+            readonly SiteTarget: {
+                readonly title: "SiteTarget";
+                readonly description: "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.";
+                readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                    readonly title: "WebOrigin";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "origin"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "webOrigin";
+                        };
+                        readonly origin: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly format: "uri";
+                            readonly description: "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }, {
+                    readonly title: "Did";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "did"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "did";
+                        };
+                        readonly did: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly description: "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }, {
+                    readonly title: "IosApp";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "bundleId"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "iosApp";
+                        };
+                        readonly bundleId: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$";
+                            readonly description: "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).";
+                        };
+                        readonly teamId: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly pattern: "^[A-Z0-9]+$";
+                            readonly description: "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }, {
+                    readonly title: "AndroidApp";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "packageName", "sha256CertFingerprints"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "androidApp";
+                        };
+                        readonly packageName: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$";
+                            readonly description: "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\").";
+                        };
+                        readonly sha256CertFingerprints: {
+                            readonly type: "array";
+                            readonly minItems: 1;
+                            readonly items: {
+                                readonly type: "string";
+                                readonly pattern: "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$";
+                            };
+                            readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                            readonly description: "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }];
+            };
+            readonly SealedEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "SealedEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.";
+                readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+                }, {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+                }, {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope";
+                }];
+            };
+            readonly TspMessageEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "TspMessageEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "message"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly envelope: {
+                        readonly const: "tspMessage";
+                    };
+                    readonly message: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly HpkeArmoredEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "armored", "recipientKeyId"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly envelope: {
+                        readonly const: "hpkeArmored";
+                    };
+                    readonly armored: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.";
+                    };
+                    readonly recipientKeyId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.";
+                    };
+                    readonly producerAssertion: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly enum: readonly ["didSigned", "attested", "pinnedOnly"];
+                        readonly default: "didSigned";
+                        readonly description: "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "jwe"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly envelope: {
+                        readonly const: "didcommAuthcrypt";
+                    };
+                    readonly jwe: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+        };
+    };
 };
 /**
  * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the success-response variant. `isRecipientRequired`
@@ -300,5 +1574,366 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
     readonly isBearer: false;
     readonly isProofRequired: true;
     readonly isRecipientRequired: true;
+    readonly payloadSchema: {
+        readonly $schema: "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema";
+        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Response";
+        readonly $defs: {
+            readonly Response: {
+                readonly $anchor: "response";
+                readonly title: "Vault Upsert — response payload";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["entry"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly entry: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/VaultEntry";
+                    };
+                    readonly created: {
+                        readonly type: "boolean";
+                        readonly description: "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one.";
+                    };
+                    readonly ext: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly Ext: {
+                readonly title: "Ext";
+                readonly description: "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly minProperties: 1;
+                readonly additionalProperties: true;
+                readonly propertyNames: {
+                    readonly pattern: "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$";
+                };
+            };
+            readonly VaultEntry: {
+                readonly title: "VaultEntry";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["id", "contextId", "targets", "label", "secretKind", "createdAt", "updatedAt", "version"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly id: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality.";
+                    };
+                    readonly contextId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side.";
+                    };
+                    readonly targets: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly minItems: 1;
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SiteTarget";
+                        };
+                        readonly description: "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level).";
+                    };
+                    readonly label: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not.";
+                    };
+                    readonly secretKind: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/SecretKind";
+                        readonly description: "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind.";
+                    };
+                    readonly tags: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly maxLength: 64;
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not.";
+                    };
+                    readonly notes: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly maxLength: 4096;
+                        readonly description: "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1.";
+                    };
+                    readonly favicon: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "uri";
+                        readonly description: "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline.";
+                    };
+                    readonly selectors: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side.";
+                    };
+                    readonly customFieldNames: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly maxLength: 128;
+                        };
+                        readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                        readonly description: "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release.";
+                    };
+                    readonly attachments: {
+                        readonly type: "array";
+                        readonly items: {
+                            readonly $ref: "#/$defs/AttachmentRef";
+                        };
+                        readonly description: "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor.";
+                    };
+                    readonly expiresAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning.";
+                    };
+                    readonly breachedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach.";
+                    };
