@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.8.2 → 0.10.0

package/src/vault/upsert/0.1/payload.ts

@@ -302,16 +302,976 @@ export const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.1#r
 /** Stable alias for this specification's success-response payload shape. */
 export type Response = VaultUpsertResponsePayload;
 
+/**
+ * This specification's payload schema, as a value.
+ *
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 item 2 is performed against this. It is shipped as data
+ * rather than only as a `.json` file because TypeScript types are erased
+ * at runtime: without a schema a consumer has nothing to validate, and
+ * every REQUIRED payload member is optional in practice. Cross-file
+ * `$ref`s are already inlined, so it needs no resolver.
+ */
+export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.1",
+  "title": "Vault Upsert — payload",
+  "description": "Create a new vault entry or update an existing one. The secret material — if present — rides inside a pluggable cipher envelope (see `vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope`), so the Trust Task carries ciphertext and an authenticator, not plaintext. Updates may be partial: any populated metadata field replaces the current value; omitted fields are left untouched; explicit null clears the field (per `clearFields`). Optimistic-concurrency check via `expectedVersion`.",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "contextId",
+    "targets",
+    "label",
+    "secretKind"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "id": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "description": "Entry id. Omit to create; supply to update. Maintainers MAY accept consumer-supplied ids on create (recommended: ULID) or MAY assign their own and return the assigned id in the response."
+    },
+    "expectedVersion": {
+      "type": "integer",
+      "minimum": 0,
+      "description": "When updating, the consumer's last-observed `version` for the entry. The maintainer rejects with `vault/upsert:version_conflict` if the current version differs. Omit on create."
+    },
+    "contextId": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "description": "Trust context the entry belongs to. Cannot be changed by upsert; to move an entry between contexts the consumer MUST delete and recreate."
+    },
+    "targets": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "minItems": 1,
+      "items": {
+        "$ref": "#/$defs/SiteTarget"
+      }
+    },
+    "label": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1
+    },
+    "secretKind": {
+      "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind"
+    },
+    "tags": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "minLength": 1,
+        "maxLength": 64
+      },
+      "uniqueItems": true
+    },
+    "notes": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "maxLength": 4096
+    },
+    "favicon": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "uri"
+    },
+    "selectors": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "minLength": 1
+      },
+      "uniqueItems": true
+    },
+    "customFieldNames": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "minLength": 1,
+        "maxLength": 128
+      },
+      "uniqueItems": true
+    },
+    "expiresAt": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "format": "date-time"
+    },
+    "sealedSecret": {
+      "$ref": "#/$defs/SealedEnvelope",
+      "description": "Pluggable cipher envelope (discriminated by `envelope`) whose cleartext is a JCS-canonical JSON conforming to `vault/_shared/0.1/vault-secret#/$defs/VaultSecret`. The supported envelope kinds are listed in the SealedEnvelope shared schema; M2A consumers reject any kind they don't implement with `vault/upsert:envelope_unsupported`. REQUIRED on create unless `secretKind` is `did-self-issued` or `didcomm-peer` (those carry only references to maintainer-internal key ids and have no extra secret bytes). On update, omit if the secret material is unchanged; populate if the secret is being rotated."
+    },
+    "clearFields": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "enum": [
+          "notes",
+          "favicon",
+          "expiresAt",
+          "tags",
+          "selectors",
+          "customFieldNames"
+        ]
+      },
+      "uniqueItems": true,
+      "description": "List of metadata fields to explicitly clear on this upsert. Distinguishes \"don't touch\" (field omitted from payload) from \"clear\" (field listed here)."
+    },
+    "ext": {
+      "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+    }
+  },
+  "$defs": {
+    "Response": {
+      "$anchor": "response",
+      "title": "Vault Upsert — response payload",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "entry"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "entry": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/VaultEntry"
+        },
+        "created": {
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "description": "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "Ext": {
+      "title": "Ext",
+      "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "minProperties": 1,
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "propertyNames": {
+        "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+      }
+    },
+    "VaultEntry": {
+      "title": "VaultEntry",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "contextId",
+        "targets",
+        "label",
+        "secretKind",
+        "createdAt",
+        "updatedAt",
+        "version"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality."
+        },
+        "contextId": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side."
+        },
+        "targets": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "minItems": 1,
+          "items": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/SiteTarget"
+          },
+          "description": "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level)."
+        },
+        "label": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not."
+        },
+        "secretKind": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind",
+          "description": "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind."
+        },
+        "tags": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "maxLength": 64
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "description": "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not."
+        },
+        "notes": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "maxLength": 4096,
+          "description": "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1."
+        },
+        "favicon": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "uri",
+          "description": "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline."
+        },
+        "selectors": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "description": "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side."
+        },
+        "customFieldNames": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "maxLength": 128
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "description": "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release."
+        },
+        "attachments": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/AttachmentRef"
+          },
+          "description": "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor."
+        },
+        "expiresAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning."
+        },
+        "breachedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach."
+        },
+        "passwordChangedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings."
+        },
+        "createdAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time"
+        },
+        "createdBy": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry."
+        },
+        "updatedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time"
+        },
+        "updatedBy": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry."
+        },
+        "lastUsedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer."
+        },
+        "version": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 0,
+          "description": "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync."
+        },
+        "principalDid": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`did-self-issued`, `didcomm-peer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauth-tokens`, `bearer-token`, `ssh-key`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "AttachmentRef": {
+      "title": "AttachmentRef",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "name",
+        "sizeBytes",
+        "sha256"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism."
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 256,
+          "description": "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\")."
+        },
+        "sizeBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 0,
+          "description": "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry."
+        },
+        "sha256": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+          "description": "Hex-encoded SHA-256 of the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption). Lets the consumer verify integrity after fetch."
+        },
+        "contentType": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\")."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "SecretKind": {
+      "title": "SecretKind",
+      "type": "string",
+      "enum": [
+        "password",
+        "passkey",
+        "oauth-tokens",
+        "did-self-issued",
+        "didcomm-peer",
+        "bearer-token",
+        "ssh-key",
+        "custom"
+      ],
+      "description": "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauth-tokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `did-self-issued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcomm-peer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearer-token` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `ssh-key` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation."
+    },
+    "SiteTarget": {
+      "title": "SiteTarget",
+      "description": "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.",
+      "oneOf": [
+        {
+          "title": "WebOrigin",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "origin"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "web-origin"
+            },
+            "origin": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "format": "uri",
+              "description": "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard."
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Did",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "did"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "did"
+            },
+            "did": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "description": "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry."
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "IosApp",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "bundleId"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "ios-app"
+            },
+            "bundleId": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$",
+              "description": "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration)."
+            },
+            "teamId": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "pattern": "^[A-Z0-9]+$",
+              "description": "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices."
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "AndroidApp",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "packageName",
+            "sha256CertFingerprints"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "android-app"
+            },
+            "packageName": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "pattern": "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$",
+              "description": "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\")."
+            },
+            "sha256CertFingerprints": {
+              "type": "array",
+              "minItems": 1,
+              "items": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "pattern": "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$"
+              },
+              "uniqueItems": true,
+              "description": "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing)."
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "SealedEnvelope": {
+      "title": "SealedEnvelope",
+      "description": "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.",
+      "oneOf": [
+        {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope"
+        },
+        {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope"
+        },
+        {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "TspMessageEnvelope": {
+      "title": "TspMessageEnvelope",
+      "description": "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tsp-message` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "envelope",
+        "message"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "envelope": {
+          "const": "tsp-message"
+        },
+        "message": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "HpkeArmoredEnvelope": {
+      "title": "HpkeArmoredEnvelope",
+      "description": "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`did-signed` / `attested` / `pinned-only`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "envelope",
+        "armored",
+        "recipientKeyId"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "envelope": {
+          "const": "hpke-armored"
+        },
+        "armored": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24."
+        },
+        "recipientKeyId": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key."
+        },
+        "producerAssertion": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "enum": [
+            "did-signed",
+            "attested",
+            "pinned-only"
+          ],
+          "default": "did-signed",
+          "description": "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `did-signed` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinned-only` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production)."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope": {
+      "title": "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope",
+      "description": "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "envelope",
+        "jwe"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "envelope": {
+          "const": "didcomm-authcrypt"
+        },
+        "jwe": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON."
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+} as const;
+
+/** As {@link PAYLOAD_SCHEMA}, for the success-response variant. */
+export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$ref": "#/$defs/Response",
+  "$defs": {
+    "Response": {
+      "$anchor": "response",
+      "title": "Vault Upsert — response payload",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "entry"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "entry": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/VaultEntry"
+        },
+        "created": {
+          "type": "boolean",
+          "description": "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "Ext": {
+      "title": "Ext",
+      "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "minProperties": 1,
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "propertyNames": {
+        "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+      }
+    },
+    "VaultEntry": {
+      "title": "VaultEntry",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "contextId",
+        "targets",
+        "label",
+        "secretKind",
+        "createdAt",
+        "updatedAt",
+        "version"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality."
+        },
+        "contextId": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side."
+        },
+        "targets": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "minItems": 1,
+          "items": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/SiteTarget"
+          },
+          "description": "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level)."
+        },
+        "label": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not."
+        },
+        "secretKind": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind",
+          "description": "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind."