+                    readonly passwordChangedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings.";
+                    };
+                    readonly createdAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                    };
+                    readonly createdBy: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly description: "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry.";
+                    };
+                    readonly updatedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                    };
+                    readonly updatedBy: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly description: "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry.";
+                    };
+                    readonly lastUsedAt: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly format: "date-time";
+                        readonly description: "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer.";
+                    };
+                    readonly version: {
+                        readonly type: "integer";
+                        readonly minimum: 0;
+                        readonly description: "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync.";
+                    };
+                    readonly principalDid: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret.";
+                    };
+                    readonly ext: {
+                        readonly $ref: "#/$defs/Ext";
+                        readonly description: "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly AttachmentRef: {
+                readonly title: "AttachmentRef";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["id", "name", "sizeBytes", "sha256"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly id: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism.";
+                    };
+                    readonly name: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly maxLength: 256;
+                        readonly description: "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\").";
+                    };
+                    readonly sizeBytes: {
+                        readonly type: "integer";
+                        readonly minimum: 0;
+                        readonly description: "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry.";
+                    };
+                    readonly sha256: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly pattern: "^[0-9a-f]{64}$";
+                        readonly description: "Hex-encoded SHA-256 of the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption). Lets the consumer verify integrity after fetch.";
+                    };
+                    readonly contentType: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly description: "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\").";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly SecretKind: {
+                readonly title: "SecretKind";
+                readonly type: "string";
+                readonly enum: readonly ["password", "passkey", "oauthTokens", "didSelfIssued", "didcommPeer", "bearerToken", "sshKey", "custom"];
+                readonly description: "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation.";
+            };
+            readonly SiteTarget: {
+                readonly title: "SiteTarget";
+                readonly description: "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.";
+                readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                    readonly title: "WebOrigin";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "origin"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "webOrigin";
+                        };
+                        readonly origin: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly format: "uri";
+                            readonly description: "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }, {
+                    readonly title: "Did";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "did"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "did";
+                        };
+                        readonly did: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly description: "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }, {
+                    readonly title: "IosApp";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "bundleId"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "iosApp";
+                        };
+                        readonly bundleId: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$";
+                            readonly description: "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).";
+                        };
+                        readonly teamId: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly pattern: "^[A-Z0-9]+$";
+                            readonly description: "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }, {
+                    readonly title: "AndroidApp";
+                    readonly type: "object";
+                    readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                    readonly required: readonly ["kind", "packageName", "sha256CertFingerprints"];
+                    readonly properties: {
+                        readonly kind: {
+                            readonly const: "androidApp";
+                        };
+                        readonly packageName: {
+                            readonly type: "string";
+                            readonly minLength: 1;
+                            readonly pattern: "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$";
+                            readonly description: "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\").";
+                        };
+                        readonly sha256CertFingerprints: {
+                            readonly type: "array";
+                            readonly minItems: 1;
+                            readonly items: {
+                                readonly type: "string";
+                                readonly pattern: "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$";
+                            };
+                            readonly uniqueItems: true;
+                            readonly description: "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).";
+                        };
+                    };
+                }];
+            };
+            readonly SealedEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "SealedEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.";
+                readonly oneOf: readonly [{
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+                }, {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+                }, {
+                    readonly $ref: "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope";
+                }];
+            };
+            readonly TspMessageEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "TspMessageEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "message"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly envelope: {
+                        readonly const: "tspMessage";
+                    };
+                    readonly message: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly HpkeArmoredEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "HpkeArmoredEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "armored", "recipientKeyId"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly envelope: {
+                        readonly const: "hpkeArmored";
+                    };
+                    readonly armored: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.";
+                    };
+                    readonly recipientKeyId: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.";
+                    };
+                    readonly producerAssertion: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly enum: readonly ["didSigned", "attested", "pinnedOnly"];
+                        readonly default: "didSigned";
+                        readonly description: "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+            readonly DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope: {
+                readonly title: "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope";
+                readonly description: "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.";
+                readonly type: "object";
+                readonly additionalProperties: false;
+                readonly required: readonly ["envelope", "jwe"];
+                readonly properties: {
+                    readonly envelope: {
+                        readonly const: "didcommAuthcrypt";
+                    };
+                    readonly jwe: {
+                        readonly type: "string";
+                        readonly minLength: 1;
+                        readonly description: "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.";
+                    };
+                };
+            };
+        };
+    };
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=payload.d.ts.map