+        },
+        "tags": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "maxLength": 64
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "description": "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not."
+        },
+        "notes": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "maxLength": 4096,
+          "description": "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1."
+        },
+        "favicon": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "uri",
+          "description": "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline."
+        },
+        "selectors": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "description": "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side."
+        },
+        "customFieldNames": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "maxLength": 128
+          },
+          "uniqueItems": true,
+          "description": "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release."
+        },
+        "attachments": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/AttachmentRef"
+          },
+          "description": "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor."
+        },
+        "expiresAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning."
+        },
+        "breachedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach."
+        },
+        "passwordChangedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings."
+        },
+        "createdAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time"
+        },
+        "createdBy": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry."
+        },
+        "updatedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time"
+        },
+        "updatedBy": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry."
+        },
+        "lastUsedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer."
+        },
+        "version": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 0,
+          "description": "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync."
+        },
+        "principalDid": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`did-self-issued`, `didcomm-peer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauth-tokens`, `bearer-token`, `ssh-key`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "AttachmentRef": {
+      "title": "AttachmentRef",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "name",
+        "sizeBytes",
+        "sha256"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism."
+        },
+        "name": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 256,
+          "description": "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\")."
+        },
+        "sizeBytes": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 0,
+          "description": "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry."
+        },
+        "sha256": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^[0-9a-f]{64}$",
+          "description": "Hex-encoded SHA-256 of the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption). Lets the consumer verify integrity after fetch."
+        },
+        "contentType": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\")."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "SecretKind": {
+      "title": "SecretKind",
+      "type": "string",
+      "enum": [
+        "password",
+        "passkey",
+        "oauth-tokens",
+        "did-self-issued",
+        "didcomm-peer",
+        "bearer-token",
+        "ssh-key",
+        "custom"
+      ],
+      "description": "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauth-tokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `did-self-issued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcomm-peer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearer-token` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `ssh-key` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation."
+    },
+    "SiteTarget": {
+      "title": "SiteTarget",
+      "description": "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.",
+      "oneOf": [
+        {
+          "title": "WebOrigin",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "origin"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "web-origin"
+            },
+            "origin": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "format": "uri",
+              "description": "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard."
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "Did",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "did"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "did"
+            },
+            "did": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "description": "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry."
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "IosApp",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "bundleId"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "ios-app"
+            },
+            "bundleId": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$",
+              "description": "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration)."
+            },
+            "teamId": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "pattern": "^[A-Z0-9]+$",
+              "description": "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices."
+            }
+          }
+        },
+        {
+          "title": "AndroidApp",
+          "type": "object",
+          "additionalProperties": false,
+          "required": [
+            "kind",
+            "packageName",
+            "sha256CertFingerprints"
+          ],
+          "properties": {
+            "kind": {
+              "const": "android-app"
+            },
+            "packageName": {
+              "type": "string",
+              "minLength": 1,
+              "pattern": "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$",
+              "description": "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\")."
+            },
+            "sha256CertFingerprints": {
+              "type": "array",
+              "minItems": 1,
+              "items": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "pattern": "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$"
+              },
+              "uniqueItems": true,
+              "description": "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing)."
+            }
+          }
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "SealedEnvelope": {
+      "title": "SealedEnvelope",
+      "description": "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.",
+      "oneOf": [
+        {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope"
+        },
+        {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope"
+        },
+        {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope"
+        }
+      ]
+    },
+    "TspMessageEnvelope": {
+      "title": "TspMessageEnvelope",
+      "description": "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tsp-message` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "envelope",
+        "message"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "envelope": {
+          "const": "tsp-message"
+        },
+        "message": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format"
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "HpkeArmoredEnvelope": {
+      "title": "HpkeArmoredEnvelope",
+      "description": "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`did-signed` / `attested` / `pinned-only`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "envelope",
+        "armored",
+        "recipientKeyId"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "envelope": {
+          "const": "hpke-armored"
+        },
+        "armored": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24."
+        },
+        "recipientKeyId": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key."
+        },
+        "producerAssertion": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "enum": [
+            "did-signed",
+            "attested",
+            "pinned-only"
+          ],
+          "default": "did-signed",
+          "description": "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `did-signed` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinned-only` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production)."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope": {
+      "title": "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope",
+      "description": "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "envelope",
+        "jwe"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "envelope": {
+          "const": "didcomm-authcrypt"
+        },
+        "jwe": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON."
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+} as const;
+
 /**
  * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
  * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
- * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone.
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone, and
+ * item 2 needs the schema this carries.
  */
 export const SPEC = {
   typeUri: TYPE_URI,
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: true,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;
 
 /**
@@ -324,4 +1284,5 @@ export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: true,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;